Opening for White according to Anand

1.e4

5

Alexander Khalifman
Opening for White According to Anand 1.e4

Book V

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Preface

Dear readers,

You are now holding in your hands the fifth volume of our series "Opening for White According to Anand – 1.e4". This book is devoted to openings (to put it mildly...) rather exotic. In fact, most of the chess-professionals consider the systems that we have analyzed in this volume as simply incorrect. It is maybe the Alekhine Defence, which can be spared such definite evaluation, but this would be probably only due to the reputation of this outstanding chess-genius.

It is hardly worth denying that Black would eventually fail to equalize after moves like 1...a6, or 1...b6. Nevertheless... the chess-players, belonging to the older generations, definitely remember the famous game Karpov – Miles (Skara 1980) 1.e4 a6 2.d4 b5 and...no, not 1–0 after 20 moves, but just the opposite – after 15 moves Black was already slightly better, after 25 moves Miles was clearly dominant and White resigned on move 46. Naturally, all that does not prove that the opening 1.e4 a6 is quite correct, but still it clarifies that neither the win, nor the opening advantage is irrevocably guaranteed even to the best players in the world. White needs some precise knowledge and energetic play to maintain his advantage in these somewhat inferior openings.

This small introduction should tell you that the author has had serious problems collecting practical examples (according to Anand...) and elsewhere at a really high level, in the process of writing this volume. The present theoretical material was not of much help either, because all these openings had never been analyzed thoroughly. It became necessary to systematize the available material and to give precise recommendations to White after the numerous orders of moves that Black had at his disposal in these rare openings.

I am not so optimistic about the eventual evaluation, which this book might deserve by my colleagues – grandmasters. It would hardly be as superb as the reviews of the previous volumes. Moreover, some of them might even pay no attention to it and that would be easily understandable. White presently has so many problems to solve, for example in the Marshall Counterattack, or in the Sicilian-Sveshnikov, so why bother about the fine points of the Owen’s Defence (1.e4 b6), which is being played so seldom anyway?
Meanwhile, this book is addressed not only to grandmasters and even least of all to them. Many less experienced players have encountered opponents at club-level who solve their opening problems once and for all, by avoiding the endless complicated lines of the Ruy Lopez, or the Sicilian Defence and instead respond to 1.e4 with 1...c6 (1...b6, 1...a6, 1...f6) and take care only about all immediate refutation attempts? The author has written this book for these particular players with the hope that it might be really useful for them. I would not venture to guarantee you winning your games with White, but you are going to have the opening advantage – be sure about that!

A. Khalifman
14th World Chess Champion

P.S. This book has included, in a separate part, some lines after 1.e4 e6 2.d4 (without 2...d5). The author considers that the French defence deserves a volume of its own – that is 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5, as for the lines, in which Black refrains from 2...d5 – that is …oh, see the first passages of this introduction.
Part 1

1.e4 – Miscellaneous
1.e4 b6 2.d4

In the first chapter we will analyze some quite strange moves for Black: 1...f5, 1...g5 (Basman Defence), 1...a6 (Baker’s Defence). Only the last variation has a somewhat sensible idea – to follow with 2...b5 and to develop the bishop to the b7-square. Such enlarged fianchetto is a bit too risky for the early stages of the opening and White achieves a substantial advantage.

There is also another possibility for Black – 1...b6 (Owen’s Defence) with the similar idea – to develop the bishop to the b7-square. It is much more difficult for White to maintain a stable edge after that, since Black has not weakened his queenside with the move b7-b5 and he has not lost additional time to develop his bishop (the a7-a6-move). Black’s most logical plan for the development of his pieces: 1.e4 b6 2.d4 a6 3.d3 e6 (preparing c7-c5) 4.f3 c5 5.c3 f6 is dealt with in Chapter 3, while the rest of Black’s possibilities are analyzed in chapter two.
Chapter 1

1.e4

1...a6
This move became gradually popular after GM Anthony Miles’s sensational win with Black against Anatoly Karpov at the European Team Championship in Skara in 1980.

The moves 1...h5 and 1...a5 hardly deserve any serious attention, since they do not contribute at all to Black’s development, and he is not fighting for the centre either. After 2.d4± White has a clear advantage, because no matter what popular scheme Black might try to employ – his first move will definitely be premature mildly speaking...

