Opening for White according to Anand
1.e4

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Opening for White According to Anand 1.e4

Book IV

1.e4 d6 2.d4
1.e4 g6 2.d4

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Preface

Dear readers,

The fourth book of the series "Opening for White According to Anand 1.e4" is devoted to opening schemes, which arise after the moves 1.e4 d6, or 1.e4 g6. These positions are so diverse strategically and so rich tactically that they deserve a separate volume.

It is worth mentioning that contrary to some other openings, like for example the Ruy Lopez, the Sicilian Defence, the Petroff Defence, or the Caro – Kann Defence, these openings are not so popular in the top-class tournaments. World’s best players try those flank set-ups only very seldom. Gary Kasparov was very skeptical about his opponent’s opening choice, while commenting his brilliant win against Veselin Topalov in Wijk aan Zee 1999. Still, we must acknowledge for fairness sake that White did not have any serious advantage as a result of the opening in that game. The chess-world however, is not confined only to Wijk aan Zee and Linares, and it is essential to understand that flank openings are quite popular among chess players at lower levels.

We have to emphasize how special the situation with the flank openings is, by noting that plenty of systems, which have been analysed in our book, have not been even named yet. These systems have proved their right of existence, beyond any doubt, despite the numerous attempts to refute them once and for all. They are not called “Irregular Openings” anymore; nevertheless there is no consent about how they should properly be named. What are the specific features of those systems?

Black avoids early clashes that are so typical for openings in which he fights for the centre right from the beginning of the game. He prefers to narrow his “sphere of influence” to only three ranks and thus presents White with a powerful centre and extra space. Black usually tries first to complete his development and he fianchettoes his dark squared bishop most of the times. He begins active operations in the centre and on the queenside only later. We cannot define such approach as classical at all. As early as during the times of the hyper-modernists, when opening systems for White like icens-3-g3-g2 became popular, it was considered that White can experiment freely in the opening due to the advantage of having the first move. Similar experiments for Black have always been regarded as extremely dangerous and accordingly condemned. It was
only during the second half of the 20th century that thanks to the efforts of some non-conformists, and you are going to find their names mentioned quite often in this book, the flank systems were proved to be respectably vital. Black’s position is often similar to a coiled spring and his harmonious development enables him to attack often White’s powerful centre successfully. So, are really openings like 1.e4 d6 or 1.e4 g6 as good as the Ruy Lopez, or the Sicilian Defence? Well, yes, but maybe not quite...

We have discussed the pro and con arguments in the previous paragraph, while now we will mention the drawbacks of those systems. The classics as well as the leading contemporary grandmasters are quite right about the fact that White’s powerful centre and his extra space are important factors, which should provide him with an opening advantage. In order to sustain and increase his edge however, White must act: a) energetically and sometimes even very aggressively; b) with profound understanding of the possible strategical plans (his own and those of his opponent); c) with an extensive knowledge of concrete variations, which tend to be quite complex sometimes. In case White plays only natural developing moves – he might end up without any advantage whatsoever. We have included in our book some exact recommendations – about how to play effectively with White against the flank openings.

I would like to advise you to employ a scheme of development including additional control over the centre, with the help of the pawn-move f2-f4, against the majority of the flank systems. This move is very useful in the eventual attack against the black king and it supports White’s active actions in the centre with e4-e5. No doubt, these energetic actions by him should not be disregarded by Black and he must strive to obtain active counterplay in various ways. White’s extensive opening knowledge might come very handy under such circumstances. I have tried to sum up the theoretical achievements at the present moment and I have included plenty of new and original analyses in this book. I hope that these analyses, as well as the possible sharp developments in the flank systems, will focus the attention of the readers.

So, play chess actively and I wish you accomplished plenty of beautiful sacrifices and checkmating attacks! I hope I have done my best to give you a helping hand in doing that.

A.Khalifman
14th World Chess Champion
Part 1

1.e4 d6 2.d4

After 1.e4 d6 2.d4, Black’s most popular move is 2...\(\text{d}f6\), so we analyse in our chapter one the lines in which Black refrains from this move. Our chapter two is devoted to some other seldom played variations arising in case of 1.e4 d6 2.d4 \(\text{d}f6\) 3.\(\text{c}c6\).

The move 3...\(\text{b}d7\) is dealt with in Chapter 3. Black intends to prepare e7-e5, without losing the right to castle in the process, but White is thus enabled to play the aggressive move 4.g4!? creating considerable disharmony in Black’s future plans.

Naturally, the main line for Black on move three is 3...g6, and Part 3 will be devoted to it. The variation 3...\(\text{c}6\) with the idea to develop early the queen to a5, or to b6, will be analysed in Part 2. After 3...\(\text{c}6\) 4.\(\text{f}3\) the arising positions will be analysed in the book dealing with the opening 1.e4 \(\text{c}6\).

Some players, particularly when playing against not so experienced opponents, choose for Black the scheme beginning with the move 3...e7-e5, ignoring the eventual loss of castling rights. Grandmasters Azmai-parashvili, Vl.Georgiev, Gulko, Epishin and Malaniuk are among the most ardent adherents of that approach. The positions, which arise after the exchange of queens, require very precise play by White and we analyse them extensively and thoroughly in Chapters 4-6.
Chapter 1  1.e4 d6 2.d4

2...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d7

Black’s most often played move here is 2...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f6, and we are analysing it in our next chapters. Now we will deal with some seldom played moves, which do not transpose to other openings.

For example, in case of: 2...e5 3.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f3 – see 1...e5; 2...g6 3.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c3 – see 1...g6; 2...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c6 3.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f3 – see 1...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c6.

Black has also tried in practice here:

2...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d7?! 3.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c3 a6 (It is not any better for Black to play here: 3...g6 4.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)g7 5.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f3 e6 6.0-0 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e7 7.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e1 0-0 8.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e3\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) Gla-wischnig – Isola, Feffernitz 1998; or 3...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c8 4.f4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c6 5.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f3 g6 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e2 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)g7 7.0-0\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) Werner – Risch, Hassloch 1999.) 4.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c6 (or 4...e6 5.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f6 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e2 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e7 7.0-0\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) White enjoys a space advantage and his pieces are developed quite comfortably, so Black’s defence is extremely difficult; 4...b5 5.e5 b4, Jonasson – Egyed, Balaton 1996, 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c6 7.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c4 e6 8.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)g5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)b8 9.d5\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) White opens files in the centre in order to exploit his huge lead in development. His attacking chances are just excellent; 5.d5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)b8 (after 5...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e5 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)xe5 dxe5 7.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)h5 – White has a solid extra pawn) 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f6 (6...e5 7.dxe6 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)xe6 8.d4\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) 7.e5 dxe5 8.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)xe5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c8 9.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d4\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) White’s lead in development is enormous and his centralized pieces look quite impressive;

2...a6 3.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)c3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d7 (About 3...g6 – see 1...g6; after 3...e6 4.f4 the game might transpose either to the French Defence with a loss of a tempo for Black – d7-d6-d5, or to the Pirc Defence with the unnecessary move e6, while in case of 3...b5 4.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)b7 5.f4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f6 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e2\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\) White has a superior development as well as extra space.) 4.f4 e6 5.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)f3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)e7 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}\)d3 7.g6, Huang – Mejico, Singapore 2004. Black’s lag in development enables White to start some de-
 decisive actions immediately: 7...f5! exf5 (7...e7 8.fxe6 fxe6 9.Qg5 Qf6 10.e5++; 7...h4 8.fxe6 fxe6 9.0–0±) 8.exf5 e7 9...e2±, and Black is obviously beyond salvation;

2...c5 3.dxc5 (Of course, now after 3.Qf3 the game transposes into the Sicilian Defence.)

1) Here, in case of 3...dxc5
4.Qxd8+ Qxd8 5...c4, Black must defend a very unpleasant endgame, because after: 5...f6
6.Qc3 a6 7...e3 e5 8.0–0–0± Wiekert, – Olf, Germany 1991; as well as after: 5...e6 (It is even worse for Black to play here: 5...e6 6...xe6 fxe6 7.Qf3±, Leicher – Rutayisire, Istanbul 2000; or 5...c6 6...xf7 Qf6 7.Qc3 e6 8.Qg5 Qe7 9.Qh5±, and Black’s compensation for the pawn is quite insufficient, or 7...g6, Zippy – Ramin, internet 1993, 8.Qg5!±) 6.Qf4 Qc6 (6...a6 7.Qc3 b5 8...e2 Qd7 9.a4 b4 10.Qb1 Qg6 11.Qd2 Qb7 12.f3±) 7.Qc3 a6 8.0–0–0+ Qe8 9...a4±;

2) 3...Qa5+ 4.Qc3 Qxc5 (White maintains a stable advantage after: 4...dxc5 5.Qf4 Qc6, G.Diaz – R.Perez, Santa Marta 1999, 6.Qd2 e5 7.Qd5 Qxd2+ 8.Qxd2 Qd6 9.0–0–0±; it is not so stubborn for Black to defend here with: 7...d8 8.Qg5 f6 9.Qf3 Qe6 10.0–0–0±) 5.Qe3 Qa5 (Black cannot change much if he plays here: 5...Qb4 6.a3 Qa5 7.Qd5; 6...Qxb2? 7.Qb5 threatening Qd4 and Qc7) 6.Qd5 Qxd5 (after 6...d8 7.Qf3 Qf6 8.Qd2±, there arises a position from the Sicilian Defence with a couple of extra tempi for White.) 7.Qxd5 Qd8 8.0–0–0 Qf6, Kurajica – Cebalo, Zagreb 1993, 9.Qxf6 gxf6 10.f4±, Black’s pawn mass in the centre is quite immobile and contrary to the similar pawn-structure in the Rauzer variation of the Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5 2.Qf3 d6 3.d4 Qxd4 4.Qxd4 Qf6 5.Qc3 Qc6 6.Qg5 e6 7.Qd2 and here for example: 7...h6 8.Qxf6 gxf6), Black does not have the two-bishop advantage as a compensation;

2...f5 3.Qc3 Qf6 (About 3...fxe4 4.Qxe4 Qf6 5.Qd3 – see 3...Qf6; while after 3...g6, the best line for White in order to emphasize the drawbacks of Black’s position is: 4.exf5 Qxf5 5.Qd3! – Black has a gaping weakness on the e6-square – therefore White should better exchange the light squared bishops 5...Qd7 (Should Black retreat his bishop, White can follow with 6.h4–+) 6.Qf3 Qg7 7.0–0 Qf6 8.Qe1 0–0 (or 8...Qc6 9.d5 Qb4 10.Qxf5 Qxf5 11.Qd4±) 9.Qxf5 Qxf5 10.Qxe7± Gonzalez

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and here Black has tested two different plans in practice: (About 4...\(\text{d}c6\) 5.\(\text{f}3\) – see 1.e4 \(\text{c}6\) 2.\(\text{f}3\) d6 3.d4 f5 4.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 5.\(\text{d}3\):)

1) 4...e6 5.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 6.0–0 0–0 7.ef ef 8.\(\text{xe}1\) d5 (after 8...\(\text{c}6\) 9.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 10.\(\text{xe}5\) dxe5 11.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{f}6\); 9...\(\text{b}4\) 10.\(\text{c}4\), Black’s e6-square has been weakened catastrophically and his knight on b4 is out of action.) 9.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{h}8\) (It is possibly more stubborn for Black to play: 10...\(\text{e}4\) 11.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 12.\(\text{e}5\) c5 13.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 14.bxc3 c4 15.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{f}2\), but even then White remains with an extra pawn, a powerful knight and domination along the e-file.) 11.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}4\) 12.\(\text{xc}6\) bxc6 13.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 14.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{f}5\) Jurkovic – Reig, Spain 1995. White’s centralized knight is much stronger than Black’s bishop on c8; moreover Black’s queenside pawns are weak as well as his dark squares;

2) 4...f5 5.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) (It is hardly better for Black to try:

5...\(\text{g}6\) 6.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{bd}7\) 7.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{b}6\) 8.\(\text{h}5\) – Schuster – Erler, Germany 1991.) 6.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 7.\(\text{h}4\) d5 (White can counter 7...\(\text{c}6\), Fyllingen – Ferkingsd, Gausdal 1999, with the simple move 8.c3, and then for example: 8...d5 9.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}6\) 10.h5 \(\text{f}5\) 11.\(\text{hxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 12.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 13.\(\text{f}3\)\(\text{f}3\), and White has a clear advantage, because of Black’s weak e7 and h7-pawns.) 8.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}6\) (8...\(\text{d}7\) 9.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{e}6\) 10.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{g}7\) 11.\(\text{c}3\)\(\text{c}3\) Timoschenko – Kusterle, Portoroz 1997; 8...\(\text{d}6\) 9.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{f}5\) 10.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{g}8\) 11.\(\text{hxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 12.\(\text{f}4\)\(\text{f}4\) Ser- gienko – Kopisch, Matra 1993; 8...e5 9.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{h}5\) – Fyllingen – Holder, Bergen 1999) 9.\(\text{g}8\) 10.\(\text{hxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 11.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}4\) 12.\(\text{f}4\) c6 13.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xd}3\) 14.\(\text{xd}3\)\(\text{xd}3\) Malaniuk – R.Lopes, Oviedo 1993. White’s position is superior. He dominates on the h-file, his development is clearly better and additionally Black’s e7 and g6-pawns are weak;

3.\(\text{f}3\)

We will now analyse in details: a) 3...\(\text{c}6\) and b) 3...\(\text{g}6\).

In case of 3...e5 4.\(\text{c}4\) – see Chapter 3, Book 1; about 3...\(\text{c}5\)
4.\text{c}c3 – see 1.e4 c5 2.\text{c}f3 d6.

In answer to 3...e6, White should fortify his centre with 4.c3, after 4...\text{e}e7 (4...g6 5.\text{c}c4 \text{g}g7 6.0–0 \text{e}e7 7.\text{e}e1, transposes to line b1) 5.\text{d}d3 \text{b}6 6.0–0 \text{b}7 7.\text{d}bd2\pm, and White has a slight, but stable advantage, because of his solid pawn-centre; moreover Black is doomed to remain passive.

After 3...\text{b}6 4.\text{d}d3 \text{b}7, Losi - Pieraccini, Siena 2000, White follows with: 5.\text{bd}2! e6 (It is too bad for Black to play 5...\text{gf}6 6.e5 \text{d}d5 7.\text{e}e4\pm) 6.0–0 \text{g}6 7.\text{e}e1 \text{g}7 8.\text{f}f1 \text{e}7 9.\text{g}3 0–0 10.\text{c}3\pm, because White’s powerful pawn-centre provides a stable pressure for him throughout the middle game, since Black lacks any active counterplay;

After 3...\text{gf}6 4.e5 \text{d}5 5.c4 – the game transposes to a very dubious for Black variation of the Alekhine Defence – see 1.e4 \text{f}f6 2.e5 \text{d}d5 3.d4 d6 4.\text{f}f3 \text{d}7?! 5.c4.

a) 3...c6 4.\text{c}c4

\text{\centerline{\includegraphics{diagram.png}}} 4...\text{gf}6

About 4...e5 5.0–0 – see Book 1, Chapter 3.

We have to analyse here some other possibilities for Black as well:

After 4...b5 5.\text{d}d3 \text{b}7 6.\text{f}4 a6 7.c3 c5 8.\text{bd}2 \text{c}7 9.e5\pm, White enjoys a huge advantage in space and development, T.Petrosian – Kasparian, Erevan 1946;

In case of 4...e6 5.\text{c}c3 d5 6.\text{d}d3 \text{b}4 7.0–0 a6 8.\text{e}2\pm Thiel – Bueyuekoezkaya, Berlin 1993, there arises a pawn-structure that is quite typical for the French Defence, in which Black has already played some strange and unnecessary moves like a6, c6 and \text{d}7;

4...\text{b}6, Kapischka – Eskandyary, Germany 2000, 5.\text{d}3 \text{g}4 (5...d5 6.\text{c}3 \text{g}4 7.h3 \text{xf}3 8.\text{xf}3 e6 9.e5\pm) 6.h3 \text{h}5 7.0–0\pm, and White’s advantage in development is quite impressive;

4...\text{d}f6?! Krassontovitsch – Beyer, Recklinghausen 2001, after 5.e5 \text{d}5 6.0–0\pm, it will be rather difficult for Black to develop his kingside;

4...h6?! 5.0–0 \text{b}6, Kastner – Eskandyary, Germany 2002 (Black would not fare any better after the other possibilities too: 5...\text{c}7, Lima Neto – Sales, Brazil 1999, in case of 6.\text{e}2 e5 7.d1 \text{gf}6 8.a4\pm, there arises a position from the Philidor Defence with the inclusion of the unnecessary premature move h6; or 5...e6, Andreassen – Ol- dernes, Vadso 1994, after 6.\text{e}2
\( \mathcal{Q}g6 7. \mathcal{Q}c3 \mathcal{Q}e7 8. \mathcal{Q}f4 \pm, \) White’s development is superior and he controls the centre unopposed.

6. \( \mathcal{Q}d3 \mathcal{Q}c7 7. \mathcal{Q}f4 e6 8.c4 \pm, \) White has a huge space advantage and excellent development;

4...d5 5.exd5 \( \mathcal{Q}b6 6. \mathcal{Q}d3 \mathcal{Q}xd5 \)
(6...cxd5 7. \( \mathcal{Q}e5 \mathcal{Q}f6, \) Iglesias Fernandez – Sanchez Castro, Zaragoza 2003, after 8.0–0\( \pm, \) White’s lead in development is impressive; 6...\( \mathcal{Q}xd5 7.0–0 \mathcal{Q}g4 \)
8.\( \mathcal{Q}bd2 \mathcal{Q}f6 9.h3 \mathcal{Q}h5 10.b3 e6 \)
11.\( \mathcal{Q}b2 \mathcal{Q}e7 – \) Kobalija – Burbakin, St. Petersburg 1997,
12.c4 \( \mathcal{Q}a5 13.a3 \pm, \) White has a slight, but stable edge, because of his space advantage.) 7.\( \mathcal{Q}e5 \)
\( \mathcal{Q}gf6 (7...g6 8.\mathcal{Q}d2 \pm, \) Istratescu – Shirazi, Elancourt.) 8.0–0 g6
9.\( \mathcal{Q}e1 \mathcal{Q}g7 10.c3 \pm, \) and once again White’s position is superior, because of his domination along the e-file and his extra space, Zhu Chen – Bosboom Lanchava, Groningen – Bosboom Lanchava, Groningen 1999;

5.e5 \( \mathcal{Q}d5 \)


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White has here at his disposal a typical pawn-sacrifice with the idea to disrupt Black’s development:

6.e6! fxe6 7.0–0 g6

After 7...\( \mathcal{Q}b6 8.\mathcal{Q}d3 g6 9.\)
\( \mathcal{Q}g5 \mathcal{Q}f6 10.\mathcal{Q}e2 \pm, \) White regains his pawn and preserves an excellent coordination of his pieces.

8.\( \mathcal{Q}g5 \mathcal{Q}e5 \)

After Black’s other possibilities: 8...\( \mathcal{Q}b6 9.\mathcal{Q}d3, \) or 8...\( \mathcal{Q}f6 9.\mathcal{Q}e1 \pm, \) White regains his pawn and preserves his space advantage.

9.\( \mathcal{Q}e6 \mathcal{Q}a5 \)

It is possibly better for Black to try here: 9...\( \mathcal{Q}b6 10.dxe5 \mathcal{Q}xe5 11.\mathcal{Q}xd5 cxd5 12.\mathcal{Q}xd5 \mathcal{Q}xe6 13.\)
\( \mathcal{Q}xe6 \pm, \) although even after that, White has a comfortable game attacking Black’s hanging pawns in the centre.

10.\( \mathcal{Q}d2 \mathcal{Q}b6 11.\mathcal{Q}c3 \mathcal{Q}xc3 12.\mathcal{Q}xc3 d5 13.a4 a5 14.\mathcal{Q}e2 e4 \)
15.\( \mathcal{Q}a3 \pm. \)

White’s has a great lead in development and he can open files in the centre with the help of the move f2–f3. His attack against the black king, stranded in the centre, will probably be quite effective then.

b) 3.g6 4.\( \mathcal{Q}c4 \)
We will analyse now: b1) 4...e6 and b2) 4...\&b6.

Black has tried sometimes 4...\&g7 too. After 5...xf7! though, he should better resign...

b1) 4...e6 5.0-0 \&g7

The line 5...\&c7 6.\&e1 leads only to a transposition of moves, while after 5...\&gf6 6.e5 \&d5 7.\&g5+, Black’s lag in development is considerable and his dark squares are quite vulnerable.

6.\&e1 \&c7 7.c3 0-0

After 7...b6, as it was played in the game De la Riva Aguado – Krasenkov, Pamplona 1998, we have a transposition to the main line: 8.\&bd2 0-0 9.\&b3 \&b7 10.\&f1.\&

White is clearly better after: 7...\&b6 8.\&b3 d5, Huelsewig – Swemers, Siegburg 1997, if he continues with: 9.\&bd2 0-0 10.e5 c5 11.\&f1, followed by \&g3, and a straightforward and effective play along the dark squares after the exchange of the dark-squared bishops.

In case of 7...a6, as in the game Vallifuoco – Werner, Gaeta 1988, White deployed his pieces in the same fashion as in the main line and he had an extra tempo to develop his initiative after: 8.\&b3 b6 9.\&bd2 \&b7 10.\&f1 0-0 11.\&g3 c5 12.\&f4.\&

8.\&b3 b6
9...h6 9.\&bd2 b6, Rabiega – Hickl, Zillertal 1993, 10.\&f1 \&b7 11.\&g3.\&

9.\&bd2 \&b7

10.\&f1

White has a clear plan of piece deployment, which contains the possible activity of Black’s pieces.

10...c5

Black’s difficulties are considerable in case he tries some active actions in the centre – 10...e5 11.\&g3 exd4? 12.cxd4 d5 13.\&g5 f6 14.\&f4, since White is clearly better prepared for the eventual opening of files in the centre.

In answer to 10...h6 11.\&g3
\( \text{h7}, \) Mehler – Braun, Germany 1990, White can counter that with the development of a powerful initiative on the kingside after: 12.h4 c5 13.h5\( \uparrow \).

11.\( \text{g}3 \text{ cxd4} \)
White’s chances are preferable after: 11...\( \text{c7} \) 12.\( \text{g}5 \text{ a}8 \) 13.\( \text{d}2 \) c4 14.\( \text{c}2 \) f6 15.\( \text{h}6 \), Corral Blanco – Glavina, Sanxenxo 2004, he has a space advantage and active possibilities on the kingside with h4, as well as in the centre with dxe5, followed by occupation of the d-file.

12.\( \text{cxd4 e5} \) 13.\( \text{e}3 \text{ c8} \)
It is not good for Black to play 13...d5? , because after: 14.exd5 \( \text{xd}5 \) 15.\( \text{g}5 \) f6 16.dxe5 \( \text{c}5 \) 17.exf6 \( \text{xf6} \) 18.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 19.\( \text{c}4 \), White remains with an extra pawn and a superior piece placement, while Black’s king is quite vulnerable.

14.\( \text{d}2 \text{ exd4} \)
Black cannot avoid the danger with the line: 14...\( \text{e}8 \) 15.\( \text{ad}1 \) c7 16.\( \text{h}6 \) h8?! 17.\( \text{g}5 \) d5 18.dxe5\( \pm \).

15.\( \text{h}6! \)
White needs to exchange the dark-squared bishops in order to exploit the weakness of the dark squares. 15...\( \text{e}5 \) (after 15...\( \text{xh}6 \) 16.\( \text{xh}6 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 17.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 18.f4\( \rightarrow \), White is threatening not only 19.e5, but 19.f5 as well, followed by opening of the f-file.) 16.\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{xf}3 \) (Black’s defence is quite problematic after: 16...\( \text{xf}7 \) 17.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 18.\( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 19.\( \text{g}5 \), since the dark squares around his king are vulnerable.) 17.\( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{xf}7 \) 18.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 19.\( \text{ad}1 \) \( \pm \) Iordachescu – Minasian, Linares, 2000. White wins Black’s d6-pawn and he is ready to attack the enemy king, after the exchange of queens, with the help of the pawn-break f3-f4-f5.

b2) 4...\( \text{db}6 \)

5.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \)
After 5...e6 6.0–0 \( \text{f}6 \) 7.\( \text{e}2 \), White is ready to open the central files with e4-e5, From – Weber, Wildbad 1993.

6.0–0 \( \text{c}6 \)
In case of 6...\( \text{d}7 \) 7.c3 c5 8.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{xd}4 \), Agababean – Frank, Mondorf 1991, White should play: 9.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 10.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{c}4 \) 11.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 12.\( \text{c}2 \), and he
1.e4 d6 2.d4

maintains his powerful pawn centre and better development.

It is hardly better for Black to try: 6...e5 7.e2 d5 (7...0-0 8.h3 Qf6 9.e3 e5 10.dxe5 dxe5 11.Bd2 c6 12.Bd1 c5, because the domination on the d-file and the lead in development provide White with a long-term stable advantage, Kononenko – Blinkov, Smolensk 2001.) 8.Bbd2 c6 9.Bc1 e6 10.e5 Qf6 11.g5 h6 12.Bd3 Qe7 13.c3 Qf8 14.a4± Dizdar – Pandurevic, Tucepi 1996.

7.a4 a5 8.Bc3 Qf6

Black’s defence is considerably more complex after: 8...d5 9.Be1 Qf6 10.e5±.

8...Qc7 9.e5! dxe5 (It is not any better for Black to follow with: 9...d5 10.h3! Qd7 – or 10...Qf5 11.Qe2!± – 11.Bc1 h6 12.Bc2 e6 13.Qf4 Qe7 14.Qd3±, and he can hardly find any reasonable plan, Rogers – Mas, Sydney 1999. It is evidently premature for Black to be too active with: 12.g5?! 13.Qg3 g4 14.hxg4 hxg4 15.Qd3 e6 16.Qh2 h5 17.f3 h4 18.Qxg4 hxg3 19.Qf4±) 10.Qxe5 Qxe5 (10...e6 11.Qf4±) 11.dxe5 Qxe5 (after 11...Qe6 12.Qxe6 fxe6 13.Qe1±, Black’s development on the kingside has been seriously hampered) 12.Be1 Qg7 (Black loses after 12...Qc7 13.Qd4 f6 14.Qf4++) 13.Qe4±. White has more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn with his powerful bishop pair and his lead in development.

9.e5 dxe5

White’s advantage is only slight, but quite stable after: 9...Qfd5 10.exd6 Qxd6 11.Qe4±, because of his extra space and the domination on the e-file.

10.dxe5 Qfd5

It is even worse for Black to follow here with: 10...Qxd1 11.Qxd1 Qg4 12.Qf4±.

11.Qe4 Qg4

12.h3! Qxf3 13.Qxf3 Qxe5 (Black would not fare any better after: 13...Qc7 14.e6!±) 14.Qh6!±. White has an excellent compensation for the pawn, because of his active possibilities against the enemy king stranded in the centre. It would be too dangerous for Black to capture now another pawn with: 14...Qxb2? 15.Qd1! Qb8 16.c4 Qf6 17.Qg7 Qg4 18.Qd6±.
Chapter 2

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ♜f6 3.♕c3

We will analyse here: a) 3...♕g4, b) 3...e6 and c) 3...a6.

About 3...♕bd7 – see the next chapter, the move 3...e5 will be dealt with in chapters 4-5, the possibility 3...c6 – will be analysed in the second part of our book, while the main line 3...g6 – in the third part of the book. As for the line: 3...♕c6 4.♕f3 – see 1...♕c6.

Black’s position is very bad after: 3...c5 4.dxc5 dxc5 (Black is just lost after: 4...♕a5 5.cxd6 ♜xe4 6.♕d5++ Hector – Milan, Linares 1987) 5.♕xd8+ ♜xd8 6.♕f4 ♜c6 7.0–0–0+ ♜d7 8.♕f3±. White’s pawn-structure is superior, he dominates on the only open file and he enjoys a space advantage.

a) 3...♕g4 4.f3 ♜h5

After 4...♕d7 5.f4±, it is quite unclear why Black has developed his bishop on the d7-square. It only hinders his natural development and piece coordination there.

5.♕e3 e6

White has a great lead in development and a huge space advantage after: 5...♕bd7, Simeoni – Orefice, Cecchina 1997, 6.g4 ♜g6 7.g5 ♜g8 8.f4 e6 9.d5 ♜e7 (9...h6 10.dxe6 fxe6 11.♗g4±) 10.dxe6 fxe6 11.♗f3±.

6.♗d2 ♜c6

Black’s lag in development becomes quite considerable after: 6...d5 7.g4 ♜g6 8.g5 ♜g8 (8...♕h5 9.0–0–0±) 9.0–0–0 c6 10.h4 h5 11.gxh6 ♜xh6 12.♗g2 ♜d7 13.♕d3 ♜b6 14.♕h3± Lopez Mateo – Carbonell Boffin, Spain 1993.

It is hardly better for Black to try: 6...c6 7.h4 h6 (7...♕g6 8.g4 h5 9.g5 ♜fd7 10.♗ge2±) 8.♕h3 ♜g6 9.♕f4 ♜h7 10.g4±, because the enormous lead in development of White and his total control of the centre make Black’s

7.d5 exd5
Or 7...\textit{\$}e5 8.g4 \textit{\$}g6 9.h4\textpm.
8.exd5 \textit{\$}e5 9.0–0 c6 10.g4 \textit{\$}g6 11.dxc6 bxc6
It is not preferable for Black to try here: 11...\textit{\$}xc6 12.g5 \textit{\$}d7 13.h4\textpm.

12.g5! \textit{\$}g8 (Black loses immediately after the other possible retreats of the knight:
12...\textit{\$}h5 13.f4 \textit{\$}d7 14.\textit{\$}e2 \textit{\$}a5 15.\textit{\$}f3+-, or 12...\textit{\$}fd7 13.f4 \textit{\$}g4
14.\textit{\$}d4+-) 13.f4 \textit{\$}d7 14.\textit{\$}e1 \textit{\$}e7 15.\textit{\$}f3\textpm. Black has great problems to complete his development successfully.

b) 3...e6 4.f4

The endgame would be very unpleasant for Black after: 4...c5 5.dxc5 dxc5 6.\textit{\$}xd8+ \textit{\$}xd8 7.\textit{\$}d3 \textit{\$}c6 8.\textit{\$}e3\textpm Sebastianiuk – Jagielski, Krynica 1994. White’s development is superior and he dominates on the d-file.

His advantage is quite clear too after: 4...e5 5.dxe5 \textit{\$}g4, Bertolini – Menato, Ischia 1997. Now, the simplest line for White would be: 6.\textit{\$}f3 \textit{\$}xf3 7.\textit{\$}xf3 dxe5 8.fxe5 \textit{\$}fd7 9.\textit{\$}f4\textpm.

After 4...d5 5.e5 \textit{\$}e4 6.\textit{\$}xe4 dxe4 7.c3 \textit{\$}c6, McCafferty – Barragan, Dos Hermanas 2003, Black’s defence is difficult: 8.\textit{\$}h3! \textit{\$}d5 9.\textit{\$}h5 \textit{\$}d8 (It would not help much if Black tries:
9...\textit{\$}xd4 10.cxd4 \textit{\$}b4+ 11.\textit{\$}d2 \textit{\$}xd2 12.\textit{\$}xd2 \textit{\$}xd4 13.\textit{\$}c2+-) 10.g3 c5 11.dxc5 \textit{\$}xc5 12.\textit{\$}g2
\textit{\$}d3 (12...\textit{\$}c4 13.\textit{\$}g5\textpm) 13.\textit{\$}g5\textpm, and White wins a pawn.

Black has also tested in practice:

4...c6 5.\textit{\$}f3 \textit{\$}e7, Klovans – Schiner, Werfen 1992. After 6.\textit{\$}d3 0–0 7.\textit{\$}e2\textpm, White preserves a powerful centre and better development;

4...\textit{\$}bd7 5.\textit{\$}f3 \textit{\$}e7 (5...c5 6.\textit{\$}e3 \textit{\$}g4 7.\textit{\$}g1 \textit{\$}e7 8.\textit{\$}d2\textpm Perez Cadenas – Rodriguez Codes, Pasao 1997) 6.e5 dxe5 7.dxe5 \textit{\$}g8 8.\textit{\$}e4 \textit{\$}h6 9.\textit{\$}e3 \textit{\$}f5 10.\textit{\$}f2 b6 11.\textit{\$}d3 \textit{\$}b7 12.\textit{\$}e2\textpm Paz – Belitz, Dos Hermanas 2003. White dominates on the d-file and in the centre and his development is admirable;

4...\textit{\$}fd7 5.\textit{\$}f3 \textit{\$}e7 6.\textit{\$}d3 c5,
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Palas – Riha, Klatovy 1999. After 7.d5 exd5 (7...0–0 8.0–0±) 8.Qxd5, White’s advantage is obvious;

4...Cc6 5.Qf3 d5 (It is worse for Black to play 5...Qd7 6.Qd3 Qe7 7.0–0 0–0 0 8.d5±, and White enjoys a huge lead in development and good attacking prospects, Schimmer – Leistner, Frankfurt 2002) 6.e5 Qe4 7.
Qd3xb4 (in case of 7...Qxc3 8.bxc3 Qe7 9.0–0 0–0 10.Qg5!, White has excellent attacking chances, for example: 10...h6
11.Qh7 Qe8 12.Qh5±) 8.Qd2 Qxd2 9.Qxd2±. White remains with a slight, but stable advantage due to his extra space; moreover Black will have difficulties to prepare c7–c5.

5.Qf3 0–0

The strange move 5...a6?! was tried by Black in the game Kulashko – Saksena, Auckland 2000. After 6.Qd3 Qc6 7.0–0 0–0
8.e5 Qd5 9.Qxd5 exd5 10.f5, White had excellent attacking chances.

5...c5, Christoff – Dengler, Gluecksburg 1988, leads to a difficult endgame for Black: 6.dxc5 dxc5 7.Qxd8+ Qxd8 8.e5 Qd5

5...d5 6.e5 Qfd7, Ruiz Jimenez – Gallego Vaquero, Malaga 2001. The line: 7.Qe3.c5 8.Qd2±, transposes to the French Defence except that White has already an extra tempo.

5...Qd7?! 6.Qd3 c5, Beharry – Butt, Thessaloniki 1984. After 7.dxc5 dxc5 8.Qe5 Qc6 9.Qe3
0–0 10.Qxd7 Qxd7 11.0–0±, White remains with the two-bishop advantage;

5...b6 6.Qd3 Qb7 7.Qe2 Qbd7 8.0–0±, and White had a better development and a space advantage in the game Arsenault – Laurin, Hull 1997.

6.Qd3 c5

The other possibilities are not so good for Black either:

6...b6 7.Qe2 Qb7 8.Qd2± Kankainen – Kaunonen, Finland 1997;

6...Qe8 7.e5 dxe5 8.Qxe5 Qfd7, Garcia Miracle – Garcia Blazquez, Sant Boi 1997, 9.0–0±;

6...h6, Polo – Barrios, Barranquilla 1999, 7.Qe2 Qc6 8.e5 Qd5
(8...Qd7 9.a3±) 9.Qxd5 exd5 10.c3±;

6...Qbd7 7.e5 Qe8 (7...Qd5 8.Qxd5 exd5 9.0–0±) 8.0–0± J.Nielsen – Jacobsen, Copenhagen 2000;

6...d5 7.e5 Qfd7, Summers – Williams, Cardiff 1995, after 8.h4! h6 (8...c5 9.Qxh7++) 9.f5±, White can organize a dangerous attack;

7.dxc5 dxc5

It is worse for Black to play: 7...d5 8.e5 Qfd7 9.Qe3 a5 10.

h4! g6 (10...h6 11.Qe2 Qxc5 12. 0–0–0±) 11.h5→ Palos – Bidwell, Washington 1998.

8.0–0 Qb6

This is an attempt by Black to solve his strategic problems by tactical means.

9.Qa4 Qc6

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10.c4 \(\text{d}8\), Kallio – Halldorsson, Korr 1992, 11.e5 \(\text{g}4\) 12. \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 14.\(\text{e}2\)\+. Black’s position is quite unpleasant, because his pieces are cramped and not well coordinated.

c) 3...a6 4.f4

4...e6

About 4...g6 5.\(\text{f}3\) – see chapter 13, 1...d6 2.d4 \(\text{f}6\) 3.\(\text{c}3\) g6 4.f4 a6 5.\(\text{f}3\).

It is too bad for Black to play here: 4...c5?! 5.dxc5 \(\text{a}5\)! (after 5...dxc5 6.\(\text{x}d8\) \(\text{x}d8\) 7.e5 Black has to defend a difficult endgame) 6.cxd6 exd6 (or 6.\(\text{x}e4\) 7.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 8.\(\text{b}5\)+ axb5 9.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{a}6\) 10.\(\text{x}b5\) \(\text{x}b5\) 11.\(\text{x}b5\)+) 7.\(\text{d}3\)+, and White remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Afek – Basman, London 1979.

The move 4...b5?! enables White to start some decisive actions immediately: 5.e5 dxe5 (White remains with an extra pawn and better development after: 5...b4 6.exf6 bxc3 7.\(\text{f}xg7\) \(\text{g}xg7\) 8.\(\text{bxc3}\) c5 9.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 10.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{a}4\) 11.\(\text{xc5}\) dxc5 12.\(\text{d}3\)+ Solberg – Bae, Oslo 2005.) 6.\(\text{f}xe5\) \(\text{d}5\) 7.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 8.\(\text{d}3\) e6 9.\(\text{g}e2\)+ Olsson – Gustafsson, Stockholm 1993.

In case of 4...d5 5.e5 \(\text{g}8\) 6.\(\text{d}3\) g6 7.\(\text{f}3\)+, White had a powerful centre and a huge lead in development in the game Shamugia – Startsev, Togliatti 2001.

4...\(\text{c}6\) 5.d5 \(\text{a}7\)! (after 5...\(\text{b}8\) 6.\(\text{f}3\), White has a noticeable space advantage and an evidently better piece development) 6.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 7.e5+ Villing – Rohrbacher, Karlsruhe 2003.

The move 4...\(\text{g}4\)! – only helps White’s development. 5.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xe}2\) 6.\(\text{xe}2\) e6 (after Black’s other possibilities White’s lead in development is even greater: 6...c6 7.\(\text{f}3\) e6 8.0–0 \(\text{e}7\) 9.e5 \(\text{f}d7\) 10.\(\text{exd6}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 11.\(\text{f}5\)+ F.Fluvia – Sole Rojals, Sant Cebria 1998; or 6.\(\text{x}e4\) 7.\(\text{f}3\) e5 8.\(\text{xe5}\) dxe5 9.\(\text{xe5}\) \(\text{g}4\) 10.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 11.h3+; 9.\(\text{d}7\) 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 11.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{xe7}\) 12.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 13.0–0–0–0; it is the best for Black to play here: 7...\(\text{d}7\), Martos Martin – Ciurana Roig, Barcelona 1997, but even then after: 8.d5 \(\text{cb8}\) 9.\(\text{e}3\)+, all of his pieces remain on
their initial squares) 7.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\) 
8.0–0 0–0 9.\(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{h}1\) \(\text{c}5\) 10.\(\text{dxc}5\) \(\text{dxc}5\) 11.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}1\) \(\text{\textgreek{c}}\text{c}7\) 12.e5 \(\text{\textgreek{f}}\text{fd}7\) 13.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}3\) 
\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{c}6\) 14.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}4\)±, and Black’s de-
fence will be rather difficult, because his bishop is bad and his 
position is cramped. Torres – Jaramillo, Cali 2002.

5.\(\text{\textgreek{f}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{b}}\text{bd}7\)

After 5...\(\text{b}5\) 6.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{b}}\text{b}7\), Weid-
mann – Schmitz, Nickenich 1998, White could have started 
active actions in the centre with: 7.e5 \(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}5\) 8.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{xd}5\) \(\text{\textgreek{x}}\text{xd}5\) 9.0–0±, and he would have had a 
development and a powerful centre.

5...\(\text{d}5\), Smistik – El Kher, 
Rimavska Sobota 1992, trans-
poses to the French Defence with 
an extra tempo for White after: 
6.e5 \(\text{\textgreek{f}}\text{fd}7\) 7.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}3\)±.

There occurred a transposition 
to the Sicilian Defence with 
several extra tempi for White 
after: 5...\(\text{c}5\) 6.\(\text{dxc}5\) \(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{a}5\) (The 
endgame is very difficult for 
Black after: 6...\(\text{dxc}5\) 7.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{xd}8\) 
\(\text{\textgreek{x}}\text{xd}8\) 8.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}3\)±.) 7.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}3\) 
\(\text{\textgreek{xc}}\text{c}5\) 8. \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}2\) \(\text{\textgreek{b}}\text{bd}7\) 9.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{c}}\text{c}7\) 10.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}4\) 
\(\text{\textgreek{c}}\text{c}5\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\) 12.\(\text{g}4\)± Bartel 
– Cicak, Cork 2005;

6.e5 \(\text{\textgreek{g}}\text{g}4\)

In case of 6...\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}5\) 7.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{xd}5\) 
exd5 8.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\) (8...\(\text{c}5\) 9.\(\text{\textgreek{g}}\text{g}5\)±) 
9.0–0±, White ends up with a 
development and a pow-
erful centre.

7.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{h}6\) 8.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\)

9.0–0± Bittner – Velenderic, 
Bergen Enkheim 1997. White 
has a huge lead in development, 
a definite space advantage and 
a clear plan for the development 
of a kingside initiative after 
10.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}4\). Black tried in the game 
to counter all that with the move: 
9...\(\text{d}5\), but after 10.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}2\) there 
arose a pawn-structure, 
which was typical for the French 
Defence. White maintained a 
great space advantage; moreover 
Black’s pieces remained a sorry 
sight.

Conclusion for Chapters 1 and 2

All of the rarely played lines, that we have analysed in these 
chapters, transpose practically to some other openings. Black usually loses 
one or two tempi in the process, or he plays some unnecessary moves 
like \(\text{h}7\)-\(\text{h}6\), and all that makes his task to equalize extremely diffi-
cult. It is far from easy for White to obtain a great advantage al-
ways, but even when his edge is not so impressive – it is stable and 
long-lasting – throughout the game.
Black is thus preparing the move e7-e5, avoiding the endgame arising after: 3...e5 4.dxe5 dxe5 5.\textit{\texttt{\textdollar}}xd8. On the other hand, he must now comply with another danger, because White can start immediate active actions on the kingside with the move g2-g4. Black’s knight, which has been already developed to f6, might come soon under attack and he must lose time to either parry the threat g4-g5, or to retreat with the knight.

\textbf{4.g4!?}

That is White’s most aggressive and most principled line in that position. He exploits the opportune moment to attack immediately on the kingside. Later, depending on his opponent’s reaction, he can choose between \texttt{\textdagger}e3, \texttt{\textdollar}d2 followed by castling long, or an “enlarged fianchetto” h3, \texttt{\textdagger}g2 and \texttt{\textdagger}ge2, castling short and then his king’s knight will be deployed to the wonderful g3-square. That second plan would be quite advisable in case Black prevents the advance of White’s g-pawn with the move h7-h6 (line \texttt{\textdagger}b). White should prefer the first plan after the rest of Black’s possible defences.

\textbf{a) 4...e5}

Black allows the move g4-g5, with the hope that he can later return with the knight to a suitable defensive position via the squares g8-e7-c6, or g4-e5. Nevertheless, we have already mentioned that White will have a powerful initiative after Black has lost so much time in the opening.

The other moves for Black, which do not prevent White’s move g4-g5, are also not good enough to equalize:

4...g6 enables White to repel the knight to the edge of the board: 5.g5 \texttt{\textdagger}h5 6.\texttt{\textdagger}e3\texttt{\textdagger}, followed by \texttt{\textdollar}d2 and 0–0–0. White has reached a very favourable posi—
tion of the Pirc Defence – his g-pawn has marched to the g5-square without any loss of time and Black’s knight is misplaced on the h5-square. White is threatening to play \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) and \( \text{\textit{xh5}} \); weakening Black’s kingside and 6...h6 can be countered simply by 7.\( \text{\textit{d3}} \)!

4...c5 – is a move that has not been tested in practice yet. The arising positions resemble the Sicilian Defence, because of the opposite side castling (White should not avoid that type of structure, because his advantage in development would be a telling factor then) and White’s prospects are clearly better, since he manages to attack Black’s knight on f6 seizing the initiative. 5.g5 cxd4 6.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \)

6...\( \text{\textit{h5}} \) (in case of 6...\( \text{\textit{g4}} \)? 7.f4, Black cannot save his knight on g4 anymore and his compensation for it is quite insufficient: 7...e5 8.\( \text{\textit{xd1}} \) and 9.h3++, or 7...h6 8.\( \text{\textit{d1}} \)++; it is just terrible for Black to play: 6...\( \text{\textit{g8}} \) 7.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \) – he can hardly come out of the opening satisfactorily with such lag in development) 7.\( \text{\textit{e2}} \) e5

8.\( \text{\textit{d5}} \)? The idea of that unbelievable move is to defend the g5-pawn after \( \text{\textit{xf4}} \) and the exchange on the f4-square. 8...\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) (after 8...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) the knight will be forced to retreat immediately: 9.\( \text{\textit{b5}} \) 9...\( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{c4}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{d3}} \), and the weakness of the d5-square is quite unpleasant for Black, for example: 11...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{b5}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 13.a4, with the idea to follow with a5 and \( \text{\textit{d5}} \). It is also good for White to play: 9.\( \text{\textit{a5}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf4}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{xf4}} \) \( \text{\textit{exf4}} \) 11.0–0–0, and Black remains with weak d6 and f5-pawns and a vulnerable d5-outpost. He cannot be happy with his position after: 8...g6 9.\( \text{\textit{hxh5}} \) gxh5 – his kingside pawn – structure has been destroyed. After the simple attack 10.\( \text{\textit{d1}} \), Black has problems to defend his h5-pawn and he has no compensation for his weaknesses.) 9.\( \text{\textit{xf4}} \) \( \text{\textit{exf4}} \) 10.0–0–0 \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{h4}} \)++. Black’s f4-pawn is endangered. He will soon be forced to exchange his bishop on c8 for the white knight on g1, after its development to the h3-square. That would only increase White’s positional advantage.

5.g5
5...exd4

5...Ng8 (the idea of that move is to preserve the centre and later to undermine White’s pawns on the kingside with h7-h6) 6.e3. Now, in case of an exchange on d4 – White can recapture with his queen, since it cannot be attacked there by a knight – it is already on the d7-square. 6...h6 (about 6...exd4 7.Qxd4 – see 5...exd4) 7.Qf3 (White should not worry too much about the eventual weaknesses of his pawn-structure on the kingside – the opponent has not even completed his development yet and his position is too cramped.) 7...hxg5 (or 7...e7 8.gxh6 Qxh6 9.Qg1†, attacking Black’s g7-pawn and preventing Qg4 at the same time. Later, White follows with Qd2 and 0-0-0, and he develops his initiative depending on his opponent’s actions, for example with: Qg5 and Qc4, or f4) 8.Qxg5 Qe7 9.h4 Qf6 (9...h6 10.Qg1 c6 11.Qd2†. White is considerably ahead in development and the most attractive plan for him is 0-0-0 and f2-f4.) 10.Qc4 Qxg5 (Black loses after: 10...Qh6? 11.Qf7+ Qxf7 12.Qe6 Qe7 13.Qd5 Qxe6 14.Qxc7+ Qe7 15.d5++, and White traps the black queen.) 11.Qxg5†. White has a space advantage, excellent development, two bishops and an open g-file... He only needs to castle and prepare f2-f4, opening the game.

6.Qxd4

White’s queen is perfectly placed here – Black cannot attack it soon favourably and secondly Black will not be able to develop his dark-squared bishop anytime soon, because the g7-pawn is hanging.

6...Ng8

After 6...Ng4, White plays 7.Qe2 Qg5 (It is too risky for Black to leave his knight on g4 for long: 7...c5 8.f4 h6. That is Black’s only chance to get some compensation for the piece. 9.Qd1 hxg5 10.Qxg4 Qxh4 11.Qxc8 Qh4+ 12.Qe2 Qxc8 13.Qf3†. Still, Black’s compensation is far from being sufficient – only two pawns, his king is in the centre just like its white counterpart, and Black has no attacking pieces.) 8.Qe3†. followed by 0-0-0. White’s queen can retreat to d2 if necessary. His plan is simple – to push forward his h and f-pawns and to prepare a kingside attack in the future.

7.Qe3

It is not so precise for White to play 7.f4 immediately. Presently, it is not so clear whether that pawn move is even neces-
sary and it is much better to play at first the always useful moves 8...e3 and 0-0-0. 7...h6 8.f3 hxg5 9.xg5 c6 10.e3 b6 11.0-0 0-0 12.xd4 h4 13.e5 (13.
8. f3 c6 9.d2 h6 10. f3 hxg5 11.xg5 e7 12.g1 f6 13.c4 0-0, G.Luque - Calvo Sanchez, Dos Hermanas 2001, because White could have continued simply with: 14.0-0-0!?, having a lead in development and open files against Black’s king, without being afraid of the possible exchange of his bishop on e3: 14.g4 15.h3 xe3 16.
xe3, and Black’s kingside is practically defenceless against White’s numerous threats (xf7, e4-e5, f2-h4, g3 etc.).

Black tried to repel the white queen from the d4-square in the game Odeev - Maje, Elista 1998, but he lost too much time: 9...
6 10.d2 a5 11.b1 e7 12.g1 e5 13.xe5 dx e5 14. g6 h6 (it was better here for Black to try: 14.g6 15.c4, but even then his position would have remained quite dubious – practically all his pieces would have been on their initial squares and it would not have been quite clear how to develop them any-
   
   way...) 15.xg7 g4, and here White’s simplest line would be: 16.xg4 d8 17.xh6 xxd2 18.xd2, with a decisive material advantage.

10.xg5 h6

11.f4. White has a space advantage and better development. Later, in the game Odeev - Karp, Moscow 1994, there followed: 11.e7 12.c4 f6 (White can now break through in the centre.) 13.e5 d5 14.exf6 xf6 15.xe3 dx e4 16.xc4 a5 17.xc5 xxc3, and White can win as he pleases, for example with: 18.e4+ e6 19.xxe6.

b) 4...h6

This is the most prudent and solid line. Black stops the further advance of White’s g-pawn and
the position begins to resemble the Philidor Defence, or the Pirc Defence (depending on where Black intends to develop his dark-squared bishop - to e7, or to g7) in which the moves g4 and h6 have been included. White's task now is to prove that the inclusion of these moves has been in his favour. He can do that by playing: h3, \( \Rightarrow g2 \) and \( \Rightarrow ge2 \) - and he should better choose that set-up right now. The arising positions resemble a line of the Pirc Defence - 1.e4 d6 2.d4 \( \Rightarrow f6 \) 3.\( \Rightarrow c3 \) g6 4.g3, in which it is favourable for White to push g3-g4, while now he has done that at once - which means that he has saved a tempo.

5.h3

The alternatives for White are - 5.g5 hxg5 6.\( \Rightarrow xg5 \) 6.\( \Rightarrow e3; \) 5.\( \Rightarrow f3. \) In all these lines, Black's early h7-h6 move turns out to be useful after all, because it has parried White's threat g5.

5...e5

5...c5 6.\( \Rightarrow ge2 \) a6 7.\( \Rightarrow g2 \) \( \Rightarrow c7 \) 8.0-0 e5!? All this has led to an original situation. (After 8...cxd4 9.\( \Rightarrow xd4 \), there arises a position similar to the Sicilian Defence in which Black has played some not so useful moves like - \( \Rightarrow c7, \Rightarrow bd7 \) and h6, which had better be postponed until the position had been more or less clarified.) 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.\( \Rightarrow g3. \) Black has a vulnerable spot on the d5-square. It is temporarily protected indeed by the knight on f6, but after White plays \( \Rightarrow d5 \) and an exchange on d5 follows, he can later place a light piece on the free e4-square. Meanwhile, White should not be in a hurry to play \( \Rightarrow d5 \) at all. 10...c4. That move increases the scope of action of the bishop on f8 and ensures the c5-outpost for Black's bishop or knight. On the other hand, his queenside pawn-chain is weakened. 11.\( \Rightarrow e2 \) b5. This move defends the c4-pawn, but weakens Black's pawns even more. 12.a4 b4 13.\( \Rightarrow d5 \) \( \Rightarrow c6 \) (13... \( \Rightarrow xd5 \) 14.exd5\( \Rightarrow e7 \), White maintains a powerful initiative, due to the threats d6, \( \Rightarrow f5, \) f4) 14.f4 \( \Rightarrow b7 \) 15.fxe5 \( \Rightarrow xe5 \), Kraft - Heimrath, Bayern 2001, White would have been clearly better after: 16. \( \Rightarrow xf6+ \text{gx} f6 \) 17.\( \Rightarrow h5 \) \( \Rightarrow e7 \) (in case of 17...0-0-0 18.\( \Rightarrow xf6 \), Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient.) 18.\( \Rightarrow g7+ \), White thus deprives Black from casting rights and he has better prospects, because of the weaknesses on Black's kingside. In fact, Black has only one well placed piece - the knight on e5, but according to the famous proverb "One soldier won't win the battle".

6.\( \Rightarrow ge2 \)

Black's task in the next few moves is to organize some counterplay on the queenside (that is to prepare b7-b5) and to develop his kingside. It is essential where he plans to place his dark-squared bishop - on e7, or on g7. In general, Black usually
fianchettoes it. In case he develops it to e7 – White places his knight on g3 and then to the f5-outpost. Black cannot control that square without the move g7-g6 and therefore his bishop should better be on g7.

6...c6
6...\(\text{c}7\) 7...\(\text{c}e3\) \(\text{c}f8\) (\(\text{c}g6\)-h4). This manoeuvre is quite sensible positionally, but it definitely slows Black’s development down. 8...\(\text{c}d2\) c6 9.0–0–0 (It is less precise for White to play 9...f4. After such order of moves, Black manages to attack White’s e4-pawn (after playing b5-b4), and forces the weakening of white king’s shelter. 9...b5 10...\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{g}6\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{a}5\) 12.a3 \(\text{d}7\) 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.d5 \(\text{b}6\)? – it would have been better for Black to play here 14...b4 15...\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{h}4\) 16...\(\text{h}2\) c5 17...\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}6\), and White cannot break through easily – 15.d6, and White had the material advantage: 15...\(\text{g}5\) 16...\(\text{g}5\) hxg5 17.xg5 \(\text{h}6\) 18...\(\text{g}3\)+− Hertneck – Jurkovic, Aschach 2003.

It was better for Black to try 12...\(\text{d}h4\), threatening after b4 and the exchange on g2 to capture the e4-pawn. In case of 13.dxe5 dxe5 14...f5 \(\text{xg}4\)+, the position would have remained quite unclear.) 9...b5 10...\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{g}6\) (the move 10...\(\text{a}5\) would be countered with 11...\(\text{b}1\) b4 12...\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 13...\(\text{c}1\) – and White avoids the creation of weaknesses.) 11...\(\text{f}5\)\(\uparrow\). The manoeuvre of the black knight has been hampered – after 11...\(\text{x}f5\) 12.gxf5 \(\text{h}4\) 13...\(\text{d}3\), it remains quite isolated on the h4-square. White’s prospects are superior, for example: 13...\(\text{a}5\) 14...\(\text{b}1\) b4 15...\(\text{e}2\) d5 16.dxe5 \(\text{xe}4\) 17...\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 18...\(\text{g}1\)\(\uparrow\).

It is wise for Black to try 6...b5 7.a3 (White should not exchange his central e4-pawn for Black’s b-pawn with: 7...\(\text{x}b5\) \(\text{xe}4\) 8.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 7...\(\text{b}7\) 8...\(\text{g}2\) a6. Black now enjoys the possibility of attacking the e4-square once more. (Well, he can only do it after castling and \(\text{xe}8\).) 9.0–0 \(\text{e}7\) (Black can now develop his bishop on g7 if he so wishes: 9...g6 10.f4 \(\text{g}7\) 11...\(\text{e}3\) 0–0 12.fxe5 – in case of the natural move 12...\(\text{d}2\), you can see the advantages of Black’s chosen move order: 12...\(\text{xd}4\) 13...\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{g}3\) c5 15...\(\text{f}2\) b4 16...\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\), and White’s e4-pawn is under attack – 12...dxe5 13.d5, and after the natural move c7-c6, there arises a position similar to the line 6...c6. It would not be good for Black to play: 10...\(\text{xd}4\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{g}7\), due to 12.e5! \(\text{xg}2\) 13...\(\text{xg}2\) dxe5 14...\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{c}8\) 15.
fxe5 ♚h7 16.♗d5+−, and White's threats are decisive.) 10...♗g3 (it is also interesting for White to try 10.f4!?), followed by ♙e3 and ♙g3) 10...0-0 11.Nf5 (now, it is already dangerous for White to play: 11.f4, because of 11...exd4 12.♕xd4 d5 ♚xc5) 11...♗e8 12. dx5 (12.f4 exd4 13.♕xd4 ♘f8+ ♚d5) 12...dx5 13.g5 hxg5 14. ♙xg5 g6 (otherwise, for example after: 14...♗f8 15.♗f3↑, White's pieces on the kingside are active and his pressure along the open d-file creates a lot of problems for Black) 15.♗xe7+ ♘xe7 16.♗f3 ♘e6 17.h4 (♚h3; it is possible that White should better play first: 17.♖ad1, in order to be able to place later his knight on the d5-square) 17...♚h7 18.♖h6 ♗d6 19.♖h3 ♙c4 20.♗fe1 ♙c8 21.♗f1 ♙e6 22.♗d5 ♙g4 (capturing of the e2-pawn creates a passed pawn for White and leads to a powerful initiative for him: 22...♕xd5 23.exd5 ♙xc2 24.♖ac1 ♙xb2 25.♖xc7 ♙f5 26.h5↑, for example: 26...♖ad8 27.hxg6 fxg6 28.♖h3 e4 29.♗g2 ♙f6 30.♗xf5 ♙xf5 31.♗g7 ♙h8 32.♗xg6 ♙xg6 33.♗xg6 ♙g8 34.♗xg8+ ♙xg8 35.♗f1 ♙f6 36.d6↑) 23.♗c3 ♙xc3 24.♗xc3±. White has a slight advantage in the endgame, because of his bishop pair, but the potential weakness of the f4-square and the h4-pawn provide Black with considerable drawing chances. Later in the game Magem Badals – Bauer, Cap d’Agde 1996, there followed: 24...c6 25.♗g2 ♙ad8 26.f3 ♙c8 27. ♙ed1 ♙h5 28.♗e3 ♙f8 (♚e6-f4) (28...♕f4+ 29.♗xf4 exf4 30.♗e2+) 29.♖b6 ♙ad7 30.♗xd7 ♙xd7 31. ♙e3 ♙f8 32.a4 ♙b7 33.axb5 cxb5 34.♗d1 (34.♗d5!?±) 34...♗c6 (34...♖e7 35.♗f2 ♙f4 36.♗xf4 exf4 37.♗e2 ♙h8 38.♗xf4 ♙h4, and the position was approximately equal, or 35.♗d5+ ♙xd5 36.exd5 ♙c8 37.c3 ♙d6=) 35.♗d5 ♙c8 36.♗b4 ♙b8 37.♗f2 ♙d7 38.c3 a5 39.♗d5 ♙c6 40.♖c5+ ♙g7 41.♗e7 ♙h8 42.♗d6±, and Black lost a pawn and subsequently the game too.

7.♗g2 b5

Black played a bit strangely in the game Moncamp – Franc, France 2001: 7...♗e7 8.♗g3 (It is usually better for White to castle first 8.0-0!?, and play f4 only later.) 8.g6 (It is hardly good for Black to try: 8...♕h5 9.g5 ♙h7 10.h4 g6 11.f4±) 9.♗e3 ♙a5 10.♗d2 ♙f8. This anti-development is awkward. It is clearly better for Black to play: 10...h5 11.g5 ♙h7 12.h4, but still White has a great space advantage.) 11.0-0±. White has been presented with a couple of extra tempi in comparison to the usual lines.

8.a3

This is a useful move, which secures the c3-square for the knight. The game A.Ivanov – Kacheishvili, Philadelphia 1998, illustrates a possibility for Black that is so very typical for that particular line – the undermin-
ing of White’s pawn-chain with h6-h5: 8.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g3 g6 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)b7 10. 0-0 h5, and suddenly it became clear that against the placement of White’s knight on g3 – that counterplay is quite effective: 11.g5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)h7 12.h4 (12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d2 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e7 13.h4 f6\(\mathcal{Q}\)) 12...f6 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xh5 (13. \(\mathcal{Q}\)d2 fxg5 14.hxg5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e7\(\mathcal{Q}\)) 13...b4 14.dxe5 dxe5 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)a4 fxg5 16. hgx5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xg5 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f6 18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)fd1 \(\mathcal{Q}\)c8 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)h4\(\mathcal{Q}\), and Black has emerged with a quite acceptable position out of the complications. Therefore White should keep his knight on e2 presently in order to prevent Black’s counterplay with h6-h5. He must be able to counter h5 with g5, and if \(\mathcal{Q}\)h7 – h4, White should play f4 if necessary.

8...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b7

Black has also tested in practice: 8...\(\mathcal{Q}\)e7 9.0-0 0-0 10.f4 a5 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)b7 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g3 exd4 13. \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd4 c5 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d2 (It deserves some attention for White to try: 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d3!? b4 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5\(\mathcal{Q}\), and his knight on the b5-square is already protected.) 14...b4 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8, Michiels – Hautot, Belgium 2003 (It is better for Black to play: 15...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b6 16.b3 d5, but even then after: 17.e5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 18.axb4 axb4 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f5\(\mathcal{Q}\), White has the advantage – Black’s pawns in the centre, contrary to White’s pawns on the kingside, are just a target for an attack and not a powerful force to reckon with. Black cannot play 19...\(\mathcal{Q}\)a6?, be-
2000, with a quite unclear position, White had better play 14.\textit{f}d1\textit{f}, preventing the move c6-c5 for a while and preparing some active actions on the queenside (a4 immediately, or after the preparatory b2-b4 move).

b1) 9...\textit{a}5

This is a logical move – Black insists on playing b5-b4. On the other hand, the inclusion of the moves a2-a3 and a7-a5 is in fact in favour of White, for example Black cannot play a7-a6 and c6-c5 anymore.

![Chess Diagram]

10.\textit{g}3

The idea of that move is to vacate the e2-square for the queen's knight in case of Black's eventual b5-b4.

10...\textit{g}6

It is also possible for Black to try here:

10...h5 – is a bit too early, because now White's knight on h4 can go to the f5-square. 11.g5 h4 (after 11...\textit{h}7 12.h4 g6 13.f4\textit{f}, Black's knight on h7 is too passive, moreover Black has presented his opponent with too much space.) 12.\textit{f}5 \textit{h}5 13.d5 \textit{b}6, and here White's simplest line was 14.dxc6 (White achieves considerably less with: 14.\textit{e}2 \textit{d}7 15.dxc6 \textit{xc}6 16.g6?! b4 17.gxf7+ \textit{xf}7 18.axb4 axb4 19.\textit{x}a8 \textit{xa}8 20.\textit{b}5 \textit{c}6 21.c4 \textit{e}6 22.f4\textit{f} Michiels – Belkhodja, La Fere 2003, and White has the initiative, while Black's pieces are misplaced and his rook and bishop on f8 are not developed at all.) 14...\textit{xc}6 15.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}7 16.\textit{d}1 \textit{d}8 17.\textit{hx}h4\textit{h}. It was just inconceivable how Black could compensate his one pawn-deficit;

10...b4. That logical move has been prepared with the move 9...a5. 11.\textit{ce}2 g6 12.\textit{e}3 \textit{g}7 13.\textit{d}2 c5 14.d5 \textit{b}6 15.b3\textit{f}. White has ample extra space in that closed position and he can organize some effective play on the queenside (the exchange on b4, c2-c3), as well as on the kingside (f2-f4). Black's light pieces on the queenside are misplaced – they have no targets for attack there and can be put under pressure by White's rooks after opening of some files. In the game Del Rio – Osuna Vega, Spain 2004, Black was a bit to eager to organize some counterplay: 15...\textit{fd}7 16.c4 bx\textit{a}3 17.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}6 (\textit{c}17...a4 18.\textit{b}5 \textit{b}8 19.\textit{c}3 axb3 20.\textit{xb}3\textit{b} – White has the initiative on the queenside indeed, but Black has managed to exchange some potentially weak pawns there.) 18.\textit{xa}3 \textit{xc}4 19.\textit{fa}1 a4?! (Black had to
retreat here – 19...d6 20.гад5+, although the opening of files on
the queenside was definitely in
favour of White.) 20.bxc4 dağ4
21.ғd3 ғxa3 22.ғxa3+, and af-
fter the recapture of the a4-pawn,
White’s two light pieces are
clearly superior to Black’s rook.

11.ғf4?

The idea of that move is not
only to open the f-file, but also to
prevent the move h6-h5, which
would have been rather unpleas-
ant for White after the imme-
diate: 11.ғe3 h5 12.g5 ғh7 13.h4
f6 14.dxe5 (14.f4 exf4 15.ғxf4
fxg5 16.hxg5 ғxg5, and White’s
compensation for the pawn is
simply non-existent.) 14...dxe5
15.ғh3 fxg5 16.ғxh5 (16.hxg5
ғe7 17.ғd2 ғd8=) 16...ғc8 17.
ғf3 gxf4 (It was correct for
Black to play: 17...ғe7 18.ғxg5
ғxg5 19.ғxd7+ ғd8 20.hxg5
ғxg5+ 21.ғg3 ғxg3+ 22.ғxg3
ғxd7=, and Black would have a
slight advantage.) 18.ғg4 ғe7
ғxa8= – Fontaine – Mensch,
France 2001 – White won that
game indeed, but as we have
already mentioned, Black could
have obtained a better position
during the game.

11...ғxd4

Black is trying to exploit the
fact that White is forced to cap-
ture on d4 with the queen. After
11...ғg7, White can play 12.
ғe3+, and later, depending on
his opponent’s actions, he can
either wait (ғd2, ғad1), or play:

fxe5 and d4-d5, or even try: dxe5
and f4-f5.

12.ғxd4 d5

13.ғe3+, and Black cannot
win a piece with: 13...c5 14.ғd3
d4, because of 15.e5 ғxg2 16.
ғxg2 ғxg4 (16...ғg8 17.e6=–)
17.hxg4 dxc3 18.e6!, and White's
attack is decisive, for example:
18...fxe6 19.ғxg6+ ғe7 20.ғf5+
exf5 21.ғf1=–.

b2) 9...ғg6

10.ғf4

White here has another pos-
sibility with quite similar ideas:
10.ғe3 ғg7 (the move 10...h5
should be countered with: 11.g5
ғh7 12.h4 f6 13.ғf4 – and af-
ter the exchange on f4, White can
capture with the knight – he
would not lose the g5-pawn, be-
cause he would be attacking Black’s g6-pawn in his turn.) 11.\textit{\texttt{w}}d2 a6 12.\textit{\texttt{ad}1} \textit{\texttt{wc}7} 13.f4 0–0 0 14.fxe5 dxe5 15.d5. We have recommended the same plan to White in the main line. 15...c5 (15...exd5 16.\textit{\texttt{xd}5} \textit{\texttt{xd}5} 17.exd5 \textit{\texttt{db}6} (17...\textit{\texttt{df}6} 18.\textit{\texttt{dc}3\texttt{±}}) 18.d6 \textit{\texttt{xg}2} 19.dxc7 \textit{\texttt{xd}2} 20.\textit{\texttt{xb}6\texttt{±}}) 16.\textit{\texttt{f}2} \textit{\texttt{d}6} 17.\textit{\texttt{df}1} \textit{\texttt{df}8} 18.\textit{\texttt{dc}1} \textit{\texttt{e}7} 19.\textit{\texttt{d}3} \textit{\texttt{e}8} 20.b4, White has excellent attacking chances against the enemy king. The game Sofronie – Hautot, Cappelle la Grande 2002, continued with: 20...\textit{\texttt{xb}4} 21.\textit{\texttt{xb}4} \textit{\texttt{d}6} 22.\textit{\texttt{dc}6} \textit{\texttt{e}8} 23.a4 \textit{\texttt{b}8} 24.axb5 axb5 25.\textit{\texttt{d}a}7+-, and White won.

10...\textit{\texttt{g}7} 11.\textit{\texttt{e}3} a6 12.\textit{\texttt{g}3\texttt{!}}?

White has also tested in practice the line 12.dxe5. This exchange is very important, because after it there is not too much sense for White to try the plan with \textit{\texttt{f}4–f5. He has no direct threats after it, because Black’s king is still in the centre and he can castle long instead. After the second exchange on the e5-square, Black’s knight can be deployed to the wonderful e5-outpost and that might compensate Black’s numerous positional defects. All that happened, by the way, in the only game that had been played in that line: 12...dxe5 13.\textit{\texttt{e}1} \textit{\texttt{c}7} 14.\textit{\texttt{f}2} exf4 15.\textit{\texttt{xf}4} \textit{\texttt{e}5} 16.\textit{\texttt{d}3} \textit{\texttt{fd}7} 17.\textit{\texttt{xe}5}. In principle, one of the black knights on e5 and d7 is unnecessary and White wishes to avoid its exchange. Nevertheless, White thus acquires the c5-square for his bishop and prevents his opponent’s castling. (After 17.\textit{\texttt{ad}1}, Black can try to sacrifice the exchange, although that idea seems risky: 17...0–0 18.\textit{\texttt{xe}5} \textit{\texttt{xe}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{ac}5} \textit{\texttt{fe}8} 20.\textit{\texttt{d}6\texttt{±}}; 19...\textit{\texttt{c}4} 20.\textit{\texttt{xf}8} \textit{\texttt{xf}8} 21.\textit{\texttt{c}5\texttt{±}}, and White’s edge is only minimal. Black can also try the line: 17...0–0 0 18.\textit{\texttt{xe}5} \textit{\texttt{xe}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{b}6} \textit{\texttt{xd}1} 20.\textit{\texttt{xc}7} \textit{\texttt{xf}1}+ 21.\textit{\texttt{xf}1} \textit{\texttt{xc}7\texttt{=}}, and his compensation for the queen is quite acceptable.) 17...\textit{\texttt{g}8} 18.\textit{\texttt{xb}6} \textit{\texttt{b}8} 19.\textit{\texttt{c}5} \textit{\texttt{h}7} (This move seems awkward, but it is purposeful. Black is preparing \textit{\texttt{f}8}, and avoids the attack against his rook after White’s move \textit{\texttt{fe}6.}) 20.\textit{\texttt{ad}1} \textit{\texttt{f}8} 21.b4 (21.\textit{\texttt{h}1} \textit{\texttt{c}7} 21...\textit{\texttt{xc}5} 22.bxc5 \textit{\texttt{f}8}. White has now gained access to the d6-square, but Black’s position is a too difficult nut to crack with such powerful knight on the e5-outpost. The game followed with: 23.\textit{\texttt{e}d}6 \textit{\texttt{e}8} 24.\textit{\texttt{fd}1} \textit{\texttt{e}7} 25.\textit{\texttt{e}2} \textit{\texttt{e}8} 26.\textit{\texttt{f}4} \textit{\texttt{g}8} 27.\textit{\texttt{d}4} \textit{\texttt{f}6} 28.\textit{\texttt{h}4} \textit{\texttt{c}8} 29.g5 \textit{\texttt{h}xg5} 30.hxg\textit{\texttt{g}5} \textit{\texttt{f}7\texttt{=}} – and Black survived somehow in the game Gruenfeld – Rukavina, Belgrade 1988. It deserved attention for White to postpone the clarification of the position in the centre – he could have thus preserved some additional possibilities for him as: \textit{\texttt{fxe}5}, followed by \textit{\texttt{d}4–d5, or g4–g5.}

12...\textit{\texttt{c}7}
It is similar to the main line 12...\texttt{c}7 for Black, if he continues with: 12...\texttt{e}7 13.fxe5 (13. \texttt{d}2!?) 13...dxe5 14.d5\texttt{d}5\texttt{d}5\texttt{d}5.

Black loses a pawn without any compensation after: 12...c5 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.dxc5\texttt{c}5.\texttt{c}5.

The other possibility for Black only worsens his position: 12...h5 13.g5 \texttt{h}7 14.d2\texttt{d}2\texttt{d}2 – he fails to undermine White’s centre and that makes the deliberate placement of his knight on the h7-square just senseless.

13.fxe5

White here could have played some other useful moves instead, like: 13.d2\texttt{d}2\texttt{d}2 and \texttt{ad}1.

13...dxe5

\textbf{14.d5\texttt{d}5\texttt{d}5}

Now, in case of an exchange on d5, White obtains the wonderful e4-square for his knight and a powerful central passed pawn. Black can block the position with the move c6-c5 indeed, but he would have plenty of problems even then. At first, White has the open f-file for his rooks and he can attack the potentially vulnerable weakness on f7. Secondly, Black’s king would hardly be comfortable after castling on either side. White can exploit the exposed placement of Black’s pawns on the queenside with moves like a4 and b4; at the same time on the kingside, White has the open f-file, as we have already mentioned, and a juicy target to attack – Black’s h6-pawn. We have already analysed one quite instructive game for the method of handling similar positions by White in our notes to White’s move ten – the game Sofronie – Hautot, Cappelle la Grande 2002.

\textbf{Conclusion}

\textit{The move that we have just analysed 3...\texttt{bd}7 seems quite logical – Black develops a piece and prepares 4...e5. That move however, enables White to start an immediate offensive with 4.g4, seizing the initiative on the kingside. In case Black does not prevent his knight from being repelled – then after g4-g5, \texttt{e}3, \texttt{d}2 and 0—0—0, White achieves a powerful attacking position. After Black’s best reaction 4...h6, we recommend the following scheme of development to White – h3, \texttt{ge}2, \texttt{g}2, 0—0, \texttt{e}3 and f2-f4 with a great space advantage for White. He maintains his opening advantage in both cases.}
Chapter 4

1.e4 d6 2.d4 \(\triangle f6\) 3.\(\triangle c3\) e5

This amusing order of moves is often encountered in the contemporary tournament practice. White is faced with a choice:

He can play 4.\(\triangle f3\), and after 4...\(\triangle bd7\) there arises a position from the Philidor Defence. Black manages to avoid in that fashion the quite unpleasant variation for him: 1.e4 e5 2.\(\triangle f3\) d6 3.\(d4\) \(\triangle d7\), and now not 4.\(\triangle c3\) \(\triangle gf6\) (which in fact transposes to the position that we will analyse...), but 4.\(\triangle c4!\), so that after 4...\(\triangle e7\) White can exchange on e5 and follow with \(\triangle g5\), as we have recommended in our volume one.

If Black succeeds in avoiding that line— he develops his bishop to e7, then he castles and fianchettoes his light-squared bishop and plays c6 and \(\mathbb{c7}\) etc.

White however, can try to make use of the possibility to exchange on e5 and d8 and transfer to a better endgame and that is exactly what we recommend now.

4.dxe5 dxe5 5.\(\mathbb{xd8+}\) \(\mathbb{xd8}\)

Let us evaluate the arising position. The drawbacks of Black’s situation are of course connected mostly with the fact that he was forced to capture on d8 with the king and he was deprived of the right to castle and develop his pieces harmoniously. He is now obliged to lose additional time to redeploy his king and to defend his f7-pawn. In general, Black is simply forced in the next few moves to only defend against White’s active possibilities—the attacks against the pawns on e5, f7, c7, and the
attempts to open the game with moves like f2-f4 etc. It is also essential that Black's rooks will not be connected anytime soon and White is dominating on the d-file. Naturally, White's attacking resources have been substantially reduced after the trade of queens and if Black manages to solve the present problems of dynamic type – that is to defend everything, to develop his pieces and to exchange a couple of pieces – his chances will not be worse at all.

6.\textit{g5}

As we have already mentioned – White’s advantage is temporary for now. After calm and quiet play Black will gradually equalize. The pawn-structure is symmetrical and Black has no long-term weaknesses and his king can go either to e8 (and later, after the development of the bishop on f8 – to the e7-square), or to c7 (after the preliminary c7-c6). White’s last move, together with the other possibility – 6.\textit{c4} – is his most energetic attempt to seize the initiative.

Black can now choose between several possibilities: \textbf{a}) 6...\textit{d6}, \textbf{b}) 6...\textit{e7}, \textbf{c}) 6...\textit{c6}.

His most popular defence 6...\textit{e6} will be analysed in the next chapters.

6...\textit{bd7} 7.0–0–0 c6 (About 7...\textit{d6} – see 6...\textit{d6}; about 7...\textit{e7} – see 6...\textit{e7}.) 8.\textit{c4} \textit{e8} 9.\textit{f3} – see 6...\textit{c6} 7.\textit{c4} \textit{e8} 8.\textit{f3} \textit{bd7} 9.0–0–0.

There are some seldom played moves for Black too:

6...\textit{b4} – this move is a bit strange. White avoids the pin easily by castling, while Black’s bishop on b4 is not so well placed: 7.0–0–0+ \textit{bd7} 8.\textit{d5} \textit{c5}. This is a bad move. (Black had better cover the d-file with: 8...\textit{d6}, but White has the advantage there too: 9.\textit{f3} \textit{e8} 10.\textit{xf6}+ \textit{xf6} 11.\textit{b5+}. Presently, that move causes a disruption of the harmony of the placement of Black’s pieces. 11...\textit{d7} 12.\textit{xf6} gxf6 13.\textit{xd7+} \textit{xd7} 14.\textit{h4}, and White has a long-lasting advantage thanks to his good knight against Black’s bad bishop and his pawn-weaknesses, or 11...\textit{f8} 12.\textit{xe5}! White thus opens the position and exploits his lead in development. 12...a6 – Black should not capture the knight immediately, because he loses the exchange after: 12...\textit{xe5} 13.\textit{d8+} \textit{e7} 14.\textit{hxh8} – 13.\textit{c4} \textit{xe5} 14.f4 \textit{g4} 15.\textit{f5} \textit{xd1} 16.\textit{xf6} \textit{h5} 17.\textit{g7}+ \textit{xg7} 18.\textit{xf1} \textit{e8} 19.\textit{e5}. White’s positional compensation for the exchange is more than sufficient.) 9.\textit{xf6}+ (White could have simply won a pawn with 9.\textit{xf6} \textit{e7} 10.\textit{hxh7} 9...\textit{gxf6} 10.\textit{xf6} \textit{xf2}, Canbolat – Rozen, IECC 1995, and now White’s simplest line is: 11.\textit{f3}+ \textit{e7} 12.\textit{d5}+ \textit{d8} 13.\textit{d2} \textit{c5} 14.\textit{g5} \textit{f8} 15.\textit{hxh7}+ and he remains with material advantage;
6...a6 – That move might turn out to be useful for Black, particularly if he intends to develop his bishop to the d6-square. 7.0-0-0+ (It is also possible for White to play 7.♗d5 ♗bd7 8.♗c4 ♘d6 9.♗f3, Lucea - Barranco, Spain 1995, and here Black had better follow with: 9...♘e8 10.♘xf6 ♘xf6 11.♗g5 ♘xd5 12.♘xd5 ♘f6 13.♗f7 ♗f8 14.♗xf6+ cxd5 15.0-0-0±, and White has only a slight advantage.) 7...♗bd7 (About 7...♘d6 – see 6...♘d6 7.0-0-0 a6.) 8.♗f3 ♘e8 (8...♘d6 – see 6...♘d6 7.0-0-0 a6 8.♗f3 ♘bd7) 9.♘xf6 gxf6 9...♘xf6 10.♗xe5±, and White has a solid extra pawn) 10.♗d5 ♘d6 11.♘h4±, and Black cannot prevent the appearance of White’s knight to the f5-square without losing the f6-pawn;

6...h6. The exchange on f6 (even doubling Black’s pawns) – is not such great achievement for White to be worth losing time, while the rest of his pieces are not developed yet. 7.0-0-0+ ♘d6 (7...♗bd7 8.♗xf6+ gxf6 9.♗c4, Black has problems defending his f7-pawn. 9...♘d6 10.♗xf7±, and White remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Coney – Jiaolong, Internet 2001.) 8.♗h4 (It is also possible for White to play: 8.♗xf6+ gxf6, Motylev – Shushpanov, Moscow 2002, 9.♗b5 ♘e7 10.♗e2 ♘e6 11.♗c3 ♘c6 12.♗xd6 cxd6 13.♗d5±. White has a bishop against a knight in an endgame with rooks present on the board, so he will have a slight, but lasting advantage. The following attractive line is not so efficient for White after: 10.♖xd6 cxd6 11.♘c7 ♘e6 12.♗xa8 ♘e8 13.♗e2 ♗d7=. Black recaptures the knight and his weaknesses are not so vulnerable.) 8...♗bd7 9.♗f3 ♘e8 10.♗b5!? (The game Enjuto – Rojas, Palencia 1999, followed with: 10.♗d2 g5 11.♗g3 ♗b4 12.f3 ♘xc3 13.bxc3 ♘h5 14.♗c4±, and Black cannot avoid opening of the h-file.) 10...♗e7 11.♗xd7 ♘xd7 12.♗xf6 gxf6 13.♗d5 ♘e6 14.♗h4†, and White’s knights are stronger than Black’s bishops, because of the powerful f5-outpost.

a) 6...♗d6

![Diagram](image)

Black’s bishop is hardly well placed here. It can be attacked later with ♗b5 and White will get the two-bishop advantage in the endgame.

7.0-0-0 ♗bd7

7...h6 – see 6...h6; 7...♗e6 8.f4 – see 6...♗e6 7.0-0-0+ ♘d6.
7...♗e7? Iancu – Hedreanu, Romania 2000, 8.♗d5++ and
Black loses material after that.

7...\textit{\mathcal{e}}8 8.\textit{\mathcal{e}}xf6 gxf6 9.\textit{\mathcal{d}}b5 \textit{\mathcal{e}}7 (9...\textit{\mathcal{e}}6? This is a terrible move. 10.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xd6+ \textit{\mathcal{c}}xd6 11.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xd6\pm.
As a result of Black’s blunder – he remained a pawn down – Crafty – Comet, 1999). There arose a position similar to the one that we have analysed in the line 6...h6, with the slight difference that Black’s pawn is on h7: 10.\textit{\mathcal{e}}e2 (The following combination: 10.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xd6 cxd6 11.\textit{\mathcal{c}}c7 \textit{\mathcal{e}}e6 12.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xa8 \textit{\mathcal{e}}c8 13.\textit{\mathcal{d}}e2 \textit{\mathcal{d}}d7=, is not so effective for White, because Black will recapture the knight with a quite acceptable game after that.) 10...\textit{\mathcal{e}}e6 11.\textit{\mathcal{c}}ec3 \textit{\mathcal{c}}c6 12.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xd6 cxd6 13.\textit{\mathcal{d}}d5\pm, and White has a slight edge in the endgame.

7...a6 – It is possible – that move to be the best for Black, since it ensures the d6-square for the black bishop. 8.\textit{\mathcal{f}}f3 (White can presently try to cramp the position of the opponent with: 8.f4 \textit{\mathcal{e}}e8 9.\textit{\mathcal{f}}f3 \textit{\mathcal{b}}d7, and to follow with: 10.\textit{\mathcal{x}}xf6 gxf6 11.f5\pm.)
8...\textit{\mathcal{b}}d7, Preiss – Zapletal, corr. 1999, 9.\textit{\mathcal{x}}xf6+ gxf6 10.\textit{\mathcal{d}}d5\uparrow \textit{\mathcal{g}}3, \textit{\mathcal{h}}h3. Black usually compensates the doubling of his f-pawns with active counterplay along the dark squares, since White’s dark-squared bishop is absent from the board. Here, White has managed to reach a position in which Black’s moves a6 and \textit{\mathcal{d}}d6 prove to be useless. White occupies the f5-square and achieves a clear advantage.

8.\textit{\mathcal{f}}f3 \textit{\mathcal{e}}e8

The move 8...\textit{\mathcal{e}}e7 seems to be too dangerous for Black. His king gets deliberately exposed to the possibility of \textit{\mathcal{d}}d5 with check, nevertheless there is no forced refutation yet: 9.\textit{\mathcal{h}}h4 (9.\textit{\mathcal{d}}d5+ \textit{\mathcal{f}}f8) 9...\textit{\mathcal{f}}f8. This move should be a mistake. (White is only slightly better after: 9...\textit{\mathcal{b}}b6 10.\textit{\mathcal{f}}f5+ \textit{\mathcal{x}}xf5 11.exf5 \textit{\mathcal{d}}d8 12.\textit{\mathcal{d}}d3\pm, and he has a long-lasting initiative and the two-bishop advantage.)

10.\textit{\mathcal{f}}f5\pm \textit{\mathcal{e}}e8 11.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xd6 \textit{\mathcal{c}}xd6 12.\textit{\mathcal{d}}d5 \textit{\mathcal{d}}xe4 13.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xc7 \textit{\mathcal{b}}b8 14.\textit{\mathcal{e}}e3 b6 15.\textit{\mathcal{b}}b5, and White wins a pawn, because after 15...a5, he has 16.\textit{\mathcal{a}}7++ Reefat – Murshed, Dhaka 2003, and White wins a piece, since Black’s knight on d7 cannot retreat, because of the check on the d8-square.

9.\textit{\mathcal{b}}b5

White will have maybe only slight, but still a long-lasting advantage in the endgame thanks to his bishop pair.

9...\textit{\mathcal{e}}7

It is not good for Black to play: 9...\textit{\mathcal{e}}xe4 10.\textit{\mathcal{x}}xd6\pm cxd6 11.\textit{\mathcal{d}}c7+ \textit{\mathcal{f}}f8 12.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xa8\pm – and Black cannot trap White’s knight on a8.

9...a6 10.\textit{\mathcal{d}}xd6+ cxd6 11.\textit{\mathcal{d}}d2\pm (White is threatening \textit{\mathcal{c}}c4.)

11...b5 12.a4 (The weaknesses on Black’s queenside provide White with an overwhelming advantage, because of his bishop pair.)

12...\textit{\mathcal{b}}b7 13.\textit{\mathcal{f}}f3 \textit{\mathcal{c}}c6 14.\textit{\mathcal{b}}b3 \textit{\mathcal{e}}e7 15.\textit{\mathcal{a}}a5 \textit{\mathcal{b}}b8 16.\textit{\mathcal{e}}e3 bxa4 17.\textit{\mathcal{c}}c4 \textit{\mathcal{b}}bd7 18.\textit{\mathcal{x}}xd6\pm Nevostrujev – Zablotsky, Tomsk 2003. White is
threatening $\text{c}4$ and $\text{f}5$ – Black’s defence is very difficult.

10. $\text{d}2$ $\text{h}6$ 11. $\text{h}4$ $\text{b}6$

Contrary to the game Nevostruiev – Zablotsky, Tomsk 2003, Black avoids the creation of additional pawn-weaknesses on the queenside.

12. $\text{f}3$ $\text{e}6$ 13. $\text{f}2$ $\text{f}d7$

14. $\text{b}3\pm$. There are no direct threats for Black to worry about yet – all his weaknesses are well-defended, his pawns will remain on the “correct” dark squares after the exchange of his dark-squared bishop, with him having a light-squared bishop left, still... White maintains a long-lasting pressure. He restricts the mobility of Black’s pieces with his last move and prepares some actions on the queenside. 14... $\text{h}c8$

15. $\text{x}d6$. Now, when Black has defended his pawn on $c7$ – White must exchange on $d6$. 15... $\text{c}xd6$

16. $\text{b}2$ $\text{c}5$ 17. $\text{b}1$. This is with the idea to bring the knight to the best place for it – the $c3$-square, after the move $c4$. 17... $\text{f}5$

18. $\text{xf}5$ $\text{xf}5$ 19. $\text{c}4$ $\text{g}5$. This seems to be an active move, while in fact it only creates a target for White to attack on the kingside (h2-h4). In the game Dvoirys – Spasov, Biel 1993, there followed:

20. $\text{c}3$ $\text{c}6$ 21. $\text{e}2$ $\text{e}6$ 22. $\text{g}3$

$\text{f}8$ 23. $\text{d}2$ $\text{c}7$ 24. $\text{h}4$ $\text{d}7$

25. $\text{hxg}5$ $\text{hxg}5$ 26. $\text{e}3$. White applies the principle of the two weaknesses. Black practically cannot defend simultaneously his two weaknesses – the pawns on $d6$ and $g5$. 26... $\text{e}6$ 27. $\text{d}5+$

$\text{f}7$ 28. $\text{b}4$ $\text{c}8$ 29. $\text{x}d6\pm$, and White has an extra pawn and a winning position.

b) 6... $\text{e}7$

This line is solid, but too passive. Black defends against the threats connected with the pin along the $d8$-$h4$ diagonal.

7.0-0-0+ $\text{bd}7$

7... $\text{d}7$. This move is weak and illogical too. Black must defend his $e5$-pawn, and the bishop move to the $d7$-square does not contribute to that at all. 8. $\text{f}3$

$\text{c}6$ 9. $\text{b}5$ $\text{d}6$. Otherwise he cannot defend the $e5$-pawn, but now he has problems with the pin of the knight on $f6$. 10. $\text{d}5$

$\text{e}7$, crafty – Eatman, ICC 1998.

White had to continue in that
position with: 11...\textbf{\textit{cxe5 \textit{xh5}}}, 11...\textbf{\textit{xe5 \textit{xf6+}}}, and White recaptures his piece with a material advantage.) 12...\textbf{\textit{xf7+ \textit{d7}}}
13...\textbf{\textit{xe7 \textit{xe4}}} (Black loses material too after: 13...\textbf{\textit{xe7}} 14. \textbf{\textit{xh8 \textit{h8}}} 15.e5 \textbf{\textit{xe5}} 16. \textbf{\textit{he1+}}, and White wins the exchange.) 14...\textbf{\textit{xh8 \textit{xf2}}} (or 14...\textbf{\textit{xf5 \textit{xh8}}} 16...\textbf{\textit{xd6 cxd6}} 17...\textbf{\textit{d5+}}, and once again White remains with an extra exchange.)
15...\textbf{\textit{f7 \textit{xh1}}} 16...\textbf{\textit{xd6 cxd6}} 17. \textbf{\textit{xh1 h6}} 18...\textbf{\textit{h4 g5}} 19...\textbf{\textit{f5+}} White has an extra pawn in that endgame.

7...\textbf{\textit{f7}} 8...\textbf{\textit{e3}}. Black does not develop his pieces actively and White can afford to retreat his bishop, preserving the option to open the game with f2-f4. 8...\textbf{\textit{c6}} 9.f4 \textbf{\textit{c7}} (Even in case of: 9...\textbf{\textit{e8}} 10...\textbf{\textit{f3}} \textbf{\textit{exf4}} 11...\textbf{\textit{xf4 \textit{d5+}}}, White's position is clearly better – he has extra space and more active pieces.) 10...\textbf{\textit{f3}} \textbf{\textit{f6}} 11...\textbf{\textit{c4 \textit{d6}}} 12...\textbf{\textit{f5}}. White closes the centre and concentrates on the pawn-break g2-g4-g5 on the kingside. 12...\textbf{\textit{b6}} 13...\textbf{\textit{e2 \textit{d7}}} 14.g4 h6 15.a4 \textbf{\textit{b4}} 16...\textbf{\textit{a2 \textit{e7}}} 17.b3 a5 18.h4 \textbf{\textit{e8}} 19.g5 hxg5 20.hxg5 \textbf{\textit{xh1}} 21...\textbf{\textit{h1 \textit{d8d7}}} 22...\textbf{\textit{h7+}}. White has an active rook and a space advantage.

7...\textbf{\textit{e8}} 8...\textbf{\textit{d3 \textit{g4}}} (8...\textbf{\textit{bd7}} 9...\textbf{\textit{c4 c6}} – see 7...\textbf{\textit{bd7}} 8...\textbf{\textit{c4 \textit{e8}}}. 9...\textbf{\textit{f3}}; it is too bad for Black to play: 8...\textbf{\textit{c6?!}} 9...\textbf{\textit{b5 \textit{d7}}}, Klausner – Zimnol, Berlin 1995, and here White was winning with: 10...\textbf{\textit{xc6 \textit{xc6}}} 11...\textbf{\textit{xe5 \textit{xe4}}} 12...\textbf{\textit{xe4 \textit{xe4}}} 13...\textbf{\textit{xe7 \textit{xe7}}} 14...\textbf{\textit{he1+}} or 13...\textbf{\textit{xf2}} 14. \textbf{\textit{xe1 \textit{d1}}} 15...\textbf{\textit{h4+}} 19...\textbf{\textit{e2 \textit{xf3}}} 10...\textbf{\textit{xf3 \textit{c6}}} 11...\textbf{\textit{e2 \textit{d7}}} 12...\textbf{\textit{f3+}}, and in the game Suda- kova – Sharovatova, Rybinsk 1999, White preserved his two-bishop advantage and with that a slight, but stable positional edge.

8...\textbf{\textit{c4}}

It is also possible for White to play 8.f4. It is usually favourable for White, if the conditions are right, to open the game with the move f2-f4 in that line. 8...\textbf{\textit{g4}}

(8...\textbf{\textit{e8}} 9...\textbf{\textit{f3 \textit{exf4}}} 10...\textbf{\textit{xf4}} 11.e5 \textbf{\textit{g4}} 12...\textbf{\textit{e4 \textit{d6}}} 13...\textbf{\textit{h3+}}, Black has serious problems to develop his pieces; 8...\textbf{\textit{h6}}
9...\textbf{\textit{xf6 \textit{xf6}}} 10...\textbf{\textit{d3 \textit{exf4}}} 11.e5 \textbf{\textit{d7}} 12...\textbf{\textit{c4+}}. White recaptures his pawn, because after 12...\textbf{\textit{f8}}
he obtains a great advantage with: 13.e6 \textbf{\textit{xe6}} 14...\textbf{\textit{d4+}}. 19...\textbf{\textit{h3}}
16.e6 15...\textbf{\textit{f1 \textit{h6}}} 16...\textbf{\textit{g3 \textit{hxg5}}} 17...\textbf{\textit{g7+}}. White regains his pawn and maintains his initiative: 17...\textbf{\textit{b5}} 18...\textbf{\textit{g5 \textit{xh2}}} 19. \textbf{\textit{g7+}} – Black's rook is not de- veloped and his king is endangered too.) 13.e6– Sorensen –

8...\textit{\&}e8

Black cannot equalize either with: 8...\textit{\&}g4 9.\textit{\&}h3 f6 10.\textit{\&}h4 g5 11.\textit{\&}g3 h5 (He loses after 11...c6?, because of 12.\textit{\&}e6+- and White wins a piece, Nehlert – Rotzinger, Baden 1997.) 12.\textit{\&}e6 \textit{\&}d6 (It is not good for Black to play: 12...\textit{\&}c5 13.\textit{\&}d2± followed by \textit{\&}ad1 – Black must try to neutralize White’s pressure along the d-file.) 13.\textit{\&}g1 \textit{\&}c5 14.\textit{\&}xc8 \textit{\&}xc8 15.h4 \textit{\&}e6 16.\textit{\&}f3±. White plans to attack Black’s pawns on the kingside that have been pushed too far.

9.f4

It is also possible for White to play 9.\textit{\&}f3 c6. (The arising position can be reached after several other move-orders, for example in the line: 7...\textit{\&}e8 8.\textit{\&}f3, as well as after 6...c6 7.\textit{\&}c4 \textit{\&}e8 8.\textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}bd7 9.0–0–0 \textit{\&}e7. Therefore, despite the fact that White has a lot of other promising lines on the road of reaching that position, it should be analysed extensively.) 10.\textit{\&}he1 h6 (10...\textit{\&}g4, Pukropski – Simon, Voelklingen 2000, 11.\textit{\&}xe7 \textit{\&}xe7 12.h3 \textit{\&}gf6 13.a4±. Black has managed to exchange the bishops indeed, but still he has not solved his problems yet. His e5-pawn is weak and he must lose additional time to develop his forces.) 11.\textit{\&}h4 \textit{\&}h5 12.\textit{\&}xe7 \textit{\&}xe7 13.\textit{\&}d2±, and White preserved a slight advantage due to his dominance on the d-file in the game, Langeweg – Llado, Torremolinos 1962.

9...h6 10.\textit{\&}xf6 \textit{\&}xf6 11.\textit{\&}f3

It is also good for White to play: 11.\textit{\&}d5 \textit{\&}d8 12.\textit{\&}f3, for example: 12...c6 13.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}c7 14.\textit{\&}f5 \textit{\&}b6 15.\textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}xf5 16.exf5 exf4 17.\textit{\&}he1+ \textit{\&}f8 18.a4+. White’s initiative is quite dangerous, particularly if you take into account the misplaced black rooks.

11...\textit{\&}xf4

Or 11...c6 12.f5 b5 13.\textit{\&}d3 \textit{\&}c5 14.g4 \textit{\&}b7 15.h4±. White has the initiative on the kingside.

12.e5 \textit{\&}d8 (It is too bad for Black to play 12...\textit{\&}xe5 13.\textit{\&}xd7± Alekhine – Aviles, Nogales 1932, and White either wins two pieces for a rook, or after 13...\textit{\&}xc3 14.\textit{\&}xc7, followed by \textit{\&}xf7 obtains an overwhelming advantage.) 13.e6 (White persists with opening the game even further.)

13...\textit{\&}xe6 14.\textit{\&}xe6 \textit{\&}b6 15.\textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}f5 16.\textit{\&}he1+ \textit{\&}f8 17.\textit{\&}b5\textit{\&}d4 and \textit{\&}e5. Black’s pieces are not developed and White’s initiative more than compensates the temporary pawn sacrifice.
c) 6...c6

This move is an essential part of Black’s plan – he has to defend against the eventual penetration of the white knight to the b5 and d5-squares and ensures the c7-square for the retreat of the black king just in case.

7.\textit{\textit{\text欧元}4 \textit{\text欧元}e8}

Or 7...\textit{\text欧元}b4 8.\textit{\text欧元}xf7\textit{\text欧元}+, and White simply wins a pawn, Carvajal – Guerrero, Cali 2002.

7...\textit{\text欧元}e6 8.\textit{\text欧元}xe6 fxe6. There arises a similar position like in the line 6.\textit{\text欧元}c4 \textit{\text欧元}e6 7.\textit{\text欧元}xe6 fxe6, but with an essential difference that changes the evaluation radically. The point is that – when Black’s e-pawns are doubled and isolated – his e5-pawn is weak, because it cannot be defended by another pawn, or by a rook behind it. Black must place his bishop on d6 and his knight on d7 and since the c-pawn is already on the c6-square – that means that the bishop on d6 will not have any protection along the d-file. So, Black will have to find some other way of defending his e5-pawn. 9.0–0–0\textit{\text欧元}bd7 (In case of 9...\textit{\text欧元}c7 10.\textit{\text欧元}f3 \textit{\text欧元}d6 11.\textit{\text欧元}h4, Black will have to play \textit{\text欧元}bd7 immediately now, or on the next move, and that transposes to the line 9...\textit{\text欧元}bd7; 9...\textit{\text欧元}e8, Starostits – Krapivin, Ceske Budejovice 1998, 10.\textit{\text欧元}f3 \textit{\text欧元}bd7 11.a3!?\textit{\text欧元}+, which prevents the move \textit{\text欧元}b4 and prepares \textit{\text欧元}h4-g3. By the way, it deserves attention for White to play immediately: 11.\textit{\text欧元}h4 \textit{\text欧元}b4 12.\textit{\text欧元}he1 \textit{\text欧元}xc3 13.bxc3 \textit{\text欧元}c5 14.\textit{\text欧元}xe5 \textit{\text欧元}fxe4 15.\textit{\text欧元}d3\textit{\text欧元}+ and Black has serious problems to defend his e6-pawn.) 10.\textit{\text欧元}f3 \textit{\text欧元}c7 11.\textit{\text欧元}h4 \textit{\text欧元}d6 12.\textit{\text欧元}g3 h6 13.\textit{\text欧元}d2 b5 14.\textit{\text欧元}hd1\textit{\text欧元}+ e8. Black’s light pieces form now a defensive construction that is totally immovable... 15.h4 \textit{\text欧元}g8 16.h5 \textit{\text欧元}b8 17.\textit{\textEuro}h4\textit{\textEuro}+ Black is pinned all over the board, Zakharov – Gusakov, Olimp 1993.

8.\textit{\text欧元}f3 \textit{\text欧元}bd7

After 8...\textit{\textEuro}d7, with the idea to follow with \textit{\textEuro}b6 and \textit{\textEuro}a6-c5, White should consider the possibility 9.a3!?\textit{\textEuro}+, in order to retreat the bishop to the a2-square and to prepare b2-b4 later.

9.0–0–0 \textit{\textEuro}c5

About 9...\textit{\textEuro}e7 – see 6...\textit{\textEuro}e7.

9...\textit{\textEuro}b4 (this move is not satisfactory for Black at all) 10.\textit{\textEuro}xf6 \textit{\textEuro}xf6 11.\textit{\textEuro}e2 (White is trying to bring his knight around the d5 and h5 squares.) 11...\textit{\textEuro}c5 12.\textit{\textEuro}g3 (The move 12.a3 presents Black with the additional possibility of playing: 12...\textit{\textEuro}xe4 13.axb4 \textit{\textEuro}xf2.) 12...\textit{\textEuro}e6 13.a3 \textit{\textEuro}a5 14.\textit{\textEuro}f5\textit{\textEuro}+ and White’s positional advantage is considerable, because
of his better pawn-structure and the powerful knight on the f5-outpost, Contreras – Romero, Merida 2000.

9...\texttt{g}4 (with the idea to play f7-f6 and to bring the knight later to h6 and f7.) 10.\texttt{h}f1 (It also deserves attention for White to play 10.\texttt{h}h4!? \texttt{e}e7 11.\texttt{g}3 f6 12.h3 \texttt{e}h6 13.a3\pm, with a slight advantage.) 10...f6 11.\texttt{h}h4 \texttt{c}5. That move can be punished by White with an interesting tactical operation: 12.h3 \texttt{h}h6 13.\texttt{x}xe5 g5 (that is the only move – Black defends the important d8-square with tempo) 14.\texttt{g}3 fxe5 15.\texttt{x}e5 \texttt{g}8 16.\texttt{x}g8 \texttt{x}g8 17.\texttt{d}d6\uparrow Lochte – Hirn, Germany 1997. White’s rook, together with the passed pawns, is worth more than Black’s two light pieces in that position.

9...b5. This attack is natural and quite logical at that.

[Diagram]

Now, Black can counter 10.\texttt{b}3 with the rather annoying line for White: 10...a5 11.a4 (11.a3 b4 12.\texttt{axb}4 \texttt{axb}4 13.\texttt{a}a4 \texttt{xe}4\texttt{a}4; 11.\texttt{x}f6 gxf6 12.a4 b4 13.\texttt{e}e2 \texttt{c}c5 14.\texttt{g}3 h5 15.h4 \texttt{e}e6 – and Black is not worse to say the least.) 11.b4 12.\texttt{b}b1 \texttt{xe}4 13.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{xe}5 14.\texttt{x}g5 \texttt{e}e7 15.\texttt{xf}7 \texttt{f}8 16.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xe}5 17.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xf}2 18.\texttt{de}1 \texttt{a}a7 (Black has this resource at his disposal now as a result of the move a7-a5, that he has already played.) 19.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{d}8 20.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{f}6 and Black’s game is quite acceptable.

The consequences of the bishop’s sacrifice on b5 are unclear: 10.\texttt{xb}5 \texttt{xb}5 11.\texttt{xb}5 \texttt{xb}8 12.\texttt{c}c7+ \texttt{d}d8 13.\texttt{d}d5 (It is better for White to follow with: 13.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xc}7 14.\texttt{xf}7 \texttt{g}8 15.\texttt{f}4+ \texttt{b}7 16.\texttt{xb}8 \texttt{xb}8 17.\texttt{e}e1, and the material ratio is quite rare and unusual (a rook and four pawns for three light pieces...) and an absolutely unclear position. 13...\texttt{e}7 14.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xe}5 15.\texttt{xe}7+ \texttt{e}7 16.f4 h6 17.\texttt{xf}6+ \texttt{xf}6 18.\texttt{e}e5 \texttt{e}5\uparrow Reipsch – Lorenz, Germany 1996. Black has defended successfully and preserved his material advantage.

It is more promising for White to follow with: 10.\texttt{xb}5 \texttt{xb}5 11.\texttt{xb}5 \texttt{b}8 12.\texttt{c}c6\uparrow h6 (12...\texttt{g}4 13.h3 \texttt{xf}2 14.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{e}7 15.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{d}1 16.\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{f}6 17.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xb}2 18.\texttt{b}1 \texttt{xd}7 19.\texttt{xd}7\pm, and the position of Black’s king is so terrible that even the possibility of a discovered check is not enough to take him safely out of the woods; 12...\texttt{e}7 13.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 14.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{b}5 15.\texttt{e}e1\uparrow) 13.\texttt{h}4 g5 14.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{b}6 15.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{g}7 16.\texttt{xd}7+ \texttt{xd}7 17.\texttt{c}4\uparrow. White’s
material compensation is ample in these lines – three pawns for the piece – and his prospects are excellent due to his queenside pawn-majority and the vulnerability of the black king.

10.\text{h}4

We reached by transposition the game Malakhov – Damljanovic, Chalkidiki 2002. It continued: 10...\text{b}6 11.\text{d}2 \text{c}7 12.\text{hd}1 \text{e}7 (it is not good for Black to play here: 12...\text{h}6 13.\text{xf}6 \text{gxf}6 14.\text{xf}7+--; 13...\text{xf}6 14.\text{xe}5\pm, and Black cannot capture on e5, because of \text{d}8+) 13.\text{a}3 \text{h}6 14.\text{b}4 \text{e}8 (But not: 14...\text{b}5? 15.\text{xb}5 \text{cxb}5 16.\text{d}5+ \text{d}8 17.\text{xf}6+-) 15.\text{e}1. White redeployed his knight from the now useless position on f3 (Black’s e5-pawn is reliably defended) to the queenside. 15...\text{b}6 16.\text{b}3 \text{g}5 17.\text{g}3 \text{h}5 18.\text{d}3 \text{f}6 19.\text{c}5 \text{d}8 20.\text{x}d8 \text{xd}8 21.\text{f}3. White has the advantage – his pieces are more active, particularly the knight on c5 and he has the initiative on the queenside. On the other hand, Black’s position is very solid and he has covered all possible squares for penetration. 21...\text{a}5 22.\text{f}2 \text{axb}4 23.\text{AXB}4 \text{a}1+ 24.\text{b}1 \text{f}4 25.\text{g}3 \text{h}3 26.\text{c}3 \text{c}7 27.\text{b}2 \text{a}8 28.\text{c}3 \text{h}5 29.\text{e}2 \text{b}8 30.\text{g}1 \text{x}g1 31.\text{x}g1\pm, and White maintained some pressure.

**Conclusion**

We have analysed some lines for Black in the 3...e5 system, in which he refrains from the main line 6...\text{e}6, with the idea to develop gradually his queenside first. Black’s plans include \text{bd}7, followed by the development of that knight later to c5 or b6-squares, and the introduction of the light squared bishop into action. Black is ready to defend his f7-pawn (in answer to \text{c}4) with his king either with \text{e}8, or with \text{e}7, in case his bishop has already been developed to d6 or b4. Black intends to neutralize White’s initiative by simplification of the position. It would be a real achievement for him if he manages to exchange rooks along the open d-file. Nevertheless Black’s position remains worse throughout, because of his lag in development and his misplaced king stranded in the centre. White can easily deploy his pieces to active squares, for example the light squared bishop to c4, the knight on f3 and the rooks along the d-file. White’s pressure would be long-lasting then.
Chapter 5

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ½f6 3.½c3 e5 4.dxe5 dxe5 5.½xd8+ ½xd8 6.½g5 ½e6

This is the most popular line for Black in the contemporary tournament practice. Black develops his bishop, defending the f7-pawn, before developing the knight to d7. Well, the placement of the bishop on e6 makes White’s offensive with f2-f4 even more effective – White is threatening f4-f5; additionally the bishop on e6 comes under the attack of White’s knight from the g5, or d4-squares.

7.0-0-0+

White’s next move will be – f2-f4, opening the game.

The unavoidable exchange on f4 will open the position and White will have additional chances to exploit the unfavourable position of Black’s king. White can attack the c7-square (½xf4 and ½b5), he also has the resource e4-e5, followed by the manoeuvre ½f3-d4xe6 exchanging Black’s bishop on e6.

White will have to pay a price for his active possibilities, mostly because of the weakening of his e4-pawn.

Black is faced with a choice now.

He can leave presently his king on the d8-square and interpose against the check with the knight c) 7...½bd7, or with the bishop, but he should worry about the threat e4-e5 – since his knight on f6 is pinned, while his king is on the d8-square. He can also retreat with the king: a) 7...½e8, or b) 7...½c8 immediately, so that he can play with the knight in case of e4-e5, for example to g4.

The move 7...½d6 is clearly weaker than the rest of the moves. It seems ugly – the bishop there can be attacked with ½b5 and e4-e5 (after f2-f4). 8.f4 ½e8 (8...½g4 9.fxe5 ½xd1 10.exf6 g6 11.½xe1+ – and White’s material advantage is sufficient to win the game, Vojta – Zboril, Czech Republic 2001; 8...h6, Lane – Tim-
mer, Oberhausen 1966, loses a pawn after: 9.fxe5 hgx5 10. exd6±; 8...c8 – 7...c8 8.f4 d6
9.f3 (It is also quite convincing for White to follow with: 9.f5 d7 10.xf6 gx6 11.d5 c6 12. xf6+ f8 13.f3± Milovanovic – Balic, Yugoslavia 1994. Black’s bishop-pair might not be quite enough to compensate the one pawn-deficit, but White’s realization of the extra pawn might not be so easy after all...) 9...c6 10.f5 c8 (But of course not: 10...g4 11.fxe6+ and White’s material advantage is decisive, Tugaj – Kachkina, Voronezh 2003.) 11.xf6 gx6 12.d5±, and White simply wins a pawn.

15.exf6±. Black can recapture the f6-pawn at some moment, but his weakness on f4 will remain.

10.e5!? It is worse for White to play e4-e5 after a different move order like: 10.xf4 c6 11.e5, because of 11...d5 (Black can now retreat with his knight in the centre.) 12.xd5 xd5++, and Black has a good position.

In the game Oral – Machelett, Germany 2003, White had no advantage after: 10.d4 db7 11.xf4 c6 12.f5 f8 13.e2 h6 14.g4 g5= 15.d2 xf5 16. exf5. His bishop-pair was not so effective. The game continued: 16...e5 17.a4 d6 18. a5 (or 18.h4 gxh4 19.xh4 e7 – Black is quite solid on the dark squares.) 18...e7 19.c4 (The combination after: 19.xd6 xd6 20.d1+, does not work, because of 20...e7 21.b4+ e8 22.c3 fd7 23.xd7 xd7 24. xe5 he8 25.c5+ c8 26.d3 f6++, and Black remains with a material advantage. It is worse for him to play: 20...d5 21.c4 b5 22.xb5 hxc8 23.c3 e7 24. xxd5+ xxd5+ 25.b1=, and White has good compensation.) 19...b6 20.c3 e4 21.d4 f6= and the position is about equal.

10...e3+ Or 10...fd7 11.xf4± – and White has active pieces, while Black has not solved the problem of development of pieces yet. The
isolation of the e5-pawn is immaterial under the circumstances.

11.\( \mathcal{B} \)b1 \( \mathcal{F} \)d7

12.g3 h6 (Black does not fare any better after: 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 13.\( \mathcal{R} \)xf4 \( \mathcal{R} \)xf4 14.gxf4±) 13.\( \mathcal{R} \)xf4±. White has active pieces and a space advantage after the exchange on f4.

b) 7...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c8

The placement of the black king on c8 has some drawbacks too. His rook on a8 is thus isolated for a long time and White can exploit that in case he manages to open the position. We will encounter that retreat of the king again in the line: 7...\( \mathcal{Q} \)bd7 8.f4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf4 9.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c8. Therefore we will not deal here with lines in which Black captures on f4 and then develops his knight to d7.

8.f4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf4

The move 8...\( \mathcal{Q} \)d6, Chang – Renzi, Elista 1998, is not good for Black now, just like on move 7: 9.f5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d7 10.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xf6 gxf6 11.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d5 (this is the simplest for White now – he wins a pawn. Meanwhile, it is also possible for White to play: 11.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)e8 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3±, with a huge positional advantage for him.) 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xf6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d7, V.Ivanov – Gorin, Moscow 1998, and here, after: 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xd7 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xd7 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)e7 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d3±, Black’s compensation is obviously insufficient.

It is not good for Black to play: 8...h6 9.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xf6 gxf6 10.f5±. His pieces are totally misplaced and the pawns on f6 and f7 are terribly weak: 10...\( \mathcal{Q} \)d7 11.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d5 (It is also possible for White to play 11.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c4, after which Black cannot play the active line: 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)g8 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xf7 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xg2 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g7 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \)h3, because White penetrates along the g-file and Black is forced to play: 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)h7 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g7 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3±. The placement of the black rook is just terrible, nevertheless White cannot achieve much directly.) 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)g7 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d3 (this is the most energetic line for White) 12...c6 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \)g3 cxd5 (Black had better comply with the fact that his rook will remain extremely passive: 13...\( \mathcal{Q} \)h7 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c3±. Black’s position is terrible, but at least he does not lose anything by force yet.)

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14.\textit{Ex}g7 \textit{f}f8 (White is again better after: 14...dxe4 15.\textit{Ex}f7 \textit{xf}5 16.\textit{Ex}f6±, and Black's e-pawns will be very weak.) 15.\textit{c}d3. White's rook on g7 provides him with the advantage, for example: 15...\textit{c}c6 16.exd5 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{c}c2 \textit{d}d7 18.\textit{c}c3 \textit{c}c6 19.\textit{c}e4 \textit{xe}4 20.\textit{c}xe4 \textit{d}d8 21.\textit{h}h7± and White has an extra pawn and a better position, Solozhenkin – Bryndin, St. Petersburg 1992.

9.\textit{bc}g2

White develops his knight here (and then from e2 to f4), so that he can attack the enemy bishop on e6 as quickly as possible.

Now, after 9.\textit{bc}f3, in the game Fercec – Dizdarevic, Rijeka 2003, there followed: 9...\textit{c}c5 (9...\textit{bc}d7 – 7...\textit{bc}d7) 10.\textit{bc}f4 \textit{g}4 11.\textit{bc}5 (White cannot achieve anything after: 11.\textit{bc}d5 \textit{xd}5 12.\textit{bc}xd5 \textit{d}d7.) 11...\textit{bc}6 12.\textit{bc}e1 \textit{c}c6 13.h3 \textit{f}f6 14.\textit{bc}5 \textit{g}6 15.\textit{bc}3 \textit{h}5 16.\textit{bc}e6 \textit{xe}6 17.\textit{bc}h2 \textit{f}f2 18.\textit{bc}d1, and the opponents agreed to a draw in an approximately equal position. It is quite obvious that White used four moves (\textit{bc}f3, \textit{bc}f4, and \textit{bc}g5xe6) in order to exchange Black's bishop on e6, while the move 9.\textit{bc}g2 enables White to do the same without removing the bishop from g5 and thus saves time.

9...\textit{bc}d7

9...\textit{bc}d6 10.\textit{bc}f4 \textit{bc}f4+ 11.\textit{bc}f4 \textit{bc}g4 (In case Black continues with his development, for example with: 11...\textit{bc}c6, then White has 12.\textit{bc}xe6 \textit{fxe}6 13.\textit{bc}4±. Black is now forced to retreat with the knight to the d8-square, or play e6-e5, and in both cases he loses the possibility to play \textit{bc}e5, because after 13...\textit{bc}e8, White follows with 14.\textit{bc}b5, compromising Black's pawn-structure on the queenside.) 12.\textit{bc}e1 \textit{bc}c6 13.\textit{bc}d5 \textit{dd}7 (This is a blunder, but Black's position was too passive anyway, for example after: 13...\textit{bc}e8 14.e5± – Black's knight on e8 defends the pawn indeed, but it is obviously misplaced.) 14.\textit{bc}b5 a6 15.\textit{bc}xc7 \textit{bc}b8, and White managed to take his knight on c7 out of isolation with: 16.h3 \textit{h}h5 17.\textit{bc}f4+, and he remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Dreev – Bebchuk, Moscow 1991.

10.\textit{bc}x\textit{f}4

This is with the idea to capture – \textit{bc}xe6 and to follow with attacking the e6-pawn.

10...\textit{bc}g4

White can maintain his advantage after: 10...c6 11.\textit{bc}xe6 \textit{fxe}6 12.\textit{bc}c4 \textit{e}5 13.\textit{bc}e6 \textit{wc}7 14.h\textit{h}f1 h6 15.\textit{bc}h4 \textit{dd}6, but here instead of the premature: 16.
This position was reached in the game: Oral – Lorscheid, Budapest 1998.

12.h3!? Bxf4 13.Bxf4 e6
(If 13...h5, with the idea to avoid the knight-attack against e6, in case of Bb5-c7, then: 14.Bb5 c6 15.Bc7 Bb8 16.Be8 f6 – or 16.Ba8 17.e5±, so that White can capture on d6 with the pawn – 17.Bd6+ Bxd6 18.Bxd6 Bb8 19.e5±. Black is still not well-prepared for opening the game – he must bring his rook on a8 into action and that is not so easy at all.) 14.Bb5 Bb4 15.Bc3. White increases the pressure against c7. 15...Bc5 (15...Ba5 16.Bc7++) 16.Bc3++, and White obtains material advantage.

c) 7...Bbd7

This is the most natural move. Black should delay for some time bringing his king to safety, while the knight should be developed quickly to the d7-square.

8.f4
This is the most energetic move. White should try to exploit
the temporarily unfavourable placement of the black king by opening of the position, despite the fact that his e4-pawn is weakened.

8...exf4

Naturally, Black loses after: 8...h6?? 9.\(\text{\text{xf}}\text{f}6+\) \(gxf6\) 10.f5--.

9.\(\text{\text{xf}}\text{f}3\)

White does not achieve much after: 9.e5 h6 10.\(\text{\text{h}}\text{h}4\) g5 11.exf6 gxf6

Now, after 10.e5 h6 11.\(\text{\text{h}}\text{h}4\) g7-g5, White has the move N\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\), which leads to a temporary win of a pawn. So, Black must make up his mind whether to ignore that threat with 1c1) 9...\(\text{\text{c}}\text{c}5\), or to defend against it by retreating with the king 1c3) 9...\(\text{\text{c}}\text{c}8\), or to defend along the diagonal with the move 1c2) 9...\(\text{\text{e}}\text{e}7\), or just play 9...h6 (Chapter 6).

In case of 9...\(\text{\text{e}}\text{e}8\), White has the move 10.\(\text{\text{b}}\text{b}5\), attacking the pawn that was just left defenseless by the black king – and it is not clear how it can be defended at all...

It is not good for Black to play 9...\(\text{\text{b}}\text{b}4\) either. He does not prevent White from winning a pawn with the move e4-e5, and he plans to exchange deliberately his dark-squared bishop on \(c3\). That deprives Black of his two bishops, so that he will have no compensation whatsoever for the pawn-deficit. 10.e5 \(\text{\text{xc}}\text{c}3\) 11.bxc3 h6 12.\(\text{\text{h}}\text{h}4\) g5 13.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\) h\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\) 14.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\text{h}}\text{h}5\) (This is in order to force White to capture on g6 with the bishop, so that later Black can exchange the dark-squared bishops.) 14...\(\text{\text{h}}\text{h}5\) 15.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{f}6+\) \(\text{\text{e}}\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{\text{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\text{xf}}\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{\text{e}}\text{e}6\) \(\text{\text{f}}\text{f}5\) 18.\(\text{\text{d}}\text{d}3\) (White can easily capture the f4-pawn in return of the f6-pawn.) 18...\(\text{\text{x}}\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{\text{f}}\text{f}1\) f3 20.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\text{x}}\text{f}3\) 21.\(\text{\text{g}}\text{xf}3\) \(\text{\text{e}}\text{e}7\) 22.\(\text{\text{a}}\text{a}4\) a5 23.h4±

Appolonov – Vorotnikov, Podolsk 1993. White has an extra passed pawn in that endgame, but it would not be so easy for him to press his advantage home due to his numerous pawn-weaknesses.

1c1) 9...\(\text{\text{c}}\text{c}5\) 10.e5 h6

About 10...\(\text{\text{e}}\text{e}3\) 11.b1 h6 – see 10...h6.

11.\(\text{\text{h}}\text{h}4\) g5 12.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\) h\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\)

13.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{g}5\)

It was all forced until now.

Black’s chances to get some compensation for the pawn are to exchange White’s dark-squared bishop and to defend somehow his f4-pawn with his bishop from the e3-square. Well, White will still have the passed h-pawn, which might become a powerful trump for him in the future battle.

13...\(\text{\text{g}}\text{g}8\)
Black can try to realize the same idea in another fashion, but that is not so favourable for him – 13...\( \text{a}h5 \) 14.\( \text{a}x\text{f6+} \, \text{c}e8 \) 15.\( \text{a}e2 \, \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 16.\( \text{a}x\text{f6} \, \text{h}5 \). Black now fails to regain his material: 17.\( \text{a}f3 \, \text{a}x\text{f6} \) (or 17...\( \text{b}8 \) 18.\( \text{a}e4 \, \text{a}e3+ \) 19.\( \text{b}1± \) – Black’s rook on \( f5 \) is rather misplaced.) 18.\( \text{a}x\text{b7} \, \text{b}8 \) 19.\( \text{a}f3± \), Motylev – Gelman, Ekaterinburg 1996. Black’s compensation for the lost material is insufficient and his best chance is to try to save the draw in an endgame with opposite-coloured bishops – exchanging his bishop on \( e6 \) for White’s knight.

Black can at first check from the \( e3 \)-square: 13...\( \text{a}e3+ \) 14.\( \text{a}b1 \, \text{h}5 \) (Black fails to capture White’s bishop on \( g5 \) in the line: 14...\( \text{c}c8 \) 15.\( \text{a}x\text{f6} \, \text{g}8 \) 16.\( h4± \) – White’s h-pawn is very powerful, while Black is a pawn down in a bad position: 16...\( \text{g}4 \) 17.\( \text{a}e2 \, \text{x}e2 \) 18.\( \text{a}x\text{e2} \, \text{c}6 \) 19.\( \text{d}d4 \, \text{c}7 \) 20.\( \text{f}5 \, \text{e}5 \) 21.\( \text{x}e3 \, \text{f}xe3 \) 22.\( \text{x}e3++ \) and White’s position is easily winning, Fontaine – Zcharov, Rimavska Sobota 1992.) 15.\( \text{a}x\text{f6+} \, \text{e}8 \) 16.\( \text{a}e2 \, \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 17.\( \text{e}x\text{f6} \, \text{h}6 \) 18.\( g4 \) (White can also play like in the game Motylev – Gelman: 18.\( \text{a}f3?! \, \text{b}8 \), and now it is good for him to try: 19.\( g4 \, \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 20.\( h4 \, \text{e}7 \) 21.\( h5± \). The material is equal indeed, but Black’s f-pawns are blocked forever, while White’s g and h-pawns are going forward...) 18...\( \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 19.\( \text{a}f3 \, \text{d}8 \) 20.\( g5 \, \text{g}6 \) (Black’s rook comes permanently under attack somehow...) 21.\( h4 \, \text{c}6 \) 22.\( \text{e}4 \) (White ensures the possibility to play later \( h5 \).) 22...\( \text{d}5 \) 23.\( h5 \, \text{a}6 \) 24.\( \text{f}6+, \) and now after the forced line: 24...\( \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 25.\( \text{x}f6 \, \text{f}3 \) 26.\( \text{a}x\text{d8+} \, \text{a}x\text{d8} \) 27.\( h6! \, \text{d}4 \) 28.\( \text{f}1 \, \text{x}f6 \) 29.\( \text{x}f3++\) – White had an easily winning position in the game Frumkin – Skeels, corr. 1992.

14.\( \text{a}x\text{f6+} \, \text{c}8 \) 15.\( \text{e}4 \)

The alternative for White is: 15.\( \text{b}1 \) 16.\( \text{h}4 \, \text{c}7 \) 17.\( h5 \, \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{e}f6\)±, pushing forward the passed pawn and making life difficult for Black if he wishes to regain his pawn.

15...\( \text{e}3+ \) 16.\( \text{b}1 \, \text{c}6 \) 17.\( h4 \, \text{a}x\text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{a}x\text{f6} \)

White has the advantage indeed, but it is not easy at all to win that position, because Black can block the passed pawn on the dark squares and can counterattack the e5-pawn. 18...\( \text{g}3 \) 19.\( \text{e}4 \, \text{g}4 \) 20.\( \text{g}5 \, \text{c}7 \) 21.\( \text{x}e6+ \) \( \text{f}6 \) 22.\( h5\) White’s passed h-pawn was brought later to the h7-square and won for White, despite the opposite-coloured bishops, in the game Smikovski – Chuprovec, Omsk 1996.
c2) 9...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}7}}

Black’s bishop is very passive here and after White captures on f4 – it will have to go to the b4-square anyway. It is therefore quite reasonable to ask – why lose a tempo to play two moves with the same bishop if Black can play instead 9...h6 and \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}4}} outright?

\textbf{10.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}xf4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}6}} 11.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d4!}}

That is the precise move. White intends to counter Bb4 with e5, and if Black captures on c3 – White captures on f6. White’s knight on d4 covers the diagonal of the black bishop in that case. In the line: 11.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}5} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}4}} 12.e5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}}3} 13.bxc3 (White has only a minimal compensation for the pawn after: 13.exf6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}6} 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}xe6+} fxe6 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}7} 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{he}1=f}) 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}5}}≠, and White’s pawn-structure is just terrible.

\textbf{11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}4}} 12.e5}

This is better than: 12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}xe6+} fxe6 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}7} 14.e5 (14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}2} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ad8=}) 14...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}5}} (After 14...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}}3} White has the tactical solution: 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}6}!↑ V.Ivanov – Prokopchuk, Moscow 1999.) 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}5+} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}8!} 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}5} (16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}5 exd5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}3} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}5=)} 16...exd5 17.e6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}5} 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{de}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}}3} 19.bxc3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}4∞ – and White fails to penetrate the enemy camp.}

\textbf{12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}}3} 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exf}}6} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}4} 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{gxf}}6} 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}3}≠}

Black’s material advantage is temporary, while his kingside and particularly the h-pawn are very weak. White has a pair of powerful bishops and his dark-squared bishop is especially strong. 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}5}} (Black is trying to evacuate his king away from the d8-square in order to defend against the threat \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}6.) 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}7} 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{he}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}6} 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}3} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ad8} 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}4}. White attacks Black’s weaknesses in a direct and straightforward fashion.}\ 19...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}5}} 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}2} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}4}. Black prefers to give up the c-pawn.}} 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exd}}4} 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}2} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}4} 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}4}≠ Svidler – Zvjaginsev, Alma-Ata 1991. White has regained the sacrificed material and now Black is faced with a long and difficult defence in a clearly worse endgame.
c3) 9...\textit{c}e8 10.\textit{x}xf4

The most vulnerable spot in Black's position at the moment is the c7-square. He has permanently to worry about the threat \textit{d}b5.

10...\textit{d}h5

That move solves the problem of the defence of the c7-pawn, because White must remove his bishop from the dangerous diagonal. Well, Black's knight on h5 is not so well placed either...

Black's other possibilities are:

10...\textit{g}4 (This is an active counterattacking move.) 11.\textit{b}5!

The arising complications are in favour of White. 11...\textit{f}2 12.\textit{xc}7 \textit{xc}h1 13.\textit{xa}8 \textit{f}2 14.\textit{d}4! White remains with an extra pawn, moreover it is not clear at all how Black can capture the knight on a8. It even participates somehow in the attack against the black king. 14...\textit{c}5 15.\textit{a}4 \textit{g}4 (The other possibility for Black is also bad: 15...\textit{d}8 16.\textit{e}2 \textit{b}5 17.\textit{xb}5 \textit{b}7, Maljutin – Komliakov, Azov 1991 – Black cannot capture the knight, while White has the resource: 18.b4! \textit{xa}8 19.bxc5 \textit{xc}5 20.\textit{b}4± – and Black's king is vulnerable. White could have also played: 19.\textit{a}6+ \textit{b}6 20.\textit{xc}5+ 21.\textit{e}3±) 16.\textit{c}7 \textit{e}3+ 17.\textit{x}xe3 \textit{xe}3 18.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 19.\textit{e}2 \textit{g}x2 20.\textit{xa}7 \textit{f}4 21.\textit{a}8+ \textit{b}8 22.\textit{d}2±, and White has material advantage in the endgame, Cifuentes Parada – Reinderman, Netherlands 1996;

10...\textit{a}6 (This move defends reliably against \textit{b}5.) 11.\textit{g}5!? Presently, White plans to exchange on e6 and follow with \textit{c}4, but this move conceals another interesting idea – in case Black plays \textit{d}5 and his bishop gets exchanged on the d5-square – White can attack the f7-square with his knight. (White obtains no advantage after: 11.e5 \textit{g}4 12.\textit{g}3 \textit{e}3 13.\textit{e}1 \textit{f}5. In the game Ivanka – Timmer, Yugoslavia, Black has a very solid position after: 11.h3 \textit{b}4 12.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}5 13.\textit{ex}d5 \textit{d}6 14.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xd}6 15.\textit{g}4 \textit{e}8 16.\textit{d}4 \textit{g}6 17.\textit{g}2 \textit{e}5 18.\textit{hf}1 \textit{fd}7±, and as Tigran Petrosian used to say – Black can rely indefinitely on his knight on e5 to be able to parry White's initiative – he has presently everything defended.) 11...\textit{b}4 12.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}5 13.\textit{ex}d5 \textit{f}8 (Black is forced to start defending his weaknesses immediately.) 14.\textit{g}3± \textit{h}3. In answer to \textit{d}6, White should not be so much in a hurry to trade on d6. Instead, he can develop quickly his bishop on h3 and his rook on e1 – otherwise Black's king is very effec-
tive in the fight for the e-file;

10...\textit{b}c5. This is a solid move. The bishop on e5 (or on b6) is safe from being attacked, contrary to its position on the b4 and a5-squares. 11.e5 \textit{d}g4 12.\textit{e}e4 \textit{e}e8+ 13.\textit{x}xe3 \textit{g}xe3 14.\textit{e}e1 \textit{x}xf1 15.\textit{h}xf1. White has a slight advantage – he has extra space and his rooks are already developed. Later in the game: Vaisser – Rausis, Hyeres 1992, there followed: 15...\textit{d}d8 16.\textit{e}eg5 \textit{e}e7 17.\textit{d}d4 h6 18.\textit{g}xe6 (18.\textit{f}xf7 \textit{h}h8 19.\textit{x}xe6 \textit{g}xe6 20.\textit{e}e3 \textit{xf}7 21.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 22.\textit{e}e6+ \textit{e}e7 23.\textit{ex}d7+ 24.\textit{x}d7=) 18...\textit{f}xe6 19.\textit{f}f3 \textit{h}h8 20.\textit{e}e4 \textit{ad}8 21.h4 \textit{x}f3 22.\textit{xf}3, and White preserves a slight advantage due to his active pieces;

10...\textit{b}b4. This is not Black's best move at the moment. In fact, White's knight would not mind to go to b5 or to the d5-square from c3. 11.\textit{d}d5 (It is also not bad for White to follow with: 11.\textit{b}b5 \textit{a}a5 12.\textit{b}d4 \textit{x}e4. Otherwise, White exchanges as usual and attacks the e6-square, and that is even more effective with a knight on f3, than on c3. 13.\textit{xe}6 fxe6 14.\textit{c}c4 \textit{e}e8 15.\textit{h}f1. Development of pieces, particularly if we have in mind Black's "dead" rook on a8, is more important than a mere pawn. 15...\textit{c}c6 16.\textit{g}g5 \textit{x}g5 17.\textit{x}g5 \textit{c}c7 18.\textit{f}f7 \textit{f}f8 19.\textit{g}g7, and White has a huge positional advantage, despite the material equality, Zufic – Armanda, Opatija 2002, or 17...h6 18.\textit{e}e3 b5 19.eb3 \textit{b}b6 20.\textit{x}xb6 ab 21.\textit{f}f7 \textit{c}c5 22.\textit{x}d6, and White can begin gobbling pawns...)

11...\textit{xd}5 (The game Moskalenko – Komliakov, Serpukhov 2004, continued with: 11...\textit{a}a5 12.\textit{x}f6 \textit{xf}6 13.\textit{d}d3 c6 14.\textit{g}g5 \textit{c}c7 15.\textit{h}f1 \textit{xf}4+ 16.\textit{xf}4 \textit{e}e8. Black is forced to play like that; otherwise after the exchange on e6, followed by e4-e5, White penetrates on the opponent's seventh rank. 17.e5 \textit{d}d5 18.\textit{x}e6 \textit{x}f4 19.\textit{xf}4 \textit{xe}5 20.\textit{x}h7 g6 21.\textit{h}h3 \textit{f}f5 22.g4 \textit{f}f6 23.\textit{g}g5 \textit{c}c7 24.h4 \textit{h}h8 25.h5= – White has some material advantage indeed, but it will be too hard for him to press it home, because of the displacement of his bishop on the h7-square. Instead of the trade on the f6-square on move 12, it might be very good for White to try 12.\textit{g}g5 – he can exchange the powerful black knight later in the game, while the manoeuvre \textit{g}g5xe6 is an essential part of his plan anyway: 12...\textit{e}e8 13.\textit{c}c4 \textit{h}h5 14.\textit{d}d2 \textit{xd}2+ 15.\textit{x}d2 \textit{e}e5 16.\textit{h}d1 c6 17.\textit{e}e2; or 13...\textit{g}g4 14.\textit{d}d4 \textit{xd}5 15.\textit{ex}d5 h6 16.\textit{e}e4 \textit{x}e4 17.\textit{xe}4, 12.exd5 \textit{g}g4 13.\textit{g}g3 \textit{d}d6 (13...\textit{e}e3 14.\textit{d}d3 \textit{c}c5 15.\textit{e}e1 \textit{e}e8 16.g3 \textit{x}f1. The bishop could now go to the h3-square. 17.\textit{x}f1. White had a huge lead in development in the game: Milov – Seiler, Baden 1998.) 14.\textit{d}d4 h5 15.\textit{d}d3 (15.\textit{xd}6!? \textit{xd}6 16.\textit{b}b5!? The simplest solution of the problem with the knight on
e5 is to exchange it. 16...a6 17. 
\[ \text{\textit{\v{c}e}3} \text{e5 4.de de 5.\textit{\v{c}}xd8 \textit{\v{c}}xd8 6.\textit{\v{c}}g5 \textit{\v{c}}e6 7.0-0-0} \]
\[ e5 \text{ is to exchange it. } 16...a6 17. \textit{\v{c}}xd7+ \textit{\v{c}}xd7 18.\textit{\v{c}}g5 \textit{\v{c}}ae8 19.\textit{\v{c}}f1 \textit{\v{e}}7 20.\textit{\v{c}}xf7 \textit{\v{c}}xf7 21.\textit{\v{c}}xf7 \textit{\v{e}}f8 22. \textit{\v{c}}f4 \textit{\v{c}}f6 23.\textit{\v{c}}g5 \textit{\v{c}}e8 24.\textit{\v{d}}d2±. 
\]
After capturing on d5 – White’s pawn-structure is just slightly better.) 15...\textit{\v{c}}e8 16.\textit{\v{c}}f5 \textit{\v{c}}h6 17. \textit{\v{c}}h3 \textit{\v{c}}d8 18.\textit{\v{c}}h4!? (It is not so precise for White to play: 18. \textit{\v{c}}xd6 cxd6 19.\textit{\v{c}}b4 \textit{\v{c}}c5 20.\textit{\v{c}}f1 \textit{\v{g}}6 21.\textit{\v{c}}g5 \textit{f}5 22.\textit{\v{c}}e6+ \textit{\v{c}}xe6 23.\textit{\v{d}}xe6 \textit{\v{c}}c7; 22.\textit{\v{d}}d1 \textit{b}6\textit{\v{c}}, because White’s bishop was misplaced in the game: Oral – Antoniewski, Czech Republic 2000.) 18...\textit{\v{f}}6 19.\textit{\v{c}}e6 \textit{\v{f}}8 20.\textit{\v{f}}e1\textup{1} White manages to exploit the weakness of the e6-square.

11.\textit{\v{d}}d2 \textit{\v{h}f6}

White must now look for something more convincing than 12.\textit{\v{d}}f4, which only leads to a repetition of moves.

Black has also tried here: 11...\textit{\v{c}}c5 12.\textit{\v{g}}g5!? (The position remains unclear after: 12.\textit{\v{c}}e2 \textit{\v{h}}6 13.e5 \textit{\v{g}}5. Black ensures the possible retreat of the knight on h5 and his weaknesses are not so vulnerable at all. 14.\textit{\v{c}}e4 \textit{\v{b}}b6 15.\textit{\v{h}f}1 \textit{\v{a}}6 16.\textit{\v{c}}b1 \textit{\v{d}}5 17.\textit{\v{f}}2 \textit{\v{e}}6 18.\textit{\v{d}}d3. White’s pieces are not so active. 18...\textit{\v{g}}7 19.\textit{\v{c}}3 \textit{\v{f}}5 20.\textit{\v{f}}c1 \textit{\v{e}}7 21.\textit{\v{h}}5 \textit{\v{c}}c6 22. \textit{\v{c}}xf7 \textit{\v{h}}8 23.\textit{\v{c}}xe6 \textit{\v{c}}xf1\textup{∞}, White’s compensation for the exchange is hardly enough to fight for the advantage in that position, crafty – EA6PZ, ICC 1998.) 12...\textit{\v{g}}g4 (12...\textit{\v{h}f}6 13.\textit{\v{c}}xe6 \textit{\v{f}}xe6 14.\textit{\v{c}}c4\textup{±}, and White remains with the two-bishop advantage.) 13.\textit{\v{e}}2 (The exchange-sacrifice here is not so effective: 13.\textit{\v{c}}xf7 \textit{\v{f}}8 14.\textit{\v{c}}c4 \textit{\v{c}}xd1 15.\textit{\v{c}}xd1 \textit{\v{e}}e8\textup{∞} – and White fails to pin Black’s knight on d7.) 13...\textit{\v{c}}xe2 14.\textit{\v{c}}xe2 \textit{\v{f}}6 15.\textit{\v{f}}3 \textit{\v{c}}e8 16.\textit{\v{c}}c3\textup{±}. Black’s knight on h5 is quite misplaced; moreover he has problems with his development too.

12.\textit{\v{g}}g5

White intends to exchange the bishop and to attack the e6-pawn. There is no other way to try to obtain the advantage.

12...\textit{\v{g}}g4 13.\textit{\v{c}}xe6 \textit{\v{f}}xe6 14. \textit{\v{c}}c4!?

This move is connected with an exchange-sacrifice. (In the game Van der Wiel – Azmaiparashvili, Wijk aan Zee 1993, the opponents agreed to a draw after 14.\textit{\v{e}}e1.)

14...\textit{\v{f}}f2 15.\textit{\v{c}}xe6 \textit{\v{c}}xh1 16. \textit{\v{e}}xh1

White has only a pawn for the exchange, but Black’s pieces are misplaced (the rook on a8, as well as the king) and White is better, for example: 16...\textit{\v{d}}d6 17.\textit{\v{f}}1 \textit{\v{e}}e8 18.\textit{\v{h}}3 \textit{\v{f}}8 19.\textit{\v{d}}d1\textup{1}. The pin along the c8-h3 diagonal is quite annoying for Black.
Chapter 6

1.e4 d6 2.d4 2.f6 3.c3 e5 4.dxe5
dxe5 5.xd8+ xd8 6.g5 e6
7.0-0-0 bd7 8.f4 exf4 9.f3 h6

10.xf4

White has created the threat
b5.

We will now deal in details
with a) 10...b4 and b) 10...c6.

The other moves have been
played only seldom:

It is too risky for Black to play
here 10...g5 – the attack against
White's bishop is not advanta-
geous for Black at all, while his
kingside gets weakened consi-
derably. 11.e5 (White is threat-
ening 12.xd7+.) 11.g7 12.h4
g4 13.d4 c8 14.h2. White
plans later to follow with xe6,
e2 (or c4), h1 and e4-e5,
with the idea to exploit the
weakness of the g4 and e6-pawns
as well as the f-file. 14.h5 15.
e6 fe 16.c4 e8 17.e2±, fol-
lowed later by h1 and d4, or
f4. In case Black retreats his

knight to f6 – White can counter
that with e4-e5;

10...g4 (This is an attempt
to counter the threat c7 with
a counter threat – f2.) 11.
g3! That is a prophylactic
move – White defends against
f2 and he is again planning
b5. (It is not sufficient for
White to play here: 11.b5 f2
12.d2 – it is not good for White
to play: 12.xc7 either, because
of 12.xd1 13.xa8 f2 14.
g1 c5, with the threat g5 and
The position is equal after the
exchange on d6. White has also
tried here: 11.d2 b4 12.d4
c6, and the opponents agreed to
draw in the game: Fernandez

After, for example: 13.h3 x3
14.bxc3 g6 15.xe6+ fx6
16.xd6 e7 17.e4 c5∞, the
position is completely unclear –
White's bishops have no active
possibilities at all.) 11.a6 (In
case of 11...b4, White can
follow with 12.d5 xd5 13.
xd5 c6 14.d3±, and then h3
and e5, or e2 and h1.) 12.
h3 e3 13.d3 xf1 14.xf1±,
with the idea to follow with \( \text{De5} \) and \( \text{Dd5} \), and White has the initiative;

10...a6 11.\( \text{Dd4} \) (It is not so convincing for White to play: 11.e5 \( \text{Dg4} \) 12.\( \text{De4} \). After: 12...g5
13.h3 – it was better for White to play: 13.\( \text{Ag3} \) – 13...gx\( f4 \) 14.
\( \text{hxg4} \) \( \text{Ag7} \) 15.\( \text{Af6} \) \( \text{We7} \) 16.\( \text{Dd5+} \)
\( \text{Ax}\( d5 \) 17.\( \text{Ad5} \) \( \text{Ad8} = \), the kingside pawns of both players are equally weak, Matsuura – Hoffman, Santos 2001) 11...\( \text{Ag4} \) 12.\( \text{Ac2} \) (This is stronger than:
12.\( \text{Ad3} \) \( \text{Ah5} \). That move ensures the d5-square for the bishop. 13.
\( \text{Ad2} \) \( \text{Ad6} \) 14.h3 \( \text{Le6} \) 15.\( \text{Axe6+} \)
\( \text{fxe6} \) 16.g4 \( \text{Dg3} \) 17.\( \text{Ag1} \) \( \text{Axf1} \) 18.
\( \text{Axf1} \) \( \text{We7} \) 19.\( \text{Ad3} = \), White had no chances to fight for the advantage in the game, Ionescu Brandis – Grigorieva, Romania 1992.)
12...\( \text{Ax} \) e2 13.\( \text{Dxe2} \) \( \text{Ac5} \) 14.\( \text{Dd3} \)
\( \text{Ac8} \) 15.\( \text{Dhd1} \). The threats along the d-file, e4-e5, \( \text{Dd5} \) or \( \text{Dd4} \), provide White with long-lasting initiative;

10...\( \text{Ac5} \). This is a developing move, but Black avoids playing \( \text{Ab4} \) and therefore he has no chances to counterattack in the centre. 11.h3 (This move is played with two ideas – to prevent Ng4 and to remain with the bishop on the excellent b8-h2 diagonal.) 11...\( \text{Ah5} \) 12.\( \text{Ah2} \) \( \text{Ae3+} \)
13.\( \text{Ab1} \) \( \text{Af4} \). That was the idea behind Black's moves 11-13. The exchange of the dark-squared bishops is in principle favourable for Black; nevertheless he loses so much time to accomplish it

that White develops a powerful initiative. 14.g4 \( \text{Ahx2} \) 15.\( \text{Ahx2} \)
\( \text{Df4} \) 16.\( \text{Dhd2} \) \( \text{We7} \) 17.\( \text{Dd5+} \)
\( \text{Ax}\( d5 \) 18.exd5 \( \text{Db6} \) 19.c4. White's position is clearly better – his bishop is stronger than Black's knight and the d-pawn is potentially extremely dangerous. There might follow: 19...\( \text{Dad8} \) 20.\( \text{Dd4} \)
a6 21.d6+! \( \text{cxd6} \) 22.\( \text{Df5+} \) \( \text{Df6} \) 23.
\( \text{Dxd6} \) (Black can hardly defend his weak b7-pawn.) 23...\( \text{Dc8} \) 24.\( \text{Dxb7} \) \( \text{Dxd2} \) 25.\( \text{Ax}\( d2 \) ±, and
Black had no compensation for the pawn in the game: Motylev – Belozerov, Kolontaevo 1997.

It is the same move or less after: 16.\( \text{Dd4} \) \( \text{Dg6} \) (It is too dangerous for Black to play: 16...\( \text{We7} \)
17.\( \text{Dd5+} \) \( \text{Ax} \) d5 18.exd5 \( \text{Db6} \) 19.d6+! White opens the position with a big advantage after:
19...\( \text{Dxd6} \) 20.\( \text{Df2} \) g5 21.\( \text{Dd2} \) 22.\( \text{Dg2} \) \( \text{Dc5} \), Grosar – Stojanovski, Bled 2002, and then he could have followed with:
23.b4+ \( \text{Dxb4} \) 24.\( \text{Ax} \) d5 \( \text{Dad8} \)
25.c3+ \( \text{Dc5} \) 26.\( \text{Dc3} \), and White would have a decisive material advantage.) 17.\( \text{Df5} \) \( \text{Dg8} \) 18.\( \text{Dd5} \)
\( \text{Dge5} \) 19.\( \text{Dhd2} \) c6 20.\( \text{Dd6} \) \( \text{Dh8} \)
21.\( \text{Dxe2} \) h5 22.\( \text{Df4} \) hgx4 23.\( \text{Dxe6+} \)
\( \text{fxe6} \) 24.\( \text{Dxg4} \), White has the initiative as before indeed, but Black's position is very solid, Milov – Lorscheid, Amsterdam 2000.

a) 10...\( \text{Ab4} \)

Black defends against \( \text{Db5} \), bringing the bishop to the a5-square in order to protect the c7-
pawn. White can play energetically and he can create plenty of problems for Black.

11.\(\text{\#b}5\) \(\text{\#a}5\) 12.\(\text{\#e}5\)

That is the point. White increases the pressure against the d7-square and secondly he is threatening to play \(\text{\#c}4\), and after \(\text{\#xc}4\) – \(\text{\#xc}4\), exploiting the unfavourable placement of the black bishop on a5.

12...g5

This is Black’s sharpest possibility, but of course it is very risky too. It is logically connected with trapping White’s bishop on g3 and capturing the pawn on e4. The other calmer lines lead to positions that are clearly worse for Black:

12...\(\text{\#b}6\) – is too passive and defends against White’s threats only temporarily. 13.\(\text{\#c}4\) \(\text{\#xc}4\) 14.\(\text{\#xc}4\)± \(\text{\#c}8\) 15.e6 \(\text{\#h}5\) 16.\(\text{\#d}2\) g5, White is threatening to trap the enemy knight with the move g4. 17.\(\text{\#h}1\) \(\text{\#h}7\) 18.e6 fxe6 19.\(\text{\#xg}5\)+ hxg5 20.\(\text{\#f}8\)+ \(\text{\#e}7\) 21.\(\text{\#xc}8\)+, and White remains with an extra exchange, Stempin – Pyda, Warsaw 1990;

12...\(\text{\#g}4\) 13.\(\text{\#c}4\) \(\text{\#gxe}5\) 14.\(\text{\#xe}6\) fxe6 15.\(\text{\#xe}5\). Black has not solved the problems of the defence yet – his g7-pawn is hanging, and White is threatening to double his rooks dangerously along the d-file, moreover the f-file has been opened too for the second white rook. 15...a6 16.\(\text{\#a}3\) \(\text{\#g}8\) 17.\(\text{\#c}4\) \(\text{\#b}4\) 18.\(\text{\#hf}1\) \(\text{\#c}8\) 19.\(\text{\#xc}7\), White wins a pawn. (It is also quite convincing for him to play: 19.\(\text{\#f}7\) \(\text{\#xe}5\) 20.\(\text{\#xe}5\)+, and White’s rook is totally dominant.) 19...\(\text{\#xc}7\) 20.\(\text{\#f}7\) \(\text{\#ad}8\) 21.\(\text{\#e}5\) \(\text{\#d}6\) 22.\(\text{\#xd}7\) \(\text{\#c}6\) (or 22...\(\text{\#xd}7\) 23.\(\text{\#xd}7\)+ \(\text{\#xd}7\) 24.e5++ and the endgame is winning for White.) 23.e5 \(\text{\#c}7\) 24.\(\text{\#d}3\) (White is threatening a deadly check for Black from the c3-square.) 24...\(\text{\#a}5\) 25.a3 \(\text{\#e}1\) 26.\(\text{\#d}1\). Black fails to protect the c3-square with his bishop and the game is over: 26...\(\text{\#a}5\) 27.b4 \(\text{\#b}6\) 28.\(\text{\#d}6\)+– Cosma – Stanciu, Calimanesti 1992;

12...\(\text{\#e}8\) (That move defends indirectly against \(\text{\#c}4\).) 13.\(\text{\#d}4\) (If now White plays 13.\(\text{\#c}4\), then 13...\(\text{\#xc}4\) 14.\(\text{\#xc}4\) \(\text{\#xe}4\), and Black attacks two pieces, so White has nothing better than: 15.\(\text{\#xa}5\) \(\text{\#xf}4\) 16.\(\text{\#xb}7\)+ \(\text{\#c}8\) 17.\(\text{\#a}5\) \(\text{\#f}5\) 18.\(\text{\#xa}7\)+ \(\text{\#xa}7\) 19.\(\text{\#c}6\)+, White’s position is hardly better with a material ratio of a rook and a pawn against two knights.) 13...\(\text{\#c}8\) 14.\(\text{\#xe}6\) (It also deserves attention for White to play: 14.\(\text{\#b}5\)! a6 15.\(\text{\#xe}6\) axb5 16.\(\text{\#xd}7\) – but not 16.\(\text{\#xg}7\)
\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Exe5} & 17.\text{Exe5} \text{Cxe5} 18.\text{Hf1} a6, \\
\text{and again the couple of light pieces is not weaker than a rook} - & 16...\text{Exe6} 17.\text{Cxf6} \text{Hxf6} 18.\text{Ee5} \text{Gg6} 19.\text{Hf1} f6 20.\text{Eg3}+. \text{White has only a slight advantage, because of the misplaced black rook on g6 and the threat e4-e5.)} \\
14...\text{fxe6} & 15.\text{Cxd7 Cxd7} 16.\text{Ee2}+, \text{White has managed to open the game in the last few moves (the f-file has been opened) and he has the bishop-pair too. Black's defence is not simple at all:} \\
16...\text{b4} & 17.\text{Hf1} a5 18.a4 (It is much simpler and also better for White to play here 18.\text{g3}, with the idea to penetrate with his rook - \text{f7, while after 18...Hc7 - White can try:} 19.c3 \text{c5} 20.h4, with the idea to follow with: h5 and \text{h4}, so that he can either repel the black rook away from the seventh rank, or force Black to weaken his kingside pawns.)} \\
18...\text{c7} & (Black has great difficulties to bring his rook on a8 into action. That problem is so very typical for most of the lines of that system in which the black king retreats to the c8-square...) 19.b3 \text{f6} 20.\text{Ee5 Cxe4} \\
21.\text{Hf7 Aa3}+ 22.\text{Cf1 Aa6} 23. & \text{Cxd6 Cxd6 (After the intermediate:} 23...\text{Cc3}! 24.\text{Cc1 Cxe2}+ 25.\text{Cd2 cxd6} 26.\text{Cxe2 Aa6} 27. \text{Xg7 Aa6. Black can solve both his basic problems – he can exchange the white bishop and he can bring into action his rook on a8. White's advantage will be almost neutralized in that fash-
\text{ion.}) 24.Xg7 e5 25.Hh7 \text{b8} 26.Xh6±, and White preserved a material advantage and a better position, Feletar – Damlj

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13.\text{g3}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
13...\text{Cxe4}!
\end{center}

That move seems to be extremely risky; nevertheless that is the principled line. It has been recommended by GM B.Avrukh, who did not find ant advantage for White in the arising complications. We will introduce some new motives and ideas into his analysis, because White still manages to obtain an advantage in the endgame in one of the lines after all...

It is not good for Black to play: 13...\text{Cc8} 14.\text{Cc4} a6 15.\text{Cxe6 fxe6} 16.\text{Cd4 He8} 17.\text{Hf1}± – and White's rook penetrates along the f-file.

In the game: Herrera – Alvar

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Chapter 6

17...\texttt{\texttt{x}d7!} 18...\texttt{xf7} 19...\texttt{d8} 19.\texttt{d3\pm}, and Black has no defence against the capture on \texttt{c7}, followed by \texttt{Ac3.}) 16.\texttt{b1} \texttt{xc4} 17.\texttt{xc4} 18.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{gxf4} 19.\texttt{xf4\pm}. Presently Black is a pawn down, but he will lose even more material after White pushes - e4-e5.

14.\texttt{c4}

Black manages to defend somehow after: 14.\texttt{xd7} 15.e5 \texttt{e8}; or 14.d4 \texttt{xg3} 15.xe6+ \texttt{e7} 16.xd7+ \texttt{xe6} 17.xc4+ \texttt{xe5} 18.hxg3 \texttt{ad8=} -- and White has nothing left to checkmate with...

14...\texttt{h7}

That move is the essence of GM Avrukh’s idea. Black defends with an X-ray, via the \texttt{f7}-pawn, his knight on \texttt{d7}. It is too bad for him to play: 14.\texttt{xg3} 15.xe6 \texttt{e2\pm} 16.b1 \texttt{x}xe6 17.xd7+ \texttt{c8} 18.hd1++ and Black has no defence against the threat \texttt{f7}.

15.\texttt{xg3}

The other possibility for White is: 15.eh1 \texttt{e8} 16.xd7 \texttt{xc4} 17.f5 (or 17.xc7+ \texttt{xc7} 18.xf1 f5 19.xf3+ \texttt{f7} 20.xh7 \texttt{xg3} 21.hxg3 \texttt{e6}. Black has trapped White’s knight on \texttt{h7}. 22.g4 \texttt{h8} 23.xd4 \texttt{xe7} 24.xf5 \texttt{xf5} 25.xxe4 \texttt{xe4} 26.xe4, and an equal rook and pawn endgame has been reached after mutual annihilation of pieces.) 17...\texttt{e6} (It is slightly worse for Black to play: 17...\texttt{d8} 18.xc7 \texttt{xd7} 19.xe5+ \texttt{e}6 20.xa5 \texttt{xd1+} 21.xxd1 \texttt{f}2+ 22.xe2 \texttt{g}4 23.xe4 \texttt{xh}2 24.xa7 \texttt{g}4 25.xb5, and Black has some problems – his rook is presently isolated.) 18.xe5 \texttt{d8} 19.xxe4 \texttt{xd7} 20.xd7 \texttt{xd7} 21.xd4+ \texttt{e}7=, White regains his c7-pawn and the game is equal.

15...\texttt{xe6} 16.eh1

White is threatening \texttt{f8\pm}.

16...\texttt{e8} 17.xd7 \texttt{xd7} 18.xd7 \texttt{xc7}

White is fighting for the advantage successfully after that move.

According to GM Avrukh it is not enough for White to play: 19.xf7+ \texttt{c6!} (That active retreat of the black king is the only correct one!) 20.xc7 \texttt{d8} 21.xe6 \texttt{d2\pm}. Black has sufficient counterplay: 22.xc7 \texttt{b6} 23.xb6 \texttt{xb6} 24.b4 \texttt{xg2} 25.xd8 \texttt{b5} 26.xb7+ \texttt{c4} \texttt{d} -- Black’s king and rook are very active.

White has only a slight and even purely theoretical advantage after: 19.xc7 a6 (19...\texttt{d2+} 20.xd1 a6 21.xd6 \texttt{xd6} 22.xd6 \texttt{xd6} 23.xd2\pm, and White has some minute edge in the rook and pawn endgame.) 20.xd6 \texttt{xc7} 21.xc4, White’s knight
is well placed here, but Black’s bishop is hardly weaker than the knight in that quite open position.

19...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}}d8}

If 19...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textit{d}}}}xg3, then 20.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{f}}}f7+ \textit{\textbf{\textbf{c}}}c6 21.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textit{d}}}xa8} ± – and White’s knight can be easily released from the entrapment on the a8-square;

19...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textit{d}}}xc7 20.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{f}}}f7} ± , and the endgame is very favourable for White with his rook on the seventh rank.

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20.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d1+ \textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d2+}. Otherwise White wins the e6-pawn. 21. \textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{x}}}xd2+ \textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d2 22.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{x}}}xd2 a6 23.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{e}}}e3}}. Black’s problem is that if he recaptures two pieces for a rook by exchanging on c7 – that would lead to a king and pawn endgame in which White would be winning due to his outside passed pawn.

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b) 10...c6 11.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d4} (diagram)

White is now threatening to capture on e6, followed by \textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{c}}}c4 – so Black must develop his bishop on f8 in order to be able to parry the threat with \textit{\textbf{\textbf{e}}}e7, and not to hamper the development of his own pieces. White cannot achieve anything substantial with 11.e5, because of 11...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d5.

11...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{b}}}b4

That is Black’s most energetic move. He counterattacks White’s centre – presently he is threatening to capture on c3 and e4. The other possibilities for Black are:

11...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{c}}}c5 12.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{e}}}e2 \textit{\textbf{e}}e8 13.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{f}}}f3}

(White took under control with his last couple of moves the squares that Black’s knight on f6 could retreat to, and he plans to follow with e4-e5.) 13...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{c}}}c8 14.e5 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}xd4 (14...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d5 15.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}xd5 cxd5 16.\textit{\textbf{h}}}hf1} ±. Black now has problems with the defence of his pawns on d5 and f7.) 15.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}xd4 \textit{\textbf{h}}}h7 16.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{e}}}e4 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{c}}}c7 17.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d6 \textit{\textbf{e}}e7 18.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{h}}}hd1} ± De-graev – S.Kasparov, Bethune 2001. White has a powerful knight on d6 and his dark-squared bishop has no opponent, so he has a clear advantage;

11...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{g}}}g4 12.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}}}d3} (White should not exchange bishops after \textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{e}}}e2 – Black’s bishop will be repelled to the e6-square anyway, or even to the unfavourable square h5 and later to g6.)
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12...\textit{\textbf{b}4} 13.h3 \textit{\textbf{h}5} 14.e5 \textit{\textbf{e}8} (It is too bad for Black to play: 14...\textit{\textbf{x}c3} 15.exf6 \textit{\textbf{d}4} 16.\textit{\textbf{x}d}4 gxf6 17.\textit{\textbf{d}3}, with the threat 18.g4 \textit{\textbf{g}6} 19.\textit{\textbf{x}g}6 fxg6 20.\textit{\textbf{d}1}, winning the knight on d7.) 15.g4 \textit{\textbf{g}6} 16.\textit{\textbf{f}5}. The bad placement of Black’s king and his passive pieces are becoming a telling factor in that position.

12.e5 \textit{\textbf{g}4}

The alternatives are not so good for Black either:
12...\textit{\textbf{x}c3} 13.exf6 \textit{\textbf{x}d}4 14.\textit{\textbf{x}d}4 gxf6 15.\textit{\textbf{e}2} (Black’s kingside is so weak that White will soon restore easily the material balance.) 15...\textit{\textbf{e}8} (It is not better for Black to play: 15...\textit{\textbf{c}8} 16.\textit{\textbf{h}d}1 \textit{\textbf{h}5} 17.\textit{\textbf{g}3} \textit{\textbf{e}5} 18.\textit{\textbf{x}h}5 \textit{\textbf{b}5} 19.\textit{\textbf{e}2} Munoz – Peicheva, Calvia 2004. Black has weakened his position considerably in the last couple of moves.) 16.\textit{\textbf{f}1} \textit{\textbf{h}5} 17.\textit{\textbf{g}3} \textit{\textbf{h}6} 18.\textit{\textbf{h}4} \textit{\textbf{e}7} 19.\textit{\textbf{x}h}5 \textit{\textbf{x}h}5 20.\textit{\textbf{x}h}5\textit{\textbf{g}5}, and White had a bishop-pair and a superior pawn-structure in the game: Dela Paz – Hernandez, Havana 2003;
12...\textit{\textbf{d}5} 13.\textit{\textbf{x}d}5 \textit{\textbf{x}d}5. White has several ways to obtain a clear advantage:
14.\textit{\textbf{f}5}, with the idea to manoeuvre the knight to the excellent d6-outpost;
14.e6 (this move is recommended by R.Hasangatin) 14...\textit{\textbf{x}e}6 (or 14...\textit{\textbf{f}xe}6 15.\textit{\textbf{c}4} \textit{\textbf{e}4} 16.a3 \textit{\textbf{e}7} 17.\textit{\textbf{x}e}6+ \textit{\textbf{c}8} 18.\textit{\textbf{d}3} \textit{\textbf{x}d}3 19.\textit{\textbf{x}d}3 \textit{\textbf{c}5} 20.\textit{\textbf{x}c}5 \textit{\textbf{x}c}5 21.\textit{\textbf{h}d}1 – and Black is playing practically without the rook on a8.) and here White achieves a great advantage after the “computer-type” tactical strike: 15.\textit{\textbf{a}6}, regaining his material and weakening Black’s pawn-structure considerably. It is weaker for White to play instead: 15.\textit{\textbf{x}e}6+ \textit{\textbf{f}xe}6 16.\textit{\textbf{c}4} \textit{\textbf{e}8} 17.c3 (R.Hasangatin) 17...\textit{\textbf{e}5}, and despite the fact that his compensation is evident – it would be very hard for White to prove any advantage;
14.h4 (White brings his rook on h1 into play in a rather original fashion.) 14...\textit{\textbf{e}6} 15.\textit{\textbf{x}e}6+ \textit{\textbf{f}xe}6 16.\textit{\textbf{h}3} \textit{\textbf{c}7} 17.\textit{\textbf{b}3} a5 18.a3 \textit{\textbf{h}f}8 19.g3 \textit{\textbf{e}7} 20.\textit{\textbf{x}b}7+! (That is the point of the rook-maneuver.) 20...\textit{\textbf{x}b}7 21.\textit{\textbf{x}d}7+ \textit{\textbf{c}8} 22.\textit{\textbf{x}e}7. Black regains his piece, but his position remains quite inferior. 22...\textit{\textbf{g}5} 23.\textit{\textbf{h}x}5 \textit{\textbf{x}g}5 24.\textit{\textbf{x}e}6 \textit{\textbf{x}f}4 25.\textit{\textbf{x}c}6+ \textit{\textbf{d}7} 26.\textit{\textbf{d}6}+ \textit{\textbf{e}7} 27.\textit{\textbf{x}f}4+ Palac – Tratar, Nova Gorica 2002. White has three passed pawns for the exchange and Black’s position is very difficult.

13.\textit{\textbf{x}e}6+ \textit{\textbf{f}xe}6

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

14.\textit{\textbf{e}4}
It is hardly better for White to play a line that has been tested in practice numerous times: 14. \( \text{c4} \ \text{e7} \ 15. \text{He1} \ \text{Hf8} \ 16. \text{g3} \) \( \text{Hf5} \) 17. \( \text{Hd6} \) (It deserves attention for White to try: 17.\( \text{Hd4} \), M. Notkin.) 17...\( \text{Cc5} \) 18.\( \text{Hd4} \) \( \text{f2} \) 19.\( \text{He3} \) (19.\( a3!? \)) 19...\( \text{a5} \! \! \! \! \) 20. \( \text{d1} \) (20. \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 21.\( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{fe4} \)) 20...\( \text{h1} \) (The idea of that move is to force White to trade the dark-squared bishops.) 21.\( \text{h4} + \text{g5} \) 22. \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{xe1} \) 23.\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{Svidler - Bologan, Novgorod 1995. The position is unclear} - White's bishop is hardly better than Black's knight on c5.

**14...\( \text{e7} \) 15.\( \text{c3} \)**

This move helps White to repel the enemy bishop and to ensure the e1-square for his rook.

**15...\( \text{a5} \) 16.\( \text{e2} \)**

That is a temporary pawn-sacrifice. White's e-pawn has been weakened long ago with the move f2-f4, so he has to worry about it permanently. How he sacrifices it and that will help him to attack Black's weak e6-pawn as well as his king along the open e-file.

**16...\( \text{af8} \)**

Or 16...\( \text{gxe5} \) 17.\( \text{Cc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 18.\( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{e4} \) 19.\( \text{Hf1} \). Black cannot protect simultaneously both the e6 and g7-pawns. He will lose one of them and White will preserve his initiative in a position with material equality.

**17.\( \text{g3} \)**

White achieves nothing after: 17.\( \text{Hf1} \) \( \text{b6} \) 18.\( \text{Xg4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 19. \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{e3} + \) 20.\( \text{Cc2} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 21.\( \text{Hd6} \) \( \text{f8} \) - he cannot defend on e5 either with: 17.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e3} \) 18.\( \text{Hd3} \) \( \text{b6} \), and Black has some counterplay.

**17...\( \text{gxe5} \) 18.\( \text{e5} \)**

**18...\( \text{xf4} \)**

In case of 18...\( \text{xc5} \) 19.\( \text{xe5} \), the threats \( \text{d6} \), \( \text{g7} \) and b4, enable White to obtain a material advantage.

We have analysed here an exchange-sacrifice for Black in our main lines, but he has instead an additional possibility worth considering: 18...\( \text{f5} \), defending his knight on e5 and threatening already to capture on c5. White can hardly achieve anything substantial with: 19. \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 20.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 21.\( \text{He1} \) \( \text{xd1} + \) 22.\( \text{Hxd1} \) \( \text{f8} \) - since Black's pieces are pinned indeed, but it is inconceivable how White can possibly break through. In case of: 19.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{c7} \), White's knight remains totally misplaced and that seems much more important than capturing Black's b7-pawn. Instead White should obviously follow with: 19.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 20.\( \text{xd7} + \text{f6} \). He can rely
on being able to capture the b7-pawn at any opportune moment, but also he should be on the alert to parry Black's possible counterplay connected with the march forward of his e-pawn and the eventual tactical strikes of his powerful knight on the g4-square. 21.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xb7}\) (The other possibilities for White are less precise: 21.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{e4+}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{g6}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xb7}\) e5 23.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{h3}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{f6}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xf6}\) gxf6 25.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{e3}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{f3}\), and Black remains with powerful central passed-pawns; or 21.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{d6}\) e5 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{h3}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{f2}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{h2}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{e8}\) – and Black's e5-pawn might turn out into a powerful force, or 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xb7}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{b6}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{e1}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xc5}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xc5}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{h2=}\) 21...g5 (21...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{b6}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{d6}\) – contrary to the previous lines, White's knight can easily centralize having gobbled Black's b7-pawn in the process.) 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{d6}\) (The situation will remain much less clear should White follow with: 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xa5}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xa5}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{d6}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xa2}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{f1+}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{g6}\) 25. \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{b1}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{a4}\) 26.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{h3}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{f6}\) 27.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{c7}\).) 22...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{b6}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{c4}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{e3}\) (otherwise White will play c4-c5, capturing, or at least isolating Black's bishop) 24.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{b1}\). White now enjoys the additional possibility to play \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{d8}\) at some moment, attacking the c6-square, while the bishop on e3 will only harm Black's counterplay.

19.\(\text{\texttt{gxf4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{xc5}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{fxe5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c7}}\)

Black can also capture on e5 with his knight in case of – 20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\text{d7}\). Well, in that case he will have to lose several tempi in order to improve the position of his knight. White can exploit that, by pushing forward his queenside pawns: 21.\(\text{\texttt{b4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c7}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{c2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{a4=}}\). Meanwhile, the knight on e5 can hardly support the possible advance of Black's e-pawn.

21.\(\text{\texttt{h1f1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf8}}\)

Black can try here to preserve a couple of rooks with – 22...\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{c2=}}\) \(\text{\texttt{b4}}\) and \(\text{\texttt{a4}}\), but that does not change the evaluation of the position. White remains slightly better, because Black's e and g-pawns are not so mobile, while White will manage to open files for his rooks sooner or later.

23.\(\text{\texttt{xf8}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf8}}\)
Conclusion for 6...\textit{e}6

In the line 6...\textit{e}6 White must be ready to play \textit{f}2-\textit{f}4 in order to seize the initiative. This active move has certain drawbacks too. It is quite clear that after the exchange on \textit{f}4 the position gets opened and White's chances to exploit the displacement of the enemy king in the centre increase considerably. Black must solve the problem of adequate development of his pieces too. After the opening of the \textit{f}-file, White has juicy targets to attack – the \textit{f}7-pawn (\textit{e}5, \textit{\textit{g}}\textit{g}5), as well as the \textit{c}7-pawn (\textit{\textit{f}}\textit{f}4, \textit{\textit{b}}\textit{b}5), and the bishop on \textit{e}6 (\textit{\textit{g}}\textit{g}5xe6, followed by the attack of the weak \textit{e}6-pawn with the bishop).

White however must pay a certain price for all that. His \textit{e}4-pawn is weakened and in case Black manages to solve all his problems – that pawn might become rather vulnerable. White therefore must play very energetically; he should attack promptly enemy's weaknesses in order to convert his temporary advantages in piece-placement into a long-term superior position. Having in mind Black's possible actions, we have indicated the correct methods of developing the initiative for White in our chapter.
Part 2

1.e4 d6 2.d4 \( \square \)f6 3.\( \square \)c3 c6

This system is relatively modern and it is played sometimes even at grandmaster level. Black is trying to counterattack White's centre, just like in the Pirc Defence, except in somewhat different fashion.

The move c7-c6 enables the black queen to go to the b6-square (in order to attack the d4-pawn!), as well as to the a5-square (this is an indirect attack against the e4-pawn). Contrary to the Pirc Defence, Black usually develops his dark-squared bishop to the e7-square and not on the long diagonal. This is quite justified though... In order to develop it on g7; Black has to play a move like 3...g6, which creates later a target for White on the kingside (mostly for the pawn-march h4-h5). The bishop on g7, particularly in the 3-pawns attack, is not quite well placed there, moreover if White manages to push e4-e5 and fortifies his pawn on e5.

So to speak, Black has saved a tempo in the opening and White must play precisely in order to defend his centre successfully. On the other hand, in comparison to the Pirc Defence, Black has one piece less in the fight for the centre and cannot put serious pressure against it at all.

In Chapter 7 we analyse Black's different continuations after 4.\( f \)4, with the exception of the main line 4...\( \textbf{a} \)a5, which is examined in Chapters 8-12.
Chapter 7  
1.e4 d6 2.d4 ♜f6 3.♕c3 c6 4.f4

Just like against the Pirc Defence, we recommend in our book the most aggressive line for White in his fight for the centre. He plans to push e4-e5 and to occupy plenty of space.

We are going to analyse the following moves for Black in this chapter: a) 4...♗bd7, b) 4...♗c7, c) 4...♗e6, d) 4...♗d5, e) 4...♗b5, f) 4...♗g4 and g) 4...♗b6.

The move 4...♗a5 is dealt with in the next chapters.

The move 4...♗g6 transposes to the Pirc Defence (3...♗g6). In general, we do not deal with lines that transpose to the Pirc Defence, in which Black plays g7-g6 early.

Black has tried in practice some other rare and not so natural moves:

4...a6 – this move is quite unnecessary: Black has already prepared b7-b5, and there is hardly any other idea behind 4...a6. 5.♗f3 ♗g4 6.♗e3 e6 7.h3 ♗xf3 8.♕xf3 d5 9.e5 ♗fd7 10.0-0-0↑ Sandor – Oliwa, Poznan 1995. Black lags in development considerably and after the game is opened with f4-f5, he will probably suffer a lot;

4...♗h6 – this move is even more senseless than 4...a6. None of White’s pieces was aimed at the g5-square and Black’s control over that square is pointless. 5.♗f3 ♗g4 6.♗e2 e6 7.0-0 ♗e7 8.♗e3 0-0 9.♕d2 ♗c7 10.h3 ♗xf3 11.♕xf3 d5 12.e5± Huguet – Brixhe, Val d’Isere 2002. White has a stable advantage in that position with a closed centre and Black has not organized any counterplay yet;

4...♗e5 – this move just loses a pawn without any reason. 5.dxe5 ♗xe5 6.♗xd8+ ♗xd8 7.fxe5 ♗g4 8.♗f3, Black fails to attack the e5-pawn effectively. He tried to exploit the weakness of the f2-square instead, but unsuccessfully: 8...♗c5 9.♗c4 ♗e7 10.♗e2 ♗d7 11.♗g5+ ♓f6 12.exf6+ gxf6 13.


This is Black's only possibility not to go back with the knight without losing material:

It is just pathetic for him to play: 5... \( \text{g8} \) 6. \( \text{d3} \) e6 7. \( \text{e4} \) d5 8. \( \text{g5} \)± Strutinskaya – Spajic, Tivat 1995. Black's loss of time in the opening is quite considerable, despite the fact that the position is rather closed. White has managed to fortify his pawn centre;

Black has also tried in practice: 5...dxe5 6.dxe5 \( \text{d5} \) (Black has some hopes for compensation like that – the other line 6... \( \text{g8} \) 7. \( \text{e3} \) e6 8. \( \text{e4} \)± Gormally – Blackwell, Newport 2004, is obviously very bad for Black. His pieces are not developed and he has a gaping weakness on the d6-square.) 7. \( \text{xd5} \) cxd5 8. \( \text{xd5} \) e6, and here probably White's best line is 9. \( \text{d3} \) (It also deserves attention for White to try 9. \( \text{d1} \)!, so that his queen is safe from being attacked. In the game Berg – De Carlo, New York 1993, there followed 9. \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{c5} \) 10. \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 11. \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 12. \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c8} \) 13. \( \text{e2} \) – or 13. \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{a6} \) 14. \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b4} \) 15. \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d3} \)+ 16. \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{c5} \), and Black had compensation – 13... \( \text{c6} \) 14. \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{a4} \) 15. 0–0–0, and here with 15... \( \text{xb2} \) Black could have drawn by a perpetual.) 9... \( \text{c7} \) (otherwise Black has no targets to attack at all) 10. \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c5} \) 11. \( \text{c3} \), and White completes his development preserving his material advantage.

\( 6. \text{xd5 cxd5 7. \text{d3}} \)
It becomes quite clear now that the placement of the black knight on d7 is very unfavourable for Black, because it stands in the way of its own pieces.

7...e6

Or 7...\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b6 8.a4↑ — and the knight is not placed better on the b6-square either, Vogler – Heindrich, Wiesbaden 1994.

Black comes under a kingside attack after the immediate: 7...g6
8.h4 (Or 8.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{G}}}}}\) g7 9.h4 0–0 10. h5 dxe5 11.fxe5 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b6 12.c3 f6 13. hxg6→, and White had a powerful attack in the game Musanti – Covas, Mar del Plata 2002.) It is too bad for Black to play: 8...h5 9.e6 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f6? (It is better for Black to try: 9...\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b8 10.exf7+ \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) xf7 11. \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f3+ – but still his king is quite vulnerable.) 10.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b5+- Hodgson – Friedland, Coulsdon 2002, and Black loses a piece. After 8...\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b6, White had better play: 9.h5!? (The move 9.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f3 was played in the game Drabke – Firman, Biel, 2001, but it led to only a slight advantage for White: 9...dxe5 10.fxe5 f6 11.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{E}}}}}\) e2 fxe5 12.dxe5 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{C}}}}}\) c5 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b5 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{D}}}}}\) d7 14.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) xd7+ \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) xd7 15.c3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{G}}}}}\) g7 16.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) e3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) a5 17.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{D}}}}}\) d4 0–0= – Black has managed to exchange some of his “bad” pieces.) 9...dxe5 10.hxg6 exd4 (After 10... fxg6 11.fxe5 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{G}}}}}\) g7 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f3↑ White has a stable advantage and good attacking prospects on the kingside.) 11.gxf7+ \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) xf7 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{H}}}}}\) h5→, with an attack for White.

8.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{E}}}}}\) e7

8...g6 9.c3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{G}}}}}\) g7 10.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{E}}}}}\) e2 0–0 11.h4↑ Black – Diaz, Moscow 1994. Black’s pieces are so passive that White can start a direct kingside attack immediately.

8...\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) c7 9.0–0 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{E}}}}}\) e7 (It is wrong for Black to try to fianchetto the bishop: 9...g6 10.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{E}}}}}\) e1 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{G}}}}}\) g7, because of 11.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) d2 b6 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) b4, so he has to go back with his bishop and White’s advantage becomes overwhelming: 12...\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) f8 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{G}}}}}\) b8 14.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) b5+ \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{C}}}}}\) c6 15.exd6 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) xd6 16.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) xd6 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{F}}}}}\) xd6 17.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) e5++, and Black resigned, since he loses either his knight on c6, or his rook – Ruck – Cseh, Hungary 1994.) 10.c3 b6 11.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) c1 a5 (This is with the idea to trade the light-squared bishops, but White prevents that.) 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) g3 g6 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{E}}}}}\) e1 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) a6 14.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) c2 (White relinquishes his control over the a6-f1 diagonal, but that is immaterial, because Black has no targets to attack along it.) 14...b5 15.a3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b7 16.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) d3 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{A}}}}}\) c6 17.f5! This pawn-break is very effective now. White exploits his advantage in development, since Black’s king is still in the centre. 17...gxf5 18.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{H}}}}}\) f4 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{B}}}}}\) b6 (or 18...dxe5 19. \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{\textsf{\textcircled{C}}}}}\) xe5, and White recaptures the f5-pawn with his next move and
he has a powerful initiative in the centre.) 19.\( \text{g7 f8} \) 20.\( \text{g5 dxe5} \) 21.\( \text{xe7 xe7} \) 22.\( \text{xe5 xe5} \) 23.\( \text{xe5 g8??} \) (This move loses immediately, but even after the more stubborn: 23...\( \text{d7} \) 24.\( \text{xf5+} \), Black's king is quite vulnerable.) 24.\( \text{xe6+ xe6} \) 25.\( \text{e1+ d6} \) 26.\( \text{e5+ d7} \) 27.\( \text{xf5+} \), and White ended up the game with a checkmate, Tkačhev – Bajramovic, Neum 2000.

9.0–0

It is also possible for White to follow with 9.\( \text{e2 f8} \) – this plan is too risky for Black. 10.0–0 g6 11.b3 \( \text{d7} \) 12.c4 dxc4 13.bxc4 d5 14.cxd5 exd5 15.b1 b6 16.b2 \( \text{e6} \) 17.f5 gxf5 18.\( \text{xf5±} \) Chatalbashew – Ianev, Plovdiv 1994. Black has no compensation for his weaknesses along the f-file, while his king is in the centre.

9...\( \text{dxe5} \)

9...0–0 10.\( \text{e2} \) (Now, it would have been better for White to develop his queen to the g3-square, just like in the game Berkes – Kis.) 10...\( \text{dxe5} \) 11.\( \text{f5} \) f5 12.\( \text{xf6 xf6} \) 13.c3 \( \text{d7} \), junior – guest, ICC 1994, and here White had to try 14.\( \text{g5±} \). Black did not achieve anything with the exchange on f6 – his e6-pawn is terribly weak and the e5-square too.

10.\( \text{fxe5} \) 0–0 11.\( \text{e1} \)

(diagram)

11...\( \text{f5} \). Otherwise White will bring his queen to g3 and he will attack g7 and h7-squares. Black's last move is not a remedy against the attack of the h7-square either. 12.\( \text{xf6 xf6} \) 13.\( \text{g5 c7} \) 14.\( \text{h4 d6} \) (After 14...\( \text{h6} \), Black should worry about the dangerous sacrifice: 15.\( \text{xf6} \) gh 16.\( \text{e5 d8} \) 17.\( \text{f3 e4} \) 18.\( \text{xf8+ xf8} \) 19.\( \text{f1+ g8} \) 20.\( \text{h5+} \) and White's threats are decisive.) 15.\( \text{e5 xe5} \) 16.\( \text{dxe5 xe5} \) 17.\( \text{xf6+} \), and White won in the game Berkes – Kis, Paks 1998.

b) 4...\( \text{c7} \)

The idea of that move is to prepare e7-e5. Contrary to the Pirc Defence, Black does not fianchetto his bishop, because after the exchange of the d-pawns, followed by f4-f5, it might become quite passive on g7, while now it remains on the a3-f8 diagonal. This is by the way
one of the main ideas of the 3...c6 variation — and it is realized differently in some of the lines. The order of moves with 4...c7 has the definite drawback that the black queen is placed on a very passive position.

5.f3

Black has played in this position mostly: b1) 5...bd7 and b2) 5...g4.

The other possibilities are less reasonable:

The move 5...e6 — is not consistent at all and it is too passive. 6.a3 b5 7.a5 (It is not quite clear — what exactly Black is doing on the queenside.) 8.e7 9.e5 d7 10.e1 Păllova — Trojan, Hradec Kralove 1992. Black has pushed plenty of pawns on the queenside, while White has occupied the centre and he is already well-prepared for actions on the kingside;

5...b5 — Black’s kingside is not developed and the combination of the moves c7 and b5 seems rather unnatural under the circumstances. 6.e5 (or 6.a3 b4 7.a2 a6 8.c4 bxc3 9.xc3 d3 10.xd3 e6 11.0—0, and it becomes clear that Black has just created weaknesses on the queenside, Conceicao—Charneira, Lisbon 1998) 6...d7 7.a3 b4 8.xe4↑ Sanetra — Kruzynski, Wysowa 2003. The advance of the b-pawn has only compromised Black’s position and it has not contributed at all to his development.

b1) 5...bd7 6.e5

It is quite natural for White to push e4-e5 at a moment in which Black was preparing e7-e5 himself. He had placed two of his pieces — the queen and the knight to unnatural positions in the process of doing that...

6.g8

Black must defend very precisely after that move, because he has lost too much time in the opening. His task now is to block White’s f4-pawn and prevent opening of files on the kingside.

About 6...d5 7.xd5 cxd5 8.d3 see line a.

6.dxe5 — Black helps his opponent open the f-file quite unnecessarily. 7.fxe5 d5 8.xd5 cxd5 9.c3 e6 10.d3 e7 11.0—0 0—0 12.g5 xg5 13.xg5± Bindrich — Toepfer, Verden 2000. Black has weaknesses on the dark squares and his king is vulnerable.

7.d3 e6

In case of 7...b6, White can follow with 8.f5!? (White has better chances even after the calm: 8.0—0 h6 9.a2 d5 10.g5 a4 11.f2 e6 12.h3 f5 13.g4 xxd3
14...cxd3 0–0 15...e3 ̵d7 16.a3 f6 17...f3 ̵f7 18.b4 ̵e7 19...fb1 ̵c7 20.b5↑, and White’s prospects on the queenside are much more real than Black’s counterplay on the kingside, Santos – Rosa, Sao Paulo 2000.) 8...e6 9...e2 dxe5 10...xe5↑. White has better development. Meanwhile, he has already managed to play f4-f5 and he has excellent attacking prospects on the kingside, which is not so easy to accomplish in positions with the same pawn-structure.

8...g5 g6 9.f5
9.0–0 ̵h6 only enables Black to fortify his kingside.

9...gx f5 10...h5
White could have tried the interesting piece-sacrifice: 10...xf7 ̵xf7 11...h5+ ̵g7 12.g4 f4 (Black should not permit opening of the g-file.) 13...xf4 dxe5 14.dxe5 ̵e7 15...f1. Black has an extra piece only for a pawn, but his defence is not easy at all, for example: 15...f8 (otherwise he cannot defend the f7-square) 16...e4 ̵g6 17...f6 ̵d7 18.0–0–0 ̵e8 19...g3 ̵d8 20...g5 ̵f7 21...e3=. and White still has some attacking resources, like ̵h5+ sacrificing again, or simply attacking the f7-square, or even h4–h5. Meanwhile, all that is not necessary for White at all – 10...h5 is clearly stronger.

10...xe5
Black loses after 10...b6 11...b5++; it is also bad for him to play: 10...b8 11...f4 d5 12.g4⇒, and White has a huge lead in development and a powerful attack.

11.dxe5 dxe5, Papp – Cseh, Hungary 1994, and here White was obviously winning after: 12...b5 (White was quite happy in the game to get a piece for three pawns and he took his attacking forces back...) 12...d7 13...e6 and White wins, because the least that he can do is capture Black’s rook on a8.

b2) 5...g4

Black pins White’s knight, which prevents e7–e5, in that fashion.

6.h3 ̵xf3 7...xf3 e5
This is practically forced. It is not good for Black to play
7...\(\text{\&}d7\) 8.e5 \(\text{\&}g8\) 9.\(\text{\&}d3\) g6, Sylvan – M. Hansen, Copenhagen 1993, and here it deserved attention for White to play: 10.\(\text{\&}e3\)!?\(\uparrow\) – because Black was not developed at all.

It is too passive for Black to play: 7...e6 8.g4 \(\text{\&}bd7\) 9.\(\text{\&}d2\) (White can also try: 9.g5!? \(\text{\&}g8\) 10.\(\text{\&}e3\), forcing Black’s knight to its initial square. It was maybe simpler for White to develop the bishop first – 9.\(\text{\&}e3\) and then castle. The bishop is more actively placed on e3 than on d2.) 9...0–0 10.0–0 \(\text{\&}e7\) 11.\(\text{\&}b1\) d5 12.e5 \(\text{\&}e8\) 13.f5\(\pm\) Parma – Tsvetkov, Polanica Zdroj 1964. White’s pawn majority on the kingside is unopposed.

8.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}bd7\) 9.0–0–0 \(\text{\&}e7\)

10.g4

White starts a pawn-offensive on the kingside, because Black’s pieces are quite passive.

10...g6

Otherwise, after g4-g5 Black will have to retreat with his knight to the g8-square. In general, now it becomes more than clear that Black has failed to profit in any way from the fact that he has developed his bishop to the e7-square, instead of fianchettoing it...

It is too bad for Black to play: 10...0–0–0, because of the forced line: 11.g5 \(\text{\&}e8\) 12.fxe5 dxe5 13.\(\text{\&}xf7\) exd4 14.\(\text{\&}xe7\) dxe3 15.\(\text{\&}c4\), Black will at least lose the e3-pawn, Saulin – Dvalishvili, Moscow 1996.

In the game Bartis – Turi, 1969, there followed: 10...exd4 11.\(\text{\&}xd4\) 0–0–0 12.\(\text{\&}xa7\) \(\text{\&}a5\). It is not good for Black to try to trap the bishop with: 12...c5 13.g5 \(\text{\&}g8\) 14.\(\text{\&}b5\)\(\pm\) – because he will never manage to capture the bishop on a7, while the light squares around the black king have been weakened considerably. 13.f2, and White simply remains with an extra pawn.

11.\(\text{\&}c4\). Black is now threatening the exchange fxe5, followed by g4-g5. 11...b5 12.\(\text{\&}b3\) b4 13.\(\text{\&}e2\) exd4 14.\(\text{\&}xd4\) 0–0 15.h4→ Lastin – Reutova, Ekaterinburg 1997. Black fails to create any real counterplay on the queenside, while White will be clearly faster on the kingside.

c) 4...e6
Black restricts his own bishop on c8, so that now he lacks the important resource \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g4} \) and he loses time in the process.

5.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e3} \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e7} \)

Black has tested some other moves in that position, but they do not equalize either:

5...a6 – that move has no idea and it simply loses time in the opening: 6.e5 \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g8} \) (it is probably better to retreat to the d5-square) 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d3} \text{d5} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e2} \text{c5} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c6} \) 10.0.0+ Evans – Calapso, Venice 1967. The position is quite closed, but Black’s terrible loss of time should be punished somehow...

5...d5 6.e5 \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{fd7} \), Hassan – Galego, Elista 1998 (6...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e4} \) loses a pawn after: 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe4} \text{dxe4} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g5} \); the move 6...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g4} \) can be countered by White with 7.h3 \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{h6} \) 8.g4+, and Black’s knight on h6 is completely out of action), and here the simplest line for White is: 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e3} \text{c5} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d2} \). In comparison to the similar lines in the French Defence, White has an extra tempo, because Black has lost time on d7-d6-d5;

5...h6 – this move is not necessary at all. The g5-square is completely irrelevant, meanwhile Black loses time. 6.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d3} \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e7} \) 7.0.0 b5 8.a3 a6, Kerkhoff – Bajonczak, Rheinhausen 2000, and here White had better play 9.e5+, since after 9...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d5} \) he can follow with 10.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e4} \) and he has a clear advantage. Black has a weakness on d6 and his kingside is weak too;

5...b5 – this idea does not seem so effective combined with the move e7-e6. 6.e5 \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g8} \) (After 6...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d5} \), besides the standard move 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e4} \), White can also try: 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xd5} \text{exd5} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d3} \) with a huge lead in development.) 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d3} \text{b7} \) 8.0.0 d5 9.f5+ Schmid – Foehl, Germany 2003. Black can hardly survive so undeveloped, after opening of the position...;

5...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{bd7} \) 6.e5 dxe5 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe5} \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d5} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xd5} \text{cx} \text{xd5} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d3} \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e7} \) 10.0.0 0-0 11.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e1} \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e8} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g3} \rightarrow \) Gaudron – Otutskaya, Szeged 1994. White has a powerful initiative on the kingside, while Black has no counterplay at all.

6.e5 \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d5} \) 7.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e4} \text{dxe5} \) 8.fxe5 \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{h6} \)

This move defends against \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g5} \) indeed, and so Black prevents the exchange of bishops and indirectly protects the weakness of the d6-square. His kingside is weakened though...

9.a3 b5, Vaisanen – Jarvinen, Helsinki 2000, and now White’s simplest line was: 10.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d3} \), followed by castling short. Black lags in development considerably.
and his position on the kingside has been substantially weakened.

**d) 4...d5**

This move is a bit strange. Black loses a tempo for d7-d6-d5. His justification is that first of all the loss of a tempo is not so essential in that closed position and secondly White's f4-pawn restricts his own bishop in that pawn-structure. Black's plan is to block the kingside on the light squares and then, depending on White's actions to seek counterplay.

5.e5

Black now has three reasonable retreats of the knight: **d1) 5...\(\text{\textit{d}e}4\), d2) 5...\(\text{\textit{g}}4\) and d3) 5...\(\text{\textit{g}}8\).

The fourth possible retreat – 5...\(\text{\textit{d}f}d7\) – after 6.\(\text{\textit{f}f}3\) (It is even more energetic for White to play 6.f5, which in the game crafty – funblitz, ICC 1997, led to a quick victory for White after: 6...\(\text{\textit{d}b}6\) 7.e6 fxe6 8.\(\text{\textit{h}}5\)> g6 9.fxg6 \(\text{\textit{d}d}7\) 10.\(\text{\textit{e}}5\), and Black resigned. Meanwhile after: 6...c5 7.e6 \(\text{\textit{f}f}6\) Black could still fight, avoiding immediate disaster. The arising position resembles a bit the French Defence (the lightsquared bishop has been already restricted by the knight on d7) and White has in addition several extra tempi (because of c7-c6 and d7-d6-d5).

**d1) 5...\(\text{\textit{d}e}4\)**

This move can hardly be recommended.

6.\(\text{\textit{x}e}4\) dxe4 7.\(\text{\textit{e}2}\) f5

That is the only reliable defence of the e4-pawn.

8.c4

White is preparing the pawn-break d4-d5 in the centre and it becomes clear that Black cannot prevent it at all.

8...e6 9.\(\text{\textit{c}3}\) \(\text{\textit{a}6}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{e}3}\) \(\text{\textit{c}7}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{b}3}\) \(\text{\textit{e}7}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{d}d}1\)

12...\(\text{\textit{d}f}8\)

Black refrains from castling 12...0–0, because of 13.d5 cxd5 14.cxd5 exd5 15.\(\text{\textit{x}d}5\) \(\text{\textit{x}d}5\) (After 15...\(\text{\textit{e}6}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d}x}c7\) \(\text{\textit{x}b}3\) 17.\(\text{\textit{x}d}8\)> White remains with material advantage.) 16.\(\text{\textit{x}d}5\>) and Black loses, because of the X-ray pressure against his king on g8. Meanwhile – the position
of the black king on f8 is quite unsatisfactory for Black.

13.d5 exd5 14.cxd5 cxd5
15.exd5 cxd5 16.cxd5 c7
17.c4

![Chess board with moves 1-17](image)

After some quiet lines like:
17...b5 18.xb5 a6, Black will have serious problems due to the pathetic placement of his rook on h8 as well as his king. Therefore he tried: 17...b5 18.xb5 a6, but White managed to neutralize his counterplay: 19.b4 a5
20.d2 d8 (Black is threatening to capture on d2 and b4).
21.c3 (21.a4!?) 21...c5
22.e2 (The other possibility for White leads to an unclear position: 22.xa6 e3+ 23.e2 c1+ 24.d1 e3∞, and White must either comply with the perpetual, or let his opponent capture on f4 with check.) 22...g5 (In case of 22...c6, with the idea to attack White's king later with g6-g4, then 23.d1 c8 – after 23...xd1 24.xd1, Black has no compensation for the pawn – 24.xa6 xa6+ 25.b5 g6. Black has no other attacking resources left. 26.f1, and if 26...h6, then 27.b8++, exploiting the un-

favourable placement of the king on the f8-square.) 23.xa6 gxf4
24.d1+ Klovans – A.Ivanov, USSR 1977. White's king simply retreats in answer to the check from the e3-square and Black's compensation for the piece is insufficient.

![Chess board with move 23](image)

d2) 5...g4

This move is with the same idea as the move 5...g8, that we are dealing with later – that is to bring his knight to the f5-square somehow.

6.d3 h6

Naturally, 6...h5 is bad, because after 7.h3 h6 8.xh5, White preserves a solid extra pawn.

7.f3

If Black deploys his knight on f5 now (immediately after the exchange of the bishops on f5), White will repel it with g2-g4 and the knight will be back to the pathetic h6-square. Therefore, Black will have to try to block the position in some other fashion.

7.f5

After 7.e6, with the idea to
place the knight on the f5-square and to be able to counter g2-g4 with the move \( \text{\texttt{Qh4}} \), it is best for White to play 8.\( \text{\texttt{Le3}} \)!!? (It is not so effective for White to play: 8.\( \text{\texttt{Le2}} \) c5 9.\( \text{\texttt{Cc3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Cc6}} \) 10.0-0 \( \text{\texttt{Lf5}} \) 11.g4 \( \text{\texttt{Qh4}} \), and Black had excellent chances for counterplay on the kingside in the game, Santos – Galego, Maia 2003.) 8...\( \text{\texttt{Qf5}} \) 9.\( \text{\texttt{Qf2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h5}} \) 10.0-0\( \text{\texttt{\pm}} \), and after some time White can think about repelling the knight with g2-g3, h2-h3, and g3-g4.

8.\( \text{\texttt{Qg5}} \)

Black has no counterplay in the centre and White can organize an offensive on the kingside.

8...\( \text{\texttt{e6}} \) 9.\( \text{\texttt{h3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qf7}} \) 10.\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxg5}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{fxg5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b4}} \) 12.\( \text{\texttt{a3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{h4}} \)

White has the initiative on the kingside. In the game Almasi – Nikolaidis, Balatonbereny 1994, there followed: 13...c5 14.\( \text{\texttt{gxf5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{exf5}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{dxc5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xc5}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{Wb5+}} \) \( \text{\texttt{g6}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{Wf3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e6}} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{h5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qf7}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{Qf4}} \). The position of Black’s king is very much endangered and he has no counterplay at all. 19...\( \text{\texttt{Cc6}} \) 20.0-0-0 \( \text{\texttt{a5}} \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{Qb5}} \). White is threatening to check from the d6-square exposing the dark squares around the black king. 21...\( \text{\texttt{Qd4}} \) 22.\( \text{\texttt{Qxd4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxd4}} \) 23.\( \text{\texttt{Cc4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qb6}} \) 24.\( \text{\texttt{Qb3}} \) a5 25.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \). It is not clear at all how Black can defend the d5-pawn.

\textbf{d3) 5...\( \text{\texttt{Qg8}} \)}

As we have already seen, after 5...\( \text{\texttt{Qg4}} \) Black fails to establish his knight on the f5-square. So, in order to realize his idea in the opening – Black is forced to retreat his knight to its initial position.

6.\( \text{\texttt{Qd3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{g6}} \)

Or 6...\( \text{\texttt{e6}} \) 7.\( \text{\texttt{Qce2}} \) (White does not need to retreat his knight yet and he can play instead 7.\( \text{\texttt{Qf3}} \), or 7.\( \text{\texttt{Qe3}} \).) 7...\( \text{\texttt{h5}} \) 8.\( \text{\texttt{Qf3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qe7}} \). The other possibility for Black ignores piece-development completely: 8...\( \text{\texttt{g6}} \) 9.\( \text{\texttt{Qe3}} \) b6, Raggini – Muha, Cap d’Agde 2002, 10.0-0? \( \text{\texttt{Qa6}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) – the position after White pushes c4 might not be as closed as Black would have liked...) 9.\( \text{\texttt{Qe3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qf5}} \) 10.\( \text{\texttt{Qf2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qa6}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{Qc7}} \), Spiekermann – Kappler, Lausanne 2000, and here 12.0-0\( \text{\texttt{Qg3}} \), h3, g4 – and White has good prospects on the kingside, while
Black has no counterplay.  
7.\(\text{\#f3}\) h5 8.0-0 \(\text{\#h6}\) 9.\(\text{\#e3}\) \(\text{\#f5}\) 10.\(\text{\#e2}\)

It is much better for White to preserve his light-squared bishop from being exchanged.
10...\(\text{\#g4}\)

Black intends to keep the f5-square for the knight.
11.h3 \(\text{\#xf3}\) 12.\(\text{\#xf3}\) e6 13. \(\text{\#f2}\) \(\text{\#f5}\) 14.\(\text{\#e1}\) \(\text{\#d7}\)

BlacK had to play the move h5-h4 at some moment in the next few moves in order to secure the placement of the knight on f5, but that would not have changed the evaluation of the position.
15.\(\text{\#e2}\) \(\text{\#e7}\) 16.b3 b5
Black prevents White’s move c2-c4.

17.g4 \(\text{hxg4}\) 18.hxg4 \(\text{\#h4}\) 19.\(\text{\#xh4}\) \(\text{\#xh4}\). Black will not dominate on the h-file for long, because his king on e8 would not let him bring the second rook in the fight for it. 20.\(\text{\#g2}\) \(\text{\#b6}\) 21. \(\text{\#h1}\) \(\text{\#xh1}\) 22.\(\text{\#xh1}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 23. \(\text{\#h7}\) \(\text{\#g8}\) 24.\(\text{\#h1}\)±. White maintains the pressure in the endgame, because of the weakness of the f7-pawn. The game fol-

owed with: 24...a5 25.\(\text{\#c1}\) a4 26.\(\text{\#xg8}\) \(\text{\#xg8}\) 27.\(\text{\#h7}\) axb3 28. axb3 \(\text{\#f8}\) 29.\(\text{\#d3}\) \(\text{\#a8}\) 30.f5 \(\text{\#xf5}\) 31.\(\text{\#xf5}\) \(\text{ef5}\) (Black cannot allow f5-f6.) 32.\(\text{\#h5}\) \(\text{\#c7}\) 33. \(\text{\#xf7}\)±, and White’s advantage is quite substantial, Yakovich – Vorotnikov, Vladivostok 1990.

e) 4...b5

This move is good now, because Black is threatening b5-b4, moreover it is useful for him, because he can develop his bishop on b7 and the eventual placement of his knight on the d5-square (in case of e4-e5 and \(\text{\#f6-d5}\) is secured too. Still, it is better for Black to develop his kingside first and only then to push his queenside pawns.

5.a3
White parries the threat against his e4-pawn.
5...\(\text{\#g6}\)
The other possibilities for Black are:
5...e5 – Black loses a pawn without any compensation after that move: 6.dxe5 dxe5 7.\(\text{\#xd8+}\) \(\text{\#xd8}\) 8.fxe5 \(\text{\#g4}\) 9.\(\text{\#f3}\) \(\text{\#c5}\) 10.\(\text{\#g5+}\) \(\text{\#c7}\) 11.h3 \(\text{\#e3}\) (after
\( \text{f}2 - \text{White plays } h2) \text{ 12.} \text{xe3 xe3 13.} \text{xb5} - \text{Garma - Sasot, Philippines 1997. White wins another pawn, because of the fork;}

5...\text{b6} - \text{This move is useless, because the queen here is attacking nothing. Black would at least be attacking the b2-pawn with a pawn on b7. 6.e5 \text{fd7 7.} \text{f3 d5 8.f5↑ Navratil - Jemelka, Czech Republic 1997. Black will soon be in great trouble on the kingside;}

5...a6 6.\text{d3 g6 7.} \text{f3 g7 8.0-0 \text{0-0 9.e5?↑. This position is more typical for the Pirc Defence and White has managed to build and fortify a solid pawn-centre. There might follow: \text{9..d5 (or 9...dxe5 10.fxe5 d5 11.e4 f5, Hidegh - Szekeres, Gyongyos 1999, and here White would have been clearly better after: 12.e1!±, with the idea to follow with } h4 \text{ and } h6.). 10.} \text{xd5 cxd5, Fuentes - Escandell, Argentina 1993, and once again it deserved attention for White to play 11.e1±, with the idea to bring the queen to h4 with the standard initiative on the kingside;}

5...c7 - \text{Black will not manage to push e7-e5 anyway, so the development of the queen on c7 does not seem to be reasonable. 6.e5 \text{fd7 7.} \text{f3 a6 8.} \text{d3 e6 9.0-0↑ Parkanyi - Fleuch, Zalakares 1998; 5...g4 6.e2 (It is also good for White to play 6.\text{d3, just like in the line 4...g4 5.\text{d3.)}

6...\text{xe2 7.xe2 a6 8.e5 d5 9.cxd5 cxd5 10.e6 (White could have simply developed with 10.f3?!), while the move 10.e6 - is a direct attempt to exploit the lead in development.) 10...fxe6 11.f3 d7 12.g5↑ Kiss - Furesz, Hungary 2002. Black's position will be very difficult if he lets his opponent bring his knight to the c6-square, as well as if he plays e6-e5 and opens the f-file himself;}

5...\text{b7 6.f3 a6, Ruszin - Pali, Budapest 2003, and here White can simply follow with 7.d3↑. If Black does not take care about the immediate development of his kingside, he might be in great trouble after 0-0 and e4-e5.}

6.\text{d3 g7 7.f3}

7...0-0

7...a6 8.0-0, and in case of 8...\text{b6, Alves - Van Riemsdijk, Itapiruba 1997 (about 8...0-0 9.e5 - see 5...a6) White must play 9.e5, without being afraid of 9...g4 10.h3 dxe5 (White can counter 10...\text{h6, with the simple 11.e3± - and Black's queen is misplaced.) 11.hxg4

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exd4 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}4 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{x}}}}g4 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{a}}}}4\_\_ - White’s extra piece is stronger than Black’s pawns in the middle game, moreover that the pawns get reliably blocked.

7...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{g}}}}4. This move does not seem to combine too well with the idea b7-b5 — after the exchange of the black bishop on f3 and the pawn-break e4-e5 for White – the black pawns on the queenside might become quite vulnerable. 8.h3 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{x}}}f3} 9.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{x}}}f3} 0-0 10.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}5 dxe5 11.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xe5 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}e8 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e3 a6 13.0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{c}}}}7 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}e4 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}e6 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{c}}}}3 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}c7}, Doyle – König, Coventry 2005, and here White could have claimed a substantial advantage after the move 16.a4\_\_. Black then would have been forced to capture on a4 and that would have compromised his queenside pawn-structure considerably. Such developments would have been almost a disaster for Black. The other possibility for Black however would have been even worse: 16...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}b7} 17.axb5 axb5 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}xa8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}xa8 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{x}}}xb5} (White’s bishop is untouched, because of the check on the f6-square.) 19...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a2} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d3} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{xb2}}} \_\_} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b1} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a2} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b7} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e8} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f1} followed by \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c4} and Black’s position is strategically hopeless. His pieces are terribly misplaced and he is utterly defenceless against the pressure along the a2-g8 diagonal.

8.0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b7}

8...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}b6} 9.e5 (White should not be afraid of the pin along the a7-g1 diagonal.) 9...dxe5 10.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{f}}}xe5} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d5} (After 10...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{g}}}g4}, White plays 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{h}}}h1}, and if Black tries the undermining move: 11...c5 – then 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e4} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{c}}}6} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{h}}}h3} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{h}}}h6} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d5} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b8}. Otherwise, White wins a pawn with the check from the e7-square. 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{g}}}g5}, threatening \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}d2} and capturing on e7 – White wins material.) 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{x}}}xd5} cxd5 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e1} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{c}}}6} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c3} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d7} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{h}}}h1} f6, Leib – Nobis, Germany 1997, and here White had to play: 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}exf6} exf6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f4} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{a}}}ae8} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{g}}}g3\_\_}, and he has better pawn-structure and comfortable lead in development.

8...a6 9.e5, leads to positions that we have dealt with in the line 5...a6.

9.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e1} a6

After 9...a5, Scharfenberg – Hain, Geramny 1999, White should better play 10.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e5} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{fd}}}7} 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e4}, and it becomes quite questionable – why Black has played a7-a5 – he has no targets to attack on the queenside.

9...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b6} 10.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{h}}}h1} (It is also possible for White to play 10.e5!? immediately, and if 10...dxe5 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{f}}}xe5} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{g}}}g4}. There is no other way to make use of the pin – after 11...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{f}}}fd7}, White plays simply 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e3\_\_}, fortifying the centre. 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e4\_\_}, and Black is forced to retreat with the bishop to the c8-square and that is quite unfavourable for him. He can never destroy White’s centre after that...) 10...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a6} (Or 10...a6 11.e5 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d5} 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textit{\textbf{x}}}xd5} cxd5, Von Westphalen – Haub, Porz 1989,
and here it deserved attention for White to follow with 13.f5!?? immediately and he seizes the initiative on the kingside.) 11.e5 dxe5 12.dxe5 cxd5 13.Wh4 dxe5 14.fxe5 f6 15.Wh6 Wc7 16.Wae1 Wae8 17.c3+. White has fortified his e5-pawn and he has better placed pieces and a huge space advantage.

10.e5 d5 11.We4 Wc7 12.Wh4 c5

13.f5→. White can start a direct kingside attack right now. Black has postponed his counter-attack in the centre considerably. 13...dxe5 14.fxg6 fxg6 15.Weg5+, and White can simply win the exchange with Weg6, Crouch – Spangenberg, Hastings 1994.

f) 4...Wg4

This move now is just useless, because of White's next move.

5.Wd3

White retreats with his queen in order to be able later to repel the enemy bishop on g4 with the move h2-h3, or even if Black is not attentive enough to trap the bishop with f4-f5.

5...g6

This move transposes to the Pirc Defence. It is not quite clear now – why Black has played Wg4 in the first place...?

The other possibilities for Black are:

It is too bad for him to play: 5...e5 6.dxe5 dxe5 7.f5+ Felczer – Danner, Hessen 1996. Black's bishop on g4 gets trapped;

It seems quite senseless for Black to play 5...h6 6.f5+, and White is threatening to capture Black's bishop on g4, Steiner – Titze, Vienna 2003;

It seems so strange for Black to continue with: 5...Wd7 6.Wf3 Wg4 (Black insists stubbornly on exchanging that bishop, disregarding completely the element of time... In case of: 6...Wc6 7.a3 Wc7 8.h3 Wb5 9.Wxb5 cxb5, Bacsi – Dobos, Budapest 2004, White maintains his edge with 10.e5, and Black is forced to retreat his knight to the edge of the board on h5, because after: 10...Wd5 11.Wxb5!+, he simply remains a pawn down.) 7.We2 e6 8.h3 Wxf3 9.Wxf3 d5 10.e5 Wfd7 11.We2 We7 12.f5 Vallejo Pons – Sanz Bosc, Mondariz 1997. White has
a great lead in development and he can realize it by opening the game;

5...d5 – that move is quite dubious. 6.e5 Qg8 (It is too bad for Black to play 6...Qe4 7.Qxe4 Qf5 8.Qd6+ and White wins a piece.) 7.h3 Qd7 8.Qf3 e6 9.Qe3± Kolcak – Briestensky, Bratislava 1986. After Black has retreated with almost all his pieces, his lag in development has become catastrophic;

In case of 5...Qa5, White follows with: 6.Qd2 Qa6, otherwise White repels the bishop on g4 and castles long. 7.Qd5 Qa4 8.Qxf6+ gxf6 9.f5, and Black's bishop is lost: 9...d5 10.h3 dxe4 11.Qxe4 Qb4 12.Qd3 (It also deserves attention for White to play 12.Qc1!?, winning the bishop.) 12...0–0 0–0 13.c3 e5 14.hxg4 Qxd3+ 15.Qxd3 exd4 16.c4± Weidemann – Straeter, Germany 1995. Black has some compensation for the piece indeed, because White's king is in the centre, but still it is obviously insufficient;

5...Qa6 (This move is with the idea to attack White's queen with the knight from the b4-square.) 6.h3 Qc8 (6...Qd7 7.Qe3 Qa5 8.Qd2 Qb4 9.e5, Leroy – Common, France 2002. Black does not have the d7-square for his knight, so he is forced to play the quite dubious line: 9...Qe4 10.Qxe4 Qxc2+ 11.Qd1 Qxd2+ 12.Qxd2 Qxa1 13.Qd3±. White captures the black knight on a1 and he remains with two pieces for a rook and a pawn and so he has a clear advantage, because Black has no passed pawns.) 7.Qe3 Qa5 8.Qd2 (It is too dangerous for White to allow Black's counterplay after 8.Qf3 d5±, and if 9.e5, Black can play Qe4, followed by Qf5, Poscher – Trauner, Linz 1999.) 8...d5 9.e5 Qd7. Black is thus forced to deploy his pieces much more passively than, for example after: 8.Qf3. 10.Qf3 b5 11.Qd3 Qb6 (This seems strange – Black should not start any active actions, before he has at least developed partially his kingside.) 12.0–0 e6 13.f5 (White must strive to open the position.) 13...exf5 14.Qh4 Qc4 (After 14...g6, White has 15.Qxd5 Qxd2 16.Qf6+ Qd8 17.Qxd2±, and Black's position is totally destroyed.) 15.Qxc4 Qxc4 16.Qxf5 Qc7 17.Qg5+ Dovzik – Profant, Nove Zamky 1999. It is not clear at all, how Black can complete his development...

6.h3 Qd7

Black has also tried two other possible retreats of the bishop:

6...Qc8. This move admits that Black's whole plan was a failure. 7.g4 (White is trying to use the free tempo for an "enlarged" fianchetto of his bishop on f1.) 7...b5 8.a3 a6 9.Qg2 Qb7 10.Qe3 Qc7 11.Qge2 Qfd7 12.0–0+ Dimitrov – Zahariev, Bankia 1992. White's prospects in the middle game are clearly better, because Black has lost plenty of time in the opening;
6...\textit{e}6 7.\textit{c}3 (It is also good for White to play 7.g4, just like in the lines where Black’s bishop retreats to other squares. White prevents the black bishop from coming to f5 and occupies extra space.) 7...d5 8.e5 \textit{\textit{f}}5 9.\textit{\textit{e}}3 \textit{\textit{g}}8 (It is too dangerous for Black to play 9...\textit{\textit{e}}4, because of 10.g4 \textit{\textit{x}}c3 11.gxf5 \textit{\textit{e}}4 12.fxg6 hxg6 13.e6! f5 (It is very bad for Black to try: 13...fxe6 14.\textit{\textit{d}}3.) 14.\textit{\textit{g}}1+, and Black loses either the g6-pawn, or the f5-pawn in the line: 14...\textit{\textit{g}}8 15.\textit{\textit{h}}4 \textit{\textit{d}}6 16.\textit{\textit{x}}f5 \textit{\textit{x}}e6 17.\textit{\textit{g}}3.) 10.g4 \textit{\textit{x}}c2 11.\textit{\textit{e}}2 \textit{\textit{e}}4 12.\textit{\textit{x}}e4 dxe4 13.\textit{\textit{x}}xe4= Tarnowski – Puc, Krynica 1956. White has occupied plenty of space and he has the bishop-pair advantage, while Black has not developed a single piece yet.

7.g4 \textit{\textit{g}}7

The immediate pawn-break is a disaster for Black after: 7...h5 8.g5 \textit{\textit{g}}8, Vehi Bach – Gomez Fernandez, Barbera 1999, and here the simplest line for White is: 9.e3\textit{\textit{f}}0–0–0 – and Black has only one developed piece.

8.e3 \textit{\textit{a}}6 9.\textit{\textit{g}}2 \textit{\textit{a}}5 10.\textit{\textit{g}}e2 e5 11.0–0–

White has extra space and very active pawns on the kingside. Therefore Black, in the game Boix Moreno – Fernandez Madrid, Santa Coloma 1997, decided to evacuate his king to the queenside, but he came under a crushing pawn-offensive there too: 11...0–0–0 12.a3 \textit{h}5 13.g5 \textit{\textit{e}}8 14.b4 \textit{\textit{c}}7 15.\textit{\textit{a}}b1–. Black has no counterplay on the kingside, while White will open the b-file on the queenside at any moment.

\textbf{g) 4...\textit{\textit{b}}6}

This move is played with several ideas. At first, the white bishop is stuck on c1 in order to defend the b2-pawn. Secondly, White’s d4-pawn comes under attack. Finally, after castling short, White might get pinned along the a7-g1 diagonal.

5.e5

Still, all Black’s achievements in that pawn-structure are suddenly not so important after that move by White. The d4-pawn is not under attack by anything else, besides Black’s queen, and White should not be so much in
a hurry to develop his bishop on c1 anyway, since he can and should develop his kingside first.  

5...\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \)  
It is also possible for Black to play 5...\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) 6.\( \text{\texttt{e2}} \) (White can play here too: 6.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \), Reschun – Dyachkov, Halle 1995, in order to repel later the bishop on g4 and gain some time for development of pieces with tempo.) 6...\( \text{\texttt{xe2}} \) 7.\( \text{\texttt{xe2}} \) 8.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 9.\( \text{\texttt{f3}} \). White has a huge lead in development (the opponent has to lose additional time in order to develop his kingside) and extra space.  

5...\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 6.\( \text{\texttt{xex5}} \) 7.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 8.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 9.\( \text{\texttt{g6}} \) (The move 8...e6, would block Black’s light-squared bishop, so he must develop his kingside in another fashion.) 9.c3 10.\( \text{\texttt{f3}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{e2}} \). In the game Skripchenko – Muresan, Romania 1994, White made good use of the order of moves chosen by Black and developed his knight possibly to a even more favourable square than f3 – the knight on e2 intends to go to f4 attacking the bishop on e6 as well as the pawn on d5.  

5...\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) – We can hardly recommend such long manoeuvres with the knight at the edge of the board. 6.h3 7.g4. This move prevents the black knight from entering the game via the f5-square. Black cannot exploit the weaknesses that White is creating, because he is not well developed at all. 7...d5 (Black blocks the centre and he cannot organize any counterplay like that, but after his long manoeuvres with his queen and knight, White’s actions will be more effective no matter what.) 8.\( \text{\texttt{f3}} \) 9.a3 10.\( \text{\texttt{e3}} \). Black cannot capture now on b2, because of 8.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \) and that was the idea of White’s previous move. 10...c4 11.b3 cxb3 12.cxb3 13.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \). White has achieved everything that he could have possibly dreamed about in that “French”-type pawn-structure, Mainka – Gazić, Germany 2002.  

6.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 7.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \)  
This is an important move – White should prevent the development of Black’s queenside bishop if he can. It is less convincing for him to play: 7.c3 8.\( \text{\texttt{f5}} \) 9.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) 10.\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) 11.0-0 g6 – Fernandez Aguado, Sitges 1995. The absence of the light-squared bishops is definitely in favour of Black who has managed to build a barrier along the light squares.
Now, if Black wishes to develop his light-squared bishop, he has to play g6 and \( \text{\textit{f5}} \), and he will have his pawn-structure compromised after the exchange on f5.

Black has two main lines in that position – g1) 7...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \) and g2) 7...g6.

The immediate exchange usually transposes to other lines:

7...dxe5 8.fxe5 g6, Berch – Bendig, Email 2000, 9.c3?!±, besides now, after the disappearance of the f4-pawn, Black’s move \( \text{\textit{f5}} \) becomes senseless, since White’s dark-squared bishop will be powerful and not weak;

7...e6 8.c3 \( \text{\textit{d7}} \) (Black plans to push f7-f6 and to follow that with capturing on f6 with the knight, but that idea has certain drawbacks too. The e6-pawn becomes weak, as well as the e5-square.) 9.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) dxe5 10.fxe5 f6 11.exf6 \( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) 12.0-0 \( \text{\textit{d6}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{h1}} \) 0-0 14.\( \text{\textit{e5}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{e2}} \)± Gumula – Krajewski, Wysowa 2003. White’s powerful knight on e5 and the weakness of Black’s e6-pawn determine White’s long-term strategical advantage.

**g1) 7...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \) 8.c3 g6**

It is not good for Black to play: 8...dxe5 9.fxe5 e6. Black has restricted his own light-squared bishop Krebs – Fischer, 2000, and here White’s simplest road to get the edge is – 10.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) (in the game there followed: 10.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) \( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{e2}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{g3}} \). White could not castle immediately, because he would have lost his e5-pawn. 12...\( \text{\textit{f5}} \)?? 13.\( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 0-0-0±, and Black had compensation for the pawn.) 10...\( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 11.0-0±. White has extra space, better placed pieces and strong pressure on the kingside.

It is too passive for Black to play: 8...\( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) dxe5 10.fxe5 f6 (Black is forced to shelter his king on the queenside, because after opening of the f-file he will fail to do that on the kingside.) 11.\( \text{\textit{e2}} \) e6 12.0-0 0-0 13.\( \text{\textit{h1}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 14.a4 (White begins a pawn-offensive against Black’s eastling position.) 14...a5 15.exf6 gxf6 16.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{de8}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{b5}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 18.c4 dxc4 19.\( \text{\textit{xc4}} \)± Stets – Khvorostinin, Alushta 1999. Black’s pieces are very passive and he will have serious problems in the nearest future with his king as well as with his e6 and f6-pawns.

After 8...h5, Artvandelay – Fuzzball, Dos Hermanas 2003, White should better play 9.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) – and presently it is not clear whether pushing the rook pawn was useful for Black, because it is usually done in order to solidify the eventual placement of the black knight on the f5-square. In our position... there is no knight like that at all...

**9.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \)??**

Black is now forced to play e7-e6; therefore he will not be able to play later \( \text{\textit{f5}} \).
9...e6 10.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e2 h5
10...\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{d}}}}\)d7 11.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{f}}}}\)f3 0–0–0 12.b4 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e7 13.a4 f6 14.0–0 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{h}}}}\)f8 15. \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e3\(\textsc{\texttt{T}}\) Sion Castro – Izeta, Spain 1995. Black’s counterplay in the centre is not so effective as to compensate White’s pawn-offensive against his king.

11.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{f}}}}\)f3 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{d}}}}\)d7 12.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e3 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{c}}}}\)c8

Contrary to the game that we have just seen – Sion Castro – Izeta, Black is trying to build a pawn-fortress and he does not even wish to castle at all. On the one hand it is not so easy for White to break a defensive setup like that, but Black can hardly organize any counterplay will his pieces so discoordinated all over the board.

13.0–0 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e7 14.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{f}}}}\)f2 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{f}}}}\)f5 15. \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{g}}}}\)g3\(\textsc{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{T}}}}}}\})$

White is preparing the pawn-break on the kingside (g3–g4). 15...\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e7 16.h3 dxe5 17.fxe5 a6 18.a4 (This move prevents the exchange of the light-squared bishops on the b5-square.) 18...\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{d}}}}\)d8 19.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{g}}}}\)g2 g5 20.g4 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{h}}}}\)h4+ 21. \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{x}}}}\)xh4 gxh4 22.gxh5 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{g}}}}\)g5 23. \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{h}}}}\)h1 f5 (This decision is quite dubious, but it is not easy at all to find any reasonable plan for Black.) 24.exf6, Turov – Rivas Pastor, Ubeda 2001. Black would hardly survive for long with his king in the centre after opening of the game.

\(g2)\ 7...g6$

This is with the idea to develop the bishop to the f5-square despite the weakening of the pawn-structure.

8.c3

That move is played in order to solidify the centre with a useful move, and White also anticipates the exchange on f5, so that he can develop his queen directly to the h5-square. 8.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e2!? can also lead to an advantage for White, for example: 8...\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{c}}}}\)c6 9.c3 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{f}}}}\)f5 10.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{x}}}}\)xf5 gxf5 11.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{g}}}}\)g3 e6 12.0–0 h5?! (It is better for Black to play: 12...0–0–0 13.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{h}}}}\)h1 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{e}}}}\)e7 14.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{h}}}}\)h5\(\textsc{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{T}}}}}}\), although we can understand his reluctance to let White’s knight to the really annoying h5-square.) 13.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{x}}}}\)xh5 dxe5 14.fxe5 \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{c}}}}\)xe5 15.\(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{f}}}}\)f6+ \(\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{d}}}}\)d8. Black relied a lot on his powerful pawn centre to compensate his problems with the king, but
after White’s next move it becomes immediately clear – that was an illusion! 16.\(\text{fxf5!!}\) \(\text{d6}\) (It is obvious now that Black cannot play: 16...exf5, because of 17. \(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{g6}\) 18.dxe5. White has a strong attack for the exchange and the attempt to trade queens with 18...\(\text{h5}\) ends in a disaster for Black: 19.\(\text{g5+}\) \(\text{xg5}\) 20.\(\text{f6}\) \(\text{c7}\) 21.\(\text{d7+}\) with a checkmate.) 17.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{g6}\) 18.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{c7}\) 19.\(\text{g4!}\) \(\text{ad8}\) 20.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{b8}\) 21. \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{a5}\) 22.\(\text{h5!}\) Leko – Hodgson, Cacak 1996. Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient.

Black now once again has a choice between \(g2a)\) 8...\(\text{g7}\) and \(g2b)\) 8...\(\text{f5}\).

About 8...\(\text{c6}\) 9.\(\text{f3}\) – see line \(g1\).

It is senseless for Black and it only weakens his position to play: 8...\(\text{h5}\) 9.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{e6}\) (Black cannot be happy either with: 9...\(\text{e6}\) 10.\(\text{e2}\) – his bishop is blocked and it is still a mystery why the move h7-h5 has been played in the first place...) 10. \(\text{h3}\) \(\text{xh3}\) 11.\(\text{hxh3}\) \(\text{e6}\) 12.0-0 Sion Castro – Ayala, Oropesa del Mar 1996. White has the bishop-pair, extra space and better development. The careless move 12...\(\text{c6}\)? led to a hopeless position for Black after: 13.\(\text{xg6}\) \(\text{fxg6}\) 14.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{e7}\) 15.\(\text{exd6}\) \(\text{d8}\) 16. \(\text{e5}\) and White had a solid extra pawn.

\(g2a)\) 8...\(\text{g7}\)

The attempt to play like in the

Pirc Defence is not good for Black in that position. The bishop has nothing to do on the g7-square when White’s e5-pawn is so well protected.

\(9.\text{e2}\)

It is also possible for White to play: 9.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{e6}\) 10.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{d7}\) 11.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{f8}\) (this is just necessary – White was threatening to play f4-f5) 12.0-0 \(\text{f5}\) 13.\(\text{xf5}\) gxf5 14.b3 \(\text{c8}\) 15.\(\text{h1}\) \(\text{a6}\) 16.\(\text{e1}\) h5 17.\(\text{b2}\) Kaidanov – Zaichik, Connecticut 2003. The position is closed indeed, so White’s advantage in development is not so obvious, but Black has a lot of problems to solve. His king is in the centre, he has not enough space and his pieces are dis coordinated on both sides of the board.

9...0-0 10.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{f6}\) 11.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{exf6}\) 12.g4!?\n
Black’s pieces are a sorry sight. It is not clear what his queen and bishop on g7 are doing and the rest of his pieces are not developed at all. He can try to improve his situation with a manoeuvre of the knight to e4 via the f6-square. White, however prevents that (after f6-f5, he has g4-g5), meanwhile White is preparing his standard kingside attack.

12.\(\text{e8}\) 13.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{h6}\) 14.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{d7}\) 15.0-0-0 \(\text{b5}\) 16.\(\text{b1}\)

White should not exchange the light-squared bishops.

16...\(\text{c6}\) 17.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{a5}\) 18.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{ac8}\)
19.\textbf{g5!}

This is the beginning of White’s attack. 19...\textbf{fxg5} 20.\textbf{f5} \textbf{g7} 21.\textbf{h4}+- Azmaiparashvili – Sinn, New York 1997. Black’s bishop on h6 is in trouble and he cannot do anything about that.

\textbf{g2b)} 8...\textbf{f5} 9.\textbf{xf5} \textbf{gxf5} 10.\textbf{\textit{h5}}

This is an important move.

10...\textbf{e6} 11.\textbf{f3}

White manages to attack quickly and effectively the f7-square with his queen on h5.

11...\textbf{c6} 12.\textbf{g5} \textbf{d8} 13.\textbf{g4}!

White can afford sacrificing a pawn, while Black’s king is in the centre.

13...\textbf{e7}

14.\textbf{gx5} \textbf{exf5} 15.\textbf{xf7} \textbf{xf7} 16.\textbf{e6} \textbf{\textit{f8}}

17.\textbf{g1}⁺

Black is now forced to give up a pawn, in order to castle and he does not obtain enough compensation for it. In the game Wells – Rashkovsky, London 1990, there followed: 17...0–0 18.\textbf{exf7} \textbf{\textit{d7}} 19.\textbf{g8} \textbf{c7} 20.\textbf{xf8} \textbf{xf8} 21.\textbf{xf5} \textbf{b5} (Black is trying to counterattack White’s king.) 22.\textbf{\textit{f2}} \textbf{e7} 23.\textbf{\textit{c2}} \textbf{d7} 24.\textbf{\textit{d3}} \textbf{g4} 25.\textbf{\textit{d2}} \textbf{xf7} 26.\textbf{\textit{g1}}⁺ – White has returned one of his extra pawns, but he has excellent chances to realize his second extra pawn after consolidating his position.

\textbf{Conclusion}

\textit{White maintains his advantage in the centre and better prospects all over, after the seldom played lines on move 4 that we have analysed in this chapter.}

\textit{Black often fianchettoes his bishop on g7 (just like in the 4...\textit{b5} variation) and that leads to positions more typical for the Pirc Defence. Such transpositions are hardly advantageous for Black, because he does not exert enough pressure against White’s centre.}
This is the most active move for Black in that position and it combines two ideas.

At first, the pin of the knight on c3 forces White to take somehow care of the defence of his e4-pawn and to protect it with 5.\(\text{d}d2\), or 5.\(\text{d}d3\) (we analyse these moves in our book).

Both moves however weaken the defence of the d4-pawn and Black can try to exploit that later.

Secondly, having his queen on a5, Black can prepare quickly and easily e7-e5 — an important move that combines development with counterattacking White’s centre.

5.\(\text{d}d3\)

White plays a natural developing move defending the e4-pawn. Black can now try to attack the other white central d4-pawn that has been weakened.

In this chapter we will deal with: a) 5...\(\text{g}4\) and b) 5...d5, while the main line 5...e5 will be analysed in chapters 9-12.

Other moves have been seldom played:

5...\(\text{bd}7\) 6.\(\text{f}3\) e5, transposes to the line 5...e5;

5...\(\text{b}6\). White has weakened his d4-pawn indeed, but still it is not to be recommended to Black to play with his queen here and there, while the rest of his pieces have not been developed yet... 6.e5 \(\text{d}5\) (White can counter 6...\(\text{g}4\) with 7.\(\text{ge}2\) \(\text{d}5\) 8.\(\text{x}d5\) cxd5 9.c3 \(\text{c}6\) 10.h3 \(\text{x}e2\) 11.\(\text{x}e2\) — and White has a bishop pair and extra space, or 7.\(\text{xd}7\)!? \(\text{d}5\) 8.\(\text{x}d5\) cxd5 9.h3 \(\text{d}7\) 10.\(\text{f}3\) — and Black lags considerably in his development.) 7.\(\text{x}d5\) cxd5 8.c3 g6 9.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 10.\(\text{e}2\) (in case Black captures on d5 with his queen — White plays \(\text{c}6\)) 10...\(\text{b}5\) 11.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{x}e2\) 12.\(\text{x}e2\) e6 13.0-0±

Ylijoki – Marttinen, Finland 1997. Black has exchanged his light-squared bishop and has built a pawn-barrier on the light
squares, but he is too far from having solved all his problems. His position is cramped and his pieces are not developed yet;

5...b4 – this attack against the d4-pawn now is even less justified than after 5...b6: White can later win a tempo for the useful move a2-a3. 6.\(a3\) \(g4\) 7.a3 \(b6\) (the point is that after 7...\(xf3\) 8.xf3, Black cannot play 8...\(xd4\) due to 9.e3++, and he loses his queen) 8.e3 e5 (Naturally, Black cannot capture the b2-pawn, because after a4, he loses his queen again.) 9.fxe5 dxe5 10.d2. The arising complications now are definitely in favour of White: 10...xf3 11. dxe5 \(xb2\) 12.0-0 (It is also possible for White to follow with: 12.a2!? \(xe4\) 13.e4 \(xa2\) 14.xa2 \(xe4\) 15.c3 – Black's compensation for the queen is evidently insufficient, because he has not completed his development yet.) 12...xe4 13.e4 \(xe4\) 14.e4→, Black lags in development considerably, having captured White’s b2-pawn, and now he must suffer the deserved punishment: 14...d7 15.d4 \(b5\) 16.e6 (Black is completely helpless after opening of files.) 16...fxe6 17.xg7 \(d5\) 18.xh8 \(xe4\) 19.ae1+– and White remained with a material advantage, Van den Doel – Wuts, Amsterdam 2001;

5...e6 – this is too passive and hardly justified, particularly combined with such active move as a5. 6.a3 \(e7\) 7.0-0 0-0 (It is not any better for Black to play 7...a6 8.a3 d7 9.d2 c7 10.e2 – his pieces are developed senselessly and the move 10...b5?, that was played in the game Preuss – Esposito, Moron 2003, enabled White to maintain a big advantage after: 11.a4 \(b4\) 12.xb5 cxb5 13.xb4. He has a powerful centre and an excellent target for attack – Black's weak queenside.) 8.e5 xe8 9.e4 d5 10.e5 Feicht – Noble, Bad Zwesten 2001. White's successful kingside assault is imminent, while Black has lost a lot of time and his pieces are misplaced;

5...b5 – pushing forward the queenside pawns seems to be unnatural in conjunction with the move a5: in case Black plays later b5-b4, White will have the undermining move a2-a3; moreover – in general these two moves (b5 and a5) do not combine well together. 6.a3 b4 – this shows stubbornness to continue playing on the queenside disregarding piece development. (Black has also tried some other moves here: 6...a4 7.0-0 d5 8.e5 ad7 9.h3 xf3 10.xf3 a6, Apicella – Cairou, Le Touquet 1988, and now White had better try: 11.f5!+– because Black has manoeuvred mostly on the queenside and his kingside has been neglected, or 6...a6 7.0-0 b6. Black is losing additional time in the opening. 8.h1 e6 9.e5 \(d5\) 10.e4+ Peranic –
Hamzic, Bosnjaci 2001. Black's senseless loss of time on queenside moves is bound to tell after opening the game in the centre.)

7.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e2\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a6\) 8.0-0 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd3\) 9.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd3\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a6\) 10.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d2\pm\). White has an advantage in development as well as an excellent target for attack on the queenside – Black's b4-pawn, so he can afford exchanging queens: 10...c5 11.e5 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd3\) 12.cxd3 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d5\) 13.f5 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a6\) 14.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}f4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xf4\) 15.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xf4\). White's advantage in development will be a telling factor in every part of the game – Black simply has too few pieces in action. 15...f6 16.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}fe1\) 0-0 0-17.e6. This pawn is a wonderful positional achievement for White. 17...g5 18.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e3\) g4 19.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}h4\) (19.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d2!?)\) 19...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}b7\) 20.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}ec1\) cxd4 21.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d2\) (Black can counter 21. \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd4\) with 21...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}h6\) and \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}c8\).) 21...d5 (21...c5 22.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}c4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd3\) 23.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd4\) – and Black's pieces are misplaced.) 22.a3 b3 23.a4. Black's b3-pawn as well as his king will be just defenceless in the near future. 23...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}c8\) 24.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xc8\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xc8\) 25.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a3\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}c5\) 26.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}b4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd3\) 27.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xb3\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xb4\) 28.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xb4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}h6\) 29.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}f1\) d3 30.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xg4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}c7\) 31.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d4\), and White remained with an extra pawn in the game, Niedermayer – Blatny, Bad Mergentheim 1989;

5...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a6\) – Black plans to attack White's bishop on d3 with this natural move. 6.e5 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d5\) (6...dxe5 7.fxe5 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d5\) 8.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d2\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}ab4\) 9.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e4\)\(\pm\); 8...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e6\) 9.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}f3\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}ab4\) 10. \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}b6\) 11.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d8\) 12.c4\(\pm\),

and Black lost a piece in the game, T.Horvath – Szirmai, Zala- karos 1995, or 11...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}b5\) 12.b3 – and c4 is unavoidable.) 7.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d2\) (It is also interesting for White to try: 7.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}f3!?)\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xc3\) 8.bxc3 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xc3+\) 9.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d2\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a3\) 10.0-0\(\uparrow\), and his advantage in development more than compensates the sacrificed pawn.) 7...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}ab4\) (This is Black's only way to justify the moves with the queen and the knights.) 8.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e4\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}b6\) 9.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}f3\). This move defends the central pawn, but now Black has an additional resource: 9...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xc3\) 10.bxc3 d5 11.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xh7\) (White should not exchange his light-squared bishop just like that: 11.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}d3\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xd3+\) 12.cxd3 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}f5\) 13.\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}e2\) \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a6\) 14.c4 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}a3\)\(\uparrow\), and Black wins White's d3-pawn, Resa – Lantzsch, Mainz 2002.) 11...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}xh7\) 12.cxb4 \(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}g4\) 13.c3\(\pm\). Black is dominant on the light squares indeed, but that does not compensate the loss of a pawn.

\[a)\] 5...\(\text{\textipa{\text{Q}}}g4\)

Now that move seems slightly better than on the fourth move – White has already occupied the d3-square with his bishop. If he
wishes to avoid the pin of his king’s knight, he has to retreat with the queen to the d2-square, restricting the development of the bishop on c1. Still, it is hardly recommendable to play like that with Black. He should better keep his bishop on c8 prior to the development of the white knight to f3.

6.\textit{\textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqd2 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqg6}}

The dangerous plan for White to castle long and organize a pawn-assault on the kingside has been prevented. On the other hand, he has another wonderful option at his disposal. He can castle short and follow with \textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqe4-e5}, while Black’s queen on a5 and bishop on g4 are misplaced.

6...d5? – this is just a terrible move in that situation. 7.e5, and since after 7...\textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqe4 8.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqxe4 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxd2+ 9.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxd2++-- White wins a piece, Fantin – Laporte, France 2003, Black is forced to retreat to the g8-square with his knight and his lag in development becomes intolerable.

6...e6? – Black’s bishop cannot retreat after that move. 7.h3 \textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh5 8.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf2 (or 8.g3!? \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh2 – and Black’s bishop will remain a captive) 8...d5 9.e5 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqfd7 10.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh2 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqe7 11.f5 (in case of 11.g3 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf5 12.g4, Black can save his bishop with the tactical trick 12...\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh6) 11...\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxd5 12.g4+-- Black’s compensation for the bishop is evidently quite insufficient in that middle game, Khenkin – Schebler, Eupen 1993.

6...e5? 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.f5 (The black bishop on g4 is in trouble – White plans to capture it with h3 and g4 – and Black is helpless against that simple and straightforward plan.) 8...\textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqc5 (It is completely harmless for White if Black plays: 8...\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqb4 9.h3\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqq, and White wins the bishop, Hitzgerova – Agababean, Elista 1998. After 9...\textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxf5 10.exf5 e4 11.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqc4 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxf5 12.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqge2 b5 13.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqb3 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqbd7 14.a3 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqc5 15.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf1 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqg6 16.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqg5\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqq, Black has only two pawns for the piece.) 9.h3 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh5 (9...\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxg1 10.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxg1++– and Black had even less than two pawns for the piece, Ebert – Hagenberg, Griesheim 2002) 10.g4 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxg4 11.hxg4 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxg4, and White wins by force with the simple line: 12.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqg5 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf2 13.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxg7++– and he remains with an extra piece, Raisa – Dunsworth, Espoo 1991.

6...\textit{\textit{\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqc8 – the fact that White’s queen has been forced to occupy the d2-square is not worth wasting two tempi in the opening. 7.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf3 g6. This seems to be the only way to develop Black’s kingside. 8.0–0 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqg7 9.e5 dxe5 10.fxe5 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqd5 11.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqxd5 (11.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqc4 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqd8. White was threatening to capture on d5 and it was hardly advisable for Black to exchange on c3, due to the weakness of his f7-pawn. 12.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf2 0–0 13.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh4 \texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqf5 14.\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqqh6\texttwqq\texttwqq\texttwqq Lisko – Stolz, Bad Wiessee 2001. Black has not completed his development yet, while White’s threats on the kingside are quite dangerous.)
11...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{x}}}}d5 12.c4±. White has a powerful pawn-centre and a huge lead in development.

6...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{d}}}}d7 – it is still better for Black to play at first the move 6...g6 (he is not losing his bishop on g4 with that move yet...), and retreat to the d7-square only after h2-h3. This is more reasonable for Black than to play with the bishop outright and lose a tempo. 7.d3 g6 8.0-0 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{g}}}}7 9.e5 (This move is more energetic than to go to a slightly better endgame with: 9.d5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{x}}}}d2 10.xf6+ xf6 11.xd2 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{g}}}}4 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{e}}}}3± Filipenko – Gofshtein, Belgorod 1989). White should try to exploit Black's loss of tempi in the opening by creating threats in the middle game and not by exchanging queens. 9...d5 10. exd6 exd6 11.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{e}}}}1± – Black has lost his right to castle and his position remains difficult.

7.h3 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{d}}}}7 8.d3

8...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{a}}}}6

8...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{g}}}}7 9.0-0 h5, Berthelot – Kozlowski, L'Etang 2001, and here it would have been excellent for White to follow with the immediate: 10.e5 d5 11.exd6 (It is not so good for White to play: 11.d5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{x}}}}d2 12.xd2 cxd5 13.exd6 c6 14.c3 e6, because Black will gradually recapture the d6-pawn.) 11...exd6 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{e}}}}1± – Black cannot castle anymore and his position is hardly defendable at all.

After the natural line: 9...0-0 10.e5, Black must retreat to the e8-square with his knight, because after: 10...d5 11.d5 (In case of Black's capturing of the queen on d2, after castling – White has the intermediate check on e7 with the knight.) 11...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{x}}}}d5 12.c4 e6 13.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{g}}}}5, and Black loses his queen. You can see now that the development of the black queen to the a5-square creates plenty of problems for Black's natural piece-development.

9.e5 d5 10.exd6 exd6 11. d5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textsc{x}}}}d2+ 12.xd2 cxd5

13.f5. This important move activates White's pieces and opens the f-file for penetration. 13...0-0 14.0-0±. Black's position is clearly worse – his d-pawns are weak, his pieces are passive and he has problems
with the defence of the f7-square. In the game V.Kozlov – Ivanov, Arkhangelsk 1996, Black blun-
tered 14...\textit{\textsc{#e}8?}, and after 15. \textit{\textsc{#g}5++}, he lost the exchange.

b) 5...d5 6.e5 \textit{\textsc{#e}4}

This is the idea of Black’s fifth move. White is now forced to cap-
ture on e4 with his bishop and Black hopes to get some compen-
sation for the e4-pawn. White however, can easily neutralize
Black’s initiative giving back the pawn sometimes.

7.\textit{\textsc{#xe}4} dxe4 8.\textit{\textsc{#e}2}

It is also attractive for White to rely on quick development af-
ter 8.\textit{\textsc{d}2}!? \textit{\textsc{b}6} 9.\textit{\textsc{#ge}2} f5 10. exf6 exf6 11.\textit{\textsc{#xe}4} f5 (It would
have been better for Black to avoid weakening his kingside so
considerably and to capture instead on b2 immediately.) 12.\textit{\textsc{g}5}
\textit{\textsc{xb}2} 13.0–0 \textit{\textsc{e}7} 14.\textit{\textsc{f}3}! (The threat of playing \textit{\textsc{b}3} enables
White to bring his rook to the e3-square and so he can prevent
Black from castling.) 14...\textit{\textsc{b}6}
15.\textit{\textsc{e}3} c5 (White can counter 15...\textit{\textsc{d}8} with 16.\textit{\textsc{b}4}.) 16.\textit{\textsc{c}3}
\textit{\textsc{d}8} 17.\textit{\textsc{h}5+} g6 18.\textit{\textsc{h}6} \textit{\textsc{d}7}
19.\textit{\textsc{ae}1++}, and Black lost the
game before he even managed to
develop his pieces, Glek – Sceckic,
Rethymnon 2003.

8...\textit{\textsc{a}6}

Black has given up his e4-
pawn indeed, but he intends to
attack quickly the c2-pawn with
his bishop and knight with the
idea to try to recapture his ma-
terial. Meanwhile, his kingside
will remain undeveloped during
these manoeuvres.

After 8...f5, Black can hardly rely on having any compensation
whatsoever: 9.exf6 exf6 10.\textit{\textsc{d}2}
\textit{\textsc{b}4} 11.\textit{\textsc{xe}4} \textit{\textsc{xd}2}+ 12.\textit{\textsc{xd}2}
\textit{\textsc{b}6} 13.\textit{\textsc{d}6} Ac8 – Okhotnik,
Balatonbereny 1996. White re-
mained with a solid extra pawn
and a better position.

8...\textit{\textsc{f}5}. The idea of that move
is to force White to weaken his
position additionally in order to
win the e4-pawn. White should
better concentrate on completing
his development in order to ex-
plot his space advantage, in-
stead of preserving his extra
pawn. He can give back, for ex-
ample his d4-pawn, finish his
development and then after cast-
ling he can recapture the e4-
pawn. 9.\textit{\textsc{d}2} \textit{\textsc{b}6} 10.0–0–0 \textit{\textsc{xd}4}
11.\textit{\textsc{e}3} (It is obviously worse for
White to follow with: 11.\textit{\textsc{e}1} \textit{\textsc{b}6}
12.\textit{\textsc{xe}4} \textit{\textsc{a}6}, or 12.g4 \textit{\textsc{d}7} 13.
\textit{\textsc{xe}4} \textit{\textsc{a}6} – Black forces the
trade of queens and his position
remains quite defendable, be-
cause his light-squared bishop is
not hampered by his pawns and
it attacks White’s g4-pawn.)
11...\$b4 12.g4 \$e6 13.f5 \$c4
14.\$d2 \$a5 15.\$d4 b5 16.a3+. White recaptures the e4-pawn and he has the initiative thanks to his active kingside pawns. It is also good for him to follow with: 9.g4 \$e6 10.\$d2 (But, of course not: 10.\$xe4?? \$d5 11.\$e3 \$xh1+- and White lost a rook, Niebling – Ulrich, Frankfurt 2000.) 10...\$b6 (Otherwise Black cannot recapture his pawn.) 11.0–0–0 \$xd4 12.\$e3 \$c4 (12...\$b4 transposes to the line 9.\$d2) 13.f5 \$xe2 14.\$gxe2 \$c4 15.\$d4 \$xe2 16.\$xe2+. White has a space advantage in this endgame and excellent mobile kingside pawns.

9.\$xe4 g6 10.\$f3 \$f5 11.\$e2 \$b4 12.0–0 \$xc2

After 12...\$xc2, White plays 13.g4 \$xa1 14.gxf5. The chances of the black knight to be freed from entrapment are minute and that means White in fact has a material advantage – two pieces for a rook. 14...\$a6 (The exchange of queens would provide the black knight with the c2-square.) 15.fxg6 (It is also possible for White to play immediately: 15.\$e4! gxg5 16.\$xf5 \$g8+ 17.\$f2+ \$b1 – because the g-file can hardly be of any use to Black.) 15...hxg6 (It becomes clear now that after: 15...\$xe2 16.gxf7+ \$xf7 17.\$xe2 \$c2 18.\$d2+, Black’s knight cannot escape anyway, while White is threatening \$c1.) 16.\$e4 \$b6 17.\$b1 e6 18.\$xa1 0–0–0 19.\$e3± Efimov – Caposciutti, Saint Vincent 1998. Black has no compensation for the lost material.

13.e6!

This standard move makes the development of Black’s kingside an arduous task. 13...f6 14.a3 \$b3 15.\$d2 \$c2 (But not 15...\$d5, because after 16.axb4 \$xa1 17.\$xd5++, Black loses – 17...cxd5 18.\$b5+ and White checkmates.) 16.\$c4 \$f5 17.\$e3 \$d3 18.\$xf5 \$xe2 19.\$xe2 \$c2 20.\$a2 gf 21.b3++. White has simply won a piece and Black’s further resistance becomes senseless, Ulibin – De Santis, Padova 1999.
This is no doubt Black’s best move at the moment.

6.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{f3}}} \)

Black now must make up his mind how to develop his pieces. At first, he can exchange on d4 (6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{exd4}}} \)), ensuring the c5-square for his knight and the theoretical possibility to exploit the weakening of the a7-g1 diagonal. Meanwhile, Black still gives up the centre with that move and in general in the opening it is better to preserve the tension as long as possible in the centre. The move 6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{bd7}}} \) serves that purpose (Chapter 10). Finally, Black can attack the d4-pawn additionally with 6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{g4}}} \) (Chapters 11-12).

It is too bad for Black to play: 6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{b6}}} \)? 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{xe5}}} \), because he loses a pawn without any compensation, Treffert – Nussbaecher, Passau 1997.

6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{exd4}}} \) 7.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{xd4}}} \)

White’s knight on d4 is now vulnerable and the a7-g1 diagonal is weakened too – Black should try to exploit all that immediately. Otherwise White will complete his development; he will evacuate his king to h1, develop the knight to f3 and organize e4-e5.

Black can now choose between: a) 7...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{g4}}} \), b) 7...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{g6}}} \), and c) 7...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{b6}}} \).

As for the other moves:

7...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{bd7}}} \) 8.0–0 is analysed in the line 6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{bd7}}} \);

7...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{b4}}} \) – this is hardly the best square for the black queen, while the white knight that has been attacked can simply retreat: 8.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{f3}}} \) \( \text{\textbf{\textit{bd7}}} \) 9.0–0 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{c5}}} \) 10.a3 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{b6}}} \) 11.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{e3}}} \) Dorenberg – Wuts, Gent 1994. Black is now forced to retreat with the queen to the c7-square (Black has played too many moves with one and a same piece in the opening), because it is too bad for him to play: 11...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{xb2}}} \) 12.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{b5}}} \) cxb5 13.\( \text{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} \) and he loses his queen;
7...£e7 8.0–0 0–0 9.£h1 (This is to prevent the future pin of the knight on d4.) 9...£e8 10.£e1. (This move creates the additional threat of £d5, while the black queen is on the a5-square, in the process of transferring the white queen to the kingside.) 10...£f8 11.£d2 (The other line leads to unnecessary exchanges of a couple of light pieces after: 11.£d5 £d8 12.£xf6+ £xf6.) 11...£c7 12.£h4†, White’s centre is well protected now and his pieces are aimed at Black’s kingside. In the game V. Moisseyev – Hassabnis, Oberwart 1991, there followed: 12...£bd7 13.£f3 £c5 14.£ae1 £xd3 15.cxd3 h6 16.f5 £d8 17.g4, and White opened Black’s kingside, while his opponent’s counterplay was nowhere to be seen.

a) 7...£g4

Black disrupts the coordination of White’s pieces a bit, forcing the queen to stand in front of the bishop on c1, but his bishop on g4 is misplaced too.

8.£d2 £b6
Black has tested in practice also: 8...£a6 9.0–0 £d7 (so that the bishop does not get cut away from the rest of the pieces after f4–f5) 10.£h1 (White does not achieve anything here with 10.£d5 £xd2 – but not 10...£d8 11.£xf6+ £xf6 12.e5†, and White can easily materialize his huge lead in development by opening files. – 11.£xf6+ £xf6 12.£xd2†. White has only a slight advantage in that endgame, because the weakness of the doubled f-pawns cannot be exploited easily.) 10...0–0 0 11.a3 £b6, Niemela – Marttinen, Finland 2001, 12.£f3 £c5 (otherwise, after b2–b4 – the black knight on a6 will be isolated) 13.b4 £xd3 14.£xd3†. White now has a free hand for a successful pawn-onslaught on the queenside.

9.£b3 £bd7 10.h3

It deserved attention for White to try 10.f5?! , in order to cut off the escape route for the black bishop on g4.

10...£e6 11.£e2
This move is with the idea to develop the bishop to the e3-square.

11...£xb3 12.axb3 £c5 13.£e3†
White completes his development and thanks to his solid centre and the quite questionable placement of the black queen has a clear positional advantage. It is now a mistake for Black to try: 13...♗b4?, because of 14.0–0 (△15.♕a2 ♖b6 16.b4) 14...♕xd3 15.♖xd3++, and Black's queen was entrapped. He failed to extract it without material losses in the game, Kersten – Tomas, Germany 1988.

b) 7...g6

Black is back again (and not for the first time at that...) to the habitual ideas of the Pirc Defence. It is no doubt attractive to develop the bishop to the long diagonal, particularly if you have in mind the vulnerability of the knight on d4.

8.♗f3

White does not need to place his bishop under attack with 8.♕e3, following 8...♕g4, as it was played in the game Glod – Schaeffer, Elancourt 2004.

8...♕g7 9.0–0 0–0 10.♕e1

White can now exploit the standard plan of attack against Black's weakened kingside with: ♖h4, f4-f5 and ♖h6 – we are going to encounter that plan so often in the Pirc Defence.

10...♕d7

Black's counterplay on the queenside is not so effective, mostly because there are no real targets there: 10...b5 11.♖h4 b4 12.♗e2 ♕bd7 13.♕f5 ♕a6 14.♕h6 ♕ae8 15.♕g5+. Presently Black's knight on f6 and also the h7-pawn are well-defended, but White has additional resources at his disposal. For example he can put his rook on h3. Later, in the game Szabo – Bogza, Romania 1998, there followed: 15...c5 (weakening the d5-square) 16.♕xa6 ♖xa6 17.♕f4 ♖c4 18.♖ad1! ♖xc2 19.♕xd6 ♖xb2 20.♕xg7 ♖xg7 21.♕xd7!, and White won with a direct kingside attack: 21...♕xd7 22.♕xh7+ ♕f6 23.♕d5 ♕e5 24.♕g7+ f6 25.♕xd7+-.

11.♕f5 ♕c5 12.♖h4 gxf5 13.♕h6⊥

It is far from clear now how Black should defend his kingside. Azmaiparashvili found an ingenious resource: 13...♗cxe4 14.♕xe4 ♖xe4 15.♕g5 ♖f5, but
he was forced to lose a piece, because of the pin along the f-file: 16.\textit{\texttt{xf7 g7}}, and now White's best would have been: 17.\textit{\texttt{f2}} (in the game after: 17.\textit{\texttt{f4 h6}} Black saved his piece, but he still obtained a somewhat inferior position: 18.\textit{\texttt{xf5}} - 18.\textit{\texttt{h3 b6+}} 19.\textit{\texttt{h1 xb2}} would have led to a totally unclear position - 18...\textit{\texttt{xf5}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xf5 h6}} 20.\textit{\texttt{g5+ h6}} 21.\textit{\texttt{f5 g4}} 22.\textit{\texttt{xe4 d5}}). Sion Castro – Azmaiparashvili, San Roque 1996, and here White had better play: 23.\textit{\texttt{e6?! e3}} 24.\textit{\texttt{f2±}}, with a minimal advantage.) 17...\textit{\texttt{h6}} 18.\textit{\texttt{h3 g6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{f4+ h7}} 20.\textit{\texttt{fe2±}}. Black loses a piece and his couple of pawns in the endgame is not enough to compensate fully for it.

c) 7...\textit{\texttt{b6}} 8.\textit{\texttt{e2}}

White retreats with the bishop in order to defend the knight as well as the g4-square at the same time. As for the loss of the tempo – the black queen has also come to the b6-square in two moves.

8...\textit{\texttt{bd7}}

Black is now deprived of the possibility to play \textit{\texttt{g4}}.

After 8...\textit{\texttt{g4}} 9.\textit{\texttt{xe4 xg4}} 10.\textit{\texttt{g4+}} Black cannot capture the knight, because of the possibility of the check on \textit{c8}.

8...c5, comet-wcrafty, Terry 1998, seems to be too risky – it is too dangerous to weaken the d5-square with the black queen placed on the b6-square. It is quite sufficient for White to continue with 9.\textit{\texttt{f3}}, followed by castling and e4-e5 and then \textit{\texttt{c3-d5}} just in case.

8...d5 9.exd5 (It deserves attention for White to play 9.\textit{\texttt{e5?! c5}} – otherwise the game develops similarly to the variation: 8...\textit{\texttt{xe7}} – 10.\textit{\texttt{a4 a5+}} 11.\textit{\texttt{c3 xd4}} 12.\textit{\texttt{xd4 e4}} 13.\textit{\texttt{d3±}}, with the idea to exchange on e4 and bring the a4-knight into action via the c5-square – and White is better.) 9...\textit{\texttt{c5}} (in case of 9...\textit{\texttt{xd5}} 10.\textit{\texttt{xe3}}, it is not good for Black to play: 10...\textit{\texttt{xb2}}, because of 11.\textit{\texttt{db5}} – and Black’s queen is endangered, while if Black does not capture the b2-pawn – his queen is misplaced.) 10.\textit{\texttt{a4 a5+}} 11.\textit{\texttt{c3 xd4}} 12.\textit{\texttt{xd4 0-0}} 13.0-0 \textit{\texttt{xd5}} 14.\textit{\texttt{xd5 xd5}} 15.\textit{\texttt{d2±}}, and White has the two-bishop advantage in the endgame, Kochetov – Yentin, corr. 1997.

8...\textit{\texttt{e7}} 9.0-0 0-0 10.\textit{\texttt{h1 d5}} 11.e5 \textit{\texttt{e4}} 12.\textit{\texttt{e3 xc3}} 13.bxc3. White has the advantage on the kingside thanks to his f4 and e5-pawns. The activity of Black’s c and d-pawns is easily contained.
13...c5 14.\texttt{\textbf{b}1 \textbf{d}8 15.\textbf{b}3 b6 (It is better for Black to play: 15...c4 16.\textbf{d}4±, but his pawns become quite immobile after that.) 16.\textbf{f}3 \textbf{a}6 17.\textbf{e}1± Benjamin – Belli, Moscow 1994. Black loses his d5-pawn, because of the pin.

8...\textbf{a}6 9.0–0 \textbf{g}4 (This move is possible now, because the knight on d4 is captured with a check, moreover the c8-square is defended.) 10.\textbf{x}g4 \textbf{x}g4 11.\textbf{a}4 (It is better to let Black exchange the less active knight.) 11...\textbf{a}5 12.\textbf{x}g4 \textbf{x}a4 13.\textbf{e}3 c5 14.b3 (It deserved attention for White to play 14.\textbf{b}3†, and it would be too dangerous for Black to capture on e4, because the game would be opened and his king is in the centre. Black has problems to complete his development anyway.) 14...\textbf{d}7 15.\textbf{x}d7+ \textbf{x}d7 (White preserves better chances in the endgame due to the weakness of the black d6-pawn and the endangered black king.) 16.\textbf{f}3 (It is also possible for White to follow with: 16.\textbf{b}5 \textbf{e}8 17.e5 dxex5 18.fxex5 \textbf{x}ex5 19.\textbf{x}f7+ \textbf{e}6 20.\textbf{f}3 \textbf{b}4 21.\textbf{f}4±, with an edge for him – the black king is quite perilsously placed in the centre.) 16...g6 17.\textbf{ad}1 \textbf{c}7 18.e5 (It would not work for White to play 18.\textbf{g}5, because of 18...h6 19.\textbf{xf}7 \textbf{h}7 – and the knight is trapped.) 18...h6 (White was already threatening \textbf{g}5.) 19.exd6+ \textbf{x}d6 20.\textbf{e}5 \textbf{h}f8 21.\textbf{c}4 \textbf{ad}8 22.f5 g5 23.\textbf{fe}1±. White maintains a slight advantage, because his pieces are better placed, Kaidanov – Nash, Philadelphia 1993.

9.0–0 \textbf{c}5 10.\textbf{f}3

White has completed his development and now he can think about playing e4-e5. Black’s queen and knight on c5 are placed on the same a7-g1 diagonal and are therefore vulnerable.

10...\textbf{e}6 10...g6 – this move seems to be very dangerous, because Black loses two tempi and he weakens the d6-square. 11.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{xb}2 (Black is now forced to enter complications, because he cannot play the calm 11...\textbf{g}7, because of 12.e5 \textbf{fd}7 13.\textbf{b}3, and Black loses at least his d6-pawn.) 12.\textbf{db}5! \textbf{xb}5 13.\textbf{d}4. Now, Black’s queen as well as his f6-knight, as well as his h8-rook are hanging and additionally White has numerous threats of knight-forks. Black has no satisfactory defence. 13...\textbf{g}7 14.\textbf{d}5→ \textbf{xd}5 15.\textbf{xb}2 \textbf{xb}2 16.\textbf{xd}5++ Ramaswamy – Schneider, Budapest 2002. Black’s compensation for the queen is obviously insufficient.
11.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \)

It is too dangerous for Black to lose time in order to win a pawn with: 11...\( \text{xb}2 \) 12.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{a}3 \) 13.\( \text{ab}1 \), since White can prevent his opponent from castling on either side – it is not possible to develop the bishop on \( c8 \), because the \( b7 \)-pawn is hanging, while after \( \text{e}7 \) – White can play \( \text{f}5 \).

12.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{xd}4 \)

Black’s relatively best line is: 12...\( \text{e}7 \) 13.\( \text{f}5 \) 0–0 14.\( \text{e}5 \), but his position remains clearly inferior. The knight is forced to go back to the \( e8 \)-square, the bishop on \( e7 \) must be exchanged for White’s knight and the \( d6 \)-square has been weakened considerably.

13.\( \text{xd}4 \)

Black has lost plenty of time on manoeuvres with his queen and knight and as a result he has only two developed pieces coming out of the opening.

13...\( \text{e}7 \)

14.\( \text{e}5 \)

Of course White must open the game in order to exploit his lead in development. 14...\( \text{dxe}5 \) 15.\( \text{fxe}5 \) \( \text{g}4 \) (Black is practically lost after 15...\( \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{e}6 \) fxe6 17.\( \text{h}5 \), because his king remains in the centre under the attack of all White’s pieces.) 16.\( \text{e}2 \) h5 17.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 18.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 19.\( \text{d}6+ \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 20.\( \text{exd}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 21.\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 22.\( \text{e}5 \) Shevchenko – Arzumanian, Yalta 1995. Black’s king has not castled yet and he has numerous pawn weaknesses.
Chapter 10
1.e4 d6 2.d4 ♗f6 3.♗c3 c6 4.f4 ♔a5 5.♗d3 e5 6.♗f3 ♗bd7

This move enables Black to preserve his pawn on the e5-square. It has a certain obvious drawback though, Black's light-squared bishop is now out of action and it cannot join the fight for the centre by pinning the white knight on f3.

7.0-0 ♗e7

7...b5 8.♗e2!? We are going to encounter that manoeuvre plenty of times in our future analyses. White plans to defend his d4-pawn with his c-pawn and his knight is headed for the kingside: ♗e2-g3, and later possibly to the f5-square. (After 8.d5 ♗b7 9.♗xc6 ♘xc6 10.♖e1 b4 11.♗d1 ♘c5† Peterlunger – Miira, Vorarlberg 1996, Black had excellent counterplay – his light pieces were very active.) 8...♖b6 9.c3±. The idea for Black to play b7-b5 and ♖b6 was hardly successful. White has managed to defend everything on the queenside and he is ready to start a kingside offensive and even to undermine Black's queenside pawns with the move a2-a4.

7...♖b6 8.♗e1 exd4 (Black's last move would be completely senseless if he does not capture on d4.) 9.♘a4 ♘c7 10.e5 (It is quite good for White to follow with: 10.♗xd4!? b5 11.♗c3±. Black has difficult problems to solve with his castling – after ♗e7, White plays ♗f5, while after g6, or ♘c5 – White follows with e5.) 10...dxe5 11.fxe5 ♘d5 12.e6 ♘f6 (It is better for Black to play 12...fxe6 13.♘xe6+ ♗e7. If White removes his knight from f3 – Black plays ♘e5, therefore White must comply with the slight advantage after: 14.♗e4 ♗f5 15.♗xd4±, which lets Black castle indeed, but still White maintains his initiative due to his active pieces.) 13.exf7+ ♖xf7 14.c4↑ Farkas – Imecs, Hungary 2000. It would be very difficult for Black to coordinate his pieces with a king on f7.
7...exd4 8.\textit{\underline{Q}}xd4.

And now Black has tried in practice:

8...g6 – this move is not so good. 9.e5 \textit{\underline{Q}}d5 10.exd6\textpm, and Black loses his right to castle. It is also possible for White to play 10.e6 \textit{\underline{Q}}f6 (10...fxe6 11.\textit{\underline{Q}}xe6 \textit{\underline{Q}}xc3 12.\textit{\underline{Q}}e1 \textit{\underline{Q}}f7 13.bxc3\textpm leads to a position in which Black’s king is perilously endangered.) 11.exf7+ \textit{\underline{Q}}xf7 12.f5\textup{\#}, and White has excellent attacking prospects – Hagarova – Sheremetieva, Bled 2002;

8...\textit{\underline{Q}}c5 9.e5 \textit{\underline{Q}}xd3 10.exf6 (This is better than 10.\textit{\underline{Q}}xd3 dxe5 11.fxe5 \textit{\underline{Q}}xe5 12.\textit{\underline{Q}}h6 \textit{\underline{Q}}e6 13.\textit{\underline{Q}}ae1 \textit{\underline{Q}}c5\textup{=}s, and Black manages to castle long.) 10...\textit{\underline{Q}}xc1 11.\textit{\underline{Q}}e1+ \textit{\underline{Q}}d8, Foster – Mira, Thessaloniki 1988, and now after 12.\textit{\underline{Q}}xc1!? \textit{\underline{Q}}xf6 13.\textit{\underline{Q}}e3 \textit{\underline{Q}}d7 14.\textit{\underline{Q}}e4 \textit{\underline{Q}}e7 15.\textit{\underline{Q}}c5 (15.b4?!\textup{\#}) 15...\textit{\underline{Q}}xc5 16.\textit{\underline{Q}}xe7+ \textit{\underline{Q}}c7 17.c3\textpm, White’s active pieces more than compensate the sacrificed pawn, while the black king is in the centre;

8...\textit{\underline{Q}}b6 9.\textit{\underline{Q}}e3 (Naturally, White can play the move 9.\textit{\underline{Q}}e2, which transposes to the line 6...exd4 7.\textit{\underline{Q}}xd4 \textit{\underline{Q}}b6 8.\textit{\underline{Q}}e2 \textit{\underline{Q}}bd7 9.0-0, but of course it is not necessary to retreat the bishop.) 9...\textit{\underline{Q}}xb2 (It is too dubious for Black to play: 9...\textit{\underline{Q}}c5?! 10.\textit{\underline{Q}}b3 \textit{\underline{Q}}g4 11.\textit{\underline{Q}}d2 \textit{\underline{Q}}fd7. White will remain with an extra central pawn in the centre in case of the exchange of knights on the c5-square. 12.h3 \textit{\underline{Q}}e6 13.\textit{\underline{Q}}xc5 – it is also possible for White to play 13.\textit{\underline{Q}}d4?! \textit{\underline{Q}}f6 14.\textit{\underline{Q}}xe6 fxe6 15.\textit{\underline{Q}}a4 \textit{\underline{Q}}c7 16.\textit{\underline{Q}}xc5 dxc5 17.\textit{\underline{Q}}c3\textpm, and Black’s pawn-structure has been compromised, but it is even more energetic to exchange on c5 – 13...\textit{\underline{Q}}xc5 14.\textit{\underline{Q}}f5 \textit{\underline{Q}}d7 15.e5. Black cannot capture the pawn, because White counters that with 16.\textit{\underline{Q}}a4 winning a piece. 15...\textit{\underline{Q}}c7 16.\textit{\underline{Q}}xc5 dxc5 17.e6\textpm, and it becomes obvious that Black cannot survive for long with a king like that, Rechel – Esterluss, Germany 2003.) 10.\textit{\underline{Q}}db5! cxb5 11.\textit{\underline{Q}}xb5 \textit{\underline{Q}}d8 12.a3 (White should avoid 12.\textit{\underline{Q}}e1, Bensch – Mira, Austria 1997, because of 12...\textit{\underline{Q}}c5, and after the exchange on d3 – Black’s queen will have the c2-square.) 12...a6 13.\textit{\underline{Q}}d4 \textit{\underline{Q}}xa1 14.\textit{\underline{Q}}xa1 axb5 15.e5\textup{\#}. Black has three light pieces for the queen indeed, which seems to be nominally sufficient. On the other hand they are not coordinated and they are even on their initial squares, moreover Black’s king is stranded in the centre. Later in the game A.Horvath – Lengyel, Salgotarjan 1997, there followed 15...\textit{\underline{Q}}d5 16.\textit{\underline{Q}}f3 \textit{\underline{Q}}c7 17.exd6
\( \mathcal{A} x d 6 \) 18. \( \mathcal{A} x g 7 \) \( \mathcal{A} e 8 \) 19. \( \mathcal{W} h 5 \) \( \mathcal{A} e 7 \) 20. \( \mathcal{B} b 2 \) \( \mathcal{A} x a 3 \) 21. \( \mathcal{A} x a 3 \) \( \mathcal{A} x a 3 \) 22. \( \mathcal{W} x h 7 \uparrow \), and White had an additional resource - his outside passed h-pawn.

8. \( \mathcal{A} e 3 \) 0–0

It is not effective for Black to attack the bishop on e3 with: 8...\( \mathcal{A} g 4 \) 9. \( \mathcal{A} d 2 \) \( \mathcal{C} c 7 \) (In case of 9...\( \mathcal{A} x d 4 \), White plays 10. \( \mathcal{A} d 5 \) \( \mathcal{A} d 8 \) 11. \( \mathcal{A} x e 7 \) \( \mathcal{X} e 7 \) 12. \( \mathcal{A} x d 4 \uparrow \), with the two-bishop advantage.) 10.\( \mathcal{H} h 3 \) \( \mathcal{A} g f 6 \), Mellado – Rodriguez Gonzalez, Las Palmas 1996, 11. \( \mathcal{W} e 1 \uparrow \). White has repelled the enemy knight and maintained his centre. Now he has a free hand for actions on the kingside.

9. \( \mathcal{W} e 1 \)

White is now ready to play \( \mathcal{A} d 5 \), making use of the vulnerability of the black queen.

We will analyse: a) 9...\( \mathcal{A} d 8 \), b) 9...\( \mathcal{A} g 4 \) and c) 9...\( \mathcal{W} c 7 \).

a) 9...\( \mathcal{A} d 8 \)

This manoeuvre has been encountered often in some 1.e4 e5 - openings. Black intends to bring his bishop to the excellent a7-g1 diagonal, defending against the threat \( \mathcal{A} d 5 \) in the process. The idea seems attractive, but it is very difficult to accomplish, because the a5-d8 diagonal is too short for Black's queen and bishop at the same time.

10. \( \mathcal{W} h 1 \) \( \mathcal{W} e 8 \) 11.\( a 3 \)

This move is with the idea to play \( b 2-b 4 \) at some moment. Black's queen on a5 is terribly misplaced.

11...\( \mathcal{A} x d 4 \) 12.\( \mathcal{B} b 4 \) \( \mathcal{W} h 5 \)

The black queen will hardly be comfortable here as well.

13. \( \mathcal{A} x d 4 \) \( \mathcal{A} f 8 \)

After the aggressive line 13...\( \mathcal{A} g 4 \) 14. \( \mathcal{A} g 1 \) \( \mathcal{A} f 6 \), White has 15. \( \mathcal{A} g 3 \), threatening \( \mathcal{A} e 2 \). Later, it is possible to follow with 15...\( \mathcal{H} h 4 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A} f 3 \) \( \mathcal{A} f 6 \) 17.\( \mathcal{H} h 3 \) \( \mathcal{A} f 8 \) 18.f5 \( \mathcal{A} x d 4 \) 19. \( \mathcal{A} x d 4 \) \( \mathcal{A} f 6 \) 20. \( \mathcal{A} g 3 \uparrow \), and White has the threats to capture on f6, or d6.

14. \( \mathcal{A} c e 2 \) \( \mathcal{A} g 4 \)

Black's activity is only temporary. White can easily defend against the checkmating threats, while Black's queen might be seriously endangered.

15. \( \mathcal{A} g 1 \) \( g 6 \) 16. \( \mathcal{W} d 2 \) \( \mathcal{A} e 6 \)

17. \( \mathcal{A} f 5 \uparrow \)
This positional piece-sacrifice enables White to achieve an overwhelming position. 17...gx.fx 18.gx.gx 19.exfx ef8 20.e2 ef6 (after 20...eh6, White plays 21.xd6 exf6 22.xe8 exe8 23.f5 24.g5++, and he wins the exchange, forcing Black to trade queens on g7 and managing to push his pawn to f6 with check, because it is too bad for Black to play: 24...eh5 25.f6+ g8 26.ed4 and White wins.) 21.xd6 exf7 22.e5 e8 23.f5 24.ed4→ V. Ivanov – Chekhov, Moscow 1999. White enjoys total dominance, because of his excellent piece placement. Black can hardly defend his king against the direct threats on the kingside.

b) 9...g4

10.d2 exd4 11.d5 d8 12.xe7+ xe7 13.xd4

White has managed to exchange the dark-squared bishop of his opponent as a result of Black’s recent tactical operation. This is a definite positional achievement for White.

13...c5

This move aims at depriving White of his two-bishop advantage.

14.b4 xd3 15.cxd3 c5

It is evidently premature for Black to play 15...f5 16.exf5 xex1 17.fxex1 xf5 18.e7 (White’s rook penetrates the enemy camp and his advantage becomes quite considerable.) 18...xd3 19.xb7 e4 (Black defends with this move the c6-pawn indeed, but overlooks White’s next tactical strike.) 20.e6 f6 (Black’s bishop on e4 is pinned and after 20...f7 21.xf7 xex7 22.g5++ White wins a piece.) 21.xg7+ h8 22.c3++ and White remained with an extra pawn and an overwhelming advantage in the game N. Kosintseva – Bachin, Essentuki 2003.

16.f3 f5

This move now is more up to the point.

17.h4 xh4 18.xh4 b6 19.ae1 g6

Black plans to develop his bishop actively on the b7-square.

20.f3!?↑ The queens have been exchanged indeed, but White manages to exploit the
weakened dark squares around the black king with that move. 20...\textit{h}b7 21.\textit{g}g3 (White is now threatening to capture on f5 twice.) 21...\textit{h}h6 22.\textit{b}xc5 \textit{d}xc5 23.\textit{c}c3 (Now, White intends to capture on g6.) 23...\textit{f}f7 24.\textit{h}h3 (White is attacking the g6-square once again and Black has no defence.) 24...\textit{f}xe4 25.\textit{x}g6 \textit{f}f5 26.\textit{e}e5 \textit{g}g7 27.\textit{d}xe4\textsuperscript{+} Besukov – Bachin, Tomsk 2001. White remains with a solid extra pawn and his central passed pawns are much more dangerous than Black’s passed pawns.

c) 9...\textit{c}c7

This retreat is solid, but very passive. Meanwhile, Black presents White with an additional tempo in the opening.

10.\textit{h}h1

White has another possibility at his disposal – 10.\textit{f}xe5 \textit{d}xe5 11.\textit{g}g3 \textit{d}d6 (It deserved attention for Black to try: 11...\textit{h}5!? 12.\textit{f}f2 – in case of 12.\textit{h}h3 g6\textsubscript{∞}, White’s queen comes under the attack of the bishop on c8 – 12...\textit{h}hf6 13.h3 exd4 14.\textit{xd}4 \textit{d}d6, and Black manages to place a piece on the e5-outpost and his position becomes quite acceptable.) 12.\textit{xe}5 (White reaches only a double-edged position in the line: 12.\textit{d}f5 \textit{b}b6 13.\textit{d}xc6 \textit{b}xc6\textsubscript{∞}, but not 13.\textit{d}ad1, because of 13...\textit{b}xd5! 14.exd5 e4\textsuperscript{+}, and it is only Black who can fight for the advantage.) 12...\textit{f}xe5 13.\textit{d}xe5 \textit{f}xe5 14.\textit{f}f4 \textit{c}c5+ 15.\textit{e}e3 \textit{e}e5 16.\textit{h}h4 \textit{d}c5 17.\textit{h}h1 \textit{e}xe3 18.\textit{c}xd3\textsuperscript{±}. White’s position is quite comfortable – he dominates on the f-file and his pieces are active, while he has no weaknesses. Later in the game T.Kosintseva – Bachin, Rybinsk 2001, there followed: 18...\textit{h}h5 19.\textit{g}g3 \textit{g}g6 20.\textit{c}c7 \textit{e}6 21.\textit{x}b7 \textit{ab}8 22.\textit{x}a7 \textit{xb}2 23.\textit{f}f2 \textit{xf}2 24.\textit{xf}2\textsuperscript{±}, and Black had no compensation for the pawn. As we pointed out – Black missed a line with good prospects for him on his eleventh move.

10.\textit{e}8

10...\textit{b}5 11.\textit{a}a3 \textit{a}6 12.\textit{d}d1 \textit{e}e8 13.\textit{d}xe5 \textit{d}xe5 14.\textit{f}xe5 \textit{g}g4 15.\textit{f}f4 (It is also interesting for White to try another standard operation in similar positions – 15.\textit{e}6!? , so that after 15...\textit{f}xe6, White’s e4-pawn does not remain on the semi-open file. After, for example: 16.\textit{g}g1 \textit{f}f8 17.\textit{h}h3 \textit{ge}5 18.\textit{h}h2\textsubscript{±}, White preserves a slight advantage – Black’s knight on e5 is not safe and the e6-pawn might become rather weak in the future.) 15...\textit{g}x\textit{e}5 16.\textit{g}g3 \textit{f}f6 17.\textit{d}d4 \textit{d}d8 18.\textit{h}h6 \textit{w}e7? (After 18...\textit{f}f6, White was planning to
compromise irrevocably Black’s kingside with the help of the exchange sacrifice: 19.\textit{\$xf6} gxf6 20.\textit{\$f1=} , and his compensation is more than sufficient. Still that was the right way for Black to play – at least he would have had some extra material worth suffering for...) 19.\textit{\$xc6=} Markovic – Lazić, Novi Sad 2000, and Black could have already resigned due to 19...\textit{\$xc6} 20.\textit{\$d5}.

\textbf{11.fxe5!?}

Black has good counter-chances after 11.a4 (this is a useless loss of time) 11...\textit{\$g4} 12.\textit{\$d2} exd4 13.\textit{\$xd4} \textit{\$c5=} , with excellent counterplay for Black 14.\textit{\$g3} \textit{\$xd3} 15.cxd3 \textit{\$b6} (You can now see the drawbacks of the move a2-a4 – White does not have the b3-square for his knight and he cannot defend comfortably the b2-pawn and the knight on d4.) 16.\textit{\$ce2} c5 17.a5 \textit{\$a6} 18.\textit{\$c2} \textit{\$h4}? This move is to deflect the queen from the defence of the d3-pawn. 19.\textit{\$xh4} \textit{\$xd3} 20.\textit{\$c3} \textit{\$xc2=} Hossain – Sakalauskas, Bled 2002. Black has simply won a pawn without any compensation for White.

\textbf{11...dxe5 12.dxe5}

White is quite right to exchange plenty of pawns and pieces on the e5-square, because Black has removed his rook from the f8-square and he has weakened his control over the f-file with his last move.

\textbf{12...\textit{\$xe5} 13.\textit{\$xe5} \textit{\$xe5} 14.\textit{\$f4} \textit{\$h5} 15.e5}

\textbf{15...\textit{\$g4}}

After 15...\textit{\$b4} , White can sacrifice: 16.exf6! \textit{\$xe1} 17.\textit{\$axe1} \textit{\$e6} (17...gxf6 18.\textit{\$e8=} \textit{\$g7} 19.\textit{\$e4} and White has a powerful attack) 18.\textit{\$e5} \textit{\$h4} 19.\textit{\$e4=} , and he can combine the attack against the totally misplaced black queen on h4 with an assault against the enemy king.

\textbf{16.h3=} . Both Black’s queen and knight are quite misplaced at the edge of the board.
Chapter 11

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ¼f6 3.¼c3 c6 4.f4 ½a5 5.¼d3 e5 6.¼f3 ¼g4

dxe5, and attacks three black pieces simultaneously: 10...¼xe4 11.¼xe4 ½xa2 12.¼xa2 ¼xe4 13. ¼c3 ¼g6 14.0–0+, Black’s compensation for the queen is quite insufficient, because his pieces are not developed.) 10. gxf3 ¼bd7 11.0–0 ¼e7 12.b4 ¼c7, Visser – Siebrecht, Leeuwarden 1994, and here White had to follow with: 13.fxe5!? dxe5 14.f4 exd4 15.¼xd4†, and his central pawns are very mobile;

7...¼e7 – this move is also part of Black’s plans and it can be played right now, because the order of moves is not so essential. 8.0–0 0–0 (8...¼bd7 – see 7...¼bd7) 9.¼d2 (this move is with the idea to follow with ¼d5) 9...¼xf3 10.gxf3. This capture is a bit non-standard. It keeps the g4-square under control (after the capture with the rook Black could have played ¼g4) and secondly it opens the g-file for actions on the kingside. 10...¼d8 11.¼h1 exd4 12.¼xd4 ¼bd7 13. ¼g1 ¼h5 14.¼f2†, White has a powerful pressure on the kingside, thanks to the open g-file, Berelovich – Hamed, Tanta 1997.
a) 7...d5

Black undermines White's centre, but that is not so satisfactory for him at all, because the arising structure is favourable for White.