It is obviously wrong for Black to play 1...f5 2.exf5 gxf6 3.e2±, because White remains with an extra pawn and better development.

White has no problems to claim the edge after: 1...a6 2.c3 c6 3.xa6 bxa6 4.f3 g6 5.0–0 g7 6.d4 f6, Comp Mephisto Genius – Van Geet, The Hague 1997, 7.e5 d5 (7..g4 8.h3 h6 9.f4±) 8.e4 0–0 9.c4 b6 (9..c7 10.b3±; 9...f5 10.c5 b6 11.c2±) 10.b3 d5 11.exd6 exd6 12.a3±2, and Black’s bishops are rather passive, while he has plenty of weak pawns to worry about.

After 1...g5 2.d4 Black usually follows with 2...g7 or 2...h6, but some other moves have been tried in practice too:

2...f6? – is a rather strange move, because after 3.e5± Black’s
knight will have to go to the centre of the board. It will come under attack just like in the Alekhine Defence, meanwhile Black will lose his g5-pawn in the process;

In answer to 2...e6, it is worth for White to try to exploit the weakening of Black's kingside immediately with: 3.h4!? gxh4 4...h5! and Black must defend very precisely against the oncoming attack. The only game played in this line followed with: 4...e7 5...d3 c5 6...e5 a5+ 7. d2 b6 8...xf7+ d8 9...g7 xeb2, Kuusela – Kiltti, Tampere 1995. Now after 10.dxc5! Black either gets checkmated, or he loses plenty of material, for example: 10...f6 (10...c7 11.f4 f6 12.xd7+) 11.f8+ c7 12. d6+ d8 13.c4 xa1 (13...d4 14.f8+ c7 15.a5+) 14. f8+ c7 15.a5+ b6 16.cxb6+ axb6 (White checkmates too after: 16..b7 17.d6+ c6 18. xc8+ xd6 19.b4+ e5 20. c7+) 17.xb6+ b7 18.xc8+ xc8 19.d6# Black thus suffers the punishment for his terrible play in the opening;

There are some games in which Black has tried the quite extravagant move 2...e5?, against which White should better continue his piece-development with 3...f3 and then for example: 3...exd4 4.xg5 b4+ 5.c3 dxc3 6...xc3± and White's lead in development is overwhelming;

2...g7 3...c3 (This is White's calmest move, but it is also very good for him to play 3.xg5, although after 3...c5 the game might get too complicated.) 3...c5 (About 3...h6 – see 2...h6; the other moves for Black enable White to dominate in the centre completely. He has additionally a powerful pressure on the kingside, which was weakened considerably with Black's first move: 3.e6 4.ge2 h5 5.e3 d6 6.d2 g4 7.0–0–0 a6 8.h3± Voulis – Papastavropoulos, Athens 1996, or 3...c6 4.c4 b5 5.b3 a5 6.a3 a6, Ginsburg – Frey, Deizisau 1998, 7.xg5±) 4.e3 b6, Kottenhahn – Zoeller, Giessen 1997 (After 4...a5 5.ge2 cxd4 6.xd4± the position resembles the Accelerated Dragon variation – 1.e4 c5 2.f3 g6 3.d4 cxd4 4.xd4 g7 5.c3 – except that Black's pawn is on the g5-square instead of on g6. This is definitely in favour of White, since he can attack much easier on the kingside – the f5 and h5-squares are very weak now.) 5.d5 a5+ 6.d2 d8 7.c3 cxd4 8.xd4± and White enjoys a total control over the centre and his lead in development is overwhelming;

2...h6 3...c3...
Chapter 1

9.\(\text{Qf3} \text{Qg6} 10.\text{Qd3} \text{Qc6} 11.\text{e5+ Smolyaninov - Khabarov, Dagomys 2003, Black lags in development considerably and he can hardly bring his king to safety, while in case of: 4...d6 5.\text{Qge2 Qc6 6.0-0 e5 7.dxe5 Qxe5 8.\text{Qb3 Qf6 9.f4 gxf4, Mordiglia - Faraoni, Asti 1995, the simple line 10.\text{Qxf4 Qe7 11.Qg3+ leads to a position, which is much more typical for the King's Gambit - White leads in development, the f-file is opened, the f5 and h5-squares are very weak, moreover White has not sacrificed anything whatsoever. White maintains a considerable lead in development too after: 5...Qf6 6.0-0 c6 7.f4= Alvarez - Theunisse, corr. 1992.) 5.\text{Qe3 Qc6 (After 5...cxd4 6.\text{Qxd4 Qxd4 7.Qxd4 Qf6 8.Qd5= Sheldrck - Williams, Mingara 2000, Black's kingside is totally destroyed; while in case of 5...Qa5 6.Qge2 Qf6, Kogge - Millgramm, Pinneberg 2000, White fortifies his centre with 7.f3 cxd4 8.Qxd4 d6 9.Qd2= and transposes to a position from the Dragon variation of the Sicilian Defence - 1.e4 c5 2.Qf3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.Qxd4 Qf6 5.Qc3 g6 6.Qe3 Qg7 7.f3 - in which Black's kingside has been weakened.) 6.Qe2 Qa5 (This chase of the white bishop consumes too much time.) 7.Qd3 cxd4 8.Qxd4 Qf6, Ward - Elieff, Canada 1996 (The exchange of White's light squared bishop does not help Black much: 8...Qxc4 9.Qxc4 Qf6 10.e5 Qg4 11.e6=; 9...Qxd4 10.Qxd4 Qf6 11.h4= and White leads in development and he has a powerful initiative in the centre and on the kingside.) 9.e5 Qh5 (in answer to 9...Qg4, White should better follow with 10.e6 and he wins a pawn preserving a huge lead in development.) 10.Qd5= White's pieces are centralized, he leads in development and he has excellent prospects for active play in the centre and on the kingside. White's advantage is overwhelming.

2.d4

2...b5

After 2...d5 3.exd5 Qxd5 4.\text{Qc3 there arises a position from the Scandinavian Defence with the strange early move a6; about 2...d6 3.\text{Qc3 - see Chapter 1, volume 4.}

In case of 2...e6 3.Qf3, Black has plenty of possibilities, but they usually lead only to transpositions: 3...b5 4.Qd3 - see 2...b5; 3...d5 4.Qc3 - see 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.Qc3 a6; 3...c5 - leads to the Sicilian Defence; 3...Qf6 4.e5 - transposes to the Alekhine
Defence with a move like e6, which is hardly the best and also with the inclusion of the strange a6?! – move.

Black has also tried the following moves in this position:

2...h6 3.c4 c5 (The attempt by Black to play symmetrically with 3...g6 4.\(\text{c}3\) b6 5.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{g}7\), Tidman – Sajjani, London 1999, leads after 6.f4± to a position in which White enjoys complete control over the centre; in answer to 3...b5, Helin – Marder, Stockholm 2000, White should simply capture 4.cxb5 and he remains with a solid extra pawn.) 4.\(\text{f}3\) cxd4 (after 4...g5 5.dxc5 \(\text{g}7\) 6.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 7.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{d}2\)± Rotman – Basman, London 1994, Black has no compensation for the pawn) 5.\(\text{xd}4\) 6.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{xc}7\) 7.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{e}2\)± Wortel – Basman, Amsterdam 1996. There arose a position, which is typical for the Paulsen variation of the Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{f}3\) e6 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{xd}4\) a6 5.c4) except that Black has played the move h6, which is hardly the best;

2...c5 3.dxc5 \(\text{a}5\)+ (It is calmer and safer for Black to play 3...e6 4.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}7\) 5.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xc}5\) 6.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xc}5\). The arising pawn-structure is more typical for the Sicilian Defence and the early exchange of the dark squared bishops enables White to either force the weakening of Black’s kingside, or to prevent him from castling. 7.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}8\) – it is possi-

bly better for Black to play: 7...g6 8.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 9.\(\text{d}3\) b5 10.0–0± and his queen is active, but both his flanks are weakened considerably – 8.\(\text{f}3\) b5 9.\(\text{d}3\) b4 10.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 11.0–0 \(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{f}4\) d6 13.\(\text{a}3\)± 12...e5 13.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{g}7\) 14.a3± Hodl – Sell, Germany 2000. White has excellent prospects on the queenside, because of the exposed position of the enemy king. Black has hardly any counterplay.) 4.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xc}5\) (The line 4...\(\text{f}6\) 5.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}5\), was played in the game Gonzalvo Lara – Cerrajeria, Zaragoza 1999. Now, it looks very attractive for White to follow with 6.\(\text{g}5\)!, for example after: 6...\(\text{e}7\) White exerts a powerful pressure: 7.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}5\) 8.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 9.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 10.0–0 d6 11.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{c}4\) 0–0 13.\(\text{f}4\); or 6...\(\text{xc}5\) 7.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 8.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 9.\(\text{g}4\)± and Black’s bishop pair does not compensate his weaknesses on the kingside and in the centre. It is even worse for him to play: 8...\(\text{c}6\)? 9.b4 \(\text{xb}4\) 10.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 11.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}5\)+, or 8...\(\text{b}6\) 9.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xf}2\)+ 10.\(\text{f}1\)+. 5.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{a}5\) (5...\(\text{b}4\) 6.a3 \(\text{xb}2\) 7.\(\text{d}5\)+; 6...\(\text{a}5\) 7.b4 \(\text{xe}5\) 8.\(\text{d}5\)+) 6.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}7\) \(\text{b}3\)!