8.fxe5 dxe5 9.0-0 dxc3

It is bad for Black to play: 9...f5 10.exf6 Qxf6 11.Qe1 e7 12.g5 b4 13.a3 d6 14.h4± Csoke – Toth, Hungary 1997. Black’s lag in development has already put him in a critical situation.

10.bxc3 e7

It is too dangerous for Black to capture a pawn, because of the terrible weakness on f7: 10...Qxc3. Black’s queen might be endangered. White has at least two possibilities to develop his initiative – 11.Qb1 (this move tries to unpin the knight on f3 with tempo) 11...b6 12.b2 a3 13.Qg5, and White has created threats along the f-file and 11...b1 b6 12.b3 a5 13.h3 h5 14.g4 g6 15.xg6 hg 16.Qg5. Black loses his f-pawn, while after 16.e7 17.Qxf7 0-0 18.e6, his f7-pawn will be under threat by the white queen on d3.

In case of 10...Qd7, Brod – Vodap, Austria 1994, White follows with – 11.Qe1±, just like in the main line.

11.Qe1

White attacks the extremely vulnerable g7-square by bringing his queen to g3.

11...d7

In case of 11...0-0 12.Qg3 h5 13.Qg5→, Black comes under attack, while after 13...Qxg5 14.Qxg5 h6, Bauer – Istvandi, Hungary 1994, White can simply win the exchange with the move 15.Qh7+-.

12.Qg3 Qe6

Should Black capture on f3, then after 13.Qxf3 his f7-pawn becomes vulnerable.

13.Qg5

It is also possible for White to play 13.Qg5 Qf8 (Black tries by all means not to let White’s knight to the g5-square.) 14.Qd2 h6 15.c4 (This move is the reason that White’s bishop retreated to the d2-square.) 15...Qa4 16.cxd5 Qxd5 17.c4 Qxc4 18.Qxc4 Qxc4 19.e6 fx6 20.Qg6+, and Black’s king remains in the centre and it is bound to come under a dangerous attack as usual, for example: 20...Qd8 21.Qae1 Qe7 22.Qxe6 f8 23.Qxg7 Qh7 24.Qxe7 Qxg7 25.Qxg7± Moldovan – Covlea, Bucharest 1995.

Black has won the enemy queen, but his position is difficult, because of the placement of his king on the d8-square.

13...Qxg5 14.Qxg5 h6
Chapter 11

Black should not castle short, because after: 14...0-0 15.\textit{\$h4} f5 16.exf6 $\textsf{\text{gxf6}}$ 17.\textit{\$xf6} $\textsf{\text{xf6}}$ 18. $\textsf{\text{e}}\text{xh7+} $\textsf{\text{f7}}$ 19.\textit{\$g5} $\textsf{\text{xc3}}$ 20.\textit{\$b1 b6} 21.\textit{\$xf6} $\textsf{\text{gx}}$f6 22.\textit{\$fl+}, White wins the f6-pawn.

White's initiative is very powerful. He has plenty of targets to attack – the pawns on b7 and f7, Black's bishop on g4 as well as his queen.

9.\textit{\$f2}

This move defends the d4-pawn – Black can hardly keep his f4-pawn anyway. White could have given up his d4-pawn: 9.\textit{\$xf4} \textit{\$xf3} 10.\textit{\$xf3} $\textsf{\text{xd4}}$ 11. 0-0-0 $\textsf{\text{bd7}}$ 12.\textit{\$e3} $\textsf{\text{b4}}$ 13.\textit{\$e7} 14.\textit{\$g2} g6 15.\textit{\$he1}. The absence of that pawn in the middle game is even useful for White – the g-file has been opened. Later, the game Huzman – Ubilava, Kecskemet 1989, continued with 15...0-0 16.\textit{\$d2} $\textsf{\text{e}}$5 17.e5!? $\textsf{\text{xe}}$5 18.f5=, and White was threatening to sacrifice on g6. Black might come under a powerful attack.

9...\textit{\$xf3}

This is to force White to capture on f3 with the pawn, so that he cannot threaten (at least for a while...) Black's knight on h5.

9...\textit{\$bd7} 10.0-0-0 11.\textit{\$xf3} $\textsf{\text{e7}}$ (Black’s play is quite harmless for White – he lets his opponent do anything he wishes and he only takes care of the development of his pieces.) 12.\textit{\$xf4} $\textsf{\text{a5}}$ 13.\textit{\$hg1} $\textsf{\text{Gipslis – Hoepfl, Passau 1997. White has a powerful centre and Black has no counterplay at all.}}$

9...\textit{\$h5} – Black is trying to defend his extra pawn. 10.0-0 11.\textit{\$d7} (or 10...\textit{\$e7} 11.\textit{\$e2}?! 0-0 12.\textit{\$c8} 13.\textit{\$he1} 14.\textit{\$h4}
\( \text{c3} c6 4.f4 \text{a}5 5.\text{d}3 e5 6.\text{g}3 \text{g}4 7.\text{e}3 \)

\( \text{g3} 15.\text{xf}4 \text{xe}2+ 16.\text{xe}2= - \) White recaptures his pawn and obtains better chances thanks to his excellent centre.) 11.\text{e}2 (The idea of that move is to capture on \text{f}3 with the bishop and to attack the knight on \text{h}5 just in case.) 11...\text{a}5 12.\text{h}3 \text{e}6 (It would have been better for Black to have captured on \text{f}3 – 12...\text{xf}3=, because now the bishop comes under attack.) 13.\text{d}5 \text{cxd}5 14.\text{exd}5 \text{f}5, Kercher – Mentel, Bad Wiessee 2001, 15.\text{he}1= Black’s knight on \text{h}5 is vulnerable, while in case of 15...\text{e}7, White follows with: 16.\text{d}4 \text{g}6 17.\text{h}5 \text{h}5 18.\text{f}5=, and he obtains material advantage.

10.\text{gxf}3 \text{h}5 11.0–0–0 \text{d}7

11...\text{e}7, Lopez – Li, Cienfuegos 1996, 12.\text{he}1=, followed by \text{e}4–\text{e}5, or \text{f}1–\text{h}3–\text{g}4 – and White regains the \text{f}4-pawn, just like in the line 11...\text{d}7.

12.\text{e}5

It is also possible for White to play: 12.\text{he}1 \text{e}7 13.\text{f}1 0–0–0 14.\text{h}3 \text{b}8 15.\text{g}4 \text{h}6 16.\text{xf}4 \text{xf}4 17.\text{f}xg4= Hulak – Mokry, Haifa 1989. White has maneuvered with his bishop a lot indeed, but he has managed to regain his pawn and he is dominating in the centre.

12...\text{d}5

Black avoids opening of the game.

13.\text{f}5 \text{g}6 14.\text{g}4 \text{g}7 (diagram)

15.\text{xf}4

White has regained his pawn and he has even more space in the centre. Black’s blockade on the \text{e}6 and \text{f}5-squares does not seem reliable at all. Later, the game Tiviakov – Jonker, Apeldoorn 2001, continued with: 15...\text{c}7 16.\text{d}2 \text{b}6 (Black is trying to obtain some counterchances against the white king.) 17.\text{d}3 \text{c}4 18.\text{e}4 (This move emphasizes the awkward placement of the black knight on \text{c}4.) 18...\text{e}7 19.\text{b}3 \text{a}3+ 20.\text{b}1 \text{b}2 21.\text{f}6+ \text{f}8 22.\text{c}3 \text{xd}1 23.\text{xd}1 (White has parried his opponent’s counterplay and now he can start attacking the enemy king in his stead. Meanwhile, he is threatening to play \text{b}3–\text{b}4 and to trap the enemy bishop.) 23...\text{a}5 (Or 23...\text{e}7 24.\text{h}4 \text{b}4 25.\text{e}3 \text{h}5 – Black should prevent White’s queen from coming to \text{h}6. 26.\text{d}7+ \text{g}8 27.\text{h}3, followed by \text{g}1 and \text{e}6 – and Black has no defence against that threat.) 24.\text{xd}5 \text{d}8 25.\text{f}6=. White has a pawn for the exchange, a powerful mobile pawn-centre and practically superiority in active forces, because Black’s rook on \text{h}8 is completely out of action.
c) 7...exf4 8.\textit{xf4}

In general, the exchange on f4 is not favourable for Black. The point is that he does not attack the d4-pawn anymore (White defends it easily with the knight from the e2-square) and secondly the f-file is opened for White’s rooks. His d4 and b2-pawns are temporarily weakened indeed, but that is immaterial.

8...\textit{b6}

8...d5 – Black has not completed his development yet and opening of the game is unfavourable for him. 9.0–0 dxe4 (White will counter 9...\textit{e7} with 10.\textit{e1+}, and Black cannot castle, because his bishop on e7 is under attack.) 10.\textit{xe4 \textit{xe4} 11.\textit{xe4} d7 12.h3 \textit{h5} 13.g4 \textit{g6} 14.\textit{xg6 hgx6} 15.\textit{e2+--} and White’s attack is decisive, Lindemann – Eis, Baden 1998.

8...\textit{b4} (It is usually better for Black to attack the b2-pawn from b6 and not from b4.) 9.a3 \textit{xf3} (Black loses after: 9...\textit{xb2} 10.\textit{xa4 \textit{xf3} 11.gxf3}, Fanouraki – Efthimiou, Aegina 1996, 11...\textit{xd4} 12.c3+-, and White traps the enemy queen in the middle of the board; 9...\textit{b6}, in comparison to the immediate 8...\textit{b6}, leads to a loss of a tempo – White has already played a2-a3, so his b2-pawn is not hanging and besides 10.\textit{e2}, just like in the main line, he can also play 10.\textit{e3 \textit{e7} 11.0–0 0–0 12.h3 \textit{h5} 13.\textit{e1}. Black’s queen on b6 is harmless – White has a free hand on the kingside and in the centre. After: 13...\textit{e8} 14.\textit{f2} h6 15.\textit{h4 d8} 16.\textit{f5}, in the game Gozis – Maisonneuve, Email 1998, White had a clear edge and Black had not created any counterplay whatsoever.) 10.axb4 \textit{xd1} 11.\textit{xd1}+ Patterson – Simon, Bermuda 2002. White is threatening to play b4-b5 and he has an overwhelming advantage in the endgame due to his bishop pair.

9.\textit{e2+!}

White is ready to sacrifice a pawn on the queenside in order to open files.

9...\textit{xf3}

9...\textit{bd7} 10.0–0+ – it is now too dangerous for Black to capture the b2-pawn, because the f-file has been opened. We have analysed the arising position in Chapter 12, line 7...\textit{bd7} 8.0–0 \textit{exf4} 9.\textit{xf4}

9...\textit{h5}, Sisniega – Rivas Pastor, Sevilla 1992, 10.\textit{e3}?+, White has an advantage in the centre in that calm position, while after 10...\textit{xf3} 11.gxf3 \textit{xb2}, White plays: 12.\textit{b1} \textit{xa2} 13.\textit{xb7}, and he has a good com-
3...c6 4.f4 ♞a5 5.♗d3 e5 6.♖f3 ♘g4 7.♗e3

pensation, just like in the game Shirov – Rivas Pastor.

10.gxf3 ♕xb2 11.♗b1 ♕xa2
12.♗xb7

Black has an extra pawn indeed, but his pieces are misplaced and the majority of them are not even developed yet. In the game Shirov – Rivas Pastor, Manila 1992, Black decided to bring his queen back to its own camp (it could have been trapped on the a2-square...). 12...♕a5+
13.♖d2 ♕d8 14.♕a1! (with the idea to follow with 15.♖a5, or 15.♕xa7) 14...a5 (Black cannot complete his development even after: 14...♗e7 15.♕g1 g6 16.♖a5 ♕c8 17.♕c7±, and he cannot retreat with his queen to e6, because of ♕f4; it is also extremely dangerous for him to play 15...0–0 16.♕g3, followed by ♕f5) 15. d5!→ (White opens files for an attack against the black king.)

15...♕c8 16.♗b2 a4 17.♕d4 a3
18.♕b3 a2 19.♕f2++. Black’s a2-pawn will not be promoted after all, while most of his pieces have remained on their initial squares. 19...♖g6 (or 19...c5 20. ♕b5 ♕a6 21.♕a7++, and White

wins material) 20.♖xc6 ♕e7
21.♕a1 0–0 (This move shows Black’s helplessness, otherwise White was threatening ♕xa2.)
22.♕xe7 ♕xc6 23.♕xc6 ♕xc6
24.♕c3++, and Black simply remained a piece down.

d) 7...♗xd4 8.♕xd4

8...♗b4

This is the most stubborn line for Black. He is attacking White’s bishop. It is not favourable for White to retreat, because the b2-pawn is hanging. He can capture on f6, as we will see later, but without any advantage. Still, White can get the edge after precise play.

It is too bad for Black to play: 8...d5? 9.♕xf6 gxf6 10.exd5 ♘c5
11.♕e2++, and Black has no compensation for the pawn, Parkanyi – Francsics, Tapolca 1997.

8...♗e7 9.0–0 ♕bd7 (Such tentative play is not quite in the spirit of the active line 4...♕a5. It is interesting, but still not enough for equality for Black to play: 9...♖d8 10.♖h1 ♕b6, Thueimller –Pehlgrim, Bad Wiessee 1998, and now 11.♕xf6!!
gxf6 12.\text{e}2\text{±}. The placement of the black bishop on b6 is not so effective to compensate the two tempi wasted on bringing it there. For example the d6-pawn is hanging, which would have been reliably defended with a bishop on f8.) 10.a3 \text{c}7 11.h3 \text{xf}3 12.\text{xf}3\text{±} Pfreundtner – Reh, Hessen 1999. White enjoys extra space and better development. He can start an eventual pawn assault against the black king on both sides of the board.

8...\text{bd}7 9.0–0 (It is also possible for White to continue with 9.\text{d}2 \text{e}7 10.0–0\text{±}, and he has a favourable game, Sikorova – Modrova, Karlovy Vary 2004) 9...\text{b}4. This move is not so effective now. (9...\text{e}7 has been analysed in the line 8...\text{e}7) 10.\text{e}2 \text{d}5 11.a3 \text{a}5 12.b4 \text{c}7 13.e5 \text{g}8 (After 13...\text{e}4, White follows with 14.c4\text{±}, opening the c-file and creating a weak d5-pawn for Black.) 14.c4\text{±} Maryasin – Shvidler, Israel 1992. Black lags in development considerably and his position is very dangerous.

9.\text{e}2!

White can hardly achieve anything substantial with 9. \text{xf}6 gxf6 10.\text{d}2 (This move allows Black to double White’s pawns, but otherwise White cannot defend his b2-pawn without losing additional time.) 10...\text{xf}3 11.gxf3 \text{h}6 12.0–0–0 \text{d}7 13. \text{b}1 0–0–0, and Black had a good position in the game Hjartarson – Dorfman, Moscow 1990.

9...\text{xe}4

9...\text{xb}2, is just bad, because of 10.\text{d}5\text{±}, with an unavoidable fork on c7.

10.0–0

White has sacrificed his central pawn, but he has opened the e-file and that is quite dangerous for the black king, because it is still in the centre of the board.

10...\text{d}5

It is too dangerous for Black to capture on c3: 10...\text{xc}3 11. \text{bxc}3 (It is almost the same after: 11.\text{xc}3 \text{b}6+ 12.\text{d}4 \text{d}7 13.\text{e}1\rightarrow.) 11...\text{a}5 12.\text{g}5\text{±}. In both cases, Black’s king is forced to remain in the centre in a board full of pieces and his extra pawn is absolutely insufficient to compensate for that.

11.\text{xe}4 \text{xe}4 12.\text{c}3

White is planning to play \text{g}5 – attacking the f7 and e4-pawns, after which opening of the position is practically unavoidable.

12...\text{e}7

Black loses after 12...\text{xf}3? 13.\text{xb}4 \text{fxe}2 14.\text{e}1\text{±}. The black pawn is pinned and White re-
mains with a decisive material advantage, De Freitas – Umetsubo, Brazil 1999.

12...\textbf{d}6 13.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{xe}2 14.\textbf{xe}2 \textbf{f}5 15.\textbf{ad}1± (Black’s e4-pawn cannot withstand the pressure.) 15...\textbf{g}6 16.\textbf{xe}4 \textbf{fxe}4 17.\textbf{f}5 \textbf{f}7 18.\textbf{f}6 \textbf{gxf}6 19.\textbf{xf}6 \textbf{d}5 20.c4, Spiridonov – Plinke, Jim Kreep 2000.

12...\textbf{a}5 13.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{xe}2 14.\textbf{xe}2 \textbf{f}5 15.\textbf{xg}7 \textbf{xg}7 16.\textbf{h}5± Jorgensen – Jaksland, Denmark 1994. White recaptures his piece, while Black’s king is deprived of castling and remains in the centre.

12...\textbf{xb}2. This move prevents (although only temporarily...) White’s move \textbf{g}5. 13.\textbf{e}1 \textbf{f}5 (Even in case of 13...\textbf{e}7, White’s attack is very powerful after: 14.\textbf{b}1 \textbf{xa}2 15.\textbf{xb}7 \textbf{c}8 16.\textbf{xe}7+! \textbf{xe}7 17.\textbf{c}5+ \textbf{e}8 18.\textbf{d}6 \textbf{e}6 19.\textbf{c}7 \textbf{d}7 20.\textbf{d}4 \textbf{f}6 21.\textbf{d}6+– De Lorenzo – Reisinger, Email 1999.) 14.a4 \textbf{d}7 15.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{c}5 (After the exchange on e2 – Black loses his queen.) 16.\textbf{xg}4 \textbf{xc}3 17.\textbf{xc}5 \textbf{xc}5+ 18.\textbf{h}1 \textbf{f}6 (Black cannot capture the bishop, because of 19.\textbf{xe}4, followed by a discovered check and a decisive attack for White.) 19.\textbf{b}3 0–0–0 20. \textbf{ab}1 \textbf{d}7 21.\textbf{h}3± Glek – Pribyl, Germany 1991. Black’s compensation for the piece is insufficient in that middle game.

13.\textbf{e}5 \textbf{xe}2 14.\textbf{xe}2

Black now must try to complete his development, before White has captured on e4 and placed his rook on the open e-file. This is the only way for him to obtain a good game, but he cannot accomplish that at all.

14.c5

This move is with the idea to remove White’s bishop from its powerful position.

After 14...\textbf{d}7, White plays 15.\textbf{xd}7 \textbf{xd}7 16.\textbf{ad}1±, and Black’s king is in trouble in the centre.

Black loses the exchange without sufficient compensation after: 14...\textbf{f}5 15.\textbf{h}5+ \textbf{g}6 16.\textbf{xg}6 \textbf{f}7 17.\textbf{h}3 \textbf{gxg}6 18.\textbf{xf}8 \textbf{c}5+ 19.\textbf{h}1 \textbf{d}7 20.\textbf{b}4 0–0–0 21.\textbf{e}5 \textbf{b}6 22.\textbf{ad}1± Bellon Lopez – Oratovsky, Heraklio 1993. Black does not even have a pawn for the exchange and the pin of the knight on d7 is extremely unpleasant for him.

14.h5 – this move is not easy to understand. Is Black just waiting for White to capture on e4, or what? 15.\textbf{xe}4 \textbf{d}7 16.\textbf{ae}1± Fressinet – A.Horvath, St Lorenzo 1995, White obtains a powerful attack and Black cannot castle long (16...0–0–0), because after 17.\textbf{f}5 he loses material.

15.\textbf{f}2 \textbf{c}6

Black loses too after: 15...\textbf{f}6 16.\textbf{h}5+ \textbf{g}6 17.\textbf{g}6 \textbf{f}7 18.\textbf{f}5!±, and Black loses one of his rooks (on a8 after the check on c8, or the rook on h8).

15...\textbf{d}7 16.\textbf{xd}7 \textbf{xd}7 16...\textbf{xd}7 loses by force after: 17.\textbf{xe}4+ \textbf{e}7 18.\textbf{a}4+ \textbf{d}7 19.
Chapter 11

\[ \text{\textit{f}e1+ \textit{e}e7 20.\text{i}xd7+ \text{i}xd7 21.} \]
\[ \text{\textit{d}ad1+ \textit{e}e8 22.\text{i}\textit{xc5+}) 17.b4!} \rightarrow \]

(After opening of the b-file Black can hardly defend against White’s attack.) 17...\textit{f}5 18.\textit{ad1+ \textit{c}c7 19.\textit{d}d5! (This move is even more energetic than: 19.\textit{xc5 \textit{e}e6 20.\textit{d}d4= – Black will fail to develop his pieces anyway...)} 19... \]
\[ \text{\textit{e}e6 20.\textit{fd1 \textit{c}c8 21.\textit{e}e5 \textit{f}f7 22.bxc5 \textit{b}b8 23.\textit{b}b5} \rightarrow \text{Ibragimov – Chekhov, Moscow 1998. White is threatening \textit{d}d7, and Black has no satisfactory defence without material losses.}
\]

15...\textit{c}c7 16.\textit{x}e4 \textit{e}e7 17. \textit{a}a4+ \textit{d}c6 18.\textit{xc6 (White can also play 18.\textit{ad1!? 0–0 19.\textit{d}d7 \textit{c}c8 20.\textit{fd1 \textit{xe}5 21.\textit{xe}5= – and Black’s pieces are extremely passive.) 18...bxc6 19.\textit{c}c4+ Fontaine – Vidovic, Oropesa del Mar 1998. Black will have to give up the weakness on c5 in order to avoid the checkmating attack. 16.\textit{ad1 \textit{e}e6)}
\]

Black is now ready to play \textit{e}e7 and 0–0, but he is doomed to fail.

17.\textit{b}b5 \textit{c}c8 18.\textit{x}b7 \textit{x}e5 19.\textit{xe}5 \textit{e}e7 20.\textit{h}4! \textit{e}3 (20... \textit{x}h4 21.\textit{d}d6++ leads to material losses for Black) 21.\textit{xe}7 \textit{e}2, Lorenzo – Pribyl, Germany 1991, and here the simplest line for White is: 22.\textit{b}b5+ \textit{xe}7 23. \textit{xe}2= and White remains with a solid extra pawn)
Chapter 12

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ♙f6 3.♘c3 c6 4.f4 ♙a5
5.♗d3 e5 6.♗f3 ♙g4 7.♗e3 ♙bd7
8.0-0

8...♗e7
8...♗xd4 9.♗xd4 ♕b4 10.♗e2 has been analysed in the line
7...♖xd4 8.♖xd4 ♙bd7.

The other moves are:

8...♕b4? – this is just a loss of additional time in the opening.
9.a3 ♕a5 (Black cannot capture on b2 as usual, due to ♙a4.)
10.h3 ♙xh3 11.♕xf3 ♙e7 12.♗e1
(or immediately 12.g4!? ♂xd4 13.♖xd4, and Black cannot castle
long, because of: 13...0-0-0 14.b4 ♙c7 15.♗xa7+ and Black loses
the pawn that shelters the black king, Wenner – Ullrich, Doernig-
heim 1994) 12...0-0-0 13.♗b1
(This move is quite possible, be-
cause Black has just clarified the placement of his king and White
can start preparing a pawn-offensive.) 13...♗c7 14.b4 ♂xd4
15.♖xd4→. Black has no counter-
play against White’s assault on
the queenside: 15...c5 16.♗e3
♗e8 17.♗b5 ♕b8 18.bxc5 dxc5
19.e5+– and White’s attack on
the open files is decisive, Winer – Bierkens, Woburn 1999;

8...a6. This move is senseless
– Black should not try to prepare
b7-b5-b4, because White’s knight
would not mind going to the e2-
square. 9.h3 ♙xf3 10.♕xf3 ♙e7,
Sott – Zugaj, Plzen 1996, and
here just like in the main line,
White should better play 11.
♗e2!?± ♖c3, achieving a similar
position except with an extra
tempo;

8...♕b6 9.♕e1 (It is also pos-
sible for White to repel the en-
emy queen immediately with:
9.♗a4!? ♕a5 10.c4±, and he
maintains his advantage in the
centre.) 9...exf5 (Black loses
material after: 9...♕xf3? 10.dxe5
♕a5 11.exf6+– De Kleuver –
Meis, Dieren 2002.) 10.♗a4 (This
move parries the attack against
the d4-pawn.) 10...♗c7 11.♕xf5
0-0-0 (in case of 11...♗e7, White
plays 12.e5, with a powerful at-
tack: 12...dxe5 13.♕xe5 ♕d8 14.
♕xg4 ♕xg4 15.♕g3 ♕gf6 16.♗c7
Chapter 12

17...\=ae1+--  \=f8 18.\=xe7 \=xe7 19.\=d6+ and White checkmates, Sleisz – Jamrich, Budapest 1996) 12.c4 h6 13.b4 g5 14.\=e3 \=g7 15.\=d2\^, Mortensen – Christensen, Copenhagen 1996. White, contrary to his opponent, has a clear plan to open files on the queenside with c4-c5;

8...h5 – this move push on the kingside is too risky. 9.h3 exf4 10.\=xf4 \=xf3 11.\=xf3 g5?! This is all in the same style, but now Black weakens the f5-square considerably. 12.\=e3 (12.e5!?) 12...g4 13.\=f5 (White will have a great positional advantage in the endgame.) 13...\=xf5 14.\=xf5 gxh3 15.gxh3 0–0 16.\=g5 \=e7 17.\=af1 \=hg8 18.\=h1\^ \=e5 – Black suffers material losses, Peredy – De Santis, Budapest 1997;

8...g6 9.h3 \=xf3 10.\=xf3 \=g7, Alonso – Watfe, Merida 1997, 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5\^, There arises a position that is rather typical for the Pirc Defence, but quite unsatisfactory for Black – his bishop on g7 is passive and it is too dangerous for him to castle short, because of the possibility g4-g5;

8...exf4 9.\=xf4 \=b4 (9...\=b6 10.\=e2 \=xf3 11.\=xf3 \=e5). This move now is harmless for White. 12.\=f1 \=h5, V.Orlov – V.Andreev, St.Petersburg 1999, and here the simplest line for White is: 13.\=xe5 dxe5 14.\=f5, winning a pawn; 9...0–0–0 10.\=d2 \=xf3 11.\=xf3 \=b4. This is an attempt to obtain some counterchances in a rather passive position. 12.\=f1 c5 13.\=d3 c4 14.\=h3 \=h6 15.\=a3 \=a5 16.b4 \=a6 17.d5, and Black's queen is quite isolated on a6 on top of the other troubles for him, Yermolinsky – Acosta, San Francisco 2000; 9...\=e7 10.\=h3 – see 8...\=e7 9.\=h3 exf4 10.\=xf4) 10.a3!? This move forces Black to take the b2-pawn and not the d4-pawn. (It is also good for White to play: 10.\=e2 d5 11.exd5 \=xd5 12.\=d2 \=b6 13.\=e1\^, Black has failed to evacuate his king until now and it is again difficult to do that, because he cannot play: 13...0–0–0?, because of 14.\=a5 \=xb2 15.\=xd8+ and White remains with a decisive material advantage, Arakhiamia-Grant – Hickman, Port Erin 2000.) 10...\=xb2 11.\=d2 \=b6 12.\=ab1 \=c7 13.e5. Black has lost a lot of tempi on moves with his queen and now he is in a very difficult position. 13...\=h5 14.exd6 \=xd6 15.\=e6 \=xd6 16.\=e4 \=d7 17.\=xb7\^, Almost all black pieces are misplaced. 17...\=f3 (After 17...0–0 White plays 18.\=e5 \=e6 19.\=e2 g6 20.g4 and wins a piece.) 18.\=xf3 0–0 19.\=h3 \=f5. Black loses too after: 19.g6 20.\=xh5 gxh5 21.\=xd7+ and White's advantage is decisive. 20.\=c5 \=h6 21.\=xf5 \=ab8 22.\=hb3+– Gagunashvili – Azmaiparashvili, Izmir 2002. White has already an extra pawn, and he will soon win even more material.
9.h3
Black usually plays here a) 9...h5, or b) 9...xf3.

9...exf4 10.xxf4 h5 (10...h5 11.e1 – see 9...h5 10.e1 exf4 11.xxf4) 11.xf3 (It is also possible for White to play 11.xf3 b6 12.e2+ Glek – Tseshkovsky, Philadelphia 1990, but it is usually more favourable for White to capture on f3 with the queen.) 11...b6 (It is too dangerous for Black to castle directly under the pawn-offensive...: 11...0–0 12.ab1 g5 13.b4 b6 14.e3 d8g8 15.d5 c7 16.dxc6 xxc6 17.db5+, and White’s attack was victorious in the game Kohout – Modrova, Rakovnik 1999. It is too risky for Black to play: 11...g5 12.e5 gxf4 13.exf6 hxf6 14.ael+ d8 15.xf4± A Horvath – Francsics, Budapest 1996. Black’s king is endangered and his f7-pawn is weak. Meanwhile, after the simple move 12.e3!?±, White still has a clear advantage – the f5-square is too weak.) 12.e2. White has the advantage in the centre and his pieces are active and after the attractive 12..e5, besides the calm retreat of the queen, White can play 13.xe5!? (It is also not bad for White to try: 13...e3 xd3 14.xd3 0–0, Can – Tasan, Kocaeli 2002, 15.g3± – and Black’s pieces are too passive.) 13...dxe5 14.g5 d6 (or 14...exd4 e5+ and White manages to attack the weakness on f7) 15.h1 c7 16.g5+, and Black loses his right to castle.

a) 9...h5

This move preserves the option to exchange on f3 at a moment in which White will not be able to capture with the queen.

10.e1 xf3.

It is not favourable for Black to capture on d4 with a bishop on h5 (10...exd4), because after 11.xd4±, Black’s bishop on h5 is permanently endangered (because of the possibility g2-g4) and quite senselessly placed too.

It is also bad for Black to play 10..c7 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.dxe5, and he will have to retreat: 12.g8 (In the line: 12..xe5 13.xe5 xe5 14.d5 d6 15.e5±, Black will have to give up two pieces for a rook.) 13.g3±, and White remains with an extra pawn and an overwhelming advantage, Dovziko – Rizsonkov, Szeged 1998.

10...0–0 (This move can be punished by White in the same fashion as 10...c7.) 11.dxe5! dxe5 12.fxe5 g8 (The other possibility practically loses: 12...xe5 13.dxe5 xe5 14.d5 e6
Chapter 12

15.\textit{e}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}}6 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}xf6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}f5 17.\textit{f}xe7+ and White has a decisive material advantage.) 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}6! fxe6 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c4\textcolor{red}{\textbf{†}}. Black’s position is very passive. His \textit{e}6-pawn is hanging and White is threatening \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d5 too.

10...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}xf4 11.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}xf4 (After the exchange in the centre, Black must watch very carefully about the possibility of White playing \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}4-\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}5.) 11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xf3 (It is too dangerous for Black to play 11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}}g6 12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}5! He has delayed his castling and White can exploit that by breaking in the centre: 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}xe5 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}xe5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d5 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}6! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}}}6+ 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}}h1 fxe6 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}g6+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}}xg6 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}}g5!→, Black’s king fails to evacuate, for example: 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}}}f6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}e5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}}}xb2. In case of Black castling – White has a fork on the f7-square. 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}}}xd5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}}}xd5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}g6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}g5 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xe6+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d8 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}}}d6+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c8 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xh8— and White remains with a material advantage, or 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}}}d5f6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xe6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}}}xb2, Browne – Benjamin, Modesto 1995, and here the simplest line for White was: 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}}}e4! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}}}f8 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}}}d6+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c8 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}}}f7— winning material; 19...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}b4 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}}}a1 0–0–0 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}c3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}a3 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}}}c1++, with an extra piece for White. Even after the best for Black: 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xg5 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xg5 0–0–0 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}}}f7++, White remains with an extra exchange.) 12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}xf3 0–0–0 (It is too dangerous for Black to play: 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}xb6 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}e3. Black’s queen will be under an X-ray attack by the white bishop. 13...0–0 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}e8 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}2 dxe5 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}xe5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}}}e4 g6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}}}xf2+ 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}xf2. White has the initiative on the kingside. Black’s queen fails to capture on b2: 19...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}xb2 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c4, because White captures on f7 with a powerful attack, or 19...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}}4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}}7 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}}e6 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d7 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}e4+ and Black cannot defend the threats against the f6 and f7-squares, Dovzík – Feygin, Pardubice 1996. Black loses after 22...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}xb4 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}xf7, because he cannot take on f7 twice, since he loses his queen.) 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}b1. Black’s king is not safe on that side of the board either. 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}6 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}f8 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}4 h6. That is Black’s only possible counterplay on the kingside, but he creates plenty of weaknesses like that. 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}}2 g5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}5. White’s positional advantage has increased. 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}}g8 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}7 19.b5, and White begins the destroy opponent’s king shelter, while in case of g5-g4 he can always play h3-h4, Saravanan – Koneru, Calcutta 2000.

11.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}}xf3

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\end{center}

11...0–0
Black can choose here be-
tween plenty of moves:

11...a6 – this move hardly improves Black’s position. 12.a3 
\( \text{c7} \) 13.\( \text{gf2} \) exd4 14.\( \text{xd4} \) 0–0
15.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{c5} \) 16.\( \text{e5} \) (White seizes
more space and repels enemy’s pieces with that move.) 16...
\( \text{xd3} \) 17.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{e8} \) 18.\( \text{g3} \) f5
19.exd6 \( \text{xd6} \) 20.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{c5} \) + 21.
\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{Castaldo – De Santis,}
Montecatini Terme 1999. White’s
pieces are considerably more active;

After 11...b5, White should
better play 12.a3± – and the in-
clusion of these two moves is
definitely in his favour. For ex-
ample, Black cannot castle long
anymore. White has a slight edge in
the endgame after: 12.fxe5
dx5 13.d5 cxd5 14.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xe1} +15.
\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 16.exd5 a6 17.
\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{Roses – V.Martinez, Spain}
1996. White has the bishop-pair,
but Black has a solid defensive
line on the dark squares;

11...\( \text{d8} \) – this idea is already
familiar – Black wishes to de-
velop and exchange the dark-
squared bishops. 12.\( \text{h1} \) 0–0
13.a3 (to be able to follow later
with b2-b4) 13...\( \text{exd4} \) 14.\( \text{xd4} \)
\( \text{e8} \) 15.\( \text{e3} \) (15.\( \text{g3} \)?) 15...\( \text{h5} \)
16.b4 \( \text{c7} \) 17.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{xf6} \)
\( \text{hxg6} \) 19.\( \text{ae1} \) (Black has man-
egaged to trade the bishops indeed,
but his position still remains a bit passive.) 19...a5 20.\( \text{g3} \) axb4
21.axb4 g6 22.e5 \( \text{h5} \) 23.\( \text{g5} \)
dx5 24.fxe5 \( \text{d8} \) 25.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{g7} \)
26.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{+, White has regrouped}
his forces. He is attacking the f7-
square and after the mistaken
26...\( \text{f8} \) 27.\( \text{e4} \) – the f6-square
too. Black’s capturing on e5 leads
to the loss of the exchange after
the check on f6, Bedoun – Toul-
zac, France 2003;

11...\( \text{h5} \). Black is fighting for
the dark squares. White must
either exchange on e5, after
which Black’s bishop gets ac-
tivated, or he must give up his
bishop by exchanging on f4. This
is not such terrible loss, though...
12.\( \text{gf2} \) (Black has good counter-
play after: 12.fxe5 dxe5 13.\( \text{c4} \)
\( \text{h6} \) 14.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{b4} \) 15.\( \text{b3} \) exd4
16.a3 \( \text{d6} \) 17.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 18.\( \text{xg7} \)
\( \text{f8} \), followed by castling long.
Black will have counterchances
even if he loses a pawn, because
White’s pieces are not harmoni-
ously placed, or 14...\( \text{exd4} \) 15.
\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 16.\( \text{d1} \), Pieri – Ben-
venuti, Forli 1993, 16...\( \text{xd4} \) 17.
\( \text{xd4} \) 0–0, controlling the
e5-square. While after 15.\( \text{xf7} \)
0–0 0–0 16.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 17.\( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{hg8} \)
18.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{g6} \) – White’s queen is
endangered: Black is threaten-
ing: 19...\( \text{e5} \) 20.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{fd7} \)
12...\( \text{xf4} \) 13.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 14.\( \text{xf4} \),
Michielsen – Meis, Dieren 2003,
and here after: 14...\( \text{f6} \) 15.\( \text{e2} \)
White preserves his advantage
in the centre, while Black has
no targets to attack on the dark squares after White plays
c2-c3.

12.a3 \( \text{c7} \)

This is a tentative move. Black
refrains from immediate counterplay on the dark squares
and concentrates on defending.

Following 12...\texttt{Zae}e8, White should better play: 13.\texttt{Wh}f2± and \texttt{Zaf}1 next, just like he does in the main line 12...\texttt{Zc}7. White did not achieve anything to boast about in the game Hasan – Haque, Dhaka 2005, 13.b4 (It is too premature for White to start such active actions on the queenside.) 13...\texttt{Zc}7 14.fxe5 dxe5 15.\texttt{Zd}2 \texttt{Zd}6 16.\texttt{Zh}h4 exd4 17.\texttt{Zx}d4 \texttt{Ze}5 18.\texttt{Zxe}5 \texttt{Zxe}5, and Black’s position was quite acceptable.

12...c5 – this move forces White to clarify the situation in the centre, but it weakens Black’s position too much and the d5-square in particular. 13.b4. It is favourable for White to remove Black’s c-pawn from the centre. (White can also play the calmer line: 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.f5 \texttt{Zac}8 15.\texttt{Ze}e2 \texttt{Zb}6 16.\texttt{Zc}4 \texttt{Zfd}8 17.\texttt{Zff}1 \texttt{Zf}8 18.g4++, with the idea for White to place the knight on the d5-outpost, Baramidze – Curic, Essen 2002.) 13...\texttt{Zxb}4 14.\texttt{Zb}5 exf4 (Black fails in his attempt to equalize with: 14...d5 15.axb4 \texttt{Zxb}4 16.\texttt{Zd}2 \texttt{Zb}2 17.\texttt{Zc}3++; 15...\texttt{Zxb}4 16.\texttt{Zb}1 \texttt{Zd}8 17.dxe5 dxe4 18.\texttt{Zxe}4 \texttt{Zxe}4 19.\texttt{Zxb}4+. White can win at least a pawn on the queenside, because of the hanging black knight on e4.) 15.axb4 \texttt{Zb}6 16.\texttt{Zxf}4. White has a clear advantage in the centre after calmer play, while after 16...a6, with the idea to exploit the vulnerability of the b4-pawn, White can play: 17.\texttt{Zc}3 \texttt{Zxb}4 18.\texttt{Zb}1 \texttt{Za}5 19.\texttt{Zxb}7 \texttt{Zab}8 20.\texttt{Zf}5±, and Black’s a6-pawn is weak.

12...\texttt{Zh}5 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.\texttt{Zf}5!? (This is now an additional possibility for White that became available to him after Black has castled, in comparison to 11...\texttt{Zh}5.) 14...g6 15.\texttt{Zx}h5gxh5 16.\texttt{Zh}6 (White recaptures the exchange immediately.) 16...\texttt{Zf}6 17.\texttt{Zxf}8 \texttt{Zxf}8 18.d5 \texttt{Zb}6+. This is with the idea to compensate the weaknesses on the kingside with something. The next few moves are all forced: 19.\texttt{Zh}2 \texttt{Zxb}2 20.\texttt{Zb}1 \texttt{Zxa}3 21.\texttt{Zxb}7 \texttt{Zc}5 22.\texttt{Zc}7 \texttt{Zxd}3 23.cxd3 cxd5 24.\texttt{Zxd}5 \texttt{Zg}7 25.\texttt{Zd}1\uparrow Gerzina – Cederlof, Email 1999. Black’s extra h5-pawn will not survive for long; his passed a-pawn is too far from promotion in order to be a real threat for White, while his king is quite vulnerable.

13.\texttt{Zh}1

This move is not so necessary. White could have played \texttt{Zf}2 immediately.

13...\texttt{Zfe}8 14.\texttt{Zf}2 a6

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\caption{Chess Diagram}
\end{figure}

15.\texttt{Zf}1!? (This line looks more natural than: 15.\texttt{Ze}1 b5 16.g4

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exd4 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd4 \textit{c}5 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}e3 18...b4
19.axb4 cxb4 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}e2 \textit{\textasciitilde}c5 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}g3
d5\textit{\textasciitilde}, and Black had a powerful
counterplay in the centre, Guido
– Toulzac, St. Lorrain 1999. In
case of 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xf6 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}d5,
then 19...\textit{\textasciitilde}d8 and if 20.c3, Black
has 20...\textit{\textasciitilde}h4 – and White’s rook
on e1 is hanging.) 15...\textit{\textasciitilde}xd4 (If
Black continues similarly to the
game Guido – Toulzac, 15...b5
16.g4 exd4 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd4 \textit{c}5 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf6
\textit{\textasciitilde}xf6, White can follow with
19.\textit{\textasciitilde}d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}d8 20.c3\textit{\textasciitilde}, and he has
the initiative on the kingside.)
16.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd4 \textit{c}5 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xf6 18.
\textit{\textasciitilde}c4\textit{\textasciitilde}, and White occupies the
d5-square.

b) 9...\textit{\textasciitilde}xf3 10.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf3

The position has been clari-
fied more or less. Black now must
make up his mind whether he
will exchange the e5-pawn in the
nearest future and also on which
side of the board he intends to
castle. Generally speaking, if
Black does not exchange the
pawn and he castles short –
White’s most effective plan is to
bring the knight from c3 to e2,
then play c2-c3, defending the
d4-square and then manoeuvre
the knight to the f5-square via
g3. His initiative on the kingside
will become very dangerous
then. Black can hardly prevent
all that, because if he plays g7-
g6 his weaknesses will be ex-
tremely vulnerable after opening
of the f-file.

10...0-0

This is the most natural move
for Black. His position is rather
passive and he should stick to
defending – everything else is
just too risky.

The other moves are:
10...exf4 11.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf4 – see 9...
exf4;

It is too bad for Black to play:
10...\textit{\textasciitilde}b4 11.a3\textit{\textasciitilde} – since it is im-
possible for him to capture on b2,
because of 12.\textit{\textasciitilde}a4, and Black
just loses a couple of tempi;
10...b5 – this move is tacti-
cally wrong at that moment.
11.fxe5 dxe5 12.d5 (Black’s b5-
pawn is hanging now.) 12...b4
(12...\textit{\textasciitilde}xd5 13.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd5\textit{\textasciitilde}, and Black
cannot evacuate his king away
from the centre, because of the
hanging bishop on e7, while af-
ter 13...\textit{\textasciitilde}d8, it is quite enough
for White to follow with 14.c3
0-0 15.a4, winning a pawn, since
Black cannot play 15...bxa4 16.
b4++; because he loses his queen.)
13.dxc6 \textit{\textasciitilde}b6, Cordts – Graul,
Bad Wiessee 2001, and after
14.\textit{\textasciitilde}b5\textit{\textasciitilde}, White remains with an
extra pawn and a clearly better
position;
10...h6 – this move creates
only additional weaknesses for Black and it is hardly necessary. 11.\check{e}e2 \check{c}7 12.c3 b6 13.a4 0–0 14.\check{g}3\uparrow Stoppel – Marzioch, Bochum 1992. White plans to bring his knight to the f5-square and that spells grave danger for the black king;

10...\check{c}c7 – this move is rather tentative, but Black will have to retreat anyway. 11.\check{e}e2?!\pm. This move is part of White's plan and it should better be played immediately, without 11.a4, although White preserves his advantage even then: 11...\check{f}8 12.\check{e}e2 \check{e}e6 13.c3 exf4 14.\check{f}e4 \check{g}5 (White will have the bishop-pair advantage and plenty of space after the exchange on f4.) 15.\check{g}3 \check{f}xe4 16.\check{e}xe4 \check{e}xe4 17.\check{v}xg7 \check{f}6 18.\check{d}5 (It is also good for White to play 18.\check{g}4?!\uparrow, and the weakness of the f7-pawn will be quite telling.) 18...\check{cxd}5 19.\check{v}xf6 \check{f}8 20.\check{f}5 0–0–0 21.\check{e}xd5\pm, and White wins a pawn without any compensation, Sjodin – Bergqvist, Stockholm 1996;

10...\check{e}xd4 11.\check{c}xd4 0–0 (It is almost senseless for Black to play: 11...\check{b}4 12.\check{e}e2 d5 13.e5 \check{e}e4 14.a3 \check{a}5 15.\check{e}xe4 dxe4 16.\check{v}xe4+, because he loses a pawn and his position remains bad, Rodriguez Lopez – Francsics, Budapest 1996.) 12.\check{e}e1 (White is now well-prepared for the pawn-break in the centre e4-e5.) 12...\check{c}c5 13.e5 \check{e}e8 (Black ends up on the receiving end after: 13...\check{c}xd3 14.\check{v}xf6 \check{xe}1 15.\check{g}3 \check{xf}6 16.\check{f}6\pm Curdo – Simon, USA 1998. White has a huge advantage in that middle game with two pieces for a rook and Black's kingside so weakened.) 14.\check{d}xd6 \check{x}d6 15.\check{x}h7+ \check{x}h7 16.\check{h}5+ \check{g}8 17.\check{e}e4 (White is threatening simultaneously \check{g}5 as well as capturing on c5.) 17...\check{b}3 (Probably Black's best line here is: 17...\check{a}a4 18.\check{x}c5\check{c}5+ 19.\check{x}c5 \check{d}d4+ 20.\check{h}2 \check{x}xb2 21.\check{d}d7 \check{f}6 22.\check{b}1 \check{d}d4 23.\check{x}xf6+ \check{x}f6 24.\check{x}xb7\pm, but White still remains with an extra pawn.) 18.\check{g}5 \check{f}5 19.axb3 \check{f}6 (19...\check{f}6 does not work for Black due to 20.g4 \check{v}xc2 21.\check{f}f2 \check{d}3 22.\check{e}e3 \check{b}1+ 23.\check{f}f1 \check{c}2 24.\check{c}c3+, and White repels the enemy queen away from the b1-h7 diagonal.) 20.\check{f}xf6 gxf6 21.\check{e}4\pm, with a material advantage for White, Curdo – Simon, Mashantucket 1999;

10...\check{h}5. In general, despite the slight weakening of White's kingside after h2-h3, it is not advisable for Black to choose a plan with castling long. White's pieces are much more active and he manages to attack Black's king much faster in a position with opposite castling. 11.a3 (It deserves attention for White to play here 11.\check{a}b1, in order to save time for the move a2-a3.) 11...\check{c}7 (11...0–0 12.\check{b}4\rightarrow. White has a target in order to open the b-file – the c6-pawn. 12.\check{c}7 13.\check{a}b1 \check{b}8 14.b5 c5 15.b6! This is a typical manoeu-
vre – White prevents blocking of the queenside with a pawn-sacrifice. 15...\(\text{\&}x\text{b}6\) 16.\(\text{\&}b\text{b}5\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 17.\(\text{\&}xe5\) \(\text{\&}e8\) 18.\(\text{\&}xd6++\), and White had a material advantage and a powerful attack in the game Matsuura – Camara, Sao Paulo 1999; 11...\(\text{\&}h4\) – The control over the g3-square is hardly so important for Black in order to waste two tempi for it in the opening, while the rest of his pieces remain passive. 12.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(\text{\&}f8\) 13.c4. White prepares an offensive in the centre. 13...\(\text{\&}c7\) 14.b4 \(\text{\&}e6\) 15.\(\text{\&}xe5\) \(\text{\&}xe5\) 16.d5 \(\text{\&}f8\) 17.c5++. Mista – Wisniewski, Brzeg Dolny 2001. White obtained an overwhelming advantage in the centre.) 12.b4 \(\text{\&}h4\). We have just mentioned – that is not justifying the two wasted tempi... 13.a4 (or 13.\(\text{\&}ab1\) a6 14.a4 \(\text{\&}d8\) 15.a5++, Weng – Ullrich, Bergen Enkheim 1997, and Black’s king has nowhere to hide.) 13...a6 (or 13...a5 14.b5++, after which Black’s king cannot be safe on the queenside anymore.) 14.a5 0–0 0 15.\(\text{\&}a4\) \(\text{\&}h5\) 16.\(\text{\&}xe5\) \(\text{\&}xe5\) 17.d5 \(\text{\&}f4\) (This knight is incapable of creating problems for White while acting alone...) 18.\(\text{\&}ab1\) f5, Kor- neev – Gutierrez Martinez, Tenerife 2001, and here White’s simplest line was: 19.\(\text{\&}b6+\) \(\text{\&}b8\) 20.\(\text{\&}xc6\), with a material advantage and attack;

10...0–0–0. We have already emphasized in our notes to the move 10...\(\text{\&}h5\), that in general it is unfavourable for Black to castle long in that system – White’s pawn-offensive develops too simply, easily and quickly. 11.\(\text{\&}ab1\) \(\text{\&}h5\) (or 11...\(\text{\&}b8\) 12.b4 \(\text{\&}c7\) 13.b5 c5 14.b6! This is the simplest way for White to open files on the queenside. 14...\(\text{\&}xb6\) 15.\(\text{\&}b5\) \(\text{\&}c8\) 16.\(\text{\&}xe5\) \(\text{\&}e8\) 17.\(\text{\&}c4\) \(\text{\&}xe5\) 18.\(\text{\&}xe5++\) Simacek – Volak, Klatovy 1999. Black has no defence against the manoeuvre of the white queen to the a3-square. He loses too after: 16...\(\text{\&}xe5\) 17.\(\text{\&}xe5\) \(\text{\&}xe5\) 18.\(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}e6\) 19.\(\text{\&}f4\) \(\text{\&}fd7\) 20.\(\text{\&}c4++\) and White has checkmating threats against the black king.) 12.b4 \(\text{\&}c7\) 13.a4 (It is even simpler for White to play: 13.b5!? c5 14.b6, just like in the game Simacek – Volak, Klatovy 1999.) 13...\(\text{\&}h4\) 14.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(\text{\&}h5\) 15.\(\text{\&}c4\). Black is helpless against White’s pawn-offensive, Slabek – Modrova, Prague 1992.

11.\(\text{\&}e2\)

Black now has plenty of moves to choose from: b1) 11...c5, b2) 11...\(\text{\&}fe8\), as well as:

11...\(\text{\&}xd4\) 12.\(\text{\&}xd4\) \(\text{\&}c7\) 13.c4 g6 14.g4+, White’s plan on the kingside is easy and effective too – \(\text{\&}e2\)-g3, followed by a pawn-
offensive. In the game Iuldachev – Alieva, Dubai 2004, Black tried to obtain some counterplay with the awkward idea: 14...b5?! 15. cxb5 c5 16. c3 c4 17. c2±, but he was left without a pawn and any compensation whatsoever;

11...a6 – is simply a loss of time – that move cannot be useful for Black at all. 12.g4 d8 13. c3 d8 14. ad1 a5 (This is another strange move, particularly in conjunction with a6.) 15.a4 f6 (That is an unnecessary weakening.) 16. d3 b6 17. c2 exf4 18. xf4 d5 19. f5 d6 20.e5 e7 21.g5 Golubev – Balanov, Ukraine 1999. Plenty of Black’s pieces are misplaced (the bishop on e7, the knight on e8, the rook on f8) and Black can hardly defend against White’s attack;

After 11...ad8, Van der Vorm – Imbrogno, Denmark 1999, White should better play the standard move 12.c3±, followed by d3-f5, or g2-g4;

11...ae8 12.c3 c5 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.f5 (It is now impossible for White to bring the knight to the d5-square, because the c3-square has been occupied by a pawn, but White still has a powerful initiative due to the prospects of a pawn-offensive on the kingside.) 14...c8 15.g4 c4 16. c2 c5. This exchange is favourable for Black from the point of view of strategy, but its preparation was overly time-consuming for Black. 17.xc5 xc5+ 18.h1f e8 (It is better for Black to play 18...h6 19.h4 d7±, fortifying the kingside – White has only a slight advantage due to his extra space and the possibility to prepare g4-g5 and to exploit the d5-outpost later.) 19.ad1 d6? 20. ad5 b6 21. fd1± T. Kosintseva – Tabrina, Rybinsk 1999. White has managed to occupy the d-file, thanks to the misplaced black knights and all that combined with the threats g4-g5 and f5-f6 spells great danger for Black; Black has also tried in practice 12...d8, instead of 12...c5. Black’s attempt to deploy then his bishop to the more active b6-square fails, since this manoeuvre does not fit well at all with the placement of the black queen on the a5-square. 13.b4 c7 14.g3 (Black has considerable difficulties to create any constructive counterplay.) 14...exd4 15.cxd4 b6 16.a4 c8 17.a5 a6 18.ac1. Black’s position was very difficult in the game Murshed – Haque, Dhaka 2005, so he tried: 18...e7 19.f5 e6, but after 20.e5 d5 the move 21.xg7 proved to be decisive, since in case Black had captured the knight 21...xg7 22.f5 d7 23. f6+ h8 24.h5, he would have been checkmated;

11...b5 – Unfortunately for Black, he has no targets to attack on the queenside. 12.c3 c7 (12...fe8 – see 11...fe8 12.c3 b5) 13.g3 (White can also try
another plan — the pawn assault 13.g4!?↑.) 13...Af8 (Black could have also tried another idea — 13...g6 14.fxe5 dxe5 15.Ah6 Af8d8, in order to follow with Ae7/f8-g7, defending the knight on f6 in that fashion. His weaknesses on the f-file are however long-lasting and quite considerable. 16.Ed1 Af8 17.Ag5 Ag7 18.Ac2!?±. White concentrates on attacking the f7-pawn. This is better than the other line that enables Black to get rid of the pin: 18.Ae3 h6! 19.Axh6 exh4. The tactical fine point is that White’s g3-knight is hanging and he cannot capture the pawn because of that: 20.Axf4 Axf4 21.Axf4 dxc3 22.bxc3 Ae8↑, and White’s pawn-structure was compromised in the game Ef-stathiou—Papatriyfonos, Athens 2003.) 14.Ef2 a5 15.Ab1 Ab8 16.Ef5 Af8 17.fxe5 dxe5 18.Ag3 Ah8 19.Eh4↑ Gonzalez de la Torre — N.Landa, Spain 2002. White has a powerful pressure on the kingside;

11...Af8. Black is trying to defend against the manoeuvre with the white knight to the f5-square, with the help of g7-g6 and later if necessary Ag7. Therefore, it seems reasonable for White to postpone that manoeuvre with the knight and to start pushing his pawns on the kingside first with 12.c3 (White has also tested in practice 12.Ag3 g6 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.Eh6 Ag7 15.Axg7 Axg7 16.Ag4 Ad8 17.Af5+ Ah8 18.Axe7 Aexe7 19.c3 exd4 20.cxd4 f5↑ Helbich — Krajnak, Olomouc 1998. Black has parried White’s threats and now White cannot capture the f5-pawn, because of Aa3+, so he has to comply with the weakness of the isolated d4-pawn. The best for White is 15.c3!?±, maintaining the advantage.) 12...b5 13.a3 Ac7, Krapivin — Ovod, Serpukhov 2003, 14.g4!?↑, White has more space and active pieces and that enables him to start active operations on the kingside.

b1) 11...c5

This move weakens the d5-square considerably and White can easily exploit that.

12.dxe5 dxe5 13.Ac3!

This is the most effective. White is now threatening to occupy the d5-square with the following plan — to play f4-f5, Ad3-c4 and then to repel, or exchange Black’s knight on f6.

13...Af6

13...Aac8 (Black is threatening to play c5-c4.) 14.Ab5 (After
14.\(\text{\textit{e}2\textit{exf4}},\) White will have to capture on \(\textit{f4}\) with the rook, because he would lose a piece after: 15.\(\text{\textit{xf4 c4}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xc4 \textit{c5+}}}\) 14...\(\textit{c4}\) (14...\(\textit{exf4}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{xf4 \textit{b6}}}\) 16.\(\textit{e5 \textit{e8}}\) 17.\(\textit{xb7+} -\) Renet – Moskalenko, St. Martin 1991. White’s advantage is practically decisive – he has an extra pawn and an overwhelming position.) 15.\(\text{\textit{ad1 \textit{fd8}}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xd7}}\) (This is even stronger than: 16.\(\text{\textit{d5 \textit{xd5}}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xd5 \textit{f6}}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xe5 \textit{d6}}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{f5 g6}}\) – 19...\(\text{\textit{b4}}\)? – 20.\(\text{\textit{xf6 \textit{xb5}}}\) 21.\(\textit{f5}\). White releases his rook easily from captivity. 21...\(\text{\textit{e5}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{fxg6 \textit{fxg6}}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{g4}}\) ↑ Flear – Papatriyonos, Plovdiv 2003. White is clearly better, but he should be careful about the possibility of a check from the \(h2\)-square.) 16...\(\text{\textit{xd7}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{d5 \textit{c5}}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xc5 \textit{xc5}}}\) (Or 18...\(\text{\textit{xc5}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{fxe5+}},\) and White wins a pawn, because Black cannot play: 19...\(\text{\textit{xe5?}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{xe5+}},\) and if Black takes that rook, White follows with a check from the \(f7\)-square and checkmate.) 19.\(\text{\textit{xe5+}}\). White has an extra pawn without any compensation for Black.

14.\(\textit{f5 \textit{b6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\)

Black might obtain a good position if he manages to push \(\text{\textit{c5-c4}}\), but that is just impossible.

15...\(\text{\textit{fd8}}\)

In case of 15...\(\text{\textit{c4}}\), Black does not obtain any compensation for the pawn after: 16.\(\text{\textit{xc4 \textit{xc4}}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xc4 \textit{ac8}}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{b3 \textit{b4}}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{d5+}},\) and White simply remains with an extra pawn.

16.\(\textit{a3}\)

After the immediate: 16.\(\text{\textit{c4 \textit{xc4}}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xc4}},\) Black can follow with 17...\(\text{\textit{b4}}\) – while the move \(a2-a3\) prevents that manoeuvre.

16...\(\text{\textit{ac8}}\)

17.\(\text{\textit{c4! \textit{xc4}}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xc4 \textit{f8}}}\) (White needs only to exchange his bishop for Black’s knight on \(f6\) to achieve an overwhelming advantage: 18...\(\text{\textit{a6}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\)！ \(b5\) 20.\(\text{\textit{e2 \textit{e7}}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xf6 \textit{xf6}}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{d5+}},\) and White’s positional advantage is just tremendous, Yakovich – Romero Garcia, Sevilla 1999.) 19.\(\text{\textit{g5 \textit{d4}}}\) (Black avoids the pin and thus preserves his knight.) 20.\(\text{\textit{xe2 \textit{e8}}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{e3 \textit{d7}}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{ad1 \textit{xd1}}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{xd1 \textit{b6}}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{b5 \textit{xb5}}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{xb5 \textit{a6}}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{c3 \textit{d6}}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{f2 \textit{f6}}}\) 28.\(\text{\textit{f3+}}\) Yakovich – Mokry, Pardubice 1994. White maintains all the advantages of his position in the endgame – he has more space, domination over the \(d5\)-outpost and a good bishop against Black’s bad bishop.

b2) 11...\(\text{\textit{fe8}}\)
This is with the idea to be able to retreat the bishop on e7 to the f8-square after White brings his knight to f5.

12.c3 c5

Now, contrary to the similar situation after move eleven, White's knight cannot go back to the c3-square in order to be established on the d5-outpost.

Black has also tried some other moves in practice, but they cannot change the evaluation of the position:

12...exd4 — this move just surrenders the centre: 13.cxd4 d6 14.a3 ∆f3 15.dc3 ∆b8 16. b4 ∆c7 17.d5 d5 18.e5 ∆fd7 19. ∆ac1+ Pilgaard – Bendel, Gelsenkirchen 2000. Black is completely squeezed and White is on the offensive all over the board;

12...∆f8 — the moves ∆fe8 and ∆f8 are logically connected, so that retreat of the bishop seems to be quite natural. 13.∆g3 (The other possibility for White 13.g4 allows a counterstrike in the centre due to the placement of the black rook on the e-file: 13...d5 14.fxe5 dxe4 15.∆xe4 ∆xe5 16.dxe5 ∆xe5 17.∆g3 ∆xe4 18.

Black remains with excellent counterchances, because of the vulnerable white king, even after White recaptures the a7-pawn. It is clearly worse for Black to play: 13...exd4 14.cxd4 e7 15.∆g3 eae8 16.eae1 ∆b6, A.Horvath – Wuts, Belgium 2003, 17.g5↑, and White repels the black knight away from the e4-pawn and he preserves a powerful initiative on the kingside.) 13...b5 (Black only loses time after: 13...a6 14.∆f5 aad8 15.∆g3 ∆h8 16.fxe5 dxe5 17.∆h4 ∆c7 18.∆g5±, and he has problems defending the f6-square, Forchmann – Apfler, Friedrichroda 2003.) 14.a3 c5 15.fxe5 dxe5 16. dxc5±. Black's unfavourable counterstrike in the centre 14... c5, presented White with an extra pawn in the game De Jong – Hania, Leeuwarden 1994;

12...b5 13.a3 a7 14.f2

(White is doubling rooks on the f-file increasing the pressure.)

14...a5 (This is an attempt to obtain some counterplay on the queenside.) 15.a1 f4 16.g3 ∆f5 17.∆f5 ∆h8 18.fxe5 dxe5 19.∆g3 bxa3 20.bxa3 (Black has no time to defend his a3-pawn anyway, because of the weakness on g7.) 20...c5 21.d5↑. This protected passed pawn is a great positional achievement for the future. 21...c4 22.a2 a5, Pektor – Adamek, Prague 1992, and here it deserved attention for White to play 23.d6!?, and if 23...c6 (23...c8 24.h4 g8
25.\text{d}d1± – White’s d-pawn becomes a powerful force), then 24.\text{h}h6 \text{c}xe4 25.\text{f}f7+ \text{g}g8 26. \text{x}xe4 \text{x}xe4 27.\text{f}3+ and Black has no defence against d6-d7.

13.\text{d}xe5 \text{d}xe5 14.\text{c}4

It also deserves attention for White to follow with the simple: 14.f5!? h6 15.g4 \text{h}7 16.\text{g}3 \text{d}8 17.\text{f}2, so that later he can prepare the pawn break g4-g5 patiently with \text{ad}1, \text{h}1, \text{h}4, \text{g}1-f3 etc.

14.\text{f}8

It is not good for Black to play: 14...b5 15.\text{xf}7+ \text{xf}7 16.\text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 17.\text{h}5+ \text{g}6 18.e5+. After White recaptures his piece – the c5-pawn will remain under attack.

15.\text{g}3 \text{b}6?!

In case of 15...\text{xf}4 16.\text{xf}4 \text{e}5 17.\text{xe}5 \text{xe}5, White follows with 18.\text{f}5+, with the powerful threats \text{h}6+ and \text{g}3.

16.\text{fx}e5 \text{xe}5 17.\text{e}2

White’s idea is to play \text{f}4 and e5 (Black’s rook is not a reliable blocker of the e4-pawn) and later to attack the f7-square.

17...\text{bd}7

18.\text{ad}1! (White is threatening \text{xd}7.) 18...\text{xa}2 19.\text{b}5 \text{e}6?! (It is still better for Black to play 19...\text{b}6 20.\text{f}4 \text{e}6 21.e5 \text{d}5 22.\text{g}5 \text{f}6 23.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 24. \text{h}5+, but White has a powerful attack.) 20.\text{f}4 \text{b}6 (But not 20...a6 21.\text{xd}7 \text{xd}7 22.\text{xd}7+ and White wins a piece.) 21. \text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 22.\text{f}4± Chabanon – Bauer, Meribel 1998. White won the exchange and Black had no compensation for it.

\textbf{Conclusion for Chapters 8-12}

In the system 4...\text{a}a5, Black creates problems for White early in the opening with the defence of the central pawns on e4 and d4, as well as with the b2-pawn. Nevertheless, after precise play, White manages to complete his development successfully and to parry Black’s counterattack in the centre. Sometimes White needs to sacrifice a pawn, because it is too dangerous for Black, having played so many moves with his queen, to go after material gains neglecting his development. He might fall a victim of a crushing attack. In general, White has found quite reliable methods of obtaining the advantage in all the lines of the 3...c6 system that we have been analysing.
Part 3

Pirc Defence
1.e4 d6 2.d4 $\text{g}f6$ 3.$\text{c}c3$ $g6$

This move is typical for the Pirc Defence. Black's long-term plans are more or less similar to the King's Indian Defence. He surrenders the center, but only temporarily and then counterattacks it with pieces and undermines it with pawns ($c7$-$c5$, $e7$-$e5$ and $d6$-$d5$).

The basic difference between the Pirc Defence and the King's Indian Defence is that White's c-pawn is on $c2$ and not on $c4$. This is sometimes favourable for White, but sometimes advantageous for Black as well...

White has an extra tempo that he uses for development, his $d4$-square is not weakened and he can use the $c4$-square favourably to place a piece there. On the other hand, White has less space on the queenside and he cannot exploit the typical pawn-break $c4$-$c5$ that is so effective in positions with a blocked centre.

Accordingly, it is logical for White to play in the centre and on the kingside, so that he can make use of his development and space advantage there, and not on the queenside.

4.$f4$

The three pawns system is definitely the most principled line against the Pirc Defence. White's idea is quite straightforward – to develop his pieces and to play $e4$-$e5$, and then to exploit the advantage in development and space.

On the other hand, Black must find a way to counterattack White's centre somehow and he should do that immediately during the next few moves.

We would like to mention Black's standard plans in this position and White's usual reactions to them. Let us begin with some seldom exploited ideas:

1) Black plays on the queenside – $a7$-$a6$ ($c7$-$c6$), $b7$-$b5$, $\text{bd}7$, $\text{b}7$ – that plan is hardly effective in the three pawns attack.
All these moves do not create any real threats and they are often just a loss of time after White's proper reaction - e4-e5 (immediately or after a couple of moves), &d3 and 0-0. Black's counterplay has a singular object - White's knight on c3 - and it either goes to the wonderful e4-square, or gets exchanged for the black knight, if after White plays e4-e5, the said knight retreats to the d5-square. The black king becomes often endangered, since it remains with a sole defender - the bishop on g7. That is particularly true when Black exchanges pawns on e5 - after f4xe5 (it is usually better for White to recapture on e5 with the f-pawn), because then the c1-h6 diagonal is opened for the bishop on c1 and White has the dangerous attacking plan &e1-h4, &h6 and &g5. In general, Black's pawn-offensive on the queenside does not promise him any good prospects in particular. Meanwhile, we have to emphasize that White's standard plan is effective enough even if Black tries some other ideas in the process, for example ãbd7 followed by e7-e5, or e7-e6 etc.;

2) c7-c6, d6-d5 and in case of White playing e4-e5 – ãf6-e4. It does not seem too logical for Black to push his d-pawn twice so early in the opening. White has two habitual reactions depending on circumstances:

to capture on e4 and follow with ãg5 – in case Black cannot defend effectively the pawn that appears on the e4-square;

to play simply &d3 and 0-0, ignoring the possible doubling of the c-pawns after the exchange on the c3-square. Black pays a dear price for that exchange - he loses plenty of time for moves with his knight on f6 and with his d-pawn. Once again White has excellent attacking prospects on the kingside - he should bring his queen to h4 and prepare f4-f5;

Black's attempts to attack the white bishop on d3 with ãa6(c6)-b4 are not dangerous for White. The bishop retreats to e2 and it is well placed there, while the black knight is repelled later with a2-a3. Indeed, Black usually combines that idea with some other plans, like - c7-c6+d6-d5, or c7-c5;

3) ãg4 with the idea to exchange on f3 and counterattack White's centre on the dark squares. White in principle does not mind Black's exchanging on f3 and sometimes even provokes that by playing h2-h3. After that exchange Black should necessarily play e7-e5 - otherwise White would play e4-e5 himself and then he would castle long and attack the black king along the h-file. Following e7-e5, White exchanges the d-pawns, plays f4-f5 and then he starts a pawn-offensive on the kingside.

4) c7-c5. This is one of the
basic plans for Black. The correct order of moves, in which Black exploits that idea, is essential for its success.

In the line 4...\textit{g}7 5.\textit{f}3 0-0 6.\textit{d}3 c5, Black permits White to exchange pawns on c5 (after 7.dxc5, Black cannot play 7...\textit{a}5, because of the capturing on d6 – White’s e4-pawn is protected and Black does not have the possibility \textit{xe}4). After the exchange on c5, White plays e4-e5, followed by \textit{e}2 and 0-0. In case of the retreat of the black knight from g6 to the d5-square, he exchanges knights and attacks the black queen with the move \textit{xe}4.

The trade of the d-pawns is not favourable for Black in that line, so he usually tries to avoid that by playing 5...c5 (while White’s e4-pawn is not protected), or by 6...\textit{a}6, followed by 7...c5.

6...\textit{a}6 is a fashionable, but rather risky plan for Black. The knight on a6 is a bit out of action in case White attacks on the kingside. After c7-c5 and d4-d5, Black’s further actions on the queenside (\textit{b}8, \textit{c}7) are quite risky, because of White’s attacking plan f4-f5, \textit{e}1-h4, \textit{h}6 and \textit{g}5. It is more prudent for Black to play Bg4 and exchange the bishop for White’s knight, but even then White dominates in the centre and he has the bishop pair advantage.

5...c5 is a separate variation of the three pawns attack in which we recommend A. Shirov’s plan: 6.\textit{b}5+ \textit{d}7 7.\textit{xd}7+ \textit{fx}d7 8. d5, and later White can again follow with f4-f5 with good attacking prospects against the enemy king;

5) Finally, Black can try 6...\textit{c}6 (the knight is well placed there, it attacks the d4-pawn and supports e7-e5). White should counter that idea with the immediate 7.e5, and after the exchange he must capture with the f-pawn. Later he should complete his development and try to parry Black’s possible counterattack of the centre with (f7-f6).

We have summarized the typical plans for White and Black in the three pawns attack of the Pirc Defence. Naturally, you should act depending on circumstances – sometimes it is good for White to avoid the standard plan in order to emphasize the drawbacks of Black’s chosen order of moves; nevertheless, generally speaking, you should better adhere to the well-trodden paths.
In this chapter, we are going to deal with lines in which Black temporarily refrains from the natural (and best) development of the bishop to g7.

The drawback of that approach is evident – the development of the kingside and castling is one of the urgent tasks for Black in the opening. He can hardly organize any effective counterplay without solving it.

Later in our book, we will deal with the best methods for Black to organize counterplay, when we will analyse his best replies in the main lines.

4...c6

Let us see some of the other possibilities for Black:

4...e5? This move is simply giving a pawn away without any compensation. 5.dxe5 dxe5 6.\texttt{xd8+ xxd8} 7.fxe5. Black's king is seriously endangered, for example: 7...\texttt{g4} 8.f3 c6 (8...\texttt{c5} 9.g5+ e8 10.0-0 d7 11.d5 c6 12.f6+ Thelen – Kruse, Mittelrhein 1994) 9.g5+ c7 10.f4 c5, Eckhardt – Janekovic, Darmstadt 1995, and here it is worth for White to try: 11.d1+!? d7 12.b5 with the idea after 12...f2 to follow with 13.a4+ and to win two light pieces for a rook;

4...c5? (Black is still far from ready to accomplish that pawn-break in the centre successfully – it is hardly effective without the bishop on g7.) 5.dxc5 dxc5 (The point is that after the standard move 5...\texttt{a5}, White plays simply 6.cxd6 cxd6 7.e5+, and Black cannot capture on c3 without a bishop on g7. White obtains a considerable material advantage – 7...\texttt{c5} 8.b5+ \texttt{bd7} 9.xc5, and Black should just resign, Privara – Hlavaty, Bratislava 1982. It is better for Black to play 6...\texttt{c6} 7.d3 \texttt{g4} 8.f3++, and he remains “only” a pawn down, Glek – Cerny, Prague 1985) 6.xd8+ xd8
7.e5+. White has a powerful centre and the black king is exposed, so White is much better, for example 7...\( \text{d} \text{d}7 \) (or 7...\( g_4 \) 8.h3 \( h_6 \) 9.g4 \( c_6 \) 10.e3\( \pm \) Trescher – Rehle, Bad Laasphe 1994. White castles and then doubles his rooks along the d-file and Black has no defensive resources.) 8.e3, and Black’s attempt to free himself with the help of 8...g5 makes only matters worse after: 9.fg \( x_e5 \) 10.0–0–0+ \( b_d7 \) 11.xc5++ and White has a decisive advantage Benko – Adad, Mar del Plata 1971;

4...\( b_d7 \) (This move deprives the knight on f6 of a square to retreat.) 5.e5 \( h_5 \) (It is hardly any better for Black to play 5...dxe5 6.fxe5 \( g_8 \), Rocha Diaz – Indarte, Montevideo 2001, 7.f3\( \pm \) – since with an open f-file White will soon prevail.) 6.f3, and Black will have to worry about the fate of the knight on \( h_5 \), because \( g_7 \) is unplayable due to g2–g4;

4...d5 – this is not so effective, because Black loses too much time in the opening. 5.e5 \( g_8 \), Huber – Grumic, Alberta 1999, and after 6.d3\( \pm \), Black has no compensation for White’s space advantage;

4...e6 (This move constrains the bishop on c8 and it is contrary to Black’s basic opening idea – pressure against White’s centre.) 5.f3 d5 (We deal with 5...\( g_7 \) after the following move order 4...\( g_7 \) 5.f3 e6.) 6.e5 d7 7.d3 g7 8.e3 e7 9.d2\( \pm \) Martin – Reinert, Hassloch 1999. This position resembles the French Defence, but Black has no counterplay at all. He wasted precious time on fianchettoing the bishop and playing d7–d6–d5 in two moves;

4...a6 (This move is with a good idea and it helps Black’s counterplay on the queenside. Nevertheless Black must fianchetto his king’s bishop anyway and the centre is much more important than the queenside...) 5.f3 b5 (5...\( g_7 \) has been dealt with in the line 4...\( g_7 \) 5.f3 a6) 6.d3\( \uparrow \), with the idea to follow with 7.e5 on the next move with White’s initiative;

4...b6. This development of the queen’s bishop is hardly Black’s best choice. It is probably better to develop that bishop to \( g_4 \), since now after 5.e5 dxe5 6.fxe5 \( d_5 \) 7.xd5 xd5 8.f3 \( g_7 \) 9.d3\( \pm \), White completes his development comfortably and preserves his edge in the centre – Black cannot undermine it easily at all;

4...c6 (This is an attempt to provoke first d4–d5, and then to undermine White’s pawn centre with c7–c6. Black is in fact not well developed yet, so the whole idea of playing the knight to \( c_6 \) and back is hardly advisable in that position.) 5.f3 \( g_4 \) (It seems even weaker for Black to play 5...d5 6.e5 \( e_4 \) 7.d3 xc3 8.bxc3\( \pm \), and White has a huge
lead in development, or 5...e6
6.d3, and the purposefulness
of the move e7-e6 is quite ques-
tionable. The line 5...g7 6.e5
leads by transposition to 4...g7
5.f3 c6 6.e5.) 6.d5 b8 7.h3
(with a pawn on d5 – it is not so wise
for White to play 7.e5 fd7, because
the e5-pawn will be hanging)
7...xf3 8.xf3 c6 9.e3!? (This
development for White looks
more reasonable than 9.d3 g7
10.0–0 0–0 11.h1 cxd5 12.exd5
d5 13.exd5, and Black reaches
the desired position in which his
king is safe and his bishop is
quite powerful on the long diag-
onal, Nishimura – Tu Hoang
Thong, Kuala Lumpur 1993.)
9...g7 10.0–0 0–0 – and White
is much better developed and he
will create dangerous threats
much faster in a position with
opposite castling;
4...g4 5.f3 d5 (Again, it is
not good for Black to play 5...c5
6.dxc5 a5 due to the same rea-
son: 7.cxd6 xe4 8.d5+ – and
Black loses material, Hamilton
– Hacche, Melbourne 1993; 5...e6
is too passive, since it does not
oppose White’s offensive in the
centre 6.h3 f3 7.xf3 c6 8.e5? Arroba – Escobar, Almendralejo
2003, 5...g7 6.e3 transposes
to the line 4...g7 5.f3 g4.
The variation 5...c6 6.d5, has
been dealt with in the same
chapter as with the line 4...c6.)
6.e5 e4, Bolon – Leon, France
1998, and here White’s simplest
line is 7.d3!? xc3 8.bxc3 g7
9.0–0±, and he has an ample
space advantage.

5.f3

5...g4

As for the other moves:
5...g7 has been analysed af-
ter 4...g7;
5...b5 6.a3 (In case of 6.e5,
with a bishop on f8 – Black can
play 6...b4, but the simple move
6.d3 deserves attention for
White.) 6...g7 (or 6...a6, Jaeckle
– Birk, Germany 1992, and here
it is worth for White to try
7.d3!± g7 8.e5 with an edge
in the centre.) 7.d3 a6 8.0–0
0–0, Shukurova – Ingrid, Istan-
bul 2000, 9.e5 ± – Black has
wasted valuable time for pawn
moves on the side, but he has not
achieved anything substantial
there;
5...d5 (This move leads to
blocked positions, but even then
Black’s great loss of time on
knight moves should be a telling
factor...) 6.e5 h5 (It is dubious
for Black to play 6...e4 7.xe4
dxe4 8.g5±, and the e4-pawn
is defenceless.) 7.e2 g7 8.
e3 h5 9.0–0 g4 10.g5 xe2
11.xe2 e6 12.b3 f5 13.f2
\$e7 14.\$f3 a5 15.c4± Jaenig – Phildius, Bad Woerishofen 2002. White cannot breakthrough easily due to Black’s solid pawn chain, but still White has a space advantage and the initiative.

6.h3 \$xf3 7.\$xf3

7...\$e6

After this move, White cannot defend his d4-pawn with the bishop, because the b2-pawn is hanging. He does not wish to push it forward either, because this contradicts the main idea of the variation – to push e4-e5.

It is too passive for Black to play 7...\$e6 8.\$d3 \$g7 9.e5± and White has a great advantage in the centre. 9...\$g8 (9...\$d5 10.\$e4 dxe5 11.fxe5 0-0 12.c3 b5 13.0-0±. The terrible weaknesses on f6 and h6 that Black has created ensure a great positional advantage for White, while the tactical mistake 13...f6? – should be countered with 13...\$d7 14.\$g5± – 14.exf6 \$xf6, Schneiders – Auer, Pirmasens 1992, and Black could have ended up in a hopeless position after: 15.\$g4 \$e7 16.\$h6, with huge material losses, for example after: 16...\$g7 17.\$xg7 \$xf1+ 18.\$xf1 \$xg7 19.\$g5+-) 10.\$e4 \$f8 (Black is trying to prevent the appearance of the white knight on the d6-square), and here it is good for White to follow with: 11.exd6 \$xd6 12.\$xd6+ \$xd6 13.c3 \$f6 14.0-0 \$bd7± Mattheai – Eckert, Duesseldorf 1995, with the pair of bishops, which are presently a bit restricted by pawns, indeed..., as well as with 11.\$e3 d5 12.\$d2± – Black has managed to close the centre, but his pieces are not developed at all. The placement of the knight on d2 is favourable for White, because now he is not afraid of his centre being destroyed after c6-c5 – he can protect it with the move c2-c3 – and proceed later with the standard plan g2-g4 and f4-f5.

In case of 7...\$g7 8.\$e3, the game transposes to lines that we deal with after the following order of moves: 4...\$g7 5.\$f6 \$g4 6.\$e3 c6.

8.e5 \$fd7

9.\$d3!?↑

and it is too dangerous for
Black to capture the pawn: 9...\texttt{\textperiodcentered}d4, because White would follow with 10.e3 b4 11.a3 a5 (11...xb2 12.d2++, and the black queen gets trapped) 12.exd6 exd6 13.d4 g8 14.0-0-0, and for the sacrificed pawn – White has a powerful attack against the black king stranded in the centre.

\textbf{Conclusions}

Black refrains from the natural development of his kingside in the lines that we have analysed in this chapter and that cannot provide him with any sufficient counterplay. White is clearly better after simple moves, just by developing and preparing the pawn-break e4-e5. Having played 3...g6, Black must be consistent and follow that with \texttt{\textperiodcentered}g7 and then he must choose his further plans depending on circumstances.
This is the most natural and strongest move.
5.\( \text{\underline{f3}} \)

Once again, Black has an ample choice of moves and the best from these: 5...c5 and 5...0–0 will be dealt with in the next chapters, while now we will analyse the relatively rare moves: a) 5...\( \text{\underline{a6}} \), b) 5...\( \text{\underline{g4}} \) and c) 5...c6.

We must also mention some other less satisfactory lines for Black.

5...d5 6.e5 \( \text{\underline{e4}} \) 7.\( \text{\underline{x}e4} \) dxe4 8.\( \text{\underline{g5}} \pm \). Black has serious problems with the defence of the e4-pawn;

5...\( \text{\underline{bd7}} \) (Now Black cannot retreat his knight to d5 in answer to e4-e5 and therefore that development of the knight is quite dubious.) 6.e5 dxe5 (The other possibility for Black – 6...\( \text{\underline{g8}} \) 7.\( \text{\underline{d3}} \pm \) looks just pathetic. It is better for Black to play 6...\( \text{\underline{g4}} \) 7.\( \text{\underline{d3}} \pm \), but still Black is worse due to his misplaced knight. White has occupied the centre indeed, but the f-file is not opened yet.) 7.fxe5 \( \text{\underline{g4}} \) 8.\( \text{\underline{g5}} \) \( \text{\underline{b6}} \) 9.e6\( \pm \), and Black is forced to retreat his knight to h6 and to lose his right to castle;

5...\( \text{\underline{fd7}} \) (This is of course prophylactics against e4-e5, but it is still better to develop new pieces in the opening...) 6.\( \text{\underline{e3}} \) 0–0 7.\( \text{\underline{d2}} \) (White can also play 7.\( \text{\underline{d3}} \)!? followed by castling short.) 7...c6, Bergdahl – Wahlstedt, Vaxjo 1992, 8.0–0–0!? – and White’s prospects on the kingside are much better than Black’s on the queenside; White’s basic plan here is – to push the h-pawn to h5, to open the “h”-file and to deploy his queen on it. This idea becomes particularly attractive after the retreat of the black knight away from the f6-square, since it prevents the pawn-move h4-h5 and defends the h7-square. It looks like Black
should better bring back his knight to f6, but he would lose valuable time. His possible counterplay with b7-b5-b4 would be too slow and he cannot create immediate checkmating threats with it;

5...\&c6 6.e5!? (It is less energetic for White to play 6.\&d3 \&g4, Black thus realizes the idea to put immediate pressure against the d4-square, since he saves time by not castling on move 5. It is also possible to play 6.\&e3 – see 1...g6 2.d4 \&g7 3.\&c3 d6 4.f4 \&c6 5.\&e3 \&f6 6.\&f3) 6...dxe5 7.fxe5 \&d5 8.\&c4 e6 (Or 8...\&b6 9.\&b5 a6 10.\&xc6+ bxc6 11.0–0 \&g4 12.\&e3 \&c4 13.\&e2+ and the black pawn chain is in ruins, Giannadis – Klokas, Ikaria 1992) 9.\&g5 \&xc3 10.bxc3 \&e7 11.0–0+ – and the weakness of the f6-square is just appalling, Marshall – Pillsbury, Cambridge Springs 1904;

5...e6 (This is too passive. Black is now obliged to attack the enemy pawn centre with his pieces.) 6.\&d3 \&c6 (6...a6, De Souza – Mendes, San Bernando 1968, and here White should better play the immediate 7.e5?!↑, in order to exploit Black’s loss of time on the move a7-a6. It is useless for Black to play 6...\&e7 7.e5↑ – and his queen on e7 is evidently misplaced. White obtains a clear advantage after 6...\&bd7 7.e5 dxe5 8.fxe5 \&d5 9.\&g5± – and it becomes clear that Black has freed White’s dark-squared bishop quite unnecessarily, Aronian – Lundberg, Verdun 1995) 7.e5 \&d5, Miles – Tanner, Teeside 1973, and now for example, White has a slight edge after: 8.\&xd5 exd5 9.0–0+ – because in positions of this type it is not advantageous for Black to fianchetto his dark-squared bishop.

Now, Black can follow with 9...0–0 10.c3, but his natural plan to undermine White’s centre with f7-f6 would not yield him equality: 10...dxe5 (Black can also try the immediate: 10...f6 11.exd6 \&xd6 12.f5. White restricts the mobility of the black bishop on g7 and occupies space on the kingside. In case Black forces an exchange on g6 with 12...\&e7, then after 13.fxg6 hxg6 14.\&h4 f5 15.\&f4+, White’s position remains clearly superior – the e5 and g5-squares can be used by his knight for operations against the weakened black king.) 11.fxe5 f6 12.exf6 \&xf6 (It is too dangerous for Black to place his queen on the open file: 12...\&xf6 13.\&g5 \&e7 14.\&xf8+ \&xf8 15.\&xh7+; 14...\&xf8 15.
\( \text{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{1.e4 d6 2.d4 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{f6}}} 3.c3 g6 4.f4 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{g7}}} 5.\textbf{\text{f3}}}} \) 13.h6 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{g7}}} 14.xg7 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xg7}}} 15.b3 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{g4}}} 16.xb7 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{f6}}}, and here White can try 17.e5?! \textcolor{black}{\text{(or 17.b3 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xf3}}} 18.gxf3 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{f6}}}) – and Black must still prove that his compensation for the pawn is sufficient enough} 17...\textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{exf5}}} 18.xf6 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xd3}}} 19.a1, and White gobbles pawns and attacks the enemy king at the same time, for example: 19...b8 (19...e2 20.f7+b6 21.xc7 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{h6}}} 20.f7+ wh6 21.xa7 a8 22.b7 b8 23.a6 axb2 24.e1 c4 25.\textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{ee7}}}+) 5...a6 (Now, Black's actions on the queenside seem a bit premature, since after White's pawn-break in the centre e4-e5, Black's moves like a6 and b5 may turn out to be superficial.) 6.d3 g4 (We have noted already that 6...b5, would be countered by White with 7.e5. In case of 6...c6, White plays 7.e5 dxe5 8.fxe5 d5 9.xd5 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xd5}}} 10.c3 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{c3}}} – and it is far from clear whether the move a7-a6 would be useful for Black in this position. The move 6...0-0 transposes to lines that we are dealing with after the following order of moves: 5...0-0 6.d3 a6.) 7.h3 xf3 8.xf3. White is threatening e4-e5. Black is now forced to play: 8...c6 9.e3 e5 10.dxe5 dxe5 11.f5 d4 12.f2 c5 13.g4 Velasco – Djukanovic, Hastings 1982, and once again the move a7-a6 is hardly useful, while White's initiative on the kingside is quite dangerous due to the threat g5; \textcolor{black}{\text{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{5..b6}}}} (This is not bad, but the e4-square that the black bishop is going to attack is quite well defended.) 6.d3 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{b7}}} 7.0-0 e6 7...\textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{bd7}}} 8.e5 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{d5}}} 9.e4 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{e4}}} Schumacher – Linsmayer, Regensburg 1998. White is dominant in the centre and 9...c4 will be countered by 10.exd6 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xd3}}} 11.\textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xc7}}} \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xc7}}} 12.\textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xd3}}} 0-0 13.c3 \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{c3}}} – and Black's compensation for the sacrificed pawn is insufficient.) 8.e5 d5 9.b5+? a6 (White's idea is that after 9...c6 10.e4+, he suddenly gets a big advantage after the manoeuvre of the knight to d6.) 10.xc6+ \textit{\textcolor{black}{\text{xc6}}} 11.d5 (It is worth for White to try 11.e4+ 11...exd5 12.e3 – and after the trade of the fianchettoed bishop, White remains with a slight edge; \textbf{\textcolor{red}{a} 5...a6})

This is a quite acceptable move, but later Black should better castle and transpose to lines that we will analyse in our next chapters. Here we will deal with variations in which Black temporarily refrains from castling.
and tries to make something out of that.

6.\hspace{0.5em}d3 c5

If 6...\hspace{0.5em}b4, then 7.e2 d5 8.e5 \hspace{0.5em}e4 9.a3±, followed by \hspace{0.5em}d3, repelling the knights.

7.d5 \hspace{0.5em}g4
7...\hspace{0.5em}c7 8.0–0 0–0 transposes to a position that we deal with in the chapter devoted to the line 5...0–0 6.d3 \hspace{0.5em}a6.

It is not so satisfactory for Black to play 7...\hspace{0.5em}c7 8.e5 (After 8.0–0, Black follows with 8...c4. It is worse for White to play 8.\hspace{0.5em}e2 0–0, because the move \hspace{0.5em}e2 is not so useful for White in this line. 9.a3 e6 10.dxe6 \hspace{0.5em}xe6 11.\hspace{0.5em}c4 \hspace{0.5em}ae8 12.0–0 \hspace{0.5em}xc4 13.\hspace{0.5em}xc4 \hspace{0.5em}c6\hspace{0.5em} Kudrin – Christiansen, Reykjavik 1986 – and Black prepares d6-d5 and obtains a good game.) 8...\hspace{0.5em}d7 9.\hspace{0.5em}b5↑. Black fails to castle, but still there remains a lot of tension on the board, because White cannot castle on either side, due to the threat c5-c4+: 9...\hspace{0.5em}b6 10.exd6 \hspace{0.5em}exd6 11.\hspace{0.5em}e2+ \hspace{0.5em}d8 12.\hspace{0.5em}g5 \hspace{0.5em}f8 13.a4. White is threatening to trap the enemy queen with the move a4-a5. 13...\hspace{0.5em}b4 14.\hspace{0.5em}c4 (or 14.a5 \hspace{0.5em}xd3+ 15.\hspace{0.5em}xd3 \hspace{0.5em}a6 16.0–0 \hspace{0.5em}f6, followed by \hspace{0.5em}f5 with a good game for Black) 14...a6 15.a5!? \hspace{0.5em}xb5 16.axb6 \hspace{0.5em}xa1 17.0–0±. White still maintains some advantage – he remains with a queen against a rook, a bishop and a pawn, but Black’s king is vulnerable, since he cannot play 17...bxc4, due to 18.\hspace{0.5em}e1++, and Black is under a checkmating threat, because of the presence of the b6-pawn on the board. He can parry that threat indeed, but only at the cost of losing a piece.

8.0–0 \hspace{0.5em}d7 9.h3

Black succeeds to make good use of the fact that he has not castled in the line: 9.\hspace{0.5em}h1 \hspace{0.5em}b8 10.e1 \hspace{0.5em}b4 11.\hspace{0.5em}h4 \hspace{0.5em}xf3 12.\hspace{0.5em}xf3 b5 13.a3 \hspace{0.5em}xd3 14.cxd3 c4± van Blitterswijk – Conquest, Neuwied 1993 – and it is not clear what White’s queen is doing on h4.

9...\hspace{0.5em}xf3

10.\hspace{0.5em}xf3±, and White plays later \hspace{0.5em}c4 and preserves his advantage in the centre. White’s next actions depend on what Black intends to do. In case he tries to prepare the pawn-break b7-b5, White can start active actions on the queenside himself (a4, \hspace{0.5em}d3, and later depending on circumstances – a4-a5, or \hspace{0.5em}b1 and b2-b4). Should Black play passively, White would be capable to prepare and push e4-e5. The arising position will resemble the structure in the variation: 5...0–0 6.\hspace{0.5em}d3 \hspace{0.5em}a6.

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7.0–0 c5 8.d5 \$g4, which we are dealing with in our Chapter 20.

b) 5...\$g4

This is a natural move – Black attacks the pawn centre.

6.\$e3

It is better for White to refrain from developing his light-squared bishop to d3 after this order of moves, since after 6.\$d3 Black can play 6...\$c6, exploiting the weakening of the d4-pawn.

Black now has a choice: b1) 6...c6, b2) 6...\$c6 or b3) 6...0–0.

He has also tried some other moves sometimes:

6...c5 – this move is not so good under the circumstances, because after 7.dxc5 \$a5 8.\$d3 dxc5 9.e5 \$fd7, White forces the exchange of the bishops 10.h3 \$xf3 11.\$xf3\$ Piris - Szollosi, Budapest 1989. White maintains the advantage, because his pair of bishops will be quite dominant with the long a8-h1 – diagonal having been already opened;

6...d5 – leads to a closed position with an edge for White. 7.e5 \$e4 8.\$d3 \$xc3 9.bxc3 \$d7 10.h3 \$xf3 11.\$xf3\$ Rapcsak – Somogyi, Paks 1995 – and White has a large space advantage and a bishop pair;

6...\$bd7 (This move does not combine too well with the active 5...\$g4.) 7.h3 (White should also consider here the immediate 7.e5.) 7...\$xf3 8.\$xf3 e5 (otherwise White would play e4-e5 himself) 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5 \$e7 11.g4 \$b4 12.0–0–0± – and Black has nothing to counter White's kingside attack with, Gibbs – Walker, London 1999.

b1) 6...c6

This is also not too well logically connected with Black's previous move \$g4.

7.h3 \$xf3 8.\$xf3 \$a5

It is hardly any better for Black to play 8...\$b6 9.0–0–0 \$fd7, Ostertag – Offenwanger, Augsburg 1998, 10.g4\$, and Black is almost helpless against White's offensive in the centre and on the kingside. The inadequate placement of Black's queen on the b6-square precludes his counterplay on the queenside (the idea b7-b5-b4 is now out of question).

It is more or less the same after 8...e6 9.g4\$, and White has a powerful initiative, without having sacrificed anything. Black has tried here 9...h5. This move is a bit too provocative – he loses time and thus lags in
development. 10.g5  $\text{h}7 (It is not any better for Black to play here: 10...$\text{g}8 11.f5 $\text{exf}5 12.$\text{exf}5 $\text{gx}5 13.0-0-0 $\text{c}7 14.$\text{d}3 $\text{d}7 15. $\text{he}1 $\text{a}6 16.$\text{f}2 0-0-0, Kryl – Ewg, playchess.com 2005, and now White’s simplest line would have been: 17.$\text{xa}6 \text{bxa}6 18.$\text{e}2 $\text{d}8 19.$\text{xa}6+ – Black’s king is vulnerable and his pawns are a sorry sight; White can also follow with: 13.$\text{xf}5 $\text{e}7 14.$\text{f}3 d5 15.0-0-0±, and Black has no compensation for his pawn-weeknesses.) 11.f5! It is quite reasonable for White to sacrifice a pawn here, because he opens the position and his advantage in development becomes a telling factor. 11...$\text{gx}5 12.$\text{exf}5 $\text{gx}5 13.$\text{g}3 $\text{f}6 14.h4 $\text{h}7 15.$\text{fxe}6 $\text{fxe}6 16.$\text{e}4→. There are plenty of open files (as well as diagonals) and Black’s king is an easy target stranded in the centre. Later, in the game Ferencz – Basagic, Finkenstein 2000, there followed: 16...$\text{e}7 17.0-0-0 $\text{f}8 18.$\text{f}4 d5 19.$\text{c}7 $\text{d}7 20. $\text{d}6+ $\text{x}d6 21.$\text{x}d6 $\text{a}6 22. $\text{d}3 0-0-0 23.$\text{e}5+-, and White was winning material.

9.0-0-0 0-0

9...$\text{bd}7 10.$\text{b}1!± – this is some useful prophylactics before the beginning of the kingside attack.

After the immediate 10.g4, Black has the tactical resource: 10...d5 11.e5 $\text{e}4, making use of the fact that the a2-pawn is hanging – 12.$\text{xe}4 $\text{dxe}4 13.$\text{xe}4 $\text{xa}2, Gretarsson – Balduresson, Reykjavik 2001 – and White is again somewhat better, but his king is a bit exposed.

After the immediate 9...d5, White has an interesting idea 10.e5 $\text{e}4 11.$\text{xe}4 $\text{dxe}4 12.$\text{g}4, and Black cannot capture the a2-pawn because of the checkmat ing threat.

\[10.\text{b}1!±\]

Black obtains some counterplay after 10.g4 d5 11.e5 $\text{e}4, Zamboukos – Dailey, California 1993. White’s prospects on the kingside after 10.$\text{b}1 are much more real than Black’s counterplay on the queenside.

10...$\text{bd}7

It is quite wrong for Black to remove his knight on f6 without any reasonable and urgent necessity: 10...$\text{fd}7 11.e5 $\text{a}6 12.h4 $\text{c}7 13.$\text{h}5 $\text{fd}8 14.$\text{hxg}6 $\text{fxg}6 15. $\text{c}4+ d5 16.$\text{d}3+ e6 17.$\text{h}3 $\text{f}8 18.g4 c5 19.$\text{f}5 c4 20.f6 $\text{cx}d2 21.$\text{fxg}7 $\text{dx}c2+ 22.$\text{xc}2 $\text{gx}7 23.$\text{h}6+ $\text{f}7 24.$\text{xf}8 $\text{xf}8 25.$\text{hxh}7+ 1-0 Gasic – Petrovic, Niska Banja 1996.

Black loses a pawn without sufficient compensation after:
10...b5 11.e5 Qd7, and here White’s best line would be 12. Qxb5 (It is also possible for White to follow with: 12.Qxb5 d5 13.Qc3 Qa6 14.g4 Qab8 15. Qc1 e6, Nowicki – Heinzel, Ruhrgebiet 1995, 16.h4±, and h4-h5 next) 12...d5 13.Qa4±, in order to place the bishop on the b3-square and to parry Black’s eventual threats against the b2-pawn.

11.g4

It is hardly convincing for White to play here: 11.e5 Qd5 12.Qxd5 Qxd5 13.Qxd5 cxd5 14.c3 e6–.

11...e6

Or 11...Qb6 12.g5 Qfd7 (It would have been better for Black to prevent the further advance of White’s h-pawn here with 12...Qh5, but still after 13.f5±, White would remain with a clear advantage, for example: 13...Qa4 14.Qxa4 Qxa4 15.Qe2 b5 16.Qf2 Qxh5 and f6) 13.h4 c5 14.h5 Qf8 15.Qhxg6 hxg6 16. f5 cxd4 17.Qxd4 Qxd4 18.Qxd4 Qg7 (18...Qe5 19.Qh3 Qg7 20.e5 dxe5 21.Qh4++) 19.fxg6 fxg6 20.Qh7+ Qxh7 21.Qf7+ Qh8 22. e5, and Black resigned, Bucher – Batchinsky, Switzerland 1999. (diagram)

12.Qg1

That move is hardly the best for White – he could have continued presently without it. (Instead, it deserved a great attention for him to play: 12.f5!? Qe8 13.h4→, or 12.Qd3!? b5 13.g5 Qh5 14.f5 – and White would have started an immediate attack on the kingside in both cases.) 12...b5 13.g5 Qh5 14.Qd3 (14.f5 b4 15.Qe2 exf5 15) 14...b4 15.Qe2 c5 16.f5 cxd4, and Black manages to prevent White’s Qf6 pawn-break just in time: 17.Qxd4 Qe5 18.Qf2 Qxd3 19. cxd3 Qxd4 20.Qxd4 Qxd4 exf5 21.b3 Qf8 22.Qf1 f4∞ Kotronias – Roktim, Mumbai 2003. White’s dominance on the long diagonal compensates his loss of a pawn indeed, but that is the maximum that he can brag about.

b2) 6...Qc6

7.h3 Qxf3 8.Qxf3 e5

It is too bad for Black to play 8...a6 9.e5– and the move b7-b5 might not be played ever...

It is too passive for Black to
play 8...\(\Box d7\) 9.e5 e6 (it was just pathetic for Black: 9...\(\Box b6\) 10.\(\Box d5\) \(\Box b4\) 11.\(\Box e4\) c5 12.a3 \(\Box a6\) 13.\(\Box b5+\) \(\Box f8\) 14.\(\Box x a 6\) \(\Box x a 6\) 15.0-0+-, and Black would not survive for long with his uncastled king, Sax – Csala, Hungary 1995) 10.0-0-0 d5 11.g4± – and Black fails to create any counterplay, while after 11...\(\Box e7\) 12.\(\Box d 3\) \(\Box h 6\) 13.f5± White breaks through, Cuartas – Schulz, Hamburg 1980.

9.fxe5

It is usually the best for White in similar positions to play something like: 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5, and follow that with pushing forward his g-pawn next. Black however, has not castled yet and White can try to exploit that with for example: 10.f5 \(\Box d 4\) 11.\(\Box f 2\) gxf5 12.exf5, Mitterhuemer – Harringer, Austria 2001, but Black can play 12...\(\Box d 7\) and castle long. He would not be afraid so much of his weaknesses on the kingside then. Therefore White should better choose another plan.

9...dxe5 10.d5 \(\Box d 4\)

It is worse for Black to play 10...\(\Box e 7\) 11.0-0-0± – and he risks remaining without any counterplay with his passive knights. Later, the game Pallova – Gallova, Svetla 1994, followed with: 11...a6 12.\(\Box c 4\). White did not need that move so much. His bishop on c4 defends his king indeed, but it also becomes a comfortable target for Black's pawns. Instead, White should have followed with 12.g4 at first and later, in case Black castles short, with – h4-h5 next. He could then exploit the power of his bishop on the kingside, for example in case the enemy counters h4 with h7-h5, the bishop would be very useful on e2, attacking the h5-square. In general, White's prospects would have been clearly better in that case, moreover that he can counter Black's counterplay with b5-b4, with the manoeuvre \(\Box a 4-c 5\), exploiting the vulnerability of the c5-square. 12...\(\Box d 6\) 13.\(\Box f 2\) \(\Box d 7\) 14.\(\Box h f 1\) 0-0 15.g4 b5 16.\(\Box b 3\) \(\Box a b 8\) 17.h4 a5 18.a3 (It would have been better for White to play 18.a4 bxa4 19.\(\Box x a 4\), with a clear advantage, since Black cannot make any further progress on the queenside.) 18...a4 19.\(\Box a 2\) b4 20.\(\Box x a 4\) bxa3 21.b3 \(\Box b 4\). Black has now a good counterplay, because he has managed to force the enemy bishop to remain away from any active actions.

11.\(\Box f 2\)

11...c5
It is also interesting for Black to try: 11...0-0 12.\(d3\) \(h5\) 13.0-0 \(ff6\) (it is better for Black to play 13...f5 14.exf5 xf5 15.e5 \(f7\) 16.ae1, and White has only a slight edge, because of the useful e4-outpost) 14.xf6 xf6, Poladura – Buergo, Asturias 1995, 15.e4+ – White is threatening to trap the enemy knight and Black needs to evacuate it urgently away from the centre with: 15...c6 (15...a6 16.e5) 16.c3 \(b5\) 17.c5 \(d6\) 18.g5 \(de8\). That is Black's only possibility; otherwise he loses the exchange: 19.dxc6 (After 19.d6, Black still has some counterplay with: 19.h6 20.xf6 xf6 21.xb7 ab8 22.e6 xe4 23.d7 f5) 19...bxc6 20.ad1. White's pawn-structure is better (Black's a7 and c6-pawns are weak), his pieces are clearly superior too: he has the bishop-pair, while Black's pieces are passive, particularly the knights, as well as his rooks on the open f- and d-files.

12.dxc6 bxc6 13.0-0

White had a major alternative here with a plan including castling short: 13.e4 (Black's powerful knight on the d4-outpost supports his counterplay considerably in case White castles long.) 13...0-0 14.0-0 \(b6\) 15.b3 ad8 16.ad1, and White can follow that by gradually rearranging his pieces according to the scheme: \(h1\), \(h4\), \(g5\) etc.

After 13...\(b6\), White can still play: 14.0-0, and if 14...\(xb2\), then 15.\(h6\) \(xc3\) (15...\(xh6\) 16.xf6 0-0 17.xf7+ xf7 18.xf7+ h8 19.ab1 xc3 20.b7 e2+ 21.h2 f4+ 22.xf4 g3+ 23.h1 e1+ 24.f1 g3+ 25.g1 xf1+ 26.xf1 xf1 27.xf1, with a great advantage for him in the rook and pawn endgame.) 16.xg7 xc4 17.xf6 g8 18.xe5+ e6 19.f6+, and Black's position remains quite dubious, because of his vulnerable king – stranded in the centre.

**13...\(d7\) 14.e4 0-0**

**15.h4.** White is threatening to start an attack along the “h”-file and Black prevents with the following manoeuvre: 15...\(b6\) 16.b3 \(f6\) 17.xf6 (It is not so reasonable for White to avoid exchanging queens at that particular moment: 17.g3 h5, followed later by \(xb3\) and \(e6\)) 18.xf6 g4 ad8 19.df1 ed6 20.f2 (20.h5!? e7 21.h2, \(e7\) 20...e7 21.h6 (21.xd4 xd4 22.hf1 \(c4=\)) 21.xb3+ 22.axb3 fd8, Wallner – Feichter, Austria 1996, and
here White had better follow with: 23.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c}e3 \texttt{\textbf{d}d7 24.g5}}}±, preserving some advantage in the endgame thanks to Black's numerous pawn-weaknesses.

\textbf{b3) 6...0–0}

\textbf{7.h3 \texttt{\textbf{xf3 8.xxf3 c6}}}

The other lines for Black are not any better:

8...\texttt{\textbf{xc6 9.e5 \texttt{\textbf{d}d7 10.0–0}–0 \texttt{\textbf{b}b6 11.h4 h5 12.g4± and White’s attack is practically decisive, Voss – Kaminik, Seefeld 1996;}}}

8...\texttt{\textbf{e5 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5}–Δg4, and Black can hardly organize any effective counterplay, Gomez Anadon – Ortega Ruiz, Oropesa del Mar 1998;}}

8...\texttt{\textbf{bd7 9.g4} (it is possible that 9.e5 is even better for White) 9...\texttt{\textbf{e}e8 10.0–0}–0 \texttt{\textbf{exf4 11.\texttt{\textbf{xf4 b8 12.h4}–}} – and again Black has no counterplay at all, Kouznetsova – Reinhardt, Hagen 1999.}}

\textbf{9.e5 dxe5}

It is not any better for Black here to play: 9...\texttt{\textbf{e}e8 10.0–0}–0 \texttt{\textbf{d5 11.h4}–, because he has no counterplay against White’s attack. In the game Limp – Mercedante, Tijuca 1978, there followed: 11...\texttt{\textbf{d}d7 12.h5 e6 13.g4 \texttt{\textbf{c}c7 14.d3 \texttt{\textbf{e}e8 15.hxg6 fxg6 16.h3 h6 17.f5, and Black’s position was utterly hopeless.}}}}

\textbf{10.dxe5 \texttt{\textbf{d}d5}}

10...\texttt{\textbf{e}e8 11.c4 \texttt{\textbf{c}c7 12.0–0 e6 13.ad1±, Van Egmond – Grondsma, Alkmaar 1983. White’s positional advantage is obvious and as a result of Black’s last move he has additionally a comfortable outpost on the d6-square for his knight.}}

\textbf{11.0–0–0}

White now exploits the open d-file and forces his opponent to weaken the d6-square.

\textbf{11...\texttt{\textbf{e}e6 12.c5}}

After White’s straightforward approach: 12.h4 \texttt{\textbf{a}a5 13.\texttt{\textbf{xd5 cxd5 14.b1 \texttt{\textbf{c}c6 15.h5, Black manages to create some counterplay: 15..\texttt{\textbf{fc8 16.hxg6 hxg6 17.c3 (17.\texttt{\textbf{h}h3 \texttt{\textbf{b}b4) 17..b5 18.a3 \texttt{\textbf{a}a4 19.d3 b4 20.cx b4 a5 21.bxa5 \texttt{\textbf{xa5 22.h3 \texttt{\textbf{ab8}}}}}}}}}}}}

\textbf{12.\texttt{\textbf{e}e8 13.\texttt{\textbf{e}e4}}}

\textbf{13...\texttt{\textbf{a}a5}}

It is too passive for Black to play: 13...\texttt{\textbf{c}c7 14.c4 \texttt{\textbf{b}b6 15.h4}
\(1.e4 \, d6 \, 2.d4 \, 5.f6 \, 3.Nc3 \, g6 \, 4.f4 \, \Box g7 \, 5.Nf3 \, c6 \, 6.d3\)

\(\Box c8 \, 16.h5 \, b6 \, 17.\Box f2 \, \Box d7 \, 18.\Box h3 \, \Box f8 \, 19.\Box h4 \, \Box e7 \, 20.\Box f6+ \, \Box xf6 \, 21.\Box xf6++ \) Y.Novikov – Ferenc, Koszalin 1997, and Black’s position is practically hopeless, because his dark-squares are catastrophically weak.

14.\Box b1

White should better refrain from retreating his bishop to the a3-square: 14.\Box a3 b5 15.\Box d6 \Box f8 16.\Box b7 \Box a6 17.\Box xf8 \Box xf8 18.\Box d6 \Box xa2, because Black has a sufficient counterplay for his exchange-sacrifice.

14...\Box d7 15.\Box f2 b5

16.g3 (It is also possible for White to play here immediately: 16.h4 \Box f6 17.h5 – 17.exf6 \Box xf6 – 17...\Box xe5 18.\Box xg6 \Box xg6 19.\Box h3 \Box f8 20.\Box xe5 \Box xe5 21.\Box e1, and he has some attack for the sacrificed pawn.) 16...\Box ed8 17.\Box g2 (Once again it deserves some attention for White to follow here with: 17.h4, for example: 17...\Box a4 18.\Box d3 \Box b4 19.\Box c3 \Box a5 20.h5; or 17...\Box f6 – Now, that move is not so effective, because Black’s e6-pawn remains defenceless. 18.\Box xf6 \Box xf6 19.\Box xf6+ \Box xf6 20.\Box h3\pm) 17...\Box h6 18.\Box d6 \Box ab8

19.\Box e2 b4 20.\Box c4 \Box c3+ 21.\Box xec3 bxc3+ 22.\Box a1 \Box b4 23.\Box xc6 \Box a4 24.\Box d5 exd5 25.\Box xd5 exd5 26.\Box xd5, and White remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Ruvinshtejn – Tjiptadi, corr. 2000.

\(c)\) 5...c6

This move combines the b7-b5 idea with the support of the centre (Black now has the d5-square for the retreat of the knight), but it does not contribute to the counterattack against White’s centre. This only helps White to obtain an edge under quiet and peaceful circumstances.

6.\Box d3 \Box g4

This is a natural move, but c7-c6 has deprived the black knight of the square from which it could have attacked the d4-pawn.

6...0–0 is dealt with after the move order: 5...0–0 6.\Box d3.

We must also analyse some other moves:

6...b5 7.e5 dxe5 (White has the edge also after: 7...\Box g4 8.h3 \Box h6, Bokros – Ruckschloss, Dunajska Streda 1998, 9.\Box e4\pm
and White dominates in the centre. Or 7...\(\text{\&}f \text{d}7\) 8.0–0 b4, Gollwesky – Heyme, Bad Blankenburg 1990, 9.\(\text{\&}e2\), and later White can exploit just in case the weaknesses on Black's queenside with a2-a3 and then eventually B2-a5, after the possible trade on the a3-square.) 8.\(\text{fxe}5\) \(\text{\&}d5\) 9.\(\text{\&}xd5\) \(\text{\&}xd5\) 10.0–0 \(\text{\&}g4\) 11.c3 0–0 12.\(\text{\&}e1\) Bonte – Borsia, Deva 1999. It is now far from clear now why Black has played the moves c6 and b5 in that position;

6...\(\text{\&}b6\) (This now is not so effective, because White's pawns on b2 and d4 are protected.) 7.e5 dxe5 (The position of the black knight is even worse after: 7...
\(\text{\&}g4\) 8.h3 \(\text{\&}h6\) 9.g4 – White's space advantage is great and he has a better development so he can afford moves like that – 9...d5 10.\(\text{\&}b1\) e6 11.\(\text{\&}e3\), and Black's pieces are misplaced and his counterplay is just non-existent, Morris – Nikolic, Lone Pine 1979; 7.\(\text{\&}d5\) 8.\(\text{\&}xd5\) cxd5 9.c3 \(\text{\&}d7\) 10.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(\text{\&}f8\) 11.a4\) – and White has a great advantage, because the manoeuvres of the black knight were far from impressive, Sakharov – Nikolaevsky, Kiev 1963. Later in the game, there followed: 11...a6 12.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}f5\) 13.0–0 \(\text{\&}c8\) 14.\(\text{\&}f2\) e6 15.\(\text{\&}e1\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 16.\(\text{\&}xf5\) exf5?! Black weakens the d5-pawn with that dubious move. He is trying to acquire the e6-square for his knight, but instead he had better play: 16...\(\text{gxf5}\) 17.\(\text{\&}d3\), but White can prepare the pawn-break g2-g4, for example with \(\text{\&}h1\), and he can counter h5 with the manoeuvre \(\text{\&}f3\) h3 – 17.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}c6\) 18.\(\text{\&}c2\) a5 19.\(\text{\&}a3\) \(\text{\&}xa4\) 20.\(\text{\&}xd5\) \(\text{\&}b6\) 21.\(\text{\&}xb7\), and Black has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn.) 8.\(\text{fxe}5\) \(\text{\&}d5\) 9.\(\text{\&}xd5\) cxd5 10.c3 \(\text{\&}c6\) (10...\(\text{\&}g4\) 11.h3 \(\text{\&}xf3\) 12.\(\text{\&}xf3\) Iochis – Khruschio, Moscow 1998) 11.\(\text{\&}e2\) 0–0 12.0–0 \(\text{\&}g4\) 13.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}ad8\) (13...f6 14.\(\text{exf}6\) exf6 15.h3\) Barth – Kavatskky, Southfield 1982 – and White has a slight edge due to his better pawn structure and a pair of bishops) 14.h3 \(\text{\&}xf3\) 15.\(\text{\&}xf3\) Durao – Cordovil, Lisbon 2002 – and White's pieces are better placed and he has a space advantage too. Later, Black continued with: 15...f5 16.\(\text{exf}6\) exf6 17.\(\text{\&}f2\) \(\text{\&}fe8\) 18.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}xe3\) 19.\(\text{\&}xe3\). White is ready to sacrifice temporarily a pawn in order to occupy the e-file. In case Black captures the b2-pawn, White can swiftly activate his rook 19...\(\text{\&}xb2\), otherwise White would follow with \(\text{\&}e1\), or \(\text{\&}e6.\) 20.\(\text{\&}b1\) \(\text{\&}xc3\) 21.\(\text{\&}xb7\) \(\text{\&}h8\) 22.\(\text{\&}d7\) \(\text{\&}g8\) 23.\(\text{\&}b5\) \(\text{\&}xe3\) 24.\(\text{\&}xe3\) \(\text{\&}d4\) 25.\(\text{\&}xa7\) \(\text{\&}f5\), and here White should have played simply 26.a4 and push his passed pawn forward;

6...\(\text{\&}c7\) (Black is thus preparing the move e7–e5, but it is far from clear whether it is worth it, because Black could have prepared it with some other more useful moves like \(\text{\&}c6\) and \(\text{\&}g4\).)
7.0-0 \textit{g4} (7...0-0 has been analysed after the move order: 5...0-0 6.\textit{d3} c6. The other possibility for Black is an obvious waste of time – 7...a6, Ondok – Kovacs, Hungary 1997, 8.e5 – White makes use immediately of Black’s futile manoeuvres.) 8. \textit{e3} \textit{bd7} (After 8...e5, White’s most straightforward plan would be: 9.h3 \textit{xf3} 10.\textit{xf3}, and if 11...\textit{exd4} – otherwise, for example in case Black castles, White exchanges pawns on e5 and follows that with f4-f5 – then 12.\textit{xd4}, and later \textit{ae1} and in case Black castles short – g2-g4).

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chess_board}
\end{center}

Now, instead of 9.h3 \textit{xf3} 10. \textit{xf3} e5 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5 a6 13.a4\textpm, as in the game Riayanningrum – Ovezova, Istanbul 2000, which brought only a slight advantage for White, because the idea g4-g5 would not be so effective for him, unless Black has already castled short. It is instead much more energetic for White to play 9.e5!??, after which it would be far from clear why Black has placed his queen on the c7-square in the first place, for example: 9...\textit{d5} 10.\textit{xd5 cxd5} 11.c3 0-0 (or 11...e6 12. \textit{e1\pm}) 12.\textit{e1\uparrow h4;

6...\textit{bd7} (This development of the knight seems a bit passive.) 7.e5 dxe5 (The other possibility – 7...\textit{d5} 8.\textit{xd5 cxd5} 9.0-0 0-0 10.\textit{e1} \textit{b5} – is quite indicative about the usefulness of the move 6...\textit{bd7} – 11.\textit{h4} \textit{f5} 12.\textit{xf5 gxf5} 13.c3\textpm White has the better pawn structure and good prospects for a kingside offensive. In the game Bragín – Chernyshov, Podolsk 1992, White played 13.e6 h6, but followed that with a mistake: 14.\textit{g5}? – 14.\textit{e1\pm}, was still preserving some edge – 14...\textit{hxg5} 15.\textit{fxg5} \textit{e8\uparrow}, and Black’s defensive resources proved to be more than enough to repel White’s attack: 16.\textit{h5} fxe6 17.g6 \textit{f6} 18.\textit{h7+ g8} 19.\textit{h6} \textit{g6} 20.\textit{xg7+ xg7} 21.\textit{xh8+ f7} 22.\textit{h5+ g6} 23. \textit{ae1 g7} 0-1) 8.fxe5 \textit{d5} 9. \textit{xd5 cxd5} 10.0-0 0-0 11.c3

11...a6 (The rest of the moves do not change the evaluation of the position as much worse for Black: it is also bad for him to play 11...h6, Ubeira Martinez – Carvalho Vasquez, Burgas 2001,
should Black weaken his king – that might prove to be fatal for him: 12.\text{\textit{W}}e1 \text{\textit{Q}}b8 13.\text{\textit{W}}h4 h5 14.\text{\textit{W}}g5 \text{\textit{Q}}c6 15.\text{\textit{W}}ae1 \text{\textit{Q}}e6 16.\text{\textit{W}}f4+ \text{\textit{Q}}h6 and \text{\textit{W}}g5; or 11...\text{\textit{Q}}b6, Abraham – Luess, Lingen 2000, 12.\text{\textit{W}}e1\pm, with the idea to follow with \text{\textit{W}}h4, \text{\textit{Q}}h6 and \text{\textit{Q}}g5. Black’s best might be: 11...\text{\textit{Q}}b6 12.\text{\textit{W}}h1 f6, Erlbeck – Sheremet, Bayern 2002, but even then, after 13.exf6 exf6 14.\text{\textit{W}}e2\pm, followed by \text{\textit{Q}}f4, White has a slight edge.) 12.\text{\textit{W}}g5. This move provokes the weakening of Black’s kingside with h7-h6. (It is also good for White to follow our recommendation in some other lines too, i.e. 12.\text{\textit{W}}e1\pm) 12...\text{\textit{Q}}b6 13.\text{\textit{W}}h1 f5 14.exf6 \text{\textit{Q}}xf6, Wilczek – Swiech, Poland 1999, and here White should have considered 15.\text{\textit{Q}}f3!?\pm, with the idea to exploit Black’s weaknesses along the e-file;

6...\text{\textit{Q}}a6 (Black usually plays that move in the main line 5...0-0 6.\text{\textit{Q}}d3 \text{\textit{Q}}a6, with the idea to follow with c7-c5, and then to capture on c5 with the knight in case of an exchange. Now that flank manoeuvre does not seem to be so reasonable.) 7.0-0 \text{\textit{Q}}c7 (7...0-0 transposes to the line 5...0-0 6.\text{\textit{Q}}d3 c6 7.0-0 \text{\textit{Q}}a6. Black has also played 7...\text{\textit{Q}}b4 8.\text{\textit{Q}}e2 a5 9.a3 \text{\textit{Q}}a6 10.e5 \text{\textit{Q}}d5 11.\text{\textit{Q}}e4\pm, but it still remains unclear what Black has achieved with his pawn on a5, Revuckij – Rizsonkov, Kosice 1997.) 8.\text{\textit{W}}e1 \text{\textit{Q}}d7 9.e5 \text{\textit{Q}}b6 10.\text{\textit{Q}}e4 d5 11.\text{\textit{Q}}c5\pm Erlbeck – Ahmels, Germany 1995. White’s space advantage is practically unopposed, moreover that in case Black tries to undermine White’s centre in a standard fashion with c6-c5, or f7-f6 – his actions would be severely hampered. White can squeeze his opponent on the queenside further more with the move a4-a5, while in case Black castles short – White can start some active operations there too with the idea f4-f5.

7.h3 \text{\textit{Q}}xf3 8.\text{\textit{W}}xf3

8...\text{\textit{W}}b6

8...\text{\textit{Q}}d7 9.e5 \text{\textit{W}}b6 transposes to the line 8...\text{\textit{W}}b6.

5...0-0 is analysed by us in the chapter concerning the variation 5...0-0 6.\text{\textit{Q}}d3 \text{\textit{Q}}g4.

As for the other moves:
The move 8...\text{\textit{Q}}a6? is simply a blunder – 9.\text{\textit{Q}}xa6 bxa6 10.e5 \text{\textit{Q}}d5 11.\text{\textit{Q}}xd5 cxd5 12.\text{\textit{Q}}xd5+- and Black has no compensation, Sanchez Guirado – Gomez, Valencia 1992;

The idea 8...\text{\textit{W}}a5 seems too risky 9.0-0 e5, Friederich – Zinser, Germany 1999, at least because of 10.\text{\textit{Q}}b5, and in case of capturing of the knight 10...cxb5,
White can follow with 11.fxe5, and the black knight on f6 has no retreat: 11...dxe5 12.dxe5 \(\square\)bd7 13.exf6 \(\square\)xf6 14.e5 \(\square\)xe5 15.\(\square\)xf7 \(\square\)d8 16.\(\square\)e3 \(\square\)ad1;

Black's counterplay is insufficient in case of 8...e6 9.e5 \(\square\)d5 10.\(\square\)e4 dxe5 11.fxe5 0–0 12.c3±, and after the forced f7-f6 (otherwise White would play \(\square\)g5) White's bishop pair advantage would be a telling factor, Schneiders – Auer, Pirmasens 1992. The game later continued with: 12...b5 13.0–0 f6 14.exf6 \(\square\)xf6, and here White's position would have been easily winning after: 15.\(\square\)g4 \(\square\)e7 16.\(\square\)h6 \(\square\)f7 17.\(\square\)ae1+-, and Black loses his e6-pawn;

After 8...\(\square\)c7, White has a powerful initiative with 9.e5 \(\square\)fd7 10.\(\square\)e3\(\uparrow\), followed by castling and a kingside attack, for example: 10...e6 11.\(\square\)e4 dxe5 12.dxe5 0-0, and here White's most natural line would be: 13.h4. White should not have castled short here and taken away his rook from the wonderful h1-square, as he did in the game. Black's every attempt at creating some counterplay is too slow, for example: 13...f5 (13...f6 14.h5 fxe5 15.hxg6 hxg6 16.\(\square\)c4 \(\square\)e8 17.f5++; 13...\(\square\)a6 14.h5 \(\square\)b4 15.hxg6 hxg6 16.\(\square\)h3 \(\square\)xd3+ 17.cxd3 \(\square\)fd8 18.\(\square\)h7+ \(\square\)f8 19.\(\square\)f6\(\uparrow\)++) 14.\(\square\)g5 \(\square\)e8 15.h5 h6 16.\(\square\)xe6 \(\square\)a5+ 17.c3 \(\square\)xe6 18.\(\square\)c4 \(\square\)f8 19.hxg6 \(\square\)h8 20.\(\square\)xe6 \(\square\)xe6 21.g4+-;

8...e5 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5 \(\square\)bd7 11.\(\square\)e3 \(\square\)h5 (Black is thus preventing temporarily g4-g5 – since he will counter that with \(\square\)f4, and after White wins a pawn – Black will have more than sufficient compensation thanks to the powerful bishop on the long diagonal.) 12.g3 \(\square\)e7 13.0–0 0 0 b6 14.\(\square\)hf1 0–0, Bogatirev – Kholmov, USSR 1974, 15.\(\square\)c4\(\uparrow\)– and Black has problems due to the weakness on f7. Black's knight on d7 might be endangered too. White's possible plan would be – to play \(\square\)b3, \(\square\)f2 (with the idea to double his rooks along one of the open files), and then – fxg6, \(\square\)g4 and sometimes later even \(\square\)g5.

9.e5

\[9...\(\square\)fd7\]

Or 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 \(\square\)fd7 11.\(\square\)c4 (White can now freely increase the pressure along the a2-g8-diagonal, because of the exchange on the e5-square. Black does not have the defensive resource d6-d5 anymore.) 11...e6 (preventing White's e5-e6) 12.\(\square\)e4 0–0 13.\(\square\)b3 \(\square\)a6 14.\(\square\)e3± Balinov – Hofer, Oberwart 2002,

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and White enjoys some space advantage and he has a wonderful outpost for the knight on d6. White has not castled yet and so his king’s rook is still on h1, therefore he can try the plan with a quick attack on the h-file that he managed to realize in the game: 14...\textcopyright c7 15.0-0-0 b6 16. \textcopyright d6 (or 16.h4→ immediately, 16...\textcopyright ac8 17.h4 \textcopyright fe8 18.h5 \textcopyright f3 19.hxg6 fxg6 20.\textcopyright h3 \textcopyright f7 21.\textcopyright g5 \textcopyright f5 22.g4, and Black resigned. 10.\textcopyright f2 \textcopyright a6 (diagram) 11.0-0\textcopyright White has managed to protect his centre and Black’s terrible move 11...e6?, led after 12.\textcopyright e4+ in the game Almasi – Lengyel, Hungary 1992, to a big advantage for White, because his knight penetrated to the weakened d6-square. It is better for Black to play 11...\textcopyright b4, although after 12.\textcopyright e4 d5 13.\textcopyright f3, White’s centre is stable and solid and he has a space advantage and better placed pieces. There might follow: 13...0-0 14.a3 \textcopyright a6 15. \textcopyright e2 \textcopyright c7 16.c3\textcopyright, and later \textcopyright b1, \textcopyright e3, and even g4 and f5 at some opportune moment.

**Conclusion**

So, most of Black’s possibilities on move 5 that lead to some original lines, with the exception of 5...0-0 and 5...c5 (that is in case Black delays castling and the game does not transpose to the lines, which we analyse later after some transposition) are not quite good enough to equalize for him. White usually makes good use of his dominance in the centre and he starts active actions there with the help of the pawn-break e4-e5. Black often suffers in case his king remains stranded in the centre for too long.

Still, some of the unusual lines for Black on move 5 are not so bad for him after all. He is in fact ready to castle at any moment, so he can afford to transpose moves a bit, in order to save a tempo for some immediate actions in the centre with 5...\textcopyright g4, or on the queenside with 5...\textcopyright a6.

Well, Black’s achievements, after such economy of moves are a bit questionable, indeed...
Chapter 15
1.e4 d6 2.d4 \( \triangle f6 \) 3.\( \triangle c3 \) g6 4.f4 \( \triangle g7 \) 5.\( \triangle f3 \) c5

This move is much more principled and stronger (more popular too (!)), than the moves that we have analysed until now. Black uses the tactical motive that in case of 6.dxc5 he follows with 6...\( \triangle a5 \), and then captures on c5 with the queen, because White’s e4-pawn is hanging. Black undermines White’s pawn center with his last move and that is an important strategical achievement.

6.\( \triangle b5+ \)

White must exploit the fact that Black has not castled yet. If White plays 6.d5, Black in comparison to the line 5...0–0 6.\( \triangle d3 \), fares much better, because there after 6...c5, White’s best is to capture on c5, because Black is forced to capture with the pawn, and not 7.d5.

In case Black wishes after 5...0–0 6.\( \triangle d3 \), to force White to play d4-d5 after Black plays c7-c5 – then he has to play the move 6...\( \triangle a6 \) (see later), which is not always necessary and useful.

6...\( \triangle d7 \)

As for some other moves:

It is not good for Black to play 6...\( \triangle bd7 \) 7.e5+ – because that knight deprives the other knight of an important square to retreat and therefore White obtains a clear advantage;

6...\( \triangle fd7 \) – is too passive and enables White to dominate in the centre. 7.dxc5 dxc5 8.e5 0–0 (8...a6 9.\( \triangle d3 \) 0–0 10.0–0 – see 8...0–0) 9.0–0 (It is also interesting for White to play the straightforward move 9.h4!? because Black has great problems to create an effective counterplay after it, for example: 9...a6 10.\( \triangle d3 \) \( \triangle c6 \) 11.h5 \( \triangle b6 \) 12.hxg6 hxg6 13.\( \triangle e2 \rightarrow \), and it is not quite clear how Black should defend against the checkmating attack along the h-file, Weeramantry – Gufeld, Philadelphia 1996)
9...a6 (It is too bad for Black to try: 9...\(\&a6\) 10.\(\&e3\) \(\&db8\). He cannot play \(\&c7\), because of \(\&xd7\) and White wins the c5-pawn; nevertheless the way Black has deployed his knights can hardly be called appropriate. 11.\(\&e2\) \(\&e6\) 12.\(\&g5\) \(\&c8\) 13.\(\&xe6\) \(\&xe6\) 14.\(\&c4\) \(\&c8\) 15.\(\&d5\) \(\&e8\) 16.f5. White's attack is overwhelming due to Black's unfortunate maneuvering. Later, in the game Hacik – Michal, Bratislava 1998, there followed: 16...\(\&h8\) 17.e6 \(\&xe6\) 18.\(\&xg6\), and Black resigned, because his king was totally defenceless.) 10.\(\&d3\) (Black cannot counterattack White's centre easily and so White remains with extra space and chances for a successful kingside attack.) 10...\(\&b6\) (10...
\(\&c6\) 11.\(\&e4\) – just like before, Black has problems with the development of his queenside, and White might capture on c6 if necessary, in order to double the enemy's pawns. There might follow: 11...\(\&a7\) 12.a4 \(\&b8\) 13.\(\&e3\) e6. Black is trying to prevent White's idea e5-e6 and \(\&g5\). 14.\(\&e1\) b6 15.\(\&d1\) \(\&b7\) 16.\(\&d2\) \(\&xe4\) 17.\(\&xe4\) \(\&b7\), and now White can play either: 18.\(\&d3\) a5 19.\(\&f2\) \(\&e7\) 20.\(\&d2\)\(\&a8\) 21.\(\&xf7\), threatening e5-e6, followed by \(\&d8\), Black's position is very difficult in both cases. He would not solve his problems either with: 10...\(\&b6\) 11.\(\&e3\) \(\&b7\) 12.e6 \(\&f6\) 13.\(\&g5\)\(\&a6\) 14.\(\&d1\) \(\&e6\) 15.\(\&h4\) \(\&h6\) 16.\(\&ge4\), and the weakness of the f6-square is deadly for Black, Matthey – Aepler, Germany 1999; or 12...
\(\&g4\) 13.\(\&h4\) and White has excellent prospects for a kingside attack, Bryson – Walker, New Castle on Tyne 1995, later the game continued with: 13...\(\&f5\) 14.\(\&xf5\) \(\&xf5\) 15.\(\&ae1\) e6 16.\(\&g4\) \(\&xg4\) 17.\(\&g5\) h6 18.\(\&ge4\) \(\&d7\) 19.\(\&f6\)*, and Black resigned, because after: 19...\(\&h8\), White plays 20.f5 \(\&xe5\); otherwise White is threatening \(\&h6\) with a checkmate. 21.\(\&xd7\) \(\&xd7\) 22.\(\&xh6\), and Black loses his queen.) 13.\(\&e2\) e6 14.\(\&d1\) \(\&f5\) 15.\(\&f2\) \(\&d7\) 16.\(\&g5\)\(\&a6\) Filipowicz – Padevsky, Skopje 1972 – and Black remained with undeveloped pieces and a weakness on
the d6-square;
6...\texttt{\&}c6 7.dxc5 (it is not so effective for White to play 7.d5 a6
8.\texttt{\&}e2 \texttt{\&}a7, or 7.e5 \texttt{\&}d7 8.d5 \texttt{\&}d4
9.\texttt{\&}xd4 cxd4 10.\texttt{\&}xd4 0-0 11.
\texttt{\&}xd7 \texttt{\&}xd7 12.0-0 \texttt{\&}f5=, and
Black regains his pawn in an unclear position, Muir – Beaumont, Plymouth 1989)
7...\texttt{\&}a5 (Black loses material after 7...
0-0 8.cxd6 \texttt{\&}xe4 – otherwise
Black simply loses a pawn –
9.\texttt{\&}xe4 \texttt{\&}a5+ 10.\texttt{\&}c3 \texttt{\&}xc3+ 11.
bxc3 \texttt{\&}xb5 12.d7 \texttt{\&}xd7 13.\texttt{\&}xd7
\texttt{\&}ad8 14.\texttt{\&}h3?, and Black’s com-
pensation for the piece is quite
insufficient, Hatanbaatar – Bayanbaigal, Erdenet 1994) 8.0-0
(It is worth for White to consider
8.\texttt{\&}d2!? 0-0 8...dxc5 9.e5=, and
also White has clear advantage in the centre after – 9.\texttt{\&}e2 \texttt{\&}g4,
Motwani – McNab, London 1989,
and here after 10.cxd6 exd6
11.\texttt{\&}d3, Black’s compensation for
the pawn is hardly sufficient.)
8...0-0 (In case of 8...dxc5, White
can continue for example with:
9.\texttt{\&}e5 \texttt{\&}d7 10.\texttt{\&}xc6 \texttt{\&}xc6 11.
\texttt{\&}xc6 bxc6 12.e5=, and he main-
tains somewhat better prospects,
because of the numerous weak-
nesses on Black’s queenside.)
9.cxd6 (After 9.\texttt{\&}e1, Black plays
simply 9...a6, and captures on
c5 with check – Black’s possi-
bility to check along the a7-g1
diagonal is a certain drawback of
the early short castling for
White. The other line for him
is almost similar 9.\texttt{\&}e2 a6 10.
\texttt{\&}d3 \texttt{\&}xc5+ 11.\texttt{\&}e3 \texttt{\&}a5 12.h3,
9...\texttt{\&}b6+ (This intermediate
check is essential. It is bad
for Black to play immediately
9...\texttt{\&}xe4 10.\texttt{\&}xe4 \texttt{\&}xb5 11.d7=, and
White wins a piece, for
which Black has no compensa-
tion whatsoever, for example:
11...\texttt{\&}b6 12.\texttt{\&}f2 \texttt{\&}d8 13.\texttt{\&}c\texttt{x}c8
14.\texttt{\&}e1+=. It is not good
for Black to try 9...exd6 10.\texttt{\&}d3
\texttt{\&}g4 11.\texttt{\&}d5 \texttt{\&}5, Stefansson –
Kohler, Leeuwarden 1995, 12.
\texttt{\&}h1 and White has a solid extra
pawn.) 10.\texttt{\&}h1 \texttt{\&}xe4 (After 10...
exd6 11.\texttt{\&}c4= Totsky – Bono
Moscow 1995, White is with an
extra pawn again.) 11.\texttt{\&}xe4
\texttt{\&}xb5 (Now, White cannot play
12.d7, since Black simply cap-
tures with the bishop – White’s
queen is occupied with the
defence of the hanging rook on
f1.) 12.c3=. Black’s more active
pieces provide him with some
compensation for the pawn, but
still it is hardly sufficient. For
example: 12...\texttt{\&}e8 13.dxe7 \texttt{\&}xe7

Brendel – Reich, Germany 1993,
12...\texttt{\&}d7!? and Black has a good
game a bit similar to the Dragon
variation in the Sicilian De-

ence.)

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14.\( \boxdd6 \boxdc5 \) 15.\( \boxdx8 \) (15.\( \boxdg5!?) \) \( \boxdc8 \) 16.\( \boxde1 \), and White must gradually develop his pieces on the queenside.

7.\( \boxdx7+ \)

This line is permanently played on a top-level by Alexey Shirov. The pawn break 7.e5 here leads to complications that are not easy to be properly evaluated to the end after: 7...\( \boxdg4 \) 8.e6 \( \boxdxb5 \) 9.exf7+ \( \boxdd7 \) 10.\( \boxdxb5 \) \( \boxda5+ \) 11.\( \boxdc3 \).

Let us analyse the possible captures on d7: a) 7...\( \boxdx67 \), b) 7...\( \boxdbx7 \) and c) 7...\( \boxdxf7 \).

a) 7...\( \boxdx67 \)

This move leads to an endgame that is worse for Black.

8.\( \boxdx6c5 \) \( \boxddx \)

It is not good for Black to play 8...\( \boxdc6 \) 9.cxd6 \( \boxdxe4 \) 10.\( \boxdx5e4 \) \( \boxdx6+ \) 11.\( \boxdxf2 \) e6 12.\( \boxdc1 \) \( \boxdf5 \) 13.\( \boxdd4 \) \( \boxdx4+ \) (after 13...\( \boxdc5 \) 14.\( \boxde3 \), Black cannot recapture his pawn – 14...\( \boxdx6 \) 15.\( \boxdx6+ \), and White wins) 14.\( \boxdx4 \) 0-0 15.\( \boxde4 \), and White has both a positional and material advantage, Christiansen – Suttiles, Surakarta 1982.

9.\( \boxde3 \) \( \boxdx61+ \)

Black is in a serious trouble in the ensuing endgame. It is obviously best for him to play: 9...\( \boxdc6 \) 10.\( \boxde5 \) \( \boxdc8 \) 11.\( \boxdd3 \) \( \boxdd7 \) 12.\( \boxdx7 \) \( \boxdx7 \) 13.0-0-0, and it is hardly advisable for Black to castle short – he will have plenty of problems with the d-file then. He should better start preparing to castle long with: 13...\( \boxdc6 \) 14.e5 0-0-0, but White can counter that with: 15.\( \boxdc4 \) \( \boxdf8 \) (15...\( \boxdxg2 \) 16.\( \boxdxf7 \) 16.\( \boxdd5 \), and Rhd1 with a powerful pressure along the d-file. Black’s c5 and f7-pawns might turn out to be potentially weak.

10.\( \boxdx6d1 \) \( \boxda6 \) 11.\( \boxde5 \) \( \boxdc8 \) 12.\( \boxde2 \) 0-0 13.\( \boxdf3 \) \( \boxdb8 \) 14.\( \boxdd2 \) b6 15.\( \boxdx6h1 \) h6

16.a4\( ^{±} \) Chandler – Chapman, Bristol 1982. Black’s position is very difficult. White’s pieces are more active and he has the space advantage and dominates on the only open d-file. The game followed with: 16...\( \boxdh7 \) 17.a5 \( \boxdc6 \) 18.\( \boxdx6c6 \) \( \boxdc6 \) 19.e5 \( \boxdg8 \) 20.\( \boxdx7 \) f6 21.\( \boxdx6f6 \) \( \boxdx6f6 \) 22.\( \boxdx6a7 \). White won a pawn and the game soon afterwards.
b) 7...\(\textbf{b}xd7\)

8.d5

Now, contrary to the position with light-squared bishops present on the board (after 6...\(\textbf{b}bd7\)), White does not achieve much with 8.e5 due to 8...\(\textbf{h}5\). Black is threatening to destroy White’s centre and after 9.g4 (It is nothing special for White to play 9.exd6 0–0 10.0–0 exd6 11.dxc5 dxc5 12.f5 \(\textbf{e}5=\), and White can hardly be better in that position, Sax – Ehvest, Haninge 1990) Black can follow with 9...\(\textbf{xf}4\) 10.\(\textbf{xf}4\) cxd4 11.\(\textbf{e}4\) dxe5\(=\), and he has a couple of excellent central passed pawns for the piece.