This move enables White to paralyze Black’s queenside completely: 7...e6. This is Black’s only move. (7...b5 8.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{a}5\)+ 9.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 10.\(\text{b}6\)+; 7...\(\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{f}4\) 9.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{h}3\)+; 8...\(\text{e}5\) 9.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 10.\(\text{c}4\)+; 8...\(\text{c}6\) 9.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 10.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 11.\(\text{c}4\)+) 8.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{c}6\) 9.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}5\) (after
Chapter 1

9...d6 10.\(\text{c}d4\) \(\text{c}d7\) 11.0–0–0±
White’s lead in development is
overwhelming) 10.\(\text{c}a4\) d6 (10...
\(\text{c}e7\) 11.\(\text{c}d4+-\)) 11.\(\text{c}x\)c5 dxc5
12.\(\text{c}b6\) \(\text{a}a7\) 13.\(\text{g}g3\)±. White wins
at least a pawn.

3.\(\text{d}f3\)

3...\(\text{b}7\)

3...e6 4.\(\text{d}3\) c5 (about 4...\(\text{b}7\)
5.0–0—see 3...\(\text{b}7\) 5.c3 and now:
5...\(\text{b}7\) 6.0–0—see 3...\(\text{b}7\);
5...d6 6.0–0 \(\text{d}7\) (after 6...\(\text{c}6\)
7.\(\text{c}e1\) e5 8.a4 \(\text{b}8\) 9.axb5 axb5
10.h3 \(\text{d}7\) 11.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{c}7\) 12.\(\text{b}d2\)±
there arises a pawn-structure
which is typical for the Ruy
Lopez, except that White has
several extra tempi, Thallinger
– Wiedner, Austria 1994) 7.a4 c4
8.\(\text{c}c2\) \(\text{b}8\) 9.axb5 axb5 10.\(\text{e}1\)
\(\text{e}7\), Anagnostopoulos – Ivanets,
Herkilohi 1996, and here the best
way for White to exploit his huge
lead in development is to play:
11.b3! cxb3 12.\(\text{d}3\)± and Black
must push his b5-pawn forward
in order not to lose it, meanwhile
White continues with his develop-
ment and Black’s king is
rather unsafe in the centre;
Black can reduce the tension
in the centre with: 5...\(\text{x}d4\) 6.\(\text{x}d4\)
\(\text{b}4+\) 7.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{b}7\) 8.0–0 \(\text{c}x\)c3 9.
\(\text{x}c3\) \(\text{c}7\), Pucovski – Rajak, Yu-
gosavia 2001, but White main-
tains a steady pressure in the
centre and on the queenside:
10.a4! \(\text{f}6\) (it is worse for Black
to play: 10...d5 11.exd5 \(\text{x}d5\) 12.
axb5, as well as 10...\(\text{c}3\) 11.
\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 12.\(\text{b}1\)+–; 11...\(\text{c}6\) 12.
axb5) 11.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{b}4\) 12.e5 \(\text{d}5\)
13.c4 \(\text{b}6\) 14.c5 \(\text{d}5\) 15.\(\text{g}5\)±.

After 5...c4, White has a clear
plan for actions on the queens-
side: 6.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 7.0–0 \(\text{f}6\) 8.
\(\text{e}1\) d6 9.b3 \(\text{c}7\) 10.bxc4 bxc4
11.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 13.
\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 14.\(\text{x}4\) \(\text{a}8\), Riefler
– Unger, Bayern 2002 (14...\(\text{x}e4\)
15.\(\text{x}d6\) \(\text{x}d6\) 16.\(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{x}e4\)
17.\(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{c}3\) 18.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}8\) 19.
\(\text{f}4\)±; 18...g6 19.\(\text{h}6\)±). Now,
White could have preserved a
solid extra pawn with: 15.\(\text{a}3!\)
d5 16.\(\text{a}6\) \(\text{x}e4\) (It is hardly
better for Black to try: 16...\(\text{x}a3\)
17.\(\text{x}a3\) \(\text{x}e4\) 18.\(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 19.
\(\text{g}5\)±, because he remains a
pawn down and his king is
vulnerable. He has no compensation
for the pawn after: 16...\(\text{x}c3\)
17.e5, while in case of: 16...\(\text{dxe}4\)
17.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 18.\(\text{x}c6\) \(\text{x}c6\) 19.
\(\text{a}7\)± Black will have to defend
a very difficult endgame.) 17.
\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 19.\(\text{d}2\)
\(\text{f}6\) 20.\(\text{a}3\)±.

4.\(\text{d}3\)

We will analyze now: a) 4...
\(\text{f}6\) and b) 4...e6.

Black has also tried in prac-
tice:

4...d6 – White can now exploit
the weaknesses on Black’s queenside with quite natural moves: 5.a4! b4 6.c3 c5 7.0-0 a5
8.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash a}b5+ \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}6 9.dxc5 dxc5 10.
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}xd8+ \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}xd8 11.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}5± and Black
must fight for the draw in an endgame with weak queenside
pawns, moreover his pieces on the kingside are not developed,
Comas Fabrego – R. Valles, Spain 1998;

4...g6 5.a4! b4, Ferret – Gasch, Internet 1996 (it worse for Black
to play 5...bxa4 6.0-0 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash f}6, Gabrielson – Nagley, IECC 1998,
because White dominates in the centre and he has excellent at-
tacking chances after: 7.e5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}d5
8.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}4!, for example: 8...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}3
9.fxe3 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}e4 10.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash g}5!+-; 8...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}8
9.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash g}5! f5 10.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}f5--; 9...h6 10.
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}f7--; 9...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash b}4 10.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash a}xa4 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}e4
11.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}e4+) 6.0-0 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash g}7 (After 6...
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash f}6 7.e5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}d5 8.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}4 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}8 9.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash g}5,
Black will hardly manage to defend against White’s numerous
threats and particularly against 10.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash f}3.) 7.c3 bxc3 8.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}c3 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}6 9.
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}3±. White’s centre is very powerful and he enjoys a much bet-
ter development.

\textbf{a) 4...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash f}6}

\textbf{5.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}d2!}

This move is a useful prophylactic against the move c7-c5,
which White will counter now with dxc5, followed by e5 and
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}4. He saves a tempo in this fashion for the move c2-c3 in
comparison to line \textbf{b}.

\textbf{5...e6}

In answer to 5...c5, which was tested in several games, White
should better capture the pawn 6.dxc5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}7 (6...e6 7.e5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}d5 8.
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}4±) 7.b4 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}6 8.a3± and Black has no compensation.

\textbf{6.0-0 c5}

Black has no other active counterplay left.

About 6...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 7.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}1 – see 4...
e6 5.0-0 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 6.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}d2 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash f}6 7.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}1.

6...d5 7.e5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash f}d7 (If 7...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}4,
Williamson – Schaeperkoetter, IECG 2001, then the simple line
8.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}2 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}d2 9.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}d2 c5 10.dxc5
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}5 11.b4 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 12.a4± enables
White to exert a powerful pressure on the queenside.) 8.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash b}3
c5 9.dxc5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}c5 (It is worse for Black to play 9...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}6 10.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}3!
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}xe5 11.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}e5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}e5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}4
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}6 13.c3 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash c}8 14.f4 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}d4 15.
x\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}4±, because White remains
with an overwhelming advantage in the centre and he can cre-
ate threats on both sides on the board, Dibley – Schaeperkoetter,
IECG 2001.) 10.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}c5 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}c5 11.e3
\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash x}6, Flear – Rossi, Asti 1997, and now the simplest way for
White to exploit the weaknesses on Black’s queenside is to play:
12.b4 \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 13.a4↑.
6...d6 – enables White to seize the initiative on the queenside: 7.a4 b4 (It is worse for Black to try 7...bxa4 8.c3 e7, Raisa – Kivisto, Finland 1994, because after the simple line: 9.xa4+ d7 10.c2 White maintains a powerful pressure over the whole board.) 8.e5 dx5 9.dxe5 d5 10.e4 e7 11.e2 d7, Bratic – Nurkic, Neum 2003. Now, after the aggressive line: 12.c4 bxc3 13.bxc3 e5 14.e5 xc5 15.d2 there arises a position in which Black cannot complete his development easily, since after: 15...0–0 White plays 16.xh7!, while in case of 15...h6 16.ab1, White maintains his space advantage and he has a powerful pressure on the queenside.