8...0–0

It is too optimistic for Black to play 8...b5 9.e5 dxe5 10.fxe5 \(\textbf{g}4\) 11.e6 \(\textbf{x}3+\) 12.bxc3 fxe6 13.\(\textbf{g}5\), with a double attack against e6 and g4. Black’s king remains stranded in the centre too, Huesmann – Lanneau, Belgium 2003. Black continued later with: 12...\(\textbf{xc}3+\) 13.bxc3 \(\textbf{a}5\) 14.0–0 \(\textbf{d}f6\) 15.\(\textbf{x}e6\) \(\textbf{xc}3\) 16.\(\textbf{d}2\) \(\textbf{c}4??\) 17.\(\textbf{f}4\), and Black resigned, because he was losing his queen. Meanwhile, even without his blunder on move 16, his position would have been extremely difficult – his king was stranded in the centre, the queen was roaming all over the board and he had to remain on the alert against a possible knight-fork on the c7-square.

After 8...\(\textbf{wa}5\) 9.0–0, it is too dangerous for Black to play 9...\(\textbf{g}4\), because after 10.\(\textbf{e}2!\) (White should also consider here 10.e5!? he cannot capture on c3 twice anyway: 10...\(\textbf{xc}3\) 11.bxc3 \(\textbf{xc}3\) 12.b1, and White has too many threats \(\textbf{x}b7\), \(\textbf{b}2\) and \(\textbf{g}5\).

9.\(\textbf{e}2\) e6

9...\(\textbf{b}6\) (That position of the knight is hardly satisfactory for Black.) 10.0–0 \(\textbf{e}8\) 11.a4 \(\textbf{d}8\) 12.a5\(\uparrow\), and Black’s counterplay is too slow, because of his poor maneuvering in the last several moves, Hernandez – Valdes, Zaragoza 2001. Later, there followed: 12...\(\textbf{c}8\) 13.\(\textbf{d}2\) b5 14. axb6 axb6 15.\(\textbf{ae}1\) \(\textbf{a}7\) 16.f5 b5 17.\(\textbf{xe}6\) \(\textbf{xe}6\) 18.\(\textbf{xf}2\) \(\textbf{d}7\) 19.\(\textbf{g}5\) \(\textbf{g}4\) (that is an awkward attempt at defending against \(\textbf{h}4\) and \(\textbf{xf}6\)) 20.h3 \(\textbf{h}5\) 21. e5 b4 (or 21...dxe5 22.\(\textbf{xe}5\), and Black loses either his f7-pawn, or his e7-pawn.) 22.\(\textbf{xf}6\) \(\textbf{xf}6\) 23.\(\textbf{ge}4\) f5 (after 23...\(\textbf{xc}3\) 24.\(\textbf{xc}3\) f5 25.\(\textbf{f}6+\) \(\textbf{xf}6\) 26. \(\textbf{xf}6\) \(\textbf{d}7\) 27.\(\textbf{e}7\), Black loses the key d6-pawn) 24.\(\textbf{g}3\), and White remains with an extra piece.
10. dxe6 fxe6 11.0-0

11...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{e}}7}

White can counter 11...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{c}}7} with 12.f5.

The other possibility for White to exploit the f4-f5 idea is clearly worse: 12.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g5 13.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{e}}}ae8 13.f5 exf5 14.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{c}}}c4+ 14.h8 15.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{f}}}f7+ (15.exf5 16.e5 gxh5 17.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{x}}}xf5 18.d7, and Black has a good counterplay.) 15...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xf}}7} 16.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xf}}7} fxe4, and Black’s compensation for the exchange is excellent.

12...gxf5 13.exf5 e5 (13...exf5 14.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g5\pm) 14.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{c}}}c4+ 14.h8 15.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g5 16.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{h}}}h4 17.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{c}}}c6 (or 17.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{f}}}f3\uparrow, with an immediate attack against the h7-pawn) 17...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{bd}}7} 18.c4\uparrow – and Black’s centre has been blocked, while his king is in imminent danger.

12.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{d}}}d2 a6 13.a4 14.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{e}}}ae1 15.d8

Black has tried that manoeuvre with the idea to get some counterplay on the queenside. He has defended presently the key e6-square with his rook indeed, but still going to the e7-square and back with his queen “don’t impress me much...”

15.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g5\uparrow

White preserves some initiative. His knight exerts pressure against the e6-square and in case Black repels it with h7-h6, he weakens his kingside. The game Shirov–Van Wely, Monaco 1998, followed with:

15...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{b}}b6} 16.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{c}}}c1 17.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{d}}}d1 18.e5 19.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{h}}}h5 20.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g4 21.b3\pm, White maintains his positional advantage. His knight penetrates to the d6-square and it is not good for Black to play: 22...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xf}}4}, due to 23.c3\pm.

Instead, it is better for Black to try: 20...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xa}}4} 21.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{d}}}d6 \text{\textsubscript{\textbf{e}}}e7 (Black should refrain from: 21...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{d}}}d8, because of 22.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g4 \text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g7 23.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{h}}}h4 \text{\textsubscript{\textbf{h}}}h5 24.g4) 22.c4 (That move is with the idea to cover the fourth rank. Black can counter 22.g4 with 22...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{x}}f4}.) 22...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{g}}}g7 23.f5 (after 23.cxd5 exd5 24.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{x}}}xd5\pm, White has an advantage in the centre and better placed pieces.) 23...\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xf}}5} 24.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xf}}5} \text{\textsubscript{\textbf{xf}}5} 25.\text{\textsubscript{\textbf{c}}}c4\uparrow – and Black’s three
pawns do not compensate his missing piece.

21.\( \text{d6}\)++. It becomes clear now that Black loses material. White wins the exchange on the e8-square and later a piece after the move g2-g4. 21.\( \text{c6}\) 22. \(\text{xe8}\) \(\text{xe8}\) 23.\( \text{c3}\) \(\text{xa4}\) 24.\( \text{g4}\) \(\text{g7}\) 25.\( \text{g5}\) \(\text{f5}\) 26.\( \text{xh6}\) 1-0.

c) 7.\( \text{fxd7}\)

This is the most principled line. Black opens the long diagonal for his dark-squared bishop and keeps his second knight on the queenside, where it can help him organize some counterplay.

8.\( \text{d5}\)

We will now deal with the moves c1) 8.\( \text{a5}\), c2) 8.\( \text{a6}\) and c3) 8.\( \text{b5}\).

8...0-0 9.0-0 \(\text{a6}\), has been analysed after c2) 8...\(\text{a6}\) (it is quite useless for Black and even harmful to play: 9...\(\text{b6}\) 10.\(\text{e2}\) e5 11.\(\text{dxe6}\) \(\text{fxe6}\) 12.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{e8}\) 13.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f8}\) 14.\(\text{f5}\), moreover, he must defend his kingside, Solon – Brumley, San Francisco 1999).

c1) 8...\(\text{a5}\)

Black can instead play b7-b5 immediately, so his last move might turn out to be a waste of time, since the placement of the queen on a5 is hardly useful for him.

9.0-0 b5 10.\(\text{f5}\)

White has another interesting set-up at his disposal 10.\(\text{e1!}\) b4 11.\(\text{d1}\) Huesmann – Verduyn, Belgium 2003, with his pieces aimed at Black’s kingside.

10...0-0 11.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{a6}\)

12.\(\text{g3}\)

White brings some additional forces to the kingside in order to continue with the attacking plan in the game, Tal – Chernin, Saint John 1988, that we are going to analyse later (see 8...b5 9.0-0 – \(\text{e2}\), \(\text{b1}\), \(\text{g5}\), and after c5-c4 – \(\text{d1}\) and \(\text{d4}\).

After 12...c4 White can also try
another plan: 13.h4 Qa5 14.h5 
Qa4 15.Qb1 c3 16.b3 Qab6 17. 
Qg5 Qac8 (Here, it is hardly bet- 
ter for Black to play: 17...Qae8 
18.Qd4, followed by Qc6.) 18. 
hxg6 fxg6, and now White can 
simply snatch the pawn 19.Qxe7 - 
and Black's compensation is insuffi- 

\[c2\] 8...Qa6

Black’s slow manoeuvres on 
the queenside (Qa6-c7, Qb8) en- 
able White to act freely on the 
kingside.

9.0–0 0–0

It is too slow for Black to fol-
low with: 9...Qb8 10.Qe2 Qc7 (or 
10...0–0 11.Qh1 Qc7 12.a4 b6, 
Horak – Houska, Nachod 2000, 
and now White should continue 
with: 13.f5, followed by Qf2-f4, 
Qh6 and Qg5) 11.a4 0–0 12.Qe1 
b6 13.f5†, transferring later the 
queen to the h4-square and ad-
ditionally Qh6, or Qg5. It is also 
good for White to try: 13.e5 f5 
14.Qg5 Qb7 15.Qb5 Qxb5 16. 
axb5 Qb8 17.Qe6 Qe8 18.Qxg7 
Qxg7 19.b3 dxe5 20.Qb2 Qg8 
21.fxe5 e6 22.d6†, and White's 
space advantage is considerable, 
Kruse – Kock, Ruhrgebiet 1996.

10.Qh1

White has also tried here 
10.Qe2 Qc7 (it seems quite du-
bious for Black to play 10...e6?! 
11.dxe6 fxe6 12.Qd1 Qb6 13.a4 
Qc7 14.e5 d5 15.Qe4 Qe7 16.Qd6 
Qe8 17.a5†, and White has the 
initiative on the queenside and 
better placed pieces, Shirov – 
Hulak, Manila 1992. It is pos-
sible that White should better 
play: 14.a5 Qc8 15.e5 d5 16.Qe4 
Qe7 17.Qeg5† Qc4 and he has 
the advantage.) 11.a4 (Black has 
some counterplay after 11.Qd1 b5 
Qe2 Qxb2 15.Qxb2 Qxb2 16.e5 
Qb6† Savon – Korchnoi, Moscow 
1973. White naturally dominates 
in the centre and on the kingside, 
but Black has certain counter 
chances – he can attack the vul-
nerable white pawns.) 11...a6 
12.Qd1 b6 (Or 12...Qb8 13.a5 b5 
14.axb6 Qxb6 15.Qd2 Qc8 16. 
Qe1 Qd7 17.Qd3 Qc8 18.Qa2 
Qa7 19.e5 Qab5 20.Qe2 Qa7 
21.c4† Hort – Torre, Polanica 
Zdroj 1977 – White has solidified 
his centre and he has the posi-
tional advantage.) 13.e5, and 
White’s activity in the centre is 
dangerous for Black: 13...Qc8 
Qb8 17.Qg5 (this move attacks 
Black’s new weakness) 17...Qf6 
18.fxe5 Qfd5 19.Qxf7 Qxf7 
20.Qxf7 Qxf7 21.Qf3+ Qg8 22. 
Qxd5 Qxd5 23.Qxd5, and in the 
game Van der Wiel – Larsen,
Amsterdam 1980, White remained with an extra passed pawn.

10...\texttt{c7}  

The game Mietzner – Iglia, Calvia 2004, followed with 10...\texttt{b8} 11.a4 \texttt{c7} 12.\texttt{e1} e6 13.f5 exf5 14.exf5 \texttt{f6} 15.\texttt{g5} h6 16.\texttt{h4} \texttt{d7}, and Black obtained a good position. White is forced to exchange on the g6-square and accordingly his attacks chances on the kingside simply disappear. It is better for White to prevent e7-e6, so he should better play first 12.f5\textsuperscript{1}, and only then follow with: \texttt{e1-h4} and \texttt{h6}.

11.f5  

White now has enough time to organize the standard kingside attack.

11...b5 12.\texttt{e1} b4 13.\texttt{e2} \texttt{e5} 14.\texttt{h4} \texttt{xf3} 15.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{f6} 16.\texttt{g5} \texttt{xg5} 17.\texttt{xg5} \texttt{e8} 18.\texttt{g3} \texttt{f6}

19.\texttt{af1}\textsuperscript{1}  

White’s forces are already concentrated on the kingside, while Black has not created any substantial counter threats, Korneev – Reina Luque, Seville 2002. Later in the game, there followed: 19...\texttt{g7} 20.\texttt{fxg6} \texttt{hxg6} 21.\texttt{f5+} \texttt{g8} 22.\texttt{xg3} \texttt{xe4} 23.\texttt{h6}, and Black resigned, because after: 23...\texttt{gxg3+} 24.\texttt{hxg3} gxf5 25.\texttt{g5+} \texttt{h8} 26.\texttt{f4}, the checkmate is unavoidable.

\begin{center}
\texttt{c3) \texttt{8...b5}}
\end{center}

This is the most energetic and principled line for Black. He starts some actions on the queenside outright.

9.\texttt{xb5}  

This move leads to a better endgame for White.

In case of 9.\texttt{e2}, Black can emphasize the drawbacks of the placement of the white queen on e2 with 9...b4 10.\texttt{d1} \texttt{a5}, with the idea to bring the queen to a6. (Black has also played 10...\texttt{b6} 11.0–0 0–0 – it might have been wiser for Black to postpone casting for a while and bring the queen to a6 immediately – 12.\texttt{f2} \texttt{e8} 13.\texttt{f3}!?)\texttt{a6} 14.\texttt{e1} \texttt{8d7} 15.\texttt{g4} \texttt{f5} 16.\texttt{h6+} \texttt{xh6} 17.\texttt{xh6+}, and Black’s kingside is endangered, Hernandez – Khalifman, Merida 2001) 11.0–0 \texttt{a6} 12.\texttt{e1} \texttt{b6} 13.\texttt{f2} \texttt{8d7}

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14.a3 (with the idea to exploit the drawbacks of the placement of Black's queen on a6) 14...bxa3
15...xa3 wb7 16.b3 0–0 17.c4 e6
18.dxe6 fxe6 19..e2 d5 20.cxd5
exd5 21.e5 ae8. The position is unclear and Black has some
counterplay based on the idea g6-
g5, while the weakness on a7 is
immaterial. In the game Shirov
– Tkachiev, Bastia 2003, there
followed 22..a6 wc6 23..d2 h6
24.b4 ec8 25.bxc5 dx5 26..e2
d6±, and the position was with
mutual chances.

White demonstrated a quite
typical plan for an attack on the
kingside in the game Tal – Chernin,
Saint John 1988: 9.0–b4
10..e2 0–0 11..g3 a5 12..e2
a6 13..b1 ec7 14.f5 c4 15..g5,
and it became clear that Black
has failed to create counterplay:
15...ff6 16..bd1 ac8 17..d4
b8 18..h1 a4 19.fxg6 hxg6
20..g5 dd7 21..f3, with an
overwhelming kingside attack.

9...a5+ 10..c3 xxc3+ 11.
bxc3 wc3+ 12..d2 wc4 13.
..e2

13..b6
Black transfers to an even
worse endgame after the immediate exchange of queens: 13...
xe2+ 14..xe2 fc6 15..d3 a6
(15..d7 16..hb1 0–0 17..c4
ab8 18..a5 fc8, Heymann –
Lopatskaya, Warsaw 2001, and
here White had better follow
with 19.h3†, and the idea would
be to prepare g2–g4. Black can-
not prevent that with 19..h5,
because of 20..e3†; or 15...e6
16.c± Liedtke – Dexter, Ger-
many 1996 – White remains with
a powerful centre and a bishop
against a knight. Black can only
make matters worse for himself
if he tries the pawn-break e7-e6,
because that would only create
additional weaknesses on his
kingside.) 16..a1 0–0 17..c4
fb8 18.a3 (White is trying to
restrict Black's knight on a6,
which can hardly enter the ac-
sions anytime soon.) 18..d7
19.g4 db6 20..b5 dc7 21..b3 e6.
Black was threatening to ex-
change on d5 and capture there
with his knight on c7. White's
loss of time for his moves with
the rook is only superficial, be-
cause thus he has provoked the
creation of an important weak-
ening of Black's kingside with
the move e7-e6. 22..b1 e8
23.h4 ab8 24.h5 a4 25.hxg6
hxg6 26..g5 e5 (White was
threatening to penetrate to the
h7-square with his knight (h7-
f6), or with his rook. Black can-
not play 26..b2+, because of
27..xb2 xb2 28..c3++ 27.fxe5
dxe5 28..h7 g7 29..g5 xb1
30.\textit{f}6+ \textit{g}8 31.\textit{xb}1 \textit{b}6 (otherwise White follows with \textit{g}5 and \textit{h}1 with a checkmate) 32. \textit{g}5 \textit{d}7 33.\textit{b}7 \textit{xd}5 34.\textit{cxd}5 \textit{xf}6 35.\textit{xf}7 \textit{c}4+ 36.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xe}4 37.\textit{h}6+ \textit{h}8 38.\textit{f}7+ \textit{g}8 39.\textit{d}6 \textit{f}8 40.d7, and Black resigned in the game, Klimov – Kornev, St. Petersburg 2004.

It is too risky for Black to capture the c2-pawn with the queen – he loses too much time and his king is still in the centre, while the bishop on g7 has already been exchanged: 13.\textit{xe}2 14. 0–0 (It is worse for White to play the immediate 14.e5 0–0 15.0–0 \textit{b}6 16.f5 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{gx}6 \textit{hx}6 18.\textit{g}5, and Black manages to repel the attack after some precise defending: 18...\textit{c}6 19.\textit{e}1 \textit{b}2! 20.\textit{h}4 \textit{d}4++; 20.e6 \textit{f}6 21.\textit{f}7 \textit{xf}7 22.\textit{xf}7+ \textit{xf}7 Van Der Wiel – Van Der Sterren, Germany 1981, and Black has three central pawns for the exchange. Or 16.exd6 exd6 17.\textit{e}7 \textit{d}3 – it is much better for Black to play 17...\textit{f}5, so that White cannot activate his dark-squared bishop. He will then have problems to prove that his compensation for the sacrificed pawn is sufficient. 18.\textit{f}5!, and the threat \textit{h}6 turned out to be deadly for Black: 18...\textit{xf}5 19.\textit{h}6 8d7 – it is too bad for Black to play 19...\textit{c}8 20.\textit{g}5+– 20.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 21.\textit{xd}6± Schroeder – W.Bauer, corr. 1990, and White remained with a material advantage, but as we have mentioned, Black has an important improvement on move 17.)

14...\textit{f}6 (After 14...0–0 it is useless for White to chase Black’s queen: 15.\textit{fc}1 \textit{a}4 16. \textit{c}3 \textit{f}6; 16.f5 \textit{f}6 – it is worse for Black to play 16...\textit{gf}5 17.\textit{c}4 \textit{a}3 18.\textit{xf}5+, and Black’s king is too weak – 17.\textit{h}6 \textit{e}8; 17.\textit{c}4 \textit{a}6 18.\textit{h}6 \textit{e}8–, and Black’s rook on c4 is misplaced. After 15.f5, it is not good for Black to play 15...\textit{gf}5 16.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5 17. \textit{xe}7 \textit{xd}5 18.\textit{h}6 \textit{c}8 19. \textit{ae}1+– and White’s threats along the open e and f-files are decisive. Black must now follow with 15...\textit{f}6, but still after: 16.\textit{fg}6 \textit{hx}6 17.\textit{g}5, White’s standard attack along the “h” and “f” files promises him excellent prospects. He only needs to bring his queen to the f-file and later to eliminate Black’s knight on f6, as his only defender. He can also increase his pressure with the moves \textit{ac}1 and \textit{c}3, if that becomes necessary. It is futile for Black to try 16...\textit{exe}4 17.\textit{gxh}7+ \textit{h}8 18.\textit{exe}4 \textit{exe}4 19.\textit{ae}1 \textit{f}5 20.\textit{h}4±, and Black loses his f5-pawn and accord-
ingly the e4-knight becomes endangered and the e7-pawn is hanging.) 15.e5 dxe5 16.fxe5 Qxd5 17.Bb5+ (It is also possible for White to play 17.Kc1 a4 18.Bxc5 b6 19.a2c1 0-0 20.a3h6 a8d8 21.e6 f6 22.a7c7 d5 23.a7c4 a5 24.a4d4↑, and Black has problems, but 17.Bb5+ is even stronger.) 17...a7d7 18.e6! fxe6 19.a3e5 b5f6 20.a3xd7 a3xd7 21.Bc6±, and it becomes clear that Black loses material due to the pin of the knight on d7 and the fact that his king has not castled yet: 21...Bb8 22.Bf4 Bb2 23.Bc8+ Bf7 24.a5e5+ a7f6 25.Bxf6+ exf6 26.Bd7+ Bf8 27.Bd8+, and Black resigned in the game, Scholten – Moynihan, Bled 1998.

14.a4 a5

It is worse for Black to play at that moment 14...Bxe2+. He should try to bring his knight on b6 to the c4-square instead, in order to force White to capture on c4; otherwise the knight on b6 is terribly misplaced on the semi-open b-file: 15.Bxe2 a5 (It is also unsatisfactory for Black to play here: 15...Bf5 16.a5 B6d7 17.e5±, because White’s space advantage is enormous and he can exploit the open b-file for penetration.) 16.Bb1. Black is already losing material – the a5-pawn is defenceless:


15.Bxc4 Bxc4

Later, in the game M.Rychagov – Agrest, Stockholm 1997, there followed 16.Bc3 0-0 17.Ke2 Bf7. White’s advantage is more than obvious – he has a bishop pair and a powerful centre, but Black preserves considerable counter chances. White cannot exploit presently the weaknesses on the dark squares, while Black can undermine White’s centre quite soon with e7-e6 and f7-f5. 18.Bd2 (In case of 18.Bb1, Black can follow favourably with: 18...Bb7 Bxe4 20.Qg5 Bcb6 21.Qe6 Bxd5 22.Bxf8 Qxf8, and Black’s compensation for the exchange is excellent; The line: 18.Bd3 Qcb6 19.g4 e6 is quite similar to the game. White does not achieve much either with the immediate: 18.g4 e6 19.dxe6 fxe6 20.Bf5 Qae8.) 18...Bb6 19.g4. This move prevents f7-f5 indeed, but the f4-pawn is weakened in case the game is opened. 19...e6 20.dxe6 fxe6 21.Bh1 d5 22.Bb3 dxe4 23.Bxa5, and now instead of: 23...Bd5 24.Bd2 e3 25.Bxe3 Bc3+ 26.Bf3 e5 27.a5 c4 28.Bc5 Bxc5 29.Bxc5 Bxf4+
30.\texttt{g2} \texttt{xf1} 31.\texttt{xfl} \texttt{e6} 32.\texttt{b6} \texttt{f7} 33.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d5}= Black had better try: 23...c4 24.\texttt{xb6} cxb3 25.\texttt{e3} bxc2 26.\texttt{f1} \texttt{f8}, after which his powerful passed c2-pawn and the threats \texttt{c4} and \texttt{c5} provide him with slightly better prospects.

The exchange on d2 on move 16 is not too advantageous for Black, because White transfers quickly his knight to the c4-square. White should try to prevent Black's counterplay with e7-e6, by transposing moves with: 16.\texttt{e2}?, in order to be able to counter: 16...\texttt{d7} with 17.\texttt{b1} bringing his rook to the b7-square: 17...\texttt{e6} (Or 17...\texttt{db6} 18.\texttt{c3} 0-0 19.\texttt{d2} \texttt{xd2} 20.\texttt{xd2=}, and Black will have problems with his defence along the b-file; 17...\texttt{cb6} 18.\texttt{b5}, and White wins the a5-pawn; 17...\texttt{xd2} 18.\texttt{xd2=}, with the idea to follow with: \texttt{c4} and \texttt{b7}, or \texttt{b5}.)

18.\texttt{c3} 0-0 19.\texttt{b7}, and White's prospects are better, for example: 19...\texttt{cb6} 20.\texttt{xe6} fxe6 21.\texttt{e5} dxe5 (or 21...\texttt{d5} 22.\texttt{d2} \texttt{f7} 23.\texttt{g5} \texttt{e7} 24.\texttt{b1} \texttt{a4} 25.\texttt{a1} \texttt{ab6} 26.\texttt{xa5} \texttt{ae8} 27.\texttt{a6=}, and Black's pieces would remain extremely passive.) 22.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{xe5} 23.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{c4} 24.\texttt{g7=} \texttt{h8} 25.\texttt{c7=} \texttt{xe5} 26.\texttt{fxe5=}, and White's advantage, in the rook and pawn endgame, is overwhelming.

**Conclusions**

5...c5 – is the first of the modern lines of the Pirc Defence that we have analysed in our book. In answer to it we do not recommend the sharp variation 6.\texttt{b5}+ \texttt{d7} 7.e5, but instead the calmer line 7.\texttt{xd7=} \texttt{fxd7} 8.d5, which became quite popular at a very high level in the contemporary tournament practice mostly due to the efforts of A. Shirov. White's idea is simple – to complete his development and to follow with the standard attack on the kingside. Black has essentially three possible plans to organize his counterplay – to play e7-e6, to prepare b5-b4, or to play immediately b7-b5 and after White captures on b5 with the knight to check with his queen from the a5-square.

We have plenty of practical examples and variations in our book that illustrate that in all three cases White has his ways to maintain his opening advantage.
This is the natural move and together with 5...c5, one of the strongest lines for Black in this position.

6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{d3}}}

This is of course not the only move for White here. He has also tried 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{e2}}} (the bishop has been developed more modestly, but White does not weaken the defence of the d4-pawn), as well as the move 6.e5, which leads to an extremely sharp play – White opens up the position of the black king later with h4-h5. Black in his turn counterattacks White’s centre – he has not yet wasted a single move in order to try to do that successfully.

Nevertheless, presently the most critical line is the natural development of the white bishop to d3, which we are analysing in our book.

White’s plan in general (naturally it all depends on Black’s actions too...) is the following:

In case Black plays some indifferent move (in the sense – concerning the counterattack of the centre) like a7-a6, White plays immediately e4-e5, and then continues depending on circumstances. For example, if Black retreats with his knight quite passively to e8, or d7 – White should start an immediate attack with h2-h4.

Should Black exchange pawns on e5 and then retreat with his knight to d5 – White’s attack will hardly be effective. Therefore, White should act more prudently. He must develop his pieces and be ready for Black’s counterattack in the centre with f7-f6.

Accordingly, if Black plans to counter e4-e5 somehow more effectively – he should play some useful move like 6...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{c6}}}.

Black in fact must make up his mind right now what he plans to do. He can play on the queenside preparing b7-b5; he
can try to undermine White’s centre with the move c7-c5 immediately, or he can prepare that move with \( \text{d}a6 \). Black can also try to attack the d4-pawn with \( \text{d}c6 \) and \( \text{g}4 \).

We will deal in this chapter with some not so popular possibilities for Black like: a) 6...\( \text{b}6 \) b) 6...\( \text{d}b7 \), c) 6...\( \text{e}6 \), d) 6...\( \text{a}6 \), e) 6...\( \text{f}d7 \), f) 6...\( \text{h}5 \), g) 6...\( \text{c}6 \) and h) 6...\( \text{c}5 \).

We have separate chapters analysing the main lines for Black 6...\( \text{g}4 \), 6...\( \text{c}6 \) and 6...\( \text{d}a6 \).

a) 6...\( \text{b}6 \)

This move is quite purposeful (Black prepares the move c7-c5 and later the development of the bishop to b7), but it is a bit slow.

![Diagram of chessboard with moves 4.f4 \( \text{g}7 \) 5.\( \text{f}3 \) 0-0 6.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 7.e5 7...\( \text{e}8 \)](image)

7.e5 \( \text{e}8 \)

This retreat of the knight is with the idea to preserve the c8-h3 diagonal open in order to be able to counter h2-h4 with \( \text{g}4 \).

White follows 7...\( \text{fd}7 \) with 8.h4→ and Black cannot undermine White’s centre, because of the move \( \text{e}4 \) and that means that White has the necessary time to organize a swift attack against the black king.

7...\( \text{g}4 \). This move enables White to repel the enemy knight to a very unfavourable position. 8.h3 \( \text{h}6 \) 9.h4. It is much more natural for White to play the move g2-g4 in similar positions, in order to impeach the black knight on h6 to enter the actions by occupying the f5-square. Here however, White can resort to even more energetic measures, because of Black’s lag in development and his misplaced knight on h6. 9...\( \text{g}4 \) 10.h5! This is the idea behind White’s previous move. He is ready to sacrifice some material for the sake of opening files on the kingside. 10...\( \text{xh}5 \) (Black’s attempt at fortifying his kingside with the help of 10...gxh5, in order to preserve the bishop on g4 on the board, can hardly succeed, due to: 11.\( \text{e}4 \) c6 12.\( \text{d}3 \) - and after the loss of the h7-pawn, Black’s king would be quite uncomfortable.) 11.\( \text{xh}5 \)! \( \text{gxh}5 \) 12.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) (Black loses too after: 12...d5 13.\( \text{hx}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 14.\( \text{xh}7 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 15.f5++) 13.\( \text{xh}7 \) \( \text{h}8 \) 14.\( \text{e}4 \) f6. White’s positional advantage and his attack is overwhelming, despite the material equality. Later, in the game Poli – Molino, corr. 1992, there followed: 15.\( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 16.d5 \( \text{d}8 \) 17.\( \text{xf}8 \) \( \text{xf}8 \) 18.e6 \( \text{e}8 \) 19.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 20.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 21.\( \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{xc}5 \) 22.0-0-0, and
Black resigned, because White captures easily the h5-pawn and checkmates.

\[\text{Diagram 8.}\]

8.\text{e2} c6, Van Riemsdijk – Vasconcellos, Porto Alegre 1994, and here after 9.e3\text{c}, followed by castling long, White has excellent chances to attack the black king successfully with h4-h5xg6 and by bringing the queen to the h-file.

\text{b) 6...\text{bd7}}

\[\text{Diagram 9.}\]

Such development of the knight is passive and also quite dangerous for Black in general, in case White can play e4-e5 unopposed.

7.e5 \text{e8}

7...\text{g4} (This move seems active, but Black might end up with a bad knight on h6.) 8.h3 (It also deserves attention for White to play 8.g5?) 8...\text{h6} 9.e3. White simply completes his development and castles short. His advantage in the centre cannot be threatened by Black even after an attempt to undermine it. 9...c5 10.\text{d2} (It is weaker for White to play 10.exd6 – this idea is questionable in principle, because he concedes his position in the centre without any compensation. 10...exd6 11.\text{d2} cxd4 12.exd4 \text{c5} 13.e2 \text{f5} 14.\text{xf5} \text{xf5} 15.0-0-0 \text{e8} and Black has powerful counterplay against White’s long castle. It does not work for White to play 10.0-0 cxd4 11.exd4 dxe5 12.fxe5 \text{xe5} 13.e5 \text{xe5} 14.e5 \text{d4+}, because Black remains with an extra pawn.) 10...cxd4 (10...\text{f5} 11.xf5 gxf5 12.0-0-0\text{c}, with the idea to follow with g4) 11.e4 dxe5 12.fxe5 \text{d6} (12...\text{f5} 13.xf5 gxf5 14.0-0-0\text{c} – White preserves his e5-pawn and he can later follow with g4 in order to open files on the kingside.) 13.g4 (This move prevents Black’s knight from occupying the f5-square.) 13...f5 14.exf6 exf6 15.0-0-0 \text{f7} 16.\text{e1}. The black knight finally got the access to a decent f7-square, but that happened at the cost of weakening considerably the a2-g8 diagonal, and that renders Black’s position quite dangerous, because of his uncompleted development. The game Grkinić – Weggen, IECG 2001,
followed with: 16...\textit{e}8 (Black cannot play 16...\textit{d}7, due to 17.\textit{x}xb6 axb6 18.\textit{x}xg6\textit{6}) 17.\textit{b}5 (White could have won a pawn here with: 17.\textit{x}xb6 axb6 18.\textit{x}xg6 \textit{xd}2+ 19.\textit{xd}2 \textit{xe}1 20.\textit{xf}7+ \textit{xf}7 21.\textit{xe}1\pm 17...\textit{e}6 18.\textit{b}1 a6 19.\textit{f}1 \textit{h}6 20.\textit{f}2 \textit{xe}1 21.\textit{xe}1 \textit{d}7 22.\textit{c}4 \textit{g}7 23.\textit{c}5 \textit{f}8 24.\textit{e}6, and Black perished without even being able to finish his development. 8.\textit{g}5

This is the most energetic and correct decision. White can feel free for actions on the kingside if Black remains passive in the centre.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

White is now threatening \textit{e}5-\textit{e}6.

8...\textit{dxe}5

This move opens files for the white pieces to attack, but it is already not so easy to find an acceptable move for Black:

8...\textit{b}6 – this placement of the black knight is not impressive at all. 9.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}6 (9...\textit{h}6 10.\textit{f}3 \textit{c}6 11.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}7, Neumann – Goerke, Berlin 1996, 12.0–0–0↑ – the move \textit{h}7-\textit{h}6 has weakened Black’s king considerably) 10.\textit{h}4–. It is not quite clear – what exactly Black can do against White’s straightforward attack along the h-file. For example – Black loses immediately after: 10...\textit{f}6? 11.\textit{xh}7+– Ankerst – Ramseier, Silvaplana 1993;

8...\textit{e}6 9.\textit{h}4→ White has excellent attacking prospects, while Black’s pieces are almost idle. 9...\textit{h}6 10.\textit{h}5 (White can even afford to sacrifice some material in this position.) 10...\textit{hxg}5 11.\textit{hxg}6 \textit{fxg}6 12.\textit{xg}6 \textit{xf}4 13.\textit{xf}4 \textit{gx}f4 14.\textit{h}5 \textit{f}8 15.0–0–0. White has more pieces in attacking than Black has in defending, as it often happens in positions like that, Flogaus – Hahnewald, Germany 1988;

In case Black plays 8...\textit{h}6 immediately, White follows with: 9.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 (After 9...\textit{xf}7 10.\textit{e}6 Black will be forced to retreat to the g8-square with his king anyway, since after: 10...\textit{xe}6 11.\textit{g}4+ \textit{f}7 12.\textit{c}4+ Black will get checkmated.) 10.\textit{e}6 \textit{f}6 (Or 10...\textit{f}8 11.\textit{ex}d7 \textit{xd}7 12.\textit{d}5± – and Black has to defend his g6-pawn with the rook from the f6-square.) 11.\textit{ex}d7 \textit{xd}7 12.\textit{f}3±. Black remains with a long-term weakness on \textit{e}7 and some problems of defending his weakened kingside to worry about. White should seriously consider the possibility to follow with: \textit{e}3 and 0-0-0, and later \textit{e}4 and to push forward his kingside pawns. In case Black tries the pawn-break 12...\textit{e}5, White can
counter that with: 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.0-0 exf4 15.\(\text{d}d5 \text{xf}8 16.\(\text{d}x\text{f}4,\) attacking simultaneously both g6 and b7-squares.

9.fxe5 \(\text{d}b6\)

Or 9...h6 10.\(\text{x}f7 \text{xf}7 (10... \text{xf}7 11.e6 \text{xf}6 12.exd7 \text{xd}7 13.\(\text{e}4\) 11.e6+ \(\text{g}8 (\text{Black cannot play here: 11...\text{xe}6?} 12.\(\text{g}4+ \text{d}6 13.\text{b}5+ \text{c}6 14.d5, because White wins after:} 14... \text{b}6 15.\text{e}3+ c5 16.dxc6+ \text{c}5 17.\text{x}c4\text{=} 12.exd7 \text{xd}7 13.\text{e}3 (but not 13.\text{x}g6 \text{xe}6+ 14.\text{e}4 \text{d}6, and Black's counterplay is very powerful) 13...\text{xe}6 14.\text{e}2 \text{d}6 15.0-0-0\text{=} . The move h7-h6 weakened Black's kingside considerably – he has problems defending the important g6-square.\)

10.\(\text{e}3\) c6 11.0-0 \(\text{c}7\)

White has an overwhelming advantage and now he has to finish the game with a direct attack on the kingside.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

12.\(\text{h}7\text{h}\)\text{h7→}

That sacrifice is hardly necessary. The calm line 12.\(\text{e}1!\text{=}?, followed by \(\text{h}4\) with a clear advantage, would have been the best decision for White.

12...\(\text{bd}5\)

After 12...\(\text{cd}5\), Schmidt – Hafner, corr. 1964, White should better transpose to the main line with: 13.\(\text{xd}5 \text{xd}5 14.\text{g}5\).

In case Black captures the piece immediately with: 12...\(\text{hx}7\), White would have followed with: 13.\(\text{x}f7 \text{xf}7 14.\(\text{h}5+ \text{g}8 15.\text{xe}6 \text{e}6 (15...\text{d}4 16.\text{e}2 \text{d}5 17.\text{xf}4 \text{xf}4 18.\(\text{h}7+ \text{f}8 19.\text{f}1\text{=} 16.\text{h}7+ \text{f}8\text{=}. Now, after 17.\text{h}6 \text{xd}4+ 18.\text{h}1, threatening to checkmate on the h8-square, Black has a problem-like salvation found by GM M.Petursson: 18...\(\text{e}8 19.\text{xe}7 \text{f}2 (\text{preventing \text{f}1}) 20.\text{d}1 (20.\text{d}4 \text{d}7 20...\text{cd}5 21.\text{e}4 \text{e}2\text{=}, and despite the fact that White can recapture his bishop effortlessly with: 22.\(\text{g}8+ \text{d}7 23.\text{c}5+ \text{c}7 24.\text{xe}6+ \text{d}7 25.\text{c}5+ \text{c}7\text{=} , he is forced to draw the game by a perpetual, because his queen and rook are hanging simultaneously.

White should therefore play at first 17.\(\text{h}1\text{=} , eliminating thus the possibility of Black's capturing on d4 with a check. Should Black now proceed in a similar fashion as in the previous line – 17...\(\text{cd}5 18.\text{h}6 \text{e}8\), then White can counter that with: 19.\(\text{xe}7\), threatening \(\text{f}1\text{=} , therefore Black is forced to play: 19...\(\text{xc}3 20.\text{xc}3 \text{d}5 21.\text{f}1 \text{xa}2 22.\text{xf}7+ \text{xf}7 23 \text{f}8+ \text{d}7 24.\text{xf}7 \text{xf}7 25.\text{xf}7 \text{a}5 26.\text{g}5 \text{c}8 27.\text{c}1\text{=} - and as a result of all that, White can easily cope with opponent's passed
pawn and he remains with extra material.

Black’s other possibility is – 17...\texttt{g}f6 18.\texttt{xf}7 \texttt{xf}7 19.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6 (19...\texttt{e}e8 20.\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{e}e6 21.\texttt{x}e7 \texttt{e}e7 22.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{d}7 23.\texttt{f}f4, but White’s attack is very powerful and the material balance has already been restored.) 20.\texttt{d}5! \texttt{c}xd5 21.\texttt{c}c5+ \texttt{e}e7 22.\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{d}5 23.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{a}4 24.\texttt{g}g6++, and White checkmates.

13.\texttt{xd}5

Black can counter the immediate 13.\texttt{g}5 with 13...\texttt{h}h7 14.\texttt{xf}7 \texttt{f}4! – analogously to the line in our notes to Black’s move 15.

13...\texttt{xd}5 14.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{h}h7

Now, Black is already forced to capture that piece.

15.\texttt{xf}7

The other possibility for Black: 15...\texttt{g}8 16.\texttt{g}6 leads only to a transposition of moves.

Instead, Black has an amazing resource 15...\texttt{f}4! (He does not capture White’s rook and instead sacrifices additionally a knight in order to attack the d4-square with his queen. He thus forces White’s queen to occupy the unfavourable f4-square.), and as a result White has nothing more than a draw: 16.\texttt{xf}4 (16.\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{xf}7 17.\texttt{h}h5+ \texttt{g}8 18.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{e}d4+\texttt{f}3; 16.\texttt{xf}g6+ \texttt{xf}6 17.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{e}d5 18.\texttt{g}xg7+ \texttt{xe}7 19.\texttt{xf}8+ \texttt{xf}8 20.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{xe}4+; 16.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{xe}+ 17.\texttt{h}h1 \texttt{xf}7 18.\texttt{g}xg6+ \texttt{xe}7 19.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{xe}7) 16...\texttt{xf}4 17.\texttt{g}5+ (17.\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{xe}4+ 18.\texttt{h}h1 \texttt{xf}4 19.\texttt{h}h5+ \texttt{h}h6++; 17.\texttt{g}xg6+ \texttt{g}8 18.\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{d}3) 17...\texttt{g}8 18.\texttt{g}xg6 (or 18.\texttt{g}xg6 \texttt{xd}4+ 19.\texttt{h}h1 \texttt{xe}5 20.\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{xf}4 21.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{f}7 22.\texttt{h}h7+ \texttt{f}8, and Black defends successfully) 18...\texttt{xd}4+ (18...\texttt{f}7 19.\texttt{h}h7+ \texttt{f}8 20.\texttt{h}h6++) 19.\texttt{h}h1 \texttt{f}2 (19...\texttt{xb}2 20.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{c}e4++) 20.\texttt{h}h6 (20.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{g}4++; 20.\texttt{h}h7+ \texttt{f}8 21.\texttt{xe}7+ \texttt{g}7 22.\texttt{g}xg7+ \texttt{d}8++; 20.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{ex}f6 21.\texttt{e}e8+ \texttt{f}8 22.\texttt{g}6=) 20...\texttt{ex}e5 21.\texttt{g}1 \texttt{f}5 22.\texttt{g}xg7+ \texttt{g}7 23.\texttt{g}xg7 \texttt{g}xg7+ 24.\texttt{g}xg2 \texttt{d}3 25.\texttt{c}xd3 \texttt{g}xg7 26.d4 \texttt{d}8 27.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{f}6 28.\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{d}5=.

16.\texttt{h}h5+ \texttt{g}8 17.\texttt{g}xg6

White is a rook and a knight down, but the black rook has no suitable square to retreat to. Our analysis shows that Black’s position is lost.

17...\texttt{f}4

17...\texttt{e}6 18.\texttt{h}h7+ \texttt{f}8 19.\texttt{h}h6 \texttt{e}8 20.\texttt{g}xg7+.

Or 17...\texttt{f}6 18.\texttt{h}h7+ \texttt{f}8 19.\texttt{h}h6 \texttt{g}6 20.\texttt{f}1+! \texttt{e}e8 (20...\texttt{f}6 21.\texttt{h}h8+ \texttt{f}7 22.\texttt{xd}8 \texttt{h}h6 23.\texttt{ex}f6++) 21.\texttt{g}xg6+ \texttt{d}7 22.\texttt{g}xg7, and Black has nothing to counter
the pawn-break h2-h4-h5-h6-h7 with.

18.\( \text{xf7+} \) \( \text{f8} \)

19.\( \text{h7!} \) (White might even lose after: 19.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xd4+} \) 20.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 21.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 22.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{xe5+-} \) 19...\( \text{xd4+} \) 20.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 21.\( \text{f1+-} \). Black is now faced with the hopeless task to save his knight on f6, as well as his bishop on g7 and defend against the checkmating threat at the same time. 21...\( \text{xe5} \) (21...\( \text{e8} \) 22.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{ex5} \) 23.\( \text{h5+-} \); 21...\( \text{e6} \) 22.\( \text{xg7} \) \( \text{d5} \) 23.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) 24.\( \text{f6+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 25.\( \text{e6+-} \); 24.\( \text{d5} \) 25.\( \text{d6+} \) \( \text{e4} \) 26.\( \text{e1} \) 25.\( \text{c4} \) 26.\( \text{b3+} \) \( \text{c3} \) 27.\( \text{f3+-} \) 22.\( \text{xf4+} \) \( \text{e8} \) (22...\( \text{e6} \) 23.\( \text{e4+-} \) 23.\( \text{g6+} \) \( \text{d8} \) 24.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{d5} \) (24...\( \text{f5} \) 25.\( \text{exe5} \) \( \text{xg6} \) 26.\( \text{exe7} \) \( \text{h6} \) 27.\( \text{g7+} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 28.\( \text{xg6+-} \) 25.\( \text{exe7} \) 1-0 C.Hansen – Hoi, Taastrup 1998.

We have already mentioned that White’s brilliances in that game were hardly so necessary. He had at his disposal a simple and solid positional line, moreover that after Black’s best defence White would have to be satisfied with only a draw. The game nevertheless demonstrates instructively White’s rich possibilities in case Black is too slow with the creation of some adequate and timely counterplay and the actions are concentrated entirely on the kingside.

c) 6...\( \text{e6} \)

There is an old rule that says that you should either play \( \text{e6} \) or \( \text{g6} \) (in order not to weaken all dark squares around the black king). If at the end, Black is somehow forced to place his pawns like that, he should better place his knight on \( \text{e7} \) and not on \( \text{f6} \). The move in the text looks like a waste of time here, because White does not plan to push \( \text{d4-d5} \) and to exchange Black’s \( \text{e6} \)-pawn.

7.0-0 \( \text{c6} \)

Black’s other moves are hardly any better:

It is really bad for Black to play: 7...c5 8.dxc5 dxc5, Perez de Aranda – Garcia Fernandez, Burgas 1999, and now after: 9.e5 \( \text{d5} \) 10.e4\( \pm \) Black has problems, due to the weakness on d6, or in case he plays f6 – the e6-
square would be weak;
7...d5 8.e5 \(\text{\textcup}e8\) 9.\(\text{\textcup}e3\)±, and
the arising structure resembles
the French Defence, but in a
clearly worse situation for Black,
Goeth – Sorsak, Prague 1964;
7...b6 8.e5 \(\text{\textcup}e8\) 9.\(\text{\textcup}e4\) \(\text{\textcup}b7\)
10.\(\text{\textcup}e2\)±, and White has a space
advantage and better piece place-
ment, Sukhorukov – Jaudzims,
Moscow 1990;
7...\(\text{\textcup}b7\) 8.e5 \(\text{\textcup}e8\) 9.\(\text{\textcup}e4\) c5
10.c3 (white preserves his edge
in the centre) 10...\(\text{\textcup}xd4\)
11.\(\text{\textcup}xd4\) dxe5 12.fxe5 f6
13.exf6 \(\text{\textcup}xf6\),
Timmermans – Birkmann,
Germany 1999, and now after
14.\(\text{\textcup}e5\)±, Black’s e6-pawn is
weaker than White’s isolated d4-
pawn.
7...a6, Overbeck – Feinshtein,
Dietzenbach 1998. This is hardly
Black’s most useful move, be-
cause the plan with b7-b5 is defi-
nitely not the best for Black here.
8.e5 \(\text{\textcup}f5\) 9.\(\text{\textcup}e4\)±, and White
consolidates his advantage in the
centre.

8.e5 \(\text{\textcup}d5\)
This is the most purposeful
move for Black here. He exploits
the fine point that his knight can
go to d5 immediately after White
plays e6.

The other possibilities for
Black are:
8...\(\text{\textcup}d7\) 9.\(\text{\textcup}e4\) d5 10.\(\text{\textcup}f2\)±
Kuntermann – Gerhards, Bad
Bertrich 1996. Some of Black’s
pieces are quite misplaced in this
position, for example the bishop
on g7 and the knight on c6;
8...\(\text{\textcup}e8\) 9.\(\text{\textcup}e3\)±. Black’s piece
position is very passive and it is
evident that he has chosen an
unsatisfactory plan in the open-
ing. His position remains solid,
though...

\[\text{\textcup}d5 \text{\textcup}xd5 \text{\textcup}e3\]± – White
still has more space. In case
Black plays f7-f6 – White can
exchange on d6 and follow that
with f4-f5, improving the pros-
pects of his dark-squared bishop
and restricting Black’s pieces.

\[d) 6...a6\]
This move is with the same
idea as 6...c6, which we will
analyse later. Black plans to play
b7-b5 and to seize the initiative on the queenside. Its drawback in comparison to 6...c6 is that the move with the rook pawn does not contribute to Black's pressure at the centre at all.

7.0-0 b5

This is the most straightforward approach. The other possibilities for Black are:

7...c5 8.dxc5 (The move a6 turns out to be useless for Black in the arising structure after the exchange on c5.) 8...dxc5 9. e5 ♜d5 10.♗xd5 ♞xd5 11.♗e2 (This is with the idea to repel the black queen from its active position in the centre with the help of the move ♛e4.) 11...♗c6 12.c3 ♛g4 13.♗e4 ♦e6, Babaeva – Ismailova, Batumi 2000, and now after 14.♗e3±, White has the advantage. His pieces are more active and he can exert pressure against the weakened black queenside;

7...♛g4 – this move seems reasonable, but it is not clear how it can be in connection with Black’s previous move. 8.h3 ♜xf3 9.♗xf3 ♞c6 10.♗e3 ♜bd7 11.e5 ♜e8 12.g4† Fischer – Wagenfeld, Chicago 1964. Black’s passivity in the centre enables White to activate easily his forces on the kingside;

7...♗bd7 – seems to be too passive for Black. 8.e5 ♜e8 (It is too dangerous to open the position with: 8...dxe5 9.fxe5 ♜e8 10.♗e1 ♜b6, Retter – Ollek, Gladbach 1999, and here after 11.♗h4† threatening ♛h6 and ♜g5, White has good prospects for a successful kingside attack.) 9.♗e1 ♜b6, Parkanyi – Thamo, Aggtelek 1995, 10.♗h4†. White’s initiative on the kingside is running smoothly, while Black’s counterplay is virtually non-existent.

8.e5

![Chess Diagram]

Black’s problem now is to be able to justify his pawn moves on the queenside. After an eventual b5-b4 – White’s c3-knight will simply go to the e4-square and in case White decides to fianchetto his bishop on b7 – he would weaken his kingside indirectly, because that would lose the control over the c8-h3 diagonal and particularly over the e6-square.

8...♗fd7

Black has also some other possibilities:

8...dxe5, Diaz Rivero – Silva Martinez, Malaga 1999, and now after 9.fxe5 ♜fd7 10.a4 b4 11. ♜e4±, White can play successfully on the kingside as well as on the weakened queenside;

8...♕g4 9.h3!? ♛h6 10.a4 b4
11.\( \textsf{c}e4 \)±, and here similarly to the line 8...dxe5, Black has weaknesses on the queenside and a rather displaced knight on h6;

8...\( \textsf{c}e8 \) 9.\( \textsf{c}e3 \) \( \textsf{f}5 \) (It is still better for Black to play: 9...\( \textsf{d}d7 \) 10.\( \textsf{c}e1 \) e6 11.\( \textsf{c}e4 \) \( \textsf{b}7 \), Delanoy – Dezan, Toulouse 2000, but even then White preserves some advantage by undermining Black’s weakened queenside with the help of the resource 12.a4±) 10.\( \textsf{xf}5 \) gxf5 11.\( \textsf{d}3 \) e6 12.g4± Wu Mingqian – Ivanka, Thessaloniki 1984. White has a great advantage, because the capturing on g4 would be followed with \( \textsf{g}5 \), otherwise Black would lose his f5-pawn.

9.\( \textsf{e}1 \) \( \textsf{d}b6 \)

It is maybe more solid for Black to play: 9...e6 10.\( \textsf{e}4 \) \( \textsf{b}7 \) 11.c3 \( \textsf{xe}4 \) 12.\( \textsf{xe}4 \) d5 13.\( \textsf{c}2 \)± Zelic – Ljubicic, Split 2002, but White’s prospects here are again better mostly because of the possibility of a pawn-offensive against the black king with g4 and f5.

10.f5!? This an interesting attempt to exploit Black’s slow manoeuvres. 10...dxe5 11.dxe5 \( \textsf{c}6 \) 12.e6. This is with an idea to weaken the g6-square. 12...\( \textsf{e}5 \) (12...\( \textsf{gx}f5 \) 13.\( \textsf{xf}5 \) \( \textsf{xe}6 \) 14.\( \textsf{e}4 \) \( \textsf{d}4 \) 15.\( \textsf{e}3 \) 13.\( \textsf{xe}5 \) \( \textsf{d}4+ \) 14.\( \textsf{h}1 \) \( \textsf{xe}5 \), Solomon – Hay, Melbourne 1987, and here after: 15.\( \textsf{xf}7+ \) \( \textsf{xf}7 \) 16.\( \textsf{fx}g6 \) \( \textsf{hx}g6 \) 17.\( \textsf{ax}g6 \)± White remains with an extra pawn.

e) 6...\( \textsf{fd}7 \)

Black prepares c7-c5 with that move. On the other hand, he deliberately redeploy an already developed knight away from a good position.

7.0–0

White now should not attempt to push e4-e5 (Black would counter that with the immediate c7-c5). It is better for White to wait for the move c7-c5 and respond to that with d4-d5, transposing quite favourably to the structure similar to the one after the move 6...\( \textsf{d}a6 \).

Black now has the choice between the following plans in that position: e1) 7...e5 and e2) 7...c5, as well as:

About 7...c6 – see g) 6...c6 7.0–0 \( \textsf{fd}7 \);

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7...\( \mathcal{Q} \)b6 – this manoeuvre is too slow and should not be an example to follow: 8.\( \mathcal{A} \)e3 e6 9.e5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d7 10.\( \mathcal{A} \)e2 \( \mathcal{A} \)e8 11.\( \mathcal{A} \)f2 (The transfer of that bishop to the h4-square is rather unpleasant for Black.) 11...\( \mathcal{A} \)f8 (It is better for Black to play here: 11...\( \mathcal{A} \)e7 12.\( \mathcal{A} \)h4 \( \mathcal{A} \)f8 13.\( \mathcal{A} \)ae1\( \uparrow \), but still White remains with an indisputable space advantage and superior pieces.) 12.\( \mathcal{A} \)h4 \( \mathcal{A} \)d7 13.\( \mathcal{A} \)e4 a6 14.\( \mathcal{A} \)f6+ \( \mathcal{A} \)xf6 15.\( \mathcal{A} \)xf6+ \( \mathcal{A} \)d5 (That is Black’s only defence; otherwise he risks getting checkmated.) 16.\( \mathcal{A} \)g5 \f (In this position, in the game Papakosmas – Schmidtke, corr. 1992, the opponents agreed to a draw quite inexplicably, from the point of view of White...) 17.exf6 \( \mathcal{A} \)f7 18.\( \mathcal{A} \)e1 \( \mathcal{A} \)xf6 19.c4\( \uparrow \), and the weaknesses on the dark squares in Black’s camp provide White with a long-lasting initiative;

7...\( \mathcal{A} \)c6. This move leads to a situation, which can arise by transposition in the line 6...\( \mathcal{A} \)c6; that is after: 6...\( \mathcal{A} \)c6 7.0-0 \( \mathcal{A} \)d7. We however, recommend not 7.0-0 for White here, but the immediate 7.e5, and if 7...\( \mathcal{A} \)d7, then 8.\( \mathcal{A} \)e4, while after 8...\( \mathcal{A} \)b4, with the idea to prepare c7-c5 and destroy White’s centre – 9.\( \mathcal{A} \)e2 c5 10.c3. If White tries to play in this order of moves the move 8.e5, just like in the previous line – Black can counter that with 8...\( \mathcal{A} \)b4 9.\( \mathcal{A} \)e4 (White cannot support his centre with the move c2-c3, while after 9.\( \mathcal{A} \)c4 c5 10.dxc5 \( \mathcal{A} \)c7 11.\( \mathcal{A} \)e3 dxe5 12.\( \mathcal{A} \)b5 \( \mathcal{A} \)c6 13.fxe5 \( \mathcal{A} \)xe5 14.\( \mathcal{A} \)xe5 \( \mathcal{A} \)xe5\( \uparrow \), or 9.\( \mathcal{A} \)e2 c5\( \uparrow \), Black’s counterplay is quite sufficient.) 9...\( \mathcal{A} \)xd3 10.\( \mathcal{A} \)xd3 \( \mathcal{A} \)b6 M.Shulman – D.Yanofsky, Canada 1963. The exchange of White’s light-squared bishop is a definite achievement for Black.

Therefore it is reasonable for White to try: 8.\( \mathcal{A} \)e3 \( \mathcal{A} \)b4 (It is logical for Black to play here: 8...e5 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5 \( \mathcal{A} \)d4 11.fxg6 hxg6 12.\( \mathcal{A} \)g5\( \uparrow \). White’s knight is excellently placed here – it attacks the f7 and h7-squares and White is also threatening to follow with \( \mathcal{A} \)c4 and \( \mathcal{A} \)e1-h4. In case Black at first captures White’s knight with: 11...\( \mathcal{A} \)xf3+ 12.\( \mathcal{A} \)xf3 then after 13.\( \mathcal{A} \)c4+ \( \mathcal{A} \)h8 14.\( \mathcal{A} \)g3\( \uparrow \), Black’s lag in development would be troublesome for him.) 9.\( \mathcal{A} \)e2 c6 (in case of 9...c5, White can counter that with 10.d5\( \uparrow \), and the arising position resembles a lot the line: 6...\( \mathcal{A} \)a6 7.0-0 c5 8.d5 \( \mathcal{A} \)b8, in which Black has placed his knight on the b4-square for no obvious reason. It only hampers Black’s usual plan with b7-b5; so it must retreat and White can proceed with his standard plan \( \mathcal{A} \)e1-h4 and f4-f5) 10.a3 \( \mathcal{A} \)a6 11.\( \mathcal{A} \)d2 (It deserves attention for White to play here: 11.\( \mathcal{A} \)d3! e5 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.f5 \( \mathcal{A} \)c5 14.fxg6 hxg6 15.\( \mathcal{A} \)c4 b5 16.\( \mathcal{A} \)a2 and he preserves a powerful pressure against the f7-square as well as against Black’s entire kingside in

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general.) 11...\(\text{Qf6}\) 12.\(\text{\text{Qh}}1\) \(\text{\text{Qg4}}\) 13.\(\text{\text{Qg1}}\) d5 14.e5 \(\text{\text{Qc7}}\) 15.\(\text{\text{Qae1}}\) f5 16.h3 \(\text{\text{Qh6}}\) 17.\(\text{\text{Qe3}}\) \(\text{\text{Qe6}}\) 18.\(\text{\text{Qg1}}\) b6 19.g4 \(\text{\text{Qb7}}\) 20.\(\text{\text{Qg3}}\) c5 21.\(\text{\text{Qh2}}\) fxe4 (Black does not achieve anything to brag about after opening of the kingside.) 22.hxg4 cxd4 23.\(\text{\text{Qxd4}}\) \(\text{\text{Qxd4}}\) 24.\(\text{\text{Qxd4}}\) e6 25.\(\text{\text{Qd3}}\) \(\text{\text{Qc8}}\) 26.\(\text{\text{Qg2}}\) \(\text{\text{Qc4}}\) 27.\(\text{\text{Qe2}}\) \(\text{\text{Qf7}}\) 28.\(\text{\text{Qh1}}\) \(\text{\text{Qc7}}\) 29.\(\text{\text{Qgh3}}\) ±, and Black's h7-pawn is defenceless, Williams – Suer, Skopje 1972.

e1) 7...e5

8.dxe5 dxe5 9.f5↑

Black now must search some compensation for the lack of space and White's building initiative.

9...c6

This is a natural move if Black plans to play on the queenside.

10.\(\text{\text{Qg5}}\)

That move is attacking the potential weakness on f7.

10...\(\text{\text{Qb6}}\)

Black's knight here looks ugly, but it defends presently against White's threat of \(\text{\text{Qc4}}\).

Black cannot defend successfully with the active 10...\(\text{\text{Qc5}}\) 11.fxg6 \(\text{\text{Qd4}}\) with the idea to prevent the move \(\text{\text{Qc4}}\). (11...hxg6 12.\(\text{\text{Qc4}}\), and Black is forced to comply with the exchange on e6 in order to be able to defend the f7-square. That would compromise his pawn-structure, though...) 12.\(\text{\text{Qh1}}\) hxg6 13.\(\text{\text{Qe2}}\) \(\text{\text{Qd6}}\) 14.\(\text{\text{Qxf7}}\) (It deserves attention for White here to follow with the not so forced line – 14.\(\text{\text{Qe1}}\), for example: 14...\(\text{\text{Qe6}}\) 15.\(\text{\text{Qh4}}\) \(\text{\text{Qxg5}}\) 16.\(\text{\text{Qxg5}}\) f6 17.\(\text{\text{Qe3}}\) \(\text{\text{Qe6}}\) 18.\(\text{\text{Qad1}}\) – and he maintains some advantage, due to the weakening of Black's kingside.) 14...\(\text{\text{Qxf7}}\) 15.\(\text{\text{Qxf7}}\) \(\text{\text{Qxf7}}\) 16.\(\text{\text{Qc4}}\)\(\text{\text{Qe7}}\) 17.\(\text{\text{Qg5}}\)\(\text{\text{Qf6}}\) (17...\(\text{\text{Qd7}}\) 18.\(\text{\text{Qxd6+}}\) \(\text{\text{Qxd6}}\) 19.\(\text{\text{Qd1+}}\) \(\text{\text{Qc7}}\) 20.\(\text{\text{Qd8#}}\) 18.\(\text{\text{Qxd6+}}\) \(\text{\text{Qxd6}}\) 19.\(\text{\text{Qxf6}}\) ±, and White remains with a bishop against a knight, superior pawn structure and a better defended king.

11.a4 a5

12.\(\text{\text{Qe3}}\). White thus emphasizes the miserable placement of the black knight on b6. 12...\(\text{\text{Qh6}}\) 13.\(\text{\text{Qd2}}\) f6 14.\(\text{\text{Qf2}}\) \(\text{\text{Qxg5}}\) 15.\(\text{\text{Qxb6}}\) \(\text{\text{Qd7}}\) 16.\(\text{\text{Qc5}}\) ±, and White wins, because after the retreat of the black rook to d8, or to e8 –
he plays h4 and wins the f6-pawn, Fischer – Jovanovac, Vinkovci 1968.

**e2) 7...c5**

![Chess Diagram](image)

8.d5 e6

8...a6 is quite unfavourable for Black, because after 9.a4 his queen knight is deprived of the only comfortable a6-square and in order for him to develop his queenside he has to bring his knight from d7 to f6 once again: 9...Cc7 10.\( \Box \)d2 \( \Box \)f6 11.\( \Box \)c4 \( \Box \)bd7 12.\( \Box \)e1±, and White has deployed his pieces perfectly, while Black has maneuvered quite awkwardly, Cagliero – Fernandez, Rio Hondo 1969.

Black has also tried here: 8...\( \Box \)a6 9.\( \Box \)h1 \( \Box \)c7 10.a4 \( \Box \)b8 11.\( \Box \)e1?!±. White brings his queen to h4, so that later he can attack the black king with its help exploiting the standard plan f5, \( \Box \)h6, \( \Box \)g5). It is also quite good for White to follow with 11.\( \Box \)e2 \( \Box \)f6 12.\( \Box \)d1 a6 13.a5 b5 14.axb6 \( \Box \)xb6 15.\( \Box \)c4± and he is dominant in the centre, Rogonian – Cherednichenko, Kiev 1999.

9.dxe6 fxe6 10.\( \Box \)g5 \( \Box \)b6

In case Black defends the e6-pawn in another fashion – 10...\( \Box \)e7 – it deserves attention for White to follow with 11.f5 \( \Box \)e5 (or 11...\( \Box \)d4+ 12.\( \Box \)h1 \( \Box \)e5 13.fxg6 hxg6 14.\( \Box \)xf8+ \( \Box \)xf8 15.\( \Box \)b5 with the threats \( \Box \)c7 and \( \Box \)xd4) 12.fxe6, and the weakness of the d6 and d5-squares and also potentially the e6-square should be a decisive factor, for example in the line: 12...\( \Box \)xe6 13.\( \Box \)xf8+ \( \Box \)xf8 14.\( \Box \)xe6 \( \Box \)xe6 15.\( \Box \)d5, and Black has plenty of weaknesses – d5, c7 and f6.

11.a4 \( \Box \)c6 12.a5 h6

![Chess Diagram](image)

13.\( \Box \)f3 (After 13.axb6 hxg5 14.\( \Box \)g4, Fischer – Domnitz, Netanya 1968, 14...\( \Box \)xb6∞ the position was quite unclear.) 13...\( \Box \)d7 14.\( \Box \)c4±, with a clear advantage for White, because of the vulnerability of the pawns on d6, e6 and g6.

**f) 6...\( \Box \)h5** (diagram)

This is a new idea that has appeared in practice quite recently. After White’s standard idea e7-e5 d4xe5 d6xe5 and f4-
f5, Black has some counterplay on the kingside with his knight on h5 by playing \( \text{\textL}_f4 \).

7.0-0 \( \text{\textL}_g4 \) 8.\textL\textE2!

This is the right move for White to parry Black's planned counterplay with e5 and \( \text{\textL}_f4 \). White's knight on f3 is not pinned now and Black cannot capture on f3, because then White will take on f3 with the bishop attacking the black knight on h5. So, the idea with \( \text{\textL}_h5 \) is practically refuted and it becomes not quite clear what the black knight is doing on h5 in the first place.

Black's idea would have been justified after: 8.\textE3 e5! 9. dxe5 dxe5 10.fxe5 (10.f5 \( \text{\textL}_f4 \) Berkhens - Avrukh, Wijk aan Zee 2000) 10...\textc6 11.\textL\textE2 dxe5, and the pawn structure was quite favourable for Black at the end in the game Sutovsky - Smirin, Tel Aviv 1999.

8...\textd7

It is bad for Black to play immediately: 8...e5 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.\textdxe5\pm, because then he will have to exchange White's knight on e5 with his bishop, otherwise he will have no compensation for the pawn.

9.h3 \( \text{\textL}_xf3 \) 10.\textxf3 \( \text{\textL}_g3 \)

11.\textE1\textH, and White will repel Black's knight from g3 after \( \text{\textL}_h2 \), or \( \text{\textE}3\text-f2 \).

\textbf{g) 6...c6}

This move combines two different ideas – Black prepares the move b7-b5 and enables the knight on g6 to retreat to the d5-square in case White pushes e4-e5. The drawback of that move is the same as most of the rare moves that we analyse in this chapter. Black's pressure against White's centre is insufficient. For example, Black's pawn on c6 occupies the important square from which the knight on b8 could have attacked White's d4-pawn.
7.0–0
Black has three basic lines: g1) 7...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{bd}7\), g2) 7...b5 and g3) 7...g4.

The other possibilities for him are seldom played:
7...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{fd}7\) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\)? The retreat of the black knight is aimed at neutralizing White’s idea to play 8.e5, since Black can then counterattack his opponent’s centre with 8...c5. White must change his plan accordingly and prepare – \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}1-h4\), \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}6\) and if the opponent allows that – \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\). That is White’s standard plan in the line 6...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{a}6\), 8...b5 9.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}1 \text{\textcopyright} \text{a}6\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}4\) e5 (Black is thus trying to protect his dark squares on the kingside.) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\) f6 (in case of 11...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{b}6\), White can play 12.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}7\) exd4 13.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}2\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}d6\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{a}5\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\) h6 16.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}g6\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}g6\) 17.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}7\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}7\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}4\)±, and he has a powerful attack against Black’s king – the g6-pawn is very weak...) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}g6\) hxg6 13.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}3\). White’s bishop retreats having created an important vulnerable spot on Black’s kingside – the g6-pawn. 13...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{c}7\) 14.a4! (this move ensures an excellent outpost for White’s bishop – the c4-square) 14...b4 15.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{c}4\) d5 16. exd5 \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{b}6\) 17.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}3\) (Black’s g6-pawn is now under attack by White’s bishop.) 17...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\) (17... \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}4\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}6\)–+) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}4\) (or 18.d6!? \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}d6\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}5\) fxe5 20. \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\)–; 18...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}8\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}4\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}d6\) 20.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}d6\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}d3\) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}d3\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd}6\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}5\) 22...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}5\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}5\)–+) 18...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{b}xd5\) 19. \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}5\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}8\) (in case Black accepts the sacrifice with 19...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{x}g5\), White would follow with 20.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}6\) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}5\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}3\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}3\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}5\) 23.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}6\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\) 25. \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\) 22...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{c}5\) 23.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}6\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}4\)± \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}4\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\) 26. \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}7\)± \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}8\) 27.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\)±) 20.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}7\)± \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}8\) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}4\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}4\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}5\)– Hector – Ferkingstad, Gausdal 1998;
7...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{c}7\) (This is not the most active development of the black queen and it is not clear whether he should even waste a tempo for it.) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}1\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{b}7\) (Black has also tried two other lines in practice, but they look quite senseless: 8...a6 Why? 9.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}4\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}8\) 10.e5 f5, and here White can even try the aggressive move 11.g4↑ Fernandez Garcia – M.Gonzalez. Las Palmas 1994, with a powerful initiative) – should Black capture the pawn, White would follow with \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}5\) and \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}6\), or 8...c5, Moradi – Mahmoodzadeh, Iran 2000, 9.d5±, and Black has simply lost a tempo in comparison to the line 6...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{a}6\) and 7...c5) 9.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}4\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}4\)↑ – Black’s pieces are misplaced, Gongora – R. Reyes, Mexico 2001;
7...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{b}6\) (This is a sensible move, but it is still easy for White to protect his d4-pawn after that order of moves.) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{h}1\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{g}4\) 9.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}5\) (The other possible retreats of the black knight are: 9...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}7\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}2\)±, followed by \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}1-h4\), or 9...\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}8\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{e}2\) \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}7\) 11.c3 \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{d}8\) 12.h3 \(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}3\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright} \text{f}3\)± Rubini...
Pelikan, Rio Hondo 1966. White has an edge in the centre and more active pieces and Black cannot do anything about it. His attempt to play f7-f6 without the light-squared bishop will only cause additional problems for him.) 10.\texttt{Qxd5} cxd5 11.c3. This pawn structure is quite typical for that line. White will exchange the bishop on g4 and irrelevant of whether Black would trade pawns on e5, or not – White will preserve better pawn structure and active pieces. 11...\texttt{dxe5} 11...e6. From – Iversen, Copenhagen 1968, 12.\texttt{We1\pm}. After White places his queen on h4, Black will have to either retreat with his bishop on g4 to f5, and that will compromise his pawn structure, or he will have to capture on f3 and that will activate White's rook to go to f5. White will have excellent attacking chances on the kingside in both cases.) 12.fxe5 f6 13.exf6 exf6 14.h3 \texttt{e6} (The exchange on f3 would only emphasize the weakness of the d5-pawn.) 15.\texttt{\texttt{Le1}} \texttt{d7} 16.\texttt{\texttt{h3}} (White will be able to activate his rook on a1 after the trade of the queens and its pressure might become annoying for Black.) 16...\texttt{\texttt{f6}} 17.\texttt{\texttt{f4}} a6 18.\texttt{\texttt{e2}} \texttt{c6} 19.\texttt{\texttt{ae1\pm}} Nevednichy – Kakageldyev, Moscow 1983. White has the initiative, because practically all his pieces are placed much better than Black's...;

7...\texttt{e6} – Black is threaten-

\textbf{g1) 7...\texttt{bd7}}

As it often happens in the “3 pawns system” – this natural development of the black knight
has its drawbacks after White plays e4-e5. On the other hand, Black can retreat the knight on f6 to the d5-square if necessary.

8.e5 Qe8

After 8...Qd5 9.Qxd5 cxd5 10.c3, Black should better play 10...dxe5 11.fxe5, transposing to the variation 8...dxe5. In case of 10...Qb6 11.Qe2 f5 (this is not a good move) 12.exf6 Qxf6 13.
Qg5\+, as in the game Hrabe – Kojetsky, Prerov 1995, White obtained a clear advantage, because of the domination over the e6-square and the potential threat f4-f5.

8...dxe5 9.fxe5 Qd5 10.Qxd5 cxd5 11.c3.

It becomes clear now that despite the fact that the black knight on d7 has been developed, it stands in the way of the bishop on c8 and that creates additional problems for Black.

He has now the following moves at his disposal:

The move 11...Qb8 seems very ugly. Its idea is to bring the knight on d7 to the better c6-square, despite the loss of two tempi. 12.Qe1 f6 13.exf6 exf6 14.Qf4 Qc6 15.Qg3\+ Zielinski – Szopka, Porabka 1986. White has a perfect piece placement and now he can think about the pawn break h4-h5;

11.Qb6 – this is hardly the best square for that knight too... 12.Qg5 h6 (but not 12...f6 13.
Qxh7 Qxh7 14.Qh5+ Qg8 15.
Qxg6\++–) 13.Qf3. White’s knight did not spend two tempi in vain. The weakening of the g6-pawn hurts Black’s position a lot. 13...Qg4 14.Qe1 Qxf3 15.Qxf3 Qc4 16.Qh3\+, and Black’s kingside is defenseless, Abraham – Luess, Lingen 2000;

11...Qb6 12.Qe2 Qb8 (this manoeuvre here loses plenty of time again) 13.Qe3 Qc6 14.
Qh1 Qg4 15.h3 Qxf3 16.Qxf3\+ Rueppel – Luess, Bad Zwesten 2001. White can try to undermine Black’s kingside with the move h4-h5 in the nearest future;

11...f5 12.exf6 exf6 13.Qf4 f5 (Black can try to bring his knight from d7 via f6 to the e4-square in that fashion, but he has to pay for that with a hurting permanent weakness on the e5-square.) 14.Qb3 Qf6 15.Qae1
Qh8 16.Qg5 Qd6 17.Qxf6 Qxf6 18.Qe2 b6 19.Qfe1\+ – and White is dominant on the open file, Novacek – Breck, Prague 1968.

9.Qe1

Black’s kingside has become vulnerable after the removal of the knight from there and White brings in his queen into
the attack.

9...\textit{c7}

White should counter 9...e6 with 10.\textit{g5}! dxe5 (10...c5 11. d5\textpm, and Black will be forced to play moves like 11...\textit{b6}, which would lead to the isolation of the e6-pawn in the centre after the trade of pawns there, because after 11...exd5 White plays 12.e6, winning material.) 11.fxe5 \textit{b6}
12.\textit{e2} \textit{d5} 13.\textit{g3} and the f6-square is quite weak in Black’s position and his pieces are a bit misplaced too, Karasek – Rabe, Erlangen 1997.

10.\textit{h1}

This move is not so necessary, because there are no real threats for Black yet on the a7-g1 diagonal. White could have tried the immediate 10.\textit{e3}!.

10...\textit{e6}

If Black plays 10...c5 immediately, White has 11.\textit{e3}! (The line 11.\textit{h4} cxd4 12.\textit{e4}, has also been tested in practice. White, of course has some compensation for the pawn, but still in the game Huerter – Bauer, Germany 2001, Black played 12...dxe5 13.fxe5 \textit{xe5} 14.\textit{xe5} \textit{xe5} 15.\textit{h6} \textit{e8} – 15...\textit{e6}!! – 16.\textit{xf7} \textit{xf7} 17.\textit{g5}+ \textit{g8} 18. \textit{g7}+ and lost almost without a fight.) 11...b6 (The idea of White’s previous move can be seen in the following line: 11... cxd4 12.\textit{xd4} \textit{e6} 13.exd6\textpm, and Black cannot capture on d4, because White takes on e7 and f8; while if Black plays 12...dxe5,

White should better capture with the knight 13.\textit{xe5} and follow 13...\textit{e6} with the favourable exchange: 14.\textit{xd7} \textit{xd7} 15.\textit{g7} \textit{g7} 16.\textit{d1}+ 12.\textit{h4} – and White still had the initiative, because his pieces have defended the centre solidly.

11.\textit{e3}\textpm

White has consolidated his centre and Black’s premature attempt to undermine it with: 11...dxe5 12.fxe5 c5 13.d5 \textit{d4}
14.\textit{xd4} cxd4 15.\textit{xd4} \textit{b6}
16.\textit{e4}\textpm led to a material advantage for White in the game Kuporosov – Mozes, Budapest 1991.

\textit{g2}) 7...\textit{b5}

8.e5

This is the sensible reaction
to the moves c6 and b5.

8...\text{\textit{Qe}8}

Black's other possibilities are:

8...\text{\textit{Qg}4} — with the idea to bring the knight to f5 in the future via the h6-square. This is however too time-consuming and hardly effective. 9.\textit{Qe}1 \textit{Qa}6 (9...\textit{Qh}6, Feustel – Lipska, Zinnowitz 1973, and here White had better try 10.\textit{Qa}4!? with the idea to attack on the queenside, while Black was "busy" with knight-maneuvers on the other side of the board. After 10...b4 11.\textit{Qe}4 a5 12.\textit{Qe}3= White preserves his space advantage and can eventually undermine Black's pawn chain with c3 at an opportune moment.) 10.\textit{Qe}4 \textit{Qh}6, and now 11.a4 \textit{Qc}7 12.\textit{Qd}2 (black's queenside is very weak now) 12...f6 13.exd6 exd6 14.\textit{Qb}4 \textit{Qf}7 15.axb5 \textit{Qxb}5 16.c4 \textit{Qc}7 17.\textit{Qc}3 f5 18.\textit{Qa}5= Pállova – Ruckschloss, Tatry 2001. Black has managed to defend everything for the time being indeed, but still his position remains slightly worse. He has less space and his pawns on the queenside are rather weak;

8...\text{\textit{Qfd}7} 9.\textit{Qe}1 \textit{Qa}6 10.\textit{Qe}4.

This move is aimed at preventing the possibility of the black knight attacking White's bishop on d3 from the b4-square. (White has also tried in practice the sharp move 10.\textit{Qh}4 \textit{Qb}4 11.\textit{Qg}5 h6 12.\textit{Qxf}7 \textit{Qxf}7 13.\textit{Qxg}6, Bangnoi – Herrou, Paris 1993. White has two pawns for the piece and excellent attacking prospects, for example: 13...\textit{Qf}8 14.\textit{Qf}5 dxe5 15.\textit{Qxh}6 \textit{Qxh}6 16.\textit{Qxh}6 \textit{Qf}6 17.dxe5 \textit{Qd}4+ 18.\textit{Qh}1 \textit{Qxe}5 19.\textit{Qae}1, and White wins by bringing his rook to the h-file; Unfortunately, Black’s correct move 12...\textit{Qxf}7 would have provided him with a quite acceptable game after: 13.e6+ \textit{Qg}8 14.exd7 \textit{Qxd}7 15.\textit{Qxg}6 \textit{Qg}4! 16.\textit{Qxg}4 \textit{Qxd}4+ 17.\textit{Qh}1 \textit{Qxg}4, or 14.\textit{Qxg}6 \textit{Qxd}4+ 15.\textit{Qh}1 \textit{Qe}5. Therefore White should better prepare carefully his active actions.) 10...d5, and here instead of 11.\textit{Qg}3, as it was played in the game O. Andersen – Sandmann, corr. 1991, White had better try 11.\textit{Qeg}5, in order not to block his own g-pawn. He also provokes the move h7-h6, which weakens the g6-square, for example: 11...h6 (11...e6 12.g4\uparrow \textit{Qf}4-f5) 12.\textit{Qxf}7 \textit{Qxf}7 13.e6 (It deserves attention for White to try the sacrifice: 13.\textit{Qxg}6 \textit{Qf}8 14.f5=, and Black's defence against the threats \textit{Qh}4 and \textit{Qxh}6 is quite problematic. His h6-pawn is quite vulnerable.) 13...\textit{Qf}6 14. exd7 \textit{Qxd}7 15.\textit{Qe}5\uparrow, and White remains with a clear positional advantage, because of his wonderful knight on e5 and Black's weakness on g6;

8...dxe5 9.fxe5 (White's attacking potential is increased considerably after the opening of the f-file.) 9...\textit{Qd}5 (Black loses a pawn after 9...\textit{Qg}4 10.h3 \textit{Qh}6 11.\textit{Qxb}5=, and he cannot capture the knight because of
\[4.f4 \text{\textit{g7}} 5.f3 \text{\textit{0-0}} 6.\text{\textit{d3 c6} 7.0-0}\]

\text{\textit{e4}, Drumm – Buckendorf, USA 1994; White can easily organize an attack on the kingside after the passive line: 9...\textit{\textit{d}fd7} 10.\textit{\textit{e}e1 \textit{\textit{b}6} 11.\textit{\textit{h}4 f6} 12.\textit{\textit{h}6 \textit{e6} 13.\textit{\textit{e}4+} and he is poised quite aggressively, Vetger – De Leeuw, Soest 1995; 9...\textit{\textit{h}5} – White cannot trap the knight so easily on that square, but it is not so brilliantly placed there either... 10.\textit{\textit{e}3+ \textit{a6}?! 11.\textit{\textit{e}4+ Thielens – Rantner, Seefeld 1999}. Black has compromised his queenside with pawn moves and his b5-pawn is hanging too.) 10.\textit{\textit{e}1} (White should not play 10.\textit{\textit{e}4}, allowing the move 10...\textit{\textit{b}4\textit{\textit{g}2}}, because Black then manages to exchange White’s good bishop – Kocsis – Remenyi, Hungary 2002.) 10...\textit{\textit{b}6} (10...f6 – this is much more to defend against White’s eventual move \textit{\textit{g}5}, than to undermine his pawn centre. 11.\textit{\textit{h}4 b4. Black tries to avoid the vulnerability of the b5-pawn after the exchange on d5. 12.\textit{\textit{x}d5 cxd5} 13.\textit{\textit{h}6 \textit{c6}}, Petronic – Petrovic, Igalo 1994, and here White could have tried 14.\textit{\textit{x}g7!? \textit{\textit{x}g7} 15.exf6+ exf6 16.\textit{\textit{a}e1+}. This pawn structure is in favour of White, because of the potential weakness of the d5, f6 and g6-pawns as well as of the e6-square.) 11.\textit{\textit{x}d5} (White can also try to emphasize the weaknesses on Black’s queenside with the move 11.a4??) 11...\textit{\textit{cxd5} 12.\textit{\textit{h}1} (It was once again interesting to play 12.a4!!?) 12...\textit{\textit{c}6

13.\textit{\textit{h}4 f6} 14.\textit{\textit{h}6+} Chapman – Ilic, Sydney 1997. White preserves his advantage in the centre as well as his chances to exploit Black’s weaknesses on the kingside.

9.\textit{\textit{e}4 a5} In case of 9...\textit{\textit{f}5}, Sasaki – Briffel, Manila 1992, White can play 10.\textit{\textit{e}3+ with the idea to repel the bishop with \textit{\textit{h}4} and to play possibly later f4-f5.

9...\textit{\textit{c}7} – is a bit too slow and passive. 10.\textit{\textit{e}1 \textit{f}5 (with the idea to reduce White’s attacking potential) 11.\textit{\textit{h}4 \textit{\textit{e}4} 12.\textit{\textit{e}xe4 e6 13.\textit{\textit{h}3 d5 14.\textit{\textit{d}3+ – and White has an easy plan to destroy Black’s kingside with the help of g4 and f5, Westernen – Korhonen, Kuopio 1992.

9...\textit{\textit{b}6} – Black’s attack with the queen against the white d4-pawn is not supported by other pieces. 10.\textit{\textit{h}1 \textit{g}4 11.c3 a5 12.h3+ Bangnoi – Herrou, Paris 1993. White has defended his centre reliably and he stands better.

10.\textit{\textit{e}1 \textit{c}7 11.\textit{\textit{h}4 \textit{b}6} Black’s flank manoeuvres do not seem to be purposeful.

12.c3 f5
13.\textbf{\textit{e}}g5±

This move provokes Black to play: 13...\textbf{\textit{h}}6, which weakens the kingside. In the game Bolslavsky – Mosionzhik, USSR 1967, the White player was a renowned specialist of opening strategy. He consolidated his position later and attacked the kingside of his opponent. 14.\textbf{\textit{h}}3 \textbf{\textit{d}}d7 15.\textbf{\textit{f}}2 c5 16.\textbf{\textit{d}}xc5 \textbf{\textit{d}}xc5. (It is hardly better for Black to play 16...\textbf{\textit{d}}xc5 17.\textbf{\textit{c}}2±, and White can combine the development in the centre \textbf{\textit{e}}3, \textbf{\textit{ad}}1 with an attack against the g6-pawn.) 17.\textbf{\textit{g}}3 \textbf{\textit{e}}8 18.\textbf{\textit{e}}1 \textbf{\textit{e}}6 19.\textbf{\textit{h}}4\textbf{\textit{d}}8 20.\textbf{\textit{h}}5 \textbf{\textit{gxh}}5 21.\textbf{\textit{h}}4 (White is threatening to play \textbf{\textit{g}}6 and \textbf{\textit{c}}2.) 21...\textbf{\textit{h}}7 22.\textbf{\textit{h}}3 \textbf{\textit{f}}7 23.\textbf{\textit{c}}2 \textbf{\textit{c}}8 24.\textbf{\textit{h}}1 e6 25.\textbf{\textit{g}}3 \textbf{\textit{g}}8 and White exploited quite effectively here the unreliable position of the black king with: 26.\textbf{\textit{g}}xf5! \textbf{\textit{exf}}5 27.e6 \textbf{\textit{f}}6 28.\textbf{\textit{xf}}5+ and White won.

g3) 7...\textbf{\textit{g}}4

![Diagram](image)

Black is preparing (after the exchange on f3) to attack the d4-pawn with \textbf{\textit{f}}6 or e5.

\textbf{\textit{e}}3

Black’s idea triumphs after 8.\textbf{\textit{h}}3 \textbf{\textit{xf}}3 9.\textbf{\textit{xf}}3 \textbf{\textit{b}}6, and White cannot defend his d4-pawn comfortably.

\textbf{\textit{bd}}7

The other possibilities for Black are:

8...\textbf{\textit{fd}}7 (This is a logical move – Black increases the pressure against the d4-pawn and retreats the knight in anticipation of an eventual attack by White with e4-e5. On the other hand, he plays again with an already developed knight that might be more useful on the f6-square.) 9.\textbf{\textit{h}}3 \textbf{\textit{xf}}3 10.\textbf{\textit{xf}}3 c5 (This decision to play c7-c6-c5 in two moves seems a bit strange. White would counter 10...e5 with 11.\textbf{\textit{dxe}}5 \textbf{\textit{dxe}}5 12.\textbf{\textit{f}}5 with the habitual edge for him, but after Black’s best move: 10...\textbf{\textit{b}}6!, he would have good chances to organize some counterplay.) 11.\textbf{\textit{d}}5 (It is worse for White to play 11.\textbf{\textit{dxc}}5 \textbf{\textit{dxc}}5 12.\textbf{\textit{ad}}1 \textbf{\textit{xd}}3 13.\textbf{\textit{xd}}3 \textbf{\textit{c}}8 14.\textbf{\textit{fd}}1 \textbf{\textit{c}}6 and Black reaches a quite favourable structure similar to the “Dragon” variation of the Sicilian Defence – Moldoveanu – Jarmolinskaya, Bucharest 1995) 11...\textbf{\textit{a}}6 12. \textbf{\textit{c}}4, and there arises a position from the variation 6...\textbf{\textit{a}}6 7.0-0 c5 8.d5 \textbf{\textit{g}}4, except that White has an extra move (\textbf{\textit{e}}3) in his favour. As you have seen that 10...\textbf{\textit{b}}6 does not solve Black’s problems, White should better play 9.\textbf{\textit{e}}1!? \textbf{\textit{b}}6 10.\textbf{\textit{a}}4± followed by 11.\textbf{\textit{h}}4, forcing Black
to exchange his g4-bishop. White manages to accomplish that without the move h2-h3 and that helps him preserve the h3-square for the rook for an eventual attack along the h-file;

8...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a5}} – This is not the most useful square for the black queen. 9.h3 (Or 9.e5 dxe5 10.fxe5 \texttt{d5} 11.\texttt{xd5 cxd5} 12.h3 \texttt{xf3} 13.\texttt{xf3 c6} 14.c3±, and Black’s queen move to a5 seems to be useless in this pawn structure, because the queen remains idle there, Roselli – De Biase, corr. 1973) 9...\texttt{d7} (It is better for Black to play 9...\texttt{xf3} 10.\texttt{xf3}↑. White intends to play e4-e5, and is Black plays 10...e5 himself, then after 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5 there arises a quite favourable structure for White that we will study later.) 10.\texttt{e1} b5 11.e5 \texttt{e8} 12.\texttt{h4}±, and White enjoyed a huge lead in development, Juarez – Wilczek, Villa Ballester 1996;

8...\texttt{b5} (This move does not combine well with the development of the bishop to g4). 9.h3 \texttt{e6}, Pyne – Gozum, Chicago 1966 (or 9...\texttt{xf3} 10.\texttt{xf3}↑ with the idea to follow with e4-e5 and an advantage for White), and here after 10.\texttt{e1}↑ \texttt{h4}, White’s forces are evidently placed much more purposefully than Black’s;

8...\texttt{a6} 9.e5 (The idea of the move \texttt{a6} is justified after: 9.h3 \texttt{xf3} 10.\texttt{xf3} – and if 10.\texttt{xf3}, then 10...\texttt{b4}, and White’s important bishop is exchanged – 10...\texttt{b4} 11.\texttt{e2} a5 12.a3 \texttt{a6}, Korolev – Ufimtsev, corr. 1986, 13.e5±, although White still preserves a slight edge thanks to his powerful centre.) 9...\texttt{d5} 10.\texttt{xd5 cxd5}, Casella – Kerman, Los Angeles 2001, 11.c3±. White plays h2-h3 on the next move and remains with a slight advantage after that. Should Black play 11...f6 immediately, White can counter that, for example with: 12.exf6 \texttt{xf6} 13.\texttt{b3}±, attacking b7 and d5 simultaneously;

8...\texttt{c7} (This move is with similar ideas to the line 8...\texttt{bd7}) 9.h3 \texttt{xf3} 10.\texttt{xf3} e5 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5 \texttt{bd7}, Sanz – Ares, Spain 1991, 13.g4↑ and White is threatening to play g4-g5, with a powerful initiative on the kingside, meanwhile Black’s move \texttt{c7} is hardly useful for him in defence;

8...\texttt{d5} – leads to a closed position which is favourable for White. 9.e5 \texttt{fd7} (Black’s pieces are totally misplaced after the dubious: 9...\texttt{h5} 10.h3 \texttt{d7} 11.\texttt{e2} \texttt{h8} 12.c3± Fritz – Inimichi, Utrecht 1999.) 10.h3 \texttt{xf3} 11.\texttt{xf3} e6 12.\texttt{e2} \texttt{b6} 13.\texttt{ab1} f5 14.c3. White’s initiative is running effortlessly on the kingside, while Black has no counterplay on the queenside, for example: 14...\texttt{c8} 15.g4 \texttt{d8} 16.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{xf5} 17.\texttt{f2} \texttt{a6} 18.\texttt{h2} \texttt{f7} 19.h4 \texttt{e7} 20.h5↑, and White’s initiative on the kingside is unop-
posed, Thuemler – Floriani, Germany 1996;
8...\texttt{\textcopyright{c8}. Dournes – Kulvietis, Emajol 1999. It is far from clear what the black queen is doing at that square. Black is threatening something like capturing on f3, followed by \texttt{\textcopyright{g4}, but White parries easily that idea with 9.h3 \texttt{\textcopyright{xf3} 10.\texttt{xf3\texttt{\textcopyright{, and it becomes evident that Black has simply wasted a tempo for the move \texttt{\textcopyright{c8}};}}

8...\texttt{\textcopyright{b6} 9.\texttt{b1?! (This is with the idea to avoid doubling of the f-pawns after 9.\texttt{d2 \texttt{xf3} 10.gxf3 \texttt{\textcopyright{bd7. In case White captures with his rook 10.\texttt{xf3}, Black has \texttt{\textcopyright{g4} 9...e5 (if 9...\texttt{fd7}, as in the game Grunfeld – Komliakov, Manila 1992, then White should play 10.\texttt{\textcopyright{e1!? \texttt{xf3} 11.\texttt{a4 \texttt{c7} 12.\texttt{xf3 with the idea to follow with \texttt{\textcopyright{h4 and \texttt{h3 and he has the initiative. Black's position is obviously worse in case of: 9...d5 10.e5 \texttt{\textcopyright{d7, and here White's simplest line would be 11.h3, and he would be clearly better after: 11...\texttt{xf3 12.\texttt{xf3 e6 13.h4, since he starts a dangerous attack against the enemy king: 13...h5 (or 13...f6 14.\texttt{h3\texttt{, followed by h5) 14.g4 hxg4 15.\texttt{gxg4, opening files; as well as after: 11...\texttt{f5 12.\texttt{xf5 gxg5} 13.g4 fxg4 14. hgxg4\texttt{, and Black's king would be seriously endangered. It is slightly worse for White to play 11.\texttt{e1, as in the game Just – Schalkwijk, IECG 2002, because after 11...e6 and \texttt{f5, Black manages to exchange the light-squared bishops, thus avoiding compromising his kingside.) 10.fx e5 dxe5 (Black has managed to play e7-e5, in a situation in which White cannot play f4-f5 after the exchange of pawns on e5, but even here White preserves his advantage with 11. \texttt{e1 exd4 12.\texttt{xd4\texttt{, for example: 12...d8 13.\texttt{e2 \texttt{e8} 14.\texttt{g3\texttt{ – White controls the square in front of the e4-pawn and attacks along the f-file that has been weakened by Black with the move g6;}}

8...e5 – This move is of course stronger than the other rare moves. 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5 (Black's position is quite acceptable, with his powerful knight on e5 after: 10.fx e5 \texttt{\textcopyright{d7\texttt{, and an excellent game for Black.) 10...\texttt{xf3 (It deserves some attention for Black to make use of the fact that the bishop on g4 is still present on the board and try: 10...gx f5 11.exf5, followed by 11...e4?! Meanwhile, the analysis shows that after 12.\texttt{xe4 \texttt{\textcopyright{xe4} 13. \texttt{xe4, White manages to prevent Black from making use of the "hanging" white bishops along the e-file, for example: 13...\texttt{e7 14.\texttt{d3 \texttt{e8} 15.\texttt{ae1, and since White would counter \texttt{\textcopyright{xe4 with 16.\texttt{f2 – winning, so White defends his bishops and remains with an extra pawn. Or 14.\texttt{d8} 15.f6 \texttt{xf6} 16.\texttt{xf7+ \texttt{g7} 17. \texttt{e4 – but not 17.\texttt{d4 \texttt{xf3} 18.\texttt{xf6+ \texttt{xf6} 19.\texttt{xf3 \texttt{xd3}}

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20.\texttt{xf6 d7}, and White loses his bishop, indeed for good compensation – 17...\texttt{xe4} 18.\texttt{xe4 e8} 19.\texttt{d2}, and if 19...\texttt{xb2} White follows with 20.\texttt{ab1} capturing on b7 and attacking the f7-pawn, otherwise he remains with an extra pawn. In case Black does not wish to determine the placement of the pawns in the centre yet, he should better play 10...\texttt{bd7} and wait for the move h3, and then after 11.h3 \texttt{xf3} 12.\texttt{xf3} the game transposes to the line 8...\texttt{bd7}.) 11.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{bd7} 12.g4\textsuperscript{f}, and White is already threatening to advance his pawns on the kingside and he has even saved a tempo for the move h2-h3, Tamin – Markalew, Jakarta 1972.

\textbf{9.h3 \texttt{xf3} 10.\texttt{xf3} e5}

This move is followed by White with the standard reaction:

\textbf{11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5}

We will study that resource in details in the chapter dealing with the variation 6...\texttt{g4}. We will just mention that in this pawn-structure White has a clear plan for a pawn-offensive on the kingside with g4-g5, or sometimes not so often, to exert pressure along the f-file, while Black has problems to organize something reasonable.

\textbf{12...\texttt{h5}}

This move prevents indirectly White from playing g2-g4, because Black would counter that with 13...\texttt{f4}, and White wins a pawn indeed after he captures on f4, but that hardly compensates the opening of the long diagonal for the enemy “King’s Indian” bishop and the weakness of the dark squares in general.

Black has also tried here:

12...\texttt{a5} 13.a3 (this move prevents \texttt{c5}, because that move is now impossible due to the move b2-b4) 13...b5 (Black’s position is just terrible after: 13...\texttt{ac8} 14.g4 h6 15.h4 and he is helpless against White’s threats g4-g5 and f5-f6. The game Abels – van Kooten, corr. 1987, continued with: 15...\texttt{e8} 16.g5 hxg5 17. hxg5 gxf5 18.\texttt{xf5}. Black’s kingside is hopelessly weak and he has no counterplay whatsoever. 18...\texttt{d8} 19.\texttt{f2 d6} 20.\texttt{h3 e8} 21.\texttt{h5 e8} 22.\texttt{af1 e7} 23.\texttt{e2 g6} 24.\texttt{h2 f4} 25.\texttt{xf4 exf4} 26.\texttt{xf4 b6+} 27.\texttt{h1 d4} 28.\texttt{g6}, White’s attack is decisive.) 14.g4 \texttt{f8} 15.\texttt{e2} (It is much simpler for White to play: 15.g5 \texttt{h5} 16.\texttt{fxg6}, and he wins material immediately thanks to the defencelessness of Black’s knight on d7.) 15...\texttt{c7} 16.\texttt{g3} (Black does not have now the resource
\( \text{h5 after g4-g5}) \) 16...\( \text{h8} \) 17.g5± and White had an overwhelming positional advantage, having cramped enemy’s pieces on the kingside, M. Rytshagov – Eskola, Helsinki 1991;

12...\( \text{e7} \) 13.g4 \( \text{e8} \) 14.g5↑ Wendt – Hausrath, Berlin 1989, and it is not quite clear how Black can defend against f5-f6, because White can counter 14...f6 with the simple 15.fxg6 hxg6 16.\( \text{g4} \) and the position of the black king seems rather vulnerable;

12...h6 13.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 14.\( \text{c4} \) b5 15.\( \text{b3} \), Black’s kingside is perceptibly weakened, Stockfleth – Bloess, Germany 1998;

12...\( \text{e8} \) 13.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 14.\( \text{c4} \) b5 15.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 16.\( \text{f2} \), and because of the threat \( \text{c5} \), Black is forced to retreat to d7 with the knight and then White simply captures on g6, f7 and d7 – winning, Kudinov – Ubykin, St Petersburg 2000;

12...gxf5 13.\( \text{xf5} \) b5 14.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 15.\( \text{g3} \), and Black’s kingside position is weakened and that will be a telling factor in the future, Tosello – Delory, France 2001;

12...b5 13.a4 a6 14.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 15.g4↑, followed by \( \text{g3} \) and g5, Vehi – Velamazan, Ortigueira 2002.

13.\( \text{c4} \)

The road to the f7-square has been opened after the retreat of the black knight.

13...\( \text{h8} \)

Or 13...\( \text{e7} \) 14.a4 \( \text{e4} \) 15.g3 \( \text{h5} \) (15...\( \text{xh3} \)↑) 16.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{g5} \) 17.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 18.\( \text{h4} \), Belaska – Novotny, Czech Republic 1995, and here it is interesting for White to play 17.\( \text{d1} \), in order to try to occupy the d-file later.

14.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e7} \)

15.a4 b6 (Or 15...\( \text{d8} \), Jonkman – Mahdi, Werfen 1992, 16.\( \text{f2} \), and now Black must worry about the defence of the a7-pawn anyway.) 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f6} \)?

It is better for Black to play 16...\( \text{d8} \) 17.\( \text{fd1} \), but still White preserves a powerful pressure. 17.g4 \( \text{f4} \) 18.g5↑ and White has a material advantage – Cardon – Leonardo, Ponferrada 1991.

h) 6...c5
This move is quite important strategically, but it enables White in this position to obtain a clear advantage in the centre by exchanging on c5, followed by e4-e5.

7. dxc5

This possibility for White should make Black think again about the move 6...a6. If he really wishes to prepare c7-c5, without surrendering the centre, he should try to be able to recapture on c5 with a piece.

7...dxc5

Of course, the move 7...a5 would not help either, because White’s e4-pawn has been defended and he can simply capture on d6 too.

8. e5

Now, it becomes a bit unclear whether the move c7-c5 has really been useful for Black. This pawn might turn out to be a weakness at the end.

8...d5

This is the most logical retreat of the knight.

The other possibilities for Black seem to be inferior:

8...h5 9.0-0 c6 10.e4 a5 11.c7 11.c3 a6 12.e3± Huber – Nazarian, Calgary 1996. White’s pieces are better placed and Black’s knight will still cause more problems for him;

8...g4 9.h3 h6 10.g4 (This move isolates Black’s roaming knight on h6 away from the actions for a long time. Black can hardly exploit some weaknesses in White’s position under the circumstances.) 10...c6 (Black’s attempts to introduce the knight immediately into play do not impress: 10...f5 11.c4+ e6 12.xd8 xh8, Dobrowolski – Zowa-da, Polanica Zdroj 1999, and now White can emphasize Black’s weaknesses with the move 13. g5± and Black cannot avoid losing material, or 10...f6 11. e4+ h8 12.xd8 xh8 13. e3. Black cannot defend easily his weakness on c5. 13...c6 14.exf6 exf6 15.xc5 b6 16.a3± – and Black’s compensation for the pawn is obviously insufficient – Hernandez Perez – Quintero, Spain 2001) 11.e2 c7 12.e3 a6 13.0-0± Badalov – Abdullaev, Baku 1999. White’s pieces are more active and his chances to attack the enemy king successfully are superior to Black’s;

8...e8 – This retreat of the knight is quite passive. 9.e3 a5 10.d2 c7 11.0-0 c6 12.f2 e6 13.e4 b6 (otherwise Black loses a pawn) 14.a3± b4 – and Black’s queen is so isolated from the actions that it would take plenty of time to free it from the “offside” situation..., Podoba – Priam, Trencin 1991;

8...fd7. Black’s knight here has no good prospects at all and blocks the c8-h3 diagonal for the bishop. 9.0-0 e6 10.e4±. White has the advantage in development as well as in piece placement. He can think about
an exchange on f6, just in case in order to compromise the pawn-structure of the opponent on the queenside. (White does not need to enter unclear complications like: 10.e6 fxe6 11.\textit{\text敬}}\textit{g5 \textit{d4=, and it is not quite clear for White how to regain his pawn, Macekova – Velcko, Slovakia 1995). Following 10.\textit{e4 in the game Dembo – Gevakina, St. Lorenzo 1995, Black played: 10...\textit{c7 11.\textit{d5 \textit{d8 12.\textit{e3 e6. This move creates an obvious weakness on the d6-square. (On the other hand Black must complete his development somehow, but b7-b6 is just impossible due to \textit{xe7+.) 13.\textit{c3 \textit{c7 14.\textit{b5 \textit{b6 15.\textit{d6 \textit{c7 (Naturally, Black cannot play: 15...\textit{xb2 16.\textit{xc6 bxc6 17.\textit{xc8=) 16.h4 (It is more solid for White to follow with: 16.\textit{d3 \textit{d1, since that solidifies his knight on d6 and creates the threat \textit{xc7 at the same time. White’s positional advantage is undisputable after that.) 16...a6 (It is much better for Black to refrain from this indifferent move and to play instead 16...f6, undermining his opponent’s centre. White cannot proceed so easily with his attack after that – 17.h5 (17.exf6 \textit{xf6) 17...fxe5 18.hxg6 hxg6 19.\textit{g5 and the position is rather unclear, but still Black’s defence would be quite difficult, for example: 19...\textit{f6 20.\textit{axg6 exf4 21.\textit{xf4 e5 22.\textit{e3; 19...\textit{d8 20.\textit{axg6 exf4 21.\textit{xf4 \textit{d4+ 22.\textit{xd4 cxd4 23.\textit{h7+ \textit{h8 24.\textit{e5+ \textit{xe5 25.\textit{xf8+ \textit{g7 26.\textit{e8+ \textit{xf8 27.\textit{xc7 \textit{b8 28.\textit{e1=) 17.h5 \textit{e7 18.hxg6 fxg6 (18...hxg6 19.\textit{g5+- \textit{g4-h4) 19.\textit{g5 \textit{b6 20.\textit{xc8 \textit{xc8 21.\textit{d6 \textit{b5 22.\textit{d2 \textit{d8 23.\textit{xe6+ \textit{xe6 24.\textit{xe6, and White pressed his advantage of an extra pawn home.

9.\textit{xd5 \textit{xd5 10.\textit{e2

This move is with the idea to repel the black queen away from its active position on d5, with the help of the move \textit{e4.

10...\textit{d6

Black’s other possibilities are: 10...e6 – This move is not logical at all. Black restricts his own bishop on c8, weakens the d6 and f6-squares and does not achieve anything in return. 11.\textit{e4 \textit{d8 12.0-0 \textit{d7 13.\textit{e3 \textit{b8 14.\textit{d1+ Enticknap – Sanz, Sunderland 1966. White is dominant on the only open d-file and he has an overwhelming advantage; 10...\textit{g4 11.\textit{e4 \textit{d7 12.\textit{e3 \textit{a6 (This is not the best placement for that knight, but Black has hardly anything better.) 13.\textit{d1 \textit{c7 14.\textit{b5 \textit{ab8 15.}
0–0±, and Black has problems, because his pieces on the queenside are quite misplaced, Winterstein – Weiler, Germany 1993;

10...\(\text{\textit{e}6}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{g}5}\) (White has a stable advantage after the exchange of the bishop on \(e6\).) 11...\(\text{\textit{c}6}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{exe}6}\) \(\text{\textit{exe}6}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{c}3}\) \(\text{\textit{a}5}\) 14.0–0 \(\text{\textit{c}4}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\)± Shilov – Szirmai, Pardubice 1993. White's bishop is clearly superior to Black's knight on \(a5\);

10...\(\text{\textit{d}8}\) (This retreat of the queen seems to be a bit premature, since White can try to find a move that would be much more useful than \(\text{\textit{e}4}\).) 11.\(\text{\textit{e}3}\) \(\text{\textit{c}7}\) 12.0–0–0 (White is of course not forced to castle long, but he wishes to punish Black with some energetic actions for his loss of time in the opening.)

12...\(\text{\textit{c}6}\) (it is too passive for Black to play: 12...\(\text{\textit{b}6}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{h}4}\) \(\text{\textit{g}4}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{h}5}\), and White is attacking – Paal – Frink, Gyongyos 1998) 13.\(\text{\textit{a}3}\) (White should better preserve his bishop on \(d3\) from being exchanged.) 13...\(\text{\textit{g}4}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{h}3}\) \(\text{\textit{xf}3}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{xf}3}\) \(\text{\textit{c}4}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\) c3 17.\(\text{\textit{b}4}\)± Kostenko – Faraj, Aden 2002. Strangely enough, only White can play successfully on the queenside, while Black cannot exploit at all the seemingly vulnerable position of the white king;

10...\(\text{\textit{a}6}\) – This is not the best placement for the black knight. 11.0–0 \(\text{\textit{c}6}\), Shavtvaladze – Lopez Martinez, Mureck 1998, and here after 12.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\) \(\text{\textit{c}7}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{e}3}\)±, White's pieces are very active and he has a stable advantage;

10...\(\text{\textit{f}5}\) – Black thus attempts to fight for the light squares in the centre, but he weakens the position of his king and White can try to exploit that at an opportune moment. 11.\(\text{\textit{xf}5}\) \(\text{\textit{gx}f5}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{e}3}\) \(\text{\textit{c}6}\) (or 12...\(\text{\textit{b}6}\), protecting the c5-pawn beforehand 13.0–0 \(\text{\textit{c}6}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{fd}1}\) \(\text{\textit{e}6}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{g}5}\) \(\text{\textit{c}8}\), Sandvik – Kauko, Finland 2001, and now after 16.\(\text{\textit{h}5}\)!

17.\(\text{\textit{f}3}\) \(\text{\textit{d}8}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xd}8}\)± \(\text{\textit{xd}8}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{d}1}\)±, White preserves his edge thanks to his better piece placement. It is also possible for him to try 13.\(\text{\textit{h}4}\) \(\text{\textit{e}6}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d}1}\) \(\text{\textit{e}4}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{f}3}\) – after 15.0–0 \(\text{\textit{c}6}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f}3}\), Djuric – Chilingirova, Aegina 1993, Black could have obtained excellent counterplay with the help of 16...\(\text{\textit{b}4}\) – 15...\(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{c}3}\) \(\text{\textit{c}6}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{d}2}\)±, with the idea to bring the knight to \(c4\) and \(d6\).) 13.0–0 \(\text{\textit{ad}8}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{fd}1}\) (The weakness of Black's c5-pawn becomes evident now.) 14...\(\text{\textit{e}4}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{g}5}\) \(\text{\textit{a}4}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xd}8}\) \(\text{\textit{xd}8}\) (It is bad for Black to play 16...\(\text{\textit{xd}8}\), because of 17.\(\text{\textit{h}5}\).) 17.\(\text{\textit{xc}5}\)±, and White remained with a material advantage, Ubilava – Vinkel, Tbilisi 1971.

11.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\)

We will analyse now: h1) 11...\(\text{\textit{d}7}\) and h2) 11...\(\text{\textit{d}8}\).

h1) 11...\(\text{\textit{d}7}\)
Black intends to develop his
light-squared bishop on b7.

12.\texttt{c3 b6}

12...\texttt{wc7 13.0-0 wh4 14.\texttt{xe3 b6 15.h3 wd7}. Black is reluctant to exchange his light-squared bishop, because the long a8-h1 has been weakened considerably. On the other hand, the move in the text looks really ugly... 16.\texttt{ad1±} – and Black’s position is quite passive, Stanojolski – Durando, Metz 2000.

13.0-0 \texttt{ab7}

Black’s other possibilities cannot equalize either:

13...\texttt{e6} – prevents White’s e5-e6 indeed, but it weakens the dark squares in Black’s camp too. 14.\texttt{ac3 \texttt{b7 15.\texttt{f2 de7 16.ad1 wc7 17.ab7 wb7 18.g5 fd8 19.\texttt{e4}, and Black will have to fight long and hard to equalize with a weakness like that on the d6-square, Khamatgaleev – Bognar, Budapest 1999;}

13...\texttt{ad8} – It is hardly advisable for Black to develop his rook to that square – he cannot fight for the d-file anyway. 14. \texttt{g5 ab7} (It is more prudent for Black to play: 14...\texttt{e6 15.e3 \texttt{b7 16.ad1 wc7}, Kerek – Bognar, Budapest 2001, 17.f3± with the idea to follow with e4-d6, and that secures a stable edge for White.) 15.e6 fxe6 16. \texttt{c2±} Feher – Bognar, Budapest 2000. White’s knight is headed unavoidably to the e6-square and his advantage increases because of that.

14.\texttt{ad1 wc7}

Black can try to prevent e5-e6 with 14...\texttt{wc8}, but after 15. \texttt{e3 h6 16.\texttt{f2±}, he will have to bring into action his queen rook anyway and that would mean to play again \texttt{wc7}, so White will still have the threat to follow with e5-e6, Balkhamishvili – Mkheidze, Tbilisi 2002.

15.\texttt{e6! f5}

It is not better for Black to try here: 15...\texttt{fxe6 16.g5 d8 17. \texttt{xe6! hxg6 18.xd8 d4+} (otherwise White follows with \texttt{xe6} and \texttt{h3} with a checkmate) 19. \texttt{xd4±} and White wins a pawn, Philippe – Bognar, Budapest 1999.

16.\texttt{ad7 wc8}

17.\texttt{d5±}

Black’s position is quite difficult from the strategical point of view. He has no counterplay, there is no coordination between his flanks and all his pieces are terribly misplaced. 17...\texttt{d8} (Black would not fare any better after: 17...\texttt{f6 18.e5 d8 19.c4 \texttt{xe5} 20.fxe5 \texttt{c6} 21.h6 \texttt{e8 22.e3 b8 23.g5}, and in the game Timoschenko – Khasin, Rostov 1976, Black resigned, be-
cause White will simply capture on e7 after every retreat of the knight on c6.) 18.\textit{\textdollar}d3 h6 19.\textit{\textdollar}e3 h8 20. \textit{\textdollar}h4 \textit{\textdollar}h7 21.\textit{\textdollar}d1 \textit{\textdollar}f6 22.\textit{\textg{xf}5}+ \textit{\textg{xf}5} \textit{\textg{xf}5}-- Levin – Tukmakov, Kiev 1963, and White wins, because after 22...\textit{\textg{xf}5}+ 23.\textit{\textg{xf}5}+ h8 he can follow with 24.\textit{\textg{e}4} checkmating.

\textbf{h2) 11...\textit{\textdollar}d8}

12.\textit{\textg{e}3} \textit{\textdollar}a5+

12...\textit{\textdollar}d4 13.\textit{\textg{xd}4} cd 14. 0-0-0. 

Black should not leave now his pawn defenceless: 12...\textit{\textdollar}c7 (It is too bad for Black to play: 12...\textit{\textg{e}6}, Kryl – Ulrich Schulze, Internet 2005, 13.\textit{\textdollar}b5±, or 13. \textit{\textg{xc}6} bxc6 14.\textit{\textg{xc}5}± – and Black loses his c5-pawn in both cases without any compensation.) 13. \textit{\textdollar}b5 \textit{\textdollar}d7 14.\textit{\textg{xc}5} \textit{\textac}8, Kryl – Ukica, Internet 2005, and here White’s simplest line would have been 15.\textit{\textdollar}d4±, preventing Black’s idea \textit{\textdollar}c6xe5, followed by an intermediate check on the f3-square after \textit{\textg{xc}7}. Black’s compensation for the pawn however remains evidently insufficient.

In case of 12...\textit{\textdollar}b6 13.c3±, Black should worry about White’s threat to play b4. 13...\textit{\textg{g}4}, Prange – Black, email 1994 (13...\textit{\textdollar}c7 14.\textit{\textdollar}b5 f5 15.\textit{\textdollar}d5+ e6 16.\textit{\textg{xc}6} bxc6 17.\textit{\textg{xc}5} \textit{\textdollar}d8 18. \textit{\textdollar}d4+-, and White’s material and positional advantage is overwhelming, Zhao – Rujevic, Melbourne 2000; Black could have defended his pawn with 13...\textit{\textdollar}d8 14.\textit{\textg{f}2} \textit{\textdollar}e6 15.0-0-0+, but he falls behind in development considerably. White’s plan on the kingside is rather simple. He can play f4-f5 – immediately, or a bit later, following the exchange \textit{\textg{xf}5} and \textit{\textg{h}4}. He plays at first g2-g4 and later f4-f5.) 14.b4 (after 14.\textit{\textg{f}2} – Black manages to continue the fight somehow: 14...\textit{\textdollar}c7 15.\textit{\textg{xc}5} f6 16.\textit{\textg{g}3} \textit{\textg{e}5}+; 16.\textit{\textdollar}d5+ \textit{\textdollar}h8 17.e6 \textit{\textdollar}d8++; 17.exf6 \textit{\textg{xf}6} 18.\textit{\textg{g}5} \textit{\textg{f}4} 19. \textit{\textdollar}f7+ \textit{\textg{xf}7} 20.\textit{\textg{f}7} \textit{\textg{e}5} 14... \textit{\textdollar}c7 15.\textit{\textg{xc}5} f6 16.0-0 fxe5 17. \textit{\textdollar}c4+ \textit{\texth}8 18.\textit{\textg{xc}6} \textit{\textx}c6 19. \textit{\textx}e5±, and Black’s only hope of survival hinges on the opposite-coloured bishops after the exchange on e5. Meanwhile even in case of a position with bishops of opposite colours – Black’s king remains quite vulnerable and his weakness on e7 renders his defence quite problematic.

\textbf{13.c3 \textit{\textg{f}5}}

Black has also tried here 13...\textit{\textg{g}4} 14.0-0 (White should also think about the possibility to attack simply the pawn with: 14.\textit{\textg{c}4}!!) 14...\textit{\textg{g}8} 15.h3 \textit{\textx}f3 16.\textit{\textg{xf}3}± Seuss – Frosch, Austria
1994. White has a stable advantage thanks to his powerful bishop pair.

13...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{e}}}}e6, Dudek – Bayer, Germany 1999, 14.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{g}}}}g5\textpm, and in order to avoid the worse (that is an exchange on e6 and doubling the pawns...), Black is forced to retreat with his bishop from the e6-square, losing additional time.

14.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xf}}}}f5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{gxf}}}}5 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{c}}}}c4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{ac}}}}8 16.a4

It is simpler for White to play 16.0–0\textpm, and Black must abandon the d-file, because of the weakness of the c5-pawn and the potential threat of White to play e5-e6.

16...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{c}}}}c7 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xc}}}}c5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xe}}}}5 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xe}}}}5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xc}}}}5 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xc}}}}c5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xe}}}}5 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xa}}}}7 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{xf}}}}4

21.0–0 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{c}}}}c4 22.g3\textpm

White’s pawn majority on the queenside makes the endgame preferable for him, Ivanenko – Gufeld, Kiev 1963.

\textit{Conclusions}

\textit{Black’s seldom played sixth moves, with the exception of 6...c6 and 6...c5, all but have one significant drawback – they do not affect directly the situation in the centre. White completes his development effortlessly and plays e4-e5. That provides him with a space advantage and long-lasting initiative.}

\textit{The move 6...c6 is played by Black with the idea to provide the knight on f6 with the d5-square to retreat to in the centre. White is clearly better after that as well, because he can simply exchange on d5 and continue with his development.}

\textit{Finally, in the 6...c5 variation, after the trade of pawns on c5, there arises a structure in which the move c7-c5 proves to be useless.}
Chapter 17  

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ♘f6 3.♘c3 g6 4.f4 ♗g7  
5.♘f3 0-0 6.♗d3 ♗g4  

Now something about the plans of both sides in the arising pawn structure. 

Should Black present White with a free hand for actions in the centre – White of course would play e4-e5, which now, after the exchange of the black bishop for the knight is even stronger. He will then have a powerful initiative on the kingside, which can soon become a decisive attack, for example after h4-h5. Black’s most effective counterplay can be connected with e7-e5 (his piece pressure against the d4-pawn can be parried by White with ♘e3, e4-e5, and finally if necessary ♘f2). After e7-e5, White as a rule should better exchange the d-pawns and gain space on the kingside with the help of f4-f5. His threat to follow that with the pawn-offensive g4-g5 is even stronger, because White has not castled short yet and he can castle long and then proceed with his kingside attack. 

Therefore, Black must look for counterchances immediately.

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Therefore, Black must look for counterchances immediately.
and mostly on the queenside.

He has three basic moves: a) 8...c6, b) 8...e5 and c) 8...\(\Box\)c6.

Some of the other moves for Black that have been tested in practice simply lose the b7-pawn without any compensation. The rest either transpose to the main lines, or they are too passive:

8...\(\Box\)c5 9.dxc5 dxc5 10.e5 \(\Box\)e8 11.\(\Box\)xb7, and Black can already resign, Lacasa Carratala – Amo Sanz, Espana 1997;

8...\(\Box\)a6 9.e5 dxe5 10.dxe5 \(\Box\)e8 11.\(\Box\)xb7, and White has a winning position, Verfuerth – Kalka, Bochum 1990;

8...\(\Box\)e8 9.e5 dxe5 10.fxe5 \(\Box\)fd7. White can now win a pawn in several different ways, for example with 11.0–0 f6, Haggren – Pera, Naan 1997, 12.\(\Box\)xb7 \(\Box\)b6 13.\(\Box\)e4, and Black has no compensation at all;

8...\(\Box\)a6, Orso – L.Marin, Romania 2001, 9.e5 dxe5 10.fxe5±, and after White captures on b7 – it will not be easy for Black to rescue his knight on a6;

8...\(\Box\)bd7 9.e5 dxe5 (9...\(\Box\)e8 10.\(\Box\)xb7±) 10.dxe5 \(\Box\)e8 11.\(\Box\)xb7 (White can also play for a king-side attack with – 11.\(\Box\)e3!? c6 12.h4→ Mueller – Schulz, Ruhrgebiet 1999. Black’s pieces are quite misplaced.) 11...\(\Box\)c5 12.\(\Box\)f3, Comp Genius – Corujo, Oviedo 1993. Black has no compensation whatsoever for the lost material;

8...e6 (this move is hardly useful for Black’s counterplay) 9.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)c6 (it is too bad for Black to expose his king to an attack: 9...h8?! 10.g4 \(\Box\)bd7 11.0–0–0 \(\Box\)e7 12.h4→, and Black has lost so much time that White’s attack is overwhelming, Licciardello – Paciaroni, corr. 1985. White can also win the b7-pawn with the move 12.e5.) 10.0–0–0 \(\Box\)b4 (Black can transpose to the main lines, but with a tempo down with: 10...e5 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5 \(\Box\)d4 13.\(\Box\)f2± Soltanici – Igreenescu, Satu Mare 2002. White has already castled and his extra tempo is essential for the success of his checkmating attack.) 11.g4↑. White plans to follow simply with f5 and g5, and Black can hardly counter that with anything.

It is a bit premature for White to play: 11.f5, Kuijpers – Adderley, Nice 1974, because of 11...\(\Box\)xd3+ 12.\(\Box\)xd3 exf5 13.exf5 d5±, and after g4-g5, Black’s knight can go to e4 and his position is quite acceptable;

8...\(\Box\)fd7 9.e5 \(\Box\)c6 (the other possibility for Black: 9...c6 10.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)b6 11.0–0–0 – transposes to a line that we analyse after the
following move order: 8...c6 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{b}}}6\) 10.0-0-0 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{d}}}7\) 11.e5) 10.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}3\) – this move also transposes to the line: 8...c6 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{d}}}7\) 10.e5.

a) 8...c6

Black prepares b7-b5 of course; nevertheless that move seems quite indifferent from the point of view of the fight for the centre.

9.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}3\)

White postpones his castling, because later he might be able to castle long and organize an attack on the kingside.

9...e5

Black stops White’s pawn-break e4-e5 altogether.

He has also tried in practice: 9...\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{a}}}5\) 10.0-0 (White can also play 10.0-0-0, because after 10..b5 he can follow that with 11.e5 and later \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{b}}}1\), while he can always counter b4 with \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}4\), and his attacking chances are much more real than those of Black.) 10...e5 (It is absolutely useless for Black to play: 10...\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{b}}}4\) 11.e5 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{d}}}7\) 12.a3 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{b}}}6\) – Black cannot capture on b2, of course, because he loses his queen after \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{a}}}4\) – 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}4\) d5 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{g}}}3\)± and Black’s position is very passive, Mazzotti – Del Nevo, Italy 1989.) 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.f5 h6 13.g4 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{bd}}}7\) 14.h4\(\uparrow\) with the idea to follow with g5 and f6, Plaskett – Afifi, Bahrain 1990. This idea is very dangerous for Black even if White castles short;

9...\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{a}}}6\), Franco Ocampo – Rossetto, Argentina 1980, and in this position White should play simply: 10.0-0-0, and later, depending on circumstances, e4-e5, g2-g4 and h3-h4-h5;

9...\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{b}}}6\) (this is now hardly satisfactory for Black – White easily defends the pawns on b2 and d4 with his next move, while Black’s queen is misplaced on b6.) 10.0-0-0 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{a}}}5\) (It is hardly any better for Black to play 10...\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{d}}}7\) 11.e5 d5, Burg – Del Nevo, Arco 2003, because here after 12.h4, White has a powerful attack on the kingside, while Black has no real counterchances.) 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{b}}}1\) \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{a}}}6\) 12.g4 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{fc}}}8\) 13.e5\(\pm\) Mueller – Loschinski, Germany 1994. The maneuvers of the black pieces seem to be quite inappropriate: White’s actions are running smoothly, while Black’s pieces are idle;

9...b5 10.e5 dxe5 11.fxe5 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{d}}}5\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{\textnot{d}}}5\) cxd5, Flores – Llanos, Lima 2002, and in this position after 13.0-0\(\pm\), it becomes clear that the move b7-b5 in this pawn structure is simply weakening Black’s queenside;

9...d5 10.e5 \(\text{\texttt{\textnot{e}}}8\) 11.h4→ Sehrt
Kraft, Giessen 1997. Black’s pieces are so passive that he can hardly survive White’s kingside onslaught;

9...\(c7\) – might turn out to be just a waste of time, because Black’s queen there is doing nothing. 10.e5 dxe5 11.dxe5 \(\text{c}7\) 12.h4\(\pm\), and White proceeds smoothly with his standard kingside attack, Chalupa – Moli-
toris, Czech Republic 2001;

9...\(\text{b}7\) 10.e5 dxe5 (or 10...
\(\text{d}8\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{c}7\) 12.h4\(\Rightarrow\) and White simply opens up the h-file and checkmates, Kotronias –
Skalkotas, Ikaria 1997) 11.dxe5 \(\text{d}8\) 12.0–0–0 e6 13.h4\(\Rightarrow\) Kok-
kinos – Bonilla, Tjentiste 1975. Black is incapable to resist White’s overwhelming kingside attack,

10.dxe5 dxe5 11.f5

Black’s move c7-c6, that pre-
vents his knight from attacking the d4-pawn, seems to be quite useless in that pawn structure. Meanwhile, contrary to the line 6...c6 7.0–0 \(\text{g}4\), that we have analysed before, White has not castled yet...

11.\(fad7\)

or 11...\(\text{bd}7\) 12.g4\(\pm\).

It is now quite unclear what should Black do against g5 and f6, Nepeina – Sorokina, Melit-
topol 1992. It seems too ugly for him to play: 11...gxf5 12.\(\text{x}f5\) \(\text{e}8\) 13.0–0–0 \(\text{d}6\) 14.\(\text{f}2\)\(\pm\) – and Black’s position is quite dubious from the strategical point of view, because of the gaping weakness


12.0–0–0 b5 13.g4 \(\text{c}7\)

14.h4\(\Rightarrow\) Fernandez Garcia –
Betancort Curbelo, Las Palmas
1989. Black’s counterplay on
the queenside is virtually non-
existent.

b) 8...e5

This move can transpose to
the lines after 8...\(\text{c}6\) 9.\(\text{e}3\) e5,
but still sometimes it leads to
original positions.

9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5 \(\text{c}6\)

10...\(\text{h}5\) – this move is with
the idea to exploit the fact that
White’s king is still in the cen-
tre. 11.\(\text{e}3\) (It is not so convinc-
ing for White to play: 11.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\)
12.g4 \(\text{f}4\) 13.\(\text{x}f4\) \(\text{xf}4\) 14.\(\text{xf}4\)

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\( \text{\textbullet} \text{xb2} \text{-- because after the opening of the long diagonal for Black's bishop on g7, his counterplay is really effective, Van der Sterren – Marangunic, Dortmund 1986.} \) 11...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{h4} \) 12.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{f2} \) \( \text{\textbullet} \text{f4}, \text{Esplana – J. Garcia, Lima 1999, and here White had better play: 13.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{d5?!} \text{\textbullet} \text{xf3} \) 14.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{gxf3} \) \( \text{\textbullet} \text{c6} \) 15.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{xc7} \) \( \text{\textbullet} \text{ac8} \) 16.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{d5} \) \( \text{\textbullet} \text{xf5} \) 17.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{g1} \text{-- and White preserves some advantage in the endgame too, because of his bishop pair and the powerful centralized knight;} \)

10...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{fd7}, \text{Maes – Soetewey, Belgium 2001, 11.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e3} \text{\textuparrow} \) and White follows with castling long and prepares a pawn-offensive on the kingside;} \)

11.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{g4} \)

Naturally it is quite possible for White to play 11.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e3}, \text{transposing to the line 8...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{c6} \) 9.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e3} \) e5 10.dxe5 dxe5 11.f5,} \) but he can also try to make good use of the transposition of moves and push forward presently his g-pawn, which might prove to be quite useful later.

11...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e8} \)

\[ 12.\text{\textbullet} \text{g5} \]

This move provokes weakening of Black's kingside. 12...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{h6} \) 13.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e3} \) \( \text{\textbullet} \text{d4} \) 14.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{g3} \) c6 15.0–0–0\textup{\textuparrow} \text{Ananiev – Bein, Osterode 1999. The move h7-h6, which is the difference in comparison to the line 8...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{c6} \), might turn out to be a juicy target for White later.} \]

c) 8...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{c6} \)

\[ \text{\textbullet} \text{c6} \]

This move is with the easily understandable idea to activate the knight and even to occupy the d4-square with it later.

9.\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e3} \) e5

Black's other possibilities are:

9...e6 – is an indifferent move, which presents White with enough time to seize the initiative. 10.0–0–0 \( \text{\textbullet} \text{e7} \) 11.g4 c6 12.f5 exf5 13.gxf5\textup{\textuparrow}, and White has already begun opening files on the kingside, Wolf – Tudosia, Bayern 1995;

9...\( \text{\textbullet} \text{e8} \) – is too passive. 10.e5 a6 11.0–0–0 e6 12.h4\textup{\textuparrow} \text{Goetz – Goessnitzer, Postbauer 1997. Black’s pieces are so misplaced that he is beyond salvation against White’s kingside attack;}
9...\(\text{Qb}4\) – is with the useful idea to exchange White's powerful bishop. On the other hand, Black plays with an already developed piece and he also exchanges it, so he loses plenty of time. All that does not help his counterplay much... 10.0–0–0 \(\text{Qxd}3+\) 11.\(\text{Qxd}3\) \(\text{Qd}7\) (Black has also tested in practice here 11...\(\text{Qc}8\), although the idea of that move remains a mystery, particularly if you have in mind Black's next move, 12.g4 c6 13.e5 \(\text{Qd}7\) 14.h4\(→\), followed by h4-h5, opening up the shelter of the black king, Krysa – Luo, Esperanza 2002) 12.h4\(→\), and Black fails to protect his kingside effectively, Darazs – Lodi, Hungary 1996;

9...\(\text{Qd}7\) 10.e5 is the simplest method to defend the d4-pawn. 10...\(\text{Qb}4\) (The other possibilities for Black are not any better: 10...e6 11.0–0–0 \(\text{Qf}6\)?? This move cannot be good, but otherwise White follows with h4-h5. 12.\(\text{Qxd}6\) cxd6 13.d5\(±\), and White simply wins the d6-pawn, Christiansen – From, Denmark 1992; 10...\(\text{Qb}6\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{Qb}4\), Grishanovich – Gubanov, St. Petersburg 1996, 12.h4\(→\), Black's last moves have not solved his problems – it is still quite unclear how he can defend his king and he has no counterplay at all. It is too dangerous for him to play: 10...\(\text{dxe}5\) 11.dxe5 e6, Piroscà – Boer, Krymica 1999, 12.0–0–0\(±\) – because White will have some additional chances then after the d-file has been opened.) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{c5}\) (This is an attempt to organize some counterplay in the centre and on the queenside. This seems logical, but tactically the lines “do not work” for Black. It is more prudent, despite being a bit passive for him to play: 11...\(\text{Qxd}3+\) 12.\(\text{Qxd}3\) c6 13.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{a5}\) 14.\(\text{h5}\)→ Ibragimov – Cicak, Moscow 1995. It is not clear how Black can defend against White's threats along the h-file. It would not help him much to play: 13...\(\text{Qc}8\) 14.\(\text{h5}\) \(\text{f5}\) 15.\(\text{hxg}6\) hxg6, Loskutov – Bujakевич, Moscow 1996, because after 16.\(\text{Qg}3\), Black gets practically checkmated.) 12.\(\text{dxc}5\) \(\text{a5}\) (in case of 12...\(\text{dxe}5\), White follows with 13.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{exf}4\) 14.\(\text{xf}4+\), and wins material, Thorsteinsson – Bjornsson, Iceland 1998) 13.\(\text{cxd}6\) \(\text{exd}6\) (after 13...\(\text{Qxa}2+\) 14.\(\text{Qxa}2\) \(\text{a}2\) 15.\(\text{dxe}7+\) White's king is safe and Black is simply a pawn down, Reznicek – Rachunek, Valtice 1992) 14.a3 \(\text{dxe}5\) (after 14...\(\text{dxe}3+\) 15.\(\text{Qxd}3\), White wins the d6-pawn, because of the pin) 15.\(\text{AXB}4\) \(\text{a}1+\) 16.\(\text{Qd}2\) \(\text{xb}2\) 17.\(\text{Qd}5\) \(\text{exf}4\) 18.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{ad}8\) 19.\(\text{xb}1+\) Byrne – Korchnoi, Moscow 1975. Black's desperate attempts to create some counterplay failed and he remained a piece down without any compensation.

10.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{dxe}5\) 11.\(\text{f5}\)
11...\(\text{d}4\)

This is the most natural move for Black and possibly the best. The other possibilities for him are definitely not stronger to say the least...:

11...\(\text{d}d7\) 12.0-0-0± Westman – Stefack, Sinaia 1965, and here the only reasonable line for Black to create some counterplay is – 12...\(\text{d}d4\) 13.\(\text{f}2\), transposing to the line 11...\(\text{d}d4\) 12.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{d}7\), that we analyse later;

11...\(\text{b}4\) – we have already encountered that manoeuvre for Black, but on move nine. Just like before – that exchange of White’s light-squared bishop is wasting too much time to be really effective: 12.0-0 \(\text{xd}3+\) 13.\(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 14.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{xf}5\) 15.\(\text{xf}5\)±, and White has already opened the g-file and Black’s counterplay is non-existent, Madhavan – Teruhisa, Asia 1989;

11...\(\text{xf}5\) – Black is trying to create some counterplay in the centre with the help of e5-e4, or f7-f5, depending on White’s actions. 12.\(\text{xf}5\) (It is worse for White to play 12.\(\text{exf}5\) e4!\(\text{xe}\), because after Black opens the e-file – White is in trouble.) 12...\(\text{d}4\)

13.\(\text{f}2\) (Black has plenty of weaknesses on the kingside and he can only compensate that by playing energetically, for example by preparing the pawn-break f7-f5.) 13...\(\text{e}8\) (13...c6 14.0-0 – White is threatening \(\text{g}5\) – 14...d6 15.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{ad}8\) 17.\(\text{e}2\)± and White exchanges or repels the black knight on d4 and he preserves a stable positional advantage, Nielsen – Sorensen, Hedehusene 1993. After 13...\(\text{d}7\), White can play 14.0-0-0 \(\text{c}5\) 15.\(\text{b}1\), with the idea to follow with \(\text{e}2\), \(\text{c}2\)-\(\text{c}3\) in order to repel Black’s knight from the centre and then to exploit Black’s kingside weaknesses.) 14.0-0 (White relies on his positional advantage – Black has weakened his position considerably after the exchange on f5.) 14...\(\text{d}6\) 15.\(\text{g}3\) (It is worse for White to play immediately: 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}5\)±, and Black has counterplay.) 15...\(\text{h}8\) (Black could have played 15...f5, now but after 16.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{g}7\) \(\text{g}7\) 18.\(\text{xg}7\) \(\text{xg}7\) 19.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 20.\(\text{ae}1\) \(\text{ae}8\) 21.\(\text{e}4\)±, and White has a slight, but stable advantage, because of his better pawn-structure and the domination over the e4-outpost. Still, that might have been Black’s best choice under the circumstances.) 16.\(\text{g}4\) c6 17.\(\text{h}5\) (White is threatening \(\text{xd}4\) and e4-e5) 17...\(\text{e}8\)? (It is better for Black to play 17...\(\text{e}6\)±, and he would not lose immedi-
ately after that move indeed. He is of course understandably reluctant to take his knight away from the centre. Meanwhile, White can improve his position by transferring his knight on c3 to the f5-square via e2 and g3.) 18.\textit{xd}4 exd4 19.\textit{xf}6!+- Black overlooked that brilliant move in the famous game Fischer – Benko, New York 1963. He was forced to resign after several moves, because of his considerable material losses. Now, after 19...\textit{xf}6 20.e5, Black gets checkmated: he does not have the saving resource f7-f5, which is absolutely essential in case of the immediate \textit{xd}4 and e4-e5.

12.\textit{f}2 c6

It is quite clear that Black will try to use his knight on d4 to create some immediate counterplay on the queenside, so White must play energetically.

Black now has plenty of possibilities:

After 12...\textit{e}8, Kalka – Slobodjan, Dortmund 1992, White can play simply 13.0–0–0!? with the standard plan to follow with g4-g5. Black’s knight on e8 will remain quite passive for the time being;

12...\textit{e}8, Kast – Smith, Manila 1992, 13.g4–. In case White plays g5 and f6 in this position, Black’s bishop would retreat to the f8-square, but White might delay f6 for a while and try to exert some pressure along the f-file against the f7-square;

12...\textit{d}7 13.0–0–0 c6 (this is too slow) 14.g4 b5 15.g5 f6 16.h4 \textit{c}5 17.h5–, and White breaks through on the kingside, Rytshagov – Svirjov, Tallinn 2000;

12...\textit{h}5 (This move stops White’s actions on the kingside for a while, since Black will counter g4 with \textit{f}4.) 13.0–0–0 c6 14.\textit{e}2 (or 14.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}7 15.\textit{e}2 \textit{ad}8 16.\textit{xd}4 exd4 17.g4±, and White will just “bury for dead” Black’s bishop with g5 and f6, Korneev – Vidarte, Sitges 1996) 14.\textit{a}5 15.\textit{b}1 \textit{xe}2 16.\textit{xe}2 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{d}3 \textit{h}5 (This move is with the same idea as 12...\textit{h}5.) 18.g4 \textit{f}4 19.g5. White presently does not even pay attention to Black’s knight on f4. He is threatening f5–f6, and if Black plays f7–f6, his king would become vulnerable. 19...\textit{xd}3 20. \textit{xd}3 \textit{fd}8 21.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 22. h4± White has a clear advantage in that symmetrical position. Black’s pawns on the kingside will soon be under attack, while he dominates on the d-file only temporarily, Morris – Kosten, Plymouth 1989;

12...c5 (This move weakens considerably the d5-square, while White’s pawn is still on e4. His knight will be headed for the d5-outpost in the nearest future.) 13.g4 \textit{b}6 (White’s advantage is huge after 13... \textit{a}5 14.g5±, and Black cannot play 14...\textit{c}4? 15.gxf6 cxd3 16.fxg7 \textit{xc}2+ 17.\textit{d}2– because White
remains with extra material, Seben – Hukel, Bratislava 1991. It is obviously best for Black to play 13...b5, transposing to the line 12...b5, in which Black’s position is relatively acceptable.) 14.0–0–0 ♞d7, Vaughan – Lang, Swansea 1970, 15.♗d5±. White has a big advantage with his knight on the all-powerful d5-outpost and his dangerous threats on the kingside;

12...b5 (This is no doubt Black’s most energetic attempt to organize some play on the queenside.) 13.g4 c5 (It is also possible for Black to play: 13...b4 14.♕e2 ♞d7 15.♕g3 ♗c5 16.♗c4 ♙h4 17.0–0–0†, but the optimistic move b5–b4 weakened the c4-square, which has already been occupied by White’s powerful bishop, Reeve – Schleifer, Canada 1986.) 14.g5 b4 (It is worse for Black to play: 14...c4 15.gxf6 ♘xf6 16.0–0–0 cxd3 17.♗xd3±, and once again White’s knight is headed for the d5-square, Stillger – G.Horvath, Budapest 1995. That is the reason Black tries first to oust it away from the c3-square.) 15.♕e2† (It is not so good for White to play: 15.♗xd4 exd4 16.gxf6 ♘xf6 17.♕e2 c4 18.0–0–0 – the point is that after 18.♗xc4 ♘h4 19.♕g3 ♙e7, Black regains his piece – 18...cxd3 19.cxd3 ♘g5+ 20.♗b1 ♘e3∞ Esplana – Condori Aranya, Lima 2000, and his bishop on e3 looks very powerful.) 15...c4 16.gxf6 ♘xf6 17.0–0–0 (It is not good for Black to play: 17.♕xc4 ♘xc2+ 18.♖f1 ♘xa1.) 17...cxd3 18.♖xd3 ♙a5 19.♖b1±. White preserves a slight advantage after the exchange of the knights on e2. Black’s pieces are rather misplaced, for example his bishop on f6. After the sacrifice: 19...♕xc2, White can follow with the simple: 20.♕h6 ♘g7 21.♕xg7 ♙xg7 22.♖c1 b3 23♗xb3 – and Black’s king is quite vulnerable and his knight is forced to retreat to the pathetic a6-square;

12...gxf5 (Contrary to the game that we have already submitted earlier – Fischer – Benko, New York 1963, White cannot capture on f5 with his queen, but instead after White captures with his pawn, Black plays e5–e4 without a fork...) 13.exf5 e4 (Now, after 13...b5, White can simply play: 14.0–0–0 c5 15.♕e4 c4 16.♕xf6+ ♙xf6 17.♕e4 ♗ad8 18.c3±, and he has a big advantage, because Black has presented him with the wonderful e4-outpost for the all-powerful white bishop, Bednarski – Kraidman, Tel Aviv 1964. Black cannot be too successful with 13...c5 either. He pushes forward his queenside pawns. 14.0–0–0 b5 15.g4 b4 16.♕e4 c4. White has an excellent resource against that attack...: 17.g5 cxd3 18.♕xf6+ ♘xf6 19.gxf6 ♙xf6 20.♗hg1+ ♘h8 21.♗xd3± Zude – Hachmeister, Stetten 1988. Black’s position is very bad indeed. He cannot defend his knight with
the rook and he cannot retreat it either, because of \( \mathcal{g}5 \). White can also play 14.0-0, just like in the game Bednarski – Kraidman, Tel Aviv 1964, which we have also cited in the same comment.) 14.\( \mathcal{c}4 \) (White’s bishop is quite powerful here as well.) 14...c5 15.0-0-0 \( \mathcal{e}7 \) 16.g4 h6 (White was threatening g5 and f6.) 17.g5 hxg5 18.\( \mathcal{x}g5^\pm \) – and Black’s king is bare and helpless, Collin – Saucey, France 1989.