7.dxc5 xc5 8.e5 d5 9.e4 e7

It is quite dubious for Black to play: 9...c7 10.xc5 xc5 11.a3 Tripoteau – Delaire, Fouesnant 2000, because White remains with the two bishop advantage and dominates in the centre.

10.a4 b4

After 10...b4 11.g5!± White manages to trade favourably the dark squared bishops.

11.c4! bxc3

It is worse for Black to play 11...b6, because after 12.e1± White controls the centre and he has excellent piece coordination.

12.bxc3 0–0, Faibisovich – Frogl, St. Petersburg 1993. (After 12.c6 13.a3± White’s knight reaches the wonderful d6-square and he maintains a powerful pressure on the queenside, Fritz 6 – Wege, Kuppenheim 2000; it is hardly any better for Black to try here: 12...f5 13.exf6 xf6 14.xf6+ xf6 15.g5± Burlant – Nagley, IECC 2003, because White preserves a huge lead in development and a strong initiative on the kingside.) 13.b1 c7 (13..c6 14.d4±) 14.d6 c6 15.c2 f5 (in case of 15...xd6 16.exd6 a5, White plays 17.c4! f6 – Black loses after 17..c3? 18.d2+ – 18.b2± and Black has no compensation for White’s two powerful bishops) 16.d4±. Black cannot activate his pieces effectively. White’s excellent knight on d6 paralyzes Black’s forces and the exchange of that knight with Black’s dark squared bishop would cause a great weakening of the dark squares. It is not clear at all how Black can complete his development.
b) 4...e6 5.0-0

5...c5
Black must organize some counterplay in the centre; otherwise he will have problems with the defence of his queenside weaknesses.

About 5...d6 6.d2d2 – see 4...d6.

5...d6 6.a4! bxa4 (after 6...b4 7.c5 White maintains his space advantage, his lead in development and his initiative on the queenside) 7.c3 c5 8.g5+ Tiger 9 – Goubet, Albertville 1997.

5...e7 6.a4! bxa4 7.c4 g6 8.c3 e7 9.a4 0-0 10.d5 c6 11.e3± Shabalov – Zapolskis, Liepaya 2004.

The move 5...e7 looks like a waste of time, because after 6.c3d2! c6! (6...c5, Trajano – Lima, Pernambuco 2000, 7.dxc5 xc5 8.a4±) 7.e1 c5 (in case of 7...d6 8.a4+ b4 9.c3 White has a powerful pressure on the queenside and in the centre), Sundeen – Vandenburg, Lansing 1990, and here the simple line 8.e5 d5 9.dxc5 xc5 10.e4+ transposes to the variation a with an extra tempo for White.

After 5...d5 6.e5 c5 7.c3 d7 (in answer to 7...e7, Erlandsen – Benn, Sandefjord 2002, White’s simplest line is 8.dxc5±, winning a pawn; the move 7...b6, Jæger – Fredriksen, Copenhagen 2004, enables White to seize the initiative on the queenside with: 8.dxc5 xc5 9.b4 e7 10.a4 bxa4 11.e3 c7 12.xa4±; in case of 7...c6, Tait – Bellon Lopez, Las Palmas 1975, White should again play: 8.dxc5 xc5 9.b4 b6 10.a4) 8.g5± and White enjoys extra space, his development is superior and his kingside initiative is dangerous for Black too, Stinson – Loncarevic, Chicago 1993.

6.c3 d6

About 6...d5 7.e5 – see 5...d5 6.e5 c5 7.c3.

Black loses plenty of time after 6...e7 7.dxc5 xc5, Nilson – Stephenson, corr. 1993. White plays: 8.b4 e7 9.a4 bxa4 (it is worse for Black to try 9...c7 10.axb5 axb5 11.xa8 xa8 12.d4, because White remains with an extra pawn) 10.xa4± and White has a superior development and a powerful pressure in the centre and on the queenside.