13.0-0-0 b5

Black has also tried here: 13...\( \mathcal{a}5 \) 14.g4 \( \mathcal{f}d8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{b}1 \) b5 16.g5 \( \mathcal{h}5 \) 17.\( \mathcal{e}2 \) c5 18.c3↑ Lobzhanidze – Aarland, Bergen 2000. On top of all defects of his position, his c5-pawn will be “hanging” after the retreat of his knight on d4.

14.g4 \( \mathcal{e}8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{b}1 \) \( \mathcal{c}7 \)

(diagram)

16.\( \mathcal{h}1f1 \)

White refrains presently from pushing his g-pawn and exerts pressure along the f-file against the black knight on f6 and the f7-square. (It is also possible for White to follow with the straightforward move 16.g5!?.) 16...\( \mathcal{a}b8 \)

It is obvious that Black wishes thus to prepare c5-c4. He has problems to create some effective counterplay on the queenside in this position anyway. 17.\( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 18.h4 \( \mathcal{d}6 \) 19.\( \mathcal{e}2 \) \( \mathcal{xf}5 \) 20.gxf5 \( \mathcal{f}6 \) 21.\( \mathcal{g}5^\uparrow \) Pavlovic – Timofeev, Eupen 1999. Black’s king position is tough to break indeed, but still White achieves much more on the kingside after he opens the g-file, than Black does on the queenside.

**Conclusion**

We have analysed in this chapter the move 5...\( \mathcal{g}4 \) – which is quite natural and it suits Black’s plans, because he counterattacks White’s pawn centre. Meanwhile, White obtains a favourable pawn structure after Black exchanges on f3 and continues with e7-e5 (otherwise White will play e4-e5 himself) in the following fashion – he exchanges the d-pawns and pushes f4-f5. Black is practically incapable to counter White’s simple threat g2-g4-g5, which is deadly in these types of positions. It is also quite essential for White that he has not castled yet and he can even increase his attacking potential on the kingside by castling long. Tournament practice shows that Black’s difficulties in these variations are considerable.
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1.e4 d6 2.d4 ½f6 3.½c3 g6 4.f4 ½g7  
5.½f3 0–0 6.½d3 ½c6

7.e5

The most logical line for Black now is to exchange on e5  
d) 7...dxe5, but we will also deal with the retreats of the black knight (only in the lines in which the game develops originally, i.e. if Black does not exchange on e5 in the next few moves)  
a) 7... ½d7, b) 7... ½g4  
and c) 7... ½e8.

The line 7... ½h5 8.½e3 ½g4  
9.½e2, Holzhauer – Heinl, Germany 1993, after the unavoidable exchange on e5 transposes to the main line d) 7...dxe5.

a) 7... ½d7

This move closes the diagonal for the bishop on c8, but it supports the c7-c5 pawn-break.  
8.½e4

This is with the idea to defend the d4-pawn with the c-pawn. Should White start an immediate attack with 8.h4, Black can create counterplay against White’s centre with 8...dxe5 9. 
fxe5 ½b6±.

8... ½b4

It is not good for Black to
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play: 8...f5, because of 9.\( \square c4+ \) \( \square h8 \) 10.\( \square e5 \) \( b6 \) 11.\( \square f7+ \) \( \square xf7 \) 12.\( \square xf7 \) e6 (otherwise White simply remains with the extra exchange) 13.\( \square g5 \) \( \square e7 \) 14.\( h4 \) \( d8 \) 15.\( \square xg6 \) h\( xg6 \) 16.\( h5 \) and White has a strong attack, Bailey - Clayton, corr. 1995.

9.\( \square e2 \) c5

It deserves attention for Black to try 9...\( \square b6 \), and White should probably counter that with 10.\( \square d2 \) \( f5 \) 11.\( \square xb4 \) \( xe4 \) 12.0-0, preserving his pawn centre, because in answer to 10.c3, Black has 10...\( f5 \) 11.\( \square gf5 \) d5! (but not 11...\( \square d5 \) 12.\( g4 \) xe4 13.\( xe4 \) \( \square f5 \) Kunzelmann - Lange, corr. 1979) 12.\( cxb4 \) xe4 and Black has a good position.

10.c3 \( \square a6 \)

11.0-0, White has managed to neutralize Black’s counterattack against the centre and he has retained his space advantage. It is not worth for White to play 11.exd6 and to destroy his pawn centre: 11...\( cxd4 \) 12.\( \square xd4 \) \( \square dc5 \) 13.\( \square xc5 \) \( \square xc5 \) 14.\( dxe7 \) \( \square xe7 \) 15.0-0 \( \square d8 \) and Black has compensation, Formanek – Waterman, Ventura 1971.

b) 7...\( \square g4 \)

As it often happens in this line – Black is forced to long manoeuvres with that knight.

8.h3 \( \square h6 \) 9.g4

This prevents Black’s roaming knight from the access to the f5-square.

9...b6

The combination of the moves \( \square c6 \) and \( b6 \) for Black seems rather strange when the black pawn is on the c7-square.

Black has also tested here 9...\( \square b4 \) 10.\( \square c4 \) dxe5 11.fxe5 (Black's knight on h6 is quite uncomfortable after the exchange on e5.) 11...\( c6 \) 12.\( \square a3 \) \( \square h8 \) 13.\( \square d2 \) \( g8 \) 14.0-0-0 – and Black’s pieces are cramped on the last rank, Mohr – Kaps, Ljubljana 2002.

It is more principled for Black to play 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 f6, in order to bring the knight into the action: 11.\( \square c4+ \) \( \square h8 \) 12.\( \square xd8 \) \( \square xd8 \) 13.\( \square b5 \) (This move attacks Black’s most vulnerable weakness.) 13...\( fxe5 \) (in case of 13...\( \square b4 \), White must play 14.\( \square h2 \) \( d7 \) 15.a3 \( \square x b 5 \) 16.\( \square x b 5 \) \( a6 \) 17.\( \square c4 \) \( \square c6 \) 18.e6!?, and Black’s
knight might never get out of its exile. It is worse for White to play 14.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.a4, Lo Presti – Flores, Buenos Aires 2000, 15...c5\(\Delta\)\(\text{c}6\), and Black has a powerful counterplay.) 14.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{b}8\), but still after the simple 15.fxe5 \(\text{xe}5\) 16.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 17.\(\text{xh}6\) \(\text{xc}7\) 18.\(\text{f}1\)\(\pm\), White preserves his advantage – his pieces are better placed and the black king is endangered.

10.0–0 \(\text{b}7\) 11.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{d}7\)

White has a space advantage and his pieces are active. He organized a powerful assault on the kingside with: 12.f5!?→ \(\text{gxf}5\) 13.gxf5 \(\text{x}5\) 14.\(\text{g}5\) e6 15.\(\text{xh}7\) \(\text{h}7\) 16.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 17.\(\text{h}5\)\(\pm\), and Black gets checkmated, or he loses his queen: 17...\(\text{g}8\) 18.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xe}4\) 19.\(\text{f}6\)+ \(\text{xf}6\) 20.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{e}5\) 21.\(\text{g}5\)\(\pm\) \(\text{g}6\) 22.\(\text{h}6\) 1–0 I.Polgar – Toth, Budapest 1970.

c) 7...\(\text{e}8\) 8.\(\text{e}3\) (diagram)

8...\(\text{b}4\)

It is not good for White to exchange his excellent lightsquared bishop – therefore Black can gain access to the f5-square for his bishop on c8.

The other possibilities for Black are:

8...a6 – This move does not combine well with the plan to attack the centre with 6...\(\text{c}6\). 9.0–0 \(\text{g}4\) 10.h3 \(\text{xf}3\) 11.\(\text{xf}3\)\(\pm\) Santacruz – Izyk, Moscow 1994. Black’s pieces are quite cramped and his attempts to undermine White’s centre will only improve the placement of the white pieces and particularly the bishops;

8...e6 (This move is too passive – Black does not need to close the diagonal for his lightsquared bishop just yet and so to reduce his chances for some counterplay in the centre considerably.) 9.h4 (this is a quite natural reaction) 9...\(\text{e}7\) 10.h5 \(\text{dxe}5\) 11.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 12.\(\text{xd}5\) exd5 13.\(\text{d}2\)→ Holder – Selfors, Kirkenes 1992. Later, White castles long, exchanges the dark-squared bishops on the h6-square and opens the h-file;

8...d5, Apaza – Saavedra, Peru 2000, is not good for Black, because after he closes the centre and he cannot prepare the advance c7-c5 – he risks remain-
ing without any counterplay whatsoever. White should better solidify the placement of his bishop on d3 with the move 9.a3±. (White played in the game the much weaker 9.Łe2 Łb4 and that enabled Black to exchange the bishop.) and so he remains with a stable space advantage;

8...Łg4 – This is not the most opportune moment for that move, because White’s d4-pawn is protected. 9.h3 Łxf3 10.Łxf3 dxe5 11.dxe5 f6 (This attempt to undermine White’s centre without the light-squared bishop is not effective at all.) 12.0–0–0 Łc8 13.exf6 Łxf6 14.Łe4± – and White’s pieces are better placed, he has the bishop pair advantage and the black king is weakened too, Smagin – Lechtynsky, Hartberg 1991.

9.Łc4

9...Łf5

In case 9...dxe5, White should better capture with the d-pawn in that position – 10.dxe5, and after 10...Łf5 (Black has hardly anything better than this logical developing move.) 11.Łb3 the game transposes to the line that you will see later in our notes to Black’s move ten.

9...d5 – This idea to close the centre is not good for Black at all. 10.Łb3. Black’s pieces are totally misplaced – look at the bishop on g7 (“attacking” the e5-pawn...), or at Black’s knights on e8, or on b4. He is incapable to undermine White’s centre and he remains in a cramped and passive position. 10...e6 (10...c6 11.h3 f5 12.Łd2± V.Gurevich – Fonseca, Le Touquet 2002. White later retreats with his light-squared bishop to the excellent c2-square with Łe2 and c3 and prepares g2-g4, and he can even castle short in order not to give Black any target for counterplay.) 11.Łe2 b6 12.c3± Ryc – Kubicek, Bratislava 1967. Black has no counterplay that can compensate the huge deficit of space.

10.Łb3

It is worse for White to play 10.Łc1 c5 11.d5 Łg4 12.0–0 dxe5 13.fxe5 Łxe5=, and Black has managed to destroy White’s centre, Kuijpers – Botvinnik, Amsterdam 1966.

10...c5

The alternative for Black is – 10...dxe5 11.dxe5!? (It is worse for White to play 11.fxe5 c5 – Black is threatening c4 as well as cxd4 – 12.dxc5 Łxd1+ 13.Łxd1. Contrary to the line that we are going to deal with later, White has a pawn on the e5-square and not a knight. Black manages to organize counter-
play: 13...\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8\textbf{+} 14.\textit{\textbf{c}}c1 \textit{\textbf{c}}c7 15.a3
\textit{\textbf{c}}c6 16.\textit{\textbf{d}}f4 \textit{\textbf{e}}a6\textbf{?}, and it is quite
difficult to defend the extra
pawn, Mueller – Eichling, Wald-
fishbach 1995.) 11...\textit{\textbf{w}}xd1+ 12.
\textit{\textbf{w}}xd1 \textit{\textbf{d}}d8\textbf{+} 13.\textit{\textbf{w}}c1\textbf{±}. It is pres-
ently impossible for Black to un-
dermine White’s centre and
therefore he cannot exploit the
temporary exile of the white rook
on a1. Meanwhile, Black’s knight
on e8 is a pathetic sight and so
his whole kingside is squeezed.
White can exploit that with
manoeuvres like \textit{\textbf{d}}d4, \textit{\textbf{c}}c5
and after the retreat of the knight he
can follow with – \textit{\textbf{a}}a4 or \textit{\textbf{d}}d5.
Black has also tried 10...c6,
but White can simply counter
that with 11.a3, and Black’s com-
penration for the sacrificed pawn
is not sufficient after: 11.a3 \textit{\textbf{d}}d5
12.\textit{\textbf{w}}xd5 \textit{\textbf{c}}xd5 13.\textit{\textbf{w}}xd5, for
example: 13...\textit{\textbf{c}}c8 14.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3 \textit{\textbf{b}}b6
15.\textit{\textbf{w}}c1 \textit{\textbf{a}}a6 16.\textit{\textbf{w}}d2 \textit{\textbf{f}}f6 17.\textit{\textbf{c}}c1
\textit{\textbf{c}}c7 18.\textit{\textbf{d}}xd6 \textit{\textbf{e}}xd6 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d5 \textit{\textbf{g}}g4
20.\textit{\textbf{f}}f2 \textit{\textbf{f}}f5 21.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4 \textit{\textbf{xf}}3 22.\textit{\textbf{w}}xf3,
and White remained with a safe
and solid extra pawn, Kranzl –

11.\textit{\textbf{d}}xc5 \textit{\textbf{d}}xe5

Now, in order to regain his
pawn (in case that is possible at
all...), Black must give up his
dark-squared bishop and that is
quite unfavourable for him.

Later, there might follow for
example: 12...\textit{\textbf{w}}xd1+ 13.\textit{\textbf{w}}xd1
\textit{\textbf{d}}xe5 14.\textit{\textbf{f}}xe5 \textit{\textbf{d}}xc2 15.\textit{\textbf{d}}d7 \textit{\textbf{a}}xb3
16.\textit{\textbf{a}}xb3 \textit{\textbf{g}}g7 17.\textit{\textbf{d}}xb7 \textit{\textbf{d}}d3+
18.\textit{\textbf{e}}e2 \textit{\textbf{d}}xe5 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d5 \textit{\textbf{f}}f5 20.
\textit{\textbf{d}}xe7+ \textit{\textbf{d}}xe7 21.\textit{\textbf{e}}xe7 \textit{\textbf{c}}c6 22.
\textit{\textbf{c}}c7, and White had an extra
pawn and also dangerous passed
pawns in the endgame – Van
Vugt – Kraanen, the Hague 1983,
or 12...\textit{\textbf{w}}c7 13.a3 \textit{\textbf{d}}d8 14.\textit{\textbf{w}}e2
\textit{\textbf{d}}d6 15.\textit{\textbf{d}}d5 \textit{\textbf{d}}xd5 (what else?)
16.\textit{\textbf{d}}xd5 \textit{\textbf{d}}xe5 17.\textit{\textbf{f}}xe5 \textit{\textbf{d}}xe5
18.0–0–0, and Black’s compensa-
tion for the exchange is quite in-
sufficient, Carleton – Berriot,
corr. 1978.

d) 7...dxe5 8.\textit{\textbf{f}}xe5

Black now has two possible
plans – to go with his knight from
c6 to b4 and to play c7-c5, or to
attack White’s e5-pawn with the
move f7-f6 and that is more prin-
cipled.

In the second case – after the
exchange on f6, the e-file is
opened and Black’s bishop on g7 springs into action and attacks the d4-pawn. His position is quite active and White’s task is to neutralize that activity somehow, to defend everything and then to try to exploit the long-term advantages of his position – his pawn dominance in the centre and the weakness of the e6-square in Black’s camp.

Meanwhile, Black must make up his mind where to retreat with his knight: d1) 8...\(\text{\&d7}\), d2) 8...\(\text{\&g4}\), d3) 8...\(\text{\&e8}\), d4) 8...\(\text{\&d5}\) and finally, d5) 8...\(\text{\&h5}\).

d1) 8...\(\text{\&d7}\)

The knight supports c7-c5 from that square, but it covers the diagonal for the bishop on c8 and that is harmful for Black’s counterplay.

9.\(\text{\&e4}\)

This move is with the idea to defend the d4-pawn with c2-c3. White can also play the standard move 9.\(\text{\&e3}\).

9...\(\text{\&b4}\)

9...\(\text{\&b6}\) 10.c3= Szczepankiewicz – Wysocki, corr. 1994, leaves Black without the counterplay with c7-c5; and in case he decides to play f7-f6, it remains unclear why he had to waste time for the manoeuvre \(\text{\&d7-b6}\) in the first place.

10.\(\text{\&c4}\) c5 11.c3 \(\text{\&c6}\) 12.0–0 cxd4 13.cxd4

White’s d4-pawn is now of course a weakness, but this is immaterial, because just like in the standard positions with an isolated pawn – White has more than enough attacking prospects on the kingside.

13...\(\text{\&b6}\) 14.\(\text{\&b3}\) \(\text{\&g4}\)

It deserves attention for Black to play immediately 14...\(\text{\&a5}\), in order to repel the bishop away from the a2-g8 diagonal, but even then after for example: 15.\(\text{\&c2}\) \(\text{\&e6}\) 16.\(\text{\&e1}\) \(\text{\&c6}\) 17.\(\text{\&h4}\), and if 17...\(\text{\&xd4}\), White follows with 18.\(\text{\&eg5}\) and later captures on e6 and preserves his initiative and crushes Black’s kingside.

15.\(\text{\&eg5}\)

White manages to defend d4 with that move as well as to provoke the weakening e7-e6.

15...e6 16.h3 \(\text{\&xf3}\) 17.\(\text{\&xf3}\) \(\text{\&d7}\)

18.\(\text{\&g5}\)

The d4-pawn is safe now and potentially White has good chances to seize the initiative on the kingside, because of the weak dark squares there. There might follow: 18...\(\text{\&a5}\) 19.\(\text{\&c2}\) \(\text{\&ac8}\) 20.\(\text{\&e4}\) \(\text{\&d5}\) 21.\(\text{\&e1}\) \(\text{\&c4}\) 22.\(\text{\&f2}\) f5. Black has chances to get some counterplay in the centre with that move and to solidify his

**d2) 8...Qg4**

Black has no chances to bring his bishop to g4 after that retreat and that diminishes his chances to organize any effective counterplay.

9.Qe4

This move defends the d4-pawn and creates the threat to capture the knight on c6 at some opportune moment.

9...f6

It is not satisfactory for Black to play 9...Qxd4 10.Qxd4 Qxe5 11.Qde2 Qxd1+ 12.Qxd1 – since his compensation for the piece is insufficient, Hamer – Lepecq, IECG 2001.

9...e6 – is not in harmony with Black’s plan. After 10.h3 Qh6 11.Qg5 Qd7 12.g4 Qh8 13.Qd2 Qg8 14.0–0–0, White has gained plenty of time to complete his development and to create some threats on the kingside thanks to the manoeuvres of the knight on g4, Bongers – Balada Moreno, Valencia 1999.

9...Qd7 – This move is too passive and enables White to occupy the centre with his pawns: 10.h3 Qh6 11.d5 Qa5 12.Qf4+ Timman – Lacalle, Malaga 1971. Black has no space and his knights are a sorry sight.

In case of 9...f5, the pawn structure in the centre stabilizes and thus White can exchange on c6: 10.Qd5+ e6 11.Qxc6 bxc6 12.Qg5. The position is closed and the absence of White’s light-squared bishop is not as important as the long-term weaknesses on Black’s queenside, for example: 12.Qe8 13.h3 Qh6 14.Qa4 Qf7 15.h4 h6 16.Qf4 Qe7 17.Qd2± Wedberg – Lekander, Eksjo 1980. White has an excellent outpost for his knight and an obvious positional advantage.

10.h3 Qh6 11.Qd5+ Qh8

It is not good for Black to play 11...Qf7, at least because of 12.e6 Qd6 13.0–0 Qh4 14.Qb3 c6 15.a3 Qa6 16.Qf4 Qc7 17.Qe1 – White’s e6-pawn provides him with a huge space advantage and cramps Black considerably, Reinhold – Mueller, corr. 1987.

Black’s other possibility is – 11...e6 12.Qxc6 bxc6. After 13.h3 Qh6 14.exf6 Qxf6 15.0–0 Qf5, and there arises a position in which Black has plenty of weaknesses, but he has a bishop pair. There followed: 16.Qe2 a5 (This is to evacuate the queen from the f-file and to activate the
bishop on c8.), and here instead of 17.\textit{\textdollar}e4, Bjuhr – Mattsson, corr. 1972, White could have played 17.\textit{\textdollar}xh6 (Black's knight on f5 would have been a nuisance for White.) 17...\textit{\textdollar}xh6 18.\textit{\textdollar}d2 (18.\textit{\textdollar}e5 \textit{\textdollar}a6, The bishop on c8 is finally in action.) 18...\textit{\textdollar}b6 19.\textit{\textdollar}b3 – White has neutralized the activity of the black pieces, while his position is clearly superior.

\textbf{12.exf6 exf6}

Black can try here an interesting move that has not been tested in practice: 12...\textit{\textdollar}xf6 with the idea to attack at some moment the d-pawn with the rook, for example: 13.\textit{\textdollar}g5 \textit{\textdollar}d6 14.\textit{\textdollar}xc6 \textit{\textdollar}xc6 (or 14...\textit{\textdollar}xc6 15.0-0 \textit{\textdollar}f5 16.\textit{\textdollar}f4\pm, eyeing the e5-square) 15.\textit{\textdollar}d2 and 0-0-0 – White defends his pawn relatively easily, while Black has many weaknesses in his position to worry about – the e5-square is vulnerable as well as the e7-pawn and his rook is endangered.

\textbf{13.0-0}

The position has been clarified more or less. White has some edge in the centre, while Black should try to counterattack the d4-pawn. This is not so easy however. If he plays f5 – then the knight on h6 would remain out of play, while if the knight goes to f5 – the bishop on g7 would be uncomfortable. This is the standard situation in which you cannot occupy one square with two pieces.

Moreover, White is dominant on the a2-g8 diagonal and Black cannot develop his bishop on c8 as well as his whole queenside because of that.

\textbf{13...\textit{\textdollar}f5}

Black cannot change much with 13...\textit{\textdollar}e8 14.\textit{\textdollar}e1 \textit{\textdollar}xe1+ (or 14...\textit{\textdollar}f5, Kaliwoda – Gradinger, Germany 1991, and here instead of 15.\textit{\textdollar}xc6, which gave Black the two bishop advantage at the cost of isolating his pawns, White had better play: 15.\textit{\textdollar}xe8+ \textit{\textdollar}xe8 16.\textit{\textdollar}f4\pm, and the placement of his pieces is much better and if 16...g5, then 17.\textit{\textdollar}xc7 \textit{\textdollar}e3+ 18.\textit{\textdollar}h1 \textit{\textdollar}cxd4 19.\textit{\textdollar}h2 – and Black's pieces in the centre are quite unstable and he has problems to develop his queenside. It is too early for Black to develop his bishop: 14...\textit{\textdollar}d7: 15.\textit{\textdollar}f4 \textit{\textdollar}xe1+ 16.\textit{\textdollar}xe1 \textit{\textdollar}e7 17.\textit{\textdollar}xc7 \textit{\textdollar}xc7 18.\textit{\textdollar}xe7 \textit{\textdollar}e8, Reisinger – Meter, corr. 1991,

And now White after: 19.\textit{\textdollar}c5 \textit{\textdollar}g3 20.\textit{\textdollar}e4 \textit{\textdollar}xe4 21.\textit{\textdollar}xe4 \textit{\textdollar}xh3 22.\textit{\textdollar}d2 could have remained with a material advantage.) 15.\textit{\textdollar}xe1 \textit{\textdollar}e7 16.\textit{\textdollar}b3 \textit{\textdollar}hf5 17.
\( \text{f2 d6} \) (This is to prevent the development of the white bishop to f4.) 18.\( \text{b5 b6} \) 19.\( \text{c4 c6} \) 20.\( \text{c3 c7} \) 21.\( \text{d2 d7} \) 22.\( \text{e1 e8} \) 23.\( \text{e4} \) – and White maintained a slight edge, because of the passive bishop on g7, Klovans – Zhuravlev, Riga 1972.

14.\( \text{e1 d6} \)

It is useless for Black to try to solve the problems tactically with: 14...\( \text{cxd4} \) 15.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 16.\( \text{xd4 c6} \) 17.\( \text{f4 exd5} \) 18.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{e7} \) Golovev – Borsenko, USSR 1971. The enormous difference in the activity of pieces might soon become disastrous for Black.

It is better for him to play 14...\( \text{cxe4} \), but after 15.\( \text{b3 g5} \), van Der Kleij – van Buuren, corr. 1977, 16.\( \text{e4} \)? with the idea to follow with c2-c3, White has a stable advantage because of the weakness of the e6-square and the passive bishop on g7.

\[ \text{15.}\text{e4!} \]

This is with the idea to place the bishop on f4 and to defend the d4-pawn too. It is weaker for White to play: 15.\( \text{xc6 xc6} \) 16.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{g5} \) 17.\( \text{h2 d7} \) V.Sokolov – Smederevac, Wijk aan Zee 1970. He should not give away his light-squared bishop just like that. 15...\( \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{f4 d8} \) 17.\( \text{xc6 xc6} \) 18.\( \text{d5} \) Now, the disappearance off the board of the light-squared bishop is not so important, because White is dominant in the centre thanks to the idea to play d5-d6.

**d3) 8...\( \text{e8} \)**

Black’s knight here is much more passive than in the main line 8...\( \text{h5} \) (see later). The ideas in the position are more or less similar, but Black’s possibilities are reduced. White can play e5-e6 in answer to f6 in many variations and after the exchange on f6 and Black’s capturing with the pawn – he still must try to activate his knight by bringing it to d6 and that would cost plenty of time.

9.\( \text{c3 g4} \)

It is interesting for Black to try immediately 9...\( \text{f6} \)? White can make good use of the position of the black knight on e8 then and avoid exchanging in the centre altogether and play in-
stead: 10.\texttt{c4+ h8 11.0–0 g4}
(in case of 11...fxe5 12.\texttt{xe5}
\texttt{xf1+ 13.gxf1 xe5 14.dxe5 f5}
15.d1 White has the advantage
- Black's pieces, and particularly
the knight on e8, are misplaced.)
12.d5?? (White's other moves
present Black with sufficient
counterplay: 12.h3 \texttt{xf3 13.gxf3}
\texttt{xd4; 13.xf3 xe5 14.xf8+}
\texttt{xf8 15.d5 d4. Black gives}
the pawn back, but he exchanges
an important bishop. 16.xd4 exd4
17.xd4+ g7 18.e3 d6\#,
and Black's dark-squared bishop
is too strong. 12.e1 e6 – It is
worse for Black to play 12...xf3
13.xf3 xd4 14.h3 f5 15.
d1\#, and White's initiative is
more than sufficient to compen-
sate the sacrificed pawn – 13.
xf6 xf6 14.h4 xf3 15.xf3
g8\# Prandstetter – Petran,
Agard 1976. The pawn on d4 is
hanging and there is no attack.)
12...fxe5 (this move is logical to
say the least – otherwise Black
has no useful moves left) 13.
xc6 exd4 (after 13...bxc6 14.
xe5 xd1 15.xf8+ xf8 16.
f7+ g8 17.xd8 xd8 18.
d1\# – Black's pawns are
so weak in this endgame that White
is clearly better.) 14.xb7 dxe3
15.xa8 xa8 16.e2\#. Black's
compensation for the exchange is
not quite sufficient, because he
loses his e3-pawn too.

\textbf{10.e2}

In case of 10.e4 f6 11.exf6
xf6, Black has some promising
counterplay, because after 12.
xc6 bxc6 13.0–0 d5\#, his two
bishops in that open position
compensate his pawn weak-
nesses, Buch – Schussler, Co-
penhagen 1974.

\textbf{10...f6}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

11.e6??

After 11.exf6 exf6 (11...xf6
transposes to the line 8...h5)
12.0–0, but here Black develops
his bishop to d6 and obtains a
satisfactory game: 12...d6
13.d5 xf3 14.xf3 (just like
14.xf3 e5 15.f2 f5 16.c5\#)
14...e5 15.f4 f5\# – and Black's
centralized knights are impres-
sive, Nemec – Novak, Presov
1978.

\textbf{11...f5}

It is also principled for Black
to play: 11.b4 12.d5 c6 13.h3
xf3 14.xf3 c7 (in a similar
position with a knight on h5 (see
later the line 8...h5 9.e3 g4
10.e2 f6), Black would have the
dangerous manoeuvre g3-f5,
and therefore 12.d5 would not
have been good for White as well
as 11.e6 altogether) 15.dxc6
xd1\# (in the game Barlov –
Schussler, Tjentiste 1975, Black
was not successful at all with
15...\texttt{dxc6} 16.0–0. White loses his e6-pawn indeed, but his compensation for it turns out to be more than sufficient: 16...\texttt{\texttt{c8}} 17.\texttt{d7} \texttt{dxc6} 18.\texttt{xc8} \texttt{xxc8} 19.\texttt{d5} \texttt{d8} 20.\texttt{d1} \texttt{f8} 21.\texttt{b3=}. The queens have been exchanged, but Black is still in trouble, because of the weak e7-pawn and his vulnerable king in the centre.) 16.\texttt{xd1} \texttt{xc2+} 17.\texttt{f2} \texttt{c3} 18.\texttt{xe3} bxc6 19.\texttt{d7} \texttt{xe6} 20.\texttt{xc6} \texttt{d8} 21.\texttt{d5} \texttt{f7} 22.\texttt{xa7} f5 23.\texttt{a6} \texttt{d4+} (It is better for Black to play 23...\texttt{d6} 24.\texttt{xd6} exd6 25.\texttt{d3} – but White still has the advantage, because of his connected passed pawns.) 24.\texttt{f3} \texttt{xd5} (Now Black cannot play 24...\texttt{d6}, because of 25.\texttt{xd6} exd6 26.\texttt{b5} and he loses a piece.) 25.\texttt{xd5} – and Black’s compensation for the exchange is insufficient, Littlewood – Schulsler, Groningen 1975.

12.\texttt{d5} \texttt{xf3} 13.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{e5}


\begin{center}
\textbf{d4) 8...\texttt{d5} 9.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{xd5} 10.\texttt{c3}}
\end{center}

White’s plan is clear – he must castle, develop his bishop to \texttt{f4} and later play \texttt{e2}, then he can repel the black queen with his other bishop etc. Black now has a multiple choice of developing moves and two of them are the most popular: \textbf{d4a) 10...\texttt{e6} and \texttt{d4b) 10...\texttt{g4}.}

His other possibilities are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item 10...\texttt{f5} – The exchange of the light-squared bishops does not compensate the compromising of the Black’s pawn structure on the kingside. 11.\texttt{xf5} gxf5 12.0–0 \texttt{d8} 13.\texttt{f4} e6 14.\texttt{e1=} Sedlak – Vukovic, Budapest 1999. White’s centre is stable and he has the initiative on the kingside;
  \item 10...\texttt{h8} 11.\texttt{e2} \texttt{g4} (11...\texttt{f6}, transposes to the line 10...\texttt{f6}) 12.0–0 \texttt{d8} 13.h3 \texttt{xf3} 14.\texttt{xf3}
\end{itemize}
Chapter 18

f5 15.exf6 exf6 16.\texttt{c}4 17.\texttt{d}7 17.\texttt{f}4± Van Gool – Borghouts, Venlo 1991. Black has placed his knight quite passively and he has weakened the a2-g8 diagonal unnecessarily by exchanging the light-squared bishops without any reason;

10...f6 – This attempt to undermine White's centre is premature and it is refuted tactically. 11.\texttt{e}2 (threatening \texttt{c}4) 11...\texttt{h}8 (It is not any better for Black to play 11...e6 12.\texttt{c}4 13.exf6 exf6 14.\texttt{h}6 15.\texttt{x}g7 16.0–0 17.\texttt{e}7 17.\texttt{h}4±, and White has a great advantage, because Black's king is misplaced and his dark squares are weak, Lehtinen – Puustinen, corr. 1987; or 11...\texttt{e}6 12.exf6 exf6 13.0–0 14.\texttt{f}4 15.\texttt{f}2 16.\texttt{g}3±, and White's pieces are much more active, Mauro – Bolignano, corr. 1996. It is less precise for White after 11...Be6 to follow with 12.c4, Kryl – Rehmsdorf, Internet 2005, because of 12...\texttt{d}8 13.d5 14.b4 15.e6 – 15...f5 16.b1 c6, and Black manages to undermine White's too far advanced centre.) 12.\texttt{e}4 17.\texttt{f}7 (after 12...\texttt{d}7, White follows with 13.h4–, and it becomes clear that the black king is quite vulnerable along the h-file – White has a strong attack.) 13.0–0. It is now clear that Black is threatening nothing (his queen is misplaced) and his attempt to undermine White's centre has failed. 13...

\texttt{d}8 14.\texttt{d}2 c6 15.\texttt{d}3± Ibragimov – Bezold, Pulvermuehle 2000. Black's pieces are placed quite passively and badly too;

10...\texttt{a}5 – This move is with the obvious idea to prepare \texttt{c}5, but White can easily prevent that. 11.b4 (White can also play simply 11.\texttt{e}2 c5 12.\texttt{e}4 13.dxc5 14.\texttt{e}3 15.\texttt{d}4 16.\texttt{xc}6 17.0–0 Moskalenko – Zhelnin, Odessa 1989, and White has an extra pawn indeed, but Black has some compensation, because of the weakness on the light squares.) 11...\texttt{c}4 12.\texttt{e}2 13.0–0\uparrow Klundt – Weill, Ybbs 1968. White has completed his development and he has solidified his centre while Black's knight was roaming here and there;

10.\texttt{d}8 – Black is now threatening to capture on e5. 11.\texttt{e}2 12.g4, Grobelny – Ferrant, Cappelle la Grande 1995 (11...\texttt{e}6 now leads to a position similar to the line 10...\texttt{e}6 11.0–0 12ad8, but the difference is that Black's rook is not on f8. All this is not good for Black, because after 12.g5, he has to go back with the rook, Abdullaev – Rahimov, Baku 2002; Black cannot play 11...\texttt{x}e5, because of 12.\texttt{x}e5 13.\texttt{e}4, and White wins a piece.) 12.\texttt{e}4±. White's centre is stable and after h3 the bishop of the opponent must be either exchanged on f3, which is quite undesirable in such open position, or retreat and that is favourable
for White as well.

\[ \text{d4a) 10...}\text{e6} \]

This move defends the a2-g8 diagonal. Black now intends to play \text{Ad8} and f6. Well, his bishop is not ideally placed on that square, because of the threat c4 and d5.

\[ \text{11.0–0 Ad8} \]

Black weakens considerably his queenside with: 11...b5 12.\text{f6 e2 a6, Kryl – Borislav, Internet 2005, and here White’s simplest line would have been: 13.\text{g5 Ad8 14.\text{exe6exe6 15.a4+}, and it is inconceivable how Black can defend his a6 and b5-pawns.} \]

It is too risky for Black to play immediately 11...f6 12.c4 \text{d7} (It is even worse for Black to play here 12...\text{d8 13.d5 b4, Justin – Veber, Portoroz 1989, 14.e4+, and White is totally dominant in the centre.)} 13.exf6 (It is worse for White to play immediately 13.d5, Holmsten – Lammi, Helsinki 1993 – because Black can counter that with 13...\text{exe5 14.\text{exe5 fxe5 15.dxe6 d4+ 16.h1 Ad8\text{x}, and he regains his piece.)} and after the capture on f6, White plays 14.d5 and preserves his edge in the centre.

\[ 11...\text{f7 12.f4} \]

(It is still premature for White to try 12.g5, Huuskonen – Molarius, corr. 1991, because Black can sacrifice a piece for three pawns on the d4-square and that would lead to a quite unclear position.) 12...f6 (About 12...\text{ad8} – see 11...\text{ad8 12.f4 d7} 13.exf6 (It deserves some attention for White to play immediately 13.e1\text{!}, postponing for a while the exchange on f6.) 13...exf6, and now instead of 14.a4, Klovans – Kirilov, Riga 1986, White had better play, just like after some other orders of moves that we have dealt with in this chapter: 14.e1 e8 15.g3\text{±, “eyeing” Black’s c7-pawn.} \]

\[ \text{12.f4 d7} \]

Once again Black cannot play 12...f6 13.exf6, and White wins the c7-pawn.

\[ 12.a6 \]

This move is hardly the most useful for Black in that position. 13.e1 d7 14.g3 b8. This manoeuvre seems too artificial. Its purpose though, is quite reasonable – Black wishes to prepare c7-c5. 15.c4. The removal of Black’s knight away from the centre enables White to push his pawns forward. They can now come under attack by the opponent’s pieces rather easily indeed. 15.g4 16.d5 f3, Herold – Gaidot, corr. 1990, and here White should follow with 17.xf3, in order not to reduce
the double protection of his e5-pawn. 17...e6 18.\*e4± – White defends his pawns presently and he is ready to push d5-d6 at an opportune moment.

Black has played numerous times in practice the move 12...\*g4, but it is a bit senseless – White simply plays 13.e1 and he has an extra tempo in comparison to the line 10...\*g4.

In case of 12...\*a5 (\*c7-c5) 13.e2 c5, Groothuisen – Brantjes, corr. 1977, it deserves attention for White to play: 14.c4!? \*x4 15.f1. Should the black knight go to b6 – then after \*xc5 and \*b5, Black loses his queen and the sacrifice 15...\*xe5 is insufficient: 16.\*xe5 \*xe5 17.\*xe5 \*xe5 18.\*xe5 cxd4 19.\*c7, and White wins a pawn and preserves his material advantage.

13.e1 \*f5

This exchange of the bishops saves Black from a direct attack against his king.

Black’s counterplay after 13...\*d5 is not helped at all, Wahlbom – Niklasson, Lund 1974, 14.\*g3± – and White is ready to start his offensive on the kingside.

There is no need for Black to play 13...a6, Arakhamia – Jokic, Pula 1990, 14.\*g3± – and Black has simply lost time in vain.

13...f6 14.\*g3. This move defends the centre and attacks the c7-pawn at the same time – it becomes clear the move f6 cannot solve Black’s problems.

14...\*f7 15.exf6 exf6 16.e1 \*e8 17.c2± Korneev – Gual, Badalona 1996. Black’s pieces in the centre are misplaced and he has weaknesses on the e6 and c7-squares – so is he too far from equalizing.

14.\*xf5 \*xf5 15.\*g3

White is not threatening anything at present, but Black cannot undermine his centre. Thus White has a stable space advantage and a clear edge.

15.h6

It is worse for Black to play 15...\*d7 16.e1 e6 (or 16...\*d5 17.a3 e6 18.\*h4 f5 19.exf6 \*xf6 20.\*g5 \*xg5 21.\*wg5 22.\*e4± Kulczycki – Pulkkinen, Email 1999, and he had plenty of weaknesses in his position.) 17.\*h4 \*e7 18.\*g5 h6 19.\*e4±, and Black has problems with his kingside, because of the vulnerable f6-square, Eberth – Gaillard, corr. 1991.

16.e1 \*e6 17.a3 \*a5

18.\*g5

This move is with the original idea of forcing Black to push forward his h-pawn, which is hardly favourable for him. The
bishop cannot be captured of course, because of the checkmate – $\text{Qxg5}$ and $\text{Wh4}$. 18...$\text{Ad7}$ 19. $\text{Wh4}$ $\text{h5}$ 20.$\text{b4}$ $\text{Ec4}$ 21.$\text{e1}$+, Ehlvest – Anand, Reggio Emilia 1988. Black cannot undermine White’s centre as before. White has solidified his position and he preserves active possibilities like $\text{Qg5}$ and e6.

d4b) 10...$\text{Ag4}$

11.0–0 $\text{Ad8}$
11...$\text{Ed7}$ 12.$\text{We1}$ $\text{Ad8}$ 13. $\text{Ag3}$ – see 11...$\text{Ad8}$ 12.$\text{We1}$ $\text{Ed7}$.
It is hardly satisfactory for Black to break White’s centre with 11...$\text{fxe5}$ 12.$\text{dxe5}$ $\text{Ad8}$ (in case of 12...$\text{fxd8}$, White can play 13.$\text{Aa4}$ $\text{xf3}$ 14.$\text{xf3}$ $\text{xe5}$ 15. $\text{e4}$ $\text{xf3}$ 16.$\text{xf3}$, and he has a clear advantage in the middle game – his two bishops are stronger than a rook.) 13.$\text{h6}$ $\text{c5}$+ 14.$\text{h1}$ $\text{xe5}$ 15.$\text{xf8}$ $\text{xd3}$ 16. $\text{d2}$ $\text{xf8}$ 17.$\text{d4}$+ – and Black’s compensation for the exchange is insufficient despite his two extra pawns, Boudy – Zwaig, Dresden 1969.
11...f6 12.$\text{We2}$ (White makes use of the same motif as after 10...f6, and obtains the advantage.) 12...$\text{Wh8}$ 13.$\text{Ac4}$ $\text{d8}$ 14.$\text{exf6}$ $\text{exf6}$ 15.$\text{f4}$ $\text{e8}$ 16.$\text{f2}$+ Graves – Butler, Seattle 1992. As usual Black’s c7-pawn is weak; meanwhile White controls the important a2-g8 diagonal.

11...e6 (This move would not help Black undermine White’s centre.) 12.$\text{We1}$ $\text{xf3}$ (or 12...f6 13.$\text{e4}$ $\text{d7}$ 14.$\text{exf6}$ $\text{xf6}$ 15.$\text{g5}$ $\text{f7}$ 16.$\text{g3}$ – Black’s pawn-move to e6 turned out to be unnecessary here too.) 13.$\text{xf3}$ $\text{e7}$ 14.$\text{e4}$ $\text{b5}$ 15.a4 $\text{a6}$ 16.$\text{g5}$+ Popescu – Croizer, Avoine 2000. Black has failed to exploit the right moment to undermine White’s centre and he has remained in a passive position with rather poor prospects on the kingside.

12.$\text{We1}$ f6
It is also possible for Black to try 12...$\text{Ed7}$ 13.$\text{g3}$ $\text{xf3}$ 14.$\text{xf3}$ f5 15.$\text{exf6}$ $\text{exf6}$ 16.$\text{f4}$ $\text{c8}$ 17.$\text{e1}$+ Kotronias – Skembris, Glyfada 1995. Black now must defend his c7-pawn, but it is quite unclear how to parry White’s threats along the e-file.

13.$\text{exf6}$ $\text{exf6}$
Or 13...$\text{xf6}$ 14.$\text{e4}$ $\text{d6}$ 15.$\text{h6}$+. White prevents Black from playing e5 – he can counter that at least by capturing on c6 or e5, and it will be also difficult for Black to organize that pawn-break even later. Therefore, without the move e5 – his position will remain worse with plenty of static weaknesses.
14. \( \texttt{\texttt{f}} \texttt{4} \) \( \texttt{d} \texttt{7} \) 15. \( \texttt{g} \texttt{3} \) \( \texttt{c} \texttt{8} \) 16. \( \texttt{ae1} \) \( \texttt{e6} \)

17. \( \texttt{d} \texttt{2} \)±

After White maneuvers his knight to the e4, or b3-square, he will emphasize the vulnerability of the e6 and b7-squares (particularly if you have in mind that Black cannot play b6, because of the move \( \texttt{a} \texttt{a6} \) and White’s advantage will be more than obvious, Zifroni – Labok, Ramat Aviv 2000.

\[ \text{d5) 8...\texttt{h} \texttt{5} 9.\texttt{e} \texttt{3} \]

We will analyse now the moves: \( \text{d5a) 9...f6} \) and \( \text{d5b) 9...g4} \).

Black has also tried here 9...\( \texttt{b} \texttt{4} \) 10.\( \texttt{e} \texttt{2} \). White keeps attacking Black’s knight on h5, which has nowhere to retreat to presently. 10...\( \texttt{f} \texttt{5} \) 11.\( \texttt{c} \texttt{1} \) \( \texttt{d} \texttt{5} \) 12.\( \texttt{xd} \texttt{5} \) \( \texttt{xd} \texttt{5} \) 13.0-0 \( \texttt{h} \texttt{8} \) (Black cannot capture the pawn, moreover he should worry about providing a square for his knight to retreat to: 13...\( \texttt{x} \texttt{xa2} \) 14.\( \texttt{d} \texttt{2} \)–\( \texttt{g} \texttt{4} \) 14.\( \texttt{h} \texttt{4} \) \( \texttt{g} \texttt{7} \) 15.\( \texttt{c} \texttt{4} \) \( \texttt{e} \texttt{4} \) 16.\( \texttt{f} \texttt{2} \) \( \texttt{c} \texttt{8} \) 17.\( \texttt{f} \texttt{3} \) \( \texttt{f} \texttt{4} \) 18.\( \texttt{g} \texttt{3} \) \( \texttt{h} \texttt{6} \) 19.\( \texttt{e} \texttt{2} \)±). White has a great positional advantage – it is just quite enough to only have a look at how practically all black pieces have been placed. Later, in the game Klovans – Karasev, Satka 2004 there followed 19...\( \texttt{f} \texttt{5} \) 20.\( \texttt{g} \texttt{2} \) \( \texttt{d} \texttt{8} \) 21.\( \texttt{cd} \texttt{1} \) g5 22.\( \texttt{g} \texttt{4} \) \( \texttt{h} \texttt{4} \) (It is quite understandable that Black is reluctant to go back with his knight, but now he loses a pawn without any compensation at all.) 23.\( \texttt{xh} \texttt{4} \) \( \texttt{gxh} \texttt{4} \) 24.\( \texttt{h} \texttt{1} \) c6 25.\( \texttt{g} \texttt{5} \) \( \texttt{g} \texttt{6} \) 26.\( \texttt{xh} \texttt{4} \)–\( \texttt{e} \texttt{6} \) 27.\( \texttt{d} \texttt{5} \) \( \texttt{cxd} \texttt{5} \) 28.\( \texttt{xd} \texttt{5} \) \( \texttt{f} \texttt{5} \) 29.\( \texttt{h} \texttt{5} \) \( \texttt{e} \texttt{4} \) 30.\( \texttt{g} \texttt{1} \) \( \texttt{b} \texttt{6} \) 31.\( \texttt{f} \texttt{2} \) \( \texttt{c} \texttt{7} \) 32.\( \texttt{xf} \texttt{7} \), and Black resigned.

\( \text{d5a) 9...f6} \)

This immediate attack against White’s centre deserves attention. Black has developed one piece less in comparison to the line 9...\( \texttt{g} \texttt{4} \) 10.\( \texttt{e} \texttt{2} \) \( \texttt{f} \texttt{6} \), nevertheless the placement of the bishop on d3 makes the d4-pawn more vulnerable.

10.\( \texttt{exf6} \)

It looks attractive for White to put his pawn as a wedge in Black’s position with: 10.\( \texttt{c} \texttt{4} \) \( \texttt{h} \texttt{8} \) 11.\( \texttt{e} \texttt{6} \), but unfortunately it would not work tactically: 11...\( \texttt{a} \texttt{5} \) 12.\( \texttt{e} \texttt{2} \) \( \texttt{xe} \texttt{6} \) 13.\( \texttt{d} \texttt{5} \) \( \texttt{g} \texttt{4} \).
Now 14.b4 does not win a piece, because of the weakness on the long diagonal: 14...\texttt{\textsection}xf3 15.gxf3 f5\textsection Bailey – Wolff, Toronto 1989, 16.\texttt{\textsection}d2 (It is too bad for White to play 16.\texttt{\textsection}b5 c6 17.\texttt{\textsection}d4 \texttt{\textsection}xd5 18.bxa5 f4 19.\texttt{\textsection}f2 \texttt{\textsection}xa5+ 20.\texttt{\textsection}f1 \texttt{\textsection}ad8=\textsection, and Black regains his knight because of the pin and he remains with a material advantage.) 16...\texttt{\textsection}d6 17.\texttt{\textsection}b5 (17.\texttt{\textsection}b1 \texttt{\textsection}e5 18.\texttt{\textsection}d1 \texttt{\textsection}c4 19.\texttt{\textsection}xc4 f4) 17...\texttt{\textsection}f6 18.\texttt{\textsection}d4 e5 19.dxe6 (In case of 19.\texttt{\textsection}c5 \texttt{\textsection}c4 20.\texttt{\textsection}xc4 \texttt{\textsection}h4+ 21.\texttt{\textsection}d1 \texttt{\textsection}xc4 22.\texttt{\textsection}xf8 \texttt{\textsection}xf8 23.\texttt{\textsection}a3 \texttt{\textsection}a6=\textsection Black has acceptable compensation for the exchange.) 19...\texttt{\textsection}h4+ 20.\texttt{\textsection}f2 \texttt{\textsection}e7, and White has nothing better than a draw by a perpetual chase of the enemy queen.

After 14.0–0, White is already threatening to play b4, but Black can counter that with 14...f5! (He must evacuate his knight from the h5-square, otherwise he cannot exchange on f3, because of \texttt{\textsection}xf3, or \texttt{\textsection}xf3-h3 followed by capturing on h5.) 15.\texttt{\textsection}d4 \texttt{\textsection}xf3 16.\texttt{\textsection}xf3 e5! 17.\texttt{\textsection}c5 \texttt{\textsection}f6, and Black has excellent compensation for the exchange due to his absolute dominance over the dark squares and his mobile central pawns.

(diagram)

10...\texttt{\textsection}xf6

It is clearly worse for Black to capture with the bishop, instead of with the knight, because after 10...\texttt{\textsection}xf6, Redven – Nouro, Jyvaskyla 1993, 11.\texttt{\textsection}e4=\textsection, he has to lose even more time in order to retreat with it, for example: 11.\texttt{\textsection}g7 12.\texttt{\textsection}c4+ \texttt{\textsection}h8 13.0-0 \texttt{\textsection}f6 15.\texttt{\textsection}eg5 (White creates the potential threat \texttt{\textsection}f7+) 15...\texttt{\textsection}g4 16.\texttt{\textsection}e2 e5 (Black's only possible counterplay is obviously connected with playing e7-e5.) 17.\texttt{\textsection}xe5 \texttt{\textsection}xe5 18.dxe5 \texttt{\textsection}xe5 19.\texttt{\textsection}xf8+ \texttt{\textsection}xf8 20.\texttt{\textsection}d4 \texttt{\textsection}e7 (otherwise Black has no defence against the exchange on e5, followed by \texttt{\textsection}f7+) 21.\texttt{\textsection}xe5 \texttt{\textsection}xg5 22.\texttt{\textsection}xg7+ \texttt{\textsection}xg7 23.\texttt{\textsection}e1=\textsection and \texttt{\textsection}e7+.

10...exf6 – This move leads to a position that is similar to the line 9...\texttt{\textsection}g4, except that it is even worse for Black, since after exf6, Black does not attack the d4-pawn anymore and White is not obliged to play \texttt{\textsection}e2. He will have more space and better prospects in the maneuvering battle that is to follow. 11.\texttt{\textsection}d2 \texttt{\textsection}g4 (or 11...\texttt{\textsection}h8 12.0–0–0 \texttt{\textsection}g4 13.\texttt{\textsection}e2 \texttt{\textsection}e7 14.h3 \texttt{\textsection}d7. Black will be happy to have the g3-square for his knight on h5. 15.g4 \texttt{\textsection}g3 16.\texttt{\textsection}he1 \texttt{\textsection}xe2+ 17.\texttt{\textsection}xe2. White should not mind the trade of his bishop, because the rest of his pieces are much more active than
those of his counterpart. 17...c6 18.\( \text{dxe1} \) \( \text{g8} \) 19.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 20.a3. White’s last two moves were not obligatory at all, but still that was useful prophylactics for the future safety of his king. 20...\( \text{e6} \) 21.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{f7} \) 22.\( \text{xex8} \) \( \text{exe8} \) 23.g5! This important move emphasizes the weaknesses of Black’s kingside. 23...\( \text{xf7} \) 24.gxf6 \( \text{xf6} \) 25.\( \text{e5}\pm \) – and White has a clear advantage, because of his powerful knight on e5, Smagin – Lau, Germany 1992.) 12.0–0–0 \( \text{xf3} \) (In case of 12.\( \text{d7} \), Roschina – Poropat, Pula 1999, White should better play 13.\( \text{he1} \)\?\( \pm \), in order to complete his development and then to choose between d5 and \( \text{e4} \).) 13.\( \text{gf3} \). It is not so dangerous for White to have his pawns on f3 and h2 isolated, because \( \text{fack} \) cannot exploit that at all. 13...f5 14.d5 \( \text{e5} \) 15.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{f7} \) (15...f4 will surrender to White the key e4-outpost.) 16.f4 \( \text{f6} \) 17.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d6} \) 18.\( \text{f3} \). The weakness of the e5 and e6-squares is much more important than the vulnerability of the e4-square, and after 18...\( \text{fe4} \) 19.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 20.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{g7} \) 21.\( \text{d5} \) 22.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 23.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 24.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{g8} \) 25.\( \text{b3}\pm \) Thipsay – Bauza, Luzern 1982, White wins the b7-pawn because of the pin of the black rook.

Therefore the capturing 10...\( \text{xf6} \), seems to be more principled, because it preserves for Black the possibility to act aggressively in the centre (to prepare e5 and to attack the d4-pawn).

11.\( \text{d2} \)

11...\( \text{g4} \)

It is favourable for Black to exchange the bishop on e3 – he will thus improve the prospects of his own dark-squared bishop.

11...\( \text{e6} \) 12.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 13.0–0–0 (White could have also tried here: 13.\( \text{exe6} \)\? \( \text{exe6} \) 14.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{h8} \) 15.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 15...\( \text{d6} \) 16.0–0–0 \( \pm \) 16.0–0–0 \( \text{e5} \) 17.\( \text{exe5} \) \( \text{exe5} \) 18.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xe2} \) 19.\( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{ae8} \) 20.\( \text{dd1}\pm \), and he preserves his two-bishop advantage.) 13...\( \text{b4} \) 14.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{g4} \) 15.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xg4} \) 16.\( \text{he1} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 17.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 18.\( \text{xe3} \). White maintains some minimal edge despite the simplifications. 18.\( \text{d7} \) 19.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{h8} \) 20.\( \text{ae8} \) 21.\( \text{xe2} \) 22.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 23.\( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{ef8} \) 24.a3\( \pm \). The opponents agreed to a draw in this position in the game Ventimiglia – Marcotulli, IECC 2001, but White was still slightly better – the f-file was almost irrelevant at that moment, while Black’s e7-pawn was obviously weaker than White’s d5-pawn. Black’s king seemed quite vul-
nerable too.

In the game Luther – H. Schmidt, Saarbruecken 2002, Black played 11...\textit{g}4 12.0–0–0 \textit{d}5 13.\textit{e}4 \textit{cb}4 (Black insists on preserving his knight on the d5-outpost, but that is hardly worth all those efforts.) 14.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 15.\textit{h}3 \textit{f}5 16.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5 17.\textit{h}6 \textit{d}6 18.\textit{xg}7 \textit{yg}7 19.\textit{he}1 – and White has a slight but stable advantage.

12.0–0–0 \textit{xe}3 13.\textit{xe}3 \textit{g}4 14.\textit{e}4 \textit{d}6 15.\textit{e}2 \textit{h}8

It will be almost the same after: 15...\textit{ad}8 16.c3±.

16.c3±

White has parried the counterattack against the d4-pawn, but he had to give up his dark-squared bishop because of that. Meanwhile, Black’s bishop on g7 is not particularly active yet and White would like to clarify presently the intentions of the bishop on g4 with the move h2-h3. In case Black exchanges on f3, White plans to advance forward his h-pawn with the standard attack against Black’s kingside.

In the game Maeder – Beim, Biel 1990, White played immediately: 16.h3 \textit{xf}3 17.\textit{xf}3 \textit{f}6 18.h4 (18.c3) 18...\textit{e}5 19.\textit{xc}6 (Black can counter 19.d5 with 19...\textit{dd}4, while in case White plays c2-c3, Black would not have that possibility.) 19...\textit{xd}4 20.\textit{xd}4 \textit{bxc}6 21.c3 \textit{ae}8, and Black’s pieces are rather well placed in that open position and that compensates the weaknesses of his queenside pawns.

d5b) 9...\textit{g}4 10.\textit{e}2

10...\textit{f}6

It is best for Black to undermine White’s centre immediately:

It is useless for Black to play: 10...\textit{d}b4 11.0–0 \textit{f}5, because of 12.\textit{e}1± \textit{g}4, and White wins a piece, Picard – Germano, Italy 1998;

10...\textit{e}6 (This move is not necessary at all – Black is thus deprived of the possibility to capture on f6 with the pawn and secondly after Black captures on f6 with a piece – his pawn on e6 will hardly be better placed there than on e7.) 11.0–0 \textit{f}6 12.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 13.\textit{h}3 \textit{xf}3 14.\textit{xf}3 \textit{d}5 (This move exploits the only plus
of the placement of the pawn on e6.) 15.\textit{\textdagger}xd5 exd5 16.c3± Ree – Donner, Amsterdam 1973. White has the two bishop advantage in a symmetrical position. Meanwhile, he is simply threatening \textit{\textdagger}b3;

10...\textit{\textdagger}d7 11.\textit{\textdagger}d2 \textit{\textdagger}ad8 (Now, after 11...f6?! White can play 12.e6, and Black cannot capture there because of the fork, while after 12...\textit{\textdagger}c8 13.d5± White squeezes the enemy position completely, E. Andreev – Stambulian, Krasnodar 2002.) 12. 0–0–0± – White has defended everything successfully and now he can prepare h2-h3. Later, there followed:

12...\textit{\textdagger}c8 13.\textit{\textdagger}e1 f6 14.exf6 \textit{\textdagger}xf6 15.\textit{\textdagger}h4 \textit{\textdagger}b4 16.\textit{\textdagger}c4+ \textit{\textdagger}e6 17.d5?! \textit{\textdagger}xd5 18.\textit{\textdagger}c5! b5 19.\textit{\textdagger}xb4 \textit{\textdagger}xc4 20.\textit{\textdagger}xe7 \textit{\textdagger}d5 21.\textit{\textdagger}xb5 \textit{\textdagger}xb5 22.\textit{\textdagger}xf8 \textit{\textdagger}xf8 23.c4±, and White wins the exchange, Panteleoni – Serrano, corr. 1985;

12...\textit{\textdagger}h8 13.\textit{\textdagger}b1 f6 14.exf6 \textit{\textdagger}xf6 15.h3 \textit{\textdagger}xf3 16.\textit{\textdagger}xf3 e5 (This operation is quite dubious, but otherwise White has a stable positional advantage anyway.) 17.dxe5 \textit{\textdagger}xd2 18.\textit{\textdagger}xd2 \textit{\textdagger}xe5 19.\textit{\textdagger}xd8 \textit{\textdagger}xd8 20.\textit{\textdagger}xb7 \textit{\textdagger}b8 21.\textit{\textdagger}a6± and White remained with a solid extra pawn, Hamers – Plassche, Netherlands 1991;

12...f6 13.exf6 \textit{\textdagger}xf6 (or 13...\textit{\textdagger}xf6 14.h3 \textit{\textdagger}xf3 15.\textit{\textdagger}xf3 \textit{\textdagger}b4 16.d5 a5 17.a3 \textit{\textdagger}a6 18.\textit{\textdagger}hf1± – the black knight has been repelled and White has an obvious advantage in the centre, Gouma – Meijer, corr. 1988) 14.\textit{\textdagger}e4 \textit{\textdagger}g7 15.\textit{\textdagger}c4+ \textit{\textdagger}h8 16.\textit{\textdagger}eg5 e5 17.dxe5 \textit{\textdagger}e7 18.\textit{\textdagger}c3 \textit{\textdagger}xd1+ 19.\textit{\textdagger}xd1 h6 20.h3 20.\textit{\textdagger}h4 \textit{\textdagger}xe5, and here White would have the edge after 21.hxg4 \textit{\textdagger}xf3 22.\textit{\textdagger}b3±, attacking Black’s queenside pawns, Maaender – Vranesic, corr. 1974.

11.\textit{\textdagger}xf6

After Black has developed his bishop to g4 – the move 11.e6 for White is not so good. After 11...\textit{\textdagger}b4, Black wins the e6-pawn. White has some compensation, though...

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

11...\textit{\textdagger}xf6

It is hardly better for Black to capture with a piece on f6:

11...\textit{\textdagger}xf6 12.0–0 \textit{\textdagger}d5 (12...\textit{\textdagger}h8 13.\textit{\textdagger}d2 \textit{\textdagger}d5 14.\textit{\textdagger}xd5 \textit{\textdagger}xd5 15.c4 \textit{\textdagger}g8 16.d5 \textit{\textdagger}xf3 17.\textit{\textdagger}xf3 \textit{\textdagger}xf3 18.\textit{\textdagger}xf3 \textit{\textdagger}e5 19.\textit{\textdagger}e2 e6 20.\textit{\textdagger}d1±. The isolation of White’s d5-pawn is not important, because after the trade on d5, Black’s c7-pawn will be weaker than White’s pawn. 20...\textit{\textdagger}d8 21.\textit{\textdagger}c2 exd5 22.cxd5 \textit{\textdagger}xd5 23.\textit{\textdagger}xd5 \textit{\textdagger}xd5 24.\textit{\textdagger}xc7±, and White had a slightly better endgame, Van de Laan – Stam, Hengelo 1994.) 13.\textit{\textdagger}xd5 \textit{\textdagger}xd5, Veroci –
Vokralova, Medellin 1974, and here after 14.c3± with the idea to follow that with \( \text{b}3 \), or \( \text{a}4 \) and \( \text{c}4 \), White preserves his opening edge;

11...\( \text{xf6} \) 12.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{xf3} \) (or 12...\( \text{d}5 \) 13.\( \text{xf6}+ \) \( \text{xf6} \) 14.0-0 \( \text{ae}8 \) 15.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{g}7 \), Katalimov – G.Kuzmin, Krasnoiarsk 1980, and here after 16.c3!?, White has a bishop against a knight and dominates in the centre. Black is also worse after: 12...e5 13.d5 \( \text{e}7 \) 14.0-0 \( \text{xd}5 \) 15.\( \text{c}4 \) c6 16.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 17.\( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 18.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{cxd5} \) 19.\( \text{e}5 \) b6 (After 19...\( \text{c}8 \), \( \text{d}8+ \) 20.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{f}4 \) 21.\( \text{e}7 \) ! \( \text{xe}5 \) 22.\( \text{f}7+ \) \( \text{h}8 \) 23.\( \text{f}7 \), White remains with an extra exchange – Black cannot play 23...\( \text{c}8 \) 24.\( \text{d}8+ \) 20.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 21.\( \text{e}1 \)± – White’s powerful knight on \( d6 \) guarantees him the advantage, Ros – Szokol, Email 1999. It is probably best for Black to play 12...\( \text{g}7 \) 13.c3± – but White again has the advantage, because he is threatening to check along the a2-g8 diagonal, and after e5 he can always counter that with d5, and he can also go to the g5-square with his knight.) 13.\( \text{xf6}+ \) \( \text{xf6} \) (13...\( \text{xf6} \) 14.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{e}8 \) 15.\( \text{f}2 \), White’s task is to neutralize Black’s initiative, to ensure the safety of his king and to bring into action his rook on a1. 15...\( \text{g}7 \) 16.c3 \( \text{f}5 \) 17.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 18.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 19.\( \text{xe}8 \) \( \text{xe}8 \), Tomba – Qendro, St Vincent 2004, 20.\( \text{g}1± \), White will gradually manage to develop his pieces and his two-bishop advantage will become a telling factor. It would not work for Black to play: 18...\( \text{xe}1 \) 19.\( \text{xe}1 \) \( \text{exd}4 \) 20.\( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{f}3 \) 21.\( \text{xd}8 \) \( \text{xe}1 \) 22.\( \text{xa}8 \) \( \text{d}3+ \) 23.\( \text{f}3\pm \), and White’s advantage in the endgame is overwhelming.) 14.\( \text{xf3} \) e5 15.\( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 16.0-0 \( \text{xf}3+ \) 17.\( \text{f}3\pm \) Timman – G.Kuzmin, Bled 1979. Black needs to go a long way before equalizing – White’s bishop is stronger in the endgame and even more so in the middle game.

12.0-0

This is a very important position for the evaluation of the whole line 6.\( \text{xc}6 \) and 9.\( \text{g}4 \). Black has made some progress indeed – he has undermined and exchanged White’s e5-pawn, he has no obvious pawn weaknesses and he has at least the e-file to organize some counterplay. All that does not mean of course that he has solved all his problems.

At first, as usual when Black’s pawn is on f6 and not on f7 – the e6-square has been weakened and that might become essential, for example after d4-d5 and \( \text{f}3-d4-e6 \) – Black must find a way to
prevent that manoeuvre.

Secondly, Black’s light pieces are rather misplaced – the bishop on g4 (particularly after the move f5) as well as the knight on h5.

In fact it is easy for White to parry Black’s counterplay against the d4-pawn and along the e-file.

Black has the choice between several possibilities in that position: d5b1) 12...d7, d5b2) 12...xe8 and d5b3) 12...f5.

In answer to 12...e7, Fecht – Huisl, Bad Neuenahr 1978, the simplest line for White is 13.h3!? xf3 14.xf3 g3 15. xe1 – Black’s knight on f5 is not enough to provide him with sufficient counterchances (particularly if you have in mind that his bishop on g7 is not active then), besides he has already exchanged an important bishop.

d5b1) 12...d7

This is tactically unfavourable for Black.

13.d5 e7

It is too bad for Black to play 13...xf3 14.xf3, and the exchange on h5 will destroy Black’s kingside completely.

14.e5!

This move exploits the misplacement of Black’s queen.

14...fexe5

Black loses after 14...xe2? 15.xd7 xzd1 16.xf8 xc2 17.e6+– and White remains with an extra exchange.

15.xf8+ xf8

In case of 15...xf8 16.xg4, and White’s bishop penetrates to the e6-square, because Black cannot play 16...f5 17.xf5! xf5 18.g4, and he loses his knight.

16.xg4 e8

It is hardly advisable for Black to try: 16...f5 17.xf5! xf5 18.g4+–, because he can neither avoid material losses, nor make any use of the weaknesses around White’s king: 18...f3 19.c5! wh3 20.gxh5 f4 21.e2, and Black is threatening nothing whatsoever. White can simply retreat with his king to the h1-square after Black’s check with the rook on g4. Later, in the game Sammalvu–Groenn, Gausdal 2004, there followed: 21.b6 22.f2 gxh5 23.g3 b4 24.a3 d4 25.b5 xd5 26.c4 e6 27.f1, and Black resigned – after c7, he loses additionally the exchange.

17.xa7!

White simply wins a pawn (he also obtains a potential passed a-pawn), because the bishop can-
not be trapped on a7. 17...\textit{c8}
(in case of 17...b6, then 18.d6!
\textit{c6} 19.\textit{d}5+ \textit{h}8 20.d7 \textit{a}8
21.\textit{f}3+-, and White wins.)
18.\textit{c}5 \textit{d}6 19.\textit{x}h5! \textit{x}h5
20.\textit{x}d6 \textit{cxd}6 21.\textit{e}4+ Shirov
White has an excellent knight on
the e4-outpost as well as an ex-
tra passed a-pawn. Later in the
game – he simply promoted it
into a queen.

d5b2) 12...\textit{e}8

This is a natural move – Black
is trying to use one of his main
trumps – the e-file.
13.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}4

Black is planning to push for-
ward his c-pawn with tempo (the
threat is \textit{c}2).

His other possibilities are:
After 13...\textit{d}7, Popescu –
Dragomirescu, Romania 1993,
White should better play 14.
\textit{ae}1\textpm, and then he must prepare
to push d5 at an opportune mo-
moment;

In case of 13...\textit{e}7, Xu Yuhua
– Segal, Halle 1995, White again
has 14.\textit{ae}1\textpm – and Black can-
not capture on e3, because of the
exchange and the check on c4,
moreover the queen on e7 is mis-
placed;

It is too dangerous for Black
to play immediately 13...f5, due
to 14.\textit{c}4+ \textit{h}8 15.\textit{g}5. After
the forced line 15...\textit{x}d4 16.
\textit{f}7+ \textit{g}7 17.\textit{x}d8 \textit{xe}3+ 18.
\textit{xe}3 \textit{xe}3 19.\textit{xc}6 bx6 20.h3+
Boehm – Weber, Suedlohn 1981,
Black is forced to retreat to g3
with his knight and after the cap-
tures on g4 and f1, there arises
a position in which Black has a
rook and two pawns for two light
pieces, but his queenside pawns
are a sorry sight;

13...\textit{xf}3 14.\textit{xf}3 f5 (Black is
threatening to capture on e3.)
15.\textit{d}5 \textit{d}7 16.c3\textpm – White has
solidified his centre and he is
slightly better thanks to his two-
bishop advantage, Ambroz
– Shpilker, Prague 1980;

It is better for Black to try
13...\textit{e}7 with the idea to follow
that with 14...\textit{f}5 and to bring
his bishop from g7 to h6. Now, in
the game Fritz 7 – Shredder 6,
Paderborn 2002, White failed to
obtain the advantage after:
14.\textit{c}4+ \textit{h}8 15.h3 \textit{xf}3 16.\textit{xf}3
f5 17.\textit{d}1 \textit{d}6 18.\textit{b}5 \textit{d}7 19.d5
\textit{c}8 20.c3 a6 21.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}6 22.\textit{b}3
\textit{e}5 23.\textit{c}2 \textit{e}4 – because Black
had good piece placement and
chances for some counterplay on
the kingside. Instead of 15.h3,
White had better play: 15.\textit{h}4!,
in order to prevent Black from
activating his bishop, and in case
of 15...g5 (15...f5 16.h3 f4 17.\textit{f}2
d7 18.\textit{f}e1\textpm, and White is better, because the a2-g8 diagonal has been weakened.) he has the resource 16.\textit{c}f3 \textit{e}f5 17.\textit{e}ae1 — and Black's bishop is misplaced as well as the knight on h5.

14.\textit{c}c4+

It is not so convincing for White to play 14.\textit{f}f2 \textit{d}d5 15.\textit{c}xd5 \textit{c}xd5 16.\textit{f}e1 \textit{d}d6 17.h3 \textit{e}e6 18.c4 c6∞ Kuijpers - Timman, Leeuwarden 1972. The exchange of the knights turned out to be in favour of Black and his other knight will easily retreat from the h5-square.

14...\textit{h}h8

15.\textit{b}b3?! (In case of 15.\textit{e}ae1, Black can play 15...\textit{xe}3 16.\textit{xe}3 \textit{h}6 17.\textit{d}d1 \textit{xf}3 18.\textit{xf}3 \textit{c}6 19.c3 \textit{e}5, Beserga - Tormak, Email 2001, but even then after 20.\textit{e}e2 White preserves some advantage, because of the e-file and the vulnerable e6-square.) 15...c5 16.d5\textpm - White's passed pawn in the centre provides him with some advantage.

d5b3) 12...f5 13.\textit{d}d2

13...f4

After 13...\textit{h}h8 White should better wait for a while and prepare his later operations with the move 14.\textit{ad}1\textpm, with some edge. After the immediate: 14.d5 \textit{xf}3 15.\textit{xf}3 \textit{e}5 16.\textit{xe}h5 \textit{c}4 17.\textit{f}f2 \textit{xe}3 18.\textit{xe}3 \textit{gxh}5 19.\textit{ad}1 \textit{xf}6, Micklethwaite - Blair, England 1995, White has a better pawn-structure indeed, but Black's dark-squared bishop is very powerful.

14.\textit{f}f2 \textit{d}d7

Black has also tried here 14...\textit{h}h8 15.\textit{ad}1 \textit{e}7 16.d5 (It deserves attention for White to try 16.\textit{e}e5?!?, making use of the absence of the black knight on c6.) 16...\textit{f}5 17.\textit{d}d4 \textit{xd}4 (in case of 17...\textit{xe}2, White has the intermediate move 18.\textit{de}6, which is quite annoying for Black.) 18.\textit{xe}4\textpm, and White will manage to compromise Black's kingside pawns with the subsequent exchange on h5, Hanley - McNab, Blackpool 2003.

15.\textit{f}e1 \textit{ae}8

This is quite similar to the main line 15...\textit{fe}8 16.\textit{ad}1\textpm.

In case of what happened in
the “computer” game Chess Tiger – y14, Sachsendorf 2002, 15...\text{\textsc{ad}8}, White should better play like Shirov 16.\text{\textsc{ad}1}, because after the immediate 16.d5 \text{\textsc{x}f3} 17.\text{\textsc{x}f3} \text{\textsc{e}5}, he cannot follow with the move 18.\text{\textsc{e}4}, because the d5-pawn is hanging, while after 18.\text{\textsc{x}h5 g}xh5 19.\text{\textsc{e}4 f}3 20.\text{\textsc{g}3 g}6 21.gxf3 \text{\textsc{x}f3}, as it was played in the game – Black had a powerful counterplay on the kingside.

16.\text{\textsc{ad}1}

Black has developed his pieces quite well, but the advance of the f-pawn has weakened his position considerably,

16...\text{\textsc{w}h8}

Black has also tested in practice here: 16...a6, Miletic – Braun, IECG, 2002, but that move can hardly be useful for him. White should better play analogously to the game Shirov – Nikolic, Monaco 1999: 17.d5 \text{\textsc{x}f3} 18.\text{\textsc{x}f3} \text{\textsc{e}5} 19.\text{\textsc{e}4}, with the idea to establish his knight on the e6-square with a clear advantage.

17.d5 \text{\textsc{x}f3} 18.\text{\textsc{x}f3} \text{\textsc{e}5} 19.\text{\textsc{e}4}

White is heading to the e6-square with his knight.

19...\text{\textsc{w}f5} 20.\text{\textsc{c}5} \text{\textsc{x}f3+}

21.gxf3

Black cannot exploit that weakening of White’s kingside, mostly because of his own f4-pawn, which stands in the way of all potentially attacking black pieces.

21...\text{\textsc{x}e1+} 22.\text{\textsc{x}e1 h}6 23.\text{\textsc{e}6 f}7 24.\text{\textsc{x}a7 b}6 25.c4±

Shirov – Nikolic, Monaco 1999. Black can neither trap White’s bishop, nor organize any effective counterplay.

Conclusion

The move 6...\text{\textsc{c}c6} that we have analysed in this chapter exerts pressure on White’s centre and it is possibly Black’s best choice in that position. White should better counter it with the immediate 7.e5, after which there usually happens an exchange of pawns on e5, followed by the undermining pawn move for Black f7-f6. White must defend his center for a while (particularly his d4-pawn) against a counterattack and then begin to exploit the advantages of his position (and mostly Black’s weaknesses along the e-file). In general, the lines that we have analysed in our book prove that White preserves a slight opening advantage.
Chapter 19

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ąf6 3.ąc3 g6 4.f4 ąg7 5.ąf3 0-0 6.ąd3 ąa6

Later, he would like to bring his queen to h4, exchange the dark-squared bishops with ąh6 and attack the h7-square (2g5, ąf3-h3, or capture on g6 and f6 destroying the defence of the h7-square. If he manages to do all that – he should not even pay attention to a trifle like the eventual sacrifice of the f5-pawn.

Black should of course try to find a way to neutralize White’s kingside attack and organize some counterattack on the queenside and possibly in the centre in order to distract him from his actions on the kingside.

7.0-0

Black here has two main possibilities – a) 7...2b4 and b) 7...c5.

7...c6 8.e5 – see 6...c6 7.0-0 ąa6 8.e5.

After 7...b6, Ketterer – Eisenbeiser, Vierneheim 1999, White should play 8.e5±, exploiting the extra tempi for actions in the centre.

It is more or less a similar situation with the move 7...e6, Sulek – Demeter, Bardejov 1981, 8.e5± – Black’s move e7-e6, as
usual in this structure is not useful for his counterplay.

Black has tried 7...\( \text{b8} \) several times. This "mysterious" rook move is with a quite understandable idea – to support the pawn move b7-b5 in the future. Meanwhile, such move can hardly be good for Black until the pawn-structure in the centre has been clarified. The rook on b8 might turn out to be misplaced in case White plays e4-e5. 8.e5 \( \text{e8} \), Bareev – Speelman, Hastings 1991, and here instead of the move 9.a3 that was played in the game, White could have saved some time and played immediately 9.\( \text{e3} \) !? \( \text{b4} \) (It is not good for Black to play 9...c5, because of 10.dxc5 \( \text{xc5} \) 11.\( \text{xe5} \), making use of the pin of the knight.) 10.\( \text{c4} \) 11.\( \text{b3} \) – it becomes evident now that the position resembles the line 6...\( \text{c6} \) 7.e5 \( \text{e8} \), in which Black has lost a valuable tempo with the move \( \text{b8} \) (this line was recommended by GM I.Stohl).

7...\( \text{g4} \) 8.e5. (One of the ideas behind this peculiar order of moves is that after the standard line: 8.h3 \( \text{xf3} \) 9.\( \text{xf3} \), Black manages to exchange White’s light-squared bishop with the help of: 9...\( \text{b4} \). White in principle should prevent that, because he must try to preserve as many pieces as possible on the board, unless the exchanges are clearly favourable for him. Capturing on f3 with the rook, so that his c2-pawn remains protected by his queen, discoordinates the natural deployment of his pieces.) 8...\( \text{d7} \) 9.\( \text{xf3} \) 10.\( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{b4} \)! Black sacrifices a pawn with that move, but this is quite strong and principled too. He must undermine White’s centre even at a price like that. 11.\( \text{xb7} \) (11.\( \text{e4} \) c5 12.a3 \( \text{c6} \)) 11...\( \text{xd3} \) 12.\( \text{cxd3} \) c5 13.\( \text{exd6} \) (13.\( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 14.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 15.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 16.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xe3} + \) 17.\( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 18.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) 19.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 20.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 21.\( \text{dd7} = \) ) 13...\( \text{xd4} + \) 14.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{exd6} \), and Black managed to at least equalize in the game Tonsingh – Santamaria, Manila 1992. Therefore White should better find a way to preserve his light-squared bishop, for example with: 9.\( \text{e4} \) c6 10.h3 \( \text{xf3} \) 11.\( \text{xf3} \) d5 12.\( \text{e2} \), and his prospects are still slightly better. He maintains his powerful centre with c2-c3, and he can plan some kingside operations in the future with: g2-g4 and f4-f5, or h3-h4-h5.

a) 7...\( \text{b4} \)

![Chess Diagram]

This is a logical move – Black
attacks the bishop on d3 and he can play c7-c5 even with a knight on b4.

8.\( \textit{f2} \) c5

Black's other possibilities are:

8...d5 9.e5 \( \textit{g} \) e8 (After 9...\( \textit{g} \) e4 10.\( \textit{f} \) xe4 dxe4 11.\( \textit{g} \) g5 – Black is incapable of defending his e4-pawn anymore, Viszlai – Fraas, Martin 1996; Black's position remains too cramped following: 9...\( \textit{g} \) g4 10.a3 \( \textit{c} \) c6 11.h3 \( \textit{h} \) h6 12.g4‡. There is no way for Black to undermine White’s centre – so his position is clearly worse mostly because of the lack of space.) 10.a3 \( \textit{c} \) c6 11.\( \textit{x} \) e3‡, and later White should better act depending on circumstances, for example: \( \textit{w} \) e1-g3, \( \textit{x} \) d3 and possibly \( \textit{g} \) g5 and f4-f5;

8...b6!? 9.a3 \( \textit{x} \) a6 (Black is now happy that he has repelled White's bishop from d3, while the loss of time with knight-moves might be acceptable for him. White's move a2-a3 is not so useful for him either.) 10.e5 \( \textit{g} \) e8 (This was a quite inopportune moment for the move 10...\( \textit{g} \) g4, Mayer – Schoenegg, Waldshut 2002. After 11.\( \textit{g} \) g5 \( \textit{h} \) h6 12.\( \textit{x} \) f3, the weakening of the long diagonal becomes considerable. 12...\( \textit{h} \) b8 13.\( \textit{x} \) b5± and Black's position is suspicious.) 11.\( \textit{g} \) e4 c5 (after 11...\( \textit{b} \) b7 12.\( \textit{x} \) d3 c5 13.\( \textit{w} \) e2 \( \textit{a} \) ac7 14.c3± – White preserves his solid centre, while Black’s pieces are presently passive.) 12.c3 \( \textit{b} \) b7 13.\( \textit{x} \) d3 (with the idea to follow with f5!?; and to prepare an attack against the black king)

13...e6 14.\( \textit{w} \) e2 \( \textit{a} \) ac7 15.dxc5!? (in the game Kotsur – Sakaev, Moscow 1998, there followed 15.exd6 \( \textit{a} \) xd6 16.dxc5 \( \textit{f} \) xe4 17.\( \textit{x} \) xe4 \( \textit{x} \) e4 18.\( \textit{f} \) xe4 bxc5 19.\( \textit{x} \) c6 \( \textit{d} \) d5 20.\( \textit{x} \) xc5 \( \textit{h} \) b8 – Black had some compensation for the pawn in the spirit of the Volga Gambit – 21.\( \textit{w} \) c4 \( \textit{c} \) c8 22.\( \textit{w} \) e4 \( \textit{w} \) b6+ 23.\( \textit{h} \) h1 \( \textit{w} \) b5 24.\( \textit{w} \) e1 \( \textit{a} \) ab8 25.\( \textit{x} \) e5 \( \textit{x} \) b6 26.a4 \( \textit{w} \) d5 27.\( \textit{w} \) xd5 \( \textit{a} \) xd5 28.\( \textit{g} \) g1 \( \textit{a} \) a6 29.\( \textit{x} \) f2± – White preserves his extra pawn and some edge too, but still Black has a good compensation.) 15...dxc5 16.\( \textit{d} \) d1 \( \textit{w} \) e7 17.\( \textit{x} \) c2±. The pawn-structure in the centre is stable and White has more space and better placed pieces. He can later exploit the weakening of the d6 and f6-squares in Black's camp.

9.d5 e6

Black's other possibilities are not better:

9...\( \textit{g} \) g4 10.a3 \( \textit{x} \) a6 11.\( \textit{w} \) e1 \( \textit{a} \) xf3 12.\( \textit{w} \) xf3 \( \textit{d} \) d7 13.f5†, with the idea to follow with \( \textit{h} \) h3 and \( \textit{w} \) h4 – and White’s initiative on the kingside is quite dangerous for Black, Tosoni – Barro, Italy 1997;

9...b6 10.a3 \( \textit{x} \) a6, Olivera – Pimienta, Oviedo 2000, 11.\( \textit{a} \) c4 \( \textit{a} \) c7 12.e5±, and White’s centre is so solid that Black can hardly undermine it.

In case of 9...\( \textit{b} \) b8 10.f5 gxf5 11.exf5, the game transposes to line b, Chapter 21.

10.a3 \( \textit{x} \) a6 11.dxe6 \( \textit{x} \) e6

In case of 11...\( \textit{a} \) xe6, White
follows with the standard sacrifice: 12.f5 gx5 13.exf5 cxf5 14. \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 15.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 16.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{c7} \). This method of defence is quite original. Black intends to counter the pin after \( \text{g5} \) – with a knight-manoeuvre to the d4-square with tempo and follow that with d5 and the idea \( \text{d6} \) next. Meanwhile, he still has problems even then. (16...\( \text{h6} \) 17.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 18.\( \text{f4} \) Lukin – Karasev, Leningrad 1975. Black’s position is difficult – his king is vulnerable, his pawns are weak and he cannot possibly retain his material advantage.) 17.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{e6} \) 18.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{d4} \) 19.\( \text{f2} \) d5. Later, in the game Karlsson – Nilsson, corr. 1989, White followed with: 20.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{xc2} \) 21.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xa1} \) 22.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 23.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e3} \)+ 24.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{c1} \)+ 25.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{xb2} \)+ 26.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{fd8} \), but his attack proved to be good enough only for a perpetual. 27.\( \text{xh7} \)+ \( \text{f8} \) 28.\( \text{xf7} \)+ \( \text{xf7} \) 29.\( \text{f5} \)+ \( \text{g8} \) 30.\( \text{h7} \)+ \( \text{f8} \) 31.\( \text{f5} \)+, draw. Instead of that sacrifice, the consequences of which turned out to be quite unclear, White could have obtained some advantage with 20.\( \text{d3} \), for example: 20...\( \text{c4} \). This is the only move. (Black cannot play 20...\( \text{b6} \), because of the exchange on f6, followed by \( \text{h5} \).) 21.\( \text{f1} \) (21.\( \text{xh7} \)+ \( \text{xh7} \) 22.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{d4} \)+) 21...\( \text{c6} \) 22.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 23.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xd1} \)+ – and White remains with a bishop against a knight in an endgame in which Black has numerous pawn-weaknesses.

12.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 13.\( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 14.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d5} \) 15.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{b6} \)

16.\( \text{f3} \) Manion – Zlotnikov, Philadelphia 1992. Black has a weakness on e6 and he must defend carefully against White’s threats on the long diagonal.

b) 7...\( \text{c5} \) 8.\( \text{d5} \)

Now, Black must make up his mind about his plan. He can exchange his light-squared bishop for the knight on f3 and then White’s offensive in the centre will not be so dangerous. He can later play for example e7-e6 undermining White’s centre. After the almost forced dxe6 and fxe6, there will arise a position in which Black will have a lot of

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pawns in the centre, but his kingside will be weakened and White’s light-squared bishop will be very powerful. If Black does not attack the centre – White will solidify it with \( \text{c}4 \) and \( \text{e}1 \) and later he will create threats like \( \text{e}4-\text{e}5 \), or \( \text{f}4-\text{f}5 \).

Black’s second possible plan is to try to counterattack immediately on the queenside by preparing \( \text{b}7-\text{b}5 \), but he then risks to be powerfully attacked on the kingside.

Black has three basic moves in this position: 8...\( \text{c}7 \), 8...\( \text{g}4 \) and 8...\( \text{b}8 \). The last two moves will be analysed later. In this chapter we will deal with 8...\( \text{c}7 \) as well as with some other seldom played lines for Black on move eight.

8...\( \text{b}4 \) 9.\( \text{e}2 \) leads by transposition to 7...\( \text{b}4 \).

8...\( \text{d}7 \) – This move is very unfavourable for Black under the circumstances, because White breaks in the centre with \( \text{e}4-\text{e}5 \) in a very bad situation for Black. 9.\( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 10.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 11.\( \text{g}4 \)? (White can also follow with the simple move 11.\( \text{c}4 \), because the black knight cannot go to \( \text{f}5 \) presently, because of the immediate 12.\( \text{g}4 \).) 11...\( \text{b}4 \), Neurohr – Hirschinger, Hassloch 1997, and now after 12.\( \text{e}2 \), Black will suffer a lot with his knight on \( \text{h}6 \) “under arrest”.

8...\( \text{e}6 \) – now, just like later (for example after 8...\( \text{c}7 \) 9.\( \text{e}1 \)) defends against the direct check-mating attack with \( \text{f}4-\text{f}5 \), but it does not solve all problems for Black. 9.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) (If 9...\( \text{xe}6 \), White will play 10.\( \text{e}5 \). This is the standard reaction against \( \text{xe}6 \), which breaks Black’s pawn-chain in the centre. 10...\( \text{xe}5 \) 11.\( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 12.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{c}7 \), Friedel – Gantner, Karlsruhe 2003, and here White must solidify the position of his bishop on \( \text{d}3 \) with the move 13.\( \text{c}3 \)!

White’s light pieces are much better placed and it is too risky for Black to win a pawn by capturing on \( \text{e}5 \), because of the weakening of the dark-squares on the kingside.) 10.\( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) (Black still does not lose material by playing 10...\( \text{c}8 \), but still his position is obviously too dangerous after the loss of so many tempi with the bishop, for example: 11.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 12.\( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{xb}2 \) 13.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 14.\( \text{ab}1 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 15.\( \text{fxg}6 \) \( \text{fxg}6 \) 16.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{h}8 \) 17. \( \text{h}6 \), and Black’s extra pawn is immaterial. He lags in development and his king will soon be under a dangerous attack – Ochsner – Lindfeldt, Randers 1996.) 11.\( \text{fxg}6 \) \( \text{hxg}6 \) 12.\( \text{x}a6 \) \( \text{bxa}6 \) 13.\( \text{x}d6 \) – Black has no compensation for the pawn, Lanc – Blaeser, Budapest 1981.

8...\( \text{b}6 \) 9.\( \text{e}2 \)? (Black has excellent counterplay after 9.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 10.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 11.\( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{b}7 \); 11.\( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{xd}3 \) 12.\( \text{cxd}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 13.\( \text{axb}4 \) \( \text{cxb}4 \) 14.\( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 15.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{xf}3 \) 16.\( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{c}8 \), in order to be able to counter \( \text{h}3 \) with \( \text{g}4 \) and to safety his king, Ligterink –
Torre, Amsterdam 1979) 9...c7 10.a4 a6 11.c4 b8 (it is not good for Black to play 11..d7?, because of 12.e5± – his bishop on d7 has nothing to do – it only makes the defence of the d5-square more difficult, while White can capture with a pawn after dxe5) 12.e5 dxe5 13.xe5→, and White preserves his initiative exploiting the weakness of the c6-square (GM Dolmatov).

8...c7

This straightforward move is a bit less precise than the move 8..b8 that we will analyse later, because with a knight on c7, Black cannot play b4 in answer to e1.

9.e1

Black now has a multiple choice of moves and his best are: b1) 9..e6, b2) 9..a6 and b3) 9..b8.

His other possibilities are:

9..d7 10.a4 a6 (It is too slow for Black to play 10..b6 11.hh4 a6 12.f5 b5 13..h6→ – White's attack was too powerful anyway, moreover Black lost some tempi on the queenside. In the game Bellin – Pribyl, Eerbeek 1978,

there followed: 13..c4 14.e2 gxf5 15.g5 e6 16.f3 exd5 17.xg7 xg7 18.g3 h8 19..h6, and Black resigned in view of the unavoidable checkmate.)

11.a5±, and all that transposes to the line 9..a6 10.a4 d7 11.a5;

9..g4 – This move now is just useless, because the capture on f3 only helps White to bring his rook into the attack. 10.f5 xf3 11.xf3 d7 12..h4 f6 13..g5 (this is to secure the h6-square for the white queen) 13..xg5 14.xg5 f6 15.h6 g5 16.h4 gxh4 17..h3† Van der Sterren – Hartoch, Leeuwarden 1981. Black has managed to defend against the direct threats on the kingside, but White still preserves a long-lasting initiative there. For example, in the game that we mentioned – White brought his bishop to h5 and later he sacrificed it on g6 and brought his knight to the f4-square;

9..d7 – This attempt to prepare the move b7-b5 is a bit strange... 10.a4 b6 11.h4 g4 12.f2 a6 13.h3 d7 14.h4 b8 15.f5 b7 16.h6† Leisebein – Arndt, Germany 1999. The important h3-square has been occupied by a white pawn indeed, but still his attack on the kingside is quite real, while Black has no counterplay at all;

9..e8 – White’s next move makes the pawn-advance e7-e6 bad for Black anyway, while the last rook-move makes Black’s
defence along the e-file still questionable. 10.f5 b5 (Black does not get any real compensation for the pawn after that move.) 11.fxe6 hxe6 12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}b5} \text{\textit{\textbf{x}}b5} 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}b5} \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}b6} 14.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c4} \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}4} 15.\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}g5} a6 16.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c3} \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}4} 17.\text{h3} \pm \text{Piesina – Labuckas, Kaunas 2001. It is not only that Black is already a pawn down, but he has to worry about his kingside defence; }

9...b5 (This is an attempt to start some immediate counterplay on the queenside even at the expense of a pawn-sacrifice.) 10.\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}b5 (It is not good for White to play 10.\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}b5}? because of 10...c4! 11.\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}c7} \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}xc7} 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}e2} \text{\textit{\textbf{xe}4} \pm, and Black has the advantage.) 10...\text{\textit{\textbf{xe}4}} (in case of 10... \text{\textit{\textbf{xe}4} 11.\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}e4} \text{\textit{\textbf{xc}}3} 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c6} \pm, Black loses the exchange. He cannot equalize after: 10...\text{\textit{\textbf{fxd}5}?! 11. \text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}5} 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}4} \text{\textit{\textbf{e}}8} 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}5 – because White preserves a dangerous initiative on the kingside. After 12...e6 White wins by playing: 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}e7} \!+! \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}8} 14.\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}6} 15.\text{\textit{\textbf{fxf7}}+} \text{\textit{\textbf{xf7}}} 16.\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}xg6}+, capturing the enemy queen.) 11.\text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}5} e6, Kostenko – Ananberdiev, Doha 2003, (11...\text{\textit{\textbf{b}}b6} 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4} \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}8}, Liew Chee Meng – Berrocal, Dubai 1986, and here after 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c3} \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}4} 14.e5 \pm Black’s compensation for the pawn is obviously insufficient; 11...\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}a6} 12.a4 \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}e8} 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7} 14.\text{\textit{\textbf{fxg6}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{hxg6}}} 15.\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}5?! White permits Black to regain his sacrificed pawn indeed, but he can use that time in order to organize a kingside at-
tack. 15...\text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}5} 16.\text{\textit{\textbf{axb}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}5} 17.\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}a3} \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7} 18.\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}af3} a5 19.\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}2} a4 20.\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}3. This move deprives Black’s queen of the g4-square. 20...\text{\textit{\textbf{eb}}8} 21.\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}4. In the game Palmo – Siklos, corr. 1977, Black lost after: 21...\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}d8} 22.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c3} \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}7} 23.\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}7} \text{\textit{\textbf{ab}}8} 24.\text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}. Meanwhile, he would not have saved the game either after: 21...\text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}2} 22.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c3} \text{\textit{\textbf{xc}}2} 23.\text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}} exf6 24. \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}7}+ \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}8} 25.\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}e6}+ \text{\textit{\textbf{fxe6}} 26. \text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}+, and White checkmates easily.) 12.e5! (recommended by GM B.Avrukh). White is thus trying to transform his material advantage into a positional one. 12...dxe5 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{xe}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}5} 14.\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4} \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}6 (It is not good for Black to play 14...\text{\textit{\textbf{b}}b4} 15.\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}3} 16.\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}6} \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}c2} 17.\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}1} \pm – White has a great positional advantage, because of his dominance over the key d6-square, and he is also threatening to play \text{\textit{\textbf{e}}e7.) 15.a4 \text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}5} 16.\text{\textit{\textbf{axb}}5} \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}6} 17.\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}4}\pm (Avrukh). Black’s position is clearly worse – his bishop on g7 is passive, because of White’s pawn on e5 and his threat to play \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}5-f6; and Black has plenty of pawn-weaknesses on the queenside. }

b1) 9...e6

Black thus opens the centre, so that White cannot attack comfortably his kingside, but after the exchange of the pawns on e6, followed by e4-e5 he will remain with a weak e6-pawn.

10.dxe6
10...fxe6

Black cannot solve his problems if he captures on e6 with pieces:

10...dxex6 11.f5 d4 (It seems logical to centralize to say the least. In answer to the move 11...c7, White can play a natural move like 12.wh4, but he can also afford to sacrifice: 12.g5 h6 13.f6g6!? hxg5 14.fxg7+ hxg7 15.xg5=). Black’s defence is extremely difficult, because of the lack of a pawn-shelter for his king and the weaknesses on the a2-g8 diagonal, for example: 15...e7 16.g3 e5 17.ad1 h5 18.d4+ d5 19.xd5 e6 20.d6+ dxf6 21.xd6 xf6 22.ad8+ xd8 23.wxe5 and White has a decisive material advantage, Dahlhaus – Nau, Bad Wiessee 1999.) 12.wh4 d7 13. g5 f6 14.xf6 xf3+ 15.xf3 xf6 16.xf6 xf6 17.fxg6 fxg6 18.x.f1± Padevsky – Sandor, Varna 1969. Black’s problems became even greater after the exchanges of pieces, because he cannot develop his queenside;

10...ex6 11.f5 d7 12.wh4. Black’s position is dangerous – White has an easy task on the kingside (g5, c4, ad1, or c4 and g5). 12.b5 (This is Black’s only real counterplay. It is too passive for him to play: 12...ce8 13.h1 c8 14.c4 b6 15.fxg6 hxg6, Berndt – Slobodjan, Germany 1992, and here White had to play 16.g5. He is threatening d5, and after 16...c6 he has 17.e6= winning.) 13.g5 b4 14.e4 dxe5 15.e4 c8 16.fxg6 hxg6 17.xe5 g5. Black is trying in vain to defend the f6-square. 18.c6 c7 19.xf6+ xf6 20.xf6 xc6 21.xf5, and White wins, since Black cannot capture the rook, because of the checkmate, Cabrilo – Strikovic, Niksic 1991.

11.e5 h5

In answer to 11...fd5, White should better play 12.e4!, while after the capture on e5 – he can choose between taking with the knight, or 13.fxe5 d5g5 and he is better in both cases. Black’s other possibility is – 12...xf4 13.xf4 xf4 14.xd6 d8 15.e3 f8 16.xc5 (White could have won a pawn here with: 16.xe8 xe8 17.xc5 b6 18.d6 ad7 19.c4+) 16...xd6 17.exd6 b6 (after 17...xb2 18. ad1, White’s passed d6-pawn provides him with a clear advantage) 18.x6 d7 19.e4 b8 20.c4 xd6 21.ad1 c5+ 22.wh1 c6? (Black could have preserved here some drawing chances with a transfer to a position with opposite coloured bishops: 22...c6 23.xc6 xc6
24. \( \text{x} e6+ \text{h} 8 \) 25. \( \text{c} 3 \text{xf} 3 \) 26. \( \text{x} f3 \text{xf} 3 \) 27. \( \text{gxf} 3 \) 28. \( \text{g} x \) g6+, and Black resigned in the game Iskov – Schmidt, Denmark 1987.

It is not good for Black after: 11...dxe5 12.fxe5, to play 12...\( \text{g} 4 \). In case of 13.\( \text{g} 5 \text{d} 7 \) 14. \( \text{d} 1 \) Berzina – Drljevic, Heraklio 2002, Black might fail to complete his development altogether – his queen and his knight on \( g4 \) are endangered.

12.f5!

This powerful move emphasizes a break at the seemingly best-defended square...

12...exf5

It is also dangerous for Black to play 12...gxf5 13.\( \text{g} 5 \text{d} 7 \) 14. \( \text{d} 1 \), and if 14...d5, then 15.\( \text{h} 4 \text{f} 7 \) 16.\( \text{e} 7 \), and Black loses material – it is not only his rook, but it is quite unclear how he should defend his knight on \( h5 \) after the move \( \text{e} 2 \).

13.\( \text{g} 5 \text{d} 7 \) 14.\( \text{c} 4+ \text{h} 8 \) 15.\( \text{d} 1 \) b5 16.\( \text{x} d6 \text{e} 8 \) 17. \( \text{d} 5 \) Thipsay – Kantsler, Frunze 1985. White’s advantage in the centre is overwhelming.

b2) 9...a6 10.a4

10...\( \text{d} 7 \) 10...\( \text{b} 8 \) 11.a5 – see line b3.

After 10...\( \text{g} 4 \), Cabrilo – Todorcevic, Belgrade 1991, White’s simplest countermeasure is 11.\( \text{h} 4 \)? – in case of \( \text{x} f3 \), he simply captures with the rook and later brings it to the h3-square, while there are no other reasonable ideas for the future of the black bishop on \( g4 \).

10...b6 – this move is too slow.

11.\( \text{h} 4 \) e6 (11...\( \text{b} 8 \) 12.f5 – see line b3 9...\( \text{b} 8 \) 10.a4 b6 11.\( \text{h} 4 \) a6 12.f5; 11...\( \text{d} 7 \) – see line 9...\( \text{d} 7 \) 10.a4 b6 11.\( \text{h} 4 \) a6) 12.dxe6 fxe6 13.e5 dxe5 14.fxe5 \( \text{d} 5 \) (It is worse for Black to play 14...\( \text{d} 7 \) 15.\( \text{g} 5 \text{e} 8 \) 16.\( \text{e} 4 \text{x} 5 \) 17.\( \text{x} 5 \text{x} 5 \text{x} 5 \) 18.\( \text{x} f8+ \text{x} f8 \) 19.\( \text{f} 1 \text{e} 8 \) 20.\( \text{f} 6 \), and Black resigned – he gets checkmated, Schaefer – Botschek, Muenster 1995.) 15.\( \text{g} 5 \text{d} 7 \) 16.\( \text{e} 4 \) – and Black’s dark squares are terribly weak, Tal – Iljic, Novi Sad 1974.

10...e6 (After the inclusion of the moves a6 and a4, this move is hardly useful for Black.)

11.dxe6 fxe6 (11...\( \text{x} e6 \) 12.f5
\( \text{\textcopyright d4} 13.\text{\textcopyright} h4. \text{Here} 13...\text{\textcopyright} d7 14.\text{\textcopyright} g5\text{±}, \text{could have led to a position, quite similar to the one that we have analysed in the variation} 9...e6 10.dxe6 \text{\textcopyright} xe6 11.f5, \text{and the transposition of moves here is practically immaterial. After:} 13...d5, \text{Stockfleth} – \text{ Richter, Germany 1992, it would be quite good for White to follow with} 14.e5 \text{\textcopyright} xf3+ 15.\text{\textcopyright} xf3 \text{\textcopyright} e4 16.f6 \text{\textcopyright} xc3 17.\text{\textcopyright} h6\rightarrow. \text{White preferred in the game to play:} 14.fxg6 fxg6 15.exd5 \text{\textcopyright} g4. \text{In case Black captures on d5 – White takes on d8 and d5 and then wins the exchange after} \text{\textcopyright} c4. 16.\text{\textcopyright} xd8 \text{\textcopyright} xd8 17.\text{\textcopyright} g5 \text{\textcopyright} e8 18.\text{\textcopyright} ae1 \text{\textcopyright} d7, \text{and here White had to follow with} 19.d6\text{!?}, \text{in order to be able after} 19...\text{\textcopyright} h6, \text{to play} 20.\text{\textcopyright} e7, \text{and after} 19...\text{\textcopyright} f5 20.\text{\textcopyright} d5\text{±}. \text{White’s passed d-pawn is so advanced in both cases that Black has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn whatsoever.} 12.e5 \text{\textcopyright} fd5 13.\text{\textcopyright} e4 \text{\textcopyright} xf4 14.\text{\textcopyright} xf4 \text{\textcopyright} xf4 15. \text{\textcopyright} xd6\text{±} – \text{and White’s knight on d6 is very powerful, Rogers – Dizdarevich, Noosa 1998.} \)

\( \text{11.a5} \)

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\( \text{11...\text{\textcopyright} b5} \)

This is Black’s best chance to organize some counterplay, since the preparation of the eventual b7-b5 seems to be too slow.

\( 11...\text{\textcopyright} b8 12.\text{\textcopyright} h4 – \text{see line} b3 11...\text{\textcopyright} d7. \)

\( \text{12.\text{\textcopyright} h4 e6} \)

\( \text{12...\text{\textcopyright} xd3 13.cxd3 \text{\textcopyright} b5 (About 13...e6 14.f5 – \text{see the variation 12...e6, with a transposition of moves.)} 14.f5 \text{\textcopyright} d4 15.\text{\textcopyright} h6 \text{\textcopyright} e8 16.\text{\textcopyright} g5 \text{\textcopyright} h8 17.\text{\textcopyright} ae1 \text{\textcopyright} d7, Barnes – Dunworth, 1994, and here White could have improved his attacking chances considerably with the move} 18.\text{\textcopyright} e3\text{!?}, \text{with the idea to bring his rook to the h3-square and the sacrifice of the knight on h7 will immediately be on the agenda.} \)

\( 12...\text{\textcopyright} d7. \text{This move here seems to be just a loss of time:} 13.f5 \text{gxf5} 14.e5 \text{dxe5} 15.\text{\textcopyright} xe5 \text{\textcopyright} d6 16.\text{\textcopyright} xb5 \text{axb5} 17.\text{\textcopyright} xf5\rightarrow. \text{White’s attack on the kingside is all-powerful. For example after} 17...c4, \text{Nicevski – Quinteros, Stip 1977, he has} 18.\text{\textcopyright} xf6! \text{\textcopyright} c5\text{±} 19.\text{\textcopyright} f2 \text{cxd3} 20.\text{\textcopyright} xd3 \text{\textcopyright} xd5 21. \text{\textcopyright} xe7 \text{\textcopyright} e6 22.\text{\textcopyright} e3\text{±} \text{and he remains with a material and positional advantage.} \)

\( 13.f5 \text{exf5} \)

\( 13...\text{\textcopyright} xd3 14.cxd3 \text{exd5} 15. \text{exd5 or} 14...\text{\textcopyright} e5 15.\text{\textcopyright} e5 – \text{see} 13...\text{\textcopyright} e5. \)

\( 14.\text{\textcopyright} xd5 15.\text{\textcopyright} xd3 \text{\textcopyright} d7 \)

This move is played with the idea to parry the threats against Black’s kingside with the move f7-f6. 15...\text{\textcopyright} cx d5. This natural move might have in fact quite
dangerous consequences for Black. White can now organize a swift kingside attack. 16.\(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xc3}}\) (White’s attack after: 16... \(\text{\texttt{d7}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h8}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{hf4}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{xf4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf4}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{fg5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e2+}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{wh1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) 23.gxh5\(+\), is overwhelming, or 17... \(\text{\texttt{xe4}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{dxe4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{b4}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{e7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{fe8}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h8}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{ad1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c6}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{xd6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c8}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{e5+}}\) \(\Delta\text{\texttt{e6}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{xc3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{gxf5}}\) 18. \(\text{\texttt{a4}}\). GM Paul Benko played here: 18... \(\text{\texttt{d7}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{xf6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf6}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{xf6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xa4}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{h4}}\), but he was forced to resign, because after 21... \(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{xf5}}\), Black was getting checkmated, Zuckerman – Benko, New York 1968. Even after: 18... \(\text{\texttt{e8}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{f4}}\), Black would have to face an irresistible attack, for example: 19...h6 20.\(\text{\texttt{xf6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf4}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{hxf7+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf7}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{h6+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h6}}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{xf7+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf7}}\) 25.\(\text{\texttt{e5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) 26.\(\text{\texttt{xf4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e5}}\) 27.\(\text{\texttt{g3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c8}}\) 28.\(\text{\texttt{g2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c7}}\) (28... \(\text{\texttt{e2+}}\) 29.\(\text{\texttt{h3+-}}\) 29.\(\text{\texttt{xf5+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) 30.g4+ \(\text{\texttt{h4}}\) 31.\(\text{\texttt{xe6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe6}}\) 32.\(\text{\texttt{h8\#}}\).

16.\(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{d2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g5}}\)

18.\(\text{\texttt{g3\#}}\)

Black has managed to block the kingside. His misfortune is that his dark-squared bishop has been quite restricted too. White preserved his edge in the ensuing tactical battle. 18... \(\text{\texttt{e5}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{d4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf3+}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{xf3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{cxd4}}\) 21. \(\text{\texttt{e2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{b5}}\) (Black cannot of course allow the appearance of White’s knight on the d4-square.) 22.\(\text{\texttt{a4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{d7}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{xd4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd4}}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{xd4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{ae8}}\) 25.\(\text{\texttt{e1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e5}}\) (He should defend now the e6-square from White’s rook.) 26.\(\text{\texttt{b4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c8}}\) 27. \(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{dxe5}}\) 28.\(\text{\texttt{b6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{a4}}\) 29. \(\text{\texttt{c3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) 30.\(\text{\texttt{xe2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f8}}\) 31.\(\text{\texttt{d6\#}}\) Gligoric – Larsen, Beverwijk 1967. White is definitely fighting for a win with his passed pawn in the centre.

\[\text{b3)}\] 9... \(\text{\texttt{xb8}}\)

10.\(\text{\texttt{a4}}\)

White could have played here the move 10.f5, transposing to a variation that we have already analysed in Chapter 21.

Meanwhile, White does not need any extreme measures like a pawn-sacrifice after this particular order of moves.

In the game Tal – Quinteros, Argentine 1987, White did not defend his queenside, but simply
proceeded with his offensive on the kingside and quite successfully at that: 10...\textmd{h}4 b5 11.f5 c4 12.e2 e8 (This is to prevent White from sacrificing the exchange on f6, in order to eliminate the defence of the h7-square. Meanwhile, maybe Black had better try the more active move 12...b4!?) 13...h6 b6+ 14.h1 xh6 15.xh6 g4 16.\textmd{g}4 ef6 17.h3 e3 18.h6! It turns out now that White’s threats (for example g5 and fxg6, or e5 and c4) are so powerful that he can simply ignore the material losses. 18...b4 19.\textmd{g}5 xf5 (After the beautiful line: 19..xf1 20.xf1 bxc3 21.fg6 22.xf5 cxb2 23.xf6 b1{ }+ 24.xf1, Black’s extra queen is not enough to save him from being checkmated.) 20.exf5 21.xf5 gxf5 22.e4, and Black resigned because of the unavoidable checkmate after: 22...fxe4 23.xf1.

10...a6

It is again too slow for Black to play 10...b6 11.h4 a6 (He shouldn't try instead 11..e6 12.dxe6 fxe6 13.e5{ }, but it is still clear that Black’s last two moves on the queenside – b6 and b8, did not affect so positively the effect of the undermining move e7-e6. 13...fd5 14.g5 h6 15.xg6 xc3 16.bxc3 b7 17.h5{ }+ Csoke – Mueller, Stockerau 1992. White is attacking comfortably with an extra pawn.) 12.f5. White’s attack is very powerful:

12...b5 (12.e8 13.h6 a8 14.e5{ }?. White plays in practice here much more often g5 and f3. 14..dxe5 15.xe5 xdx5 16.g5! xc3 17.bxc3 xf5. This sacrifice, with the idea to defend somehow the g6-square is just hopeless for Black. 18.xf5 e6 19.c6 exf 20.xd8 bxd8 21.xf5 d5 22.f1 e8 23.g3 h5 24.h3, and Black resigned in the game, Stean – Poutainen, Teeside 1974.) 13.axb5 axb5 14.h6 c4 (Black must exploit every opportunity to repel White’s bishop away from the d3-square: 14..b4 15.d1 a8 16.xa8 xa8 17.xg5 xf5 18.f3, and White’s threats turned out to be impossible to parry in the game, Borst – Chovanec, email 2002.) 15.e8 h6 (15..e8 16.g5 b6+ 17.h1 b4 18.d1 d4 19.c3 bxc3 20.bxc3 e5, Edelman – Iljic, New York 1985, 21.xg7 xg7 22.f4!+– f3 – and Black’s queen was lost in the haze; 16..e6? 17.fxe6 fxe6 18.xg7 xg7 19.a7+ c7 20.xf6+– Steenbekkers – Van Opstal, Den Bosch 1992 – and White wins; 16...b4 17.d1 c3 18.bxc3 bxc3 19.h1 b6 20.xf3 e6 21.h3 exf5 22.xg7 f4 23.xf6 h5 24.xc3+–, and White remained with a decisive material advantage in the game Hammar – Gruvaeus, Boras 1979.) 16..xh6 b4 17.g5{ }+. White’s attack is possibly irresistible, for example: 17..xf5 (or 17..bxc3 18.fg6, and White
checkmates.) 18.\(\text{d}d1\). White has won a piece and after 18...
\(\text{cxd5} 19.\text{exf5} \text{b6+} 20.\text{wh1} \text{d4} 21.\text{c3} \text{bxc3} 22.\text{bxc3} \text{d2} 23.\text{xc4} \text{f4}, Black resigned in the game Schmidt – Terzic, Bayern 1998.

Black has also tried here 10...\(\text{d}d7 11.\text{h1} \) (White can play 11.\(\text{h4} \) immediately too.) 11...b6 12.\(\text{h4} \) a6 13.f5 b5 14.\(\text{h6}, \) Saveride – Polihroniade, Buenos Aires 1978. Black’s counterattack is not any faster in comparison to the game Schmidt – Terzic, Bayern 1998.

**11.a5**

This move fortifies the position of White’s knight on the c3-square. It cannot be repelled now by Black’s b-pawn.

**11...b5**

Or 11...e6 12.dxe6 \(\text{dxe6} \) Reeh – Schlosser, Leibnitz 1990, and here White had better play the standard line for similar positions: 13.f5 \(\text{d4} 14.\text{h4} \text{gxf5} \) (14...\(\text{d7}?! 15.\text{g5}++) 15.\text{exf5} \text{xf5} 16.\text{xf5} \text{xf5} 17.\text{g5}, and White’s threats along the f-file are quite unpleasant for his opponent.

Black cannot equalize after the other possibilities either:

In case of 11...\(\text{d}d7, \) White should follow with 12.f5, and later \(\text{h4}, \) since Black can counter the immediate move 12.\(\text{h4}, \) with 12...e6;

11...\text{e}8 12.\text{h4} b5 13.\text{axb6} \text{xb6} 14.f5 \text{b5}, Van Gool – Van Gool, Venlo 1992, and now the best for White would have been to act in the standard fashion: 15.\(\text{h6}, \) and Black’s counterplay is too slow to be effective: 15...\(\text{h6} 16.\text{h6} \text{xc3} 17.\text{xc3} \text{gxf5} 18.\text{g5} \text{c4} 19.\text{f3} \text{b2} 20.\text{g3}, \) threatening \(\text{e6}+;\)

11...\(\text{g4} \) (this move usually only helps White) 12.\text{h4} \text{xf3} 13.\text{xf3} e6 (otherwise f5 and \(\text{h6} 14.\text{dxe6} \text{dxe6} 15.f5 \text{d7} \) or 15...\(\text{d4}, \) Mueller – Arnold, Budapest 1995, 16.\(\text{h3}?! \), and in order to avoid problems with his h7-pawn Black must retreat with his knight to d7 anyway) 16.\text{h5} \text{d8} 17.\text{d5}, White’s pieces are very active and he has a powerful knight on d5. Black can hardly compensate that with the dominance over only one good e5-square and after the wrong move: 17...\text{e}8?! 18.f6± Black’s dark-squared bishop is totally cramped, possibly to the end of the game, Westerinen – Hoi, Esbjerg 1982;

11...\(\text{d}d7 \) (This move is hardly necessary – Black can play b7-b5 without it.) 12.\text{h4}, and here Black has already tried four different lines but without any success at all – White is much faster.
on the kingside than Black on the queenside:
12...e6 (After Black’s loss of tempo for the move \( \text{\underline{d}7} \), that move seems to be quite dubious.) 13.dxe6 \( \text{\underline{d}} \)xe6 14.f5 \( \text{\underline{e}} \)d4 15.g5 \( \text{\underline{c}} \)e6, Ponting – DeCoverly, corr. 1991, and here White’s simplest line would have been: 16.\( \text{\underline{x}} \)xd4 cxd4 17.\( \text{\underline{d}} \)d5 \( \text{\underline{x}} \)xd5 18.exd5, and the deadly pin along the f-file renders Black’s position absolutely hopeless – he has no defence against \( \text{\underline{R}} \)f3, followed by \( \text{\underline{H}} \)f1;
12...\( \text{\underline{b}} \)b5 13.f5 (It is also possible for White to play 13.\( \text{\underline{x}} \)xb5 axb5 14.c3 c4 15.\( \text{\underline{c}} \)c2 \( \text{\underline{a}} \)a6 16.f5 \( \text{\underline{c}} \)c5 17.fxg6 fxg6 18.\( \text{\underline{e}} \)e3\( \text{\underline{+}} \), with the idea to penetrate with the knight to the e6-square, Ionescu – Moldovan, Baile Tusnad 2001)
13...\( \text{\underline{d}} \)d7 14.\( \text{\underline{h}} \)h6\( \text{\underline{+}} \) – Black’s counterplay is again too slow, Zivic – Zivkovic, Sokobanja 1989;
12...\( \text{\underline{b}} \)b5 13.\( \text{\underline{c}} \)e2 (It deserves attention for White to follow with 13.f5\( ? \), continuing with his plan and ignoring Black’s counterplay.) 13...c4 14.\( \text{\underline{c}} \)xc4 \( \text{\underline{x}} \)xe4 15.\( \text{\underline{d}} \)d3 \( \text{\underline{f}} \)f6 16.c4 \( \text{\underline{c}} \)c7 17.f5, Wempe – Bakels, Haarlem 1996.

Even after the exchange of the e4-pawn – White preserves his standard threats on the kingside;
12...b5 13.axb6 \( \text{\underline{b}} \)xb6 14.f5 \( \text{\underline{c}} \)c8, Rocha – Bosco Ladeira, Curitiba 1984, 15.\( \text{\underline{h}} \)h6?!?, and once again Black can hardly defend against White’s overwhelming kingside attack.

12.axb6 \( \text{\underline{b}} \)xb6

13.\( \text{\underline{d}} \)d2?!\( \text{\underline{+}} \)
White calmly places his knight on the c4-square and exerts pressure in the centre and on the queenside. After the standard attack with 13.\( \text{\underline{h}} \)h4, he should worry about 13...\( \text{\underline{b}} \)b4, Sosa – Moussa, Manila 1992, and an eventual counterplay along the fourth rank, although it might prove to be insufficient to distract White’s forces.
Chapter 20

1.e4 d6 2.d4 ♗f6 3.♗c3 g6 4.f4 ♗g7 5.♗f3 0-0 6.♘d3 ♗a6 7.0-0 c5 8.d5 ♗g4

One of the ideas for Black here is that after for example: 9.♖h1 ♗xf3, White must capture with the rook – 10.♗xf3 (in case of 10.♗xf3 ♗b4, Black manages to exchange his knight for White’s bishop quite favourably). There might follow: 10...♗c7 11.a4 e6 12.dxe6 fxe6 13.♗e1 ♗d7?! (It is stronger for Black to play 13...♗e7?! 14.♗d2 ♗ae8∞ – and Black must still worry about the defence of the h7-pawn, because White is ready to go with his rook to h3 at any moment.) 14.♗d2 ♗h8 15.♗h3 (White is threatening to push e5 and capture on g6.) 15...e5 16.♗g3 ♗e8 17.♗b5! ♗xb5 18.♗xb5 ♗f7 19.♗xh7+ ♗xh7 20.♗h3+ ♗h6 21.♗xe5 ♗g7 22.♗xd7 ♗xe5 23.♗g5+ Jonkman – Reinderman, Wijk 1994. White’s bishop is not weaker at all than Black’s rook, so White’s chances are better.

The lines that we are analysing are abundant with possible transpositions (Black can play the move ♗c7 immediately, or after several moves.), therefore we will study Black’s plans now, before the almost unavoidable exchange on f3.

One of the possible plans for Black after the exchange is to play e7-e6. We have already mentioned that before.

The other possible plan for him is to try to break on the queenside with the help of the pawn-advance b7-b5. The point is how to prepare it.

After the immediate a7-a6 – White plays a4-a5, and in case of b7-b5 he will capture en passant, after which Black will remain with a weak pawn on the semi-open a-file. White preserves a stable, despite slight advantage, since it is not clear how Black can compensate his weak pawn.

Black can play at first b7-b6, and only then a7-a6. White then has some interesting resources
4.f4 \textit{g7} 5.\textit{f3} 0-0 6.\textit{d3} \textit{c6} 7.0-0 c5 8.d5 \textit{g4} 9.\textit{c4}

- \textit{a3-b3} (or even \textit{b1} and \textit{b4}), and again Black cannot play \textit{b6-b5}.

Well, Black's counterplay on the queenside has almost been stopped instead, but it is not easy for White to claim any progress on the kingside either - the pawn-break e4-e5 yields nothing yet.

9.\textit{c4}

This powerful piece (the bishop prevents the move \textit{b7-b5} and defends the \textit{d5-pawn} and it helps the preparation of the move e4-e5, moreover it is active along the diagonal in case of e7-e6 and a subsequent exchange on e6) is not so easy to be ousted from that excellent square. Meanwhile, this is the essential difference between that position and a similar one that can arise in some closed openings in which White already has a pawn on the c4-square.

We can start with 9...\textit{d7}
10.h3 \textit{xf3} 11.\textit{x}f3. Now, Black should better play 11...\textit{c7} and transpose to the line 9...\textit{c7}
10.h3 \textit{xf3} 11.\textit{x}f3 \textit{d7} - Black does not achieve much if he tries to play originally: 11...\textit{b6} (11...
\textit{b8} 12.\textit{g}e2 - see 9...\textit{b8}; he has also tried in practice: 11...\textit{a5}
12.\textit{g}b5 \textit{c7} 13.\textit{xc7} \textit{xc7} 14.a4
a6 15.c3\textpm Lozbanidze - Bitman, Kstovo 1997. Black's counterplay is quite impaired, while White managed later in the game to push forward his g and h-pawns and to seize the initiative on the kingside.) 12.\textit{b5} (White's bishop might not be best placed here, but Black's knight is definitively not on its ideal square either.) 12...\textit{f5}! (This counterattack against White's centre is a bit risky, since it weakens the light squares.) 13.e5 15.\textit{d2} \textit{c7} 15.\textit{d3} c4 16.\textit{e}2 e6
17.a4 \textit{bxd5} 18.\textit{xc4} \textit{b4} 19.\textit{b3}\textpm. Black's e6-pawn is much rather a weakness, because he cannot manage to push forward his central pawns. In the game Krakops - Nogueiras, Ubeda 1997, there followed: 19...\textit{c6} 20.
\textit{b5} d5 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{e}8 22.\textit{xg7} \textit{xg7} 23.\textit{ad1}\textpm, and despite the fact that everything seems to be well protected in Black's position - he has a weakness, while White has no weaknesses at all;

9...\textit{b8} 10.h3 \textit{xf3} 11.\textit{x}f3 \textit{d7} (or 11...\textit{c7} 12.a4 a6 13.a5\textpm, and there arises a position that we deal with later, when we
analyse the line: 9...\( \text{Q}c7 \) 10.h3 \( \text{A}xf3 \) 11.\( \text{A}xf3 \) a6 12.a4 \( \text{B}b8 \) 13.a5 12.\( \text{A}e2 \) \( \text{Q}c7 \) 13.a4 \( \text{A}h8 \) (after 13...a6 14.a5 \( \text{A}c8 \) 15.\( \text{A}a4 \), it is not good for Black to play 15...e6 16.dxe6 \( \text{A}xe6 \), Erturan – Bitansky, Athens 2001, because of 17.\( \text{A}d3! ? \) – and he has no compensation for the backward d-pawn.) 14.\( \text{A}d1 \) \( \text{A}b6 \) 15.\( \text{A}b3 \) \( \text{A}d7 \) 16.\( \text{A}e3 \) a6 17.a5 \( \pm \) W. Schmidt – Terzic, Bayern 1999. White has the advantage – Black’s counterplay with b7-b5, or f7-f5 will only create new weaknesses for him;

It is not so good for Black to play 9...\( \text{A}b8 \) – it is more natural to support the b-pawn with his rook. 10.h3 \( \text{A}xf3 \) 11.\( \text{A}xf3 \) \( \text{A}c7 \) 12.a4 a6 13.a5 b5 14.axb6 \( \text{A}xb6 \), Howell – Alber, Yaroslavl 1990, and after 15.\( \text{A}a3! ? \) \( \pm \) \( \text{A}b3 \), the black queen is hardly on its best place and White will soon start some active actions on the queenside.

10.h3 \( \text{A}xf3 \)

Black has also tried here the surprising move 10...\( \text{A}d7 \). It seems to be rather challenging – Black does not reduce the pressure of the opponent in the centre and on the kingside (that was the idea behind the move \( \text{A}g4 \) after all...) and simply retreats the bishop. Well, there was some merit in provoking h2-h3 for White (for example, he does not have that square for the rook after f4-f5 and \( \text{A}e1\)-h4), but also Black cannot retreat his knight to the g4-square after the eventual e4-e5. 11.a4 a6 12.e5 \( \text{A}fe8 \) 13.a5 e6 (13...\( \text{A}b5 \) 14.\( \text{A}e4 \) \( \text{A}c7 \) 15.\( \text{A}d3 \) \( \text{A}f5 \) 16.g4 \( \text{A}xe4 \) 17.\( \text{A}xe4 \) \( \text{A}c8 \) 18.c3 \( \pm \), with a great space advantage for White, Zambor – Kaposztas, Slovakia 1998) 14.\( \text{A}e3 \) \( \text{A}c8 \) 15.\( \text{A}d2 \) exd5 16.\( \text{A}xd5 \) \( \text{A}xd5 \) 17.\( \text{A}xd5 \) \( \text{A}c6 \) 18.\( \text{A}ad1 \) \( \text{A}xd5 \) 19.\( \text{A}xd5 \). White has a clear opening advantage – he enjoys more space and his pieces are very active. Later in the game Mahjoob – Azmaiparashvili, Tripoli 2004, it was played 19...\( \text{A}c6 \) (Black wants to play 20...\( \text{A}c7 \) and 21...d5, with an excellent game, but White must prevent that plan.) 20.f5!? (White thus begins active operations on the kingside and he sacrifices a pawn temporarily.) 20...\( \text{A}xf5 \) 21.\( \text{A}g5 \) \( \text{A}d7 \) 22.\( \text{A}h4 \) \( \text{A}c7 \) 23.\( \text{A}f3 \) \( \text{A}xe5 \) 24.\( \text{A}h6 \) \( \text{A}e8 \) 25.\( \text{A}xf5 \) d5 (Black intends to defend with his rook along the sixth rank.) 26.\( \text{A}de1 \) (26.\( \text{A}g7! ? \)) 26...\( \text{A}g6 \) 27.\( \text{A}c3 \) (White is threatening \( \text{A}h6+ \)) 27...\( \text{A}f6 \) 28.\( \text{A}xc5 \) \( \text{A}h8 \) 29.\( \text{A}d4 \) \( \text{A}b5 \), and now after 30.c3! \( ? \) \( \pm \), White would be slightly better, because of the numerous pawn weaknesses of his opponent.

Black has also tried here 13...\( \text{A}b5 \) (instead of 13...e6) 14.\( \text{A}d3 \) \( \text{A}xc4 \) 15.\( \text{A}xc4 \) \( \text{A}b5 \) 16.\( \text{A}e4 \) (It was also worth for White to try 16.\( \text{A}xb5! ? \) axb5 17.\( \text{A}xb5 \) dxe5 18.\( \text{A}xe5 \), and Black’s weaknesses on the queenside (together with the potential passed pawn on a5) provide White with the advantage.) 16...\( \text{A}d4 \) 17.
\( \text{x}d4 \text{cxd}4 18.\text{w}xd4 \text{c}7 \text{19.w}d3 \text{dxe}5 20.\text{c}4 \text{d}6 \text{21.w}xd6 \text{exd}6 \text{22.f}5\uparrow \text{Black is now forced to give up a pawn in order to avoid being cramped.} \)\text{22.e}4 \text{23.w}xe4 \text{e}5, \text{but he did not obtain enough compensation for the pawn in the game De Firmian – Todorcevic, Las Palmas 1999.} \text{11.wxf3} \\

We will analyse now \text{a}) \text{11...a}6, \text{b}) \text{11...d}d7 \text{and c}) \text{11...e}6. \text{11.b}b8 \text{12.a}4 \text{b}6 (\text{12...a}6 \text{will be dealt with in the line about 11...a6; about 12...d}d7 – see line \text{b}) \text{11...d}d7 \text{12.a}4 \text{b}8.) \text{13.w}d3 \text{c}8, \text{Zenklusen – Roemer, Lindau 2002, 14.e}3!?, \text{and later, in case Black tries to implement the plan including a7-a6, White, just like in the game that we have already analysed in our variation \text{a2} Grischuk – Ponomariov, Lausanne 2000, should play wab1 and b2-b4.} \\

\text{a}) \text{11...a}6 \text{12.a}4 \\
\text{Black now has two principally different moves: \text{a1}) \text{12...b}8, ignoring the fact that after 13.a5 Black cannot play b7-b5 without disrupting his pawn structure (after White captures en passant Black's a6-pawn becomes weak) and \text{a2}) \text{12...b}6.} \text{12...d}d7 \text{transposes to the line 11...d}d7. \\

\text{a1}) \text{12...b}8 \text{13.a}5 \\

\text{Alack has also tried in practice 13...e}6 (this is an attempt to combine the two basic plans for counterplay) 14.dxe6 dxe6 (This move is with the idea to bring the knight to the d4-square. It is obviously better for Black to follow with the standard: 14...fxe6 15.e3\pm, but the inclusion of all these moves on the queenside (a4-a5, a7-a6, wB8) is hardly favourable for Black.) 15.e2 d4 16.wxd4 cxd4 17.e5 w8 (or 17...dxe5 18.fxe5 w7 19. wxf7+ w8 20.e6 w5 21.w4 w4\pm Kovacevic – Strikovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1999. White has won and preserved an extra pawn and Black's compensation for it is insufficient.) 18.f5 (White is thus eyeing Black's most vulnerable spot – the f7-pawn.) 18.wxe5 19.w6 w7, Wahls – Strikovic, Zaragoza 1996, and here after
20.fxg6 hxg6 21...xf7+ @h7 22. @d2± Black can hardly compensate his vulnerable king.

14.axb6 axb6 15.d3 b8

It is obviously worse for Black to play 15...@b5 16.d2 @c7 (now after 16...@b8 17.a5 and @a4, Black loses a pawn.) 17.b3 e6 18.a5 @e8 19. @h1 @e7 20. @a4± Black is clearly worse after he has lost so much time on his knight moves, Matros – Odesskij, Moscow 1994.

In the game Wahls – Norwood, Baguio 1987, Black failed to solve his problems with 15...e6 16. @a4 @b8 17.dxe6 fxe6 18.e5 dxe5 19. @xd8 @xd8 20. @xc5 @fd5 21.fxe5 @xf1+ 22. @xf1 @xe5 23.c3± and he cannot defend his weakness on a6.

16.a2 @b5

17.d2±

White is better, because Black’s weakness on a6 is very vulnerable. Later in the game Berescu – Dzhumaev, Kavala 2003, Black brought his knight to c7 and undermined White's centre – 17.e8 18.e2 @c7 19.c3 (It was worth for White to play 19.b3!?, with the idea to try to win the a6-pawn with the move @a5.) 19...e6 20.dxe6. This move for White, just like the next one too, is hardly necessary (Black was in fact threatening nothing), but still White has a powerful initiative. 20...fxe6 21.f5!? gxf5 22.exf5 d5 23. @xb5 axb5 24.f6 @xf6 25.@xf6 @xf6 26. @f4, and the open and vulnerable position of the black king proves to be much more important that a mere pawn: 26...@b7 27.a6 @d8 28.g3+ @f7 29. @b6 @a7 30. @f3 @g8 31. @c7 @c7 32. @f4±. White has regained his material with interest and he is still attacking.

a2) 12...b6 13.d3

13.e6

It is not so effective for Black to prepare gradually b6-b5 in this position: 13...@b8 14.e3 @b7 15.ab1! (This is a key-move for White – he opens the b-file and begins active actions on the queenside himself.) 15...e6 (It is too bad for Black to play 15...b5? 16.axb5 axb5 17.@xb5 @xb5 18.@xb5±, and he cannot capture
on e4, because of \( \text{c6} \); after 15...\( \text{ab}8 \) 16.b4 b5?, White wins a pawn with: 17.axb5 axb5 18.\( \text{bxc6}+ \) 16.b4 exd5 17.exd5 cxb4 18.\( \text{xb4} \) b5 (It is unplayable for Black to try 18...\( \text{d7} \), due to 19.\( \text{e4} \)) 19.axb5 axb5 20.\( \text{b3}+ \). Black’s weakness on b5 provides White with the advantage, while after 20...\( \text{a5} \) 21.\( \text{f5}+ \), in the game Grischuk – Ponomariov, Lauenanne 2000, he started an aggression on the other side of the board too. Later, this game continued: 21...\( \text{a6} \) 22.fxg6 hxg6 23.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{a1} \) 24.\( \text{xf6}+ \) \( \text{xf6} \) 25.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 26.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xf1}+ \) 27.\( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 28.\( \text{d4} \), and here the opponents agreed to a draw, although White was still slightly better. Subsequently, an improvement was found: 22.\( \text{b4} \), which was in general a very useful move overall, avoiding the simplification of the position. 22...\( \text{a1} \) 23.\( \text{d4} \) b4 24.\( \text{xa1} \) \( \text{a1}+ \) 25.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{c1} \) 26.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{g5} \) 27.\( \text{b6} \) \( \text{ce8} \) 28.\( \text{d8} \) \( \text{h8} \). Otherwise Black loses the exchange. 29.\( \text{e7} \) \( \text{g8} \) 30.\( \text{h1} \) (It is even better for White to play: 30.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{c7} \) 31.\( \text{c6}+ \) – M.Roiz, with a huge positional advantage for him.) 30...\( \text{h6} \) (30...\( \text{f8} ?+ \)) 31.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 32.fxg6! \( \text{xe7} \) (32...\( \text{xg6} \) 33.\( \text{d8}+ \)) 33.gxf7 \( \text{g5} \) 34.fxg7++, and here after: 34...\( \text{xe8} \) 35.\( \text{d4}+ \) \( \text{f6} \) 36.\( \text{xb4} \), White could have remained with an extra pawn and a winning position in the game Acs – Bogdanovski, Yerevan 2001.

It is quite possible that Black could have tried a more subtle manoeuvre with the queen with the same idea: 13...\( \text{d7} \) 14.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c8} \), or immediately 13...\( \text{e8} \) 14.\( \text{e3} \) (It is too early for White to play: 14.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{fe8} \) 15.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b7} \) 16.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{d8} \) 17.\( \text{b3} \) e6 18.\( \text{dxe6} \) fxe6 19.\( \text{exd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 20.\( \text{f3}+ \) \( \text{h8} \) 21.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{fe8} \), Borriss – Bogdanovski, Panormo 2001, because Black remains with a quite sufficient compensation for the pawn – White has no good square for his queen, because it hampers the retreat of his bishop to the f3-square,) 14...\( \text{d7} \) 15.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{b8} \). In the game Hitzgerova – Bosboom-Lanchava, Halle 2001, White played immediately 16.b4 in that position, but this plan turned out to be not so effective, while Black’s queen was still on the c8-square: 16...\( \text{xb4} \) 17.\( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 18.\( \text{xe5} \) bxc5 19.\( \text{xb8} \) \( \text{xb8} \) 20.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{a7} \) 21.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b8} \) 22.\( \text{xb8}+ \) \( \text{xb8} \) 23.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{xb3} \) 24.\( \text{xb3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 25.\( \text{f2} \) e6, and the endgame was approximately equal.

It deserved some attention for White to try the waiting move: 16.\( \text{h1} !? \), since presently Black still cannot play b6-b5 favourably. He needs the support of his queen to do that. Only following 16...\( \text{b7} \), White plays 17.b4 cxb4 (17...b5? 18.axb5 axb5 19.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{xb5} \) 20.\( \text{bxc5}+ \)) 18.\( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 19.\( \text{xc5} \) dxc5 20.\( \text{b3}+ \), and he maintains his advantage in the centre.
14.f5!?  
This is stronger than 14.dxe6 fxe6 15.\(\text{\textit{}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{}}\)e7 16.e5 \(\text{\textit{}}\)fe8 17.exd6 \(\text{\textit{}}\)xd6, and Black’s pieces come to active positions, Paramos – Bogdanovski, Skopje 2002.

14...\(\text{\textit{}}\)xf5 15.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xf5 b5!?  
This attempt to undermine White’s position in the centre was recommended by L.Gofstein.

16.axb5 axb5 17.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xa8 \(\text{\textit{}}\)xa8 18.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xb5 \(\text{\textit{}}\)xd5  
After 18...\(\text{\textit{}}\)xb5 19.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xb5 \(\text{\textit{}}\)xd5 20.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xd5 \(\text{\textit{}}\)xd5 21.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xd6\(\text{\textit{}}\)\(\text{\textit{}}\), Black has serious problems to regain his pawn.

19.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xd5 \(\text{\textit{}}\)xd5

20.g4\(\text{\textit{}}\)\(\text{\textit{}}\)\(\text{\textit{}}\)\(\text{\textit{}}\)
White is threatening to isolate Black’s bishop on g7 (with g5 and f6), so he is going to reach an endgame with a slight advan-

tage for him (due to his bishop pair).

b) 11...\(\text{\textit{}}\)d7 12.a4

12...a6  
The other possibility for Black:

12...\(\text{\textit{}}\)b8 has no particular value, Cormos – Henson, Canada 1996, because after White’s standard reply 13.\(\text{\textit{}}\)d3, Black must still play 13...a6 in order to continue his queenside actions and that transposes to the variation 12...a6 13.\(\text{\textit{}}\)d3 \(\text{\textit{}}\)b8;

12...b6 13.\(\text{\textit{}}\)d3 h6 (This move weakens Black’s kingside; it is better for him to play the standard 13...a6.) 14.\(\text{\textit{}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{}}\)c8 15.\(\text{\textit{}}\)ad1 \(\text{\textit{}}\)b8 16.e5 (Black’s unfavourable piece-placement and the vulnerability of the g6-square enable White to proceed with this pawn-break, which is quite rare in a position with an exchanged knight on f3.) 16...\(\text{\textit{}}\)b7, Caruso – Sarno, Toscana 1999, (in case of 16...dxe5 17.d6 exd6 18.\(\text{\textit{}}\)xd6, Black’s knight on d7 is hanging as well as the g6-pawn) and now after 17.e6\(\text{\textit{}}\)\(\text{\textit{}}\), White has a space advan-
tage and some initiative on the kingside;

12...e6 13.dxe6 fxe6 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e2 (White must avoid his queen being attacked with tempo.) 14...\textit{\textvisiblespace}h8 15.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}e7 16.\textit{\textvisiblespace}ad1\textit{\textvisiblespace}†, It is reasonable for White to place his rook here, because Black's weaknesses on d6 is considerable with a knight on d7. It is worse for him to play: 16.\textit{\textvisiblespace}ae1 \textit{\textvisiblespace}f6 17.e5 dxe5 18.fxe5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}fd5 19.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xc3 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc3 b6 (It is obvious better for Black to play 20...\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe5 21.c3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d6 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}g5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}ae8=, or 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xb5= – and White will of course regain his pawn, but he will hardly manage to achieve anything substantial.) 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}g5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xg5 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xg5 h6 23.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf8+ \textit{\textvisiblespace}xf8 24.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d8 25.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f2\textit{\textvisiblespace}† – White preserved a slight advantage in the endgame Kovchan – Zubov, Nepomnyshev 2000.

13.\textit{\textvisiblespace}d3

13...\textit{\textvisiblespace}b6

About 13...b6 – see line a2 13...\textit{\textvisiblespace}ad7.

It is not so good for Black to try: 13...f5, Rebel 7.0 – Rebel Decade, Usti 1998, because after 14.e5, followed by e5-e6 (Natural rally, Black cannot capture on e5, because of 15.d6\textit{\textvisiblespace}†) White squeezes his opponent completely in the centre.

White found an interesting idea 13...\textit{\textvisiblespace}b8 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}b6 15.b3!? in the game Yegiazarian – Bogdanovski, Ohrid 2001, and then they played 15...\textit{\textvisiblespace}d7 16.a5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xc4 17.bxc4. He opened the b-file at the expense of doubling his c-pawns and solidified his centre. After 17...b5 (otherwise Black remains with an “eternal” weakness on b7) 18.axb6 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xb6 19.e5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c8 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}ae1\textit{\textvisiblespace}±, White dominates in the centre and his pieces are active, and after Black’s mistake 20...dxe5? 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}b7 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}a3\textit{\textvisiblespace}± White had powerful passed pawns.

14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}a2

It is worse for White to play 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b3, because of 14...\textit{\textvisiblespace}c8.

14...\textit{\textvisiblespace}d7

Black can try here the somewhat paradoxical, but still quite playable retreat of his knight backwards – 14...\textit{\textvisiblespace}d7. Its idea is that after 15.a5, Black can counter that with the temporary pawn-sacrifice: 15...\textit{\textvisiblespace}b5! 16.\textit{\textvisiblespace}c4 (16.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xb5 a6b5 17.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xb5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xa5 18.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xb7 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c8, and White is incapable of preserving his extra pawn, because of the possibility for him to lose his bishop on a2, due to the pin: 19.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc8 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xc8 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}d2 \textit{\textvisiblespace}a4 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xe4=) 16...\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc3 17.bxc3 b5 18.axb6 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xb6 19.e3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}f8 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xa6 \textit{\textvisiblespace}b2 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}d2 c4 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xc2 23.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b3
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24.\textit{f}a1 \textit{c}c5 25.\textit{e}e1 (25.\textit{e}5 \textit{w}xc4 26.\textit{x}c4 \textit{x}a2 27.\textit{x}a2 dxe5\textsuperscript{+}) 25...\textit{w}xc4 26.\textit{x}c4 \textit{a}xa2 27.\textit{a}xa2 \textit{d}xe4 28.\textit{e}e2 \textit{x}c3 29.\textit{x}c3 \textit{x}xc3 30.\textit{x}e7 \textit{b}b4, and Black obtained quite reasonable winning chances in the endgame in Maia – Simonenko, corr. 2000.

White therefore must retreat his bishop to the b3-square and in fact he thus compensates the tempi that his opponent has lost in the process. The game might follow with: 15.\textit{b}b3 b6 (This is slightly better for Black than 15...\textit{b}b8, for example: 16.a5 b5 17.axb6 \textit{x}xb6 18.\textit{a}a4 \textit{x}xa4 19.\textit{a}xa4 \textit{d}d7 20.\textit{a}a2. White protects his b2-pawn and prepares to exert some pressure against Black’s a6-pawn. 20...\textit{b}b4 21.\textit{c}c4 e6 22.\textit{d}xe6 fxe6 23.\textit{c}3 \textit{b}b6 24.\textit{e}e3\textsuperscript{±}. White preserves some positional advantage, because of the weaknesses of Black’s pawn-structure, Golod – Bogdanovski, Ohrid 2001.) 16.\textit{e}e3 \textit{b}b8 17.\textit{c}c4 \textit{c}c8 18.\textit{a}ab1 \textit{b}b7 19.b4\textsuperscript{±}, and White still had some edge after: 19...\textit{x}xb4 20.\textit{a}xb4 \textit{c}c5 21.\textit{x}c5 dxc5 22.\textit{b}b3\textsuperscript{±} (There arises a quite similar position, with the exception that White’s king is on the h1-square, in the line a2).

15.a5 \textit{c}c8

Black’s knight might get trapped in case of: 15...\textit{a}a4 16.\textit{d}d1 b5 (16...\textit{b}b5 17.\textit{c}c4 \textit{a}a5 18.\textit{d}d2\textsuperscript{+}) 17.c4 \textit{a}ab8 18.\textit{a}a1\textsuperscript{±}\textit{b}b3.

16.\textit{d}d2 b5 17.axb6 \textit{b}b6

18.\textit{a}e1 \textit{b}b5 19.\textit{d}d1 \textit{d}d4 20.\textit{e}e3 (It is a mistake for White to continue with 20.c3 \textit{w}b5\textsuperscript{!} 21.\textit{x}xb5 axb5, and Black gets rid of his weakness on a6 thankfully.) 20...\textit{a}ab8 21.\textit{c}3. Now, contrary to the previous line, the bishop on a2 is not hanging. 21...\textit{b}b5 22.\textit{a}xb5 \textit{c}xb5 23.\textit{b}b3 \textit{c}7 24.\textit{c}2 a5 25.\textit{a}1 a4 26.\textit{a}a2 (Or 26.\textit{f}b1 \textit{a}a8 27.\textit{a}a2\textsuperscript{±}, which forces Black to place his rook less actively.) 26...\textit{b}b7 27.\textit{f}a1\textsuperscript{±} Dolmatov – Chernin, Minsk 1987. Black’s a4-pawn is presently defended indeed; nevertheless its permanent weakness provides White with a stable advantage.

c) 11...\textit{e}6

12.dxe6 fxe6 12...\textit{d}xe6 will be followed by
13.\(\text{e}2\)±, then \(\text{xe}3\) and \(\text{ad}1\) with an advantage – White’s bishop is strong with such structure.

13.\(\text{e}3\)

13...\(\text{b}6\)

After the immediate 13...\(\text{e}7\), White has the strike: 14.e5! dxe5 15.\(\text{xb}7\), after which Black must search compensation for his weak pawns in the centre and on the queenside: 15...\(\text{fb}8\) (It is bad for Black to play 15...exf4 16.\(\text{xf}4\) – because the c7-knight is hanging...) 16.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xb}2\) (and here 16...exf4 17.\(\text{xf}4\), is again wrong for Black, because he cannot play 17...\(\text{xb}2\)?) 18.\(\text{xc}7\) – and the rook on a8 is hanging) 17.\(\text{e}4\)! (This powerful move with tempo enables White to activate his pieces considerably. It was worse for him to capture on e5, because of 17...\(\text{d}7\).) 17...\(\text{xe}4\) (It is not good for Black to play 17...exf4 18.\(\text{xc}5\) – because White will capture on f4 and then his pieces will be much better placed despite the material advantage; or 17...\(\text{xc}2\) 18.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 19.fxe5! \(\text{xe}4\) 20.\(\text{xe}4\)± and once again White’s pieces are dominant.) 18.\(\text{xe}4\) exf4 19.\(\text{xf}4\) (Black’s rook on a8 as well as his pawn on e6 are hanging and his pieces are obviously misplaced.) 19...\(\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{b}3\), This move traps the enemy rook and forces Black to capture the rook, (because of the threat \(\text{ae}1\) and \(\text{c}1\)), so he has to take instant countermeasures. 20...\(\text{xb}3\) (Black achieves the same result after: 20...\(\text{d}4\)+ 21.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{xb}3\) 22.\(\text{axb}3\) \(\text{xa}1\) 23.\(\text{xa}1\) – and the vulnerability of the placement of the white king is immaterial, Sasata – Dikmen, IECG 1997.) 21.\(\text{xb}3\) \(\text{xa}1\) 22. \(\text{xa}1\)\(\text{c}1\)+ Dolmatov – Smirin, Rostov 1993. White is a pawn down indeed, but Black has numerous weaknesses (the pawns on a7, c5 and e6, as well as the complex of dark squares on the kingside) that are more than sufficient compensation.

It is stronger for Black to play 13...\(\text{d}7\), with the idea to follow later with \(\text{e}5\) at some moment, or even \(\text{xc}3\). 14.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{xc}3\) (14...\(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) d5 17.exd5 \(\text{cx}d5\) 18.\(\text{xd}5\) exd5 19.c3 \(\text{ae}8\) 20.\(\text{f}3\) c4 21.\(\text{c}2\)± d4. This sacrifice is hardly justified. White intended to retreat his queen to f2 and follow that with f4-f5, opening the diagonal for his light-squared bishop and destroying the shelter of the black king. 22.cxd4 \(\text{f}6\) 23.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 24.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}2\) 25.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 26.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}4\) 27.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{xe}2\) 28.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 29.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{d}2\) 30.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{xd}2\) 31.
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...32. bxc4 33. e4 34. xf2+ e2 35. h2 xc4 36. xb7, and White remained with an extra pawn in the endgame in Perlitz – Moeller, email 2002.) 15. bxc3 b5 16. e2 e7, Comet – Little Goliath, 2000, and here White should have followed with: 17. c4!?, and if 17... d5 17... bxc4 18. xc4 e5 19. xe2 xc4 20. xe4± d4-e5), then 18. g3 c5 19. xc4 bxc4 20. f5 – the absence of Black’s dark-squared bishop becomes very important, since it is an essential defender of the black king.

14. Ad1 e7 15. fe1 h8

(diagram)

16. f2

Black’s centre is presently static and White has enough time to complete the manoeuvre with his bishop to h4 and to make the threat e4-e5 even more dangerous for Black. It is too risky for White to start an immediate aggression on the kingside: 16. g4 Ad8 17. f2 d7 18. g3 g5! 19. f5 e5± – and Black’s counterplay is quite efficient with his powerful knight on the e5-outpost, Wedberg – Azmaiparashvili, Reykjavik 1990.
1. e4 d6 2. d4 .df6 3. dc3 g6 4. f4 dg7 5. df3 0–0 6. dd3 da6 7. 0–0 c5 8. d5 db8

Black is preparing a queenside operation with b7-b5, but now contrary to the move 8... dc7, he preserves the possibility to go with his knight to b4. That is quite favourable for him, for example in answer to de1, since then White’s bishop on d3 cannot retreat and it will be exchanged. Meanwhile, Black ignores White’s possible attack on the kingside with his move db8 and that provokes White to immediate active actions there.

9. f5?

This is connected with a pawn-sacrifice in many lines, but it is quite worth it – after Black captures on f5 his king is considerably weakened by the absence of the g6-pawn and White’s attack becomes dangerous.

On the other hand, White does not have so many purposeful moves left at his disposal – he wants to bring his queen to h4, but in case of de1 he has to worry about the manoeuvre db4 that we have already mentioned before. He can of course prevent that with the move 9. a3, but he is reluctant to waste a tempo on a move like that.

We recommend here 9. f5 and this is no doubt the most energetic move in that position.

Black has a choice in this position between several moves and we will deal in details with a) 9... de7, and of course with the most natural move – capturing the sacrificed pawn b) 9... gxf5.

It is premature for Black to play in that position 9... b5 with the standard idea to capture on e4 in case White takes on b5 like in the game Brustkern – Arnold, Budapest 1998. After 10. dx5 c4 (or 10... dx4 11. dx7 – and Black remains a pawn down without much of a compensation) 11. dx4, Black cannot play 11... dx5 12. dx5 db6+, because of 13. de4 – pres-
ently Black is an exchange and two pawns down and he cannot
win back a piece relying on the pin, because of: 13...\textcircled{c}xe4 14.\textcircled{c}e3
\textcircled{c}xd4 15.\textcircled{c}xd4 \textcircled{h}xb5 16.\textcircled{c}xe4,
and White wins.

9...\textcircled{g}g4 is hardly good for
Black, because the knight goes away from the important f6-
square from where it defends the vital h7-pawn, moreover he loses
time in vain, because it is not reasonable for him to go to e5
with the knight in that position.
10.\textcircled{e}e1 \textcircled{b}b4 11.\textcircled{h}h4 \textcircled{c}xd3 12.
\textcircled{c}xd3 gxf5 13.h3 \textcircled{g}f6 (It was still
better to go to e5 with the knight in order to defend against \textcircled{g}g5
with f7-f6. Now, after Black has lost a couple of tempi –
White's attack is very danger-
ous.) 14.\textcircled{h}h6 \textcircled{h}xh6 15.\textcircled{x}h6 \textcircled{h}h8
16.\textcircled{g}g5 \textcircled{e}e8 17.\textcircled{x}f5 \textcircled{g}g8 18.
\textcircled{a}e1+ threatening \textcircled{c}e4 and
Black does not have any satisfac-
tory defence against that, Don-
chev - Kljako, Trnava 1982.

9...\textcircled{b}b4 – this manoeuvre now
is harmless for White, since his
bishop can simply retreat. 10.
fxg6 (10.\textcircled{e}e2 gxf5 11.exf5, trans-
poses to the line 9...gxf5.) 10...
fxg6 (10...hxg6 11.\textcircled{e}e2 \textcircled{g}4 12.
\textcircled{g}g5 \textcircled{d}d7 13.a3 \textcircled{a}a6 14.\textcircled{e}e1 \textcircled{c}c7
15.\textcircled{d}d3 b5 16.\textcircled{h}h4 Acs – Spasov,
Budapest 2000. White's attack is
standard, but Black cannot
counter it with anything. Later,
the game followed with: 16...
\textcircled{f}c8 17.\textcircled{e}e3 c4 18.e5 \textcircled{c}xd3 19.
exf6 exf6 20.\textcircled{h}h7+ \textcircled{f}f8 21.\textcircled{g}ge4
\textcircled{e}e8 22.\textcircled{a}e1 dxc2 23.\textcircled{h}h6 \textcircled{h}xh6
24.\textcircled{h}h8+ \textcircled{e}e7 25.\textcircled{x}f6+, and
Black resigned.) 11.\textcircled{e}e2 \textcircled{g}4
12.a3 \textcircled{a}a6 13.\textcircled{e}e1 \textcircled{c}c7 14.\textcircled{h}h4
\textcircled{e}e8 (This is to prevent White's
idea \textcircled{d}d2 and \textcircled{g}5, attacking the
h7-square.) 15.\textcircled{d}d2 h6 16.h3 g5
17.\textcircled{x}g5! \textcircled{h}xg5 (in case of 17...
\textcircled{x}f3 18.\textcircled{x}f3 hxg5 19.\textcircled{x}g5 \textcircled{f}6
20.\textcircled{a}f1, White is attacking in
a position with material equality.)
18.\textcircled{x}g5 \textcircled{f}6 (Black cannot play:
18...\textcircled{d}d4+ 19.\textcircled{h}h1 \textcircled{f}f2+ (19...\textcircled{f}6
20.\textcircled{x}f6--) 20.\textcircled{x}f2 \textcircled{f}2 21.
\textcircled{h}h7+ \textcircled{f}f8 22.\textcircled{h}h5 \textcircled{d}d8 23.e5!
\textcircled{x}e5 24.\textcircled{c}e4 \textcircled{f}5 25.\textcircled{f}6! This
is a spectacular tactical strike
based on the theme of cross-cov-
ering – White checkmates either
on f7, or on the h8-square.) 19.
\textcircled{x}xh6! 20.\textcircled{h}h7+ \textcircled{f}f8 21.\textcircled{h}h5
\textcircled{d}d8 (21...\textcircled{d}d7 22.\textcircled{f}7 \textcircled{f}7 23.
\textcircled{x}xh7+ \textcircled{e}e8 24.\textcircled{f}1 \textcircled{f}6 25.\textcircled{h}h8
\textcircled{h}h8 26.\textcircled{x}h8+ \textcircled{e}e7 27.\textcircled{f}5 \textcircled{e}e8
28.\textcircled{h}7+ \textcircled{f}f8 29.\textcircled{h}h6+ \textcircled{d}f7 30.
\textcircled{g}5+--) 22.\textcircled{f}7 e5 (22...\textcircled{f}7
23.\textcircled{x}f7 \textcircled{f}f7 24.\textcircled{f}1+ \textcircled{e}e8 25.
\textcircled{x}g7 \textcircled{d}d7 26.\textcircled{g}4+ \textcircled{e}e8 27.\textcircled{g}8+
\textcircled{d}d7 28.\textcircled{f}8+, and if 28...\textcircled{e}e8
29.\textcircled{b}5! leads to a checkmate.)
23.dxe6 \textcircled{f}7 (it is more stubborn
for Black to defend with: 23...
\textcircled{x}e6 24.\textcircled{e}xe6+ \textcircled{e}e6 25.\textcircled{g}8+
\textcircled{e}7 26.\textcircled{d}5+ \textcircled{d}7 27.\textcircled{x}f6+ \textcircled{x}f6
28.\textcircled{e}5--) 24.\textcircled{x}f7 \textcircled{d}d4+ 25.\textcircled{h}1 \textcircled{f}f6
26.\textcircled{d}5 \textcircled{x}xd5 27.
exd5 \textcircled{e}7 (otherwise White plays
\textcircled{x}xd6 and e7+) 28.\textcircled{h}6+ \textcircled{d}8
29.\textcircled{x}f5 \textcircled{e}5 30.\textcircled{f}1 \textcircled{e}6 31.dxe6
\textcircled{x}xe6 32.\textcircled{d}4 \textcircled{e}7 33.\textcircled{e}6+ \textcircled{d}7
34.\textcircled{f}7 \textcircled{e}8 35.\textcircled{f}8+ 1-0 S.Solo-
vjov – Lugovoi, St. Petersburg
2005.
a) 9...\(\text{c7}\)

This move is with two ideas – to prepare b7-b5 anyway; and after g6xf5 e4xf5 to attack White's d5-pawn.

10.\(\text{we1}\)

This is the simplest and most purposeful continuation.

White has also some other lines that illustrate his huge attacking potential:

10.fxg6 (This deprives Black of the pleasure to gobble one of the white pawns on f5 or d5.) 10...hxg6 (It is safer for Black to play 10...fxg6 11.a4 a6, Van der Weide - Muhren, Willemstad 2003, and now after 12.a5 \(\text{g4}\) 13.\(\text{we1}\), White has blocked Black's activity on the queenside and preserves his advantage with his usual plan on the kingside.) 11.a4 \(\text{g4}\) (It is too risky for Black to disregard White's action altogether: 11...a6 12.\(\text{we1}\) b5 13.\(\text{h4}\) c4 14.\(\text{xe2}\) \(\text{e8}\) 15.\(\text{h6}\), with the threat to play \(\text{g5}\), with a powerful attack for White – Van der Weide – Wissmann, Leeuwarden 2002) 12.\(\text{we1}\) \(\text{xf3}\) 13.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{d7}\) 14.\(\text{h1}\) a6 15.\(\text{g5}\) b5 16.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{fe8}\) 17.\(\text{af1}\) Acs –

Hoang Thanh, Budapest 1997. White has a huge superiority of forces and a dangerous attack against the black king;

10.a4 (This is hardly the most necessary move for White in that position.) 10...a6 (Black should have tried to exploit the tempo lost by White on a move like a2-a4, with 10...gxf5 11.exf5 \(\text{cxd5}\) 12.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 13.\(\text{we1}\), and despite the fact that White is a tempo down in comparison to the line 9...gxf5 10.exf5 \(\text{c7}\) 11.\(\text{we1}\), that we will deal with later – White has excellent prospects for an effective kingside attack.) 11.a5 \(\text{b5}\). this is an attempt at some counterplay that is quite typical for this placement of White’s a-pawn on the queenside, but still it is insufficient (Again it deserved attention for Black to play 11...gxf5 12.exf5 \(\text{cxd5}\) 13.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 14.\(\text{we1}\), just like on the previous move.) 12.fxg6 hxg6 (in case of 12...fxg6 13.\(\text{xb5}\) axb5 14.\(\text{xb5}\) \(\text{e4}\) 15.\(\text{we1}\) \(\text{f6}\) 16.\(\text{g5}\) Black's e6-square is catastrophically weak...) 13.\(\text{we1}\) \(\text{xc3}\) 14.\(\text{bxc3}\) \(\text{h7}\) (This is to prevent the appearance of White's bishop or knight on the g5-square.) 15.e5! e6 16.\(\text{a4}\)!. This is an excellent idea to occupy the 4th rank with the white rook. 16...dxe5 17.\(\text{h4}\) (White is threatening \(\text{h7}\), \(\text{g5+}\) and \(\text{h4}\). 17...\(\text{f6}\) 18.\(\text{h6}\) exd5 (after 18...\(\text{c4}\), White follows with 19.\(\text{xe6!}\) fxg6 20.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{h8}\) (20...\(\text{g7}\) 21.\(\text{a6}\)++) 21.\(\text{g5}\)-,
with a powerful attack for White – the black rook on b8 is hanging in many variations in addition to Black’s other troubles.) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}x\text{\textcopyright}t\) (Black’s extra pawn is absolutely immaterial when so many white pieces are attacking on the kingside.) 19...\(\text{\textcopyright}g7\) 20.\(\text{\textcopyright}x\text{\textcopyright}7 \text{\textcopyright}x\text{\textcopyright}7\) (20...c4 21.\(\text{\textcopyright}xg7+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xg7\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright}g3!\) cxd3 23.\(\text{\textcopyright}x\text{\textcopyright}f7\)+) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf7\), Almasi – Hickl, Germany 2003, and because of the line: 21...\(\text{\textcopyright}xf7\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf7\) c4 23.\(\text{\textcopyright}e5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g8\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}h5\#\) Black resigned.

10...\(\text{\textcopyright}b5\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}h4\) c4

It is useless for Black to play: 11...\(\text{\textcopyright}b7\), Brill – Pruitt, IECG 1995. After 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}h6\) the only thing that Black’s bishop on b7 is good for is to attack White’s d5-pawn. It is however well protected and it is hardly good for Black to play 12...\(\text{\textcopyright}xf5\), in order to eliminate its defender (the e4-pawn), because White can counter that with 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}g5\), followed by \(\text{\textcopyright}xf5\), or \(\text{\textcopyright}f3\)-g3 (h3) with an overwhelming kingside attack.

12.\(\text{\textcopyright}e2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}ce8\)

This retreat avoids the possibility for White to sacrifice the exchange on f6 in order to annihilate the defender of the crucial h7-square.

In case of 12...\(\text{\textcopyright}d7\), White can play 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}h6\)#, and it is not so clear how Black can defend against the standard attacking scheme \(\text{\textcopyright}g5\) and \(\text{\textcopyright}xg6\), Koines – Guthrie, Webb 1989.

12...\(\text{\textcopyright}d7\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}h6\) f6. This move is not aesthetic and it is passive too, but still it is very solid. 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}d4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e5\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}d1\) (It deserved attention for White to try: 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3\) b4 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}d1\)±, in order not to exchange Black’s dark-squared bishop, which has become extremely passive after the move f7-f6. Black’s position would have been clearly worse in that case. His counterplay on the queenside is ineffective, because there are no targets to attack there, while the static drawbacks of his position are quite evident. His bishop is weak and the e6-square is quite vulnerable.) 15...\(\text{\textcopyright}xh6\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}xh6\) \(\text{\textcopyright}f7\) 17.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g7\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}g4\) (White could have played here 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}h1\)?, and only after 18...\(\text{\textcopyright}d7\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}g4\)±, depriving Black of the tactical resource that he employed in the game.) 18...\(\text{\textcopyright}xf5\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe5\) dxe5 20.\(\text{\textcopyright}c6\) \(\text{\textcopyright}f8\) (threatening \(\text{\textcopyright}xg2\)) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright}d2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}b7\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g5\) 23.\(\text{\textcopyright}f3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e8\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}d8\) (This move is quite original indeed, but still it is objectively stronger for White to follow with: 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d6\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}ae1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xf5\) 26.\(\text{\textcopyright}c6\)± – and Black’s weaknesses along the e-file are rather vulnerable.) 24...\(\text{\textcopyright}b6\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}e6\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe6\) 26.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe6\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d6\) Filchenkov – Odinokov, Tomsk 2002. Black managed to block White’s pawns on the light squares and later he even won the game, but we have already indicated that White’s play could have been considerably improved.

13.\(\text{\textcopyright}h6\) \(\text{\textcopyright}b6\)+ 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}h1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xh6\)
15.\textit{xh6} \textit{g4} 16.\textit{wh4} \textit{ef6} 17.\textit{h3} \textit{e3}

10.\textbf{exf5}
White can sometimes even not capture back on f5, but he can play instead 10.\textit{h4} in order to join in the attack with the bishop on d3, in case Black exchanges on e4. Now however, Black has the powerful resource 10...c4!, dislocating the bishop on d3 away from the e4-pawn and Black has a good game after that: 11.\textit{xxc4} \textit{exe4} (Black has tested in practice only: 11...b5 12.\textit{b3} b4 13.\textit{e2} \textit{wb6}+ 14.\textit{h1} \textit{exe4} 15.\textit{e1} \textit{ac5} – 15...e6 would not have defended the f5-pawns, because of 16.\textit{dxe6} \textit{fxe6} 17.\textit{xxf5} – 16.\textit{xf5} \textit{xf5} 17.\textit{xf5} \textit{xb3} 18.axb3 \textit{e6} 19.\textit{f3} Gallego – Narciso Dublan, Andorra 1998, Black’s king is evidently weakened, but his pieces are extremely active.) 12.\textit{exe4} (It is hardly better for White to play: 12.\textit{xf5} \textit{xf5} 13.\textit{xf5} \textit{b6}+ with a powerful counterplay for Black.) 12...\textit{fxe4} 13.\textit{f5} \textit{xf5} 14.\textit{xf5} \textit{b6}+ (in the variation: 14...\textit{c8} 15.\textit{g4} \textit{xc4} 16.\textit{h6} \textit{d4}+ 17.\textit{h1} e3 18.\textit{g5} \textit{xg4} 19.\textit{xg4}, White regains his material, but he is hardly better) 15.\textit{h1} \textit{d4} 16.\textit{e2} \textit{bc8} – and Black’s pieces in the centre are very active.

10...\textbf{b4}
After 10...\textit{c7}, Horvat – Allen, Spain 2000, White can continue with his plan at leisure with: 11.\textit{e1}, and in case of 11...\textit{cxd5} 12.\textit{xd5} \textit{xd5} 13.
h4 h6 14. h6 g5, he can continue with his standard attack, while Black’s extra pawn is immaterial.

11. e2 xf5

Otherwise White repels the black knight on b4 with the move 12.a3 and proceeds with his habitual plan.

12. a3!

This is the critical position for the 9.f5 variation, but it has not been tested enough in practice yet (there have been only two games played...). Black has the choice between capturing on c2 and that leads to a non-standard material ratio and retreating with the knight, which preserves the material advantage for him, but surrenders the initiative altogether.

12... xc2

It is obviously insufficient for Black to play: 12... xc2 13. h4 x1 14. xf5+. He is going to lose his knight on a1 anyway and two light pieces are stronger in the middle game than a rook and a couple of pawns.

White has a good compensation for the pawn after 12... a6 13. h4 g6 14. f5 (or 14. d3=, with similar ideas) 14... xf5 15. xf5=. Black’s pawn-centre has just begun advancing, and it cannot affect the outcome of the battle really, while Black might have great problems with his kingside after for example: d3, g5, f3-h3 and a1. Black failed to solve his defensive tasks in the only game that was played in that line and lost after: 15... c7 16. g5 d7 17. d3 b5 18. a1 b4 19. xf6 xf6 20. e4 d4+ 21. h1 f6 22. h3 h8 23. g5! (This knight is untouchable; otherwise Black loses his queen on d7.) 23... e6 24. xh7, and Black resigned, because he either gets checkmated, or he loses plenty of material, Acs – Lorscheid, Budapest 1997.

13. d2 g6

This is a piece-sacrifice for which Black obtains three pawns. Meanwhile, that move is obviously forced, if 13... a5, then 14.axb4 (It is worse for White to play 14. a2 e4 15. e1 c6 16. dxc6 x e1 17. e1 b3= – the passed pawns are stronger without queens, while the attack against the king is not effective despite the extra piece.) 14... xa1 15. xc2 cxb4 16. e4. White’s two light pieces are stronger than the rook and pawns, particularly in the middle game, while there are still chances to attack the king (moreover when the black queen is isolated on the a1-square),
4.f4 g7 5.Qf3 0-0 6.Qd3 Qa6 7.0-0 c5 8.d5 b8 9.f5

for example: 16...Qxd5 17.Qxd6
(There is an interesting line, but not so favourable for White after: 17.Qf5 h6 18.Qc3 Qf6 19.Qd5 hxg5 20.Qxe7+ Qh8 21. Qxg5 Qa5 22.Qxf6 Qc5+ 23. Qxc5 dxc5. Black can create numerous potential passed pawns and possibly White should better force a draw with: 24.g4 Qxf6 25.Qxf6 Qbe8 26.Qh6+ Qg7 27. Qf5+ Qg8 28.Qc4=, with a perpetual check on the squares g6 and h6.) 17.exd6 18.Qg5 f5 19. Qc4 Qh8 20.Qxd5+, and Black is completely helpless against the simple threat of Qf7+, not to even mention the attack on the h7-pawn with White's queen.

14.axb4 cxb4 15.Qd1 Qb6+

White should avoid the line 16.Qe3 Qbc8 17.Qh1 Qh6=–.

16...Qfc8 17.Qg5 Qc2 18.Qe3

19.Qd4!?  
This recommendation of GM Mihai Marin is evidently quite sufficient to guarantee a huge advantage for White. It is not so clear for him to play: 19.Qe1 a6, Nataf – Marin, Andorra 1998, and here after: 20.Qd4 Qc5 21.Qf3+, White is still better despite the approximate material equality.

19...Qe4

The point is that Black cannot play 19...Qc5, because of 20. Qb5++, and White remains with a rook for a pawn... Meanwhile, that is why Black played 19...a6 in answer to 19.Qe1.

20.Qg4 h5 21.Qf3 Qd2

It is not good for Black to play 21...Qxd4 22.Qxd4 Qd2 23.Qf4 Qxf1 24.Qh6++ and White has dangerous checkmating threats.


Black has managed to avoid losing immediately the exchange by a miracle, but now it becomes clear that he does not have enough for the piece.
Conclusions about 6...\(\text{Da6}\)

The contemporary system with 6...\(\text{Da6}\) – is one of the best ways for Black to fight for equality in the 3 pawns variation. He manages at least to push c7-c5 and practically forces White to play d4-d5, after which Black’s knight is quite useful. It is placed at the edge of the board indeed, but it can support b7-b5 from the c7-square and it can also go to b4 if necessary. The main drawback of the whole system is the fact that Black is preoccupied with the creation of some effective counterplay on the queenside and he risks coming under the gun on the kingside after White’s standard plan: f4-f5, \(\text{He1-h4, Kh6, Kg5}\). Black must remain constantly on the alert in order to be able to prevent that attack and presently the tournament practice shows that he succeeds in doing that only after 7.0—0 c5 8.d5 \(\text{Kg4}\). Meanwhile, the move 8...\(\text{Kg4}\), as we have already seen is also not enough to solve Black’s problems – after the trade of the light-squared bishop his queenside counterplay is quite difficult to organize.

In general, the tournament practice has proved that White maintains his advantage in the line 6...\(\text{Da6}\).
Part 4

Modern Defence
1.e4 g6 2.d4

We have to note that Black can transpose if he so wishes into the Pirc Defence, or into some lines of the Caro-Kann Defence. We will mention that later in the text, should it happen, but only in rare cases.

Black treats almost with indifference the fact that the opponent occupies the centre. We have to warn you that White must play quite inventively if he wishes to refute such strategy.

2...\( \text{g7} \)

The development of the bishop on the long diagonal is Black’s basic and most logical continuation. He tries some other moves, but quite rarely.

2...d6 3.\( \text{c3} \) usually transposes to the Pirc Defence (Part 3), or to some other lines that are dealt with in this Part, for example: 3...a6 4.f4 \( \text{g7} \) – see 2...\( \text{g7} \) 3.\( \text{c3} \) d6 4.f4 a6, and in case of 3...c6 – see Chapter 2, Book 3.

The line 2...c6 3.f4 d5 4.e5 transposes to the Caro-Kann Defence.

2...\( \text{c6}?! \) – goes way beyond the acceptable risk after 3.d5 \( \text{b8} \) (3...\( \text{e5}?! \) 4.f4) 4.\( \text{d4} \pm \).

2...d5 – this counterstrike leads to a peculiar mixture of two different openings: there are some motives of the Scandinavian Defence (1.e4 d5), 3.exd5 \( \text{xd5} \) 4.c4! (The move 4.\( \text{c3} \) provides White with long-lasting initiative too.) 4...\( \text{d8} \) 5.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 6.\( \text{e2} \) c5 (6...\( \text{h6} \) 7.\( \text{c3} \) c6 8.0–0 0-0 9.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{f5} \) 10.d5± Zapata – Zlotnikov, New York 1992) 7.d5 \( \text{f6} \) 8.0–0 0–0 9.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{a6} \), Fernandez Aguado – Fernandez Madrid, Spain 1996, 10.\( \text{e1} \pm \).

3.\( \text{c3} \)

Black has plenty of moves to choose from. In Chapter 22 we will analyse 3...b6, 3...a6, 3...d5, 3...c6 and 3...c6; the move 3...c5 – in Chapter 23, while 3...d6 – is dealt with in Chapters 24-28.

Black has tried in practice
some other moves too:

Black loses a lot of time after 3...f6?! 4.e5 g8 – this retreat looks pathetic, but there is nothing better (4...h5?? 5.g4) 5.f4 d6 6.f3 h6 7.h3 dxe5 8.fxe5 c6, Labropoulos – Vasileiadis, Ionia 1998, 9.d5=;

3...h6 4.h4!

This powerful resource puts the development of the black knight on the h6-square in doubt. It has been played only once until now, nevertheless that is only a matter of time. Black should not create such favourable situations for White so early in the game!

4...c6 5.h5 d5 6.f4 d2 g4 8.0–0–0 dxe4 9.xe4 f5 10.f3 xe4 11.fxe4 e5 12.dxe5 f2 13.hxg6 xd1 (13...xh1 14. gxf7+ xf7 15.c4+ e8 16. g5+–) 14.gxf7+ xf7 15.c4+ e8 16. xd1 b4 17.e6 h5 18.g5 a5 19.xh5=–;

4...e6 5.h5 d5 6.f3 c6 7. hxg6 hxg6 8.e5 b6 9.g5 d7 10. d2. Black’s knight is under threat now! 10...f5 (10...g8 11.xh8 xh8 12.0–0–0 b7 13.b5 g7 14.h1 a6 15.h7 f8. Capturing on b5 was

5...g7 (It is evident that the exchange on c3 creates big problems for Black – the weaknesses on the dark squares are just catastrophic. The bishop is therefore forced to retreat to g7, despite the loss of time.) 6.c4 (This is White’s most energetic move – he is ready to exploit the weakness on the f7-square, and he has other possibilities too.) 6...c6, G.Muller – Nische, corr. 1978, 7.g5! ge7 (Black loses a piece after 7...f6 8.e5+–. It is hardly
good for him to play one more move with the bishop: 7...\(\text*{f6}\) 8.h4! h6 9.\(\text*{xf6}\) \(\text*{xf6}\) 10.e5\(\text*{f}5\). Black weakens his position too much with: 7...f6 8.g4 d6 9.e2 \(\text*{g4}\) 10.0-0 0-0 d7 11.h3 \(\text*{xf3}\) 12.\(\text*{xf3}\) e5 13.e2 c4 14.\(\text*{xc4}\) 0-0 15.e5\(\text*{f}5\) 8.d5! (This move is based on a well-familiar motive with a beautiful queen sacrifice.) 8...0-0 (The essence of White’s idea can be seen in the following variation: 8...\(\text*{xb2}\) 9.d4!! \(\text*{xd4}\) 10.\(\text*{xd4}\) \(\text*{xd4}\) 11.d6+ \(\text*{f8}\) 12.h6\#) 9.h4! (It becomes evident now that Black’s king is not safe even after Black has castled. White’s swift attack along the h-file is the logical consequence of his excellent opening idea.) 9...\(\text*{xb2}\) 10.h5! \(\text*{xd5}\) 11.\(\text*{xd8}\) c3 12.\(\text*{xd8}\) (12...\(\text*{axa1}\) 13.d6 b4 14.hxg6 \(\text*{xd3+}\) 15.exd3 hxg6 16.\(\text*{h8}\#) 13.hxg6 hxg6 14.e5 d5 15.xc6 bxc6 16.d4 \(\text*{f8}\) 17.e6++. White’s pressure brings him complete success.

3...e6 – that is a quite dubious decision. Playing both moves e7-e6 and g7-g6 in the opening, often spells danger for Black. 4.h4!

This energetic and resolute idea is absolutely justified now. No matter how Black reacts – his defence becomes very difficult.

The following moves have been tested in practice:

1...\(\text*{e7}\) 5.h5 b6 (5...d5 6.h6 \(\text*{f8}\) 7.g5 c6 8.d4 \(\text*{d7}\) 9.0-0-0 6.h6 \(\text*{f8}\) 7.g5 \(\text*{b7}\) 8.d5 c8 9.d3 d6 10.b5+ c6 11.dxc6 \(\text*{xc6}\) 12.f6. Note how simple and effective White’s plan is! Black’s rook is forced to abandon the defence of the valuable h7-pawn. 12.g8 13.g5 \(\text*{d7}\) 14.xh7+ Jaeger – Haetta, Kautkeino 1996;

4...\(\text*{c6}\) 5.g5 \(\text*{ge7}\) (5...\(\text*{f6}\) 6.xe3! This dynamic pawn-sacrifice provides White with excellent prospects. 6.xh4 7.d5 exd5 8.exd5 b4 9.a3 \(\text*{a6}\) 10.xh4?! \(\text*{xh4}\) 11.f3 \(\text*{f6}\) (11...\(\text*{e7}\) 12.d4 \(\text*{f6}\) 13.0-0-0 \(\text*{h6}\) 14.ee1++) 12.e4 \(\text*{g7}\) 13.d6+ 6.f3 d5 7.e5 h6 8.xf4 \(\text*{f5}\) 9.g4 \(\text*{xh4}\) 9...\(\text*{f7}\) 10.h5 \(\text*{g5}\) 11.xg3 \(\text*{f6}\) 10.xh4 g5 11.xg3 gxh4 12.xh4. White’s pawn-structure is clearly better and that has been proved in practice: 12...\(\text*{d7}\) 13.e2 \(\text*{a5}\) 14.f4 \(\text*{a4}\) 15.c3 \(\text*{xd1+}\) 16.xd1 \(\text*{c4}\) 17.xh5 \(\text*{xg8}\) 18.b3 \(\text*{b6}\) 19.xg7+ \(\text*{xg7}\) 20.f3 \(\text*{g8}\) 21.xg3 \(\text*{d7}\) 22.xh6+– Hamilton – Eike, ICCF 1994;

4...h5 5.g5! That is an excellent move! Black can now repel that bishop indeed, but only at the cost of considerable positional compromises. 5...f6 (5...
\( \Delta f6 \) 6.\( \Delta f3 \). Black cannot create any real problems for White by playing: 5...\( \Delta e7 \) 6.\( \Delta d2 \) d6 7. 0–0–0 \( \Delta d7 \) 8.f3 c6 9.d5 cxd5 10.exd5 e5 11.\( \Delta e4 \) \( \Delta c7 \) 12.\( \Delta b4 \) \( \Delta c5 \) 13.\( \Delta b5+ \Delta f8 \) 14.\( \Delta xc5! \) That beautiful tactical move is the most direct road to victory for White. 14...dxc5 15.d6 \( \Delta b6 \) 16. dxe7+ \( \Delta g8 \) 17.\( \Delta d8+ \Delta h7 \) 18. \( \Delta xh8+ \Delta xh8 \) 19.e8\( \Delta \) \( \Delta a5 \) 20. \( \Delta xf7+ \) 1–0 Roselli – Larrea, San Jose 1989) 6.\( \Delta e3 \) d6 (6...d5 7.g4 h\( \Delta xg4 \) 8.\( \Delta xg4 \) \( \Delta e7 \) 9.0–0–0 f5 10.exf5 exf5 11.\( \Delta g3 \) \( \Delta d6 \) 12. \( \Delta xd6 \) cxd6 13.\( \Delta ge2 \) \( \Delta e6 \) 14.\( \Delta f4 \) \( \Delta f7 \) 15.\( \Delta g2\), White wins the d5-pawn now) 7.g4! h\( \Delta xg4 \) 8.\( \Delta xg4 \) \( \Delta e7 \) 9.0–0–0 \( \Delta bc6 \) 10.\( \Delta g2 \) \( \Delta h6 \) 11.\( \Delta xh6 \) \( \Delta xh6 \) 12.h5 \( \Delta d7 \) 13.\( \Delta e2 \) e5 14.h\( \Delta xg6 \) \( \Delta xh1 \) 15.\( \Delta xh1 \) \( \Delta xg6 \) 16.\( \Delta d5 \) \( \Delta g7 \) 17.\( \Delta h5 \) 1–0 Lang – Rode, Hassloch 1998. It might seem that Black resigned too early, but his position was beyond salvation anyway...
In this chapter we will analyse four Black's moves: a) 3...b6, b) 3...a6, c) 3...d5, d) 3...\(c6\) and e) 3...c6.

a) 3...b6

This move is not popular, but it is playable enough and in a way logical too! Black is not satisfied with just having one bishop fianchettoed, and he intends to do the same with the other one too. This idea might seem attractive, but Black has to pay a dear price for that. He falls behind in development (each fianchetto requires at least two tempi) and presents White with undisputed dominance in the centre. Black's hopes are based on the future developments! His bishops are capable of becoming extremely active in case White does not play precisely.

4.f4!

That is a principled decision! Black presents his opponent with an ample choice of possibilities and White should not neglect the opportunity to increase his achievements in the centre. The axiomatic laws of playing chess have not been refuted yet!

4...\(\text{b7}\)

This is the most natural move for Black, because now both his bishops participate actively in the game. The other possibilities for him are hardly worth analysing:

4...d5, Van der Sterren – Visser, Velp 1977. This counter-strike is obviously not timely!

5.exd5 \(\text{b7}\) 6.\(\text{b5}+\) \(\text{f8}\) 7.\(\text{f3}\); 4...\(\text{a6}\) – The idea of this move is quite obscure. Black cannot rely on having an active fianchettoed light-squared bishop, because he is actually exchanging it... Why did he lose so much time, then...? 5.\(\text{xa6}\) \(\text{xa6}\) 6.\(\text{f3}\); Fusthy – Kunszt, Hungary 1992.

We can hardly approve of
4...c5. Black's opening play is not consistent with this obliging pawn-move. He is too much behind in development and he is not well prepared for immediate clashes in the centre. 5...f3! (This is the simplest for White. He transposes to a favourable line of the Sicilian Defence, in which the move b7-b6 causes plenty of troubles for Black.) 5...cxd4 6...xd4 c6 7...e3 b7 8...e2 d6 (8...f6 9.e5+) 9.0–0 f6 10.b5! (Black fails to complete his development successfully!) 10...c8 (10...c8 11.e5+; 10...c7 11.e5 dxe5 12.fxe5 cxe5 13...f3+; 12...d7 13...d5 c8 14...xc6 bxc6 15...xe7 cxe7 16...d6+ e8 17...xe6+) 11.e5! dxe5 12.fxe5 g4 13...xc6 cxe3 14...xe7+! f8 (14...xe7 15...d6+) 15...xc8 bxc8 16.bxc8 17.c4 1–0 Lanka – Tansky, Sitges 1994. This game was very important from the theoretical point of view, because it shows the drawbacks of Black's idea. The combining of a double fianchetto with a dynamic and risky opening like the Sicilian Defence proves to be extremely dangerous for Black!

4...d6 - The contemporary opening schemes consider the combination of the moves b7-b6 and d7-d6 as almost always unfavourable for Black. This position is not an exception at all. 5...f3 b7 (5...e6 6...d3 e7 7...e3 d7 8.0–0 0–0 9...h1 h6 10...e1 f6 11...h4 h7 12.ae1 a6 13.h3 h8 14.f5 Blasiak – Stepniewski, Poland 1994) 6...c4 d7? (It is more stubborn for Black to play: 6...f6 7.e5 dxe5 8.fxe5 d5 9.g5 e6 10.0–0 0–0 11.g4+) 7.g5! e6, arrocolungo – trytrash, Internet 2000, 8.f5! – Black's e6-outpost as well as his whole position crumbles now and White is totally dominant. After 7...h6, White has a simple combination with which he wins a pawn and compromises Black's position: 8...xf7+ xf7 9.e6 c8 10.xg7+ f8 11.e6+–.

5...f3

5...e6

This is a logical move. Black avoids the immediate confrontation in the centre and intends to complete calmly his development. White cannot win quickly at all! He should patiently and accurately improve his position and begin a direct attack only later under opportune circumstances.

About 5...d6 6...c4 – see 4...d6; 5...c5, Moelderkivi – Sander, Tallinn 1998, 6...e3 cxd4 7...xd4+; 5...f6, Poelike – Zimmermann, Germany 1993, 6.e5
e4 (6...d5 7.exd5 Exd5 8.e2 0–0 9.0–0 e6 10.e3 f6. This possibility for Black to create some counterplay is interesting, but still insufficient. There are not enough strategical prerequisites for it to succeed. 11.c4 Ab7 12.\texttt{\textgreek{d}}2±. White has brought his rooks into action and he has a powerful pressure in the centre.) 7.exe4 exe4 8.d3 (White must exchange the active bishop of his opponent. He thus increases his lead in development, emphasizes his space advantage and deprives his adversary of plenty of his tactical chances.) 8...\texttt{\textgreek{d}}x3 9.xxd3 c6 (9...e6 10.d5±) 10.f5±. Black fails to complete his development safely. White's pawn chain is strong and aggressive and his pieces are very active too.

6.d3 c6 7.e3 f6 8.a3

This is a good prophylactic move. White prevents his opponent from exchanging the powerful white light-squared bishop with a knight-move to b4.

8...g4 9.g1

This retreat of the bishop can be termed as a temporary success for Black. White will soon repel the knight and will establish a powerful position on the kingside.

9...d6 10.h3 f6 11.g4 e7 12.e2 h6 13.f2 d7 (diagram)

14.0–0–0±

White has a mighty centre and good attacking prospects and he is clearly better, Dabo – Delic, Croatia 2000.

b) 3...a6

This is an ambitious idea! Black does not wish to comply with being only the defending side and plans to organize some counterplay on the queenside with the help of b7-b5. The game is complicated and White should be careful.

We need to mention here that some very strong players use this variation sometimes!

4.f4 b5

About 4...d6 – see Chapter 28 (3...d6 4.f4 a6).

The other possibility for Black 4.c5?! is quite illogical, Grosse – Eng, Germany 1990, because of the simple 5.dxc5!±. The line 4...c6 5.e3 d5 6.e5±, transposes

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to the Caro-Kann Defence

4...e6 – Black emphasizes with that move his reluctance to play sharply in the opening. The reader may already have a good idea, from the lines that we have analysed up to now, that Black is not yet prepared for active actions. Therefore he plans to complete his development patiently at first and possibly to play actively only later. Black’s position is solid. White should not try to crush his opponent immediately, but improve his position. 5.\f3 d5 (5...\e7 6.\e3 d6 7.0-0 \bc6 8.\e3 0-0 9.a3= Thompson – Ifill, Detroit 1991) 6.e5! (This move is necessary. It is important not to let Black’s pieces enter the action. The arising position resembles the French Defence, but the bishop on g7 is quite misplaced and that has long been proven by the theory and practice of chess. White’s chances are clearly preferable.) 6...\d7 7.\e3 b6 8.\e2 \b7 9.0-0 c5 10.\e1 (Note that White is just placing his pieces patiently on good squares! He should not be in a hurry, because Black has no active plan.) 10...\h6 11.h3 \f5 12.\f2 h5 (White should not be worried by the temporary appearance of the black knight to f5. He will repel it at an opportune moment, gaining space and time.) 13.\d1 \f8 14.\e3 \c8 15.g3 \c7 16.\g2 cxd4 17.\xd4 b5 18.g4! (Now is the time to oust the black knight!)

18...\x4 19.\x4 \xd4 20.\xe5 \c5 21.\h1 Fichtl – Ujetky, Ostrava 1960. White has the powerful central d4-outpost at his disposal and an active pawn chain on the kingside, so he has a clear positional advantage.

5.\f3 \b7

About 5...d6 – see 3...d6.

5...e6 6.\e3 d6 7.\e7, Radulov – Delithanasis, Xanthi 1990, 8.0–0=.

5...b4 6.\b1 (This retreat of the knight is not a concession by White. He can bring back the knight into action via the d2-square, while Black’s weaknesses on the queenside are just permanent.) 6...\b7 7.\d3 d6 8.a3! (White immediately attacks the vulnerable targets of the enemy...) 8...a5 9.\xb4 \xb4 10.\xa8 \xa8 11.0-0 \d7 12.\e1 \b8 13.\c5 14.\h1 d5 15.e5= and White had a clear advantage all over the board, Mukhametov – Cherniaev, Russia 1995.

6.\d3

6...\e6

This good move is one of the best for Black in this position. He is evidently in need of space and
now he has the e7-square at his disposal.

About 6...d6 – see 3...d6.

6...Qh6!? – This flank development of the knight is the beginning of an interesting counterattacking plan. 7.0–0 f5 (This is the logical consequence of Black's previous move. He hopes that the possible opening of files and diagonals will enable him to obtain a satisfactory game. This can help him seize the initiative, but it is risky too.) 8.exf5! (White should not fear complications. In case of opening of the position, White's king will surely be safer than Black's. It was not so good for White to play: 8.e5 0–0 9.a4 b4= Daniliuk – Starosek, Minsk 1994) 8...Qxf5 9.Axf5! (The knights prove to be stronger than the bishops in this position.) 9...gxfs 10.d5 (White sets up a barrier against the bishop on b7. Black's weaknesses are evident now. His bishop pair cannot provide safety for the black king.) 10...b4 (10...Qg8 11.Qe5 Qf8 12. Qh5++; 10...0–0 11.Qe3 c6 12. Qd4=) 11.Qe5! 0–0 12.Qe2 d6 13.Qf3 c6 14.Qed4! (White is fighting for the e6-square.) 14...cxds 15.Qe6 Qb6+ 16.Qh1 Qf6 17.Qe1 d4 18.Qxg7 Qxg7 19. Qxe7= White's initiative is far more dangerous than Black's counterattacking attempts.

6...Qf6 – This move has some positive sides (Black is developing and fighting for the centre.), but it has some serious drawbacks too. White can exchange that knight for his knight on c3. So, what – the readers might ask? The point is that Black does not have the resource to push b5-b4 anymore, because that pawn has no target...It looks like a trifle, but everything matters in the opening fight! 7.e5 Qd5 8.0–0 (White is not afraid of the doubled pawns and quite justifiably at that. He can always get rid of his weakness with c3-c4 if he so wishes and also he can sometimes capture on d5 preserving his advantage.) 8...Qxc3 9.bxc3 0–0 (9...e6 10.Qg5 0–0 11.Qg4=) 10.f5 (White obtains excellent attacking chances if he manages to make that important move unopposed.) 10...c5 11.Qe2 Qb6 12.Qh1 d5 13.dxc5 Qxc5 14.Qe3 Qxc3 15.Qd4 Qc6 16.e6 Qxd4 17.Qxd4 Qb6, Zendrowski – Ehrman, Canada 1995. White could have won immediately with: 18.exf7+ Qxf7 19.fxg6 Qxf1+ 20.Qxf1=, and Black's king is helpless.

7.0–0 Qc6 8.Qe3 Qe7 9.a4 b4 10.Qe2 f5

Black's strategy is rather unusual and it has some merits indeed, nevertheless White remains dominant in the centre. He can easily parry Black's threats on both sides of the board, because of that important factor.

11.e5 d6 12.c4 Qd7 13.Qb3 a5 14.Qad1 Qd8 15.Qc2 Qf7 16. Qd3 h6 17.Qb3 Qd8 18.Qd2 Qg8
The game Bredewout – Ujtelky, Wijk aan Zee 1969 reached that position. The previous play of both opponents was quite logical and then White could have proved his considerable edge with: 19.exd6! Qxd6 (19...cxd6 20.d5 exd5 21.cxd5++; 20.e5 21. fxe5 dxe5 22.hb6 ha8 23.c5+) 20. Qxe5 Qe4 21.Qe1 Qxe5 22.dxe5 Qc6 23.Qxg8+ Qxg8 24.Qd4 Qd7 25.Qh4 Qh8 26.Qd1. White is threatening to capture on f5!
26...Qc8 27.Qe1 g5 28.Qxf5 Qe8 29.Qd6+ cxd6 30. exd6±.

c) 3...d5!?  

This is an interesting gambit idea. Black sacrifices a pawn and he has good non-standard possibilities to develop his pieces as compensation. The idea is quite popular, so White should know the basic lines to fight for the advantage in the arising complex positions.

4.exd5!

This is the principled decision. In case White takes on d5 with the knight – Black easily recaptures his pawn and has good chances to equalize.

4...Qf6

This is the most natural and popular move. Black is simply trying to recapture his pawn.

4...a6 – Black takes the important b5-square under control. This is quite sensible; at first he prevents White’s bishop check from b5, and secondly he prepares the possible pawn-advance b7-b5-(b4). 5.Qe2! b5 6.Qf3 a7 (This ugly rook-retreat is forced, because White will counter the natural move 6...Qb7 with the witty tactical strike: 7.d6! Qc6 8.dxc7 Qxc7 9.Qge2± Torhola – Ahlback, corr. 1979) 7.a3 Qd7 8.Qf4 Qb6 9.Qge2 Qb7 10.Qe5! (This move provokes the weakening of Black’s position.) 10...f6 11.Qg3 Qxd5 12.Qxd5 Qxd5 13.Qxd5 Qxd5 14.0–0 c5 15.Qf4 Qxd4 16.Qf3± Valve – Ahlback, corr. 1967. Black’s defence is very difficult and his extra pawn is immaterial.

4...Qd7, Ekmark – Ahlback, corr. 1988, 5.Qh3! Qg6 6.Qf4 Qb6 7.Qb5+! Qd7 8.Qe2 (White has secured the safety of his d5-pawn with this typical bishop manoeuvre.) 8...Qf5 9.g4 (This is not really weakening White’s
position, because Black has not developed his pieces yet and he cannot exploit the drawbacks of that move.) 9...\textit{c8} 10.\textit{f3}±, White has preserved his extra pawn and Black has no counterplay at all.

4...\textit{c6} – This is a rather straightforward decision. Black hopes to recapture easily his pawn in the future in different ways, while now he plans to develop quickly. 5.dxc6 \textit{c6}. This natural move leaves White no choice, but to push the attacked pawn forward. (5...\textit{xd4}, Eberth – Barna, Eger 1997, 6.cxb7! White should not be afraid to lose his right to castle in this position. His extra pawn is much more important: 6...\textit{xc3}+ 7.bxc3 \textit{xd1}+ 8.\textit{xd1} \textit{xb7} 9.\textit{b1}! \textit{c6} 10.\textit{f3} \textit{xf3}+ 11.gxf3 \textit{f6} 12.\textit{a3}±. White has numerous pawn weaknesses, but still he is clearly better, because his pieces are extremely active and he has an extra pawn.) 6.d5 \textit{b4} (This position is quite modern and White has not been always able to prove his advantage.) 7.a3!? (White is ready to return the pawn, but he plans to seize the initiative. Black has excellent piece play after: 7.\textit{c4} \textit{c7}± Pandur – P.Smyth, IECG 2001, as well as after: 7.\textit{b5}+ \textit{d7}± Mowsziszian – Schulz, Cuxhaven 1993) 7...\textit{xc3}+ (This is practically forced, because the retreat of the knight to a6 is not even worth analyzing, since it is without any good prospects.) 8.bxc3 \textit{xd5} 9.\textit{b5}+! (This check is essential. Black is now forced to forfeit his right to castle, otherwise he loses his knight.) 9...\textit{f8} 10.c4 \textit{gf6}! (This is an ingenious defensive resource. The capture on d5 is senseless now, because of \textit{a5}+, and Black recaptures his piece with an excellent play.) 11.\textit{e2}! \textit{f5} (Black fails to secure the safety of his king with: 11...\textit{g7} 12.\textit{d2}! Black's knight is endangered now! 12...\textit{c7} 13.\textit{h6}+ \textit{g8} 14.0–0 \textit{xb5} 15.\textit{xb5} \textit{f5} 16.\textit{b2}± White is dominant on the long diagonal and he can create powerful threats because of that.) 12.\textit{h6}+ \textit{g8} 13.0–0 \textit{b6} 14.c5 \textit{bd7} (Black can hardly solve his problems by going into an endgame: 14...\textit{xd1} 15.\textit{fxd1} \textit{bd7} 16.c6 \textit{xc6} 17.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc8} 18.\textit{d4}±) 15.c6 \textit{xc6} 16.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc8} 17.\textit{d4} \textit{e4} 18.\textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} 19.\textit{f3} \textit{df6} 20.\textit{ad1}±. White has a clear advantage, because of the vulnerable placement of the black king.

5.\textit{c4}

White does not intend to give back the extra pawn for the time
being. There is a conflict of interests now...

Now we will analyse c1) 5...\( \text{Q} \text{bd}7 \) and c2) 5...0–0.

5...a6 6.a4 \( \text{Q} \text{bd}7 \), Fogarasi – Treffert, Passau 1996, 7.\( \text{a} \text{g}5 \) \( \text{b} \text{b}6 \) 8.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 9.\( \text{b}3\pm \).

\textbf{c1) 5...\( \text{Q} \text{bd}7 \)}

Black plans to play \( \text{b}6 \) and to recapture his pawn as soon as possible, without losing time to castle. Therefore White must react swiftly and resolutely. He must now attack the knight on \( f6 \).

\textbf{6.\( \text{a} \text{g}5! \)}

White is now ready to exchange his bishop for the knight, because he cannot preserve his material advantage otherwise.

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\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{6...\( \text{b}6 \)}

It is not good for Black to force White to a favourable trade with: 6...h6 7.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \), Zelenika – Kljako, Opatija 2001, 8.\( \text{f}3 \) 0–0 9.0–0.

6...0–0 7.\( \text{ge}2 \) h6 (7...\( \text{b}6 \) 8.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) – it is obviously stronger for Black to play: 8...\( \text{xf}6 \) 9.\( \text{b}3\pm \) – 9.\( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{xg}7 \) 10.\( \text{d}3! \) This energetic decision enables White to complete his development quickly and to start attacking. Black cannot capture on \( b2 \), because he loses his knight after 11.\( \text{b}5 \). 10...\( \text{b}6 \) \( 11.\text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 12.0–0 \( \text{d}6 \) 13.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{ge}4 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 15.\( \text{a}5 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 16.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 17.\( \text{e} \) 8 18.\( \text{e} \) 1 \( \text{d}7 \) 19.\( \text{b}5 \) – and Black decided to terminate his agony and resigned, Keskisarja – Kilpela, Helsinki 1997) 8.\( \text{h}4! \) Capturing on \( f6 \) reduces White’s advantage and possibly even equalizes altogether! Why? That is because Black’s knight will not be forced to occupy the unfavourable \( b6 \)-square now and Black will be able to fianchetto his knight and Black should trust me on that – I feel it and I will not even illustrate that with any additional lines. 8...\( \text{g}5 \) (In case of 8...\( \text{b}6 \), it is already favourable for White to follow up with: 9.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 10.\( \text{b}3\pm \) 9.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \), V.Belov – Milovanovic, Greece 2004. White should not waste time for the retreat of his bishop to \( b3 \), but instead he can continue with his development by playing: 10.\( \text{d}3! \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 11.\( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) (11...a6 12.\( \text{xc}7 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{e}5\pm \) 12.\( \text{h}4 \) g4 13.\( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 14.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 15.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 16.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{xc}2 \) 17.\( \text{g}4 \pm ; \) 10...\( \text{fxd}5 \) 11.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 12.\( \text{h}4! \) g4 (it is weaker for Black to play 12...\( \text{gh}4 \) 13.\( \text{e} \) \( \text{h}4 \) 13.0–0 \( \text{e}6 \) 14.\( \text{e} \) 1. White plans to undermine opponent’s kingside with the move \( f2–f3 \). Still, he prefers to complete his development be-
9...\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}4}

It is probably worth playing the move 9...\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}6} for Black, despite the fact that he has tried it in practice only once and quite disastrously at that. I have to admit that to be a witty attempt at solving his problems in the opening! Instead of trying to recapture his \textit{\textcolor{red}{d}5}-pawn – Black simply exchanges it. Well, he might have to play with a pawn down for a long time indeed, but White should then worry about the possible activity of Black's bishops. After the inevitable exchange on the \textit{\textcolor{red}{c}6}-square, Black's prospects seem to be quite bright as a result. 10.dxc6 bxc6, P.Eljanov – Kovchan, Kharkov 2000. White won that game, but I noticed while analysing it that the play of both sides can be easily improved. White should not be in a hurry to castle: 11.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}4}! (White played in the game the move 11.0–0, but after the natural reaction 11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}5} 12.dxe5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{xe}5} 13.f4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{g}7} 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}3} c5=, the consequences would be quite unclear.) 11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}7}. It is sensible now to bolster up the centre with 12.c3. Black does not have full compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

It deserves attention for Black to try the move 9...\textit{\textcolor{red}{a}5}. After 10.a4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{c}6} (The moves 10...\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}7} and 10...\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}4} do not seem convincing at all: 10...\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}7} 11.0–0 \textit{\textcolor{red}{g}4} 12.f3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{d}7}, Reyes – Izeta, Marchena 1991, 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}4}±;
10...\textit{\textbf{g4}} 11.f3 \textit{\textbf{c8}} 12.0-0 \textit{\textbf{c6}}
13.dxc6 bxc6 14.\textit{\textbf{e1} \textit{\textbf{a6}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{e4} \textit{\textbf{g7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{c3} \textit{\textbf{b8}}} 17.\textit{\textbf{c5± Skytte}}
– Rewitz, Aarhus 1998; 11...\textit{\textbf{f5}}
12.0-0 \textit{\textbf{e8}} 13.\textit{\textbf{d2} \textit{\textbf{b8}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{ad1} \textit{\textbf{g7}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{g3} \textit{\textbf{d7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{ge4± Hiarcs}} 7.32 – Shredder 5.32, Le
Fou 2001). After 11.dxc6 bxc6 12.0-0!,

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (0,0) -- (1,1);
\draw (0,1) -- (1,0);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Black has tried both: 12...\textit{\textbf{a6}} and 12...\textit{\textbf{c7}}:

12...\textit{\textbf{a6}} 13.\textit{\textbf{e1} \textit{\textbf{c4}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{e4!}}
That is the right decision! (Black has sufficient compensation for
the pawn after the tentative attempt by White to play: 14.
\textit{\textbf{b1?! \textit{\textbf{d6}}}! Keitlinghaus – Vokac, Prague 1992. White cannot
place now his knight on the important e4-square and Black's future prospects seem
quite promising.) 14...\textit{\textbf{xb2}}
(14...\textit{\textbf{g7}} 15.\textit{\textbf{b1}} with the idea to follow with \textit{\textbf{c5}} and White's advan-
tage is out of doubt.) 15.\textit{\textbf{xf6+ exf6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{d2 \textit{\textbf{c4}}} (16...\textit{\textbf{e8}}
17.\textit{\textbf{f4} \textit{\textbf{xe1}}}+ 18.\textit{\textbf{xe1} \textit{\textbf{d6}}} 19.g3
\textit{\textbf{c4}} 20.\textit{\textbf{c3 \textit{\textbf{b4}}}} 21.\textit{\textbf{xb4 axb4}} 22.\textit{\textbf{e7 \textit{\textbf{f8}}} 23.\textit{\textbf{c7 g5}} 24.\textit{\textbf{d3+-}}}
17.\textit{\textbf{c3±;}}

12...\textit{\textbf{c7}}, Campora – Rocha,
\textit{\textbf{d3! There might follow:}}

13...\textit{\textbf{e5}} 14.\textit{\textbf{g3! That is the whole point! The pin along}}
the h2-b8 diagonal almost precludes Black's eventual counterplay.
14...\textit{\textbf{e8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{e4 \textit{\textbf{g7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{g5 \textit{\textbf{d5}}} 17.\textit{\textbf{f1e1 h6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{f3 e4}} 19.\textit{\textbf{xc7}}
\textit{\textbf{xc7}} 20.\textit{\textbf{e5 \textit{\textbf{xe5}}} 21.dxe5 \textit{\textbf{xe5}}
22.\textit{\textbf{g3 \textit{\textbf{f5}}} 23.\textit{\textbf{ad1 \textit{\textbf{d5}}} 24.\textit{\textbf{d4 \textit{\textbf{f8}} 25.\textit{\textbf{xf5 gxf5}}} 26.\textit{\textbf{c4 \textit{\textbf{b4}}} 27.}}
f4 \textit{\textbf{e7}} 28.\textit{\textbf{c5±;}} 13...\textit{\textbf{f5}} 14.\textit{\textbf{f3}}
\textit{\textbf{ad8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{ad1}} (White can now easily prevent both Black's at-
ttempts at undermining his d4-pawn.) 15...\textit{\textbf{c5}} (15...\textit{\textbf{e5}} 16.g4! exd4
17.gxf5 dxc3 18.fxg6 \textit{\textbf{g7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{gxf7+}}) 16.dxc5 \textit{\textbf{xc5}} 17.\textit{\textbf{xd8}}
\textit{\textbf{xd8}} 18.g4 \textit{\textbf{c8}} 19.\textit{\textbf{e4 \textit{\textbf{e5}}} 20.\textit{\textbf{c2c3 \textit{\textbf{d4}}} 21.\textit{\textbf{d1±,}} White
forces favourable complications
preserving his material advan-
tage;)

13...\textit{\textbf{a6}} 14.\textit{\textbf{f3 \textit{\textbf{ad8}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{f1e1}}
\textit{\textbf{xd4}} 16.\textit{\textbf{xd4 \textit{\textbf{xd4}}} Black re-
stores now the material balance, but that is only temporary. 17.\textit{\textbf{e3 \textit{\textbf{f8}}} (17...\textit{\textbf{d7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{c5}}
\textit{\textbf{c8}} 19.\textit{\textbf{e5 \textit{\textbf{fd8}}} 20.\textit{\textbf{xa5±}})
18.\textit{\textbf{xe7 \textit{\textbf{xe7}}} 19.\textit{\textbf{xe7 \textit{\textbf{c4}}} 20.}}
\textit{\textbf{a7 \textit{\textbf{xb3}}} 21.cx\textit{\textbf{xb3 \textit{\textbf{a8}}} 22.\textit{\textbf{xa8+ \textit{\textbf{xa8}}} 23.\textit{\textbf{d1+-}}.

10.\textit{\textbf{f3}}

White should not worry about the consequences of that minute
weakening of his position. In fact that move might turn out to be
quite useful for an eventual attack on the kingside in the fu-
ture.
10...\textit{h4+}
10...\textit{c8} 11.\textit{d2} a5 12.a3 c6
13.dxc6 bxc6 14.h4 \textit{a6} 15.h5\pm

10...\textit{d7}, Baramidze – K. Schulz, Saarbruecken 2002,
11.\textit{e4! \textit{g7} 12.\textit{d3} a5 13.a3 a4
14.\textit{a2 \textit{h6} 15.h4\pm.}

10...\textit{f5}, Palliser – Houska, Witley 1999. I recommend the
move 11.g4!? here. White’s attack
on the kingside becomes really
dangerous after that. For example:
11...\textit{c8} 12.h4 e5 13.dxe5
\textit{xh4+} (13...\textit{xe5} 14.\textit{d3} a5 15.
a3 a4 16.\textit{a2 \textit{e8} 17.0–0–0\pm})
14.\textit{f1 \textit{e8} 15.\textit{d4++}; 11...\textit{h4+}
12.\textit{g3 \textit{c8} 13.\textit{e2} a5 14.a3 a4
15.\textit{a2 \textit{d6} 16.0–0–0\pm}.

11.\textit{g3 \textit{f5}
11...\textit{c8} 12.\textit{d2} e6 13.dxe6
fxe6 14.\textit{c4 d5} 15.0–0 \textit{g7}
16.c4 \textit{f4} 17.\textit{c2} c6 18.\textit{c3 f6

12.\textit{d2!} White intends to
castle long and that plan is quite
resolute and effective too. (12.
0–0\pm Keitlinghaus – Siebrecht,
Dortmund 1998) 12...\textit{e6} (12...\textit{e5
13.dxe5 \textit{e8} 14.f4+-; 12...\textit{d6
13.0–0–0 \textit{xg3} 14.hxg3 \textit{xg3
15.e2! \textit{d6} 16.g4++) 13.0–0–0!
\textit{g5} 14.f4\pm.

\textbf{c2) 5...0–0}

![Diagram]

Black completes his development calmly and hopes to recapture his pawn later. This strategy has some logic, though...

It is interesting whether White can protect his d5-pawn
for long. That task would have been easy if White had the
possibility to play c2-c4 at some
moment. This is however impossible in that position, because
there is a white knight on the c3-
square! Nevertheless, White has
found pretty good and convinc-
ing ways of fighting for the open-
ing advantage in that line nowa-
days.

6.\textit{ge2!}

This knight is headed for the
f4-square. It is not so reliable an
outpost in the long run, because
Black can oust it from there. He
can do that however only with
the help of the move g6-g5, which
weakens Black’s position consid-
erably. Tournament practice has
shown that the position is very

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difficult for Black.
6...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash \textbf{b}d7}} 7.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}3}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}6}}}
7...a6 8.a4 (White prevents Black from playing b7-b5 just in time.) 8...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}b8} 9.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}b6} 10.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}4}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}4} 11.f3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}c8} (It is evident that Black lacks a reasonable plan.)
12.a5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}b7} 13.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e1} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e8} 14.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d6} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}f2}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}f6} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d3} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}b5} 17.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xb5}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}xb5} 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}b4+ -- Delchev – Lupu, Manresa 1996. White preserved his extra pawn with a great advantage.
8.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}4}} a5
Black's attempt to fight with the bishop on b3 is easily countered by White.
9.a4! \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5} 10.0-0 h6
Black plans to play g6-g5 despite the obvious risk. Should he play without a plan, he is doomed to fail anyway as you can see in the following game: 10...\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d7} 11.h3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}ad8} 12.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}f3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}h5} 13.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}c8} 14.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}ad1} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d6} 15.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}xd3} 16.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xd3} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5} 17.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}f4}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}h4} 18.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e2} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}c8} 19.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e1} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}c8} 20.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e5+ -- Sorkin – Segal, Netanya 1993.
11.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e1} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d7} 12.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}h3} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}5} 13.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}h5} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}h5} 14.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}h5} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}6} 15.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}1}} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}ad8

![Chess Board](image)

16.f4! Black must “pay” now for his attempts at early activity. White’s offence on the kingside is running smoothly, because the adversary has created plenty of weaknesses there! The later developments in this game are hardly worth commenting.
16...\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}xf4} 17.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xf4} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}6} 18.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}xc6} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}d4+} 19.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}1} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}c6} 20.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{h}5} 21.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}3} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}4} 22.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xe7} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}8} 23.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}e1} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}7} 24.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}e6} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}5} 25.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}e4} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5} 26.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d6} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}d6} 27.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xg6} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}4} 28.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}xg7+} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}8} 29.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}xe4} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}4} 30.\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}5} 1-0 Yudasin – Vysotskij, Beersheba 1992. This game has dealt a heavy blow against Black’s concept of playing in the gambit system 3...d5. White players should study that game thoroughly, since that can bring them plenty of well deserved points.

d) 3...\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}c6

Black prefers a method of piece pressure against White’s centre. It may look quite strange at first sight – where that knight is headed in case White attacks it? Is it really going to risk going forward? Yes, it is! White needs plenty of ingenuity in order to
neutralize that fearless knight and to obtain the advantage. He needs a lot of exact knowledge too, though...!

**4.d5**

Black's main idea is to go to d4 with the knight see (line **d2**), but Black sometimes retreats 4...g6 (line **d1**). He has also tested some other retreats of that knight:

Black just loses the knight after: 4...g6?? 5.f4+–;

We will also analyse the quite questionable retreat 4...a5. It is now the time for White to concentrate on that black knight which is evidently misplaced: 5.d2! (White has created the powerful threat b2-b4 winning the knight.) 5...c5 (This is Black's only defence.) 6.a3! (White's threat is again on the agenda.) 6...b6 (6...c4 7.b4 cxb3 8.cxb3 b6 9.c1±) 7.b4 g6 8.f4±.

Black obviously loses too much time after 4...b4 5.a3 a6 6.e3 bxc3+ 7.bxc3 f6 (DIEP 1.40 – Springer 1.0, 1995) 8.e5±.

**d1) 4...g6**

This move has been tested in tournaments numerous times. It may look like Black has lost two tempi just in vain and White should not have problems to punish him for that. This is not so easy for White, however. Black can now create some counterplay on the long a1-h8 diagonal and also with a move like c7-c6.

White should therefore play energetically!

**5.h4!**

This is the most aggressive method for White to punish Black for his lag in development!

**5...d6**

5...h5 – Black is trying to stop the advance of White's h4-pawn “physically”. There is one essential drawback of that idea however and we will deal with that a bit later (see the next note). 6.g5! Now, (after Black has weakened his position with the move h7-h5) Black cannot oust that bishop so easily, because he has lost the possibility to play h7-h6 forever. The possible move f7-f6 is absolutely not comparable as a replacement of h7-h6. Black is therefore forced to put up with White's bishop on g5.

6...d6 7.d2 c6 8.d3 c7 (It is hardly better for Black to play 8...g4 9.dxc6 xc6 10.xd5 xf3 11.gxf3 d4 12.d3 c8 13. c3 xe6 14. a3 c5 15. e3 c6 16. axe6 fxe6 17.f4+ – Gavin – Di Paolo, Genoa 1998; 8...f6 9.0–0–0±) 9.e4 f6 10.dxc6 bxc6 11.0–0–0 e4 12.e5! (The
position is now ripe for White to begin active actions. He is not afraid to sacrifice the exchange in the process.) 12...dxe5 13. \text{\&}xe5 0–0 (13...\text{\&}xd1 14.\text{\&}xf7+ \text{\&}f8 15.\text{\&}f4\pm) 14.\text{\&}xg6 \text{\&}xd1 15.\text{\&}xf8 \text{\&}xc2 16.\text{\&}e6 1–0 Vallejo Pons – Fernandez Lopez, Ponferrada 1997.

6.h5 \text{\&}f6

Black provokes the further advance of White’s pawn. It is not creating any direct threats on the h6-square, while from the h5-square it can capture on g6 at any opportune moment, or it can go forward too. That would be causing troubles for Black. He can now solve his problems by castling, therefore White must go forward.

7.h6 \text{\&}f8


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8.f4!

White thus consolidates his space advantage. The idea belongs to GM A.Bezgodov.

8...\text{\&}bd7

8...\text{\&}g8 – Black plans to try to capture the annoying white h6-pawn. That is far from simple, though...! 9.\text{\&}d4 f6 10.f5! gxf5 11.\text{\&}d1! White’s queen returns unexpectedly to its initial square (which it abandoned quite recently...) and that seems strange and even discouraging. This is however a quite justified decision caused by the considerable changes in the position. White’s threat to check from the h5-square is quite serious. 11...\text{\&}d7 (It is hardly better for Black to play: 11...e5 12.dxe6 \text{\&}xe6 13.\text{\&}h5+ \text{\&}f7 14.\text{\&}xf5\pm White is clearly better despite the material equality.) 12.\text{\&}h5+ \text{\&}d8 13.\text{\&}f7 \text{\&}e8 14.\text{\&}g7! It is not so often that White’s queen comes to that square at such early stage, moreover under the attack of Black’s bishop! 14...\text{\&}xg7 15. hxg7 \text{\&}h6 16.gxh8\text{\&}h \text{\&}xh8 17. \text{\&}xh6 fxe4 18.0–0–0\pm. This is an amazing position with a quite original material ratio and doubtlessly White has a powerful initiative.

8...e5. This central counter-strike is the correct responce to White’s “diversions” on the side. White can still preserve his advantage, though... 9.dxe6 \text{\&}xe6 10.\text{\&}f3 d5 11.exd5 \text{\&}xd5 12.\text{\&}d4! White gains time for development by attacking the enemy rook. 12...\text{\&}g8 13.\text{\&}d2 \text{\&}c6 14.\text{\&}b5 \text{\&}db4 15.0–0–0\pm. White has an excellent position in the middle game as well as in the endgame after the trade of the queens.

9.g4!
This move is a bit unexpected, nevertheless quite logical. White should not disregard the possibility to squeeze the enemy position as much as possible!

9...e5 10.g5 \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{h}5

It might seem that knight is a substantial barrier against White's initiative. In fact White overcomes that obstacle in the simplest possible fashion.

11.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xh}5!\) \textit{g}x\textit{h}5 12.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xh}5\) \textit{exf}4 13.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xf}4\) \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{g}8

14.0–0–0±

White's compensation for the exchange is now more than sufficient.

\textbf{d2) 4...\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{d}4

This is the most popular and logical move. White of course must pay attention to that unwanted guest on enemy territory. Black on the other hand is trying to profit maximally from the activity of that knight. The position becomes very complicated.

5.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{e}3

White is developing his bishop and he is also attacking the enemy knight – what more can you expect from a really good move in the opening? Black now must make up his mind – with which pawn to support his knight – the c-pawn or the e-pawn.

5...\textit{c}5

5...\textit{e}5 6.dxe6! (This exchange might seem unexpected. It is however quite justified – White opens the position and plans to oust the annoying enemy knight from the d4-square and to exploit his better development.) 6...\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xe}6\) 7.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{d}2\), and White can easily improve his position, while Black can hardly offer any resistance. For example: 7...\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{f}6\) 8.h3 0–0 9.0–0–0 d6 10.f4 \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{e}8\) 11.g4±) 7.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{d}2\) \textit{c}5

(7...\textit{e}5 8.0–0–0 \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{e}7\) 9.f4 \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{g}4\) 10.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{f}3\)! This move may look like a blunder for White, while in fact it is the strongest and the most elegant way to make use of some "geometric" details of the position. You can see the effect of White's idea in the line: 10...\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xf}3\) 11.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{e}2\)! Black cannot preserve his extra piece: 11...\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{d}4\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{yg}4\) 0–0 13.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{c}4\) \textit{c}5 14.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{h}f1\)±; 10...\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xf}3\) 11.gxf3 \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{xf}3\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{\&}}\text{d}4

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13.fxe5 c5 14.\(\text{Q}a4\) \(\text{Q}a5\) 15.\(\text{Q}xc5!\) The problem with Black’s centralized knight is not on the agenda anymore... 15...\(\text{Q}xc5\) 16.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Q}c6\) 17.e6± 8.0–0–0 \(\text{Q}d7\) 9.\(\text{Q}ge2\) e5, Socko – F.Nielsen, Hamburg 1996, 10.f4! This immediate strike against the e5-outpost is very effective and provides White with powerful initiative. 10...\(\text{xe}4\) 11.\(\text{Q}xd4\)! White complies with the exchange of his active dark-squared bishop and dominates in the centre, while Black’s development has been slowed down. 11...\(\text{c}x\)d4 12.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{A}h6\) 13.\(\text{Q}b1\) f3 (13...\(\text{Q}e7\) 14.g3±) 14.\(\text{Q}f2\) fxg2 15.\(\text{Q}xg2\). White’s evident advantage in the centre and the great activity of his pieces guarantee him excellent prospects.

6.\(\text{Q}a4!\)

White’s knight is not only attacking the c5-pawn, but he has also quietly created the threat 7.c3!, after which Black’s centralized knight will be in grave danger.

6...d6

Black’s problem is that the line 6...\(\text{Q}a5\) + 7.c3 \(\text{Q}b5\), Fernandez – Ortega Valle, Sevilla 2001, does not work due to the surprising exchange 8.\(\text{Q}xb5!\) (It is weaker for White to play 8.\(\text{Q}xc5?!\) \(\text{Q}xc3\) 9.\(\text{Q}d2\) b6=) 8...\(\text{Q}xb5\) 9.\(\text{Q}b3\)±. It is easy to be convinced that White is winning at least a pawn.

7.c3 e5!?

This is an extremely interest-

8.b4!!

This is a great move! White destroys the base under the attacked black knight and additionally secures the b2-square for an eventual retreat of his own knight on a4. You can see how dangerous it is for Black to accept the sacrifice in the following instructive example: 8.cxd4?! \(\text{c}x\)d4 9.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{Q}f6\) 10.f3 0–0 11.\(\text{Q}d3\) \(\text{Q}e8\) 12.\(\text{Q}f4\) \(\text{Q}xd5\) 13.\(\text{Q}xd6\) \(\text{Q}e3\) 14.\(\text{Q}e2\) \(\text{Q}xa4\)++ De Firmian – F.Nielsen, Farum 1993.

8...f5

Black can be hardly satisfied with the results of the other pos-
sible try for him: 8...\textit{h}h4 9.\textit{d}d3 \textit{c}4 10.\textit{x}d4 \textit{e}xd4 11.\textit{f}f3 \textit{e}7 12.\textit{x}d4 \textit{x}d4 13.\textit{x}d4 \textit{c}xd3 14.0-0\textit{f} White wins a pawn.

9.\textit{c}c5 \textit{d}c5 10.\textit{c}c5 \textit{a}5 11.\textit{e}2

White can consolidate his advantage in another fashion too: 11.\textit{c}1 \textit{x}c5 12.\textit{x}d4 \textit{b}4+ 13.\textit{d}2 \textit{xd}2+ 14.\textit{c}c2 \textit{e}xd4 15.\textit{c}7 \textit{e}d7 16.\textit{x}f5 \textit{c}e7 17.\textit{x}g6 \textit{h}xg6 18.\textit{f}3 \textit{c}xd5 19.\textit{x}b7\textit{f} The readers should make their choice between these two about equally advantageous lines.

11...\textit{e}2 12.\textit{e}2 \textit{f}4

Capturing the pawn with a check is also in favour of White: 12...\textit{xc}3+ 13.\textit{f}f1 \textit{f}6 14.\textit{c}1 \textit{a}5 15.\textit{b}3++.

13.\textit{b}3 \textit{a}4

13...\textit{xc}3+ 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}7 15.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}6 16.\textit{a}5 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{b}3++. 14.\textit{c}c5 \textit{x}e4 15.0-0 \textit{f}6 16.\textit{e}1 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{b}5+ \textit{f}7 18.\textit{c}2 \textit{f}3 19.\textit{g}f3 \textit{e}6 20.\textit{c}c4 \textit{d}5 21.\textit{d}d1 \textit{d}8 22.\textit{e}4+

The idea 8.b4!! refutes Black's piece sacrifice, which for some time used to be his basic hope in the 3...\textit{c}6 variation.

e) 3...\textit{c}6 4.\textit{f}4

4...\textit{b}6

This non-standard manoeuvre is becoming popular and deserves serious attention. We have already analysed the rest of the moves for Black in our book 3: about 4...\textit{d}6 5.\textit{f}3 see page 18, about 4...\textit{d}5 5.\textit{e}5 see chapters 3-4.

5.\textit{f}3 \textit{d}5?!

This is a very interesting idea! Black sacrifices a pawn, but White should better decline it.

Black has also tested here 5...\textit{d}6. White can try to emphasize the fact that the move is too slow, by attacking the f7-square with: 6.\textit{c}4 \textit{h}6 (Black is now forced to play that ugly move!) 7.\textit{b}3 (this prophylactic is very much up to the point) 7...\textit{g}4 8.\textit{c}3! \textit{d}5 9.\textit{d}2. Black is now faced with a difficult choice.

In case of the overly optimistic move: 9...\textit{d}xe4 10.\textit{e}5 \textit{f}5, Andreev - Kornev, Tula 2001, Black will be the victim of an all-powerful attack: 11.\textit{d}5! \textit{c}7 (11...\textit{d}8 12.0-0-0 0-0 13.h3 \textit{c}xd5 14.g4 \textit{e}6 15.f5\textit{f} 12.0-0-0 \textit{f}6 13.\textit{c}4 \textit{b}5 14.d6! \textit{d}7 15.\textit{a}5 \textit{e}6 16.\textit{a}xd6 \textit{f}xd6 17.\textit{c}xd6. After the exchange of queens, White's pressure has not diminished at all! This is due to his overwhelming lead in development. 17...\textit{g}4 18.\textit{d}4 \textit{h}6 19.g3 \textit{f}8 20.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}6 21. \textit{d}6+ \textit{d}7 22.\textit{d}1 \textit{c}7 23.h3 \textit{h}2 24.\textit{xf}6 \textit{f}8 25.\textit{g}7 \textit{d}8 26.\textit{e}5++.

9...\textit{xf}3. That move was
played by a future world-champion of FIDE and led to a crushing loss for him against a player that was considerably inferior to him both in terms of class of playing and in rating too. This should be a convincing proof of how difficult Black’s position is. 10.gxf3 e6 11.f5! That is the right move for White, because now Black’s knight is forced to retreat! 11... \( \mathcal{D} \)g8 12.fxe6 fxe6 13.\( \mathcal{D} \)a4 \( \mathcal{W} \)c7 14.\( \mathcal{D} \)c5 \( \mathcal{W} \)f7 15.0–0–0 \( \mathcal{D} \)f6 16.\( \mathcal{W} \)g2 0–0 17.c4 \( \mathcal{D} \)a6 18.\( \mathcal{D} \)d3± Cools – Kasimdzhanov, Antwerp 1998.

I should also mention something about the manoeuvre: 5...\( \mathcal{D} \)h6, Hebden – Nijboer, London 1986. This strange knight-move looks awkward and should not attract followers. 6.\( \mathcal{A} \)c4! d6 7.h3! That prophylactic move prevents both Black’s knight and bishop from coming to the g4-square. 7.0–0 8.\( \mathcal{B} \)b3 \( \mathcal{D} \)d7 9.g4±, Black is now quite cramped and he is under the threat of losing his knight.

6.e5! \( \mathcal{A} \)g4 7.\( \mathcal{A} \)e2 e6

7...\( \mathcal{A} \)xf3 (about 7...\( \mathcal{D} \)h6 8.0–0 – see book 3, page 35). Black presents White with the two bishop advantage, but that does not make his position so bad outright! Why? That is because Black’s pawn chain is very solid and also quite flexible and aggressive. White should now work hard in order to activate his bishops. 8.\( \mathcal{A} \)xf3 \( \mathcal{D} \)d7 (8...e6 9.\( \mathcal{D} \)a4 \( \mathcal{W} \)c7 10.b3± Cherniaev – Hodgson, Blackpool 1998) 9.\( \mathcal{W} \)d3! That is the right decision. White should not be in a hurry to castle short. I think that he should try to prepare castling long with excellent attacking prospects. 9...e6 10.\( \mathcal{D} \)d2 \( \mathcal{A} \)e7, Almasi – Hodgson, Horgen 1995 (10...c5?! 11.\( \mathcal{D} \)a4 \( \mathcal{W} \)c6 12.\( \mathcal{A} \)xc5 \( \mathcal{A} \)xc5 13.\( \mathcal{D} \)xc5 \( \mathcal{W} \)xc5 14.\( \mathcal{W} \)b3! \( \mathcal{W} \)b8 15.\( \mathcal{A} \)e2 \( \mathcal{A} \)e7 16.\( \mathcal{A} \)b4±). White can now follow up with his logical plan: 11.0–0–0! c5. Why should Black play like that? The point is that he has no other reasonable idea. In case he castles short, White can immediately start a pawn-offensive on the kingside. 12.\( \mathcal{D} \)a4 \( \mathcal{W} \)c7 13.\( \mathcal{D} \)xc5 \( \mathcal{A} \)xc5 14.\( \mathcal{D} \)xc5 \( \mathcal{W} \)xc5 15.\( \mathcal{W} \)b1 \( \mathcal{W} \)c8 16.h4 h5 17.\( \mathcal{A} \)e3±.

8.0–0 \( \mathcal{A} \)e7 9.\( \mathcal{A} \)a4! \( \mathcal{W} \)c7

9...\( \mathcal{W} \)a5 10.c3±

10.\( \mathcal{A} \)e3 \( \mathcal{A} \)d7 11.b3!

White prepares a typical attack beginning with the move c2–c4.

11...b5

Black has also tried in practice 11...h5, Tzermiadianos – Norwood, Isle of Man 1996. 12.h3! (this move was recommended by Tzermiadianos) 12...\( \mathcal{A} \)f5 (The point is that in answer to 12...\( \mathcal{A} \)xf3, White can counter that with: 13.\( \mathcal{W} \)xf3 \( \mathcal{A} \)f5 14.\( \mathcal{W} \)f2±, threatening to start an offensive all over the board.) 13.\( \mathcal{W} \)f2 \( \mathcal{A} \)xf3 14.\( \mathcal{W} \)xf3±.

There is some logic in the seemingly paradoxical retreat of the bishop: 11...\( \mathcal{A} \)f8, Ris – Bottema, Wijk aan Zee 2003. Black is preparing the move c6–c5, de-
spite the obvious loss of time. White should better force the exchange of the light squared bishop of his opponent: 12.h3 \( \text{xf3} \) 13.\( \text{xf3} + \).

(diagram)

12.\( \text{b2} \) 0-0, Bellin – Norwood, England 1999. Black is planning to follow with the move c6-c5, so White should take the c5-square immediately under control: 13.\( \text{d3} \) The game might follow with: 13...a5

14.h3 \( \text{xf3} \) 15.\( \text{xf3} \) a4 16.\( \text{f2} \) f6 17.\( \text{e2} \) fxe5 18.fxe5 c5 19.c3 c4 20.bxc4 bxc4 21.\( \text{b4} + \).

**Conclusion**

The lines that we have analysed in that chapter are just some of the methods for Black to try to equalize. In fact, by playing like that, Black attempts to confuse his opponent and to complicate the game. This is a very risky strategy. White obviously dominates in the centre, while Black tries to obtain some counterplay. We must admit that Black was often successfully playing like that some decades back in the past. Nowadays, there are so few unexhausted paths in the opening that these non-traditional methods of playing for Black have long lost the aspect of “sensationalism”.

It would be however quite wrong to assume that all problems of the evaluation of that system for Black have been solved once and for all in favour of White! He must work hard not to get lost white fighting against Black’s numerous ways of obtaining quite sufficient counterplay. White can often be faced with a lot of problems to solve if he underestimates Black’s counter chances and plays one or two tentative moves.

The game might develop in numerous ways. Every player who is really meticulous in his preparation should be convinced by now that White must be very careful and he should act depending on circumstances. Sometimes he must castle short, some other times he should opt for castling long. It even often happens that White’s king feels quite comfortably in the centre for a while.

White’s powerful centre is the main prerequisite for his long lasting advantage! It is only when White is deprived of that asset – that Black’s counterplay becomes really powerful and dangerous. White must therefore be careful to preserve his centre at all cost!
This idea is too risky! White should accept the pawn sacrifice. Black will have to make considerable concessions in the process of regaining it.

4.dxc5!

This is the simplest. We have to say that Black can regain the pawn, but he can also continue playing in a gambit style. In this case Black can either exchange his powerful bishop for the white c3-knight, with the hope to exploit White’s pawn weaknesses, or try to compensate his material deficit in another fashion. The way in which White must react is largely dependent on what Black does. The possible developments are so variable that it is not even easy to systematize them.

We will analyse now: a) 4...

4.a6, b) 4...c6, c) 4...xc3+ and d) 4...a5.

The move 4...b6 will hardly ever become popular, Marton – Zsedely, Hungary 1996. Black gives up the hope to regain his sacrificed pawn with that move and his compensation is evidently insufficient: 5.c4 b7 6.cxb6 axb6 7.f3±.

a) 4...a6

This interesting pawn sacrifice has been tried by Black in the game Diebl – Jahnel, Germany 1994. White should better ignore the provocation.

5.e3!

In case of an exchange on a6 – Black can hope to get enough counterplay thanks to the open b-file and the couple of active bishops.

5...a5 6.d4!

This useful move is connected with an instructive strategical idea. Black is forced to either exchange the bishops and that is quite unfavourable for him from the strategical point of view, or close the operational diagonal for the fianchettoed bishop.
6...e5
6...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{x}}}d4\) 7.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{g}}}d4\)±.
7.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}e3\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f6\)
7...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xc5\) 8.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d5\)±.
8.f3 \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xc5\) 9.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d6\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}e6\) 10.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}c4\)

10...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f8\)

This retreat of the bishop seems unusual. There are no other ways for Black to oust the white queen from its excellent placement. 11.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d2\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}e7\) (11... \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{b}}}b4\) 12.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{g}}}ge2\) 0–0 13.a3 \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}c5\) 14. \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d1\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}xe3\) 15.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}xe3\)\)
12.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d5\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{w}}}xd2\) 13.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{w}}}xd2\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xd5\) 14.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xd5\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f4\) 15.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{x}}}xf4\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}xf4\) 16.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}e2\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d6\) 17.g3\)±. Black has numerous weaknesses in this endgame and he is doomed to a long and difficult defence.

b) 4...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}c6\)

Black continues his development effortlessly, ignoring the pawn deficit. White should solidify his material advantage.

5.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}e3!\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xc3\)±

It looks like Black is hesitating and he decides to exchange his bishop not in the most opportune moment. The same exchange on move four provides him with better tactical chances.

The move 5...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{a}}}a5\) usually leads only to a transposition of moves: 6.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d2\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xc3\) 7.bxc3 – see 5...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xc3\), because after 6...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f6?!\)
7.f3 0–0 8.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d3\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d8\) 9.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{g}}}ge2\) d5 10.cxd6 \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}xd6\) 11.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{b}}}b5\)± Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient, Horvath – Shurygin, Hungary 1995.

After 5...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f6\) White's task is not particularly difficult. He should calmly complete his development. 6.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f3\) 0–0 7.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}e2\) b6 (Black thus complies with the fact that he would not manage to recapture his pawn. Meanwhile, his b6-pawn can also become a serious weakness in his position.) 8.cxb6 axb6 9.0–0± White has a solid extra pawn, Fauli – Blackmar, ICS 1997.

6.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{b}}}xc3\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{a}}}a5\)
6...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f6\) 7.f3 \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{a}}}a5\) 8.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d2\) – see 6...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{a}}}a5\).

7.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d2\) \(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{f}}}f6\) 8.f3 0–0 9.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{e}}}e2\) d6

Black is forced to open the position; otherwise he cannot activate his pieces. White should welcome that thanks to his better development.

9...\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{c}}}c8\) 10.\(\mathsf{\text{\textit{\texttt{d}}}d4\) d6 (or 10...d5)
11. cxd6 – see 9...d6.
10. cxd6 d8 11. d4 xd6
12. d3 e5 13. 0-0 d8

14. ab1±
White preserved an extra pawn and a favourable position, Reprintsev – Tate, Richmond 1997.

c) 4...xc3+!?

This is one of the most interesting lines with good prospects for Black in this opening. He exchanges his excellent dark-squared bishop indeed, but he has good practical chances to exploit the weakness of White's tripled (!) pawns on the queenside. This idea can provide Black with a good game if he manages to neutralize White's threats along the dark squares. Black's idea seems to be almost absurd at first sight. He lost a pawn and immediately after that he exchanged deliberately his strong bishop for the knight. Despite all that – White must play very precisely in order to obtain some advantage. The point is that White has several weak pawns and he can compensate that only by energetic piece play.

On the other hand, White has not played until now a single weak and even dubious move and you cannot say that about Black’s play at all. Therefore, White should be able to find a way to preserve, consolidate and even increase his advantage.

5. bxc3 f6
This simple attack of the central pawn requires from White energetic and even non-standard measures.

5...c6 6. b5! (White's advantage increases after the trade of the powerful black knight on c6. The other possibility for him leads to an unclear position: 6. d3 a5 7. e2 xc5 8.0–0∞ Pavlovic – Habibi, Basle 2001) 6... a5 (It is too bad for Black to play here: 6...e5, Flecker – Krassnitzer, Austria 1991, since after: 7. d3 g7 9. h6+ Black remains a pawn down; moreover his dark squares on the kingside are catastrophically weak. On the other hand, following: 6...f6 7. xc6 bxc6 8. d4 a6, Brause – BigSky, ICS 1995, White must act resolutely in order to main-
tain his advantage. 9...h6! 10...b8
10...f3 g8 – in case of: 10...b2
11.e5 d5 12.c4 b4 13.d2±
White’s advantage is clear, be-
cause of his control over the cen-
tre, superior development and the
obvious misplacement of the
black bishop, which has no good
prospects – It is also far from
clear how Black can introduce
his rook on h8 into action after:
11.e5! g5. This is an attempt by
Black to counter the actions of
the powerful white bishop. 12.c4
a5+ 13.c3 b2 14.0-0 xa2.
Black has regained his pawn
indeed, but all his pieces are
away from the defence of the
king now and White should ex-
plot that immediately. After
15.xc6! xc6 16.xa2 xa2 17.
d1 a5 18.e5→ White recap-
tures his piece and the presence
of opposite coloured bishops on
the board makes his attack even
more effective: 18...d5 19.exd5
cxd5 20.xd5 c7 21.e4! g6
22.a4+ c6 23.d4! c7 24.
e6+–) 7.xc6 dxc6 8.d4 f6
9.h6! (This aggressive move
prevents Black from castling
and creates the threat g7.)
9...g8 10.e2 g5 (It might seem
that White’s bishop is endan-
gered, but his tactical resources
are quite sufficient not only to
save the bishop, but also to
preserve the advantage.) 11.
g3 g6 12.f4! xf4 (12...xh6
13.fgx5+-) 13.xf4±. White’s
pieces became even more active
and he managed to keep his
extra pawn, despite its being
tripled...

5...a5 – This double attack
against two pawns provokes a
natural reaction from White:
6.d4 d6 (It is too dubious and
creating too many unnecessary
weaknesses for Black to play:
6...f6 7.xf3 c6 8.c4 e5 9.d3
a6 10.0-0 b5 11.cxb6 cxb6 12.
e3 c7 13.ab1++ crafty –
guest, ICC 1998). 7.b4! (This is
a useful move and White either
exchanges queens quite favour-
ably with it, or forces the black
queen to a less advantageous
placement.) 7...c7 (Black would
like to continue his efforts to
exploit White’s weaknesses.
He could have regained his
pawn: 7...xb4 8.cxb4 xe4 9.
b2± M. Petrov – Dembour,
Belgium 2004, but White’s powerful
bishop pair and his overwhelm-
ing dominance on the queenside
promise him an excellent game.)
8.b5! (White must take the c6-
square under control. The quiet
development of the knight gives
Black a satisfactory game: 8.f3
c6=Doncev – Istratescu, Bou-
zakis 2000) 8...c6 (It is useless
for Black to play 8...a5, because
that only creates additional
weaknesses for him. 9.d4 c6
White’s advantage is not so much
that he has an extra (tripled)
pawn, but his pieces are much
more active than Black’s light
pieces that seem to be quite idle
at the moment.
6. \( \text{h6} \)!

This bishop move is much stronger than the already tested line: 6.e5 \( \text{dxe4} \) 7.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{a5} \) 8.\( \text{b2} \) \( \text{xc5} \)\( \text{=} \) Mayer – Parker, USA 1997.

6...\( \text{xa5} \)

This is a witty decision. Black temporarily ignores the possibility to capture White’s central e4-pawn and he creates a threat against two more white pawns!

6...\( \text{xe4} \) 7.\( \text{xd4} \) (This effective double attack forces Black to the following forced lines.) 7...\( \text{f6} \) 8.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{c6} \) (8...\( \text{g8} \) 9.\( \text{xf6} \) exf6 10.\( \text{d2} \)\( ± \)) 9.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 10.\( \text{h3} \)!

(Black has serious problems to solve now – it becomes clear that his rook cannot abandon its initial square.) 10...d6! This is Black’s best chance. (10...\( \text{g8} \) 11.\( \text{h7} \)\( \text{=} \) 11.\( \text{h8} \) \( \text{xf2} \) 12.\( \text{xh7} \) \( \text{h1} \) 13.\( \text{g8} ! \) That is White’s simplest solution that enables him to obtain a decisive material advantage. White’s knight on h1 is doomed now. 13...\( \text{d7} \) 14.\( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{d8} \) 15.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 16.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{f5} \) 17.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 18.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{h8} \) 19.\( \text{f3}+- \) Black loses his knight and White should easily win this endgame.

7.\( \text{f3} \)!

White is again threatening 8.\( \text{g7} \) and that leaves Black no choice:

7...\( \text{xe4} \) 8.\( \text{c4} \) e6

Black could have also tried to go into an endgame with: 8...d5 9.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 10.\( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 11.\( \text{f3} \)! (White could have won the exchange with the move 11.\( \text{g7} \). Black’s compensation then is quite sufficient and therefore White should better rely on the two bishop advantage.) 11...\( \text{a4} \) 12.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 13.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b4} \) 14.0-0! \( \text{xc2} \) (Should Black refrain from that capture, White’s advantage is evident, so Black has to be consequential.) 15.c6! \( \text{xa1} \) (15...\( \text{xe3} \) 16.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 17.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xf1} \) 18.\( \text{xa8} \) 0-0 19.\( \text{c6} \)\( + \) 16.\( \text{xa1} \) \( \text{f5} \) (16...\( \text{b6} \) 17.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{b8} \) 18.\( \text{xc8} \) \( \text{a+} \) \( \text{xc8} \) 19.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{c4} \) 20.a5 \( \text{d8} \) 21.\( \text{d4} \) e5 22.\( \text{c6} \) e4 23.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{b4} \) 24.\( \text{d1} \)\( + \)) 17.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{b8} \) 18.\( \text{xa7} \) \( \text{d7} \) 19.\( \text{d4} \)\( + \).

9.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 10.0-0 d5

10...\( \text{c6} \) 11.\( \text{d4} \) f5 12.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 13.f3 \( \text{d6} \) 14.\( \text{b3} \).

White has a number of attractive options in this position. For
instance, he could simply retreat the bishop to b3 with a fantastic compensation for the pawn, or play 11.\(\text{d}d4\) at once, threatening 12.\(\text{g}g5\) \(\text{g}g8\) 13.\(\text{g}g5\). In the latter line the bishop is untouchable for 11...dxc4? loses to 12.\(\text{f}f6\) \(\text{g}g8\) 13.\(\text{g}g5\) \(\text{c}c7\) 14.\(\text{b}b5+-\); 13...\(\text{f}f8\) 14.\(\text{e}e7\) \(\text{g}g7\) 15.\(\text{f}f6\) \(\text{h}h6\) 16.\(\text{x}xf7+-\).

d) 4...\(\text{a}a5\)

This move is logical and quite popular. Black regains his pawn with a double attack against c5 and c3. He can easily obtain a good game if White does not play aggressively enough. Therefore, you should study carefully the games and analyses that we include in our book. According to them, Black’s problems are quite serious!

5.\(\text{d}d2\)!

This is the right reaction! The bishop move might seem ugly and not active enough to obtain the advantage, but that is not true at all. White prevents Black from capturing on c3 and practically forces him to capture the c5-pawn immediately. The position becomes quite tactical after that and White can hope to win quickly and beautifully.

5...\(\text{xc}c5\)

It just looks ridiculous for Black to play 5...\(\text{d}d8\) 6.\(\text{b}b4\)± Paetzold – Spike, IECG 1997.

6.\(\text{d}d5\)!

This position is very important for the evaluation of the variation. Black has problems defending against the threats to his strongest piece – the queen.

Below we will analyse d1) 6...\(\text{f}f8\), d2) 6...\(\text{b}b6\) and d3) 6...\(\text{a}a6\).

We should also mention the fact that Black has lost plenty of games after move six almost without a fight! He used to lose his queen regularly and just have a look how all that happened:

6...d6?? 7.\(\text{b}b4\)± F.Landa – Del Campo, San Jose 1998;

6...\(\text{f}f6\)? 7.\(\text{b}b4\) \(\text{c}c6\) 8.\(\text{b}b5\) \(\text{x}xd5\) 9.\(\text{xc}c6\) \(\text{xb}4\) 10.\(\text{b}b5\) a6 (10...\(\text{xb}2\) 11.\(\text{b}b1\) \(\text{c}c3\)+ 12. \(\text{f}f1+-\) 11.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{d}d4\) 12.\(\text{xc}c6\) dxc6 13.0–0–0± Orzechowski – Hollis, IECC 1998;
6...e6?? 7.\_b4 \_c6 (7...\_d4 8.\_xd4 \_xd4 9.\_c7+ \_d8 10.\_xa8+- Dumitrescu – Raut, Tusnad 2000) 8.\_b5 exd5 9.\_xc6 \_xc6 10.\_a3+– Schneider – Nievergelt, Spreitenbach 1993;
6...a6?? 7.\_e3 \_c6 8.\_b6 \_xb2 9.\_xa8. We can say that Black was lucky in that game – he lost “only” a rook and not his queen! This is however immaterial if you have in mind the outcome of the game... 9...\_c3+ 10.\_d2 b5 (10...\_f6 11.f3 \_xa1 12.\_xa1 d6 13.\_c3+– Karacsony – Sandor, Eger 1994) 11.\_b6 \_xd2+ 12.\_xd2 \_xb6 13.\_c3+- Laflair – Strenzwilk, Philadelphia 1992;
6...\_xb2? Black should not capture that pawn: 7.\_b1 \_g7 (7...\_d4 8.\_b4 \_xf2+ 9.\_e2+–; 7...\_e5 8.\_f3 \_c7 9.\_b4 \_a5 10.c3 \_c6 11.\_d4+–; 7...\_a3 8.\_b3 \_d6 9.\_a1 f6 10.\_xa3 \_xa3 11.\_c7+ \_d8 12.\_xa8+) 8.\_b4 \_d4 (8...\_c6 9.\_b5–+) 9.\_xd4 \_xd4 10.\_f3 \_b6 11.\_c3 f6 12.\_xb6 1–0 Hjelm – Smedjeborg, Hallsberg 1990;
That is an interesting resource for Black! He prevents the possible forks losing his right to castle, (Black can hardly manage to castle in that opening line anyway...), but still the idea deserves attention. We will analyse it now.
7.\_b4!
This move is quite useful – the black queen should be necessarily displaced to the c6-square.
Black can save his queen with the amazing move: 6...\_c6!? This is his best choice among the second-rate moves! 7.\_b5 \_d6, surprisingly Black is presently avoiding the material losses! His position remains very bad indeed. 8.\_b4 \_e5 9.\_d3 \_f8 10.\_f3 \_e6 11.0–0 \_a6 12.\_a3 \_c6 13.\_e2 \_c7 14.\_c4 d6 15.\_g5 \_e6 16.\_xe6+
\_xe6 17.c3 \_f6 18.\_ad1 \_d7 19.\_b5 \_d8 20.\_xe7! This is a beautiful winning tactical strike!
20...\_h6 21.\_xd6 \_xe7 22.\_xe6 fxe6 23.\_f3 a6 24.\_xf6+ 1–0 N.Bojkovic – Petrovic, CETINJE 1990.

\[\]
\[d1\] 6...\_f8!? 296
12.\textbf{\textit{x}e7}!!

White had only small chances to prevail without that crushing blow. It is quite essential to understand that the possibility of that move is a logical consequence of White's successful opening strategy! 12...\textit{\textit{x}e7} 13.e5 \textit{\textit{x}d5} 14.\textit{\textit{x}d6+} \textit{\textit{e}e8} 15.\textit{\textit{f}f3!} a6 16.\textit{\textit{x}d5} axb5 17.\textit{\textit{x}b5} \textit{\textit{a}a5} 18.a4 \textit{\textit{x}e5} 19.\textit{\textit{a}a1} f6 20.f4\dash White's attack is decisive.

d2) 6...\textit{b6}

Black ensures the safety of his queen in a non-standard fashion - he now has the b7-square! Black's defensive concept seems artificial, but still it is not easy to refute it in a practical game.

7.\textit{\textit{b}b4} \textit{\textit{c}c6} 8.\textit{\textit{b}b5}!

That is a developing and also attacking manoeuvre which is essential for the White player to know. It is of course impossible to capture the bishop, because of the loss of the queen. White gains plenty of time for development and displaces Black's queen to an unfavourable position.

8...\textit{\textit{b}b7} 9.\textit{\textit{f}f3!}

White creates some threats with his queen and plans to castle long.

The rules of chess do not approve in general the early introduction of the queen into actions. There are no rules without exceptions, though... White's queen in that position is causing plenty of troubles for Black. On the other hand, Black has also broken the opening balance, since he has made so many moves with his queen that White's queen manoeuvre seems like a kind of retribution!

9.\textit{\textit{x}xb2}

This is a principled decision. Black snatches a pawn and forces White to prove the effectiveness of his attack.

The other lines also require from White plenty of inventiveness, ingenuity and readiness for material sacrifices. For example:

9...a6 10.\textit{\textit{c}c3} f6 11.\textit{\textit{a}a4} e6 (Black does not solve his problems with 11...b5 12.\textit{\textit{b}b3} \textit{\textit{c}c6} 13.e5 fxe5 14.\textit{\textit{c}c7\mp, because White wins the exchange.}) 12.0–0–0!
This is an instructive knight sacrifice. We must note that these ideas are much more typical for the Sicilian Defence. Now, the same sacrifice is also extremely dangerous for Black, because the important e-file is opened and White's pieces are dangerously activated. White is on the road to a victorious attack. 12...exd5 13.exd5 Qe7 14.Qe1 Qf7 15.Qh3 Qf5 16.g4 Qd6 17.Qg5+ Qg8 18.Qe7+—;

9...e6 10.0–0–0! That move is with the same idea as in the previous game. White's knight is not forced to retreat at all, despite the fact that it has been attacked! 10...exd5 11.exd5 f6 (11...f5 12. Qe2+ Qd8 13.Qd6 Qa6 14.Qe5 d6 15.Qxd6 Qc7 16.Qxc7+ Qxc7 17.Qc6+—) 12.Qe1+ Qf7 13.Qe4 Qh6+ 14.Qb1 Qg7 15.Qe8 d6 16.Qxd6 Qf7 17.Qxc8 Qe7 18. Qb7+.

10.Qc3!?

White sacrifices the exchange in addition to the pawn. Black is faced with a decision now – whether to accept the exchange sacrifice, or only trade the bishops?

White has tried the calmer and less risky retreat of the rook, but it is also less promising for him: 10.Qb1 Qg7 11.Qe2 Qc6 12. Qc3 Qe5 13.Qg3 f6=. White's compensation for the pawn is sufficient, but he is hardly better, Rossell – Balza, UECC Email 2000.

10...Qxc3+

You might ask: “Why Black did not capture the exchange?” The point is that Black's king will be in a great trouble after the “greedy”: 10...Qxa1 11.Qxa1, because Black will be quite vulnerable on the long a1-h8 diagonal: 11...f6 (11...e6 12.Qf4! exd5 13. Qe5+ Qf8 14.Qg7+ Qe7 15.Qxh8 Qc7 16.Qe2!! Qxc2 17.0–0+–) 12.e5 e6 13.exf6! This pawn suddenly becomes all-powerful! 13...Qh6 (13...Qf7 14.Qc4 b5 15.Qh3 h6 16.Qh4 bx4 17.Qc4 Qe7 18.fxe7 Qg8 19.Qf3+–) 14. Qa3 Qc6 15.Qf3 Qf7 16.0–0 exd5 17.Qd4 Qfe5 18.Qe1 Qd8 19. Qxe5 Qc7 (19...Qxe5 20.Qe7+ Qc7 21.Qe6+ Qb8 22.Qd6+ Qc7 23.Qxc7#) 20.f7+–.

11.Qxc3 f6

This decision is very unpleasant for Black, but it is the only one. The point is that after the natural developing move 11... Qf6, White follows with the crushing: 12.Qe5! 0–0 13.Qxe7+ Qg7 14.Qd5 Qxd5 15.exd5 Qe8 16.Qxe8 Qxe8 17.Qf3+–, and he should easily win the endgame with the extra exchange.

12.e5!
This move is quite obvious; nevertheless it is a very powerful blow against Black’s undeveloped position.

12...\texttt{\texttt{d}a6}

We must also see the consequences of: 12...\texttt{c}c6 13.\texttt{d}f3 \texttt{ex}e5 14.0–0–0! \texttt{c}c6 15.\texttt{he}1 \texttt{f}8 (15...e5 16.\texttt{exe}5 \texttt{fx}e5 17.\texttt{xc}6 \texttt{dxc}6 \texttt{exe}5+ \texttt{f}8 19.\texttt{c}4+++) 16.\texttt{g}g5 \texttt{b}8 17.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{c}xe7 18.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{exe}7 19.\texttt{b}4+ \texttt{d}8 20.\texttt{e}6+ \texttt{e}8 21.\texttt{f}8#. 13.0–0–0! \texttt{f}7

Black’s king joins in the defence, but that cannot change the evaluation of the position.

14.exf6 exf6 15.\texttt{xf}6! \texttt{xf}6 16.\texttt{d}6 \texttt{e}8

It might look like Black has managed to defend, but...

17.\texttt{f}3!! White continues with his development and brings into the attack not only the surviving knight, but also the “forgotten” kingside rook... 17...\texttt{xd}6 18.\texttt{hx}8 \texttt{c}5 19.\texttt{g}5+ \texttt{e}7 20.\texttt{xb}7! \texttt{e}8 21.\texttt{e}1+ \texttt{e}6 22.\texttt{f}8! \texttt{gx}2 23.\texttt{xe}6 \texttt{x}2 24.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{g}1+ 25.\texttt{b}2 \texttt{dxc}6 26.\texttt{exe}8+ \texttt{d}6 27.\texttt{d}8+ \texttt{c}5 28.\texttt{e}5+ \texttt{b}4 29.\texttt{d}2#

\texttt{d}3 6...\texttt{a}6

This is a solid move – Black not only develops a piece, but he takes the c7-square under control in advance. It is also important that White’s bishop is deprived of the b4-square and it cannot bother Black’s queen.

7.\texttt{f}3!

This natural developing move is also the strongest for White. His other tries that have been tested in practice seem less convincing and therefore we will not even analyse them.

7...e6

It is quite possible that attempt to repel White’s knight to be the most stubborn line for Black.

As for the other moves:

7...\texttt{e}5, Faisal – Mohd Hussein, Dubai 2002, 8.\texttt{b}4! \texttt{d}6 9.\texttt{g}5! White is threatening to check from the f6-square. 9...\texttt{b}8 10.\texttt{xa}6 bxa6 11.0–0;

7...\texttt{f}5, Lopez Colon – Martinez Rodriguez, Spain 1996, 8.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{d}6 9.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}5 10.\texttt{g}5! \texttt{f}8 (10...\texttt{fxe}4?! 11.\texttt{f}6++) 11.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{b}6 12.\texttt{c}5! This pawn-onslaught is decisive. Black’s queenside will soon be
in ruins: 12...bxc5 13.\(\text{x}a6 \text{x}a6 14.bxc5 \text{x}c5 (14...\text{x}c6 15.e5+--) 15.c1 c4 16.xe5+-;

7...b6 8.b4 \(\text{d}d6 9.f4 f3+ (9...e5 10.g5+- with the threat of a check from the f6-square) 10.
\(\text{e}2 \text{c}6 (10...e5 11.xc3 \text{xd}1+ 12.xd1 exf4 13.xa6 x\text{xa}6 14.d5+-) 11.xc3 xc3 12.
\(\text{e}5+- M.Eriksson – T.Karlsson, Sweden 1998;

7...\(\text{f}6 8.b4! Black managed to prevent the appearance of the white bishop on that key-
square and so its function has to be taken by White’s b-pawn! The bishop will soon be needed
on other diagonals. 8...x\text{d}6 9.
\(\text{f}4 \text{e}6 (9...c6 10.b5 \text{c}5 11.e3 a3 12.d4 c5 13.
c7+ d8 14.xa8 \text{cxe}4 15.
d3 c3 16.\text{c}1 a5 17.d2 1–0 West – Safarian, Canberra 2003) 10.g5 c6, Shiliv –
Kopylov, Warsaw 1997, 11.e5! h6 (11...b5 12.a4+–) 12.b5 c5 13.d4 a3 (13...d6 14.e5
\text{xd}5 15.c4 \text{xd}4 16.xd4 b4 17.d2+-) 14.bxa6 hxg5 15.c7+
f8 16 xa8 a5+ 17.c3 e5 18.
e3 xe4 19.b3+-;

7...xb2 8.b1 g7 9.b5!!
This unusual early aggression of the rook in this position is quite justified! Moreover, White can
obtain a great advantage only by effective manoeuvres of that rook. (It is much weaker for him
to play: 9.xa6 bxa6≈ MChess Pro – Van der Pol, the Hague 1995) 9...d6 (9...c6 10.b3 c5 11.b5 d6 12.b4 b6 13.e5
xe5 14.xe5 xe5+ 15.e3
g5 16.d4 f6 17.xc5 bxc5 18.xc5 f8 19.xe7 d6 20.xd6
\text{c}1+ 21.e2 xc2+ 22.e3+-; 9...a3 10.b3 c5 11.xa6
bxa6 12.c3 d6 13.b4 c4 14.d2 \text{c}6 15.d3 b7 16.c7+
f8 17.xa8 xa8 18.0–0+- 10.
f4 xe6 (10...e5 11.f6+!! x\text{xf}6 12.e5+-) 11.e5 f6 12.c4 fxe5
13.c7+ xc7 14.xxe6 x\text{xe}4 15.xg8 \text{xb}5 16.d5 e6 17.
xe6 c3 (17...dxe6 18.xb5+ d7 19.xb7+-) 18.f7+ 
f8 19.d6+ x\text{xf}7 20.g5+ e8 (20...g8 21.e7+-) 21.d2+-.

8.b4! \text{f}8
Black’s queen is now placed on a miserable square that is usually reserved for the bishop! White should not overestimate
his achievements, though.

9.a6 exd5

10.exd5!
White is prepared to sacrifice a rook, or a light piece in order
to crown his attack.

The move 10.d3 was so harmless for Black that he con-
solidated gradually his position and even won: 10...dxe4 11.xe4
f5 12.d3 e7+ 13.e2 x\text{a}1
14.\textit{\texttt{xa1 \texttt{f6}}} Gelfer – Czerniak, Israel 1967.

10...\texttt{bxa6} 11.0–0! \texttt{d6} (11...
\texttt{\texttt{xa1}} 12.\texttt{\texttt{e1}}+! \texttt{e7} 13.\texttt{\texttt{xa1}} \texttt{d6}
14.\texttt{\texttt{g5}}+--; 12...\texttt{\texttt{d8}} 13.\texttt{\texttt{xa1}} \texttt{f6}
14.\texttt{b5}! White is threatening to
checkmate in one and Black is
beyond salvation, despite his
extra rook) 12.\texttt{\texttt{e1}}+ \texttt{d7} 13.
\texttt{c4} \texttt{b7} 14.\texttt{c5}! It is important
not to give your opponent any re-
spite while you are attacking!
Black is doomed now, because
White has an overwhelming ma-
jority of forces on the decisive
area of confrontations on the
board... 14...\texttt{\texttt{xd5}} 15.\texttt{\texttt{f4}} \texttt{\texttt{f6}}
16.\texttt{\texttt{xd6}} \texttt{\texttt{d8}} 17.\texttt{\texttt{a4+}} \texttt{c8}
18.\texttt{\texttt{e7}} \texttt{\texttt{d7}} 19.\texttt{\texttt{d1}} \texttt{\texttt{xf3}} 20.
\texttt{\texttt{xf3}} \texttt{\texttt{b8}} 21. \texttt{\texttt{xf7}}++. Black is
utterly helpless against the
checkmating threats.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The idea 3...\texttt{c5} for Black is risky; nevertheless it leads to lively
piece-play. Whenever Black fails to recapture White’s \texttt{c5-pawn}, he is
usually forced to exchange it, since it hampers the development of
his queenside considerably. In fact, every time Black succeeds in re-
gaining that pawn, he loses plenty of time by introducing his queen
into action at such early stage of the game. The exchange of the bishop
on \texttt{g7} for the knight on \texttt{c3} compromises White’s pawn structure in-
deed, but the weakness of Black’s dark squares on the kingside turns
out to be a much more important factor in the ensuing battle. White
has not broken any axiomatic rules in the opening, on the contrary
his play is quite logical – he develops pieces, he occupies the centre
and therefore he should be better. Despite all, White must act very
energetically and sometimes he should be ready to even sacrifice
material if necessary in order to prove his advantage.
Chapter 24

1.e4 g6 2.d4 \( \mathcal{g}7 \) 3.\( \mathcal{c}3 \) d6

This popular and solid move fortifies Black’s centre.

4.f4

White is quite consistent in his concept of occupying the centre. Black has tried an abundance of moves in this position. Naturally, not all of them are comparable in the aspect of quality. We will deal in this chapter in details with: a) 4...e5, b) 4...f5, c) 4...c5 and d) 4...e6.

The move 4...\( \mathcal{d}7 \) will be analysed in Chapter 25, 4...\( \mathcal{c}6 \) – in Chapter 26, 4...c6 – in Chapter 27, while 4...a6 – in Chapter 28; as for 4...\( \mathcal{f}6 \) – see 1...d6 (The Pirc Defence).

About 4...\( \mathcal{d}7 \) – see 2...\( \mathcal{d}7 \).

Black has some other possibilities too:

It is quite illogical for him to play 4...d5? 5.\( \mathcal{d}x\mathcal{d}5 \) c6 6.\( \mathcal{c}3 \) \( \mathcal{d}4 \) (It is even worse for Black to try 6...\( \mathcal{w}xd4 \) 7.\( \mathcal{d}2 \)\( \mathcal{d}+ \), because White’s lead in development is overwhelming.) 7.\( \mathcal{w}f3 \) \( \mathcal{g}7 \) 8. \( \mathcal{d}2 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 9.0–0–0 \( \mathcal{c}7 \) 10.e5 \( \mathcal{b}6 \) 11.\( \mathcal{e}4 \)\( \mathcal{d} \) White has already occupied plenty of space and he can easily organize an attack against the enemy’s king no matter which side of the board Black evacuates it to, Mack – Swanson, West Bromwich 2003;

4...\( \mathcal{a}6 \) 5.\( \mathcal{f}3 \) \( \mathcal{g}4 \) (About 5...\( \mathcal{f}6 \) – see 1...d6; while in answer to 5.c5, Ziegler – Karlsson, Saltsjobaden 1988, White’s simplest line would have been: 6.\( \mathcal{x}a6 \) bxa6 7.dxc5\( \mathcal{d} \) and Black would have to defend a very difficult endgame, due to his great lag in development.) 6.\( \mathcal{e}3 \) c6 7.h3 \( \mathcal{xf}3 \) 8.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) \( \mathcal{c}7 \) 9.0–0–0 d5 10.e5 \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 11.g4\( \mathcal{d} \) Gligoric – Ljubojevic, Teeside 1972. White enjoys a space advantage and his plan is quite clear – he prepares f4-f5 and his edge remains lasting;

4...b6 5.\( \mathcal{f}3 \) \( \mathcal{b}7 \) (It is not logical for Black to play: 5.c5?! 6.dxc5 \( \mathcal{x}c3 \) 7.bxc3 dxc5 8.\( \mathcal{w}xd8 \)\( \mathcal{x}d8 \) 9.\( \mathcal{c}4 \)\( \mathcal{d} \), or 6.dxc5

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7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{x}}}}}}xd8+ \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{x}}}}}}xd8 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{c}}}}}}c4± and Black's defence in the endgame is difficult, since the move b6 can hardly be an improvement for him in the 4...c5 line; Black wastes too much time in order to exchange White's good bishop in the line: 5...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{a}}}}}}a6 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{x}}}}}}xa6 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{x}}}}}}xa6, G.Nunez – G.Lechuugo, Caleta 2005, 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{d}}}}}}d3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{g}}}}}}b8 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{e}}}}}}e3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{f}}}}}}f6 9.0–0\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{d}}}}}}d7 and White is quite well prepared for active actions in the centre and on the kingside, while Black still needs 3–4 moves in order to complete his development.) 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{d}}}}}}d3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{d}}}}}}d7 (Black’s bishop on b7 is misplaced and the pawn-structure, which resembles the Benoni Defence, is not favourable for him after: 6...c5 7.d5 a6 8.a4 \fbox{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}}}f6 9.0–0 0–0 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{c}}}}c7 11.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{c}}}}c4 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{b}}}}bd7 12.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d2± Rubinetti – Aguirre, Argentina 1969.) 7.0–0 e5 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.fxe5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}xe5 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}xe5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}xe5 11.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{g}}}}f3± White's lead in development was overwhelming in the game Sznapik – Nkunda, Manila 1992;

4...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{h}}}}h6 5.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}f3

5...0–0 (About 5...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{g}}}}g4 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{c}}}}c6 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3 d5 8.e5 – see 5...0–0; after 5...f5, Windelband – Schulz, Guben 2000, 6.e5 d5 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e2±; 6...e6 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e2 0–0 8.0–0 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}7 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3± Black has no compensation for his extremely cramped position; 5...c6 6.h3 d5 7.e5 – see 4...c6 5.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}f3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{h}}}}h6 6.h3 Chapter 27; it is worse for Black to play 6...a5?! 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3 e6 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{a}}}}a6 9.a3 f5 10.e5± V.Gurevich – Zavorotko, Alushta 1998.) 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{c}}}}c6 7.0–0 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{g}}}}g4 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3 d5 (8...e6 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}xf3 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{x}}}}xf3 f5 11.e5 d5 12.h3± Flaisigova – Radlinger, Czech Republic 1999) 9.e5 \fbox{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}}}f5 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}f2±. The arising pawn-structure is typical for the variation: 1.e4 g6 2.d4 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{g}}}}g7 3.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{c}}}}c3 c6 4.f4 d5 5.e5 (Book 3, Chapter 3), but instead of a pawn on the c6-square, Black has his knight there and that precludes his counterplay connected with the pawn-break c5;

4...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{h}}}}h5 5.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{f}}}}f3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{g}}}}g4 (White has a huge space advantage after: 5...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{h}}}}h6 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d3 0–0 7.h3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{c}}}}c6 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3 f5 9.e5± Nieto Miguez – Tanner, Teeside 1973.) 6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e2 e6 (After 6...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d7 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3 e6 8.0–0 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e7 9.h3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{x}}}}xf3 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{x}}}}xf3 c6 11.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d2± White was leading in development and his centre was very powerful in the game Pfaffel – Legat, Finkenstein 1998.) 7.0–0 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{x}}}}xf3 (In case of 7...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e7, Niesel – Zyla, Germany 1991, White should play 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{e}}}}e3± and Black's only sensible counterplay is connected with the move d5 and that would lead to positions from the Caro-Kann Defence with the move g6.) 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{x}}}}xf3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\texttt{d}}}}d7,
Balogh – Hlavacs, Budapest 1998, now the simplest line for White should be to transpose to the Caro-Kann Defence with g6, with the help of the line: 9.e5 d5 10.\(\text{c}e2\) \(\text{c}e7\) 11.\(\text{c}e3\) \(\text{c}f5\) 12. \(\text{f}f2\). White has captured on f3 with the bishop and not with the queen and Black's c-pawn is placed on c7 and not on c6; nevertheless White follows with the set-up that we have recommended in chapters 3 and 4 of our book 3. In addition – he has saved a tempo for the move h2-h3.

a) 4...e5?!

This is a dubious idea. Black is going to suffer a lot, while defending a very difficult position without any compensation for that. White should not avoid the favourable trade of queens.

5.\(\text{dxe5! dxe5}\) 6.\(\text{xd8+ xxd8}\)

7.\(\text{c}4\)

White can maintain his initiative in some other lines too and the tournament practice proves that convincingly. Still, the direct attack with the bishop against the vulnerable f7-square is White's most energetic method of utilizing his lead in development.

7...\(\text{e}6\)

7...f5 8.\(\text{xf3}\) exf4, Feicht – Lemonidis, Griesheim 1999, 9.\(\text{xf4}\)! White should not fear the consequences of the possible exchange on the c3-square. The enormous activity of his pieces is by far more important than the almost immaterial weakening of his queenside, because of the doubled c-pawns after: 9...\(\text{xc3+}\) 10.\(\text{bxc3}\) \(\text{e7}\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{fxe4}\) 12. \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f6}\) 13.\(\text{xc7}\) \(\text{c6}\) 14.\(\text{d6+}\) \(\text{e8}\) 15.\(\text{ce5}\) \(\text{e5}\) 16.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{fd7}\) 17.\(\text{b5}\).

7...f6 8.\(\text{fxe5}\) fxe5 9.\(\text{g5+}\) \(\text{f6}\) (Black has no satisfactory defence at his disposal against this check: 9...\(\text{xf6}\) 10.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{bd7}\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{f8}\) 12.\(\text{f3}\). He loses a pawn now. 12...\(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 14.\(\text{xf6+}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 15.\(\text{xe5}\)--) 10. 0–0–0+ \(\text{e8}\) 11.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{g4}\), Lous-tau – Clausen, USA 1998, 12. \(\text{d5}\) \(\text{g5+}\) 13.\(\text{gxg5}\) \(\text{xd1}\) 14. \(\text{xd1}\). The c7-square is indefensible and White wins material decisively.

About 7...\(\text{ef}\) 8.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{e6}\) 9. \(\text{xe6}\) fxe6 10.\(\text{f3}\) – see 7...\(\text{e6}\) 8.\(\text{xe6}\) fxe6 9.\(\text{f3}\) exf4 10.\(\text{xf4}\).

In the game Hodl – Jung, Germany 2002, Black tried 8... \(\text{e7}\)!, but he had to resign only three moves later – 9.\(\text{f3}\) f6 10.0–0–0+ \(\text{d7}\) 11.\(\text{d4}\) 1–0.

8.\(\text{xe6}\) fxe6 9.\(\text{f3}\)

Unfortunately for Black, he failed to solve his problems de-
spite the exchange of White’s active bishop on c4.

9...\(\text{c6}\)

In case of 9...\(\text{d7}\) 10.\(\text{fxe5}\) \(\text{exe5}\) 11.0–0 – see 9...\(\text{c6}\).

9...\(\text{exf4}\) 10.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{xc3+}\) 11.\(\text{bxc3}\) \(\text{e7}\) 12.0–0 \(\text{d7}\) 13.\(\text{g5+}\) \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{c5}\) 15.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{a6}\) 16.\(\text{f4+}\).

10.\(\text{fxe5}\)

10...\(\text{exe5}\), Aveholt – Goransson, Sweden 1992 (10...\(\text{h6}\) 11.0–0 \(\text{exe5}\) 12.\(\text{exe5}\) \(\text{exe5}\) 13.\(\text{f8+}\) 1–0 Van Houtte – Tonoli, Belgium 1997; 10...\(\text{h6}\) 11.\(\text{g5+}\) \(\text{e8}\) 12.\(\text{f6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 13.\(\text{exf6}\) \(\text{f7}\) 14.e5 \(\text{g4}\) 15.\(\text{g5+–}\) Coclet – Jaumin, Email 2000) 11.0–0 \(\text{xf3+}\) 12.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{d4+}\) 13.\(\text{h1}\) \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{c5}\) (14...\(\text{b6}\) 15.\(\text{f4+–}\) 15.\(\text{f4+}\).

b) 4...\(\text{f5}\)

5.\(\text{e5}\) \(\text{c5}\)

The endgame is difficult for Black, because of his lack of space after: 5...\(\text{dxe5}\) 6.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{xd1+}\) 7.\(\text{xd1}\), for example:

7...\(\text{c6}\) 8.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{h6}\) (It is better for Black to play here: 8...\(\text{h6}\) 9.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{f7}\) 10.\(\text{e3±}\), but even then White occupies the d-file and Black has no active possibilities to his avail, Kolar – Jablecnik, Czechoslovakia 1988.) 9.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{f7}\) 10.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{e6}\) (The other possibilities for Black lead to almost the same developments, for example: 10...\(\text{b6}\) 11.\(\text{g4!}\) \(\text{e6}\) 12.\(\text{gxf5}\) \(\text{gxf5}\) 13.\(\text{e2±}\) 11.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 12.\(\text{g1}\) \(\text{d7}\) 13.\(\text{gxf5}\) \(\text{gxf5}\) 14.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{f8}\) 15.\(\text{e2±}\) Morvay – Zsebok, Hungary 1994. Black's pieces are cramped, they do not coordinate well and he has too many weaknesses to worry about. His chances to defend them successfully are quite minimal;

or 7...\(\text{e6}\) 8.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{c6}\) 9.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f7}\) (after 9...0–0–0+ 10.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{d7}\) 11.\(\text{a4!}\) \(\text{b6}\) 12.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{d5}\) 13.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{xg2}\) 14.\(\text{g1±}\) Black loses material) 10.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{h6}\), Joachim – Kinder, Dresden 2001, Black's bishop and knight remain out of play and after: 11.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{a6}\) 12.\(\text{xc6+}\) \(\text{bxc6}\) 13.\(\text{xf7}\) \(\text{xf7}\) 14.\(\text{e2±}\) he has a multitude of weaknesses on the kingside.

6.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{cxd4}\)

Black's defence in the endgame after: 6...\(\text{dxe5}\) 7.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{xd1}\) 8.\(\text{xd1}\) \(\text{c6}\) 9.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{b6}\) 10.\(\text{d5}\) will be quite complex, because of
his lag in development.

7.\f{b}b{5}+ \f{c}c{6}

Following 7...\f{d}d{7} 8.\f{x}d{4} \f{f}f{8} (about 8...\f{c}c{6} 9.\f{x}c{6} – see 7...\f{c}c{6}; Black loses after 8...
\f{a}a{5} 9.\f{e}e{6} \f{x}b{5} 10.\f{d}d{5}++, as well as after 8...\f{x}b{5} 9.\f{e}e{6} \f{b}b{6} 10.\f{x}b{5}++) 9.\f{e}e{3} \f{c}c{6} 10.exd{6} exd{6} 11.0–0± Black can hardly hope to equalize, because of the weakness on d6, his lag in development and the vulnerability of his king stranded in the centre.

8.\f{x}d{4} \f{d}d{7}

We have reached a position from the game Newton – Schalkwijk, corr. 1998. White should better consider now the following active plan: 9.\f{x}c{6}! \f{b}c{6} 10.e{6} \f{c}c{8} 11.\f{e}e{3} c{5} 12.\f{x}f{5} \f{x}c{3}+ 13.\f{b}xc{3} \f{f}f{6} 14.\f{h}h{6}! \f{x}e{6} 15.0–0. The essential drawback of Black’s position is the absence of a reliable shelter for his king. The following lines illustrate the abundance of difficulties he has to face: 15...\f{a}a{5} (15...
\f{c}c{4} 16.\f{e}e{1} \f{a}a{5} 17.\f{f}f{2} \f{a}a{6} 18.\f{h}h{4} \f{f}f{8} 19.\f{f}f{3} \f{b}b{8} 20.\f{f}5–; 18...d{5} 19.\f{f}f{3} \f{e}e{4} 20.\f{x}e{4} dxe{4} 21.\f{x}e{4}+) 16.\f{d}d{2} \f{a}a{4} (16...\f{c}c{4} 17.\f{e}e{1} 0–0–0 18.\f{f}f{3}++) 17.\f{e}e{1} \f{d}d{5} 18.\f{f}f{5}.

c) 4...c{5}

This is a logical counterstrike against the key d4-pawn. Now, White should not try to fortify it, but instead his prospects are superior after some exchanges, since the black king might quickly fall into trouble.

5.dxc{5} \f{x}c{3}+

White’s task is much simpler after the immediate: 5...dxc{5} 6.\f{d}d{8}+ \f{d}d{8} 7.\f{d}d{2}±. Black has no compensation for the loss of his castling rights.

In case of 5...\f{a}a{5} 6.cxd{6} \f{c}c{6}? (About 6...\f{x}c{3}! 7.b{c}c – see 5...\f{c}c{3}, 6...\f{a}a{5}; Black has no compensation for the pawn after: 6...exd{6} 7.\f{d}d{2}±, Wong Zijing – Zahiruddin, Elista, 1998; 6...\f{f}f{6} 7.e{5}++, Black is now already two pawns down and he cannot save the game after: 7...\f{e}e{4}, because of 8.\f{d}d{5}.) 7.\f{d}d{2} exd{6}, Piche – Hassain, Winnipeg 1998, the simple line for White: 8.\f{b}b{5} \f{d}d{8} 9.\f{e}e{3} \f{x}b{2} 10.\f{b}b{1} \f{a}a{3} 11.c{3} \f{c}c{5} (11...\f{a}a{5}? 12.\f{b}b{3} \f{c}c{5} 13.\f{x}c{5} dxc{5} 14.\f{d}d{6}++) 12.\f{x}c{5}
dxc5 13.\d6+ leads to a very favourable endgame for him with an extra pawn.

6.\bxc3 dxc5

This is the simplest and the best move for Black. The endgame is slightly worse for him indeed, but White must play very precisely in order to preserve his small advantage.

6...\a5 – that is a dubious idea. Black’s queen enters the action a bit early and it cannot create any serious threats from that square. 7.cxd6 \xc3+ (7...exd6 8.\d4± 7...\f6 – see 6.\f6) 8.\d2 \d4 (8...\c6 9.\d3 exd6 10.\b1 \d7 11.\b2± Black lags in development and he remains with plenty of weaknesses, Stopka – Jansen, Germany 1992) 9.\d3 \g4 (it is slightly better for Black to play here 9...\xd6 10.\c3 \f6, Carlsen – Johansen, Gausdal 2001, but even then after 11.\e2 \c6 12.\c4± White’s bishop pair exerts a powerful pressure) 10.\b1! \d7 (Black loses after his other possibilities too: 10...exd6 11.h3 \e6 12.\f3 Petkov – Vutov, Teteven 1991; 10...\c6 11.h3 \d7 12.\xe7+− Kuprijanov – Sazhin, Cherepovets 2002.) 11.h3 \e6 12.\f3 \b6 13.\xb6 axb6, Veroci – Janus, Wuppertal 1990, 14.\c3+− White wins a pawn, moreover Black has problems to develop his kingside.

6.\f6 7.cxd6 \xd6 (7...\a5, Maus – Mista, Hamburg 1995, 8.\e2 \xe4 9.\d4 \f6 10.dxe7 \xe7 11.\b4+ \xb4 12.\xb4±) 8.\xd6 exd6 9.\d3 0–0 10.\f3 \e8 11.0–0 \xe4 12.\e1. Black has managed somehow to restore the material balance, but White’s advantage is more than obvious. His active pair of bishops would cause plenty of worries for Black. 12...\f5 13.\a3 \d7 14.\d4 \xc3 15.\xd6 \e4 16.\c4+ \g7 17.\e5+ \f8 18.\ab1 \c6 19.\xe4! This exchange-sacrifice is decisive. White’s attack compensates swiftly the slight material deficit. 19...\xe4 20.\d6+ \g7 21.\xb7 \xd4 22.\xd7+ \h6 23.\e5 \xe5 24.\xe5 \f5 25.\f2 1–0 Muir – Pupols, corr. 1971.

7.\xd8+ \xd8 8.\c4

8.e6

8...\e8, Perez – Henriquez, Mesa 1992, 9.\f3 \d7 10.a4 \b6 11.\d3±.

Black has also tried the counterattacking idea: 8...\f6 9.e5 \e4, Hansson – Rallsjo, corr. 1992. White can claim an advantage after: 10.\e2, because it turns out that Black’s centralised knight has no moves left. 10...\e6 11.\xe6 fx6 12.h4! This is an excellent method of
activating the rook. It can join in the actions on the kingside as well as in the centre. 12...\textit{\texttt{d}d7 13. \textit{\texttt{h}h3 c4 14.\textit{\texttt{b}b1 \textit{\texttt{c}ec5 15.\textit{\texttt{b}b4 \textit{\texttt{b}b6 16.\textit{\texttt{c}e}e3 \textit{\texttt{c}c8 17.h5 gh 18.\textit{\texttt{x}xh5}}}}}}}

\textbf{9.\textit{\texttt{f}f3 \textit{\texttt{c}c6}}}

Following 9...\textit{\texttt{e}e7}, in the game Pletanek – Just, corr 1993, White managed to crush the seemingly sound black defensive fortress with: 10.0-0 b6 11.f5! \textit{\texttt{a}a6 12.\textit{\texttt{x}xa6 \textit{\texttt{c}xa6 13.fxg6 hxg6 14.\textit{\texttt{d}e}e5! \textit{\texttt{h}h7 15.\textit{\texttt{g}g5} f6 16. \textit{\texttt{a}ad1! \textit{\texttt{b}b8 17.\textit{\texttt{d}xg6}+ \textit{\texttt{f}f7 18.\textit{\texttt{e}e5}+ \textit{\texttt{e}e7 19.\textit{\texttt{h}h4}!+- \textit{\texttt{h}h5 20.\textit{\texttt{f}f3 c4 21.e5 \textit{\texttt{c}d7 22.g4! \textit{\texttt{d}xe5 23. \textit{\texttt{x}xe5 \textit{\texttt{x}e5 24.g5 1-0}}}}}}}}}

9...\textit{\texttt{d}f6} 10.f5! This powerful pawn-sacrifice is quite timely. Black’s position turns out to be rather vulnerable after it! 10...\textit{\texttt{g}xe4 11.\textit{\texttt{g}g5 \textit{\texttt{d}d6 12.fxg6 hxg6 13.\textit{\texttt{f}f4 \textit{\texttt{d}h4 (13...e5 14.\textit{\texttt{x}xe5 \textit{\texttt{x}e8 15.0-0-0 \textit{\texttt{x}e5 16.\textit{\texttt{x}f7}+ \textit{\texttt{c}c7 17.\textit{\texttt{x}e5 \textit{\texttt{x}c4 18.\textit{\texttt{x}c4}+- Campbell – Lanners, corr. 1981) 14. \textit{\texttt{x}xd6 \textit{\texttt{x}c4 15.\textit{\texttt{x}f7}+ \textit{\texttt{x}e8 16. 0-0 \textit{\texttt{c}c6 17.\textit{\texttt{d}ad1 e5 18.\textit{\texttt{x}xe5 \textit{\texttt{x}e5 19.\textit{\texttt{f}f8}+ \textit{\texttt{d}d7 20.\textit{\texttt{x}e5}+ \textit{\texttt{e}e6 21.\textit{\texttt{h}h8. The presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board is not necessarily a prerequisite for a draw in this position. This is simply due to the fact that Black cannot preserve his bishop from annihilation! 21...\textit{\texttt{a}a4 22. \textit{\texttt{x}dd8 \textit{\texttt{x}xa2 23.\textit{\texttt{x}xc8 \textit{\texttt{x}xc8 24.\textit{\texttt{x}xc8 1-0 Selivanovsky – Gruzman, Moscow 1964.}}}}}}}

\textbf{10.0-0 \textit{\texttt{f}f6}}

Black develops easily his pieces with a degree of patience. It seems like he has nothing to worry about right now. Suddenly, there comes “a jolt from the blue”...

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[height=0.3\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{11.\textit{\texttt{e}e5!}}

This non-standard manoeuvre serves White right in order to emphasize the considerable drawbacks of his opponent’s position. Black is now forced to either comply with the sudden dangerous activity of White’s rook (after the exchange on e5), or to allow his opponent to trade on c6, thus compromising Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside. Both possibilities end up in a disaster for Black.

\textbf{11...\textit{\texttt{e}e8 12.\textit{\texttt{x}xc6 \textit{\texttt{bxc6}}}}}

White now acquires the bishop pair advantage indeed, but Black hopes to compensate that by attacking White’s weaknesses on the queenside. After the exchange on c6 however, Black’s hopes are quite futile, moreover White remains with a couple of powerful bishops. Black’s pawns are much weaker that these belonging to his adversary and that only makes matters worse for him.
13.\texttt{\textgreek{a}e1} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} 14.\texttt{\textgreek{e}e5} \texttt{\textgreek{b}b8} 15.\texttt{\textgreek{a}e3} \texttt{\textgreek{b}b6} 16.\texttt{\textgreek{a}a4} \texttt{\textgreek{g}5} 17.\texttt{\textgreek{a}a5} \texttt{\textgreek{b}b2} 18.\texttt{\textgreek{g}b3} \texttt{\textgreek{c}c4} 19.\texttt{\textgreek{t}xc4} \texttt{\textgreek{t}xc2} 20.\texttt{\textgreek{t}xa7}. The position now enters the purely technical stage – White’s win seems to be just a matter of time. 20...\texttt{\textgreek{b}b7} 21.\texttt{\textgreek{f}xg5} \texttt{\textgreek{c}c5} 22.\texttt{\textgreek{f}f1} \texttt{\textgreek{e}e7} 23.\texttt{\textgreek{n}ab1} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d5} 24.\texttt{\textgreek{c}c4} \texttt{\textgreek{c}c6} 25.\texttt{\textgreek{a}b6} \texttt{\textgreek{a}a8} 26.\texttt{\textgreek{a}b3} \texttt{\textgreek{a}x\textgreek{b}6} 27.\texttt{\textgreek{a}x\textgreek{b}6} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} 28.\texttt{\textgreek{a}x\textgreek{c}6} 1–0 S. Solovjov – Zakharevich, St. Petersburg 2001. This game is very important theoretically and it challenges critically Black’s defensive concept in this variation.

\textbf{d) 4...\textgreek{e}6}

\texttt{\textgreek{d}f3} \texttt{\textgreek{c}e7}

About 5...\texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} – see 4...\texttt{\textgreek{d}d7}.

\texttt{\textgreek{a}d3}

We will now analyse in details the following moves: \texttt{\textbf{d1}) 6...\textgreek{b}6; \texttt{\textbf{d2}) 6...\textgreek{c}5} and \texttt{\textbf{d3}) 6...0–0.}

As for 6...\texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} – see 4...\texttt{\textgreek{d}d7}; while 6...\texttt{\textgreek{b}bc6} 7.\texttt{\textgreek{e}e3} 0–0 8.0–0 transposes to line \texttt{\textbf{d3}}.

\texttt{\textbf{d1}) 6...\textgreek{b}6}

This pawn-move seems to be too tentative.

\texttt{7.0–0 \textgreek{b}b7 8.f5!}

White starts attacking, since his opponent’s last moves look too slow.

\texttt{8...\textgreek{e}xf5}

Black must capture that pawn; otherwise White’s initiative develops effortlessly: 8...\texttt{\textgreek{d}bc6} 9.\texttt{\textgreek{f}xe6} \texttt{\textgreek{f}xe6} 10.\texttt{\textgreek{d}d5} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d4} (10...\texttt{\textgreek{e}xd5} 11.\texttt{\textgreek{e}xd5} \texttt{\textgreek{e}e5} 12.\texttt{\textgreek{a}xe5} \texttt{\textgreek{a}xe5} 13.\texttt{\textgreek{a}f3} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} 14.\texttt{\textgreek{f}f7}+ \texttt{\textgreek{d}d8} 15.\texttt{\textgreek{a}g5}+) 11.\texttt{\textgreek{e}e3} \texttt{\textgreek{a}xf3}+ 12.\texttt{\textgreek{a}xf3} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} 13.\texttt{\textgreek{a}h3} \texttt{\textgreek{g}g8} 14.\texttt{\textgreek{f}2}+– Gama -o – Exposito, Linares 2005; Black fails to hold the important e6-square after: 8...\texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} 9.\texttt{\textgreek{f}xe6} \texttt{\textgreek{f}xe6} 10.\texttt{\textgreek{g}g5} \texttt{\textgreek{a}xd4}+ 11.\texttt{\textgreek{c}c1} \texttt{\textgreek{c}xc3} 12.\texttt{\textgreek{a}xe6} \texttt{\textgreek{c}c8} 13.\texttt{\textgreek{x}xc3}± Semokoff – Tanner, Teeside 1973.

It is slightly better for Black to follow here with: 8...\texttt{\textgreek{h}h6}, Vea – Matto, Catalan Bay 2003, 9.\texttt{\textgreek{f}xe6} \texttt{\textgreek{f}xe6} 10.\texttt{\textgreek{a}e3} 0–0 11.\texttt{\textgreek{a}d2} \texttt{\textgreek{h}h7} 12.\texttt{\textgreek{f}f2}±, but even then White’s development remains superior and he is dominant in the centre.

\texttt{9.\textgreek{e}xf5 \textgreek{d}d7}

Black’s defence would be extremely hard in case of: 9...\texttt{\textgreek{a}xf5} 10.\texttt{\textgreek{a}xf5} \texttt{\textgreek{g}x\textgreek{f}5}, Micic – Gaprindashvili, Belgrade 1991. After 11.\texttt{\textgreek{g}g5} \texttt{\textgreek{f}6} (It is even worse for Black to play: 11...\texttt{\textgreek{f}6} 12.\texttt{\textgreek{e}e2}+ \texttt{\textgreek{f}8} 13.\texttt{\textgreek{e}e3}+, because he would have great problems due to his weak f-pawns and his vulnerable king.) 12.\texttt{\textgreek{f}4} 0–0 13.\texttt{\textgreek{d}d5} \texttt{\textgreek{d}d7} 14.\texttt{\textgreek{a}d4}± and White’s knight penetrates to the e6-square.

It is slightly better for Black to try here: 9...0–0, Palkovi – Dobos, Helsinki 1990. Now after 10.\texttt{\textgreek{g}g5} \texttt{\textgreek{f}6} (in case of 10...\texttt{\textgreek{h}h6} 11.\texttt{\textgreek{f}6} \texttt{\textgreek{x}xg5} 12.\texttt{\textgreek{f}xg7} \texttt{\textgreek{x}xg7} 13.\texttt{\textgreek{a}xg5}±
Black can hardly defend his kingside successfully) 11.\textit{xf}4\textit{f}± Black’s e6-square is very weak and his bishop on g7 remains a sorry sight, so White’s advantage would be long-lasting.

\textbf{10.\textit{g}5! \textit{xf}3}

It is not any better for Black to play: 10...0–0, Donevic – Ostl, Germany 1991, because White transfers his queen to the h4-square with 11.\textit{e}1\textit{f}± and he creates easily checkmating threats.

\textbf{11.\textit{x}f3 \textit{xd}4+ 12.\textit{h}1 \textit{e}5 13.\textit{h}3 \textit{xc}3}

Black loses immediately after: 13...\textit{xd}3 14.\textit{xd}3, but his defence is extremely difficult even now.

\textbf{14.fxg6! fxg6} (Black loses quickly after: 14...\textit{xb}2 15.gxf7+ \textit{xf}7 16.\textit{b}5+ c6 17.\textit{xc}6=+) \textbf{15.\textit{bxc}3 \textit{d}7 16.\textit{h}4=} White preserves a couple of powerful bishops. Black’s king is stranded in the centre and the coordination of his pieces has been disrupted. The following simple line illustrates the complexity of Black’s defensive task: 16...\textit{f}5 17.\textit{xf}5 gxf5 18.\textit{f}6 \textit{f}8 19.\textit{h}5+ \textit{f}7 20.\textit{xf}5±.

\textbf{d2) 6...c5}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

This is an attempt by Black to fight for the centre, which after the exchange on c5 leads to a position with immobile central pawns.

\textbf{7.dxc5 dxc5 8.e5 0–0 9.\textit{e}3}

After the reduction of the tension in the centre, White gets a free hand to seize the initiative on both sides of the board.

\textbf{9...\textit{a}5}

It is worse for Black to play: 9...b6 10.\textit{e}4 \textit{bc}6 (It is possibly better for Black to try here: 10...\textit{xd}1+ 11.\textit{xd}1 \textit{bc}6 12.\textit{b}5±, although the weakness of the d6-square and the domination on the d-file provide White with a long-lasting pressure.) 11.\textit{e}2 a6 12.h4→ and Black’s defence against White’s oncoming attack along the h-file will be extremely problematic, Kagan – Camara, Lugano 1968.

\textbf{10.0–0 \textit{d}5}

The variation: 10...\textit{ad}8 11.\textit{e}1 \textit{f}5 12.\textit{f}2 \textit{b}4 13.\textit{b}5± illustrates the consequences of Black’s lag in development and his lack of space.

\textbf{11.\textit{xd}5 \textit{exd}5 12.\textit{c}4 d4}
After 12...\textit{\v E}e6 13.f5!± the pawn-shelter of the black king is easily destroyed.

\textbf{13.\textit{\v D}d2 \textit{\v C}c7}

In case of 13...\textit{\v W}b6, White plays 14.a3 \textit{\v C}c6 15.b4±.

\textbf{14.\textit{\v W}e1 \textit{\v C}c6 15.\textit{\v G}g5 \textit{\v E}e7} (It is slightly better for Black to follow with: 15...\textit{\v W}b6 16.\textit{\v H}h4 h6 17.\textit{\v E}e4 \textit{\v W}xb2? 18.\textit{\v F}fb1++; 17...\textit{\v F}f5 18.b3±, but even then he has no active play whatsoever.)

\textbf{16.\textit{\v G}g3 \textit{\v D}d7 17.\textit{\v M}ae1± Podlesni\v k – Butala, ljubljana 1996, White preserves excellent attacking chances, for example it is too bad for Black to play: 17...\textit{\v F}fe8 18.e6! \textit{\v X}e6 (18...fxe6 19.\textit{\v X}xh7!±--) 19.f5.}

d3) 6...0–0

\textbf{7.0–0 \textit{\v B}c6}

After 7...c5 8.dxc5 dxc5 there remains no tension in the centre and White is once again free to act on the sides of the board. 9.e5 \textit{\v B}c6 (9...\textit{\v D}d5 10.\textit{\v E}e4 \textit{\v W}b6, Kolcak – Danek, Slovakia 1998, 11.c4 \textit{\v B}b4 12.\textit{\v E}e3 \textit{\v B}a6 (but not 12...\textit{\v X}xd3 13.\textit{\v W}xd3 \textit{\v D}d8 14.\textit{\v W}a3 \textit{\v D}d7 15.\textit{\v M}ad1 \textit{\v F}f8 16.\textit{\v F}f2 \textit{\v E}e7 17.\textit{\v F}h4± and Black must worry about his dark squares on the kingside; his pieces are quite cramped too and White has excellent attacking prospects) 13.\textit{\v E}e2 \textit{\v C}c6 14.\textit{\v W}c2± Black’s pieces are deployed so disharmoniously that White can develop a powerful initiative on both sides of the board.) 10.\textit{\v D}e4 b6, Pastori – Benitez, Montevideo 1976, and here after the patient line: 11.c3 \textit{\v F}f5 12.\textit{\v W}e2 \textit{\v B}b7 13.g4 \textit{\v H}h4 (or 13...\textit{\v F}fe7 14.\textit{\v D}d6 \textit{\v W}c7 15.\textit{\v G}g5 \textit{\v M}ad8 16.\textit{\v X}xb7 \textit{\v W}xb7 17.\textit{\v E}e4±) 14.\textit{\v X}h4 \textit{\v W}xh4 15.\textit{\v D}d6 \textit{\v M}ab8 (15...\textit{\v W}e7 16.\textit{\v E}e4±) 16.\textit{\v X}xb7 \textit{\v X}xb7 17.\textit{\v E}e4 \textit{\v C}c7 18.\textit{\v E}e3± White remains with a two bishop advantage and complete dominance in the centre. His advantage is indisputable.

After 7...d5 8.e5 \textit{\v D}d7 9.\textit{\v E}e3± Mattern – Bott, Badenweiler 1994, there arises a pawn-structure typical for the French defence in which Black’s bishop on g7 is misplaced, moreover his dark squares on the kingside are weakened and he can hardly organize any counterplay.

In case of 7...h6 8.\textit{\v E}e3 b6, Kramer – Thiering, Bayern 1995, White maintains good attacking chances after: 9.\textit{\v W}e2 \textit{\v B}b7 10.f5 \textit{\v X}xf5 11.exf5 \textit{\v M}xf5 12.\textit{\v X}xf5 gxf5 13.\textit{\v W}d2±.

After 7...b6, White plays: 8.\textit{\v W}e2 \textit{\v D}d7 9.\textit{\v D}d2 \textit{\v B}b7 10.\textit{\v M}ae1, Seminara – Turek, Brazil 1997, and he has developed all his pieces and can start an immediate attack with 11.f5.
In answer to 7...\(\text{Q}d7\), Arul – Bakar, Genting Highlands 1998, White can begin his offensive immediately with – 8.f5 exf5 9.exf5 \(\text{Q}f6\) 10.fxg6 hxg6 11.\(\text{Q}g5\)±.

Following 7...f5, Bueblighuisen – Junker, Oberhau 1991, 8.e5 \(\text{Q}bc6\) 9.\(\text{A}e3\)± White has extra space and a possibility to organize active actions all over the board.

8.\(\text{A}e3\) e5

White has no problems whatsoever after: 8...\(\text{A}b4\) 9.\(\text{A}e2\) d5 10.e5 b6, Kunz – Hallmann, Hemmingen 2000, 11.a3 \(\text{A}f5\) 12.\(\text{A}f2\) \(\text{Q}c6\) 13.\(\text{A}d3\)± White’s pawn-centre is solid and he has a free hand to prepare a kingside attack.

The line 8...a6 9.\(\text{A}d2\) \(\text{A}h6\), Michellotti – Cerovic, Saint Quentin 2000, enables White to seize the initiative outright with 10.f5→.

9.dxe5 dxe5

\[\begin{align*}
10.\text{A}e1! & \text{A}g4 \ 11.\text{A}h1 \text{exf4} \\
12.\text{A}xf4 & \text{A}xf3 \ 13.\text{gx}f3 \text{A}e5, \text{Bologan – Krasenkow, Tilburg 1993,} \\
14.\text{A}g3! & \text{A}xd3 \ 15.\text{A}xc7 \text{A}d7 \ 16.\text{A}ad1±. \text{White remains with a solid extra pawn.}
\end{align*}\]

**Conclusion**

The main drawback of Black’s opening strategy, in the variations that we have analysed, is his lag in development. In fact, White’s dominance in the centre often leads to a dangerous direct attack against Black. Strangely enough, the possible exchange of queens after 4...c5, or 4...e5 does not facilitate Black’s defence, but on the contrary – makes it even harder. This is due to the circumstance that the black king remains in the centre and White has more than enough pieces to attack it effectively. Black’s defence is difficult after the move 4...f5 too, since White occupies space and Black must either comply with being slowly squeezed to death, or enter a complicated sharp line in which he might suffer due to the lack of a reliable shelter of his king. After the tentative move 4...e6 for Black, White can seize the initiative quite dangerously with natural moves, making a good use of his powerful pawn-centre.
Chapter 25

1.e4 g6 2.d4 \_g7 3.\_c3 d6 4.f4 \_d7

Black's main idea after this order of moves is to play c7-c5 and to transpose to the Sicilian Defence. White however, must consider some other possibilities for Black as well.

5.\_f3 c5

This counterstrike against White's centre is not particularly successful for Black, since his knight on d7 is placed too passively.

About 5...b6 6.\_d3 \_b7 – see 4...b6.

The other possibilities for Black are:

It is a disaster for Black to play: 5...f6?! 6.\_c4± Brodie – Dougherty, Ottawa 1978;

5...\_b6 – this placement of Black's knight is hardly satisfactory. After 6.\_d3 \_g4 7.\_e3 e6 8.h3 \_xf3 9.\_xf3± White can boast about numerous achievements – he has extra space, superior development and the two bishop advantage, Kaezer – Dettmann, Altenkirchen 1999;

Black has tried several times in practice the rather eccentric move 5...\_h6, so I recommend against it the simple reaction: 6.h3!±. The Black players will certainly be sorry during their games for choosing such inappropriate corner square for that knight. Presently, the only available game on that theme followed with: 6...0–0 7.\_e3 f5 8.\_c4+ \_h8, Preusser – Richter, Kassel 1998. Now, White can prevent the entrance of that knight into action after the intermediary move fxe4, with the correct measure: 9.e5 c6 (in case Black closes the centre with: 9...\_b6 10.\_b3 d5 11.\_e2 c6, White can start an immediate attack with: 12.h4! \_g4 13.h5→) 10.\_g5 \_b6 11.a3!, and the weakness of the e6-square as well as the discordination of Black's pieces qualify his position as extremely difficult, for example he loses after: 11...dxe5?
12. ∆a4! ♞a5+ 13. ∆d2 ♞xa4 (or 13... ♞c7 14. ∆e6++) 14. b3++ and Black’s compensation for the queen is insufficient;

5...e5?! This counterstrike in the centre enables White to claim a clear advantage without too much of an effort: 6.fxe5 dxe5 7.dxe5. White can capture on e5 in some other orders of moves, but that is immaterial. Black’s position is very bad anyway: 7... ∆xe5 (7... ∆xe5 8. ∆xe5 ∆xe5 9. ∆xd8+ ∆xd8 10. f4 f6 11.0-0-0+ ∆d7 12. ∆d5 c6 13. ∆xf6+ – Volodarsky – Leonov, Novokuznetsk 1996; 7...c6 8. ∆c4+ Pinski – Lobeiko, Kazimierz Dolny 2001; 7... ∆e7 8. ∆c4 ∆xe5, Kern – Stark, Hessen, Germany 1983, 9.0-0 0-0 10. ∆g5++ 8. ∆xd8+ ∆xd8 9. ∆g5+ ∆e8 (9... ∆e7 10.0-0-0+ ∆d7 11. ∆d5++; 9...f6 10. ∆xe5 ∆e6 11.0-0-0+ ∆e7 12. ∆d5+ ∆xd5 13. ∆xd5 fxg5 14. ∆d7+ ∆e6 15. ∆xg7 ∆xe5 16. ∆xc7 ∆f6 17. ∆xb7 ∆g4 18. ∆d3 ∆h8 19. ∆b5+ ∆d4 20. ∆e1 ∆e3 21. ∆d2 ∆f2+ 22. ∆e2 ∆f1+ 23. ∆e1 ∆xe2+ 24. ∆xe2 ∆e3 25.c3# 1-0 Suttlles – Guti, Tel Aviv 1964) 10. ∆b5 ∆xf3+ 11. ∆xf3 ∆e5 (11... ∆xb2 12. ∆d1 f6 13. ∆xc7+ ∆e7 14. ∆e3+- Leisebein – Becker, Email 1999) 12.f4 a6 13.fxe5 axb5 14. ∆xb5+ c6 15. ∆c4+ Koscielski – Rickert, Germany 1995;

5... ∆gf6?! This move is played only very seldom. White attacks immediately the black knight, which has entered the action a bit untimely. The situation on the kingside becomes quite favourable for White now. 6.e5 ∆g4, Rozycki – Waller, Hill Rainbow 2000 (6...dxe5 7.fxe5 ∆g8 8. ∆c4±). It looks like the best way for White to realize his attacking potential is to sacrifice immediately a pawn: 7.e6 fx6 8. ∆g5 ∆df6 9. ∆c4! (This move prevents Black from facilitating his defence by sacrificing a pawn back with the resource e6-e5 at an opportune moment.) 9...d5 10. ∆d3 0-0 11. ∆e2 ∆d6 12. h3 ∆h6 13. g4. White intends later to complete his development and then just crush Black’s kingside. It seems that Black’s attempts to prevent that somehow, only would bring the end closer, for example: 13... ∆f7 (13...c5 14. dxc5 ∆xc5 15. ∆xe6±) 14.h4 ∆h6 15.h5 gxh5 16.gxh5 ∆f5 17.h6 ∆xh6 18. ∆e3 ∆f5 19.0-0-0 ∆g3 20. ∆h2 ∆xh1 21. ∆xh7+ ∆h8 22. ∆xh1 ∆g4 23. ∆h5 ∆f6 24. ∆f7+ ∆xf7 25. ∆xf7 ∆xh7 26. ∆e8+ ∆f8 27. ∆xf8#;

5...a6 – Black hopes to organize some counterplay on the queenside with that move. He is however too slow in accomplishing that idea (instead, it is better for Black to play a6 on move 4 – see Chapter 28), because his king is in the centre and White can exploit that. 6. ∆c4! This move is very energetic and effective too. 6...e6. This is Black’s best bet; nevertheless his position remains quite perilous.
(6...b5?? Voevodina – Prokopchenkova, Smolensk 2001. This is a terrible blunder and Black loses material decisively after the simple combination: 7.\( \text{xf7+} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 8.\( \text{g5} \)++; 6...\( \text{b6} \) 7.\( \text{b3} \) h6? 8.0–0 \( \text{g4} \) 9.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 10.\( \text{h3} \)± Vincze – Geroly, Hungary 1993.) 7.f5 \( \text{b6} \), G.Livshits – Ma.Tseitlin, Israel 2002. I recommend here the logical move 8.\( \text{b3} \)!

White sacrifices a pawn, opens the f-file and his attack becomes overwhelming. 8...\( \text{xf5} \) (8...\( \text{gx5} \) 9.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 10.0–0+) 9.0–0 \( \text{e7} \) (9...h6 10.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 11.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 12.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 13.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{e6} \) 14.d5 \( \text{xd5} \) 15.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 16.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 17.\( \text{a1} \) \( \text{d8} \) 18.\( \text{e5} \) 10.\( \text{g5} \) f6 (10...0–0 11.\( \text{wd2} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 12.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 13.\( \text{f6} \) \( \text{xb3} \) 14.\( \text{axb3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 15.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{g7} \) 16.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{c8} \) 17.\( \text{ae1} \) \( \text{f5} \) 18.g4 \( \text{h6} \) 19.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d8} \) 20.\( \text{e3} \) d5 21.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 22.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 23.\( \text{wh6} \) \( \text{g8} \) 24.\( \text{wh7} \) 11.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 12.\( \text{xe4} \) g5 13.\( \text{fxg5} \) \( \text{fxg5} \) 14.\( \text{xg5} \) h5 15.\( \text{f7} \) \( \text{f8} \) 16.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{e6} \) 17.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{e8} \) 18.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 19.\( \text{h1} \)++;

5...\( \text{e6} \) – that move is quite popular. I suggest White continued in a resolute and attacking fashion with: 6.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e7} \) (6...\( \text{h6} \), Rybak – Novak, corr. 1999, 7.h4! 0–0 8.h5±; 7...c5 8.dxc5 dxc5 9.h5 0–0 10.hxg6 fxg6 11.f5 \( \text{g5} \) 12.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 13.\( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 14.\( \text{xg4} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 15.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{xal} \) 16.\( \text{h4} \) h5 17.\( \text{xe6} \)++ 7.h4!

Black's knight is slightly better deployed on the e7-square than on h6, but still White's initiative is very powerful. 7...c5. This attempt at counterplay is logical, but now the apparent weakness of the d6-square becomes a telling factor in the ensuing battle. 8.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{b6} \) (8...0–0 9.h5 d5 10.\( \text{hxg6} \) \( \text{g6} \) 11.f5 \( \text{exf5} \) 12.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{e8} \) 13.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{g8} \) 14.\( \text{f4} \) c4 15.\( \text{c7} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 16.\( \text{xa8} \) 9.e5 \( \text{f5} \) 10.g4 a6, S.Jensen – Moller, corr. 1974. White could have obtained a huge advantage in that position with the manoeuvre: 11.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 12.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c7} \) 13.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{f8} \) 14.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 15.\( \text{xf3} \) h5 16.0–0–0+;

5...c6 – this move is too slow. Black does not exert any pressure now against the d4-pawn, so White can safely develop his bishop to a more active square. 6.\( \text{d3} \)!

Black can hardly find any successful method of defending this position:

About 6...\( \text{gf6} \) 7.e5 – see Chapter 14 (The Pirc Defence);

6...\( \text{c7} \) 7.0–0 b5 8.a3 \( \text{b6} \) 9.\( \text{e1} \) a6 10.e5 d5, S.Maksimovic – Konarkowska, Belgrade 1987, 11.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 12.f5±;
6...b5 7.0-0 b4 8.\(\&\)e2 c5 9.c3 bxc3 10.bxc3 \(\&\)b7 (after 10...cxd4 11.cxd4 \(\&\)c5 12.\(\&\)c2 d5 13.e5 \(\&\)e4 14.\(\&\)g5\(\pm\) Black has great problems to complete his development; 10...\(\&\)gf6 11.\(\&\)b1\(\pm\)) 11.\(\&\)b1 \(\&\)c7 12.\(\&\)g3\(\pm\) and White is up in arms to start an offensive in the centre and on the kingside, Chudinovskii – Roth, Germany 2000;

After 6...\(\&\)b6 7.\(\&\)e2 c5 8.c3 e6 9.0-0 \(\&\)e7 10.\(\&\)e1 d5 11.e5\(\pm\) Seiler – Jopek, Germany 1996, White can easily develop his initiative on the queenside with the move a4, as well as on the kingside – by preparing f5, meanwhile Black has no counterplay whatsoever;

In answer to 6...h5 7.0-0 \(\&\)b6, Doronenev – Ukhanov, Kollontaev 1998, it seems very reasonable for White to continue with: 8.f5 gxf5 9.exf5 \(\&\)f6 10.\(\&\)g5\(\pm\).

We can draw a general conclusion from the analysis of Black’s possibilities until now with the assumption that they are all unsatisfactory for him and White’s game develops effortlessly.

6...e5 – we have to admit that we consider this move to be the main line for Black. Still even after it, according to the game and moreover to the analysis of GM B.Lalic, Black’s defensive task is extremely difficult. 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.\(\&\)e2?! This idea belongs to GM Lalic. We quote some of his analyses further: 8...\(\&\)c7 (after 8...\(\&\)c7, White can sacrifice a pawn: 9.0-0! exf4 10.e5 \(\&\)e7 11.\(\&\)xf4 \(\&\)b6+ 12.\(\&\)h1 \(\&\)xb2 13.e6 fxe6 14.\(\&\)e4 0-0 15.\(\&\)d6 \(\&\)d5 16.\(\&\)xf8\(\pm\)) 9.f5 \(\&\)c5 (9...0-0 10.g4\(\pm\); 9...gx5 10.\(\&\)f5 0-0 11.\(\&\)g5\(\pm\) 10.\(\&\)c4 gx5 (10...b5 11.\(\&\)e3? \(\&\)xe4? 12.\(\&\)xe4 bxc4 13.f6\(\pm\)) 11.\(\&\)g5 \(\&\)e6 (11...\(\&\)e6 12.\(\&\)e3! \(\&\)xc4 13.\(\&\)xc4\(\pm\)) 12.\(\&\)xf7! This knight-sacrifice spells great danger for Black. 12...\(\&\)xf7 13.\(\&\)ex5 \(\&\)xf5 14.0-0! \(\&\)e8 (14...
\(\&\)d4\(\pm\)?) 15.\(\&\)e3!+-; 14...\(\&\)e7? 15.\(\&\)xf5 \(\&\)d4 16.\(\&\)f7+-; 14...
\(\&\)g6? 15.\(\&\)xf5! \(\&\)xf5 16.\(\&\)h5+ \(\&\)f6 17.\(\&\)e4+ \(\&\)e7 18.\(\&\)g5+ \(\&\)xg5 19.\(\&\)xg5+ \(\&\)e8 20.\(\&\)h5+-+) 15.\(\&\)xf5+ \(\&\)g8 16.\(\&\)e3 \(\&\)h8 17.\(\&\)h5! e4 (17...\(\&\)f4 18.\(\&\)xf4 exf4 19.\(\&\)hx7! \(\&\)hx7 20.\(\&\)h5 \(\&\)h6 21.\(\&\)d3 \(\&\)g8 22.\(\&\)xh6! \(\&\)d4+ 23.\(\&\)h1 \(\&\)e6 24.\(\&\)h7+ \(\&\)f8 25.\(\&\)f1+-) 18.\(\&\)f1! \(\&\)e7 19.\(\&\)xe4 \(\&\)d7 20.\(\&\)hx7!+- \(\&\)hx7 21.\(\&\)h5 \(\&\)g8 22.\(\&\)g5 \(\&\)xg5 (22...\(\&\)f6 23.\(\&\)g6+ \(\&\)g7 24.\(\&\)xf6 \(\&\)xg6 25.\(\&\)xg6+ \(\&\)f8 26.\(\&\)xe6 \(\&\)xe6 27.\(\&\)c5+! \(\&\)e7 28.\(\&\)xe6+-) 23.\(\&\)xg5 \(\&\)f8 24.\(\&\)d1 1-0 B.Lalic
– Turner, Kilkenny 1998. This game almost sent the 5...c6 line into oblivion.

6.\(\&\)e3

(diagram)

6...\(\&\)gf6

It is not good for Black to try: 6...e6 7.\(\&\)b5 \(\&\)f8 8.dxc5\(\pm\) Carpentier – Musiaka, Email 2001.

6...\(\&\)h6?! – this is a very poor square for the black knight. 7.h3 a6 (Disaster befalls Black after:
1.e4 g6 2.d4 Bg7 3.Nc3 d6 4.f4 Nf6 5.Nf3

Qg8 10.0-0-0±.

After 6...a5 (Black's queen creates no real threats on this square and might be successfully attacked too.) 7.Bd2 (This is the simplest and also the best continuation for White.) Black should better play 7...Qg6 in order to transpose to the line 6...Qg6, because it is too bad for him to try: 7...e6 8.0-0-0 Qe7 9.Qb5!± Mirabile - Fireman, USA 2004. The move 7...cxd4, Heinicke - Stephan, Germany 1998, is not satisfactory for Black either, because the trade of the dark squared bishops is in favour of White: 8.Bxd4! (Black's bishop on g7 is thus neutralized.) 8...Qxd4 (8...Qg6 9.e5 dxe5 10.fxe5
Qd5 11.e6; 8...e5 9.Qf2 exf4 10.Qb5 Qxd2+ 11.Qxd2±) 9.Qxd4 f6 (9...Qg6 10.e5±) 10.Qc4±.

6...a6 7.dxc5 Qxc5 8.Qd4 f6 9.Qxc5 dxc5 10.Qxd8+ Qxd8, Tran Thi – Nguyen Thi, Can Tho 2001. White's development is superior (despite the fact that White had to pay for it by exchanging his powerful bishop for the black knight) and the endgame is clearly in his favour, because of that. The energetic move 11.Qd5! now prevents the black king from joining in the defence of the queenside pawns, for example: 11...b5 (or 11...e6 12.Qb6 Qb8 13.Qc4± forcing Black to weaken further his light squares.) 12.0-0-0 Qd7 13.Qb6 Qa7 14.a4! bxa4 (it is not any better for Black to play here: 14...c4 15.Qd4± 15.Qxa6±. White's lead in development is huge and he wins irrevocably a pawn.

6...b6 7.Qc4! (This move creates the threat 7.Qxf7+! and Black's answer is practically forced.) 7...Qh6 (In the game Lidkpine – E.Karlsson, Allsvenskan 1981, Black failed to parry that threat and played 7...a6 8.Qxf7++. The defence chosen by Black in another game was not successful either i.e. Staber – Bierbach, corr 1986, 7...e6 8.Qb5! cxd4 9.Qxd4 Qd6 10.e5 dxe5 11.Qxe5++. White's lead in development is overwhelming after: 7...h6 8.e5!± Erpel – Bierbach, corr 1986.) 8.Qg5 (White is threatening Qxf7 once again.) 8...Qf6 9.h3! After this move Black's knight on h6 will hardly enter the action anytime soon. 9...cxd4 10.Qxd4± Zastrow – Schuh, corr, 1992. White must prevent Black from playing the freeing move e7-e5; therefore he should develop his queen to d3, castle long and then start an
offensive on the kingside.

6...\texttt{b}6 (or 6...\texttt{c}7) 7.\texttt{d}5 \texttt{a}5+ (In case Black retreats with the queen 7...\texttt{d}8, G.Fischer — Brand, Graz 1997, then after 8.dxc5 \texttt{e}6 9.\texttt{d}4!\pm; 8...dxc5 9.e5 \texttt{e}6 10.\texttt{b}5+ \texttt{f}8 11.\texttt{c}3\pm Black will have problems to develop his kingside pieces.) 8.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{d}8, Batuev — Matveev, Serpukhov 1999. Now, the simplest method for White to maintain his advantage is the trade of the dark squared bishops: 9.dxc5 \texttt{xc}5 10.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{xc}3+ (Black's attempt to avoid the exchange of the bishops: 10...\texttt{f}6 11.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6 12.\texttt{d}4\pm, leads to a situation in which he can hardly protect his d6-pawn.) 11.\texttt{xc}3 \texttt{f}6 12.e5 \texttt{g}4 13.h3 \texttt{e}3 14.\texttt{b}5+ \texttt{d}7 15.\texttt{e}2 \texttt{f}5 16.exd6 \texttt{xd}6 (16...\texttt{g}3? 17.\texttt{e}5\pm) 17.0-0-0 \texttt{xb}5 (17...0-0 18.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 19.\texttt{he}1 \texttt{fe}8 20.\texttt{d}5!\pm) 18.\texttt{xb}5 0-0 19.\texttt{c}3! \texttt{c}8 20.\texttt{d}5\pm. All white pieces are centralized and he can create threats much earlier than his opponent.

6...cxd4 7.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{e}5 (Black has not tried in practice yet the exchange: 7...\texttt{xd}4 8.\texttt{xd}4, and that is hardly surprising – White can seize the initiative immediately, for example after: 8...\texttt{gf}6 9.e5 \texttt{h}5 10.g4 \texttt{g}7 11.exd6 0-0 12.0-0-0+; Black cannot avoid the exchange without considerable positional compromises i.e. 7...\texttt{gf}6 8.e5 dxe5 9.fxe5 \texttt{h}5 10.e6! fxe6 11.\texttt{g}5 e5 — 11...\texttt{e}5 12.\texttt{b}5+ \texttt{c}6 13.\texttt{xg}7\pm — 12.\texttt{e}6 \texttt{a}5, Hrvacic — Ljubicic, Split 1999, 13.\texttt{e}3\pm 8.fxe5 (it is also worth trying for White the immediate pressure against the critical d6-square: 8.\texttt{f}2!?+, for example: 8...\texttt{xf}4 9.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{xb}2 10.\texttt{b}1 \texttt{e}5 11.\texttt{xe}5 dxe5 12.\texttt{d}6 \texttt{a}5+ 13.c3 \texttt{d}8 14.\texttt{h}4+ f6 15.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{e}7 16.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{e}8 17.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{b}6 18.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{e}3+ 19.\texttt{f}1\pm) 8...dxe5 (It is worse for Black to play 8...\texttt{xe}5, because then White can enter a very attractive endgame with 9.\texttt{xe}5! — and after 9...\texttt{xe}5 10.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{d}7 11.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 12.\texttt{xd}7+ \texttt{xd}7 13.0-0-0+ \texttt{c}6 14.\texttt{d}3\pm he dominates on the d-file and he has a great advantage, due to his excellent development. In case of — 9...\texttt{xe}5 10.\texttt{xe}5 dxe5 11.\texttt{xd}8+ \texttt{xd}8 12.0-0-0+ \texttt{c}7 13.\texttt{c}4\pm Black has great problems to preserve the material equality, since his lag in development is considerable, Choyke — Moore, Detroit 1994.) 9.\texttt{g}1 \texttt{gf}6 10.\texttt{c}4 0-0 11.\texttt{yd}6 \texttt{e}8 12.\texttt{a}3 \texttt{c}7 13.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{ef}6 14.\texttt{g}5! (White is threatening to play: 15.\texttt{xf}7 \texttt{xf}7 16.\texttt{e}7\pm) 14.\texttt{d}8 15.0-0-0 \texttt{h}6 16.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{g}4 17.\texttt{b}1\pm Witzschel — Krause, corr. 1998.

7.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{a}5

After 7...\texttt{xc}5, White can obtain a better endgame, despite conceding the two bishop advantage to his opponent with: 8.\texttt{xc}5 dxc5 9.\texttt{xd}8+ \texttt{xd}8 10.e5 \texttt{d}7 11.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}8 12.\texttt{c}4 e6. White enjoys a great space advantage.
1.e4 g6 2.d4 ♘g7 3.♘c3 d6 4.f4 ♛d7 5.♕f3

and his opponent's bishops are harmless. 13.a4 ♗e7 14.a5 h6 15.♗ge4 g5 16.g3 f6 17.exf6+ ♗xf6 18.♗xf6 ♗xf6 19.0–0± Black's attempts to liven his pieces up ended in creating a permanent weakness on the e6-square, Hodgson – Jones, Gwbert-on-Sea 2001.

7...dxc5 8.e5 ♘g4 9.♗g1 0–0 10.♗e2 ♘a5 11.0–0–0± White's attacking chances are excellent, meanwhile Black should worry about his knight on g4, which can easily come under attack, Motwani – Wijesurija, Istanbul 2000.

8.♕d2 ♘xc5

8...dxc5 9.e5 ♘g4 10.♗d5 ♖d8 11.0–0–0±; 10...♖xd2+ 11.♖xd2±.

9.e5!

The arising complications now are definitely in favour of White.

9...♘g4

Black loses after 9...dxe5 10.b4!! White wins a piece now and his opponent cannot even dream about any compensation. 10...♘xb4 11.♗b1 ♘fe4 (11...♗a5 12.fxe5 ♗fd7 13.♗b5 ♗a3 14.♗xc5 0–0 15.♗b5 ♗b6 16.♗c5 1–0 Smits – Mendosa, Email 1999) 12.♗xb4 ♘xd2 13.♗xd2 ♗e6 14.♗b5+ ♗d7 15.♗xd7+ ♗xd7 16.♗xe5+ ♗e8 17.♗xb7 ♗g5 18.g3 1–0 Strauss – Tisdall, Lone Pine 1976.

Black must defend a very difficult endgame after: 9...♗fd7 10.♗d5 ♖xd2+ 11.♖xd2 ♗e6 (11...♗d8 12.exd6 exd6 13.0–0–0±) 12.g4! ♗d8 (The other possibilities for Black are even worse for him: 12...f5 13.gxf5 gx5 14.♗g1 ♗f7 15.exd6±; 12...♗b6 13.♗b5±; 12...♗b8 13.exd6 exd6 14.0–0–0–0±) 13.exd6 exd6 14.♖c4 ♗c7 15.0–0 ♗xd5 16.♖x5 ♗f6 17.♖xd6+ ♗c7 18.g5 ♗e4 19.♗d4 ♗xd6 20.♗xg7 ♗e6 21.♗xd6 ♗xd6 22.♗xh8 ♗xh8 23.♗g2±, and White pressed his advantage home quite convincingly in this endgame with an extra pawn – Tseshkovsky – Quinteros, Manila 1976.

10.♗b5+

It is also good for White to play: 10.♗d4 0–0 11.h3 ♗h6 12. exd6 ♗xd4 13.♗xd4 exd6 14.0–0–0± Black's king is vulnerable, his knight on h6 is misplaced and the isolated d6-pawn is very weak.

10...♗d7 11.b4! ♘xb4 12.♗b1 ♗a3

Black's compensation for the queen-sacrifice is quite insufficient after: 12...♗xb1+ 13.♗xb1 ♗xb5 14.♗d4±.

13.♗xc5 ♘xc5 14.♗xd7+ ♗xd7 15.♗xb7+ ♗d8

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16.\textbf{\( \text{d5} \)} \text{e6} (16...\text{\textit{f2}} 17.0–0! \text{\textit{e4}}+ 18.\text{d4} \text{c8} 19.\text{xd1} \text{xd4+} 20.\text{xd4} \text{e8} 21.\text{xa7} \text{c3} 22. \text{xc3} \text{xc3} 23.\text{b1+}) 17.\text{g5} \text{exd5} (17...\text{xd5} 18.\text{xf7+} \text{e8} 19.\text{xd5} \text{exd5} 20.\text{hxh8} \text{hxh8} 21.\text{xe7+}) 18.\text{xf7+} \text{c8} 19. \text{d6+} \text{d6} 20.\text{exd6} \text{xb7} 21.\text{xd5+} \text{a6} 22.\text{c6+} \text{a5} 23.\text{c7+} \text{a6} 24.\text{xg7} \text{he8+} 25.\text{d2} \text{ad8} 26.\text{d4} \text{e3} 27. \text{b1} 1–0 \text{Vitolins – Luckans, Daugavpils, 1973. This game belongs already to the classics in this variation.}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Black’s defence is very difficult in this line, mostly because his knight on d7 is passive, moreover it stands in the way of the rest of his pieces. His attempts at counterplay by attacking White’s centre with the help of the pawn-breaks c5 and e5 only lead to opening of the position. White is perfectly prepared to counter that and he can claim the advantage with simple aggressive moves. In case Black plays calmly and slows down his attempts at active play, White enjoys an abundance of possibilities to seize the initiative in the centre as well as on the kingside – he can prepare e5, or f5, and even h4–h5 in some variations.
Black counterattacks the important central d4-pawn. He makes use of the fact that White cannot protect it with the natural move c2-c3 anymore.

5...e3

This is the most reliable defence of the pawn presently.

In case of the seemingly natural move 5.d5, Black can simply go back with his knight to b8 and later he can undermine White’s d5-pawn with moves like e7-e6, or c7-c6 with a quite acceptable counterplay. The other possibility 5...d4 is more enterprising, but riskier too and leads to unclear situations.

5...f6

That move is logical and solid as well. Black develops his knight and can castle short (not necessarily, of course...). He is also threatening at that moment to play the annoying move – 6...g4, winning the all-important d4-pawn. Naturally, White can and should parry that threat.

Black has also tried in practice here:

5...f5 – this move is a bit too risky! Black enables White to dominate in the centre quite obviously and weakens his kingside unnecessarily: 6.e5 e6 7...f3 h6 8.f2 0–0 9...d2 a6 10.0–0 b5 11.d5± P.Flavia – Santos Ramos, Spain 1997;

5...d7 – the drawback of this move is the fact that the bishop has been developed too passively. In fact, the advantages of its deployment to the d7-square, instead of on c8, are too small to matter. 6...f3 e5, Muntslag – Van Olderen, Soest 1995 (6...h6 7.c4 g4 8.g1 e5 9.fxe5 dxe5 10.d5±) 7.d5 c7 8.fxe5 dxe5 9.d6! (This active operation puts in doubt Black’s questionable opening strategy.) 9...cxd6 10.xd6 c6 11.xd8+ xd8 (11...xd8 12.xa7) 12.0–0–0±; 10...c6 11.b5 c8 12.d2–

5...d5 – this decision is too
forceful! Black wishes to free his position, but he loses plenty of time in doing that. This pawn goes to the d5-square in two moves! 6.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\)xd5! This is White's simplest decision. He does not win material indeed, but after opening of the d-file his lead in development becomes a decisive factor in the ensuing battle. 6...e6 7.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 \(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 (7...\(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 8.\(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 \(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 10.0-0-0 c5 11.e5 \(\text{\textit{de}}\)7 12.\(\text{\textit{de}}\)e4 b6 13.c3) 8.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6 9.\(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd8+ \(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd8 10.0-0+ \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7, Escobar – Fulgenzi, Buenos Aires 1990. Now, White should follow with: 11.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b5 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)c8 12.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 a6 13.\(\text{\textit{xc}}\)xc6 \(\text{\textit{xc}}\)xc6 14.\(\text{\textit{hd}}\)h1 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f6 15.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5+;

5...a6 – that move is useful for Black in general. He is preparing some counterplay in the future, based on the possibility of playing b7-b5. White, however, has no problems with his development and preserves stable space advantage. 6.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)f3 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 (6...b5 7.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)d2+ 6...\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f6 7.h3 0-0 8.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h5 9.g4! That is the simplest line for White. It looks like Black facilitates his defence by exchanging his knight for White's light-squared bishop, but the truth is – things are far from simple. White in fact remains with a great space advantage. 9...\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g3 10.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g1 \(\text{\textit{exe}}\)e2 11.\(\text{\textit{xe}}\)e2 e5 12.0-0-0 exd4 13.\(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 14.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f5; 11...\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 12.h4 e5 13.0-0-0 exd4 14.\(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)xh4 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 16.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h1 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)xg4 17.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h2 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h5 18.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f2 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h3 19.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g3 \(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 20.\(\text{\textit{xd}}\)xd4 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 21.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h3+; 12...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8 13.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a7 14.h5+ and White's mobile pawns supported by his active pieces paralyzed soon Black's position completely in the game Lopez Nadal – De Cuadra, Zaragoza 1992) 7.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e2 e5 (7...d5 8.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5! \(\text{\textit{e}}\)xe2 9.\(\text{\textit{xe}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f6 10.\(\text{\textit{xc}}\)xc6 bxc6 11.e5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 12.0-0 e6 13.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4; 7...\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f6 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 e5, Hector Lopez – Fausto Gonzalez, Spain 1988, and White could have won a pawn: 9.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)xe5 \(\text{\textit{xe}}\)e5 11.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)xe5++; 10.\(\text{\textit{xe}}\)xe2 11.\(\text{\textit{xc}}\)xc6 bxc6 12.\(\text{\textit{xe}}\)xe2 0-0 13.0-0 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b8 14.\(\text{\textit{ab}}\)1 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 15.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3\(\text{\textit{f}}\)3\(\text{\textit{f}}\)3 8.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)xe5! \(\text{\textit{xe}}\)e5 9.d5 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3 (9...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)ce7 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3 11.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)5 12.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5\(\text{\textit{f}}\)3\(\text{\textit{f}}\)3 10.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3 \(\text{\textit{xd}}\)4 11.0-0 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)ce7 12.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4! 0-0 13.c3 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3\(\text{\textit{f}}\)3 14.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\)3\(\text{\textit{f}}\)3 15.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c4 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)5 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3; 5...e6 – that moves gives White a free hand to do almost anything... 6.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f3

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)
and here Black has tested in practice:

6...\( \text{\=Q} \text{ge7} \) (about the most popular move 6...\( \text{\=Q} \text{f6} \) – see the line: 5...\( \text{\=Q} \text{f6} \) 6.\( \text{\=Q} \text{f3} \) e6) 7.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \) a6 (7...0–0, Stauss – Reck, Stuttgart 2001, 8.0–0 b6 9.a3! This prophylactic is useful against the possibility of Black playing \( \text{\=Q} \text{c6-b4} \). 9...\( \text{\=Q} \text{b7} \) 10.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e1} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{e1} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{e1} \) 7...f5 8.e5 0–0 9.0–0 \( \text{\=Q} \text{b4} \), De Paula – Asfora, Minoxel 2004, 10.\( \text{\=Q} \text{c4} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{bd5} \) 11.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xd5} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{xd5} \) 12.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d2} \) b6 13.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xd5} \) exd5 14.\( \text{\=Q} \text{f2} \) 0–0, Evans – Asselin, USA 1972, 9.a3! b5 10.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e1} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{b7} \) 11.\( \text{\=Q} \text{h4} \) b4 12.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e2} \) d5 13.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e5} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f5} \) 14.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xd8} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{xd8} \) 15.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d2} \) a5 16.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xb4} \) axb4 17.\( \text{\=Q} \text{h6} \) 18.h3 \( \text{\=Q} \text{a8} \) 19.f5 \( \text{\=Q} \text{fd8} \) 20.f6 \( \text{\=Q} \text{f8} \) 21.\( \text{\=Q} \text{fb1} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{fb1} \);

6...a6 7.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f6} \) (7...\( \text{\=Q} \text{ge7} \) 8.0–0–0 d5 9.e5 \( \text{\=Q} \text{d7} \) 10.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{a7} \) 11.g4 \( \text{\=Q} \text{h6} \) Rogulj – Nikolac, Rabac 2004) 8.0–0–0 b5 9.e5 \( \text{\=Q} \text{g4} \) 10.\( \text{\=Q} \text{g1} \) dxe5 11.dxe5 (exchanging queens is useful for White, because he can now exploit the weakness of the c5-square as well as the general displacement of Black’s pieces) 11...\( \text{\=Q} \text{xd2} + \) 12.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xd2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{b7} \), Rocha – Terres Trois, Brazil 1984, and here White would have obtained a great advantage, by playing: 13.h3 \( \text{\=Q} \text{h6} \) 14.\( \text{\=Q} \text{de4} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f5} \) 15.g4 b4 (It is hopeless for Black to try: 15...\( \text{\=Q} \text{xe5} \) 16.\( \text{\=Q} \text{g2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{h4} \) 17.\( \text{\=Q} \text{f6} + \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{xf6} \) 18.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xb7} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{b8} \) 19.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xa6} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{ef3} \) 20.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xb5} + \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f8} \) 21.\( \text{\=Q} \text{c5} + \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{g7} \) 22.\( \text{\=Q} \text{c6} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{xb2} \) 23.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xb2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{b8} + \) 24.\( \text{\=Q} \text{a3} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{xc3} \) 25.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{b2} + \) 26.\( \text{\=Q} \text{a4} + \) 16.\( \text{\=Q} \text{a4} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{fe7} \) 17.\( \text{\=Q} \text{ac5} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{ac5} \);

6...\( \text{\=Q} \text{d7} \) 7.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f5} \) (7...\( \text{\=Q} \text{f6} \) 8.0–0–0 0–0 9.h3 d5 10.e5 \( \text{\=Q} \text{e4} \)!! Black now loses a pawn without sufficient compensation: 11.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xe4} \) dxe4 12.\( \text{\=Q} \text{g5} \) a5 13.\( \text{\=Q} \text{xe4} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{h8} \) 11.0–0 0–0 12.\( \text{\=Q} \text{ae1} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{h8} \) 13.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d4} \) Carvalho – Charneira, Lisbon 1999;

6...d5 7.e5 h5 (7...\( \text{\=Q} \text{ge7} \) 8.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \) a6 9.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d2} \) b6 10.0–0 h5 11.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{Samaritani – Kljako, Bled 1998) 8.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{h6} \) 9.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d2} \) a6 10.0–0–0 \( \text{\=Q} \text{d7} \) 11.h3 \( \text{\=Q} \text{b4} \), Szikra – Ruttkay, Hungary 1997, 12.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f5} \) 13.\( \text{\=Q} \text{f2} \) h4 14.a3 \( \text{\=Q} \text{c6} \) 15.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \); 6...\( \text{\=Q} \text{c7} \). This unusual manoeuvre is aimed at forcing White to solve “non-theoretical” problems. Naturally, Black can hardly equalize losing so much time for such knight-moves and avoiding any direct clashes in the centre; nevertheless White needs to play precisely and show consistency in the implementation of his plan. He must improve his position patiently, because Black’s position remains very flexible and solid enough. 7.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d3} \) b6 8.\( \text{\=Q} \text{e2} \) \( \text{\=Q} \text{f6} \) 9.0–0 \( \text{\=Q} \text{b7} \) 10.\( \text{\=Q} \text{d1} \) 0–0 11.\( \text{\=Q} \text{c1} \) That is an excellent prophylactic move – White prepares the central pawn-break e4-e5 and deploys his bishop to a safe place well in advance. 11...\( \text{\=Q} \text{e8} \) 12.e5 \( \text{\=Q} \text{e8} \) – that is another passive decision by Black. (We are however not so convinced that Black would cope with his difficulties after the more natu-
rational reaction: 12...\(\text{Qf}5\) 13.\(\text{Qxd5} \text{Qxd5}\) 14.c4 \(\text{b}4\) 15.\(\text{b}1+\). Note that White's pieces are placed seemingly modestly, nevertheless quite effectively!) 13.\(\text{Qe}4 \text{a}5\) 14.b3 \(\text{a}6\) 15.c4 d5 16.\(\text{Qc}3\) c5. Black's desperate attempt to free himself from the tight positional bind is only making matters worse. His position would have remained quite difficult anyway... 17.cxd5 \(\text{Qxd}3\) 18.\(\text{Qxd}3\) cxd4 19.\(\text{Qa}3\) dxc3 20.\(\text{Qxe}7\) \(\text{Qc}7\) 21.\(\text{Qxf}8++\) and White's overwhelming positional edge brought him soon a decisive material advantage in the game Dolmatov - Azmaiparashvili, Elenite 1995.

5...e5?! It is amazing, but that move has been played numerous times! In fact, White transfers to a very advantageous endgame immediately after the exchange of queens. Meanwhile, it becomes an endgame only relatively – there are still so many pieces left on the board...

6.dxe5! dxe5 7.\(\text{Qxd}8++ \text{Qxd}8\) (Black's position is beyond salvation after: 7...\(\text{Qxd}8\) 8.\(\text{b}5!\) \(\text{Qe}6\) 9.f5 gxf5 10.exf5 a6 11.fxe6 axb5 12.\(\text{Qxb}5++\) Ondok – Mester, Hungary 1996; 9...a6 10.fxe6 axb5 11.\(\text{Qxb}5+\) \(\text{Qe}7\) 12.\(\text{Qc}5++\) \(\text{Qxe}6\) 13.\(\text{Qc}4+\) \(\text{Qf}6\) 14.\(\text{Qe}2\) \(\text{Qe}6\) 15.0-0 \(\text{Qg}5\) 16.\(\text{Qxe}6\) fxe6 17. \(\text{Qf}7\) 1-0 Nataf – Roche, France 1995; 11...c6 12.exf7+ \(\text{Qxf}7\) 13. \(\text{Qc}4++\) Shirov – Vial, Oviedo 1992) 8.0-0-0+ \(\text{Qd}7\) 9.\(\text{Qc}4\) \(\text{Qh}6\) (Black loses a pawn and the game in case of: 9...\(\text{Qe}8\) 10.\(\text{Qxf}7++\) \(\text{Qe}7\) 11.\(\text{Qc}5++\) \(\text{Qxf}7\) 12.\(\text{Qxd}7++\) \(\text{Qge}7\) 13.\(\text{Qd}5\) \(\text{Qae}8\) 14.\(\text{Qxe}7\) \(\text{Qxe}7\) 15.\(\text{Qxc}7\) exf4 16.\(\text{Qxb}7\) 1-0 Warzech – Silies, corr. 1991.

9...exf4 10.\(\text{Qxf}4 –\) That quite difficult for Black position has been reached numerous times in practice: 10...\(\text{Qh}6\) 11.\(\text{Qxh}6\) \(\text{Qxh}6\) 12.\(\text{Qf}3\) \(\text{Qc}8\) 13.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{Qe}6\) 14.\(\text{Qxe}6++\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 15.\(\text{Qg}5\) \(\text{Qd}8\) 16.\(\text{Qh}f1\) a5 17.\(\text{Qxh}7\) \(\text{Qxh}7\) 18.\(\text{Qxd}8++\) \(\text{Qxd}8\) 19.\(\text{Qf}8++\) \(\text{Qd}7\) 20.\(\text{Qxa}8++\) Erlach – Schaefer, Germany 1992. It is also not to be recommended for Black to follow with: 10...\(\text{Qe}5\) 11.g3 \(\text{Qxf}4+\) 12.\(\text{gx}f4\) \(\text{Qh}6\) 13.\(\text{Qf}3\) \(\text{Qa}5\) 14.\(\text{Qe}5\) \(\text{Qxc}4\) 15.\(\text{Qxd}7++\) \(\text{Qc}8\) 16.\(\text{Qd}5\) \(\text{Qxe}5\) 17.\(\text{Qxc}7++\) \(\text{Qb}8\) 18. \(\text{fxe}5\) \(\text{Qe}8\) 19.\(\text{Qd}7\) \(\text{Qc}8\) 20.\(\text{Qf}6\) a5 21.\(\text{Qhd}1++\) Csoke – Djen, Hradec Kralove 1992; 10...\(\text{Qxc}3\) 11.bxc3 f6 12.\(\text{Qe}6\) \(\text{Qb}8\) 13.\(\text{Qf}3\) \(\text{Qc}8\) 14.\(\text{Qxd}7\) \(\text{Qxd}7\) 15.\(\text{Qd}1++\); 13.\(\text{Qe}7\) 14.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{Qa}6\) 15.e5 \(\text{Qf}5\) 16.\(\text{ex}f6+\) \(\text{Qxf}6\) 17.\(\text{Qhe}1++\) \(\text{Qe}4\) 18.\(\text{Qd}5\) \(\text{Qac}5\) 19.\(\text{Qg}5++) 10.h3!

(This useful prophylactic move emphasizes the unfortunate placement of Black's knight on the h6-square.) 10...\(\text{Qa}5\) 11.\(\text{Qe}2\) \(\text{Qe}8\) 12.\(\text{fxe}5\).
\(1.e4 \text{g}6 \ 2.d4 \text{\&}g7 \ 3.\text{\textit{\&}}c3 \text{d}6 \ 4.f4 \text{\textit{\&}}c6 \ 5.\text{\textit{\&}}e3\)

\(\text{\textit{\&}}c6 \ 13.\text{\textit{\&}}f3 \text{\textit{\&}}xe5 \ 14.\text{\textit{\&}}xe5 \text{\textit{\&}}xe5 \ 15.\text{\textit{\&}}d4 \text{\textit{\&}}e8 \ 16.\text{\textit{\&}}xg7 \ 1-0 \text{- Dam-mkoehler – Somoza, IECC 1995)}\)

11.\text{\textit{\&}}xf4 \text{\textit{\&}}e5 \ 12.\text{\textit{\&}}b3 \text{c}6 \ (12...\text{\textit{\&}}c8 \ 13.\text{\textit{\&}}f3 \text{\textit{\&}}xf3 \ 14.\text{\textit{\&}}xf3 \text{\textit{\&}}a5 \ 15.\text{\textit{\&}}d5 \text{a}4 \ 16.\text{\textit{\&}}xc7 \text{\textit{\&}}a5 \ 17.\text{\textit{\&}}d5 \text{axb}3 \ 18. \text{\textit{\&}}b6+ \text{\textit{\&}}d8 \ 19.\text{\textit{\&}}xd7+ \text{\textit{\&}}xe8 \ 20. \text{\textit{\&}}hd1 \text{\textit{\&}}d4 \ - 20...\text{\textit{\&}}bxa2 \ 21.\text{\textit{\&}}d8+ \text{\textit{\&}}e7 \ 22.\text{\textit{\&}}c8+ \text{\textit{\&}}f6 \ 23.\text{\textit{\&}}d1d6\text{\textit{\&}} - 21.\text{\textit{\&}}xb3 \text{\textit{\&}}xb6 \ 22.\text{\textit{\&}}xh6 \text{\textit{\&}}xa2 \ 23.\text{\textit{\&}}b1 \text{\textit{\&}}a8 \ 24.\text{\textit{\&}}g8 \ 25.\text{\textit{\&}}f6 \text{\textit{\&}}d1 – 0 \text{- Podlesnik – Belotegov, Bled 2000)} \ 13.\textit{g}4 \text{\textit{\&}}g8 \ 14.\text{\textit{\&}}h2 \text{\textit{\&}}e7 \ 15.\text{\textit{\&}}f2 \text{\textit{\&}}e6 \ 16.\text{\textit{\&}}f3 \text{\textit{\&}}xb3 \ 17.\text{\textit{\&}}xb3 \text{\textit{\&}}c8 \ 17.\text{\textit{\&}}f6 \text{\textit{\&}}d7+ \text{\textit{\&}}e8 \ 21.\text{\textit{\&}}xb7++ – Zozulia – Awwad, Cairo 1993;

5...\text{\textit{\&}}h6 – this move seems awkward. Black's knight might end up isolated from the actions on that square. 6.\text{\textit{\&}}f3 \text{\textit{\&}}g4 (It is quite possible that Black should make use of the opportune moment and transpose to the line: 6...\text{\textit{\&}}g4 7.\text{\textit{\&}}g1 – see 5...\text{\textit{\&}}f6 6.\text{\textit{\&}}f3 \text{\textit{\&}}g4. After 6...0–0, White can prepare a kingside attack at ease: 7.h3 \ f5 8.e5 \ d5 9.\text{\textit{\&}}d2 \text{a}6 10.\text{\textit{\&}}e2 \text{e}6 11.0–0–0 11.\textit{\&}d1 \text{\textit{\&}}a5 13.\text{\textit{\&}}b3 \text{\textit{\&}}b7 14.g4+ Hilton – Parr, York 1959]\)

7.\text{\textit{\&}}d2 \text{\textit{\&}}xf3 (7...d5?! – this counterstrike is bound to fail: 8.\text{\textit{\&}}xd5 \text{e}6 9.\text{\textit{\&}}c3 \text{\textit{\&}}xf3 10.gxf3 \text{\textit{\&}}xd4 11.0–0–0 \text{\textit{\&}}xe3 12.\text{\textit{\&}}xe3 \text{\textit{\&}}h4 13.\text{\textit{\&}}b5 \text{\textit{\&}}h5 14.\text{\textit{\&}}xc6 15.\textit{\&}xh6 \text{\textit{\&}}b6+ \text{\textit{\&}}d1d6 15.h4 0–0 16.\text{\textit{\&}}d7 \text{\textit{\&}}ac8 17.\text{\textit{\&}}e2 \text{\textit{\&}}a5 18.\text{\textit{\&}}f5 \text{\textit{\&}}xa2 19. \text{\textit{\&}}d1 \text{\textit{\&}}a1+ 20.\text{\textit{\&}}d2 \text{\textit{\&}}d1h1 21. \text{\textit{\&}}f6+; 19...\text{\textit{\&}}xf5 20.\text{\textit{\&}}c3 \text{\textit{\&}}a1+ 21. \text{\textit{\&}}d1 \text{\textit{\&}}b8 22.\textit{\&}b3 \text{\textit{\&}}xe4 23.\textit{\&}h5 1–0 Chessmaster 6000 – Chess Tiger 11, Ace of Chess 1999; 7...\text{\textit{\&}}f5 8.d5! \text{\textit{\&}}xe4 9.\text{\textit{\&}}g5 \text{\textit{\&}}b8 10.\text{\textit{\&}}d7 11.\text{\textit{\&}}g4! That is an excellent positional decision! White deprives Black's knight of the f5-square. 11...\text{\textit{\&}}f7 12.\text{\textit{\&}}xf7 \text{\textit{\&}}xf7 13.\text{\textit{\&}}xe4; 8...\text{\textit{\&}}xf3 9.\text{\textit{\&}}xc6 \text{\textit{\&}}xc6 10.\text{\textit{\&}}axe4 \text{\textit{\&}}xc6 11. \text{\textit{\&}}d3 \text{\textit{\&}}g4 12.\text{\textit{\&}}e2 e5 13.\text{\textit{\&}}xe4 \text{\textit{\&}}h4+ 14.\text{\textit{\&}}f2 \text{\textit{\&}}xg4 15.\text{\textit{\&}}f3 \text{\textit{\&}}xf3 16.\text{\textit{\&}}xf3 \text{\textit{\&}}h6 17.\text{\textit{\&}}e2± Pfrommer – Schlenker, Kehl 1989) 8.\text{\textit{\&}}xf3 \text{\textit{\&}}e6 (Black loses immediately after 8...e5? 9.\text{\textit{\&}}xe5 \text{\textit{\&}}xe5, Stoddard – S.Wolff, corr. 1980, because of the surprising tactical strike 10. \text{\textit{\&}}g5!, and White wins a piece: 10.\text{\textit{\&}}xd4 11.0–0–0 \text{\textit{\&}}e8 12. \text{\textit{\&}}xh6 \text{\textit{\&}}xf3 13.\text{\textit{\&}}e3++; Black only weakens his position with: 8...\text{\textit{\&}}f5, Juarez – F.Perez, Guatemala 1982: 9.0–0–0! \text{\textit{\&}}e6 10.d5 \text{\textit{\&}}xd5 11.\text{\textit{\&}}xd5 10.\text{\textit{\&}}e7 10.\text{\textit{\&}}g8 11.\text{\textit{\&}}xe6 \text{\textit{\&}}xe6 12.\text{\textit{\&}}h3 \text{\textit{\&}}e5 13.dxe5 \text{\textit{\&}}xe5 14.\text{\textit{\&}}g7 15.\text{\textit{\&}}f5 16.\text{\textit{\&}}xf5 \text{\textit{\&}}xf5 17.\text{\textit{\&}}g2 \text{\textit{\&}}h6 18.exd6++ J.Hartston – Polihroniade, Skopje 1972.

6.\text{\textit{\&}}f3

Now, in case Black attacks White's bishop with the move \text{\textit{\&}}g4 – it can retreat to the excellent g1-square, which has been
just vacated by the knight. We will analyse: a) 6...\textit{e}6, b) 6...\textit{\&}g4, c) 6...\textit{\&}g4, and d) 6...0–0.

The other possibilities have been tried only seldom:

6...d5 – loses a tempo (d7-d6-d5) and that counterstrike is not favourable for Black. White’s advantage is doubtless, despite the fact that Black’s position is still solid enough. 7.e5 \textit{\&}g4, Andrejchuk – Olszewski, Poznan 2003, 8.\textit{\&}g1 0–0 9.h3 \textit{\&}h6 10.g4±. Black’s position is cramped. White can patiently build up his initiative on the kingside;

6...a6 7.h3! This strong move is quite typical for the whole system. White is planning to follow with g2-g4 occupying space on the kingside. This idea spells danger for Black. 7...b5. That is a logical move – Black seeks counterplay on the queenside, as his last move implied. The idea has not been tested in practice yet. (7...e6, Vidal Pardal – Frorit, corr. 1984, 8.g4 0–0 9.\textit{\&}g2±. That position needs practical experimenting, but still Black’s counterplay seems almost non-existent...)

7...0–0 – castling right under the gun! 8.g4 b5 9.e5 \textit{\&}d7 10.\textit{\&}g2 b4 11.\textit{\&}e2 d5 12.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}b6 13.b3 f6 14.0–0 fxe5 15.fxe5 a5 16.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}a6 17.\textit{\&}f2 \textit{\&}d7 18.\textit{\&}h6± Efimenko – Karpovich, Kiev 1997) 8.e5 \textit{\&}d7 9.a4! b4 10.\textit{\&}e4±. Black’s counterplay looks to have been stopped dead in its tracks.

a) 6...e6

This move is solid, but its drawback is that it is too passive. White has fought for the initiative in different fashion. We recommend a method that has been tried by GM Alexey Shirov quite successfully.

7.e5!? \textit{\&}d5

That is possibly Black’s best decision. He centralizes his knight and provokes some simplification of the position solidifying his situation in the centre. Retreating to the g4 and d7-squares does not seem to be convincing at all:

7...\textit{\&}g4 – Black’s knight is quite unstable at that square and has no good prospects. 8.\textit{\&}g1 0–0 9.h3 \textit{\&}h6 10.g4! This is a resolute measure – now the knight on h6 will hardly be back in action anytime soon. Note that White should not fear the weakening of his position on the kingside – he can instead castle long. 10...dxe5 11.dxe5 \textit{\&}e7 12.\textit{\&}e2! f5 (12...\textit{\&}b4 13.0–0–0! \textit{\&}xf4?? 14.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}b4 15.\textit{\&}d2++, White now captures Black’s knight on h6) 13.g5 \textit{\&}f7 14.
0–0–0±;
7...\textit{\$d7} – that move provides White with a free hand for actions on the kingside. He should start attacking immediately! 8.h4! 0–0 (8...h5 9.\textit{\$g5} \textit{\$b6} 10.\textit{\$f3±}) 9.h5±. Black simply fails to create sufficient counterplay.

8.\textit{\$d5} exd5 9.\textit{\$d3}

9...\textit{\$b4}!? We must approve that concrete decision by Black.

9...0–0 – it is not yet clear whether Black’s immediate castling is to be recommended. White now has a target. 10.0–0 dxe5. Black's attempt at simplifications only creates additional difficulties for him. Why? The weaknesses of his position that were more or less covered until now just became even more obvious... (10...f6 11.exd6 \textit{\$xd6} 12.f5±! White is playing that strong and aggressive move at the right moment! Black would have obtained an excellent position if he had managed to play f6-f5 himself. Now he is doomed to defend a very difficult position without any bright prospects.)

11.fxe5 f6 (11...\textit{\$g4} – Black should be ready now to exchange on f3 and that leads to White obtaining the two bishop advantage. 12.h3 \textit{\$xf3} 13.\textit{\$xf3} f6 14.exf6 \textit{\$xf6} 15.c3±) 12.exf6. Now, Black has no chances to equalize no matter how he recaptures:

12...\textit{\$xf6} 13.\textit{\$g5} \textit{\$e7} 14.\textit{\$xf8+} \textit{\$xf8} 15.c3 \textit{\$e7} (15...\textit{\$f5} 16.\textit{\$b3±}) 16.\textit{\$b3} c6 17.\textit{\$f1} \textit{\$f5} (Black cannot interpose with the bishop, because he loses the b7-pawn.) 18.\textit{\$xf5}! This is the simplest decision for White. He obtains a great positional edge simply by exchanging. 18...\textit{\$xf5} (18...\textit{\$xf5} 19.\textit{\$xb7+-}) 19.\textit{\$f4} \textit{\$e8} 20.\textit{\$f3±}. White can claim an overwhelming positional advantage. Black has plenty of weaknesses, his pieces are very passive and his king is vulnerable;

12.\textit{\$xf6} 13.c3 \textit{\$e7} 14.\textit{\$g5}! White forces the trade of the dark squared bishops and increases his positional edge. This is because he can occupy the important e5-outpost after that. Meanwhile, Black’s king is deprived of a valuable defender. 14...\textit{\$xg5} 15.\textit{\$xg5} \textit{\$f5} 16.\textit{\$xf5} \textit{\$xf5} (16...\textit{\$xf5}? 17.\textit{\$e6+-}) 17.\textit{\$e2}! \textit{\$d7} 18.\textit{\$e6+}! This surprising decision is in fact the right one at the right time too. The endgame is very difficult for Black after the trade of queens...

18.\textit{\$xe6} 19.\textit{\$xe6} \textit{\$xf1+} 20.\textit{\$xf1} c6 21.g4 \textit{\$e8} 22.\textit{\$c5} b6 23.\textit{\$d7} \textit{\$g7} 24.\textit{\$e1±}. Black is faced with
a long and burdensome defence in that seemingly simple endgame.

10. \( \text{#b5} \)

White’s light squared bishop is a valuable piece and he should not let it be exchanged for Black’s knight.

10...\( \text{d7} \)

10...c6 11.\( \text{a4} \) dx \( e5 \) (11...0–0 does not create any serious problems for White: 12.c3±) 12.fx \( e5 \) \( \text{a5} \) 13.c3 \( \text{d3} \) 14.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{xa4} \) 15.\( \text{d2} \). Black’s attempt at preventing White from castling short with 15...\( \text{b5} \) can be refuted tactically: 16.\( \text{h6} \)? \( \text{xh6} \) 17.\( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 18.0–0 \( \text{xc3} \) 19.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{xd4} \) (19...\( \text{e6} \) 20.\( \text{ab1} \) 0–0 21.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 22.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 23.\( \text{xf7} \) b5 24.\( \text{c1} \) \( \text{b6} \) 25.a4 \( \text{h8} \) 26.\( \text{xh7} \) and White has a powerful attack.) 20.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{e6} \) 21.\( \text{ab1} \) 0–0 22.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{f5} \) 23.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xb1} \) 24.\( \text{xb1} \) b6 25.\( \text{h8} \)+–.

11.\( \text{xd7} \) 12.0–0 \( \text{c6} \)

12...0–0–0 13.c3 \( \text{c6} \) 14.b4± – and White organizes an attack on the queenside at leisure.

13.\( \text{d3} \) 0–0–0

This original idea belong to an extra-class GM! Despite his image as a world-renowned master of vicious attacks Alexey Shirov solidifies his position in the centre before doing anything else... It becomes clear now that Black’s position is quite unstable and vulnerable.

14.f6 15.\( \text{exd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 16.f5!

Black’s pieces are cramped now.

16.g5

16...\( \text{e7} \) 17.\( \text{f4} \)! This is an important tactical nuance – White intends to exchange favourably some light pieces and his attacking chances are enhanced because of that. 17.\( \text{d7} \) (17...\( \text{xf4} \) 18.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{f8} \) 19.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{h6} \) 20.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{e3} \) 21.\( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 22.\( \text{xf6} \)±) 18.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 19.b4 \( \text{xf5} \) 20.b5, and White has excellent attacking prospects.

17.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{he8} \) 18.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{d7} \)

19.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{xe1} \) 20.\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{h5} \) 21.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 22.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{d8} \) 23.\( \text{xe8} \) \( \text{xe8} \)

24.\( \text{f3} \)

White maintains a stable initiative despite the simplifications. 24...c6 25.h4. Black’s
kingside remains obviously quite vulnerable. 25...\textbf{h}6 (25...gxh4 26.\textbf{x}h4= 25...g4 26.\textbf{f}4 \textbf{d}7 27.\textbf{g}3. Now, Black’s king will be seriously endangered. 27...\textbf{e}7 28.\textbf{b}8=, and White wins a pawn.) 26.\textbf{a}3 \textbf{gxh}4 (26...\textbf{e}4 – Black’s attempt to counterattack fails after: 27.\textbf{d}6 gxh4 28.\textbf{x}f6 \textbf{h}3 29.gxh3 \textbf{f}4 30.\textbf{g}6 \textbf{x}c2 31.\textbf{x}h5 \textbf{x}b2 32.\textbf{f}6 (White will win a piece, because of that powerful pawn!) 32...\textbf{d}6 33.\textbf{f}5+ \textbf{c}7 34.\textbf{f}7 \textbf{f}8 35.\textbf{e}5+ \textbf{c}8 36.\textbf{g}3++) 27.\textbf{x}h4 \textbf{e}4 28.\textbf{x}f6 \textbf{xf}5 29.\textbf{x}d8 \textbf{g}7 (29...\textbf{d}8 30.\textbf{d}6=) 30.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{xd}4+ 31.\textbf{e}3 1–0 Shirov – Nikolaidis, France 2002.

b) 6...\textbf{g}4

This move is quite possible, but White solves the problems comfortably. Of course, he should not allow the exchange on the e3-square!

7.\textbf{g}1

Black’s “hyper-active” knight will soon have to retreat losing additional time.

7...0–0

The line 7...\textbf{f}6?! 8.\textbf{d}2= looks pathetic for Black.

7...\textbf{d}7 – that move will only lose some additional tempi senselessly. 8.h3 \textbf{h}6 9.\textbf{d}2 e5 10.\textbf{d}xe5 dxe5 11.\textbf{x}e5 \textbf{g}8 12.0–0 0 15.\textbf{c}e5 14.\textbf{c}e5 15.\textbf{d}c4 c6 16.\textbf{x}d7+ \textbf{xf}7 16.\textbf{x}d7+ \textbf{xf}7 17.\textbf{x}d7+ 1–0 Voss – Lemonidis, Griesheim 1998.

7...\textbf{f}5, Frei – E.Paulsen, Hassloch 1999, 8.h3! This move is going to force opening of files on the kingside favourably for White. 8...\textbf{xe}4 9.\textbf{hx}g4 \textbf{xf}3 10.\textbf{gf}3 e5 11.\textbf{d}d2 d5 12.0–0 0 13.\textbf{d}d7 13.\textbf{e}1 \textbf{e}7 14.\textbf{f}5 \textbf{gf}5 15.\textbf{gf}5 \textbf{xf}5 16.\textbf{xd}5.

7...\textbf{a}6 8.h3 \textbf{a}6 9.\textbf{g}4! d5 (9...\textbf{b}5 – that move seems logical, but it is still insufficient for Black after: 10.d5 b4 11.g5 \textbf{hx}h5 12.\textbf{e}2 \textbf{a}5 13.c3 bxc3 14.\textbf{a}4+ c6 15.b4= White wins a knight and Black cannot obtain any reasonable compensation for it; 13...c5 14.cxb4 cxb4 15.\textbf{d}4 0–0 16.\textbf{c}1= White’s king is bound to remain in the centre for a while indeed, but still Black cannot solve his problems completely. White dominates in the centre, while Black’s knight on the a5-square is out of play. The move 11...bxc3 leads to a piece-sacrifice that is definitely incorrect: 12.\textbf{xf}6 \textbf{xf}6 13.\textbf{d}c6 \textbf{xb}2 14.\textbf{b}1 \textbf{c}3 15.\textbf{e}2 0–0 16.\textbf{d}4 \textbf{xd}4 17.\textbf{x}d4+) 10.e5 \textbf{e}4 11.\textbf{xe}4 dxe4 12.\textbf{g}5 f5 13.\textbf{c}4= Santacruz – Ucedo, Asuncion 1989. Black can hardly
defend effectively the weak e6 and f7-squares.

7...e5 - Black forces the exchange of queens with that counterstrike in the centre, but it turns out to be quite favourable for White at the end. 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.♕xd8+ ♤xd8 (9...♕xd8 10.h3±) 10.0-0-0 ♦d7 11.h3 ♤h6 12.♖a4 ♤c8 (12...b6 13.♘b5+-) 13.♗c5 ♤e6 (13...♖d8, Caurin - Cuadra, corr. 1987, 14.fxe5 ♦xe5 15.♖d4 f6 16.♗xe5 fxe5 17.♖c4+-) 14.♗xe6 fxe6 15.♘c4 ♦e8 16.♕g5±. White will soon obtain a material advantage.

8.h3 ♦f6

9.g4

This idea is quite justified now. White has a powerful pawn centre and he can easily afford that aggression on the kingside. Black’s pieces lack sufficient space. 9...e5, Almado – Gimeno, Spain 1993, 10.d5 ♦d4 - Black is trying to solve some of his problems with a pawn-sacrifice. (10...♖e7 11.f5±) 11.♗xd4 exd4 12.♖xd4+. Black’s compensation for the pawn is obvious not satisfactory.

c) 6...♕g4

7.h3

This is a simple decision. White forces the exchange on f3 with the hope that he will manage to parry Black’s attack against the vulnerable d4-pawn. We have to admit that White is quite right to feel optimistically. He obtains the two bishop advantage and he has excellent prospects.

7...♗xf3 8.♕xf3 ♦d7

Black’s position is practically hopeless after: 8...0-0 9.0-0-0!. This evaluation has been proved correct in numerous games:

9...♗a6 10.g4 ♦d7 11.h4 ♤e8, Jointer – Rostrom, Lansing 1995, 12.h5±;

9...♖e8 10.e5 ♦d7 11.h4 e6 12.h5 ♤e7 13.hxg6 fxg6 14.♕h3 ♤f8 15.♗d3 ♤f7 16.g4 ♦e7 17.f5 exf5 18.e6 1-0 Banchio – Castaldo, Ivrea 2001;

9...e6 10.g4! Naturally, White’s pawns are marching forward unstoppably. 10...♗d7 (10...d5 11.e5 ♦d7 12.f5 exf5 13.gxf5 gxf5 14.♗g1 ♤h8 15.♗xd5 ♤e7 16.♗xe7 ♤xe7 17.}
\( \text{d}3+ \) laazrockit – maybe, USA 2000) 11.h4 a6 12.h5 \( \text{xe}8 \) 13.hxg6 hxg6 14.f5 g5 15.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 16.fxe6 1–0 Pedzich – Marzec, Katowice 1995.

9...\( \text{d}7 \) 10.e5 \( \text{b}6 \) (10...e6, Gretarsdottir – V. Smith, Istanbul 2000, 11.h4 h5 12.g4++) 11.h4 d5 12.h5 e6 13.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 14.hxg6 fxg6 15.\( \text{xh}7+ \) \( \text{f}7 \) 16.\( \text{d}3 \) Sevillano – Maduro, Manila 1992.

8...e5. This counterstrike in the centre is of course Black’s most logical decision. Still, it is almost amazing how easily White parries all his attempts to obtain some counterplay! 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.f5! That is decisive! Black now has no objects for counterplay whatsoever. The tournament practice confirms that evaluation doubtlessly. 10...\( \text{d}4 \) (10...0–0) 11.\( \text{f}2 \) c6 12.0–0–0 \( \text{d}7 \) 13.g4 g5. If that move is really the best that Black can do – his position must be pathetic indeed! 14.h4 h6 15.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{xe}2+ \) 16.\( \text{x}e2 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 17.\( \text{c}4 \) gxh4 18.\( \text{e}6 \) fx6 19.fxe6 0–0 20.\( \text{xd}7 \) \( \text{xe}8 \) 21.\( \text{f}5 \) 1–0 Sax – Csala, Hungary 1997.

9.e5 e6

Black did not oppose White pushing forward his d-pawn (d4-d5) in a game that followed with:

9...\( \text{b}6 \) 10.d5 \( \text{b}4 \) 11.\( \text{e}4 \) c5 12.a3 \( \text{a}6 \) 13.\( \text{b}5+ \) \( \text{f}8 \) (this looks quite unconvincing) 14.\( \text{x}a6 \) bxa6 15.0–0 \( \text{d}7 \) 16.e6 f5 17.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 18.g4 c4 19.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 20.a4 a5 21.\( \text{d}4 \) Sax –


10.0–0–0 d5 11.g4

Look at that position. How can Black compensate White’s better pawn-structure and two bishop advantage? He can do practically nothing! 11...\( \text{e}7 \) 12.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 13.f5 \( \text{xe}3+ \) 14.\( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 15.fxe6 fxe6 16.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{g}8 \) (16...\( \text{xd}4 \) 17.\( \text{xg}6 \)++) 17.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 18.\( \text{h}5 \) 0–0–0. Finally, Black has managed to evacuate his king, but White’s offensive on the kingside has developed too far to be countered effectively. 19.hxg6 \( \text{xd}4 \) (19...hxg6 20.\( \text{xg}6 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 20.gxh7 \( \text{h}8 \) 21.g5 \( \text{xe}5 \) 22.g6++ Cuartas – W. Schulz, Hamburg 1980.

d) 6...0–0

7.\( \text{e}2 \)!
Chapter 26

This is the best placement for the white bishop – it is deployed reliably, quite actively too and it does not stand in the way of the rest of White’s pieces. It is now essential that Black can hardly claim any dividends from the eventual pin 7...\(\text{\textit{g}}\)4.

We will now analyse in details the moves: d1) 7...\(\text{e}5\), d2) 7...\(\text{\textit{g}}\)4, d3) 7...\(\text{\textit{g}}\)4, d4) 7...\(\text{a}6\) and d5) 7...\(\text{e}6\).

The other possibilities for Black are:

7...\(\text{b}6\) 8.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\)5 (About 8...\(\text{b}7\) 9.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{e}6\) – see line d5.) 9.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{g}3\), Doncevic – Borik, Germany 1991, 10.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{xe}2\) 11.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 12.0–0–0 \(\text{d}5\) 13.\(\text{e}5\)\(\text{\textit{f}}\);

7...\(\text{h}6\), Blehm – Czerwonski, Warsaw 1998. This move is quite original we recommend a measure that is no less original: 8.\(\text{c}1!?\) \(\text{g}4\) 9.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{g}7\) 10.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 11.\(\text{e}5\)\(\text{\textit{f}}\);

7...\(\text{d}5\) 8.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{g}4\) 9.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{f}6\) (9... \(\text{h}5\) – this pawn-move creates a wonderful target for White to attack in the future battle: 10.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 11.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 13. \(\text{xf5}\) exf5 14.\(\text{g}4\) hgx4. It is evident now that Black can hardly avoid opening files. 15.hxg4 \(\text{e}6\) 16.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{f}6\) fxg4 18.\(\text{f}5\)! \(\text{xf6}\) 19.exf6 \(\text{xf5}\) 20.\(\text{d}2\)\(\text{\textit{f}}\) and White checkmates in three irrevocably; 19...\(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{f}6\) 21.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xf6}\) 22.0–0–0–0–0 Drbohlav – Illetsko, Czech Republic 1997) 10.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 11.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 12.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 13.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{f}2!\) This is an excellent decision!

Black cannot hope to create any counterplay on the queenside, because White’s king will not be present there anymore! 15...\(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{h}8\) 19.\(\text{ag}1\)\(\text{\textit{f}}\) Liebert – Kotov, Sochi 1967. Black is doomed to a long and difficult defence.

\[\text{\textit{d1) 7...e5}}\]

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess-board.png}
\end{center}

This counterstrike is quite interesting, but still not enough for equality. White should not be afraid of simplifications and he must fight for the advantage in the endgame.

8.\(\text{f}xe5!\) \(\text{dxe}5\)

8...\(\text{g}4?\) 9.\(\text{g}5\)\(\text{\textit{f}}\).

9.\(\text{d}xe5\) \(\text{g}4\)

9...\(\text{xd}1\) 10.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{g}4\) 11.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{f}8\) 12.\(\text{d}5\)\(\text{\textit{f}}\).

10.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\) 11.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}7\)

This is the best move for Black, despite the obvious misplacement of his rook.

11...\(\text{e}8\) is definitely weaker. Black should now worry about the possible knight-forks on the \(\text{c}7\) and \(\text{f}6\)-squares and that makes his defence very problematic. 12.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 13.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{xb}2\)
14.\(b1\) \(\text{h}5\) 15.\(h3\) \(f6\) 16.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{gxe}5\) 17.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{f}7\) 18.\(\text{xe}8++\).

12.\(\text{d}5\)

12...\(\text{h}6\)

Black is trying to repel White’s active bishop and provides his king with a safe haven for an eventual retreat – the h7-square. This might turn out to be quite useful as you can see in the following lines:

12...\(\text{gxe}5\) 13.\(\text{f}6\) 14.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{e}5\) (14...\(\text{h}6\) 15.\(\text{f}6++\) \(\text{xf}6\) 16.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{xc}7\)) 15.\(\text{xc}7\)!

This brilliant tactical strike becomes possible due to Black’s lag in development and the misplacement of his pieces. White now wins a pawn with an overwhelming advantage...

15...\(\text{b}8\) (15...\(\text{xc}7\) 16.\(\text{d}8++\) \(\text{f}8\) 17.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{d}1++)\) 16.\(\text{d}5+\) Bellin – Ludden, England 1974;

12...\(\text{c}xe5\) – this capture with the knight is much more acceptable for Black. 13.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 14.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{c}6\) (14...\(\text{b}6\), Varga – Csibor, corr. 1993. White should now continue in the following fashion: 15.\(\text{f}6++!\) \(\text{xf}6\) 16.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{c}6\) 17.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{xd}1\) 18.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{e}6\) 19.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{f}6++\) 15.\(\text{f}6++\) \(\text{xf}6\) 16.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{d}2\) 17.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{xd}1\) 18.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{g}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}2\) 20.\(\text{d}7\)++.

White’s advantage is quite obvious, because the black king is bound to remain out of play for a long time to come.

13.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{gxe}5\)

Black can recapture his pawn only if he first repels White’s bishop from the h4-square: 13...\(\text{g}5\) 14.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{c}xe5\) 15.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 16.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{f}5\). Black does not achieve much with that forceful attempt. (His other possibilities do not create problems for White either: 16...\(\text{c}6\) 17.\(\text{f}6++\) \(\text{xf}6\) 18.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{d}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}4\) 20.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xe}2\) 21.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{f}5\) 22.\(\text{d}1++)\, and White’s attack is decisive, since he wins at least Black’s bishop on \(c8\).)

17.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 18.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{g}7\) 19.\(\text{xf}5\) Balzizzone – Fiorentini, corr. 1983.

14.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 15.\(\text{f}6++\) \(\text{g}7\)

16.\(\text{d}f1\)

The f6-square is the Achilles heel of Black’s position. 16...\(\text{d}4\) 17.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{e}6\) (17...\(\text{c}6\) 18.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{xf}6\). Otherwise Black loses the exchange immediately. 19.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{g}8\) 20.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 21.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 22.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{f}7\). That is Black’s only
defence against White’s check- 
mating attack after his rook 
penetrates to the f6-square. 23. 
\text{xf7} \text{xf7} 24.\text{f1}+ \text{e7} 25.\text{f6} 
\text{d7} 26.\text{xg6} \text{f8} 27.\text{xh6} \text{f1}+ 
28.\text{d2} \text{f2}+ 29.\text{d3} \text{xg2} 30. 
\text{h7}+ \text{e8} 31.\text{h4}++. The march of 
White’s passed pawn is unstoppable.) 18.\text{g4} \text{d6} 19.\text{e7} \text{c6} 
20.\text{b4} \text{c4} 21.\text{d3} \text{d4} 22.\text{b3} 
\text{e3}+ 23.\text{b1} \text{xe4} 24.\text{f6}+ 
\text{g8} 25.\text{f3}++, and Black’s rook 
was trapped in the middle of the 
board in the game Beliavsky – 
Cekro, Sarajevo 1982.

d2) 7...\text{g4}

8.e5!
That decision is well timed. 
Black is now forced to comply 
with White’s long-term space 
advantage.

8...\text{dxe5}
8...\text{d7} 9.\text{g5}! White achieves 
a lot by exchanging these 
bishops. What exactly? At first, 
he can complete quickly his de- 
vvelopment by castling long. Sec- 
ondly, his knight on g5 is not so 
stable indeed, but it is very ac- 
tive and can participate in plenty 
of dangerous tactical operations.

Last but not least, the knight will 
provoke Black to repel it by cre- 
at ing additional weaknesses 
around his king. All this is more 
than enough to justify that ma- 
noeuvre! 9...\text{xe2} 10.\text{xe2} e6 
(White was threatening to play 
e5-e6 himself.) 11.0-0-0 \text{e7} 
12.h4 f6 (12...h6 is not any bet- 
ter for Black: 13.\text{ge4} d5 14. 
\text{d2}++, and White is threatening 
to organize a powerful attack af- 
ter 15.h5.) 13.\text{xe6}! This is not 
a sacrifice, but just an exchange 
after which White forces very 
favourable simplifications. 13... 
\text{xe6} 14.d5 \text{e7} 15.dxc6 bxc6 
16.\text{c4}+ \text{h8} 17.\text{xc6} fxe5 18. 
h5. White attacks energetically 
and Black has no resources to 
defend successfully. 18...\text{fxe4} 19. 
\text{d5} \text{e5} (after 19...\text{g5}, White 
can follow with the beautiful line: 
20.\text{xf4} \text{e5} 21.\text{xg6+ hxg6} 22. 
\text{xg6+ \text{g8} 23.\text{d4 \text{f4}+ 24.\text{b1} 
\text{xd4} 25.\text{xf8} 26.\text{b3}}! Black 
is utterly helpless, despite his 
extra bishop: 26...\text{g7} 27.\text{h7} 
\text{xf6} 28.\text{xg7+ \text{g7} 29.\text{e6}+, or 
23...\text{g5}+ 24.\text{b1 \text{ad8} 25.\text{g7} 
\text{xg7} 26.\text{h7+ \text{g7} 27.\text{xd7}+}. 
The exposed and vulnerable 
placement of Black’s king and 
White’s material advantage 
make his victory just a matter of 
time...) 20.\text{xa8} \text{xa8} 21.\text{axe7} 
\text{f6} 22.\text{hxg6} h6 23.\text{f5 \text{g6} 24.\text{e3}++. 
Vitolinsh – Chap- 
linsky, USSR 1977.

8...\text{h5} – that flank place- 
ment of Black’s knight would 
make most of the grandmasters
of the past quite suspicious about that position. The players are much more restrained and tolerant nowadays. Still, Black will hardly manage to equalize in that difficult position after: 9...\(\text{d}2\). This is an excellent move! White preserves the option of castling on both sides of the board and Black should now worry about his numerous problems. 9...dxe5 10.fxe5 f6. This is a natural attempt by Black to destroy White’s powerful centre and bring back his knight on h5 into action. White can preserve his advantage however using quite simple means: 11. exf6! \(\text{xf}6\) (11...exf6 12.0–0–0) 12.0–0–0 \(\text{d}7\), Vouldis – Fournarakos, Ikaros 1995, 13.\(\text{e}5\)!
\(\text{c}8\) (13...\(\text{xe}5??\) That natural move is a blunder losing a piece. 14.dxe5 \(\text{xd}2+\) 15.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{xe}2\) 16. \(\text{xf}6\)–\(\text{c}4+\) \(\text{e}6\) 15.\(\text{xe}6+\) \(\text{xe}6\) 16.\(\text{xe}6!\) This is a spectacular combination. White forces favourable simplifications in a non-standard fashion: 16...hxg6 17.d5 \(\text{xd}5\) 18.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 19.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 20.g3\). White has an obvious advantage. His pawn-structure is flexible and solid and he can easily create an outside passed pawn on the kingside. Black’s defence will be very difficult; moreover he has no easy targets to organize any effective counterplay against.

9.dxe5

The tournament practice has shown that Black must overcome considerable difficulties. This is hardly a surprise. White is clearly dominant in the centre and Black’s pieces are so cramped that they are incapable of putting up any real resistance against White’s actions.

9...\(\text{d}7\)

9...\(\text{xd}1+\) 10.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{h}5\), Kopczynski – Blaszczzyk, Poland 1992, 11.\(\text{d}4!\) The unfortunate placement of Black’s knight on the h5-square is best emphasized after some exchanges. 11...\(\text{xe}2\) (11...\(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{xd}4\)\(\text{e}4\)) 12.\(\text{c}xe2\) \(\text{xd}4\) 13.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 14.\(\text{d}7\). White wins a pawn now.

9...\(\text{e}8\) – Black’s knight is very passive on that square and the move does not deserve approval. 10.h3 \(\text{xf}3\) (10...\(\text{f}\)5 11.g4\). Black is trying to organize some counterplay, but that attempt is so risky that he might get checkmated quickly. 12.\(\text{d}5+\) \(\text{h}8\) 13.h4! This idea is quite typical in various positions, for example in the Pirc Defence. White’s attack is too powerful and Black’s counterplay in the centre is slow and ineffective. 13...\(\text{f}5\) 14.h5 \(\text{exf}4\) (14...\(\text{d}6\)
loses quickly: 15...\texttt{\texttt{d}e4} \texttt{\texttt{w}d7} 16. \texttt{\texttt{x}h}6 e6 17.\texttt{\texttt{x}h}7+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g}8 18.\texttt{\texttt{b}b}3−
Fernandez Garcia – Villegas, Portugal 1973) 15.\texttt{\texttt{x}g}6 \texttt{\texttt{c}c}3+ 16. \texttt{\texttt{b}c}3 \texttt{\texttt{f}f}6 17.\texttt{\texttt{x}h}7+! This simple
sacrifice spells disaster for Black. 17...\texttt{\texttt{x}h}7 18.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}5 \texttt{\texttt{g}g}7 19.\texttt{\texttt{x}h}7+ \texttt{\texttt{f}f}6 20.0−0−0! That move is the
final touch of White's combination. Black's king is beyond salvation now. 20...\texttt{\texttt{x}e}3 21.\texttt{\texttt{g}g}7 e2
22.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}6+ \texttt{\texttt{e}e}5 23.\texttt{\texttt{e}e}6+ \texttt{\texttt{f}f}4 24. \texttt{\texttt{d}d}3! White weaves a checkmating
net. 24...\texttt{\texttt{d}d}6 25.\texttt{\texttt{b}b}3+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g}5
26.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}8+ \texttt{\texttt{x}x}8 27.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5+ \texttt{\texttt{h}h}6 28. \texttt{\texttt{h}h}3+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g}7 29.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}7#
9...\texttt{\texttt{h}h}5, Norevall – Majstr, corr. 1990, 10.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}5! White empha-
sizes the unfortunate placement of the black knight on h5 immediately, without wasting
time for castling. It would only lose part of the advantage, des-
pite the fact that castling seems quite natural. Moreover, great
simplifications are to be expected and White's king might turn out
to be quite handy in the centre in an eventual endgame. 10...
\texttt{\texttt{x}x}d1+ 11.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}6 \texttt{\texttt{x}e}2 12.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}e2 \texttt{\texttt{h}h}6
(12...f6 loses the exchange for Black: 13.\texttt{\texttt{c}c}6 \texttt{\texttt{f}f}8 14.\texttt{\texttt{g}g}4 \texttt{\texttt{f}f}7 15. \texttt{\texttt{c}c}5+−; 13...\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5 14.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}8 \texttt{\texttt{x}x}f8 15.
\texttt{\texttt{x}x}e5 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}5 16.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}4+ 13.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}3 \texttt{\texttt{g}g}5.
That is Black's best try to free the knight. (13...\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5 gives up ma-
terial immediately: 14.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}7 \texttt{\texttt{a}a}8 15.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}d1 \texttt{\texttt{f}f}8 16.\texttt{\texttt{b}b}5−−, and
Black loses his c7-pawn with-
out any compensation) 14.g3!
White persists in keeping Black's
knight on h5 trapped. 14...\texttt{\texttt{x}x}f4
(14...g4 15.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}4 \texttt{\texttt{x}x}d4+ 16.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}d4
\texttt{\texttt{x}x}e6 17.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}7+ 15.gxf4 \texttt{\texttt{a}a}d8 16.\texttt{\texttt{e}e}4
\texttt{\texttt{b}b}4 17.\texttt{\texttt{g}g}3! White has failed
to capture the knight on h5,
but he can instead exchange it
favourably. His pawns have be-
come powerful and that could be
decisive in the endgame. 17...
\texttt{\texttt{f}f}3+ 18.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}g3 \texttt{\texttt{c}c}2 19.\texttt{\texttt{c}c}5
\texttt{\texttt{f}f}8 20.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}d8 \texttt{\texttt{x}x}d8 21.\texttt{\texttt{c}c}1 \texttt{\texttt{b}b}6
22.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}6+ \texttt{\texttt{e}e}5 23.\texttt{\texttt{e}e}6+ \texttt{\texttt{f}f}4 24. \texttt{\texttt{d}d}3! White weaves a checkmating
net. 24...\texttt{\texttt{d}d}6 25.\texttt{\texttt{b}b}3+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g}5
26.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}8+ \texttt{\texttt{x}x}8 27.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5+ \texttt{\texttt{h}h}6 28. \texttt{\texttt{h}h}3+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g}7 29.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}7#
What about the exchange of bishops? Let us check: 10...\texttt{\texttt{h}h}2
(instead of 10...\texttt{\texttt{x}x}d1+) 11.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}e2
\texttt{\texttt{h}h}6 (11...\texttt{\texttt{d}d}4. This activity
turns out to be superficial.
Black's actions are not effective
at all, because of the misplace-
ment of the knight on h5. 12.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}2
\texttt{\texttt{e}e}6 13.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}e6. The other re-
treats lose a piece for Black:
12...\texttt{\texttt{c}c}6 13.\texttt{\texttt{g}g}4−−; 12...\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5 13.\texttt{\texttt{g}g}4
\texttt{\texttt{x}x}d2+ 14.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}d2 \texttt{\texttt{d}d}4 15.0−0−0 \texttt{\texttt{f}f}6
16.\texttt{\texttt{h}h}3−−) 12.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}1 \texttt{\texttt{c}c}8 13.\texttt{\texttt{c}c}4
\texttt{\texttt{g}g}7 14.0−0 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}6. Black has fi-
nally solved his main problem −
his knight, which was perma-
nently in offside, has been ex-
changed. Meanwhile, White has
achieved a lot. Black can now
only dream about equality...
15.\texttt{\texttt{x}x}e6 \texttt{\texttt{x}x}e6 16.\texttt{\texttt{c}c}5 \texttt{\texttt{c}c}8. That
is the best move for Black. His
queen however would not be
back in action anytime soon and
the safety of his king would be
outright questionable. (16...\texttt{\texttt{a}a}2
leads to interesting positions, but
still quite favourable for White:

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17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}a1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d5 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}fd1--; 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xb2 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}fb1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d4 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}c4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xc2 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd4 b6 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{K}}}e4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xe4 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xe4\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}. White's knight is obviously stronger than Black's three pawns.) 17.f5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}g7 (Black cannot afford exchanging his knight, because it is his king's only reliable defender! 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xe3 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xe3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xf5 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d8 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}g5+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}h8 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xf5++) 18.e6! That move inflicts a powerful blow at the safety of Black's king. 18...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xe6 19.fxg6\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}. The shelter of the black king has been almost totally destroyed and his pieces are deprived of any activity.

\textbf{10.h3!}

10...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xf3

10...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}f5 – this seemingly illogical move has not been tested in practice yet. It is not so easy for White to prove a real advantage, though... We recommend the following line: 11.g4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}e6 12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d3! That move is not so easy to find over the board! The bishop supports the possible f4-f5 pawn-break and it can later occupy the wonderful e4-outpost. 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{B}}}b4 (12...f6?? 13.f5++) 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}e4 c6 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{B}}}g5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d5 (14...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}c4

15.a3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d5. We will not even analyse the retreat to the a6-square, because it does not promise any good prospects for Black. 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd5 cxd5 17.e6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xe6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xc3+ 19.bxc3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}a5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d4! White should not capture on f8. His knight is stronger than a rook, moreover that the knight can be supported by the rest of White's pieces and pawns too... Soon Black's king might be seriously endangered. 20...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}f7 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}f6 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}c1! That is the most direct route for the white queen to join in the attack against Black's king! 22...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}a4 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}b1 b6 24.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}g1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}a6. The black bishop intends to capture White's powerful knight. There is not enough time to accomplish that, though... 25.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}b4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}c6 26.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}h6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}c8. Black is now forced to sacrifice the exchange in order to parry White's dangerous threats. The attack develops unopposed, despite that. 27.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d8 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}e8 28.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xf7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xf7 29.h4++. White has a powerful attack and a material advantage too.)

15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd5 cxd5 (15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd5 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd5 cxd5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd5. White has won a pawn, but he must be careful in order to materialize it. 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}b6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}xd8 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}fxd8 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}e2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}ac8 20.c3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}c4 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}ab1 h6 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}e4\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}. White's winning chances are considerable in that endgame with an extra pawn.) 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}d3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}a5 17.0–0–0 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}fd8 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{N}}}b1. White has completed his development harmoniously and he is ready for a vigorous kingside attack. 18...
ancient game at a grandmaster level. That exchange-sacrifice is interesting indeed, but it is only good enough for equality. 14...\(\text{Qxf1}\) 15.\(\text{Qxb7}\) \(\text{Rb8}\) 16.\(\text{Qc6}\) \(\text{Rx}d1\) 17.\(\text{Rx}d1\) \(\text{Qg}3\) 18.\(\text{Qf}2!\) In case White captures on e7 – Black obtains good counterplay giving back the extra exchange. 18...\(\text{Qf}5\) 19.\(\text{b}4!\) \(\text{Rb}8!\) 20.\(\text{g}4!\) \(\text{Rx}d1\) 21.\(\text{Rx}d1\) \(\text{Rx}d8\) 22.\(\text{Qxf}5!\) \(\text{Qx}d1\) 23.\(\text{Qe}2\), Byrne – Keene, Hastings 1971, 23...\(\text{Qc}1=\) and Black’s pieces are quite active.

14...\(\text{Qxf}3+\) 15.\(\text{Qxf}3\) \(\text{Qc}8\) 16.\(\text{Qd}5\) \(\text{Qe}8\) 17.\(\text{Qd}1\) e6

This decision for Black is forced – he cannot afford to put up with White’s powerful knight for such long time.

18.\(\text{Qc}3!\)

White should refrain from the tempting check on the f6-square, because it only facilitates Black’s defence. He must preserve his mobile and aggressive knight!

18...\(\text{Qd}8\)

18...\(\text{f}6\) – this attempt by Black at simplifying the position can hardly be successful, because the safety of his king becomes even more questionable. 19.\(\text{ex}f6\) \(\text{Qxf}6\)
20...\texttildelow e4 \texttildelow xeb2?? 21.c3++; 20...\texttildelow g7 21.\texttildelow fd2 e5. After the rest of the moves for Black – the penetration of White's rook to the d7-square spells defeat for Black.

22.\texttildelow d7 \texttildelow d4 23.\texttildelow g4 \texttildelow f5 24.fxe5 \texttildelow xe5 25.\texttildelow b4 \texttildelow e8 26.\texttildelow xg7++! This simple combination for White is based on the motive of pinning. 26...\texttildelow xg7 27.\texttildelow f6++; 26...\texttildelow xg7 27.\texttildelow c3 \texttildelow b5 28.a4 \texttildelow b6+ 29.\texttildelow h2 \texttildelow e6 30.\texttildelow g5 \texttildelow e7 31.\texttildelow e1++; 27...\texttildelow f8 28.\texttildelow f6 \texttildelow e3 29.\texttildelow d4 \texttildelow xd1 30.\texttildelow xe8 \texttildelow xe8 31.\texttildelow xd1++.

19.\texttildelow fd2 \texttildelow xd2 20.\texttildelow xd2 a6 21.g4

This is not weakening of the position, but just occupation of space.

21...\texttildelow e8 22.\texttildelow e4 \texttildelow d8 23.\texttildelow d1 \texttildelow xd2 24.\texttildelow xd2 \texttildelow e7 25.\texttildelow c4±

Black's position remains cramped and passive, despite the exchanges. This is mostly due to the vulnerability of his king. The black bishop should permanently keep the f6-square under control.

d3) 7...\texttildelow g4

(diagram)

8.\texttildelow g1 e5

This logical idea is already quite popular. Black is trying to create some counterplay with this reasonably justified strike in the centre.

9.d5 \texttildelow b8

Generally speaking, it is not advisable to retreat an already developed piece back to its initial square early in the opening. White should react energetically to prove that, though...

9...\texttildelow e7 10.h3 \texttildelow f6 (10...\texttildelow h6 11.fxe5 dxe5, Bednaski – N.Gaprindashvili, Georgia 1971, 12.\texttildelow g4! threatening \texttildelow g4-g5. 12...\texttildelow f5 13.gxf5 gxf5 14.\texttildelow c5++; 12...\texttildelow f6 13.\texttildelow d2 \texttildelow f7 14.0-0-0 \texttildelow h6 15.\texttildelow e3++) 11.fxe5 dxe5 12.\texttildelow e3 \texttildelow h5. That attempt at organizing counterplay is logical with the idea to try to penetrate with the knight to the f4, or g3-squares. Meanwhile, Black is preparing the sharp move f7-f5. White however, can counter Black's intentions successfully with: 13.\texttildelow c4! White's bishop has left the unfavourable e2-square and the move f7-f5 has been prevented at the same time. 13...\texttildelow g3 (13...\texttildelow h8 14.g4! \texttildelow f4 15.\texttildelow d2±; 13...\texttildelow f4 14.\texttildelow d2±) 14.\texttildelow g1. White cannot castle short anymore in-
deed, but that is hardly good enough consolation for Black. White in fact plans to castle long favourably. 14...h8 15.f2 h5 16.d5f5 (16...g8 17.e3 g7 18.0-0-0 d7 19.g4 h6 20.d6! White forces the trade of queens and that is rather unpleasant for Black. 20...cxd6 21.xd6 xd6 22.xd6 c6 23.e5 h6 24.f1 e8 25.d2 f6, Veroci – Polihroniadi, Belgrade 1989, 26. f3! It has become evident that Black’s pieces are quite misplaced. He loses material imminently: 26...g8 27.g5 e7 28. xe5+-; 27...g7 28.e5+- 17.0-0-0 fxe4 (The move 17...f4 enables White to inflict a powerful blow in the centre: 18.xe5! xe5 19.d4. White regains his piece with an overwhelming advantage. 19...xd4 20.xd4+ g8 21.d6+-; 19...d6 20.exf5 xf5 21.xe5+ xe5 22.ge1 d6 23.b5+-; 22...g7 23.xf4 d6 24.d4+-, and White remains with an extra pawn and a better position.) 18.g5 f5 (18...h6 19.xe4 f5 20.e3 f4 21.c3 g7 22.d6! Black went too far in his attempts to create counterplay and he gets punished by a pawn-break in the centre. His position becomes terrible. 22.c6 23.dxc7 xc7 24.d6 d8 25.g3 xh3 26. xf5 xg1 27.xg7 xg7 28. xg1+-; 27.xg7 28.xd8!+-, with the idea of a fork on the e6-square) 19.xe4 d6 20. xd6 cxd6 21.e6 xe6 22.dxe6.

White enjoys the bishop pair advantage in an open position. 22...f4 23.e3 c8 24.e7 e8 25.b3 xe7 26. g3! Black should better decline that pawn-sacrifice, because opening of the h-file (in case of capturing on h3) would be very dangerous for the safety of his king. 26...h5 (26...hxh3 27.h1 g4 28.h2 g5 29. xd6 ae8 30.b1++) 27.xd6 c7 28.b1 c6 29. d7+. After the eventual trade of queens, White retains excellent prospects, thanks to his two bishops, the dominance along the open d-file and his pawn-majority on the queenside.

10.h3

10...f6

10...h6 11.fxe5 dxe5 12.g4! (White is threatening to win a piece.) 12...f5 (12...f6 – is a calm line for Black. He ensures the f7-square for his knight and avoids sharpening of the position. Meanwhile, White has nothing to worry about. He can complete his development logically and quickly. 13.e3 f7 14.g1 h6 15.xh6 xh6 16. d2 f7 17.0-0-0 a6 18.h4±.
Black cannot secure the safety of his king effectively and therefore his chances are inferior.) 13.\(\text{c}c5\) \(\text{e}8\) 14.gxf5 gxf5 15.\(\text{g}g1\) \(\text{h}8\) 16.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{f}7\) 17.0-0 0-0 \(\text{d}d7\) 18.\(\text{e}3\)±. White has excellent winning chances. He is dominant along the open g-file and his pieces are very active, moreover Black’s king is quite vulnerable.

**11.fxe5 dxe5 12.\(\text{e}3\)!**

White’s plans include castling short – therefore he removes his bishop. It goes to a safer and better square.

**12...c6**

It is too slow for Black to play: 12...\(\text{e}e7\) 13.0-0 \(\text{d}d8\), A.Schmidt – Horch, corr. 1987. White now has a perfect possibility to increase his pressure with a superb manoeuvre of his queen: 14.\(\text{e}e1\)! White’s queen can go, depending on circumstances, to h4, or to f2, or even to the g3-square. Black must be constantly on the alert. 14.\(\text{h}5\) 15.\(\text{c}c4\) \(\text{f}4\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{d}d7\) 17.\(\text{f}2\)±. Black’s knight on f4 is quite unstable. White can start a powerful attack on the f-file, as well as along the a2-g8 and c1-h6 diagonals.

**13.0-0 cxd5 14.exd5**

**14.e4**

14...\(\text{bd}7\), Chess machine – Azmaiparashvili, Asturias 1982, 15.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}4\) 16.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}8\) 19.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{f}8\) 20.\(\text{xb}6\) axb6 21.\(\text{d}5\)±.

14.\(\text{h}5\) 15.\(\text{c}4\)! This is a superb square for White’s bishop! It is essential that it attacks the f7-square and indirectly Black’s king too. 15...\(\text{b}6\), Galje – Westerman, corr. 1987, 16.d6! White needs to play energetically and aggressively; otherwise his attack would not be so effective. 16...\(\text{b}7\) 17.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 18.\(\text{ce}4\)! (This is stronger than the tempting move 18.\(\text{d}5\).) 18...\(\text{xe}4\) (White’s task is much easier after: 18...\(\text{bd}7\) 19.\(\text{xf}7\) 19.\(\text{xf}7\) 20.\(\text{g}5\)+, or 18...\(\text{xe}4\) 19.\(\text{xf}7\)! 19.\(\text{xf}7\) 20.\(\text{xf}7\) \(\text{c}8\) 21.\(\text{d}d7\) 22.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{xe}4\) 23.\(\text{xc}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 20.\(\text{xf}7\)! White should not be disturbed by the fact that he remains a piece down temporarily – his attack is victorious! 20...\(\text{xf}7\) 21.\(\text{xf}7+\) \(\text{xf}7\) 22.\(\text{d}5\). Black loses even after the other retreats (to e8, or to f8): 22...\(\text{e}8\) (22...\(\text{f}8\) 23.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{xd}6\) 24.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{c}6\) 25.\(\text{f}1\)+ \(\text{g}8\) 26.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{xa}7\) 27.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{c}6\) 28.\(\text{f}6\)±. White’s win is out of doubt due to his three connected passed pawns on the queenside.) 23.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 24.\(\text{f}1\). Black is doomed, despite his extra piece: 24...\(\text{c}8\) (24...\(\text{f}6\) 25.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{f}8\) 26.\(\text{g}5\)+; 24...\(\text{f}6\) 25.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 26.\(\text{d}5\)+ \(\text{f}8\) 27.\(\text{d}7\) (White’s passed pawn has become all-
powerful!!) 27...\=e7 28.\=g5 h6 29.\=e1+ \=f8 30.\=d6+ \=f7 31.\=e6+ \=f8 32.\=f4+-, with the decisive threat 33.\=d6+) 25.\=d5 \=f6 26.\=e6+ \=f8 27.d7 \=b8 (27...\=xc2 28.\=h6 \=xh6 29.\=xf6+ \=xf6 30.d8\+=+--) 28.\=g5 \=e7 29.\=xf6+ \=xf6 30.\=h6+ \=g7 31.\=xg7+ \=xg7 32.\=d6+ \=f7 33.\=xb8+-, and White promotes his pawn to a new queen.

15.\=e5! \=h5

Black would hardly save himself in the ensuing endgame after: 15...\=xd5 16.\=xf7 \=xe3 17.\=xd8 \=xd1 18.\=c4+ \=h8 19.\=axd1±.

16.\=xf7!

This piece-sacrifice is very effective.

16...\=xf7 17.\=xf7 \=xf7 18.\=xe4 \=e7

18...\=f6 – that natural retreat of the knight is not enough to rescue Black. His lag in development is too great to be compensated. 19.\=g5+ \=g8 20.d6 \=h6 (White is threatening a check from the c4-square.) 21.\=d4 \=c6 22.\=h4! This is the simplest. White forces the exchange of the important bishop on h6 and Black’s king is deprived of its only true defender. 22...\=xg5 23.\=xg5 \=b6+ 24.\=h1 \=d5 25.\=c4 \=e6 26.\=e4 \=d4 27.\=d1+-.

19.\=d3 \=xb2

Greed would hardly help Black. Still, that is possibly the best way to create some concrete problems for White in that position.

19...\=f5 would not make White’s task harder: 20.\=f3 \=f6 21.\=g5+ \=e8 (21...\=g8 22.d6 \=xd6 23.\=c4+ \=f8 24.\=xb7 \=e7 25.\=e1!! This is a spectacular strike – White leaves his queen en pris, and forces the win immediately. Black is obliged to accept the sacrifice; otherwise White simply captures on a8. 25...\=xb7 26.\=c5+ \=e7 27.\=xc7 \=e8 28.\=xf6+ \=d7 29.\=xg7+-) 22.\=e1. Everything is rather simple now. Black can hardly withstand such powerful pressure. 22...\=xd3 23.cxd3 \=bd7 24.d6 \=e5 25.\=f1 \=xd6 26.d4 \=a6 27.dxe5+- Balashov – Tseshkovsky, Moscow 1976.

20.d6 \=e5 21.\=f3+ \=f5

This move enables White to make good use of another important nuance of the position – the defencelessness of the b7-square. Look at some beautiful lines after: 21...\=f6 22.\=f1 \=bd7 23.c3! That is a strong move! White creates the threat 24.\=d4 and that leads to some forced play: 23...\=xc3 24.\=c4+ \=g7 (24...\=e8 25.\=g5 \=d4+ 26.\=h1. The position is with balanced material
indeed, but Black cannot avoid being crushed: 26...\textw e4 27. \textd x3 \textw e6 28.\textd b5 \textf 7 29.\textd c7 \textw x d6 30.\textg b3+ \textf 8 31.\textc 3! The idea to exploit the pin of the black knight on f6 yields more dividends for White than the immediate capture of the rook on a8: 31...\textg 8 32.\textc 4+ \texth 8 33.\textx a8 \textf 8 34.\textc 7 \textd 6 35.\textf 7 \textg 8 36.\texte 6 \textc 5 37.\textf 6+ \textw f 6 38. \textw f 6 \textg x f 6 39.\textg 7#) 25.\textd x c 3 \textw x d 6 (25...\textw x c 3? loses the queen outright after: 26.\texth 6+ \textw x h 6 27. \textw x c 3++) 26.\textb 5 \textw e 6 27.\textf 4 b 6 28.\texth 6+ \textw h 8 29.\textw x f 6 \textw x f 6 (29...\textw x f 6 30.\textf 8+ \textg 8 31.\textx g 8#) 30.\textd 4++.

22.\textg 5+ \textg 7 23.\textx f 5 \textc 6

23...\textw x f 5 is equally hopeless for Black after: 24.\textx b 7+ \textd 7 25.\textf 1 \textb 8 26.\textw c 7 \textw b 5 27.a 4 \textw x a 4 28.\texte 6+ \textw h 8 29.\textw x b 8+! \textw x b 8 30.\textf 8#

24.\textb 1 \textf 6 (24...\textw x f 5 25. \textw x b 2 \textw x f 3 26.\textw b 7+. That is an important intermediate move. 26...\textg 8 27.\textx f 3++) 25.\texte 4 h 6 26.c 3 h x g 5 27.\textx c 6 b x c 6 28. \textd 4 \textw x d 6 29.\textx b 2 \textf 8 30. \textb 7+ \textf 7 31.\textx f 7+ \textf 7 32. \textx a 7+. White's victory is beyond any doubt in that endgame with an extra pawn.

\textbf{d4) 7...a 6}

8.e 5 \textg 4

8...\textd 7 9.0–0 \textw b 6 10.d 5 \textg 8 11.\textc 2 \textg 4, A.Kuzmin – Gulko, Pavlodar 1982, 12.\texta 1 \textx f 3 13.\textx f 3 \textc 4 14.\textd 4 \textx e 3 15. \textw x e 3 \textd 7 16.e 6±.

8...\textd x e 5 9.dxe 5 \textg 4 10.\textg 1 \texth 6, Jaulin – Vitchen, France 1990, 11.\textd 5 \texte 6 12.\textc 5 f 6 13.\textc 4±.

9.\textg 1 b 5

That is the most logical move. Black is preparing to attack White's knight on c3 at an opportune moment. Meanwhile, he can fianchetto his second bishop as well.

After 9...\textd x e 5 10.fxe 5 \textw b 4 11.h 3 \textw h 6 12.g 4 \textw d 5 13.\textw d 2 f 6, Binham – Kaupalla, Finland 1984, 14.0–0–0! b 5 15.\texte 4 \textf 7 16.\textb 1 \texth 6 17.\texte 1±, Black has tried to create some counterplay on the queenside, but he has weakened the important c5-square in the process.

9...d 5 – this unnecessary reduction of the tension in the cen-
tre is favourable for White. He can now prepare his kingside offensive at leisure. 10.h3 \( \Diamond h6 \)
11.g4 \( \Diamond h8 \) 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c3 f5 13.g5. White should not be perturbed by the fact that the position would remain too closed. This is because he can always rely on the logical plan of opening of the h-file with - h2-h4-h5. Black has nothing to counter that simple idea with. 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g8 14.h4 h5
15.gxh6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xh6 16.h5 e6 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d2 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e7 18.hxg6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xg6 19.0-0-0.
That is not so much to secure the safety of White’s king (it cannot be threatened seriously) as to bring into action his last reserve – the queen’s rook. Black is immediately defenceless. 19...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d7
20.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)dg1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e8 21.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)g8 22.
\( \text{\textcopyright} \)hg1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)g4 23.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e7 24.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xg4 fxg4 25.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xg4+- Valiente – Riego Prieto, Paraguay 1997. That was an instructive example how to play with White against an opponent without any constructive plan in his mind.

10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)h6
10...f6, R.Vera – Goodman, Mexico 1978. This ingenious counterstrike requires from White precise actions. 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)ge4?! (We recommend that patient retreat of White’s knight, which prevents Black from creating great and quite favourable for him complications.) 11...f5 (11...
dxe5 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xg4 f5 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f3 fxe4 14.
\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)b7 15.fxe5 b4 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)a4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)a5 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)c8 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)h4+-; 17...
\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c8 18.e6+-; 11...b4 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)a4! f5
13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g5\( \text{\textcopyright} \) 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)g5. White’s knight is back to that excellent square. At the same time Black’s f5-pawn cannot retreat to f7, because that is against the rules. The weaknesses that have been created by its pushing forward are now irreparable. 12...b4 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c4+ \( \text{\textcopyright} \)h8
14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)b1 d5 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)e2 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)h6 16.h4 e6
17.h5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)g8 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d2±.

11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)b7

Even after: 11...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d7, Wells – Keene, Morecambe 1980, White can and should act energetically:
12.h4! b4 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)e2 f6 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d3 fxg5
15.hxg5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)f7 16.e6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xe6 17.
\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xc6±.

12.h4!

Black cannot punish his opponent for his aggression in any way. (The move 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)e2 is too slow for White: 12...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f5 13.
0-0-0 e6\( \text{\textcopyright} \) Zenker – Schwertel, corr. 1986)

12...dxe5
12...b4 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d5±

13.dxe5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd1+

That is a difficult decision for Black, because White is clearly better in this endgame after the trade of queens. It is however even more dangerous for Black
to try to avoid it, because he might get checkmated promptly. There might have followed: 13...\texttt{c}8 14.\texttt{h}5 \texttt{d}8 15.\texttt{e}2 \texttt{f}5 16.\texttt{hxg6 hxg6} 17.\texttt{g}4 e6 18.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{ce7} 19.\texttt{ce4} \texttt{d}5 20.\texttt{xf5 exf5} 21.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{fxe4} 22.\texttt{c}5+-, and White's threats are decisive.

14.\texttt{xd1} \texttt{ad8} 15.\texttt{h}5 \texttt{a}5 16.\texttt{hxg6 hxg6}
16...\texttt{fxg6} loses very quickly for Black: 17.\texttt{d}5 \texttt{h}8 18.\texttt{e}6+-.

17.\texttt{d}5 \texttt{xd5} (The move 17...\texttt{e}8? is not even defending the pawn, because of: 18.\texttt{xe}7+-) 18.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{xd5} 19.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{d}8 20.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{c}4 21.b3 \texttt{a}3 22.c3 \texttt{f}5 23.\texttt{e}4+. Black has failed to activate his pieces to the extent of being able to compensate White's positional pluses.

d5) 7...\texttt{e}6

8.\texttt{h}3!
White is preparing to occupy space on the kingside.

8...\texttt{b}6
Black intends to fianchetto his light squared bishop in order to create some counterplay. That idea is quite reasonable! White must play energetically and precisely too; otherwise Black's couple of fianchettoed bishops might become very active.

Black has tried in practice some other moves too, but without anything to be able to brag about:

8...\texttt{h}5 9.g4! No doubt - the best for White, since he does not need his light squared bishop so much! 9...\texttt{g}3 10.\texttt{g}1 \texttt{xe}2 11.\texttt{xe}2. White's powerful centre insures him against anything surprising. Black obtained the two bishop advantage indeed, but he lost so much time that it became immaterial: 11...\texttt{d}5 12.e5 \texttt{f}6 13.0-0-0 \texttt{f}5 14.h4 \texttt{fxg4} 15.\texttt{xg4 f}5, F.Fernandez – P.Smyth, IECG 2000, 16.\texttt{g}5+.

8...\texttt{e}7 – I do not consider that knight to be any stronger here than on the c6-square. 9.g4 \texttt{d}5 (about 9...\texttt{b}6 – see 8...\texttt{b}6) 10.e5. This move is quite necessary and after it Black's pieces are definitely misplaced. 10...\texttt{e}4 11.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{xc}3 (11...\texttt{b}5? 12.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{dxe}4 13.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{d}5 14.\texttt{e}2\texttt{e}2 Van der Wiel – Schlenker, Baden-Baden 1981) 12.bxc3\texttt{e}2. Black has no prospects for any active counterplay. On the con-
trary – White’s plan for a kingside attack is quite obvious and effective.

9.\textit{g4} \textit{b7}

9...\textit{e7} 10.\textit{g5} \textit{h5}. This is the most principled decision! That knight might be under attack subsequently by White’s bishop on e2, but still his attack would not be running so smoothly now. Eventually, Black’s knight might end up on the wonderful f4-square. (It is clearly weaker for Black to choose the tentative retreat: 10...\textit{d7}, P.Kovacevic – Vujadinovic, Yugoslavia 1995, because of the resolute measure by White: 11.h4 \textit{b7} 12.h5±)

11.\textit{g1} c5 12.\textit{d2} cxd4, Shirov – C.Hansen, Biel 1992, 13.\textit{xd4}?! \textit{xd4} 14.\textit{xd4} e5 15.fxe5 dxe5 16.\textit{f3} \textit{c7} (Stohl) 17.0–0–0! \textit{f4} 18.\textit{d6} \textit{xd6} 19.\textit{xd6}±. White is evidently better in that “asymmetrical” endgame. He can easily exploit his opponent’s weaknesses.

10.\textit{g5} \textit{h5}

The following risky line has not been tested in practice yet: 10...\textit{d7} 11.h4 f5 12.e5±.

11.\textit{g1} f6

This is a double-edged idea! Black weakens his king indeed, but he is trying to create some counterplay.

11...e5 12.dxe5! That is the simplest method for White to parry Black’s activity. 12...dxe5 13.f5±.

11...\textit{g7} 12.\textit{d2} c5 13.0–0–0 a6. This position has not been evaluated properly by the contemporary theory yet, Nimtz – Lanzendoerfer, corr. 1983. I recommend the following line: 14.dxc5! dxc5 15.\textit{e5}! \textit{xd2}+ 16.\textit{xd2} \textit{fd8} 17.\textit{gd1} \textit{xd2} 18.\textit{xd2} \textit{xe5} 19.fxe5 \textit{c6} 20.a4 a5 21.\textit{d6} \textit{f8} 22.\textit{d2} \textit{e8} 23.\textit{f2} \textit{d8} 24.\textit{e3}+–.

12.\textit{d2} \textit{e8}

13.0–0–0 \textit{h8}, van der Wiel – Azmaiparashvili, Groningen 1994 (13...\textit{e7} 14.gxf6! \textit{xf6} 15.\textit{g5}±) 14.\textit{b1}!±. This is a useful prophylactic move that impedes Black’s counterplay. Additionally, White can choose between several methods of developing his initiative. He can prepare f4–f5, or he can exchange of f6 and put pressure along the g-file. It is also possible for him to attack the black knight on h5, placed at the edge of the board, and he can even prepare the pawn-break d4–d5.

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Conclusion

The defensive system for Black that we have analysed in this chapter is very dynamic and requires from White energetic play right from the start. Black fights for the centre with the help of his fianchettoed bishop and his knights. Both of them come often under attack by White early in the opening! It is quite essential for White to avoid unclear complications while attacking and he should not neglect development under any circumstances.

In case Black acts tentatively, as if provoking his opponent to an early offensive – White should better seize the opportunity to grab some space on the kingside with the help of h2-h3 and g2-g4. That might be particularly effective if Black fianchettoes his bishop on the b7-square.

Should Black go after the central counterstrike e7-e5, White must react with f4xe5, followed by d4-d5. Black’s defensive task after that would be extremely difficult.
Chapter 27  
1.e4 g6 2.d4 \$g7 3.\$c3 d6 4.f4 \c6

The idea of this move is connected with a plan to exert early pressure against the d4-pawn, but White can protect it in numerous ways and he obtains a solid centre and a powerful build-up on the kingside.

5.\$f3

We will analyse in this chapter only schemes, which are not a part of the Pirc Defence and also do not transpose to the Caro–Kann Defence. Basically, Black’s counterplay should be aimed at neutralizing White’s mighty pawn-centre.

We will deal now with: a) 5...\$h6, b) 5...b5; c) 5...\$b6 and d) 5...\$g4.

In case of 5...\$f6 – see 1...d6 (the Pirc Defence); about 5...\$d5 – see chapter 2 of our book 3; as for 5...\$d7 – see 4...\$d7.

Black has also tried in practice:

5...\$c7 6.\$d3 \$g4 (6...\$f6 7.0–0 – see Chapter 14, the line 5...c6 6.\$d3 \$c7 7.0–0; 6...b5 7.0–0 \$b6 8.\$e2 \$a6 9.c3± Fongers – Hagesaether, Zagan 1995) 7.\$e3 \$b6, Adam – Fazekas, Aggtelek 2000 (After 7...\$f6 8.h3 \$xf3 9.\$xf3± Black has no compensation for White’s bishop pair as well as for his excellent centre, moreover the “active” move 9...b5? loses immediately for Black after: 10.e5 \$fd7 11.\$xb5+– JBond – andryusha, Internet 2003), 8.\$d2! \$xf3 9.\$a4 \$c7 10.gxf3 b5 (otherwise Black should worry about the possibility of White playing c4) 11.\$c3± and Black’s king can hardly find a safe shelter;

5...e6 6.\$d3 \$c7 (The passive line 6...\$d7 7.0–0 \$e7, Schneider – Freese, corr. 1993, enables White to follow with the typical scheme of activating pieces i.e. 8.f5! exf5 9.\$g5! \$f6 10.exf5 \$xf5 11.\$xf5 \$xf5 12.\$h4±; Black only creates additional weaknesses after: 6...b5 7.\$d2 a5 8.\$e2 \$e7, Buecherl – Jor-
dan, Germany 1998, 9.e5±; Black would lose plenty of time if he
tries to simplify the position by
exchanging the light squared
bishops with: 6...b6 7.0–0 ²a6,
Vega - Krzyston, Lansing 1993,
8.f5 ²xd3 9.²xd3 exf5 10.exf5
²e7 11.²g5 f6 12.fxg6!→ hxg6→
it is too bad for Black to play: 12...
fxg5 13.²xg5 ²d7 14.²ae1 ²g4
15.²e6+— 13.²ae1 ²d7 14.
²e5+! fx e5 15.dxe5 d5 16.²f7++)
7.0–0 b5 (The rest of Black’s
moves do not prevent White’s
initiative in the centre and on
the kingside: 7...0–0 8.²e3 b5
9.²e1 ²d7, Popova - Sirotkina,
St.Petersburg 2000, 10.e5 ²f5
11.²f2 b4 12.²e2±; or 7...b6,
Smeckert - Uy, Trenton 1993,
8.e5 ²a6 9.²e4 ²f5 10.g4! ²xd3
11.cxd3! d5 12.gxf5 dxe4 13.dxe4
gxf5 14.exf5±; 10...d5 11.²f6+
²xf6 12.gxf5 ²g7 13.fx e6 fx e6
14.²g5 ²e7 15.²g4 ²xd3 16.
cxd3 ²d7 17.²xe6++; 12...²e7
13.fxe6 fxe6 14.²g5±) 8.e5 d5,
Gaprindashvili - Ivanka, Wijk
aan Zee 1975. Now, White can
maintain his advantage with the
standard redeployment of his
bishop to the kingside: 9.²e3
b4 10.²a4 ²f5 11.²f2±. The
centre has been closed and White
has excellent prospects to seize
the initiative on both sides of
the board, while Black has no
counterplay whatsoever.

a) 5...²h6?!
This is not the best square for
Black’s knight. White obtains a
great advantage with rather
simple moves.

6.²e2 0–0
6...²g4 7.²e3 d5 (After 7...
0–0, Pover - Driessen, Alkmaar
1983, 8.h3 ²xf3 9.²xf3±. White’s
advantage is quite stable, be-
because of his powerful centre
and a couple of active bishops. Black’s
knights are misplaced too,
and that makes matters even
worse for him.) 8.e5 b5 (About
8...²f5 9.²f2 – see chapter 3
of book 3, variation e, except that
White has an extra tempo.)
9.²d2 ²d7 10.0–0 ²b6 11.b3 ²f5
12.²f2 ²xf3 13.²xf3 h5 14.g3±.
White has the two bishop advan-
tage and a powerful centre, while
Black has plenty of weaknesses
on the queenside, so White’s
prospects are clearly superior,
Gunnarsson – Baldursson, Rey-

7.0–0 ²a6
In answer to 7...²d7, White
should better follow with: 8.h3!
b5 9.²e3 b4 10.²a4 d5 11.e5 ²f5
12.²f2 ²a5 13.c3 bxc3 14.²xc3±
and Black should worry about
White’s future offensive on the
kingside as well as his queenside

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weaknesses.

It is too passive for Black to play: 7...e6 8.h3 f5 (It is not any better for Black to try: 8...d5 9.e5 \textit{\&f5} 10.\textit{\&}e1 b6 11.g4! \textit{\&e7} 12.\textit{\&}e3\textpm, because his defence on the kingside is problematic.) 9.e5 d5 10.b3 \textit{\&}e8 11.\textit{\&}a4 \textit{\&}d7 12.c4\textpm van Gysel – van Osmael, E-mail 2001. White enjoys a great space advantage and he can easily seize the initiative on both sides of the board.

8.\textit{\&}h1 c5 9.\textit{\&}e3 b6

This position was reached in the game Joachim – Emami, Bad Wildbad 2000. White can now combine his attempt at trapping the enemy’s knight with a kingside attack.

10.h3 \textit{\&}c7 11.dxc5 dxc5

It is worse for Black to play: 11...bxc5 12.f5 \textit{\&}h8 (or 12...gxf5 13.\textit{\&}d2 fxe4 14.\textit{\&}h4\textpm and Black’s knight has been trapped) 13.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}g8 14.fxg6 fxg6 15.\textit{\&}g5–

12.\textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}b7 13.\textit{\&}d1 \textit{\&}c8

14.f5! gxf5 15.\textit{\&}xh6 \textit{\&}xh6 16.exf5

Black’s king is quite vulnerable and his heavy pieces are rather passive too.

16...\textit{\&}g7 16...\textit{\&}xf5 17.\textit{\&}g3+ \textit{\&}h8 18.\textit{\&}xc7–; 16...\textit{\&}f4 17.\textit{\&}h4 e5 18.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}xf5 19.\textit{\&}xf4–;

17.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}e8

The other possibilities for Black are even worse: 17...\textit{\&}h8 18.\textit{\&}e5!\textpm f6? 19.\textit{\&}g6+ hxg6 20.\textit{\&}h4–; or 17...\textit{\&}d8 18.\textit{\&}xd8+ \textit{\&}xd8 19.\textit{\&}d1 \textit{\&}c8 20.\textit{\&}e5! \textit{\&}xf5 21.\textit{\&}xf7 \textit{\&}g6 22.\textit{\&}g5\textpm; 21...\textit{\&}xf7 22.\textit{\&}f1\textpm; 21...\textit{\&}xf7 22.\textit{\&}xc7–.

18.\textit{\&}c4 \textit{\&}c7 19.\textit{\&}b4 \textit{\&}d6

The knight is better than the bishop in the variation: 19...\textit{\&}f6 20.\textit{\&}d5 \textit{\&}xd5 21.\textit{\&}xd5 \textit{\&}xd5 22.\textit{\&}xd5 \textit{\&}fd8 23.\textit{\&}xd8+ \textit{\&}xd8 24.\textit{\&}e1\textpm, meanwhile Black might fall under attack in case queens still remain present on the board. It might end up in a disaster for Black if he gives up the vital defender of his king in order to create some weaknesses, which he will hardly ever manage to exploit: 19...\textit{\&}xc3? 20.bxc3 \textit{\&}f6 21.\textit{\&}de1 \textit{\&}d5 22.\textit{\&}xd5 \textit{\&}xd5 23.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}f6 24.\textit{\&}e6!! There is no salvation for Black anymore:

24...fxe6 25.\textit{\&}xe6 \textit{\&}b7 26.\textit{\&}g5\textpm \textit{\&}f7 27.\textit{\&}g7–; 24...h5 25.\textit{\&}xf6! exf6 26.\textit{\&}xh5 \textit{\&}fc8 27.\textit{\&}h7+ \textit{\&}f8 28.\textit{\&}e1–; 26...\textit{\&}f8 27.\textit{\&}h7+ \textit{\&}f8 28.\textit{\&}e6+ \textit{\&}xe6 29.\textit{\&}xe6+-.

20.\textit{\&}d5 \textit{\&}xd5 21.\textit{\&}xd5 \textit{\&}xc4 22.\textit{\&}xc4 e6 (22...\textit{\&}xb7! 23.c3\textpm)

23.\textit{\&}d1 exf5 24.\textit{\&}h4 b5 (24...f4 25.\textit{\&}xf4 \textit{\&}ad8 26.\textit{\&}df1 \textit{\&}xb2 27.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}d2 28.\textit{\&}f3\textpm) 25.\textit{\&}xb5 \textit{\&}ab8 26.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}fe8 27.\textit{\&}h5 \textit{\&}xb2 (27...f4 28.b3\textpm) 28.\textit{\&}xf5→Black’s king is so vulnerable that he can-
not even hope to equalize, meanwhile White’s threat 29.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)d7! can hardly be parried by Black.

b) 5...b5 6.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)d3

![Chess Diagram]

We will analyse now the following possibilities for Black: b1) 6...b4, b2) 6...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)d7 and b3) 6...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)g4.

About 6...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)f6 – see 1...d6 (The Pirc Defence).

b1) 6...b4

This move seems to be the logical consequence of Black’s last move; nevertheless it weakens his queenside considerably.

7.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e2 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)d7

After 7...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)f6 8.0–0 0–0 9.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)h1 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)a6 10.a3! \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xd3 11.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xd3 bxa3 12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xa3, White manages to emphasize the main drawback of Black’s move six, for example: 12...d5 13.e5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e4 14.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)c3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xc3 (14...f5 15.exf6 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xf6 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e2 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)d6 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e1 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e8 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)g5\(\pm\) and there remains an abundance of weaknesses in Black’s position.) 15. \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xc3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)b6 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e3\(\pm\) and White can prepare active actions on both sides of the board, having such wonderful centre; Black does not fare any better after: 12...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)bd7, Berndt – Trachtmann, Bremen 1996, in case of 13.f5 gxf5 (if 13...c5 14.e5 dxe5 15.dxe5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)g4 16.e6\(\pm\) White will have an edge in every possible endgame, because all black pawns will be extremely weak) 14.exf5 c5 (after 14...d5 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)f4\(\pm\) Black fails to establish a piece on the only possible important outpost – the e4-square: 15...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)e4 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)g5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)df6 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xe4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xe4 18. \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)g3) 15.d5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)b6 16.c4. White’s space advantage is huge and he can exert pressure against Black’s weak a7 and e7-pawns.

The drawbacks of Black’s move 6...b4 are too obvious after 7...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)g4 8.0–0 e6 9.h3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xf3 10. \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)xf3 d5 11.e5 h5 12.g3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)h6 13.a3 bxa3 14.b3\(\pm\) Larski – Salem, Hampstead 1998.

Black’s attempt to fortify his queenside with the move: 7...a5 leads after: 8.0–0 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)f6 9.e5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\)}\)d5 10.c4 bxc3 11.bxc3\(\pm\) to a considerable lag in development for him, K.Ilyin – Nebylitsin, Novosibirsk 2001.

8.0–0

![Chess Diagram]

8...a5
The other moves for Black are even worse:

Should he decide to open up the centre, being so much behind in development, after: 8...e5 9.fxe5 dxe5 10.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&c4}}! Black remains either a pawn down, or he has to parry a powerful attack, for example:

10...exd4 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xd4 \&b6}} (11...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b6}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&e3+ -}}) 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc6 \&xd1}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xd1 \&d7}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&ce5 \&xc4}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc4 \&a4}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&d6+ \&e7}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&e5+; or}} 10...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&gf6}}, Llorens – A.Castro, Santiago 1997, 11.dxe5 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xe4}} (It is bad for him to play: 11...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b6+}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&ed4 \&xe4}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&e3-}} and Black has problems to neutralize White’s threats: 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&f5}}, 13.e6 and 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xf7+}}) 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&ed4 0-0}} (but not 12...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b6}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xf7+ \&xf7}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g5+ \&g8}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc6\&}}, because White regains his piece preserving powerful threats against the enemy’s king) 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc6 \&b6+}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&d4\&}}. White has an extra pawn and extremely active pieces;

Black cannot achieve anything much if he tries to undermine White’s centre with the typical pawn-break – 8...c5 9.c3 bxc3 10.bxc3 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b7}} (after 10...exd4 11.cxd4 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&c5}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&c2 d5}} 13.e5 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&e4}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g5\&}}. Black has problems to complete his development) 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b1 \&c7}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g3\&}} and White has everything ready to begin his offensive in the centre and on the kingside, Chudinovskih – Roth, Wuerttemberg 2000;

There arises a position, which resembles the Alekhine Defence after: 8...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&gf6}} 9.e5 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&d5}} 10.c4 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b6}}, Kracik – Vitak, Plzen 1997, and the vulnerability of Black’s b4-pawn enables White to start attacking with – 11.exd6 exd6 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&e1 c5}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g3+ \&e7}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&f5\&}}. His pieces are so active that his initiative will surely be long-lasting.

9.e5 e6 10.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g5\&}} d5

White is threatening the dangerous move: 11.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&e4\&}}.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

11.f5! gxf5 12.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&f4 \&f8}},

McDonald – Burnett, Hampstead 1998 (Black can hardly defend against White’s check-mating threats after: 12...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&b6}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&fxe6 \&xe5}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&h1\&}}). 13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&h5\&}}. The exchange of the dark squared bishops is the most direct way for White to get at the black king. 13...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&h6}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&f3\&}}

\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc1}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc1 \&a6}}. This is the best defence for Black. (After 15...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g6}} 16.c4\&, White opens the game on the queenside, making good use of the fact that Black’s kingside is almost stalemated.) 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&g7\&}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\&d7}} 17.c4! bxc3 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\&xc3\&}}. Black’s king has no reliable shelter and White’s compen-
sation for the sacrificed pawn is more than sufficient.

b2) 6...\(\text{\#d7} 7.0-0\)

7...\(\text{\#b6}\)

In case Black forgets about the development of his kingside – 7...\(\text{\#b7}, \text{Orso - Nagy, Helsinki 2001}, \text{he risks coming under attack after: 8.e5 b4 9.\#e4 c5 (The quiet line: 9...d5 10.\#eg5 e6 11.a3± leads to a position, in which White has a free hand to attack Black's queenside weaknesses.) 10.dxc5 dxe5 (or 10...d5 11.\#eg5 \#xc5 12.\#b5+ \#f8 13.\#d4+) 11.fxe5 \#xe5 12.\#xe5, for example: 12...\#d4+ 13.\#h1 \#xe5 (13...\#xe5 14.\#d6++) 14.\#b5+ \#f8 15.\#xf7+! \#xf7 16.\#g5+\).}

The main drawback of Black's move 7...\#b6 is that he does not exert any pressure against the b2-square. 8.\#e3 \#gf6 (in case of 8...e5 9.fxe5 dxe5 10.\#e2 \#gf6 11.h3 0-0, Pedersen - Vajda, Istanbul 2003, White can create plenty of threats in the centre and on the kingside: 12.c3 \#d8 (12...\#e8 13.\#c2\+) 13.\#c2 c5 14.dxe5 \#e8 15.c4\+ 9.h3 b4 10.\#e2 c5 11.c3 \#b7 12.e5 \#d5 13.\#f2 cxd4 14.e6! fx6 15.\#fxd4 \#c7, Dubinsky - Irzhakov, Nizhni Novgorod 1998, Black's pieces are not well coordinated and his king is quite vulnerable, so he is faced with a difficult defence 16.\#a4! 0-0-0 17.cxb4 \#c5! 18.bxc5 dxc5 19.\#ac1! \#b8 20.\#c4 \#a6 21.\#d1 cxd4 22.\#xd4=)

8.a4

White is trying to force the appearance of additional weaknesses.

8...b4

After 8...\#g4 9.e5 b4 10.\#e4 \#d5 11.h3\+ Black is too much behind in development. His knight on d5 looks impressive indeed, but White can later try to repel it away from that excellent square.

9.\#e2 a5

Black's b-pawn has been pushed too far and White can easily seize the initiative after: 9...d5 10.e5 a5 11.c3\+, or 9...\#f6 10.a5 \#bd7 11.\#e1 \#b8 12.\#d2=.

10.c3 bxc3

In the line: 10...c5 (10...d5 11.e5\+ 11.dxc5 dxc5 12.\#e3 c4 13.\#c2 \#xd1 14.\#axd1 \#a6 15.\#ed4\+. Black's weaknesses on the queenside and his lag in development make his defence in the endgame very problematic.

11.bxc3 \#f6 12.\#b1 0-0

Black again fails to occupy the powerful e4-outpost with his knight after: 12...d5 13.e5 \#e4, because White then simply wins the central pawn with: 14.\#xe4
dxe4 15.♘g5 ♘g4 16.♗xe4 ♘xe2 17.♕xe2 ♘xa4 18.♗b7\+.  

13.f5 d5 (13...gxf5 14.exf5 c5 15.♗f4\+) 14.e5 ♗e4 15.fxg6 fxg6, Degraeve – Cekro, Istanbul 2000 (15...hxg6 16.♗xe4 dxe4 17.♗g5\+) 16.♗xe4 dxe4 17.♗g5\+.  

b3) 6...♗g4 7.e5  

7...dxe5  
It is dubious for Black to play: 7...d5?! 8.h3 ♘xf3 9.♗xf3 e6 10.g4 ♗e7 11.♗e3 f6 12.f5\+ and Black failed to develop his queenside in the game Te – Gorbatow, St. Quentin 1999.  
After 7...♗h6 8.h3 ♘f5 9.g4 ♖xd3 10.♖xd3 ♗d7 11.♗e3 ♗a6 12.0–0–0\+. Black’s pieces are out of play Ehlvest – Granda Zuniga, Zagreb 1987.  

In case of: 7...♗b6 8.h3 ♘xf3 9.♗xf3 b4 10.♗e2 e6 11.0–0 ♗e7 12.c4\+. White remains with the two bishop advantage, superior development and a powerful centre Tseitlin – Scalchione, Saint Vincent 2002. After 7...a6 8.♗e3 d5 9.h3 ♘xf3 10.♖xf3 e6 11.0–0± Ribeiro – Reis, Lisbon 1997, there arise positions that we have analysed in Chapter 4, Book 3, but Black, instead of having played normal moves, has weakened his queenside with b5 and also he has wasted a tempo for the move a6.  

8.dxe5 ♘h6 9.0–0 0–0 10.h3 ♖f5 11.♗e4 ♘a6 12.♗e1 f6 13.a4\+. White dominates in the centre. He can easily develop his initiative on the queenside, as well as on the kingside Anand – Norwood, Oakham 1990.  

c) 5...♗b6 6.♗c4  

This move precludes the development of Black’s bishop to the g4-square.  
6...♗h6  
Black’s attempt to seize the initiative with: 6...d5 7.exd5 ♘g4
leads after: 8...b3 to positions in which he has no counterplay at all:

8...h6 9.dxc6 bxc6 (Black fails to regain his pawn after: 9...dxc6 10.d5 d8 11.c3±.)
10.xf3 xc6, Cabrilo - Barlov, Tivat 1995, 11.d5! White gives back his extra pawn in order to enter a better endgame: 11...
xd4 (11...d8 12.c3± 12.b6 xf3+ 13.f2 axb6 14.xf3 f5 15.c3± in which his couple of powerful bishops and the weaknesses on Black’s queenside provide him with a clear advantage;

It is even worse for Black to play: 8...xf3 9.xf3 xd4 10. 
. His lag in development is considerable and he risks coming under attack: 10...d7 (Black loses after 10...xd5 11.xd5 
d6 12.0-0-0 c6 13.c3--; 11...c6 12.e4+- T.Horvath - Bertagnolli, Bozen 1998; The open position in the centre and Black’s lag in development make his defensive task extremely hard in the variation: 10...a5 11.dxc6 xc6 12.d5 d8 13. 0-0-0±) 11.a4 c7 12.0-0-0 g6 13.dxc6 xc6 (after 13...
bxc6 14.b4 a5 15.a3+- Black loses material unavoidably) 14.d3! c5 (The move 14...e5 opens the position and this is definitely in favour of the side with the bishop pair: 15.fxe5 xe5 16.f3±.) 15.he1 b5 16. c3 a6 17.d5± White is better developed and all his pieces are well centralized.

7.b3 g4 8.e3 d5

Black has tried several times the move 8...xf3 in practice, but after: 9.xf3! he has no compensation for White’s two bishops, because it is too bad for him to play: 9...xd4? 10.xd4 xd4 11.h3++, the other possibilities for him are not satisfactory either: 9...f5 10.0-0 fxe4 11.xe4 xf5 12.g5?; or 9...d5 10.h3 dxe4 (10...e6 11.f5??; 10...d7 11. f5 g8 12.exd5+ 11.c8+ d8 12.xb7 f5 13.d1 d7 14. xc6 0-0 15.xe4 f6 16.d3 d5 17.c3 fxe3 18.xe3 xf4 19.e4+, or 9...e6 10.0-0 d5 11.g4±.

In answer to 8...e6, White should not fear the doubling of his pawns after: 9.d2 xf3 10.gxf3 d5 11.f5+ Gensler - Batet, Chicago 1988.

In case of 8...f5, Ortiga - Spinelli, Rosario 2002, White can sacrifice a pawn with: 9.h3 xf3 (or 9...fxe4 10.hxg4 xg4 11.g1 exf3 12.xf3 d6 13.d5) 10.xf3 xd4 11.a4 a5 12.d2 c7 13.0-0-0 d7 14. exf5 xf5 15.g4 h4 16.g3 f6 17.e6=. White’s active pieces and the misplacement of the black knight on the h4-square compensate amply his one pawn-deficit.

9.d2

After 9.exd5 f5 10.f2 xf3 11.xf3 xd4 White has no advantage to brag about.

9...dxe4

In the game Cools - Kasim-
dzhanov, Antwerp 1998, Black was to much in a hurry to double his opponent’s pawns with: 9...\( \texttt{\textit{xf3}} \) 10.gxf3 e6 11.f5 \( \texttt{\textit{g8}} \) 12.\( \texttt{\textit{fxe6 fxe6}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{c4 c7}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{c5 f7}} \) 15.0–0–0 and White had a great advantage in connection with the possible pawn-break 16.c4, the weakness of the e6-square, his superior development and the absence of a reliable shelter of the black king.

10.\( \texttt{\textit{e5 f5}} \)

The game develops in a much calmer fashion after: 10...f6 11.\( \texttt{\textit{xg4 xg4}} \) 12.\( \texttt{\textit{xe4 a6}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{g1 h6}} \) 14.0–0–0 0–0–0, P.Kovacevic – Barlov, Igalo 1994, but still White’s two bishop advantage enables him to act energetically with: 15.\( \texttt{\textit{e6+ b8}} \) 16.d5! \( \texttt{\textit{c7}} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textit{xc5 xc5}} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textit{xc5 xd5}} \) 19.\( \texttt{\textit{b4=}} \); Black would not fare any better after: 10...\( \texttt{\textit{a5}} \) 11.h3 \( \texttt{\textit{c8}} \), Palac – Sale, Croatia 1992, 12.0–0–0 f6 (12...0–0 13.\( \texttt{\textit{g4=}} \) 12...f5 13.\( \texttt{\textit{xe4=}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{c4 c7}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{xe4=}} \) and White’s development is impressive, moreover he has an excellent outpost on the e6-square.

![Diagram 11.h3 f6, E.Andreev – Kornev, Tula 2001, 12.g4! fxe5 13.dxe5 \( \texttt{\textit{d8}} \) 14.gxf5 \( \texttt{\textit{xd2+}} \) (In case of 14...\( \texttt{\textit{xf5}} \) White can play: 15.\( \texttt{\textit{xe4 xd2+}} \) 16.\( \texttt{\textit{xd2 d4}} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textit{e3 xb3}} \) 18.axb3 \( \texttt{\textit{a6}} \) 19.\( \texttt{\textit{e2=}} \) and he maintains a stable advantage, because the comparison between the activity of the pieces of both sides is clearly in his favour.) 15.\( \texttt{\textit{xd2 e3!}} \) (About 15...\( \texttt{\textit{xf5}} \) 16.\( \texttt{\textit{xe4 xd2 – see 14...\textit{xf5}; after 15...\textit{gxf5?! 16.e1 \textit{g8 17.e3 Black’s pieces are completely undeveloped and his f5-pawn is very weak.}}}) 16.\( \texttt{\textit{xe3 f5}} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textit{f2 h6}} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textit{e2=}} \).

We have the two bishop advantage and very active pieces. Black’s kingside is almost stalemated and White’s edge is undisputed.

\[ \textbf{d) 5.g4 6.e3} \]

![Diagram 11. We will analyse now: d1) 6..b5, d2) 6..f6, d3) 6..a5, d4) 6..d7 and d5) 6..b6.

About 6.d5 7.e5 – see Chapter 2, Book 3.

\[ \textbf{d1) 6..b5 7.h3xf3 8.xf3 b4} \]

Black has no compensation
for the pawn after: 8...\textit{a}5? 9.\textit{x}xb5! e6 (9...\textit{cx}b5 10.e5+-) 10.e5 d5 11.\textit{d}d3+- Saverymuttu – Uddenfeldt, Groningen 1970.

It seems too slow for Black to play: 8...a6, Pereg – Lengyel, Salgotarjan 1975. After 9.\textit{d}d3 \textit{d}d7 10.e5 White is quite well prepared for an onslaught against the black king stranded in the centre.

\textbf{9.\textit{d}d}1 \textit{f}6

In case Black closes the centre with: 9...d5 10.e5 \textit{h}6 11.g4\textpm, he would not have a single well placed piece left on the board. It is not easy for him to develop his kingside after: 9...\textit{d}d7, Limbos – Czerniak, Eersel 1966, 10.e5 \textit{c}c7 11.\textit{f}f2\textpm.

\textbf{10.\textit{d}d}3 \textit{bd}7 \textit{11.0–0 0–0}

\textbf{12.\textit{f}f2 e}6

After 12...e5 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.f5\textpm. White has excellent attacking prospects.

\textbf{13.a}3\textpm

This move emphasizes the drawbacks of 6...b5. White's chances to exploit the weaknesses on Black's queenside are superior.

\textbf{d2) 6...\textit{f}6 7.h3 \textit{xf}3 8.\textit{xf}3}

\textbf{8...\textit{a}5}

The natural move for Black 8...0–0, enables White to play: 9.e5! dxe5 (White developed a checkmating attack rather quickly after: 9...\textit{d}e8 10.0–0–0 d5 11.h4 \textit{d}d7 12.h5+- Limp – Mercadante, Tijuca 1978) 10. dxe5 \textit{d}d5 (It is even worse for Black to play: 10...\textit{d}e8 11.\textit{c}c4 \textit{c}7, Van Egmond – Grondsma, Alkmaar 1983, because he has practically no pieces left to defend his king. 12.\textit{d}d1 \textit{c}8 13.h4 b5 14.\textit{b}b3 a5 15.a4 b4 16.\textit{d}e4 \textit{d}d5 17.h5\textpm) 11.0–0–0 e6 12.\textit{c}c5 \textit{e}8 13.\textit{e}e4 \textit{c}c7 14.c4 \textit{b}b6 15. h4\textpm. White has occupied all key-squares in the centre and his lead in development is overwhelming Novikov – Ferenc, Koszalin 1997.

White's initiative develops effortlessly after: 8...e6 9.0–0–0 d5 10.e5 \textit{fd}7 11.g4 \textit{a}5 (It is even easier for White to get the advantage after: 11...\textit{b}b6 12.f5 \textit{d}d7 13.\textit{d}d3 \textit{a}6 14.\textit{g}g5\textpm Vatter – Drewes, Bad Mergenthein 1988.) 12.\textit{b}b1 b5 (It is too pas-
sive for Black to play: 12...\(a6\) 13.f5 \(f8\) 14.\(e2\) \(c7\) 15.\(g5\) Caro – Rantanen, Tel Aviv 1964.) 13.f5 \(b6\) 14.\(e2\) \(c4\) 15.\(c1\) \(a6\) 16.\(f4\) Borngaessers – Niebergall, Essen 1996.

\(9.0-0-0\) \(d7\)

Once again it is too dangerous for Black to evacuate his king away from the centre with: 9...0–0 10.e5! \(e8\) (It is better for Black to try: 10...\(d5\), but still after 11.\(xd5\) \(xd5\) 12.\(b1\) \(c8\) 13.\(h4\) \(c6\) 14.\(c3\) White is perfectly prepared for a successful attack.) 11.\(h4\) \(e6\) 12.\(h5\)–– Claus – Karner, Schney 1999; while in case of: 9...\(d5\) 10.e5 \(e4\) (after 10...\(fd7\) 11.\(f5\) \(xf5\) 12.\(xf5\) \(e6\) 13.\(h5\)– Black’s f7-square is indefensible) 11.\(xe4\) \(xe4\) 12.\(g4\) \(e6\) 13.\(c4\)– and White is surely going to capture on e4 sooner or later, Parker – Gross, Berlin 1998.

10.\(c4\) \(b5\)

It is advisable for Black not to weaken the d6-square after: 10...e6 11.e5! \(d5\) 12.\(e4\) \(f8\) 13.\(xd6\)– Markun – Biscan, Slovenia 1994.

11.\(b3\) \(b4\) 12.\(e2\) \(d5\) (12...

0–0 13.\(g4\) \(d5\) 14.\(g3\) \(dxe4\) 15.\(xe4\) \(d5\) 16.\(h4\)–– 13.\(g3\) \(dxe4\) (13...0–0–0 14.e5 \(e8\) 15.\(f5\)–) 14.\(xe4\) \(d5\) 15.\(g4\)! \(h5\) 16.\(g5\)

\(d3\) 6...\(a5\) 7.\(d3\)

7...\(d5\)

The dangers for Black, due to his lag in development, are well illustrated in the variation: 7...e5 8.\(dxe5\) \(dxe5\) 9.\(f5\)! \(gxf5\) 10.\(xf5\) \(e7\) 11.0–0 \(xf5\)!! (11...\(xf5\) 12.\(g5\)–) 12.\(xf5\) \(xf5\) 13.\(g5\) \(g6\) 14.\(d6\).

It is no less perilous for him to play: 7...c5 8.\(dxc5\) \(xc3+\) 9.\(bxc3\) \(xc3+\) 10.\(e2\) \(dxc5\) 11.\(d2\) \(g7\) (11...\(a3\) 12.\(b1\) 12.\(d1\) \(b6\) 13.\(e5\)–, and Black’s queen remains out of play.

8.\(e5\) \(c5\)

The other possibilities for Black are hardly any better: 8...\(h5\) 9.\(h3\), or 8...\(h6\) 9.\(h3\) \(xf3\) 10.\(xf3\) \(f5\) 11.\(f2\) \(h5\) 12.\(g4\)! \(hxg4\) 13.\(hxg4\) \(xh1+\) 14.\(xh1\) \(h6\) 15.\(h4\), or 8...\(a6\)!! 9.a3 \(b6\) 10.0–0. White has a powerful centre in all variations, a superior development and a clear cut attacking scheme.
9.\textit{dxc5} \textit{\textbf{c}6} 10.\textit{b3}!

After 10...\textit{d4} 11.\textit{hxg4} dxe3 (or 11...\textit{dxc3} 12.\textit{bxc3} \textit{\textbf{xc}3+} 13.\textit{\textbf{f}2}++)
12.\textit{\textbf{b}5}\textup{±} Black has a material deficit and he lags in development too.

10...\textit{\textbf{x}f3} 11.\textit{\textbf{x}f3} e6

The "pseudo-active" move 11...\textit{d4}? loses after: 12.\textit{\textbf{b}5}! 0–0–0 (12...\textit{dxc3} 13.\textit{\textbf{xc}6+} \textit{\textbf{f}8}
14.\textit{b4}! \textit{\textbf{x}b}4 15.\textit{\textbf{xb}7+}–; 12...\textit{\textbf{d}8}
13.\textit{\textbf{xc}6+} \textit{\textbf{b}xc}6 14.\textit{\textbf{xc}6+} \textit{\textbf{f}8} 15.
\textit{a}3 \textit{\textbf{b}8} 16.\textit{\textbf{b}4} \textit{\textbf{d}8} 17.0–0–0++)
13.\textit{\textbf{xc}6} \textit{\textbf{b}xc}6 14.\textit{\textbf{xc}6+} \textit{\textbf{b}8}
(14...\textit{\textbf{c}7} 15.\textit{\textbf{xc}7+} \textit{\textbf{xc}7} 16.
\textit{\textbf{b}5–+}) 15.\textit{\textbf{b}4}! \textit{\textbf{a}3} 16.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{xb}4}
17.\textit{\textbf{d}2–+}.

In the line: 11...0–0–0 12.\textit{\textbf{d}2}! \textit{\textbf{xc}5} 13.0–0–0\textup{±} White remains with extra space, superb development and the two bishop advantage.

12.0–0 \textit{\textbf{dge}7}

Black should avoid the possibility of a fork with -- 12...\textit{d4}?
13.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{d}8} 14.\textit{\textbf{xc}6+} \textit{\textbf{b}xc}6 15.
\textit{\textbf{xc}6+} \textit{\textbf{f}8} (15...\textit{\textbf{e}7} 16.\textit{\textbf{d}2–+})
16.\textit{\textbf{ad}1–+}.

13.\textit{\textbf{b}5} 0–0

14.c3\textup{±}

White had a solid extra pawn, a powerful centre and a bishop pair in the game Nataf – Chabanon, Enghien les Bains 1997.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{d4}) 6...\textit{\textbf{d}7} 7.\textit{h3} \textit{\textbf{xf}3} 8.\textit{\textbf{xf}3}
\end{itemize}

8...\textit{\textbf{e}6}

It is a disaster for Black to play: 8...\textit{c5}? 9.\textit{dxc5} \textit{\textbf{xc}3+} (9...
\textit{\textbf{a}5} 10.\textit{e5}! \textit{\textbf{d}5} 11.0–0–0\textup{–})
10.bxc3 \textit{\textbf{a}5} 11.\textit{\textbf{d}4} \textit{\textbf{e}5} 12.\textit{\textbf{xe}5}
\textit{\textbf{d}xe}5 13.\textit{\textbf{c}4} \textit{\textbf{xd}4} 14.\textit{\textbf{xf}7+} \textit{\textbf{d}8}
15.0–0 \textit{\textbf{xc}3}? (Black could have prolonged the game a bit more with: 15...\textit{\textbf{xc}5} 16.\textit{\textbf{g}7!} \textit{\textbf{d}3+}
17.\textit{\textbf{h}1} \textit{\textbf{e}5} 18.\textit{\textbf{f}8+} \textit{\textbf{c}7} 19.
\textit{\textbf{xe}5+} \textit{\textbf{xe}5} 20.\textit{\textbf{xa}8} \textit{\textbf{xc}4} 21.
\textit{\textbf{f}1–+}) 16.\textit{\textbf{b}5} 1–0 Hector – Zaja,

In answer to 8...\textit{\textbf{a}5}, White can follow with the powerful resource 9.e5! and here it is not good for Black to play 9...\textit{\textbf{e}6}
10.\textit{\textbf{d}2}! \textit{\textbf{f}8} (10...\textit{\textbf{b}6} 11.\textit{\textbf{e}4}
\textit{\textbf{f}8} 12.\textit{\textbf{xd}6+}) 11.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{b}6} 12.
\textit{\textbf{xd}6+} \textit{\textbf{xd}6} 13.\textit{\textbf{xd}6} \textit{\textbf{xb}2} (after
13...\textit{\textbf{gf}6} 14.0–0–0 0–0–0, Klovans – Kirilov, Espoo 1993,
White wins immediately with the energetic move 15.\textit{\textbf{a}3}!, for example: 15...\textit{\textbf{xd}4} 16.\textit{\textbf{e}3} \textit{\textbf{e}4}
17.\textit{\textbf{d}4} \textit{\textbf{f}5} 18.\textit{\textbf{xa}7+–; it is}
slightly better for Black to de-
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fend with 14...\(\text{c5}15.\text{c3 c5}16.g4\) 14.\(\text{c3 b6}\) (It is also bad for Black to follow with: 14...\(\text{xc2}15.d5 \text{gf6}16.dxc6\) bxc6 17.\(\text{b5}0-018.\text{xc6}\) – because White’s active bishop pair and the passed d6-pawn provide him with a long-lasting advantage.) 15.d5 \(\text{gf6}16.dxe6 fxe6\) 17.\(\text{c4}\) 0-0, Berebora – Dizdarevic, Osijek 1993, (White’s couple of bishops in an open position guarantees his edge after: 17...\(\text{c5}18.\text{xe6 cxd6}19.0-0\)
18.\(\text{xf6! xf6}19.\text{xe6+ b8}\) 20.0-0-0 \(\text{c5}21.d7\) \(\text{c7}\) 22.\(\text{f5}\). White has an extra pawn and it would be too hard for Black to regain it at some moment, because he might come under a dangerous kingside attack.

Black will hardly equalize after: 9...f5 10.0-0 d5 11.\(\text{b1 e6}\). White’s plan to crush his opponent’s kingside is crystal clear: 12.g4 \(\text{e7}13.\text{d2 c7}\) 14.h4 fxg4 15.\(\text{xg4 f5}16.h5\) and Black will not manage to defend his weaknesses. After: 16...0-0 17.\(\text{d3 xd4}18.\text{hxg6 hxg6}19.\text{e3} – White remained with an extra pawn, Zuidema – Czerniak, Havana 1966.

Black’s attempt to seize the initiative on the queenside seems to be quite futile after: 8...b5 9.\(\text{d3 b4}\) (if 9...a5 10.0-0 b4 11.\(\text{e2 gf6}\), then 12.g4\) and Black’s king has no safe shelter under the sun Karsai – Pasztorschik, Nyiregyhaza 1994; while it is even worse for Black to play: 9...e5 10.\(\text{xe5 dxe5}11.0-0 \text{gf6}\) 12.d5 b4 13.dxc6 bxc3 14.\(\text{xd7+ xd7}15.\text{g5+} – \) and White’s material advantage can easily be pressed home, Nagy – Hajdu, Hungary 1999) 10.\(\text{e2 gf6}11.0-0 0-0\), Franzen – Zakic, Trnava 1989, and here after the energetic move 12.g4! White maintains a great advantage, for example: 12...c5 13.e5 \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{xc5 xc5}\) 15.\(\text{xe5}\) 16.ad1 \(\text{c8}\) 17.\(\text{c4}\). Black does not have a single active piece piece left on the board.

9.0-0-0 \(\text{e7}\)

The other possibilities for Black are even worse:

It is too passive for Black to play: 9...\(\text{c7}10.g4 \text{e7}11.\text{d3 b6}12.f5\) Thomaschke – Wolfrum, Pinneberg 2000;

After 9...d5, Comp Rebel 10 – Anand, Ischia 1998, despite the fact that Anand himself has played that move, it can hardly be recommended, because White’s energetic response 10.f5! puts it under serious doubt, for example: 10...\(\text{gf5}\) (in case of: 10...\(\text{xe4}\) 11.\(\text{xe4 xf5}\) 12.\(\text{d6+}\) \(\text{f8}\) 13.\(\text{c4} – \) Black would not be able to neutralize easily White’s threats: 14.\(\text{xf7}\), 14.g4, 14.\(\text{xb7}\.

White’s game develops effortlessly after: 10...\(\text{e7}11.\text{xe6 xe6}\) 12.h4+) 11.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{f6}\) (it is not favourable for Black to open the centre: 11...e5 12.dxe5 \(\text{xe5}\) 13.\(\text{e1 xc3}\) 14.bxc3 \(\text{e7}\) 15.\(\text{d1} \text{e5}\) 16.\(\text{f2 f6}\) 17.\(\text{f4}\), be-
cause he is too much behind in development and his king is rather vulnerable) 12.g4 0–0
(12...exf5 13.g5±) 13.♕d3 ♦h6 14.h4±. White has a lead in development, a better pawn-structure, a powerful bishop and strong pressure along the f-file. His prospects are clearly superior.

10.g4

10...♕a5

It seems dubious for Black to play: 10...d5 11.f5! dxe4 12.♗xe4 exf5 13.♕d6+ ♦f8 14.♖c4+— Milov – Lada, Biel 2003, or 10...f5
11.♕d3 d5 (It is only slight better for Black, but not too promising, if he tries: 11...fxe4 12.
♕xe4±; 11...♕f8 12.exf5 exf5 13.♗f2±; 12...gx5 13.g5±) 12.exf5 exf5 13.gxf5+– V.Gurevich – Dorne, Katowice 1993.

11.♖b1 ♦b8

It looks more logical for Black to follow with: 11...0–0–0 12.♕d3 d5 13.e5 ♦f6 (13...c5?! 14.♗b5+–) 14.exf6 ♦xf6, although after 15.♖he1±, Black’s weakness on the e6-square requires protection, while he has great problems to create effective counterplay, since 15...c5 would not work, because of 16.♗b5! c4 17.♕xc4! dxc4 (Black cannot change much after: 17...♕h4 18.♖e2 dxc4 19.
♕d6+ ♦c7 20.♗b7+ ♦d6 21.♕d2! c3! 22.f5! ♦xf5 23.gxf5+–; or 17...a6 18.♕d6+ ♦c7 19.♕d2 ♦b6
20.♖xe6+–) 18.♕d6+ ♦c7 19.♗b7+ ♦d6 20.♕d2! ♦b8 (20...c3
21.f5! ♦xf5 22.♕xc3! ♔xc3 23.
♔a6+ ♙c6 24.♖xe6+ ♦xe6 25.
♖xc6+ ♔d6 26.♔e1+–) 21.♔xe6+!
♖xe6 22.♔e4+ ♦f7 23.♕xa5
♕he8 24.f5→ and Black has great problems despite the material equality. His king is quite exposed and his pieces lack coordination.

12.e5 dxe5

Or 12...d5 13.♕d3± and Black can hardly neutralize White’s pawn-break f4–f5.

13.♖xe5 ♔d5 14.♗e4 ♦f8
15.♕c1 b5

16.f5!

Black’s position seems to be undefensible after that move. 16...b4 (Black loses immediately
after: 16...gx5 17.gxf5 ♔xe5 18.♕g3 ♔c7 19.♕f4+–, or 16...
♔xe5 17.♕g3 ♔c7 18.♕f4! ♦xf4
19.♕f6+ ♔e7 20.♔h4+–; 17...♕d7

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18.fx6 fx6 19.\(\Box_d6\) \(\rightarrow\) 17.fx6 fx6 18.\(\Box_c4\) \(\Box_e5\) 19.\(\Box_g3!\) \(\Box_g7\) (Black would not save the game after: 19...\(\Box_c7\) 20.\(\Box_xd5\) exd5 21. \(\Box_f6+\) \(\Box_f7\) 22.\(\Box_hf1\) \(\Box_e6\) 23.\(\Box_f4\) \(\Box_d6\) 24.\(\Box_de1\) \(\rightarrow\); 22...\(\Box_g7\) 23.\(\Box_f4\) \(h6\) 24.\(\Box_d7\) \(\rightarrow\), or 20...exd5 21.\(\Box_f6\) and White's attack is irresistible, for example: 21...\(\Box_f7\) 22.\(\Box_hf1\) \(\Box_g7\) 23.\(\Box_f4\) \(h6\) 24.\(\Box_d7\) \(\rightarrow\) 20. \(\Box_xd5\) exd5 21.\(\Box_h6\) \(\Box_c7\) 22. \(\Box_d6\) \(\rightarrow\) Fischer – Beach, Pough- skeepie 1963.

\(d5\) 6...\(\Box_b6\) 7.\(\Box_d2\)

The most principled move for Black in this position is \(d5d\) 7...\(\Box_xf3\). He has often tried in practice \(d5b\) 7...\(\Box_f6\) and \(d5c\) 7...\(\Box_d7\). There have been some players who were willing to grab the pawn with \(d5a\) 7...\(\Boxxb2\).

The move 7...e6?! enables White to try to trap the enemy's bishop with: 8.\(\Box_g5!\) \(h6\) 9.\(\Boxxf7\) \(\Boxxf7\) 10.\(\Box_h3\) \(\Box_f5\) (Black's attempt to seize the initiative, while White is busy with regaining his piece, leads after: 10...c5!? 11.e5! \(\Box f5\) 12.dxc5 dxc5 13.g4 \(\Box e7\) 14.0–0–0\(\rightarrow\) to a position in which Black has problems keeping the material balance, moreover his king is quite vulnerable.) 11.exf5 exf5 12.g4 \(\Box e7\) 13.0–0–0 \(d5\), Zvara – Spacek, Prague 1990, and Black must be careful about the safety of his king after: 14.\(\Box a4\) \(\Box c7\) 15.\(\Box d3\) \(\rightarrow\).

After the dubious pawn-sacrifice 7...d5, White plays 8.exd5 \(\Box xf3\) 9.gxf3 \(\Box h6\), Fernandez Garcia – Todorcevic, Mesa 1992 (Black can regain his pawn with: 9...\(\Box_xd5\) 10.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box xb2\), but after 11.\(\Box d1\) \(\Box d7\) 12.\(\Box c3\) \(\rightarrow\) he lags behind in development and his king remains in the centre.) and here following the simple line: 10.0–0–0 \(\Box f5\) 11.\(\Box h3\) \(\Box d6\) (11... \(\Box xe3\) 12.\(\Box xe3\) \(\Box d8\) 13.\(\Box he1\) \(\rightarrow\)) 12.\(\Box e2\) \(\rightarrow\) White remains with an extra pawn and better development.

\(d5a\) 7...\(\Boxxb2\)

This capture opens the b-file and that is in favour of White, because of his superior development.

8.\(\Box b1\) \(\Box a3\) 9.\(\Box xb7\) \(\Box f6\)

Black's attempt to repel the active white rook with: 9...\(\Box c8\) 10.\(\Box b3\) \(\Box a5\) 11.\(\Box d3\) \(\Box f6\) 12.\(h3\) 0–0 13.0–0 \(\Box bd7\) 14.e5 \(\rightarrow\) led to a considerable lag in development for him in the game A.Kovacevic – Tocsic, Belgrade 1999, while his try to develop the queenside first – ended up in his failure to castle: 9...\(\Box d7\) 10.\(\Box c7!\) \(\Box gf6\) 11.e5 \(\Box d5\) 12.\(\Box xd5\) exd5 13.\(\Box b5\) \(\Box d8\) 14.\(h3\) \(\Box xf3\) 15.gxf3 \(e6\) 16.0–0 \(a6\) 17.\(\Box c6\) 0–0 18.\(\Box xd7\) \(\Box xd7\) 19.\(\Box xd7\) \(\Box d8\)
20.\textbf{\texttt{c}}b1 \textbf{\texttt{a}}h6 21.\textbf{\texttt{a}}b3 \textbf{\texttt{x}}xa2 22.f5 \textbf{\texttt{f}}8 23.fxe6 1–0 Arakhamia-Grant – Gligoric, Moscow 1989.

After 9...\textbf{\texttt{a}}5 10.\textbf{\texttt{e}}e2 \textbf{\texttt{c}}8 (The endgame is very difficult for Black in the variation: 10...\textbf{\texttt{f}}6 11.e5 \textbf{\texttt{f}}d7 12.\textbf{\texttt{b}}5 \textbf{\texttt{x}}d2+ 13.\textbf{\texttt{x}}d2 \textbf{\texttt{c}}xb5 14.\textbf{\texttt{x}}g4\textbf{\texttt{+}}, because all of White’s pieces are very active.) 11.\textbf{\texttt{b}}b1 \textbf{\texttt{f}}6 12.h3 0–0 13.0–0 \textbf{\texttt{e}}6 14.\textbf{\texttt{h}}bb1 \textbf{\texttt{c}}7, Korneev – Arbakov, Bad Woerishofen 1998, and here it was very efficient for White to play 15.Bd3\textbf{\texttt{+}} with the idea to begin a kingside attack with the move 16.f5→.

\textbf{\texttt{10.\texttt{c}}c4}

This is the most energetic move for White. He attacks the f7-square and prevents d5.

\textbf{\texttt{10...\texttt{x}}xf3}

Black cannot compromise White’s pawn-structure otherwise – 10...\textbf{\texttt{a}}a5 11.\textbf{\texttt{g}}g5! 0–0, Timoschenko – Shtukaturkin, Leningrad 1967 (it is worse for Black to play 11...d5 12.exd5 0–0 13.d6\textbf{\texttt{+}}. The most aggressive line for White here seems to be: 12.e5 \textbf{\texttt{f}}d7 13.h3 \textbf{\texttt{f}}5 14.g4 \textbf{\texttt{b}}6 15.\textbf{\texttt{b}}3 \textbf{\texttt{d}}7 16.e6\textbf{\texttt{+}}.

\textbf{\texttt{11.gxf3 \texttt{bd7}}}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{\texttt{8...0–0}}
\end{center}

It is hardly good for Black to play: 8...d5 9.e5 \textbf{\texttt{f}}d7 (if 9...\textbf{\texttt{g}}8, Gosio – Aldrovandi, Porto San Giorgio 2002, then after 10.0–0–0 e6 11.h3 \textbf{\texttt{x}}f3 12.\textbf{\texttt{x}}f3 \textbf{\texttt{e}}7 13.g4\textbf{\texttt{+}}, Black lags behind in development considerably; in case of 9...\textbf{\texttt{e}}4 10.\textbf{\texttt{xe}}4 dxe4 11.\textbf{\texttt{g}}5 \textbf{\texttt{xe}}2 12.\textbf{\texttt{xe}}2 \textbf{\texttt{xb}}2 13.0–0 \textbf{\texttt{a}}3 14.\textbf{\texttt{xe}}4\textbf{\texttt{+}} White’s centre is very powerful, Ploetz – Taeger, Munich 1985) 10.0–0–0 \textbf{\texttt{a}}5. After 11.\textbf{\texttt{g}}5\textbf{\texttt{!}} White manages to organize a powerful at-

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tack: 11...\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe2 12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe2 h6 (12...
\textit{\textbf{Q}}e6 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f8 14.\textit{\textbf{f}}xe6 \textit{\textbf{f}}xe6 15.\textit{\textbf{R}}hf1
\textit{\textbf{Q}}bd7 16.\textit{\textbf{f}}f7 \textit{\textbf{g}}a6 17.\textit{\textbf{R}}g5 1–0
\textit{\textbf{G}}ross – \textit{\textbf{D}}olezal, \textit{\textbf{P}}lzen 2001.)
13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf7 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xf7 14.\textit{\textbf{f}}5 \textit{\textbf{x}}f5 15.\textit{\textbf{R}}h5+
\textit{\textbf{Q}}g8 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}df1 \textit{\textbf{a}}6 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d8 18.
\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf5 \textit{\textbf{x}}f5 19.\textit{\textbf{Q}}h1 \textit{\textbf{e}}7 20.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xg7+
\textit{\textbf{Q}}xg7 21.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g1+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}f8 22.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xh6+
\textit{\textbf{Q}}xh6 23.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xh6+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}e8 24.\textit{\textbf{E}}g7 \textit{\textbf{B}}b4
25.\textit{\textbf{a}}3 1–0 \textit{\textbf{S}}hirov – \textit{\textbf{S}}tangl, \textit{\textbf{T}}unja
1989.

White should not mind
\textit{\textbf{B}}lack’s capturing the pawn:
8...\textit{\textbf{Q}}xb2 9.\textit{\textbf{B}}b1 \textit{\textbf{a}}3 10.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xb7 0–0
11.0–0 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c8 12.\textit{\textbf{B}}b3± \textit{\textbf{L}}agumina –
\textit{\textbf{A}}rduman, \textit{\textbf{F}}orli 1992. The material
is equal, but White dominates in the centre, he has the b-
file and better development.

It seems a bit strange for
\textit{\textbf{B}}lack to play: 8...\textit{\textbf{Q}}c8?! 9.0–0–0
0–0 10.\textit{\textbf{h}}3 \textit{\textbf{a}}5 11.\textit{\textbf{B}}b1 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 12.
\textit{\textbf{Q}}g5± \textit{\textbf{S}}tets – \textit{\textbf{K}}uzmin, \textit{\textbf{A}}lushta
1999. White manages to organize
an attack much earlier than his opponent.

It is not logical for \textit{\textbf{B}}lack to follow with: 8...
\textit{\textbf{Q}}c7 9.\textit{\textbf{h}}3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xf3
10.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf3 \textit{\textbf{e}}5, \textit{\textbf{T}}zermiadianos –
\textit{\textbf{I}}stratescu, \textit{\textbf{P}}atras 2001, because
the opening of files in the centre
is in favour of White – he has
better development and a pair of
bishops 11.\textit{\textbf{d}}xe5 \textit{\textbf{d}}xe5 12.\textit{\textbf{f}}xe5
\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe5 (12...\textit{\textbf{Q}}fd7 13.\textit{\textbf{e}}6 \textit{\textbf{f}}xe6 14.0–
0–0 \textit{\textbf{e}}5 15.\textit{\textbf{e}}xe5 0–0 16.\textit{\textbf{c}}c5±)
13.0–0–0 0–0 0–0 14.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4±.

12.e5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e8, \textit{\textbf{B}}areev – \textit{\textbf{T}}odorcevic, \textit{\textbf{Y}}ugoslavia 1989, 13.\textit{\textbf{h}}4?!
\textit{\textbf{d}}d8 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}ad1 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 (White’s attack
is dangerous after: 14...\textit{\textbf{Q}}b6
15.\textit{\textbf{e}}e2 \textit{\textbf{d}}5 16.\textit{\textbf{b}}3 \textit{\textbf{h}}6 17.\textit{\textbf{h}}5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g7
18.\textit{\textbf{g}}4–) 15.\textit{\textbf{h}}5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}b6 (It is too
 risky for \textit{\textbf{B}}lack to follow with:
15...\textit{\textbf{g}}xh5 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xh5 \textit{\textbf{c}}5 17.\textit{\textbf{d}}5–
\textit{\textbf{d}}xe5 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf7++) 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}e2 \textit{\textbf{d}}d5
17.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xd5 \textit{\textbf{c}}xd5 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d3±. White
enjoys the two bishop advantage,
a solid centre and excellent
attacking chances.

\textit{\textbf{d}}5c) 7...\textit{\textbf{d}}d7 8.\textit{\textbf{e}}e2
(diagram)

8...\textit{\textbf{a}}5
White’s advantage is huge
after \textit{\textbf{B}}lack’s other possibilities:
8...\textit{\textbf{d}}5 9.\textit{\textbf{e}}5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}h6 10.0–0–0 \textit{\textbf{d}}5
11.\textit{\textbf{f}}2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xf3 12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf3 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 13.\textit{\textbf{g}}4
\textit{\textbf{Q}}e7 14.\textit{\textbf{b}}1 0–0–0 15.\textit{\textbf{h}}4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}de8
16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}hf1 \textit{\textbf{Q}}h8 17.\textit{\textbf{f}}5± \textit{\textbf{K}}orneev –
Gutierrez Lopez, Malaga 2002. White has the bishop pair, a powerful centre, besides Black has no counterplay at all.

After 8...\(\text{Qg6}\) 9.h3 \(\text{xf3}\) 10. \(\text{xf3}\) 0-0 11.0-0-0 12.e5 \(\text{e8}\) 13.h4\(\pm\), White begins a kingside attack, while Black has no active piece to counter it with – Kaiszauri – Poutiainen, Groningen 1971;

It is too dangerous for Black to grab the h2-pawn, either immediately – 8...\(\text{Xxb2}\) 9.\(\text{b1 a3}\), Larnsson – Gheorghiu, Krakow 1964, 10.\(\text{b3}\) 11.\(\text{xb7}\) 12.\(\text{b6}\) 13.\(\text{xd2}\) 14.\(\text{g4}\)\(\pm\), as well as after 8...e6 9.0-0 d5 10.e5 \(\text{xf3}\) 11.\(\text{xf3}\) 12.\(\text{ab1 a3}\) 13.\(\text{b3}\) 14.\(\text{xb7}\) Thipsay – Soltis, Cuttacka 1986.

9.0-0 \(\text{xf3}\)

In answer to 9...e5, G.Hernandez – Vassallo, Barcelona 2000, it is quite good for White to follow with 10.\(\text{ad1}\)\(\pm\), and Black cannot play for example: 10...\(\text{gf6}\)?, because of 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.fxe5 \(\text{xe5}\) 13.\(\text{xe5}\) 14.\(\text{xf6}\)\(\pm\).

It is also too bad for Black to try: 9...\(\text{gf6}\) 10.e5! dxe5 11.fxe5

\(\text{d5}\)\(\pm\) Winkler – Clemens, Dortmund 1987 (it is only slightly better for Black to play 11...\(\text{g8}\) 12.\(\text{g5}\)\(\pm\)) 12.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd2}\) (in case of 12...\(\text{xd5}\) 13.\(\text{c4}\) 14.\(\text{g5}\)\(\pm\), Black loses his queen) 13.\(\text{c7}\) 14.\(\text{d8}\) 15.\(\text{xd2}\) 16.\(\text{xf1}\) \(\text{xf1}\)\(\pm\). Black will probably manage to regain his piece, but he will surely lose several pawns in the process.

10.\(\text{xf3}\) e5 11.b4 \(\text{d8}\)

White’s endgame is clearly better after: 11...\(\text{xb4}\) 12.\(\text{ab1}\) 13.\(\text{xb7}\) ed 14.\(\text{xd4}\) 15.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c5}\) 16.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 17.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 18.e5 d5 19.c4\(\pm\), because Black will hardly be able to introduce his rook on h8 into play anytime soon.

12.\(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{e7}\) 13.\(\text{f5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 14.\(\text{d5}\)\(\pm\) Korneev – Vassallo, Mislata 2001.

\(\text{d5d)}\) 7...\(\text{xf3}\) 8.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{d7}\)

The other possibilities for Black are:

8...\(\text{a5}\) 9.0-0-0 \(\text{gf6}\) (About 10...\(\text{d7}\) – see 8...\(\text{d7}\); 10...b5 10.\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{d7}\) – see 8...\(\text{d7}\); 9...e6 – see 8...e6) 10.0-0-0 b5 (10... \(\text{bd7}\) – see 8...\(\text{d7}\)) 11.e5 \(\text{fd7}\)
(11...\(\Box\)h5 12.\(\Box\)h3!±) 12.\(\Box\)g1 0–0 13.h4→;

8...\(\Box\)xb2?! 9.\(\Box\)b1 \(\Box\)a3 10.\(\Box\)xb7 \(\Box\)d7 (Black’s defence is difficult too after 10...\(\Box\)f6 11.\(\Box\)c4 0–0 12.0–0 \(\Box\)fd7 13.\(\Box\)b1 \(\Box\)a4 14.\(\Box\)b4 1–0 Schaefer – Boehm, Groningen 1992; it is only slightly better for him to try: 12...\(\Box\)bd7 13.e5 \(\Box\)b6 14.exf6 \(\Box\)xc4 15.\(\Box\)e2!±) 11.\(\Box\)c7 c5 (White remains with too many extra pawns after: 11...\(\Box\)g6f 12.\(\Box\)xc6 0–0 13.e5 \(\Box\)h5 14.\(\Box\)a6 \(\Box\)b2 15.\(\Box\)d5± Wood – Wright, Barnstable 1971.) 12.\(\Box\)b5 \(\Box\)d8 13.e5± Dimitriadis – Cobb, corr. 1997;

8...\(\Box\)f6 9.0–0–0 d5 (About 9...\(\Box\)a5 – see 8...\(\Box\)a5; 9...\(\Box\)bd7 10.\(\Box\)g1 – see 8...\(\Box\)d7 9.0–0–0 \(\Box\)g6f 10.\(\Box\)g1; 9...\(\Box\)c7 10.h4 \(\Box\)d7 – see 8...\(\Box\)d7; 10...\(\Box\)b5 11.\(\Box\)e2! \(\Box\)bd7 12.\(\Box\)g3↑) 10.f5!↑ The most energetic way for White to emphasize his advantage is to open files. It is too dubious for Black to try: 10...gx\(\Box\)f5 (in answer to 10...\(\Box\)bd7, Metz – Mandic, Richmond 2004, White should better follow with: 11.e5! \(\Box\)h5 12.\(\Box\)h3 0–0–0 13.\(\Box\)g4±; the endgame is very difficult for Black after: 10...\(\Box\)a6 11.\(\Box\)a4 \(\Box\)b4 12.\(\Box\)xb4 \(\Box\)xb4 13.e5 \(\Box\)d7 14.c3 \(\Box\)a6 15.\(\Box\)xa6 bxa6 16.\(\Box\)hg1±, because his queenside pawns are weak, his pieces are passive and he lacks space.) 11.\(\Box\)g1 \(\Box\)f8, Thorhallsson – S.Nikolic, Komotini 1993, because after: 12.\(\Box\)a4 \(\Box\)d8 (12...\(\Box\)c7 13.exf5 \(\Box\)bd7 14.\(\Box\)f4+) 13.exf5± Black’s lag in development is considerable;

8...e6 9.0–0–0

and now:

1) in answer to 9...d5 White’s best move is 10.f5↑.

Now, it is too bad for Black to play: 10...gx\(\Box\)f5 11.\(\Box\)g1 \(\Box\)f6 (it is even worse for him to try: 11...\(\Box\)f8 12.exf5 exf5 13.\(\Box\)e1 \(\Box\)e7 14.\(\Box\)e4 \(\Box\)d8 15.\(\Box\)e3 1–0 Koscieliski – Boehm, Germany 1997, or 11...f4 12.\(\Box\)xg7 fx\(\Box\)e3 13.\(\Box\)xe3 \(\Box\)f8 14.\(\Box\)g3+ Savereide – Gonzalez Rodriguez, Saint John 1988.) 12.exf5 exf5 13.\(\Box\)h3 \(\Box\)e7 14.\(\Box\)g5 \(\Box\)xg5 15.\(\Box\)xg5 \(\Box\)g8 16.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)xg1 17.\(\Box\)xg1± and Black’s defence is extremely difficult, because of the weaknesses on his kingside Bakic – Cabrilo, Herceg Novi 2000;

Black has no compensation for the pawn after: 10...exf5 11.exd5 \(\Box\)f6 (11...\(\Box\)a5, Lang – Kaufmann, Schonach 1979, 12.\(\Box\)e1 \(\Box\)f6 13.\(\Box\)f4+ \(\Box\)d8 14.d6±) 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.d5± Jerman – Kansky, Czech Republic 1999;

Black only creates too many weaknesses after: 10...\(\Box\)a6 11.\(\Box\)a4! \(\Box\)b4 (11...\(\Box\)c7 12.\(\Box\)xa6 bxa6 13.fxe6 fxe6 14.\(\Box\)c5±) 12.
\[ \text{\textbullet x} b 4 \text{\textbullet x} b 4 \text{13.} \text{c} 3 \text{\textbullet a} 6 \text{14.} \text{\textbullet x} a 6 \text{b} x a 6 \text{15.} \text{f} x e 6 \text{f} x e 6 \text{16.} \text{\textbullet c} 5 \pm \text{Tomba - Ferro, Bratto 2003, while in the variation 10...\textbullet d} 7 \text{11.} \text{f} x e 6 \text{f} x e 6 \text{12.} \text{\textbullet h} 3 \text{\textbullet f} 8 \text{13.} \text{\textbullet a} 4 \text{\textbullet c} 7 \text{(13...} \text{\textbullet a} 6 \text{14.} \text{\textbullet b} 4 \pm) 14.\text{\textbullet c} 5 \pm \text{White ends up with better development, the two bishop advantage and extremely active pieces Neverov – Erushev, Blagoveshchensk 1988;}

2) 9...\text{\textbullet a} 5 \text{10.f} 5! \text{White's lead in development is huge, so he must begin opening files in the centre. 10...\text{g} x f 5 \text{(in answer to 10...\text{e} x f 5, Springmann – Kurz, Zell 1993, White's simplest line would be: 11.\text{e} x f 5!, for example: 11...\text{\textbullet x} f 5 – but not 11...\text{\textbullet e} 7 12.\text{f} 6 \pm 12.\text{\textbullet e} 4 \text{\textbullet f} 8 13.\text{\textbullet b} 4 \text{\textbullet d} 7 14.d} 5 \pm and White's great lead in development is more than sufficient compensation for the pawn. Black loses after: 12...\text{\textbullet e} 6 13.\text{\textbullet e} 1! \text{\textbullet x} a 2 14.\text{\textbullet b} 4 \pm) 11.\text{e} x f 5 \text{e} x f 5 \text{(White has excellent chances to trap the enemy's queen after: 11...\text{\textbullet x} f 5 12.\text{\textbullet e} 4 \text{\textbullet f} 8 13.\text{\textbullet d} 3 \text{\textbullet d} 5 14.\text{c} 4 \text{\textbullet h} 5 15.\text{\textbullet b} 4 \pm; 13...\text{\textbullet h} 5 14.\text{\textbullet h} 1 \text{\textbullet d} 7 15.\text{\textbullet g} 5 \pm; while the passive line 11...\text{\textbullet d} 7 12.\text{f} x e 6 \text{f} x e 6 13.\text{\textbullet h} 3 \text{\textbullet f} 8 14.\text{\textbullet h} 1 \text{\textbullet f} 6, David – San Segundo, Athens 1997, led to a very difficult endgame for Black – 15.\text{\textbullet e} 4! \pm) 12.\text{\textbullet e} 1 \text{\textbullet d} 7 13.\text{\textbullet c} 4 \text{d} 5 14.\text{\textbullet d} 3 \pm Jakovenko – Odinokov, Tomsk 1998. Black's defence is quite problematic in this position, because his king is stranded in the centre, he lags in development and there are plenty of weaknesses on his kingside.}

9.0–0–0

9...\text{\textbullet a} 5

After 9...\text{\textbullet g} f 6, Lanka – Simon, Chemnitz 1998, White's most simple decision seems to be 10.\text{\textbullet g} 1! \text{\textbullet c} 7 (in the line 10...\text{\textbullet g} 8 11.\text{\textbullet c} 4 \text{\textbullet b} 4 12.\text{\textbullet b} 3 \text{\textbullet b} 6 13.\text{\textbullet d} 3 \pm Black must consider White's pawn-breaks e5 and f5, moreover he should worry about how to evacuate his king away from the centre.) 11.f5 0–0–0 12.\text{\textbullet c} 4 \text{\textbullet h} 8 13.\text{\textbullet b} 3 \pm and White has powerful pressure on the kingside and in the centre.

In case of 9...0–0–0 White can deploy his bishop to a more active placement. 10.\text{\textbullet c} 4 \text{f} 5 (The passive move 10...\text{\textbullet f} 8, de Firmian – Ravishkar, Dubai 1986, enables White to seize the initiative in the centre and on the queenside with: 11.d5!? \text{\textbullet b} 4 – after 11...c5 12.a3 \pm Black has no counterplay – 12.dxc6 \text{\textbullet x} c 4 13.cxd7+ \text{\textbullet x} d 7 14.e5 \pm Black's defence is difficult, because his pieces on the queenside are misplaced and his king is vulnerable in the centre; or 12...\text{\textbullet x} c 6 13.\text{\textbullet d} 4 \text{\textbullet g} f 6 14.\text{\textbullet a} 6+}{
Chapter 27

\( b8 \text{ 15.e5±) 11.hg1 } h6 \text{ 12. e6 h8 13.h4 } h8 \text{ 14.h5 gxh5 15.d5 c5 16.e5 } b8, \text{ Javelle – Fricker, Dieppe 1967. White’s centralized bishop on the e6-square paralyzes Black’s pieces and White has a free hand to act on both sides of the board. 17. } h2! \text{ g8 (It is a disaster for Black to play: 17...dxe5 18.xd7 xd7 19.fxe5 g8 20.a4++) 18.xh5 dxe5 19.xh7±. Black’s central pawns are weak and his pieces are quite passive.}

9...c7 10.h4 g6 11.e5!? h5 (White’s initiative develops effortlessly after: 11...d5 12. xd5 cxd5 13.h5 0–0–0 14.h6 f8 15.e6 b6 16.exf6 e6 17.a5 b8 18.xd3 c8 19.c3± Shirov – Speelman, Bordeaux 1998. In case of 15...fxe6 16.h3 xh6 17.xe6 g7 18.f5 gxf5 19.g2 f6 20.f4±, White’s powerful bishop on e6 more than compensates the temporary pawn-deficit.) 12.h3 f5 (This move prevents 13.g4±, but it weakens the e6-square.) 13.exf6 xf6 (It is worse for Black to follow with 13...hxg6 14.f5±, and White destroys Black’s kingside, or 13...dxf6 14.e6! h6 15.f5! xe3 16.xe3 gxf5 17.hg1± and White’s powerful bishop on e6 again paralyzes Black’s pieces.) 14.e4 g7 (following 14...d5 15. xf6+ dxg6 16.f5 g3 17.he1 xf5 18.f4 xd7 19.e5= the black king can hardly find a safe shelter; it is also bad for Black to play: 16...gxf5 17.g5 f4

18.he1±, because White’s active piece placement is more than sufficient compensation for the missing pawn) 15.d5 f8 16.f5! xf5 (In the line: 16...gxg5 17.xf6+ xf6 18.h6± Black fails to bring his king to safety.) 17.xf5 gxf5 18.g5= White has a very powerful initiative for the sacrificed pawn and Black’s difficulties are illustrated in the following line: 18...xg5 19.xg5 f4 20.xf4 cxd5 21.e3 xg3 (21...f7 22.xd5±) 22.xh7 f8 23.h8=.

10.b1

10...b5

In answer to 10...e6 11.g1 0–0–0, Todorovic – Todorcovic, Panccevo 1987, White should better sacrifice a pawn in a standard fashion in order to seize the initiative with: 12.f5! exf5 13.xf5 xf5 13...b6 14.fgx6 hxg6 15.g5±) 14.d5 e5 (14...b6 15.dxc6 bx6 16.g5→) 15.dxc6 xcx6 16.b5±.

White’s initiative develops effortlessly after: 10...0–0–0 11.g1 b8 12.c4 e6 (or 12...d5, Brueggemann – Meis, Germany 1997, 13.b3 e6 14.f5±, and
Black will have plenty of weaknesses on the kingside to worry about) 13.f5 exf5 14.\x26xf7 \x26e7 15.\x26h4+ Smikovski – Utkin, St.Petersburg 2002. White’s centre is solid, he has the two bishops and his initiative on the kingside is overwhelming.

10...d5 11.f5 gxf5 12.\x26g1 \x26f8 13.exf5 \x26gf6 (after 13...0-0-0, Prandstetter – Sikora, Slovakia 1979, Black’s king remains rather vulnerable: 14.\x26f4 \x26gf6? 15.\x26b5+; 14...\x26b6 15.\x26e5 \x26f6 16.\x26d3+, Black has problems developing his kingside, since he cannot repel White’s bishop from the e5-square, because in answer to \x26d7 he should consider \x26b5! 14.\x26f4 \x26g8 (Black should refrain from castling, because of: 14...0-0-0? 15.\x26b5! b6 16.\x26xa5 bxa5 17.\x26c7+ 15. \x26xg8 \x26xg8 16.h4 \x26gf6 17.\x26e1+. Black’s position seems solid, but he cannot complete his development successfully.

10...\x26gf6 11.\x26g1 0-0-0 (The move 11...\x26h5, Mainka – Hickl, Bad Neuenahr 1989, enables White to occupy the centre 12.f5 0-0-0 13.\x26c4 \x26df8 14.f4+.) 12.f5 \x26c7 13.\x26f2 \x26hg8 14.\x26h3 \x26b8 15.f4 \x26b6 16.\x26c1 Kritz – Arapovic, Mallorca 2004. White has a couple of bishops, a very mobile pawn-centre and extra space.

11.h4 \x26b6
About 11...\x26b8 12.h5 \x26b6 – see 11...\x26b6.

11...b4 12.\x26e2 \x26f6 13.\x26g3 \x26b8 14.h5+ Lanka – Todorcevic, Roma 1990.

12.\x26h5 \x26b4
Black fails to organize an attack along the b-file after: 12...\x26b8 13.hxg6 fxg6 14.\x26a1! \x26a4 (if 14...\x26c4, then after 15.\x26xc4 bxc4 16.f5! \x26b4 17.\x26b1 gxf5 18.\x26g2 \x26f8 (18...\x26f6 19.\x26xh7+) 19.d5! \x26f6 20.\x26d4 \x26g8 21.\x26h3 \x26g7 22.\x26h1+ White is clearly ahead of Black in the creation of dangerous threats.) 15.\x26xa4 \x26xa4 (Black must defend a much inferior endgame after: 15...\x26xd2 16.\x26xd2 bxa4 17.\x26h3+ 16.f5 gxf5 17.\x26g2! \x26f8 18.e5 d5 19.\x26xh7! – Pichler – Padros, corr. 1981.

13.\x26e2 \x26c4 14.\x26d3

14...\x26xe3
In the game Korneev – Movsziszian, Berga 1996, Black refrained from capturing the bishop and lost quickly after:

14...d5 15.\x26c1 \x26b8 16.hxg6 hxg6 17.\x26xh8 \x26xh8 18.f5 gxf5 19.\x26g3! fx4 (Black fails to block the f5-square with 19...e6 20.\x26xf5 e5, since White sacrifices a pawn with a dangerous attack after: 21.f6! \x26xf6 22.\x26h7+; 21...\x26xf6

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22.dxe5 \(\text{Qd7} \ 23.f4\pm \) 20.fxe4 \(\text{Qf6}\) (Black loses after: 20...\(\text{Bb6} \ 21.e5 \text{Aa6} \ 22.a3++\) while in case of 20...\(\text{Qb6} \ 21.a1 \text{Cc7} \ 22.e5\pm\) Black’s pieces on the kingside are totally misplaced.) 21.e5 \(\text{Qd7} \ 22.\text{Qf5!}\pm \text{Qdxe5} \ (22...\text{e6} \ 23.\text{Qh6}\to) \ 23.dxe5 \text{Axe5} \ 24.\text{Qd4} \text{Qb6} \ 25.\text{Bh7} \text{Qd6} \) (Black would not save the game after: 25...\text{Qxd4} \ 26.\text{Qxc4} dxc4 \ 27.\text{Qg8+} \text{Qd7} \ 28.\text{Qg4}++\) 26.\text{Qxc6} 1–0.

15.\(\text{Qxe3} \text{Qb6}\)

It is too bad for Black to play: 15...0–0–0?, because White’s plan to seize the initiative is crystal clear, while Black has no counterplay whatsoever: 16.\(\text{Qb3} \text{e6} \ 17.\text{Bh3} \text{Cc7} \ (17...\text{d5} \ 18.\text{Qxf5} \text{exf5} \ 19.\text{exf5} \text{Qb8} \ 20.\text{hxg6} \text{hxg6} \ 21.\text{fxg6} \text{fxg6} \ 22.\text{Qf4}\pm) \ 18.\text{f5} \text{exf5} \ 19.\text{exf5} \text{d5} \ 20.\text{fxg6} \text{fxg6} \ 21.\text{Qf4+} \text{Basden – Kempen, Australia 2001.}

The other possibility for Black is not connected with any constructive plan and it does not prevent White’s offensive on the kingside: 15...\(\text{Qd8}?! \ 16.\text{hxg6} \text{hxg6} \ 17.\text{Bxh8} \text{Bxh8} \ 18.\text{Bh3} \text{Qf6} \ (18...\text{Qf6} \ 19.\text{Qh1} \text{g7} \ 20.f5 \text{gxh5} \ 21.\text{Qg5}+) \ 19.f5 \text{gxh5} \ 20.\text{Bxg1+} \text{Scheuermann – Vence, corr. 2001.}

After 15...\(\text{Qf6}?\) White’s pressure in the centre and on the light squares is very powerful: 16.h6! \(\text{Qf8} \ 17.d5 \text{exd5} \ 18.e5! \text{Qd7} \ 19.e6 \text{fxe6} \ 20.\text{Bxe6} \text{Bb8} \) (Black would not survive the attack after: 20...\(\text{Qf6} \ 21.\text{Qd4} \text{a6} \) 22.\(\text{Qe1}++\) 21.\text{Qd4} \text{Qc5} \ 22.\text{Bh3} \text{Bb7} \ 23.\text{Bhe1}\pm \text{Bologan – Todorcevic, Las Palmas 1993. Black lost the game quickly, because his light squares were very weak, his kingside was not developed at all and his monarch was too exposed.

16.\(\text{hxg6} \text{hxg6} \ 17.\text{Bxh8} \text{Bxh8}\)

18.f5 \text{gxh5} 19.\text{Qg5} \text{Qxf8}, \text{Glek – Cekro, Belgium 2001 (19...\text{Qf6})}

Black’s attempt to simplify the position by exchanging pieces leads to a disaster after: 20.e5 \text{dxe5} \ 21.dxe5 \text{Qd8} \ 22.\text{Bxd8+} \text{Qxd8} \ 23.exf6 \text{Qd1+} \ 24.\text{Qc1} \text{Qxf6} \ 25.\text{Qxf6}++\) 20.\text{Qxf6} \text{e6} \ 21.\text{Qf4} \text{Qf6} \ 22.\text{Qc4}+–\) 21.\text{Qh3} \text{Qf6} \ (It is worse for Black to play: 21...\text{Qg7} \ 22.f4 \text{c5} \ 23.f5 \text{exf5} \ 24.\text{Qxf5}\to) \ 22.f4 \text{e5} \ 23.\text{Qg3} \text{exd4} \ 24.\text{Qf5} \text{Bc5} \ 25.\text{Qh7}+. Black has an extra pawn indeed, but his defence is very difficult against the attack along the g-file and on the vulnerable light squares. His heavy pieces are totally isolated from the actions.

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Conclusion

Black’s defence is quite problematic in the variation that we have analysed. It is hardly possible for him to exploit the doubling of the pawns on the f-file, while White’s powerful pawn-centre and his bishop pair provide him with a dangerous initiative. His light squared bishop remains without an opponent and it becomes a force to reckon with. In case Black refrains from exchanging on f3 – his defence is even more difficult, because the sortie of the bishop to the g4-square loses plenty of important tempi. Black’s attempt to seize the initiative on the queenside, with the help of the move b7-b5, only creates additional weaknesses for him. Should he try to prepare d6-d5 – that transposes to some lines of the Caro-Kann Defence, which we have analysed in our book 3, except that White has an extra tempo. His initiative then develops quickly and effortlessly.
Chapter 28  
1.e4 g6 2.d4 ♘g7 3.♘c3 d6 4.f4 a6

This is the starting position of the Ujtelyky-Chepukaitis system. At the beginning of the 60ies of the last century Maximilian Ujtelyky worked out a new and quite interesting opening strategy: Black, practically disregarding White’s moves, arranges his pieces in the following fashion: e6, ♙d7, ♙e7, b6, ♙b7, h6. All of Black’s pieces occupy the sixth, seventh and eighth ranks and it seems that White is about to win soon. Most of the games however, which ended up in the vicinity of move 20, were won by Black...

Later, there appeared another ardent follower of that opening – the master from Saint Petersburg Henrich Chepukaitis. He experimented a lot, while playing this opening (he often tried early the following plan g6-g5, ♙g6, g5-g4...) and as a result he found intuitively the most unpleasant set-up for White – 5...b5, 6...♙d7 and later c7-c5.

Nowadays, the critical opening battles are focused around that same build-up for Black.

5.♗f3 b5

About 5...♗f6 – see Part 3, Chapter 14; as for 5...♘c6 6.♗e3 – see 3.♗c3 d6 4.f4 ♘c6 5.♗e3 a6 6.♗f3.

Black has also tried in practice:

5...♗h6?! This move is rather dubious and it has been played only very seldom. After White’s simple answer 6.h3 (with the possible g2-g4 to follow later) Black’s task seems to be really difficult;

5...c5?! After that move, White should better enter a superior endgame with: 6.dxc5 dxc5 7.♗xd8+ ♘xd8 8.♗e3. His evident lead in development and the unsafe placement of the enemy’s king provide him with a clear advantage. 8...♘xc3+ (It is hardly better for Black to try here: 8...b6 9.0-0-0+ ♙d7 10.

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\(\text{\$g_5 \text{\$e_8 \text{\$d_5 \text{\$a_7 \text{\$e_5 h_6}}}}\) \text{13.\$e_4 \text{\$b_7 \text{\$e_2 \text{\$c_6 \text{\$f_3 \text{\$f_3 \pm}}}}}}\) 9.bxc3. The doubling of White's pawns is almost immaterial here, since Black cannot attack them effectively. 9...\text{\$d_7 10.\text{\$g_5 \text{\$e_8 \text{\$e_5 \text{\$d_6 \text{\$b_6}}}}}} 12.\text{\$c_3 \text{\$b_7 \text{\$e_6 \text{\$f_6 15.\text{\$x_g_6 \text{\$f_8 16.0-0 \text{\$g_7 17.\text{\$d_3 \text{\$f_6 18.\text{\$a_1 \text{\$e_4 \text{\$b_6}}}}}}}}}} 13.\text{\$d_6 + \text{\$e_7 14.\text{\$x_8 15.\text{\$c_6 \text{\$a_8 \text{\$b_5 \text{\$f_5 Hala}}}}}} - \text{Kincs, Hungary 1995;}}\)

5...\text{\$g_4 (This move does not seem logical, because Black has already wasted a tempo for the move a7-a6 in vain.) 6.\text{\$e_3 \text{\$d_7 \text{\$f_6 7.h_3 \text{\$x_3 8.\text{\$x_3 c_6 9.e_5 \text{\$fd_7 10.0-0 \text{\$w_5 \text{\$c_4 \text{\$x_3 Geenen - Deleyn, Bosvoorde 1994;}}}}}}}} 6...\text{\$b_5, Boehlig - Nedela, Germany 2000, 7.h_3 \text{\$x_3 8.\text{\$x_3 6.\text{\$c_6 7.h_3 \text{\$x_3 8.\text{\$x_3 e_6 9.0-0 \text{\$d_5 10.g_4! \text{\$e_7 11.\text{\$d_3 \text{\$f_5 12.f_5 \text{\$a_5 13.e_5 \text{\$x_5 14.\text{\$x_5 Feher - Csala, Harkany 2000;}}}}}}}}}} 6...\text{\$c_6 7.\text{\$e_2 e_5, Klundt - Bilek, Bad Pyrmont 1970, 8.f_5! \text{\$d_5 9.d_5 \text{\$c_7 10.0-0 \text{\$c_6 6.\text{\$e_6 7.\text{\$a_2 c_6 11.dxc_5 12.e_5 \text{\$h_6 13.0-0 \text{\$c_5 14.\text{\$d_5 \text{\$x_5 13.dxc_5 \text{\$xc_5}}}}}}}}}} 9.a_4! \text{This powerful pawn-break on the queenside is quite timely. It definitely parries Black's possible activity there.}}}} 9...\text{\$b_4 10.\text{\$e_2 \text{\$e_5 10.\text{\$b_8 11.0-0 \text{\$d_1 \text{\$b_7 13.\text{\$f_1 e_8 14.\text{\$g_3 f_5 15.\text{\$f_2 \text{\$d_5! \text{\$x_3 14.\text{\$d_7 \text{\$e_6 \text{\$f_7}}}}}}}}}}}}

9.a_4! \text{This powerful pawn-break on the queenside is quite timely. It definitely parries Black's possible activity there.}}

10.\text{\$x_4 11.\text{\$c_5 \text{\$d_5 \text{\$d_5 \text{\$c_5 \text{\$c_5}}}}}}

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\( \text{Qxf5 18. Qxf5 gxf5 19. Qf4 Qe5 20. Qd5 Qd6 21. Qf6+ Qxf6 22. Qxe5 Qb6 23. a5 Qb7 24. Qxb8 Qxb8 25. Qxc5+; 14... Qa5 15. f5 0–0 16. fxe6 fxe6 17. Qg5 Qxf1+ 18. Qxf1 Qe5 19. Qf4 bxc3 20. bxc3 c4 21. Qe2 Qb3 22. Qfxe6 Qxe6 23. Qxe6++; 15... gxf5 16. exf5 Qxf5 17. Qxf5 exf5 18. Qf4 Qb7 19. Qe3+ Qd8 20. Qg5++). White played in the game 15. c4 and won convincingly. Still, I think that White could have followed with a temporary pawn-sacrifice 15. f5! It would have created an immediate pressure on Black’s kingside and it would have emphasized the fact that Black was quite unprepared to defend his king effectively; moreover he would have no hopes of creating any counterplay. 15... exf5 (15... 0–0 16. Qh6 c4 17. Qb1 Qc5+ 18. Qh1 exf5 19. exf5 Qxf5 20. Qxf5 Qxf5 21. Qxg7 Qxg7 22. Qd4+ Qf6 23. Qxc4+). 16. exf5 c4 17. Qb1. Note that White’s rook has already been developed to the c-square, and therefore the bishop on b1 does not stand in its way of entering the actions actively. 17... Qe5 18. Qf4 Qc5+ 19. Qh1 f6 20. Qh4 Qxf5 21. Qxf5 Qxf5 22. Qxf5 gxf5 23. Qd4 Qd5 24. Qxe2 0–0 25. Qxf5;}

5... b6 – this move is also too slow and besides it does not combine well logically with Black’s fourth move. The only thing, which makes that idea worthwhile, is the fact that Black’s rook can later be activated via the a7-square. 6. Qd3 c5, Mrdja – R. Thomas, Cesenatico 2002. White should now emphasize immediately his space advantage with the typical centre pawn-break 7. e5!

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Diagram}
\end{array}
\]

Black might quickly fall in trouble after that, for example:

7... dxe5 8. dxe5 Qh6 9. Qe2 Qc6 10. Qe4 Qb7 11. Qe3 Qg4 12. Qd1 Qb8 13. Qg1 f5 14. Qd5 Qd8 15. h3 Qh6 16. Qb3 Qh7 17. Qf2+;

7... Qb7 8. d5! White’s central pawns are very powerful now. Black’s attempts to exchange, or annihilate these pawns might bring him quickly to the edge of the precipice. 8... dxe5 (8... b5 9. 0–0 b4 10. Qe4 Qxd5 11. Qb5+ axb5 12. Qxd5 Qa6 13. exd6 exd6 14. Qd1 Qf8 15. Qe1 Qe7 16. Qf5 Qh6 17. Qf6+ Qf8 18. Qxf7+ Qxf7 19. Qe6#) 9. fxe5 b5 10. 0–0 c4 11. Qe4 f5 12. Qg5 Qb6+ 13. Qh1 fxe4 14. Qe6 Qh6 15. Qxe4 Qd7 16. Qf3 Qxe5 17. Qc3 Qxd5 18. Qxh6 Qxh6 19. Qxe5 Qxe6 20. Qxh8+ Qg8 21. Qc3 0–0 0–0 22. Qae1 Qc6 23. Qxd5 Qxd5 24. Qxh7++;

7... cxd4 – this is definitely...
Black’s best option to counter his opponent’s idea. White however, should not necessarily recapture that pawn immediately. 8...\texttt{e}4! (this is an important intermediary move) 8...\texttt{a}7 (Black’s compensation for the exchange sacrifice is insufficient after: 8...dxc3 9.\texttt{x}a8 \texttt{c}7 10.0–0=) 9.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{g}4 10.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{d}7 11.0–0–0 dxe5 12.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xd}1 13.\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{gf}6 14.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 15.\texttt{c}6 \texttt{ac}8 16.\texttt{xd}7+ \texttt{xd}7 17.\texttt{xb}6=;

5...\texttt{d}7 – this tentative move develops a piece indeed, but it enables White to occupy the key-e5 central square outright. The tournament practice confirms that assessment, and so does the contemporary theory. 6.e5!

![Chess Board Image]

White’s advantage is quite clear in all variations:

The move 6...e6 – does not cause any trouble for White. 7.\texttt{d}3 b5, Pham Minh – Dinh Duc, Vietnam 2003, 8.\texttt{e}3=;

6...\texttt{h}6 7.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{b}6, Gudlaugsson – Smet, corr. 1990, 8.0–0 \texttt{f}5 9.h3 \texttt{xd}3 10.\texttt{xd}3 dxe5 (10...d5 11.g4 \texttt{wd}7 12.a4 0–0–0 13.a5 \texttt{a}8 14.b4=) 11.\texttt{xe}5 0–0 12.\texttt{e}4=;
21.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{xf}3\) 22.\(\text{gxf}3\)\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{h}6\) (there is no other square for Black's knight) 9.\(\text{g}5\) 0–0 (9...e6 10.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 11.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{wa}5\) 12.\(\text{xg}7+\) \(\text{f}7\) 13.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{xg}7\) 14.\(\text{f}6\)++) 10.a4! This move is very useful for White. Plenty of Black's pieces are misplaced after it; moreover his important c5-pawn might be endangered. 10...\(\text{b}6\) (10...\(\text{b}6\) 11.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 12.e6+) 11.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\) 12.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{f}5\) (Black remains with a lot of weaknesses to worry about after: 12...e6 13.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 14.0–0–0 \(\text{b}6\) 15.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{ge}4\)\(\text{c}8\) 13.a5 \(\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{c}e4\) \(\text{d}4\) 15.\(\text{x}c5\) \(\text{xc}2\) 16.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}4\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 18.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{b}5\) 19.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{xb}5\) 21.\(\text{xb}6\)++)

6.\(\text{d}3\)

Black's defence here is connected with two main lines: a) 6...\(\text{b}7\) and b) 6...\(\text{d}7\) with the idea to prepare c7-c5 and to be able to capture \(\text{d}7\)\(\text{xc}5\), in case White takes d4\(\text{xc}5\).

The other moves for Black have been played only very seldom:

6...\(\text{b}4\) – White's knight, which is now under attack, manoeuvres comfortably to the kingside in answer to that pawn-attack. Meanwhile, Black's queenside has been considerably weakened in the process. 7.\(\text{e}2\) d5 (7...\(\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{c}3\) bxc3 9.bxc3 0–0 10.0–0 d5 11.e5 \(\text{e}4\) 12.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 14.\(\text{g}3\)\(\text{+}\), and White wins Black's central e4-pawn) 8.e5 \(\text{g}4\) 9.0–0 e6 10.a3 \(\text{c}6\) 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}5\)? (11...\(\text{b}xa3\) 12.\(\text{xa}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 13.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 14.b4\(\text{+}\) 12.\(\text{xb}4\)++ Iniov – Arnaudov, Sofia 1977;

6...\(\text{c}6\) – that move has been
played only occasionally. 7...e3 8.f6 8.h3 0–0 9.0–0 8.b7, Reeh – G. Kuzmin, Gausdal 1992. White must prevent now the idea 8.c6-b4, since it is very unpleasant for him: 10.a3! Black has great problems now to create any counterplay, for example: 10...b4 (10...e5 11.fxe5 dxe5 12.dxe5 8.d7 13.g5 8.c8 14.8d5 8.dxe5 15.8xe5 8xe5 16.8d2! 8xb2 17.8f6++; 10...d5 11.e5+) 11.8e2 d5 12.e5 8.e4 13.8d2 bxa3 14.bxa3 8f5 15.c4 e6 16.cxd5 8xd2 17.8xd2 8xd5 18.8c3 8d7 19.8ab1 8ab8 20.8a4±;

6...8h6 – this development of the knight reduces Black’s possibilities considerably. 7...e3 0–0 8.h3. Black’s pieces are deprived of the useful g4-square after that prophylactic; moreover White has an additional resource for the development of his initiative – the move g2-g4. 8...8b7 9.8d2 f5 (this is a risky, but quite logical attempt to create some counterplay for Black) 10.8g5 8d7 11.d5 b4 12.8d1 fxe4 13. 8xe4 8f5, crafty – Anat, ICC 1999. White had to play here: 14.8f2 c6 15.g4 8h6 16.8e6 8f7 17.8xg7. Black’s defence seems hopeless after the exchange of his powerful bishop. 17...8xg7 18.8e3 cxd5 19.8xd5+ e6 20.8xb7 8xb7 21.0–0–0 0–0 22.f5++;

6...c5 – this is an attempt to undermine White’s centre, but his task becomes only easier after that: 7.dxc5! dxc5 8.e5!

8...8b7 (It is essential that the exchange of queens leads to great difficulties for Black in the defence of his queenside. He has too many weaknesses there to worry about: 8...c4 9.8e4 8xd1+ 10. 8xd1 8a7 11.a4! f5 12.8d5! White’s bishop will soon be forced to go to the a8-square (!) after this move, but White would not mind that at all. 12...e6 13.8e3 8c7 14.8a8 b4 15.8b6 8d7 16.8e3+, and Black soon loses a pawn irrevocably.) 9.8e2 8h6 (9...8c6 10.8e3 8d4 11. 8xd4 cxd4 12.0–0–0 0–0 b4 13.8e4 8h6 14.8xd4+ Tal – Szabo, Sochi 1973) 10.a4! White undermines his opponent’s queenside quite timely. 10...b4 11.8e4 8c8 (11... 8d7 12.8f5 8b6 13.8c4 8f8 14.8e3++; 13...8d8 14.e6++) 12. 8f6! Black is now forced to compromise his position after this powerful move. 15...8g8 (12... 8f8 13.8e4++; 12...8xf6 13.exf6 8e6 14.8e3 8d7 15.fxe7 8xe7 16.0–0 0–0 17.8ae1 8g4 18.8d2++; 14...8xf3 15.8xf3 8g4 16.8xa8 8xe3+ 17.8e2 8f2+ 18.8d1 8e3+ 19.8c1 0–0 20. fxe7 8e8 21.8f3++; 12...exf6 13. exf6+ 8f8 14.8e5 8xf6 15.8xf6

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\[ \text{Chapter 28} \]

\[ \text{\&e6+}, \text{leads to a very difficult endgame for Black after: 16. \&xe6 fxe6 17.\&e3 \&d7 18.\&e5 \&xe5 19.fxe5 \&g7 20.\&xc5\pm) 16.f5! White opens Black's kingside with this pawn-sacrifice and the enemy king will hardly survive after that.} 16...\&xf5 (16...\&e8+ 17.\&f1 \&g4 18.\&h4 \&e5 19.\&h6 \&bd7 20.\&e1 \&xf3 21. gxf3 \&d8 22.\&g5 \&b6 23.\&e4 \&e8 24.\&d5 \&d6 25.\&d1 \&c7 26.\&h6 \&b6 27.f4+; 16...\&g4 17.\&h4 \&e8+ 18.\&f1 \&xf3 19. gxf3 \&e3+ 20.\&xe3 \&xe3 \&xe3 21. \&d8+ \&g7 22.\&f6+ \&h6 23.\&xh8 \&xf3+ 24.\&g1 \&g4+ 25.\&f2 \&f4+ 26.\&e1--; 19...\&e5 20.\&e4 \&xc6 \&f6 \&d8 22.\&g5 \&c8 23. \&xd8+ \&xd8 24.\&f6+-) 17.\&c4 \&e8+ (17...\&d7 18.\&e5 \&d5 19.\&xd7 \&xd7 20.\&xh8+ \&xh8 21.\&xd5--\) 18.\&e5-- Chatalba-shew – Soloviov, Sautron 2001; \]

6...e6 – this move slows down Black's development. All his pieces will have to be deployed along the seventh rank. It is hardly surprising that White's prospects to seize the initiative are excellent after that. 7.0–0 \&e7 (Black has also tried here 7...f5, but after White's simple answer 8.exf5, his advantage is evident. Black's king has no reliable shelter.) 8.\&e3 \&d7 9.\&e1 0–0 10.\&d1 \&b7 11.f5! Black has just diminished his control over the vital f5-square and White can make immediately good use of that. 11...exf5 12.exf5 \&d5 13. \&g5! This attacking move re-

quires precise calculations, because it is connected with a pawn-sacrifice. 13...\&e8. GM Smyslov, who was playing with Black in that game, decided simply not to challenge the correctness of White's combination. (He was quite right, by the way, for example: 13...\&xd4+ 14.\&h1 \&xc3 15.bxc3 \&f6 16.\&h6 \&e8 17. \&g3 \&xc3 18.\&xg6 \&h8 19.\&g5 \&xg5 20.\&g7+ \&g8 21.\&xg5+--; 14... \&f6 15.\&e4 \&xg5 16.\&xg5 \&h6 17.\&h4 \&xg5 18.\&xg5 \&f7 19. \&xg6 \&xe6 20.\&xe6 \&e7 21.\&de1 \&g7 22.\&f5 \&fe8 23.\&e6--; 22...\&c8 23.\&e6 \&xe6 24.\&xe6+ \&f7 25.\&c3 \&e8 26.\&e4 \&xe4 27.\&e3 \&e7 28.\&xf6 \&xf6 29.\&xf6 \&xf6 30.\&xe4; \]

6...\&g4 7.\&e3

7...\&d7 (7...\&c6 – this idea is too
dubious. White achieves easily a long-lasting positional advantage after: 8.d5 ♗a5 9.0–0 ♗f6 10.b4 ♘d7 11.♘e1 ♗c4 12.♗xc4 bxc4 13.♕d4 ♘b8. The fact that Black is forced to retreat his knight to its initial square only proves that his position is not to be envied. 14.a4 ♘d7 15.b5 0–0 16.♗e2 e5, V.Popov – Chepukaitis, St. Petersburg 2000. Later, White’s play was not so convincing and the game ended in a draw. Instead, his simplest line would have been: 17.dxe6! ♘xe6 18.f5 c5 19.bxc6 ♘xd4 20.♗xd4 ♘xc6 21.♗e3 ♘xd4 22.♗xd4 gxf5 23.e4 ♘d7 24.♘e4 f6 25.♘xd6++; 17...fxe6 18.♗xc4 ♖f7 19.♗ab1±.) 8.h3! White thus forces an exchange on f3 and he acquires not only the two bishop advantage, but also a considerable lead in development. 8...♗xf3 9.♗xf3 c5. Naturally, Black takes his chances by opening the game in the centre, but his position is hardly satisfactory anyway. (9...e6 10.f5 ♘gf6 11.g4 b4 12.♗e2 gxf5 13.exf5±; 9...e5 10.fxe5 dxe5 11.0–0 ♘gf6 12.♗d5 c6 13.♗xe5! ♕xd5 14.♗d4!++) 10.dxc5 ♘xc3+ (10...♗xc5 11.♗xc5 dxc5 12.e5 ♕c4 13.♗c6+ ♔f8 14.♗e4 ♕b8 15.0–0 ♕d4+ 16.♗h1 b4 17.♗ad1 ♕a7 18.♗d7 ♕e3 19.♔c7 ♕e8 20.♗d8++; 10...dxc5 11.e5 ♕b8 12.0–0–0 ♕c7 13.♗e4+) 11.bxc3 dxc5, K.Szabo – Popovics, Budapest 2004. Now, White needs to start immediate actions on the queenside, because Black’s pieces are incapable of defending his pawns there: 12.a4! ♕a5(12...c4 13.♗e2 e5 14.0–0±; 12...♗gf613.e5 ♘h5 14.axb5++) 13.0–0 bxa4 14.e5 ♕c8 15.♗b7 ♕b8 16.♗xa6±.

a) 6...♗b7 7.0–0

7...♗d7

About 7...♗c6 8.♗e3 ♕f6 9.h3 – see 6...♗c6.

7...♗f6 8.♗e2 b4 9.♗d1 0–0 (9...d5 10.e5 ♕e4 11.♗f2 ♕xf2 12.♗xf2++) 10.♗f2 e6 11.♗d2 a5 12.c4! White is occupying space. 12...♗a6 13.♗ad1 c5 14.e5 ♕d7 15.♗e4 ♘xe4 16.♗xe4 ♕b8 17.♗e3 ♕c7 18.♗xd6 ♕xd6 19.♗e5 ♘xe5 20.dxe5 ♕c7 21.♗d6± Klovans – Balcerowski, Rowy 2000.

7...b4 8.♗e2 ♕d7 (8...♗f6 9.♗g3 c5, Castellano – Brito Garcia, Las Palmas 1993. White had to take care of the fortification of his pawn-chain with: 10.c3! d5 11.c5 ♕e4 12.♗e3 bxc3 13.bxc3 ♕xg3 14.hxg3 ♕c7 15.f5±) 9.c3 c5 10.e5 dxe5 11.fxe5 ♕b6, Kuijpers – Bakhmatov, Vlissingen 2003. Black’s opening strategy seems to be too risky and dangerous for him. White
can prove that in the following fashion: 12...\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{d6}\) (12...\(\text{cx}\) 13...\(\text{xc7}\) 14...\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{xe}\) 15. \(\text{xf7}\) \(\text{c6}\) 16...\(\text{f2+}\) ) 13...\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 14...\(\text{xb}\) \(\text{b6}\) 16...\(\text{b4+}\) ; 10...\(\text{ch6}\) 11.e6 \(\text{fxe6}\) 12...\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f6}\) 13...\(\text{dxc5}\) \(\text{dxc5}\) 14. \(\text{a4+}\) \(\text{d7}\) 15...\(\text{xd7+}\) \(\text{xd7}\) 16. \(\text{d1}\). White is a pawn down in this endgame, but that is completely irrelevant, since he is the indisputable master of the situation. 16...\(\text{e8}\) 17.a3 \(\text{bxc3}\) 18. \(\text{bxc3}\) \(\text{d5}\) 19...\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{f5}\) 20.c4 \(\text{c6}\) 21...\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{d4}\) 22...\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{xd4+}\) 23...\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{a}4\) 24...\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xd1}\) 25. \(\text{xa8}\) \(\text{e2}\) 26...\(\text{d2+}\). 7...\(\text{e6}\). Black creates an important weakness in his position with this seemingly natural move. White can now attack immediately the e6-pawn. Black should worry about the safety of his king as well. 8.f5! White should not slow down, since now the right moment has come! 8...\(\text{exf5}\) (it is also bad for Black to play: 8...\(\text{e6}\) 9.e5 \(\text{dx}\) 10...\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{d5}\) 11...\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 12...\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 13...\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c5+}\) 14...\(\text{h1}+\) 9...\(\text{f6}\) \(\text{d7}\) (Black loses his castling rights after 9...\(\text{f6}\) 10...\(\text{e}1+\) \(\text{f8}\) 11...\(\text{g}5\) ) 10...\(\text{g}5\) ! This pawn-sacrifice is quite logical and it provides White with excellent prospects. 10...\(\text{xd4+}\) (It is hardly any better for Black to try here: 10...\(\text{xf3}\) 11...\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{xd4+}\) 12...\(\text{h1}\) \(\text{e}5\) 13...\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{f6}\) 14...\(\text{g6}\) \(\text{h}6\) 15...\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 16...\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 17...\(\text{c6+}\) \(\text{e}7\) 18...\(\text{d5+}\) \(\text{e}6\) 19. \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}8\) 20...\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{c}8\) 21...\(\text{g}4+\) \(\text{xd5}\) 22...\(\text{d1+}\) \(\text{d3}\) 23...\(\text{xd3+}\) \(\text{e}5\) 24...\(\text{e}2\) ; 10...\(\text{e}7\) 11...\(\text{xe7}\) ! Now, it becomes clear that the seemingly attractive capture on e7 with the queen would lose immediately material for Black. He should therefore forget about castling, but that is only the beginning of his real problems. 11...\(\text{xe7}\) 12...\(\text{fxg6}\) \(\text{hxg6}\) 13...\(\text{e}6\). This is an important tactical point! Black loses a pawn, because he cannot play: 13...\(\text{fxg6}\) 14...\(\text{e}2+\) \(\text{f}8\) 15...\(\text{g}5+\) ; 10...\(\text{gf6}\) 11...\(\text{e}1+\) \(\text{f}8\) 12...\(\text{e}2\) 11...\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{f}6\), S.Schmidt – Weise, Boeblinger 2000. I recommend to you to exchange the bishops, because that would make White's attack even more effective: 12...\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{c}4\) 13...\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 14...\(\text{fxg6}\) \(\text{h}6\) 15...\(\text{fxg6}\) \(\text{hxg6}\) (15...\(\text{fxg6}\) 16...\(\text{e}5\) 16...\(\text{d}5=\) ) 16...\(\text{e}5\) 0-0 (Black has somehow managed to castle indeed, but White's pressure is still overwhelming.) 17...\(\text{ae}1\) \(\text{e}5\) 18...\(\text{f}6+\) \(\text{g}7\) (Black now loses the exchange and the game. 18...\(\text{h}8\) 19...\(\text{gh7+}\) ) 19. \(\text{exf5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 20...\(\text{e}\) \(\text{f}5\) 21...\(\text{d7+}\) \(\text{h}6\) (21...\(\text{f}6\) 22...\(\text{e}6+\) \(\text{h}8\) 23. \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 24...\(\text{d}3+\) ) 22...\(\text{xf8}\) \(\text{g}5\) 23...\(\text{h}4+\) \(\text{h}5\) 24...\(\text{g}4+\) \(\text{e}4\) 25. \(\text{e}2+\) \(\text{h}4\) 26...\(\text{g}2+\) \(\text{g}4\) 27. \(\text{f}4+\) \(\text{g}5\) 28...\(\text{h}7.\) 7...\(\text{c5}\) – this is Black's most active line. 8...\(\text{dxc5}\) \(\text{dxc5}\) (8...\(\text{b}4\) 9...\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}5\) 10...\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xb}\) 11...\(\text{a}3\) 12...\(\text{x}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 13...\(\text{x}4\) \(\text{d}6\) + 14...\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xb}\) 15.a3; 10...\(\text{d}7\) 11...\(\text{c}\) 12...\(\text{f}6\) 12...\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}4\) 13...\(\text{d}4\) 0-0 0 14...\(\text{g}3;\) 10...\(\text{c}7\) 11...\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}4\)
12...\textbf{c}2 \textbf{d}f6 13...cxb4 \textbf{x}e4 14. \textbf{d}c1\#; 11...bxc3 12...\textbf{x}c3 e6 13. \textbf{d}c1 \textbf{d}f6 14..a4 \textbf{x}e4 15..\textbf{x}e4 \textbf{x}e4 16..\textbf{x}c5 \textbf{c}6 17..\textbf{d}4\# A.Davies – Milicevic, Vancouver 1999) 9.e5,

and now several moves have been tried in practice:

9...b4? This try weakens additionally Black’s queenside. White can exploit that, by forcing a favourable trade of bishops and eventually queens too. 10. \textbf{d}e4! \textbf{c}6 (10...\textbf{d}xe4 11..\textbf{x}d8+! \textbf{x}d8 12..\textbf{x}e4 \textbf{d}d7 13.e6 fxe6 14..\textbf{d}e5\#; 10...\textbf{c}8 11..\textbf{x}b7 \textbf{b}7 12..\textbf{x}d5 \textbf{a}7 13..\textbf{x}b7 \textbf{b}7 14..\textbf{e}4 \textbf{d}d7 15..\textbf{e}3 c4 16..\textbf{d}4 \textbf{h}6 17..\textbf{f}d1 \textbf{g}4 18..\textbf{d}2 \textbf{b}6 19.h3 \textbf{h}6 20.c3\#) 11..\textbf{a}4 \textbf{a}5 12.c3 \textbf{d}8 13..\textbf{d}2. Black’s difficulties in defending his queenside are quite considerable. 13...f5 (13...\textbf{b}xc3 14..\textbf{b}xc3! \textbf{a}8 15..\textbf{b}b3\#) 14..\textbf{c}2 \textbf{b}5 15..\textbf{c}1 \textbf{h}6 16..\textbf{e}1 \textbf{b}xc3 17..\textbf{x}c3 \textbf{b}2 18..\textbf{b}3 c4 19..\textbf{a}4 \textbf{x}c1 20..\textbf{x}c1 cxb3 21..\textbf{c}5++! Crafty 17.06 – SOS 11/99, Larsen 2000;

It is not logical for Black to follow with: 9...\textbf{h}6, Duschek – Reinhardt, Germany 2000, 10. \textbf{e}2 c4 11..\textbf{e}4 \textbf{x}e4 12..\textbf{x}e4 \textbf{d}7 13.a4 b4 14..\textbf{d}5 \textbf{c}8 15..\textbf{d}1\#;

9...\textbf{d}6 10..\textbf{e}3 c4 11..\textbf{e}4 e6 12..\textbf{e}2 \textbf{g}e7 13..\textbf{a}d1 \textbf{c}7 14. \textbf{f}2 0–0 15..\textbf{b}6 \textbf{c}8 16..\textbf{d}2\# Sousa – Wohl, Oslo 2004;

9...\textbf{d}7, Forsberg – Piersig, corr. 2000, 10..\textbf{e}2! c4 (10...e6 11..\textbf{e}4 \textbf{c}8 12.c4\#) 11..\textbf{e}4 \textbf{x}e4 12..\textbf{x}e4 \textbf{h}6 13.a4\#;

9...c4 – this interesting defensive resource for Black has not been analysed thoroughly yet. 10..\textbf{e}4 \textbf{b}6+ 11..\textbf{h}1 \textbf{e}4 12..\textbf{x}e4 \textbf{h}6, Pyhala – Svorjov, Helsinki 1996, 13.a4!? This is an attempt by White to exploit the weaknesses on his opponent’s queenside. White can at least rely on occupying the open a-file. 13...\textbf{c}6! This is the best move for Black, but it is by far not an easy choice to make over the board. (13...b4?! 14..\textbf{e}2 0–0 15..\textbf{x}c4+; 14...\textbf{c}6 15..\textbf{d}4 \textbf{c}8 16..f5! \textbf{x}e5 17..\textbf{x}h6 \textbf{x}d4 18..\textbf{d}6++; 16..\textbf{f}5 17..\textbf{x}h6 \textbf{x}h6 18..\textbf{d}d6+ \textbf{xd}6 19..\textbf{e}d6+ \textbf{f}8 20..\textbf{e}7+ \textbf{g}8 21..\textbf{xf}5++) 14. \textbf{ax}b5 \textbf{d}8 15..\textbf{e}2 \textbf{ax}b5 16..\textbf{f}6+! This is a key-check, after which
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Black is forced to either forfeit his castling rights, or to exchange his bishop for the dangerous white knight. 16...\textit{xf}6 17. exf6 e6 18.\textit{exe}3±.

\textbf{8.e5}

This critical line has been tried in practice numerous times by strong players.

The other possibilities for Black are:

8...b4? This move is too ambitious and White can hope to end the game up in the following spectacular and swift fashion: 9.\textit{e}e4 d5 10.\textit{eg}5 e6 11.f5! (this is the decisive tactical strike!) 11...gx\textit{f}5 (11...ex\textit{f}5 12.e6++) 12. \textit{xf}7! \textit{xf}7 13.\textit{g}5+ \textit{e}7 14. \textit{xe}6! \textit{xe}6 15.\textit{xf}5+ \textit{e}7 16. \textit{g}5+ \textit{df}6 17.\textit{e}1 \textit{f}7 18.\textit{e}6+ \textit{g}6 (18...\textit{xe}6 19.ex\textit{f}6+ \textit{d}7 20.fx\textit{g}7 \textit{xg}5 21.gx\textit{h}8\textit{ep}++) 19. \textit{g}3 \textit{e}4 20.\textit{f}7# Yeo - E. Smith, London 1979;

8...e6 9.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}7 10.\textit{f}2 \textit{b}8 11.a4 bx\textit{a}4 12.\textit{xa}4 0-0 13.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}6 14.\textit{a}3 \textit{bd}5 15.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 16.\textit{g}4 f5 17.exf6 \textit{xf}6 18.\textit{e}4 \textit{xf}4 19.\textit{xe}6+ \textit{h}8 20.\textit{g}5 \textit{we}8 21.\textit{wh}3 \textit{ff}6, Jansa - Bern, Gauss-
dal 1991. White can now consolidate his advantage with the move 22.\textit{e}1t;

8...\textit{h}6 9.\textit{g}5 c5 10.e6 \textit{xd}4+ 11.\textit{h}1 \textit{f}6. This is how the game Buchal - Alber, Germany 1993 proceeded. White had to follow with 12.\textit{e}2! c4 13.\textit{xd}4 \textit{cxd}3 14.\textit{xd}3±.

\textbf{9.\textit{xe}4!}

White must trade Black’s active bishop on b7.

\textbf{9...\textit{xe}4}

It is weaker for Black to play: 9...\textit{b}8 10.ex\textit{d}6 \textit{cxd}4 11.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}6 12.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xd}4+ 13.\textit{h}1 \textit{d}8, Karjakin - Lobron, ACP (blitz) 2004. White could have obtained a decisive advantage with the simple tactical strike 14. \textit{xa}6!++.

\textbf{10.\textit{xe}4 \textit{cxd}4}

10...\textit{b}6 - presents White with the chance to maintain his space advantage and excellent prospects to improve his position with: 11.\textit{e}3 \textit{b}7 (11...c4 12.a4 \textit{d}5 13.\textit{c}5 b4 14.b3 c3 15.a5 \textit{b}8 16.e6 \textit{xe}6 17.\textit{xe}6 \textit{h}6 18.\textit{e}2 \textit{gf}6 19.f5 \textit{xe}3+ 20.\textit{xe}3±; 13...\textit{xc}5 14.dxc5 \textit{b}7 15.axb5 \textit{xb}5 16.\textit{xa}8+ \textit{xa}8 17.\textit{a}1 \textit{b}7 18.\textit{d}4 \textit{h}6 19.c6±) 12.d5 \textit{c}8 (12...\textit{xe}5 13.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xc}5 14.\textit{xc}5 \textit{bc}7 15.\textit{g}5 \textit{d}6 16.\textit{ge}6 \textit{fxe}6 17.\textit{xe}6 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{g}7+ \textit{f}7 19.\textit{d}6) 13.a4 \textit{f}5 14.\textit{eg}5 \textit{dx}e5 15.axb5 \textit{AXB} 16.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 17.\textit{e}6 \textit{xf}3+ 18.\textit{xf}3 \textit{xb}2 19.\textit{b}1 \textit{e}5 20.c4± Ventimiglia - Cumper, IECG 2001.

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11.exd6 \textit{\$b6}

Black has often tried: 11...e6, Fiorito – Peralta, Argentina 1997. I recommend to you the novelty – 12.a4!? (in case of 12.\textit{\$xd4}, as it was played in the game, Black should not have great problems to hold the position) 12...b4 13.\textit{\$e5} \textit{\$gf6} (13...
\textit{\$xe5} 14.\textit{\$xe5} \textit{\$xe5} 15.\textit{\$f3} \textit{\$a7} 16.\textit{\$f4} \textit{\$a5} 17.\textit{\$g5} \textit{\$xf4} 18.\textit{\$xf4} \textit{\$e5} 19.\textit{\$e4} \textit{\$f5} 20.\textit{\$c6+} \textit{\$d7} 21.\textit{\$ae1++} 14.\textit{\$xd4} \textit{\$g4} 15.\textit{\$xb4++;} 12...\textit{\$gf6} 13.\textit{\$xf6+} \textit{\$xf6} (13...
\textit{\$xf6} 14.\textit{\$xb5+}) 14.\textit{\$axb5} \textit{\$axb5} 15.\textit{\$xa8} \textit{\$xa8} 16.\textit{\$xd4} \textit{\$d5} 17.\textit{\$d3.}

11...\textit{\$h6}, Baklan – Lobron, ACP (blitz) 2004, and the simplest way for White to preserve his initiative is to play: 12.dxe7 \textit{\$xe7} 13.\textit{\$g3} 0–0 14.\textit{\$f5±.}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

Until now, White has tried in practice only the line: 12.\textit{\$e5} \textit{\$a7}, and here in the game Grischuk – Milov, Torshavn 2000, White failed to obtain any real edge after: 13.\textit{\$xd7} \textit{\$xd7} 14.\textit{\$f6} 15.\textit{\$xf6+} \textit{\$xf6} 16.\textit{\$xe7} \textit{\$xe7} 17.\textit{\$f3} \textit{\$g5} 18.\textit{\$h1} \textit{\$f8} 19.\textit{\$d2} \textit{\$g7} – Black has completed his development and his king's position is safe enough.

White’s game might be improved by an attempt to undermine Black’s queenside with 13.a4, but Black can still manage to complete his development and equalize with: 13...
\textit{\$f5} 14.\textit{\$g5} \textit{\$xe5} 15.\textit{\$xe5} \textit{\$xe5} 16.\textit{\$xb5} \textit{\$xb5} (it is worse for Black to play 16...\textit{\$axb5} 17.\textit{\$xa7} \textit{\$xa7} 18.\textit{\$d3→} 17.\textit{\$xe7} (It is not advisable for White to follow with: 17.\textit{\$e1} \textit{\$exd6} 18.\textit{\$a5} \textit{\$b8} 19.\textit{\$f4} \textit{\$e7} 20.\textit{\$a1} \textit{\$f6} 21.\textit{\$a4+} \textit{\$d7} 22.\textit{\$xa6} 0–0 23.\textit{\$a7} \textit{\$xf4} 24.\textit{\$xf4} \textit{\$xb2++;}) 17...\textit{\$xe7} 18.\textit{\$f3} \textit{\$f6} 19.\textit{\$g5} 0–0 20.\textit{\$xf6} \textit{\$xf6} 21.\textit{\$xd4} \textit{\$b6=).}

It is unclear whether it is useful for White to try 12.\textit{\$e5}, the move that was played by A.Grischuk in the abovementioned game. White fails to open files with that move and it is not worth for him to trade pieces while attacking. White does not obtain any advantage either if he tries some other lines on move 12: 12.\textit{\$e1} e6 (12...\textit{\$d8} 13.a4 b4 14.a5 \textit{\$a7} 15.\textit{\$xe7} \textit{\$xe7} 16.\textit{\$d6++;} 12...\textit{\$f5} 13.\textit{\$g5} \textit{\$xd6} 14.\textit{\$e6±} 13.a4 \textit{\$g5} (13...\textit{\$c8} 14.\textit{\$d3} \textit{\$h6} 15.\textit{\$xb5} \textit{\$xb5} 16.\textit{\$d2} \textit{\$f5} 17.\textit{\$a5} \textit{\$b7} 18.\textit{\$c7++;} 13...b4 14.a5 \textit{\$a7} 15.\textit{\$d4} \textit{\$b8} 16.\textit{\$d2++)} 14.\textit{\$xf6+} (14.a5 \textit{\$a7} 15.\textit{\$d4} \textit{\$xe4} 16.\textit{\$xe4} \textit{\$d8=;} 14.\textit{\$xd4} \textit{\$xd4+} 15.\textit{\$xe4} \textit{\$xe4} 16.\textit{\$xe4} \textit{\$c5} 17.\textit{\$e5} \textit{\$d7++;}) 14...\textit{\$xf6}, and White has nothing more than equality after: 15.\textit{\$xb5} \textit{\$xb5} 16.\textit{\$xd4} \textit{\$b6} 17.\textit{\$e3} \textit{\$xd6} 18.\textit{\$f3}
0–0 19.\(\text{Q}d1\) \(\text{Q}f8\) 20.\(f5\) \(\text{exf5}\) 21.\(\text{Q}xf5\) \(\text{Q}e6\) 22.\(\text{Q}d4\) \(\text{Q}e7=\).

Therefore White should better play immediately:

12.\(a4?!\) with quite similar ideas without losing time. He can rely on obtaining the advantage, which can be illustrated by the following lines:

![Diagram](image)

We will now analyse the following possibilities in this position: a1) 12...\(d3+\) and a2) 12...\(\text{Q}e8\).

Black can also try 12...\(\text{bxa4}\). This move parries White's threat \(\text{axb5}\), but still it does not solve Black's problems: 13.\(\text{Q}e1\) e6 14.\(\text{Q}xa4\), and White will capture the d4-pawn with the help of the rook: 14...\(\text{Q}h6\) (14...\(\text{Q}g6\) 15.\(\text{Q}xd4\)) 15.\(\text{Q}x d 4\) \(\text{Q}f5\) 16.\(\text{Q}e3\). White manages to protect and support the important passed d-pawn.

a1) 12...\(d3+\) 13.\(\text{Q}h1\) \(f5\)

In case of 13...\(\text{dxc2}\), White has the powerful resource 14.\(\text{Q}d5\) (it is less promising for him to play: 14.\(\text{Q}xc2\) e6 15.\(\text{Q}d1\), although White still obtains a slight edge, by protecting his powerful passed d-pawn) 14...\(\text{Q}d8\) 15.\(\text{dxe7}\) \(\text{Q}xe7\) 16.\(\text{Q}b3\), White captures the c2-pawn and manages to prevent his opponent from castling, since it is bad for Black to follow with: 16...\(\text{Q}e8\) 17.\(\text{Q}b4+\) \(\text{Q}d8\) 18.\(\text{Q}d6+=\).

14.\(\text{Q}eg5\) \(\text{Q}xd6\) 15.\(\text{axb5}\) \(h6\) 16.\(\text{Q}h3\) \(\text{dxc2}\)

It is still somewhat better for Black to play: 16...\(\text{Q}g6\), allowing White to win a pawn: 17.\(\text{Q}xd3\) \(\text{Q}xd3\) 18.\(\text{cxd3}\) a5 19.\(\text{Q}e5\) (this move is with the idea to bring into action, via the f4-square, the knight on h3, which was misplaced until now) 19...\(\text{Q}xe5\) 20.\(\text{fxe5}\) \(\text{Q}d5\) 21.e6?!\(\text{Q}\) -- with the aim to follow with \(\text{Q}f4\) and after the exchange on f4 to capture with the bishop and push forward the b-pawn. It is just inconceivable how Black can prevent the accomplishment of that plan.

17.\(\text{Q}xc2\)±

![Diagram](image)

Black has not completed his development yet, and he is now forced to abandon his a6-pawn, because after: 17...\(a5\) White will follow with: 18.\(\text{dxa5}!!\) \(\text{dxa5}\) 19.\(\text{Q}c8+\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 20.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{a4}\) (20...\(\text{Q}xb5\) 21.\(\text{Q}h5+\) \(\text{hgx}5\) 22.\(\text{Q}xg5\)±)
\[ \text{\textit{13.axb5!?}} \]

Black has created the threat 13...d3+, but it turns out to be not so dangerous after all. The opening of the a and d-files proves to be much more important than the temporary loss of the c2-pawn and even the appearance of a black passed pawn on that square.

It is not so good for White to play: 13.dxe7 d3+ 14.\textit{\texttt{h1 f5 15. c3 dxc2}}, because he cannot capture then on c2, because of the move b4.

Black manages to develop his pieces harmoniously after White’s calm move 13.\textit{\texttt{h1 e6}} (It is worse for Black to play: 13...f5 14.\textit{\texttt{g5 xe6 15.axb5 axb5 16.\textit{\texttt{e6 g7}}}) 14.axb5 axb5 15.d2 (15.e1 g6 16.xd4 e4 17.xe4 xd6=) 15...b7! 16. e1 (16.g3 h6 17.b4 g4) 16...gf6 17.xf6 (17.f2 wb6=) 17...xf6 a5 0–0 19.c7 (19.xd4 xd4 20.xd4 xc2 21.g1=) 19...d5 20.d3 a8 21.ad1 a2=.

\textit{13.d3+}

The other natural line for Black is – 13...axb5 14.e5!? In comparison to the line, which we have analysed before 12.e5, now White succeeds in opening the a-file favourably. Meanwhile, Black’s rook on c8 does not defend the knight on d7, so as a result of the exchange on d7 Black loses his castling rights. 14...d3+ (It is wrong for Black to play: 14...e6 15.xd7 xd7 16. d3 f6 17.xf6+ xf6 18.f5=), because the placement of his king on the d7-square is unsafe: 18.gxf5 19.xf5 exf5 20.xf5+ c6 21.xf6 and White’s attack is overwhelming. Still, Black should seriously consider the possibility of capturing on e5 twice: 14.xe5 15.fxe5 xe5, after which White’s attack will hardly run so smoothly. Evidently, he should better follow with: 16.g5 f6 17.dxe7 and the black king is bound to remain in the centre: 17...d3+. In case Black refrains from capturing on c2, White has an excellent compensation for the pawn and a clear plan – f3xd4, e1 etc. 18.h1, and there either 18...dxc2 19.e2 b8 20.b3 \textit{\texttt{a=}} a=, or 18...h6 19.f3 dxc2 20.e2\textit{\texttt{a=}} 20 with a good compensation: 20...d6 21.e3, with the idea to fol-
low with $\text{d4. 21...c6 22.d4 c4 23.xc4 xc4 24.xf6 x7f 25.h2 h8 26.c1.}$ 15.h1
(after 15.f2, Black plays 15...f5
16.xd7 x7 17.dxe7 fxe4 18.
$g4+ x7 19.xc8 h6 20.h3 f5$ with a good game; or 16.
$xd3 fxe4 17.d5 h6 18.xd7 d6$) 15...dxc2 (White can
counter 15...f5 with 16.xd7
$xd7 17.dxe7 fxe4 18.g4+ x7 19.xc8 h6 20.h3$ and
he remains simply with extra
material.) 16.d3 x5 17.fxe5
$xg8$ and White checkmates
easily.

14.f2!
Now, contrary to the variation
that we have analysed 13...xb5
14.e5 d3+, it is favourable for
White to interpose with the rook
against the check.

14...dxc2
14...axb5 15.xd3 and Black
remains a pawn down in an in-
ferior position.

14...f5 15.c3 dxc2 16.e2 a5
17.dxe7 and White has a great
advantage, because Black's only
battle unit that he can be proud
of—the c2-pawn gets annihilated
quickly.

15.d3 f5
15...axb5 16.dxe7 $d6.$

16.e5 xb5
But not 16...xb5, because of
17.d5 h6 18.h6 g4 19.
$g7+ f8 20.e6+ e8 21.
xc7+ d8 22.d4+-.

17.xc2 xc2 18.xc2 $c5+$
(White was threatening $c8$ or
$e6.$)

19.xc5 xc5

20.e3+, and Black fails to
develop his pieces naturally, for
example: 20...d6 21.xc5
dxc5 22.xa6 xb2 23.a8+
d7 24.a7+ f8 25.f7+.

b) 6...d7 7.e5!

This is White's most prin-
cipled reaction against Black's
risky opening strategy. Great
complications arise now at a very
early stage of the game.

7.c5
7...b6 8.0-0 e6 9.a4! bxa4
10.xa4 x4 11.xa4 e7
12.xe2 0-0 13.d2 b7 14.xa1
b8 15.b3 f5 16.e4± Rogulj-

7...f5 — this rather obliging
move was tested by the most experienced practitioner of this variation – Henrich Chepukaitis. However, even he often failed to defend successfully Black’s difficult position. 8.a4! b4 9.\(\textit{\&} e2\) e6 10.0-0 \(\textit{\&} e7\) 11.c4 a5 12.\(\textit{\&} e3\) \(\textit{\&} b7\) 13.\(\textit{\&} c1\) (this is a very purposeful manoeuvre – White’s knight is redeployed to the b3-square) 13...\(\textit{\&} b6\) 14.\(\textit{\&} b3\) 0-0 15.\(\textit{\&} e2\) \(\textit{\&} e8\) 16.\(\textit{\&} f2\) \(\textit{\&} e c8\) 17.\(\textit{\&} e f1\) \(\textit{\&} d7\) 18.\(\textit{\&} x d 6\) \(\textit{\&} x d 6\) 19.d5+ Yemelin – Chepukaitis, St. Petersburg 2004.

7...\(\textit{\&} h 6\) – this move requires very precise play by White. The next game is an instructive example of a superb treatment of that position: 8.a4! b4 9.\(\textit{\&} e 4\) \(\textit{\&} b 7\) (9...c5 10.c3 \(\textit{\&} x c3\) 11.bxc3 \(\textit{\&} d 5\) 12.\(\textit{\&} g 3\) 10.0-0 c5 11.e6! This typical pawn-sacrifice forces Black into a long and laboring defence: 11...\(\textit{\&} x e 6\) 12.\(\textit{\&} e g 5\) \(\textit{\&} f 8\) 13.dxc5 dxc5 14.\(\textit{\&} e 2\) \(\textit{\&} b 6\) 15.a5 \(\textit{\&} d 6\) 16.\(\textit{\&} e 3\) \(\textit{\&} f 5\) (16...\(\textit{\&} x b 2\) 17.\(\textit{\&} a d 1\) \(\textit{\&} c 7\) 18.\(\textit{\&} e 5\) \(\textit{\&} x e 5\) 19.\(\textit{\&} c 5\) \(\textit{\&} f 6\) 20.\(\textit{\&} x f 5\) \(\textit{\&} x f 5\) 21.\(\textit{\&} c 4\) \(\textit{\&} e 6\) 22.\(\textit{\&} x c 5\) \(\textit{\&} c 8\) 23.\(\textit{\&} x e 6\) \(\textit{\&} x e 5\) 24.\(\textit{\&} g 7\) \(\textit{\&} x g 7\) 25.\(\textit{\&} e f 1\) \(\textit{\&} e 4\) 26.\(\textit{\&} e 4\) \(\textit{\&} x e 4\)+ 27.\(\textit{\&} x e 4\) \(\textit{\&} f 7\) 28.\(\textit{\&} f 1\) \(\textit{\&} g 8\) 29.\(\textit{\&} d 5+-\) 17.\(\textit{\&} c 4\) \(\textit{\&} x e 4\) 18.\(\textit{\&} a d 1\) \(\textit{\&} c 7\) 19.\(\textit{\&} a d 1\) \(\textit{\&} c 7\) 20.\(\textit{\&} x f 5\) \(\textit{\&} x f 5\) 21.\(\textit{\&} c 4\) \(\textit{\&} c 6\) 22.\(\textit{\&} e f 1\) \(\textit{\&} c 7\) 23.\(\textit{\&} g 5\) e5 24.\(\textit{\&} x e 5\) \(\textit{\&} b 5\) 25.\(\textit{\&} b 5\) \(\textit{\&} d 7\) 26.\(\textit{\&} a 8\) \(\textit{\&} e 7\) 27.\(\textit{\&} x e 6\) 28.\(\textit{\&} x d 7\) \(\textit{\&} x d 7\) 29.\(\textit{\&} x a 6\) \(\textit{\&} c 8\) 30.\(\textit{\&} x e 6\) \(\textit{\&} c 8\) 31.\(\textit{\&} g 5\) 1-0 Rahal – Vassallo, Spain 2003.

7...e6 8.a4! This move is very advantageous for White. It forces Black to solve difficult strategical problems in rather unfavourable circumstances: 8...bxa4 (It is also very good for White if Black plays: 8...b4 9.\(\textit{\&} e 4\) d5, Bareev – Lautier, Cap d’Agde 2002, 10.\(\textit{\&} g 3\) c5 11.\(\textit{\&} e 3\) c4 12.\(\textit{\&} e 2\) 9.\(\textit{\&} x a 4\) \(\textit{\&} e 7\) 10.\(\textit{\&} e 4\) 0-0 11.0-0 \(\textit{\&} b 6\) 12.\(\textit{\&} x a 1\) a5 13.\(\textit{\&} e 2\) \(\textit{\&} b 5\) 14.\(\textit{\&} d 2\) \(\textit{\&} b 7\) 15.\(\textit{\&} c 3\) \(\textit{\&} b 8\) 16.\(\textit{\&} a 4\) \(\textit{\&} e 1\) \(\textit{\&} h 8\) 18.\(\textit{\&} h 4\) \(\textit{\&} d 8\) 19.\(\textit{\&} f 6\) \(\textit{\&} x f 6\) 20.\(\textit{\&} x f 6\) \(\textit{\&} g 8\) 21.g5± E.Alekseev – ALOGINOV, Saratov 1999. Black has nothing else left to do except to wait for the decisive actions of his opponent.

Presently the move 7...\(\textit{\&} b 7\) is in crisis. Why is that? Everything will become quite clear right now! 8.\(\textit{\&} g 5!\) This excellent idea belongs to GM A.Beliavsky (about 8.0-0 – see line a) 8...\(\textit{\&} f 8\).

This move seems to be too passive. Black is faced with real problems at the moment! (8...e6 9.\(\textit{\&} c 4\) d5 10.\(\textit{\&} f 2\) c5 11.c3 \(\textit{\&} e 7\) 12.0-0 0-0±, 9...\(\textit{\&} h 6\) 10.c3 \(\textit{\&} e 7\) 11.a4 b4 12.0-0 \(\textit{\&} b 8\) 13.a5 0-0 14.\(\textit{\&} e 2\) \(\textit{\&} x e 4\) 15.\(\textit{\&} x e 4\) d5 16.\(\textit{\&} f 2\) c5, Hector – Vokac, Hamburg 2003. White had outplayed his opponent completely and he could have obtained a decisive advantage outright with: 17.\(\textit{\&} x a 6\) c4 18.b3 \(\textit{\&} x b 3\) 19.c4 \(\textit{\&} f 5\) 20.\(\textit{\&} b 2\) dxc4 21.\(\textit{\&} x c 4++\) 9.\(\textit{\&} x e 2!\) b4 (it is hopeless for Black to play: 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 c5 11.\(\textit{\&} x b 5\) h6 12.\(\textit{\&} e 4\) axb5 13.\(\textit{\&} x b 5\) \(\textit{\&} d 7\) 14.\(\textit{\&} x c 5\) \(\textit{\&} c 8\) 15.e6+-, or 9...c5 10.\(\textit{\&} x b 5\) dxe5 11.dxe5 h6 12.\(\textit{\&} e 4\) axb5 13.\(\textit{\&} x b 5\) \(\textit{\&} d 7\) 14.\(\textit{\&} x c 5\)+-; 10...ab 11.\(\textit{\&} x b 5\) \(\textit{\&} d 7\) 12.e6+-)
10.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{e}4\) \(f5\)? (Black could have only prolonged the game, but hardly save it with the line: 10...\(h6\) 11.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}2\!=\!\pm\)) 11.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}5\!+\!\pm\) \(c6\) (11...\(a\!\!\!x\!\!b\) \(5\) 12.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}b5\!+\!) \(\text{\textit{w}}\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}b7\) \(\text{\textit{w}}\text{d}8\) 14.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{f}2\!+=\!\pm\); 12...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}b7\) \(f\!x\!e4\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}6\!+\!\pm\) 12.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}4\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}\!\!\!b\) \(5\) (13...\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}6\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{x}\!\!\!d\) \(6\!+\!\pm\) 14.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}g7\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{x}e4\) 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{x}e4\) \(f\!x\!e4\) 16.\(f5\)?! (White could have also won with: 16.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}h8\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{h}6\) 17.\(d5\!+\!\pm\).) 16...\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{xf}5\) 17.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}h8\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{e}6\) 18.\(d5\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7\) 19.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}h7\) 1–0 Beliavsky – Hickl, Pula 2000. Black resigned, because of the variation: 19...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{x}d5\) 20.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}f5\!+\!\pm\) 21.\(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}e4\!+\!\pm\).

8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\)!?

This logical move is connected with the idea to exploit the weakness of the \(f7\) and \(e6\)-squares and the \(h1\!-\!a8\) diagonal. It was played for the first time by GM Vasiliy Emelin. He prepared it especially for his game against Henrik Chepukaitis, but subsequently he lost that game with White and possibly because of that – the knight-move did not become popular.

White has plenty of other attractive moves, but Black can then hold the position: 8.\(e6\) fe 9.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\)! Ostergaard – Hillarp Persson, Sweden 1993; 8.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}7\) 9.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}8\)! Pavasovic – Touzane, Leipzig 2002; 8.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}8\) 9.0–0 cd! 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{x}d4\) dxe5! 11.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}6\!+\!) 12.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}1\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}6\)! 13.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}b8\) \(\text{\textit{w}}\text{x}b8\) and Black enjoys an excellent compensation for the exchange. He has a pawn, a couple of powerful bishops and an excellent pawn-centre, particularly in case the game simplifies into an endgame, Jussupow – Forster, Switzerland 1999.

After 8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\)!? we will deal with the moves: \(b1\) 8...\(h6\)!? and \(b2\) 8...\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}6\).

The line 8...dxe5?! 9.dxe5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6\) 10.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{c}4\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}8\) 11.e6\!\pm\) illustrates convincingly all the advantages of White’s move eight.

\(b1\) 8...\(h6\)!?

This careless move enables White to acquire a material advantage in a relatively calm position.

9.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}f7\)!? \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}f7\) 10.\(e6\!+\!) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8\)

Black loses immediately after: 10...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}e6\) 11.\(f5\!+\!) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{f}7\) (11...\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{xf}5\) 12.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}h5\) \(d5\) 13.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{f}4\!+\!\pm\) 12.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}g6\!+\!) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{f}3\!+\!\pm\).

11.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}d7\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}d7\)

11...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}d7\) 12.dxc5 b4 (in case of 12...dxc5 13.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}g6\!\pm\) White remains with a solid extra pawn and superior development, while in the line: 12...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{x}c3\!+\!) 13.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{c}3\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{g}7\) 14.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{e}3\!\pm\) he has again a bishop pair and his dark squared bishop is particularly powerful,)
being unopposed.) 13.\(\text{c}4\)d5 (After 13...\(\text{c}7\) 14.cxd6 \text{exd6} 15.0-0= \(\text{b}\) Black’s king is vulnerable, besides he lags in development too and he must worry about his numerous pawn-weaknesses.) 14.\(\text{d}f2\) \(\text{d}f7\) 15.c3 bxc3 16.\(\text{c}6\)± White ends up with a huge lead in development, a passed pawn and excellent attacking prospects.

11...\(\text{e}b7\) 12.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}6\) (In case of 12...cxd4, White can exploit the vulnerability of the light squares in the enemy camp with the energetic move 13.\(\text{e}6\)! with eventual developments like: 13...\(\text{c}7\) 14.\(\text{d}5\)! \(\text{x}d5\) 15.\(\text{x}d5\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.a4=.) 13.\(\text{x}g6\) \(\text{x}d7\) (after 13...cxd4 14.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{x}d7\) 15.f5= Black can hardly defend his e6-square against the penetration of the white knight) 14.f5 \(\text{e}8\) (14...cxd4 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{f}4\)=; 15...\(\text{d}5\) 16.\(\text{d}x\text{d}4\)=) 15.\(\text{xe}8+\) \(\text{x}e8\) 16.dxc5 dxc5 17.0-0 \(\text{g}4\) 18.\(\text{f}6\)! (White should prevent the activity of the black dark squared bishop.) 18...\(\text{xf}6\) 19.a4 b4 20.\(\text{e}2\) e5 21.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 22.\(\text{x}d3\)± Black is noticeably behind in development and plenty of his pawn are weak. His defence will be extremely difficult, because of that;

Black’s defensive task is not any easier after: 12...\(\text{x}d4\) 13.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{g}7\) (White can counter 13...\(\text{f}6\) quite easily, since his moves are practically forced i.e. 14.\(\text{x}g6\) \(\text{g}8\) 15.\(\text{d}d4\) cxd4 16.\(\text{x}h6+\) \(\text{f}7\) 17.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{x}d7\) 18.f5! \(\text{g}2\) 19.\(\text{g}5\)=, now Black’s king is vulnerable and White has excellent attacking chances with his couple of powerful bishops.) 14.\(\text{x}g6\) \(\text{x}d7\) 15.f5= Black is presently forced to enter a difficult endgame in view of the terrible threat of White to bring his knight to the g6-square: 15...\(\text{d}5\) 16.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}7\) 17.\(\text{e}6+\) \(\text{x}e6\) 18.\(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{x}g6\) 19.\(\text{f}1+\) ! \(\text{f}6\) 20.\(\text{x}g6\) d5 (20...h5 21.\(\text{e}4\)=) 21.\(\text{h}5\) and Black can hardly develop his kingside successfully.

12.dxc5

12...\(\text{x}c3\)+

After 12...dxc5 13.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 14.0-0 \(\text{d}4\)+ 15.\(\text{e}3\)= Black’s lag in development would not enable him to exploit the temporary activity of his bishops, while the weakness of his pawns presents White with a stable advantage.

Black can hardly equalize after: 12...\(\text{b}7\) 13.cxd6 \(\text{xd6}\) (In case of 13...\(\text{x}c3\)+ 14.bxc3 \(\text{c}6\) 15.\(\text{e}3\)= the game is opened in favour of White, who has a powerful bishop pair, or 14...\(\text{e}6\)+ 15.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{x}d6\) 16.\(\text{e}3\)=.) 14.\(\text{e}2\)!

(This is much better for White
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than the greedy move: 14.\(\text{g4?}\) \(\text{x}c3+!\) 15.bxc3 \(\text{f6!}\) 16.\(\text{xg6}\) \(\text{g8!}\) 17.\(\text{xh6+}\) \(\text{f7}\) 18.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{h8}\) 19.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{e6+}\) 20.\(\text{e5}\) \(\text{d8!}\)\(\rightarrow\) 14...\(\text{xc3}\) (or 14...\(\text{d4}\) 15.\(\text{e3}\)!\(\pm\) White completes his development and intends to exchange the active black pieces) 15.bxc3 \(\text{g7}\) 16.0–0\(\pm\).

13.bxc3 \(\text{c6}\)

Black will be faced with the defence of a difficult endgame after: 13...\(\text{x}c5\) 14.c4 \(\text{e6+}\) 15.\(\text{e2}\)\(\pm\).

14.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xc5}\) 15.c4 \(\text{f6}\)

16.\(\text{e}3\)\(\pm\)

White’s pieces are very active indeed; nevertheless he must very accurately in order to prevent Black’s possible counterplay on the light squares.

b2) 8...\(\text{h}6!\)

Black defends his vulnerable f7-square.

9.\(\text{f}3\)

The game Yemelin – Chepukaitis, St. Petersburg 2001, followed with 9.e6 \(\text{f6}\) 10.dc dc and as a result of numerous mistakes by both sides Black prevailed at the end.

9...\(\text{b}8\)

In case of 9...\(\text{a}7\) 10.e6 \(\text{f}6\) 11.\(\text{c}6+\) \(\text{f}8\) 12.\(\text{xc}5\), Black’s rook is misplaced and it can easily be attacked by White, for example with: 12...\(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{xc}5\) 14.\(\text{f}5!\)\(\pm\).

Black’s defence is also very difficult after: 9...\(\text{xd}4\) 10.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{b}8\) (It is worse for Black to try: 10...\(\text{b}6\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{dxe}5\) 12.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{xe}5\)\(\pm\), since it is too dangerous for him to play: 13...\(\text{f}6\), because of 14.\(\text{xf}7\) \(\text{f}5\) 15.\(\text{g}6+\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.\(\text{e}3\) and White preserves excellent attacking prospects, despite the approximate material equality.) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{b}7\) 12.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 13.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{c}5\) (In answer to 13...\(\text{b}6\), White’s most logical line is 14.\(\text{g}3!\), he wins a pawn and he can easily consolidate the position after: 14...\(\text{c}5\) 15.\(\text{c}6\)\(\pm\), or 14...\(\text{g}4\) 15.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 16.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 17.\(\text{e}2\)\(\pm\)). 14.\(\text{c}6+\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{gf}3\) \(\text{xc}6\) 16.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{c}8\) (following 16...\(\text{b}6\) 17.\(\text{a}5\)\(\pm\) White preserves his extra pawn) 17.\(\text{cd}4\) \(\text{dxe}5\) 18.\(\text{xe}5!\) \(\text{xe}5\) 19.\(\text{fxe}5\) \(\text{g}4\) 20.e6! \(\text{xe}6\) (In case of 20...\(\text{fxe}6\) 21.h3 e5 22.\(\text{f}3\)\(\pm\) White wins a pawn and Black’s temporary ac-
tivity would not compensate it sufficiently.) 21.\( \text{Q} \times e 6 \text{fxe6} 22.\text{h3} \text{Qf6} 23.\text{c3} \pm.\)

The material has been equalized, but White should be able to gradually complete his development and realize his pawn-majority on the queenside.

10.e6 \( \text{Qf6} \)

Black’s passive move 10...\( \text{Qb6} \) enables White to destroy his opponent’s queenside completely after: 11.\text{dxc5} \text{dxc5} 12.\text{e6}+ \text{f8} 13.\text{wxc5} f6 14.\text{Qf3} \text{exe6} 15.a4! \text{c8} 16.\text{we3} \text{f5} 17.axb5\pm.

11.\text{dxc5}

11...0–0!

This is the most precise move for Black and he intends to complete his development quickly and seize the initiative. In answer to 11...\text{fxe6}, Yemelin – Mehmedovic, Neum 2002, White should better follow with 12.a4!? and now there arise plenty of variations that have not been checked in practice. We will not include here all possible lines – this is practically impossible; instead we will give you only the most typical developments: 12...\text{wa5}! (It is too dubious for Black to play: 12...b4?! , because of 13.\text{Qe2} \text{dxc5} 14.\text{wa6}!± , while 13...\text{af5} loses after: 14.g4! \text{b7} 15.c6 \text{h4} 16.\text{wg3} \text{wc6} 17.\text{g1}+– 13.\text{e3}!? That is just one of the moves for White, which deserves attention. (He can also play: 13.0–0!; 13.cxd6!?; 13.\text{d2}!?) 13...\text{ad5} 14.0–0 \text{axe3} 15.\text{axe3} \text{dg4} (There are a lot of beautiful lines arising after: 15...b4 16.\text{ce4}, for example: 16...\text{xb2} 17.\text{ab1} \text{g7} – it is better for Black, but still not equalizing, to play here: 17...\text{af4} 18.\text{f3} \text{ad4}+ 19.\text{ah1} \text{de3} 20.\text{xd6}+! \text{exd6} 21.\text{ce6}+ \text{d7} 22.\text{xd6}! \text{exd6}+ 18.\text{xd6}+! \text{exd6} 19.\text{xe6} \text{af6} 20.f5 \text{xf5} 21.\text{xf5} \text{gx5} 22.\text{xf5}+; 20...\text{g4} 21.\text{e4} \text{gf5} 22.\text{xf5} \text{gg8} 23.\text{cxd6}+; 21...\text{de5} 22.\text{ad5}! \text{xd3} 23.\text{fxg6} \text{exf5} 24.\text{xf5}+; 22...\text{dxc5} 23.\text{fxg6} 24.\text{xf6}+ 34.\text{xf6}+– 16.\text{fe3} \text{b4} 17.\text{wg4} \text{bxc3} 18.b4! White’s main task here is to prevent Black from completing his development, therefore he must act energetically. He should be prepared to even sacrifice material if necessary. 18...\text{xb4} (White has a powerful attack in the following line, which is practically forced: 18...\text{xb4} 19.\text{xe7} \text{d4}+ 20.\text{h1} \text{xc5} 21.\text{xe6}+ \text{d8} 22.\text{g5} \text{e5} 23.\text{f7}+ \text{c7} 24.\text{g5} \text{g8} 25.\text{xe7} \text{d7} 26.\text{xf5} \text{c6} 27.\text{g5} \text{exf4} 28.\text{ad1}! \text{e5} 29.\text{fe1}+– and all White’s pieces are ideally coordinated.) 19.\text{xe7} \text{xc5}+ (Black cannot neutralize White’s attack after: 19...\text{d4}+ 20.\text{h1}
\[ \text{xc5 21. xg6+ d8 22. g5\rightarrow.)} \]
\[ 20. h1 d7 21. xg6 d4 22. ae1 c7 (Black would not save the game with: 22...d5 23. xe6 b7 24. f5\pm, because he loses after: 24...bg8 25. xd6+ c7 26. xd5 xg6 27. d7+-) 23. g5 f6 24. xe6+ xe6 25. xe6\pm. \]
White’s advantage is due not only to his extra pawn, but as well to the more reliable placement of his king and his control over the light squares.

12. cxd6 exd6

Black’s compensation for the pawn is hardly sufficient in the other variations too, for example:
\[ 12...fxe6 13. dxe7 xe7 14.0-0\pm; \]
\[ 12...xd6 13. xf7 xf7 14. ge4 xe4 15. xe4 c6 16. e2 b7 17.0-0 bd8 g3\pm. \]
\[ 13. xf7 xf7 14. xf7 xf7 \]
15.0-0

White remains with an extra pawn and good chances to parry Black’s temporary activity, for example: 15...g4 16. g3! d4+ 17. h1 b6 18. d1\pm. It is not easy for Black at all to maintain his initiative. White should be gradually able to consolidate his position by repelling, or even exchanging his opponent’s most active pieces.

Conclusion about 1...g6

The 1...g6 system has been the favourite opening weapon of plenty of creative players, who do not like to play extensively analysed opening lines. Such players enjoy forcing their opponents “to think over original problems early in the game”! This strategy tended to bring considerable success for many years. Unfortunately, nowadays it slowly but surely will start belonging only to the past...

Contemporary chess is an integral part of the information age and there appeared plenty of excellent methods to fight for the advantage even in this somewhat uninvestigated opening. White has gradually learned how to overcome Black’s tactical tricks in this opening scheme.

The most important feature of this opening for Black is that it guarantees him numerous different possibilities. This more or less defines the character of the battle in the opening. Black can force his opponent into sharp tactical fights in which everything hinges literally on a thin hair and White might be forced to calculate the varia-
tions precisely to the end. Black can also try to build a solid and flexible, but a bit passive defensive position. White needs to show then some patience as well as accuracy and skill in order to choose the right moment to start the decisive offensive successfully.

In general, White players should be able to play chess well in order to prevail in this opening. While writing these chapters, we did not aim at analysing all possible lines that have been tested in practice. This could have led to an enormous increase of the volume of material analysed in our book and it would have been hardly useful for our readers. Still in some lines in which we have considered that as necessary, we have offered you exact and concrete recommendations, based on our newest analyses as well as on the latest achievements of the theoretical knowledge.
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