In answer to 6...b6, Brustman – Lebel Arias, Dubai 1986, White can create dangerous threats on the queenside with: 7.dxc5 xc5 (or 7...xc5 8.a4 b4 9.e3 c7 10.cx b4 xb4 11.b3 c6 12.c1 b8 13.a3±) 8.b4 e7 9.a4±.
6...\(\text{c6}\) enables White to occupy the centre: 7.d5 \(\text{c7}\) (after 7...\(\text{c5}\) 8.e1 \(\text{c7}\) 9.b3± Black’s queenside pieces are totally misplaced) 8.c4 bxc4 9.xc4 \(\text{f6}\) 10.e3± and White has a huge space advantage and better development, Flear – Wohlers, France 1998.

6...h6 7.e2 \(\text{f6}\) (it is too passive for Black to play: 7...e7, Jenni – Erenskaja, Bad Wörishofen 2001, because White can counter that with 8.dxc5 \(\text{x5}\) 9.b4 \(\text{b6}\) 10.a4±) 8.bd2 cxd4 (Black loses plenty of time with: 8...\(\text{c7}\) 9.dxc5 \(\text{x5}\) 9.dxc5, Pierangeli – Mazziotto, Rome 1996, and now 10.e5 \(\text{d5}\) 11.e4 \(\text{c7}\) 12.a4± provides White with domination in the centre and a powerful initiative on the queenside.) 9.cxd4 \(\text{c7}\) 10.a4 b4 11.a5 0–0 12.e5 \(\text{e8}\) (12...\(\text{d5}\) 13.e4 \(\text{g6}\) 14.\(\text{c4}\)±) 13.\(\text{c4}\)±, Black’s pieces are extremely passive and he can hardly organize counterplay anytime soon, Bengtsson – Engstrom, Linkoping 1984.

6...d6 7.e2 \(\text{f6}\) (After 7...\(\text{e7}\) 8.a4 b4, Levitt – Zapolskis, Plovdiv 2003, White can exploit the weakening of Black’s queenside with: 9.dxc5 dxc5 10.d1 \(\text{c7}\) 11.xb2 \(\text{g6}\) 12.\(\text{c4}\)± and Black’s defence is quite problematic, for example: 12...\(\text{e7}\) 13.cxb4 cxb4 14.e3 \(\text{d7}\) 15.\(\text{ac1}\)± \(\text{c5}\)±. It is too bad for Black to play 7...\(\text{e7}\), because after 8.dxc5 dxc5 9.e5 \(\text{d7}\) 10.e4±, Black can hardly develop his kingside, while White’s queenside initiative is overwhelming, Kovalevskaya – Dergatschova-Daus, Germany 2003. In answer to 7...\(\text{d7}\), Hernandez – Lucena, Havana 2003, White should better play 8.b3?! \(\text{g6}\) 9.\(\text{bd2}\) \(\text{e7}\) 10.a4 b4 – Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient after: 10...0–0 11.xb5 12.xa8 \(\text{x8}\) 13.\(\text{g5}±\) 11.cx6 \(\text{xb4}\) \(\text{cxb4}\) 12.xb2 0–0 13.\(\text{ac1}\)±, because White can patiently prepare his queenside initiative making use of his domination in the centre.) 8.xd2 \(\text{e7}\), Abello – Dunis, France 2000. White can obtain a clear advantage in the centre after: 9.dxc5 dxc5 10.c4?! b4 (10...\(\text{xc4}\) 11.\(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 12.e5 \(\text{d5}\) 13.\(\text{g5}\)±) 11.e5 \(\text{d7}\) 12.e4 \(\text{c7}\) (12...0–0 13.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 14.\(\text{ad1}\)±) 13.\(\text{f4}\)±. White’s piece-formation in the centre is so powerful that his advantage is overwhelming.

6...\(\text{c7}\) 7.e2 \(\text{c6}\) (About 7...\(\text{f6}\) 8.xd2 – see 6...\(\text{f6}\) 7.e2 \(\text{c7}\) 8.xd2; while in answer to 7...d5, Hartmann – Stone, IECG 2000, the simplest line for White is: 8.e5 \(\text{d6}\) 9.xc5 \(\text{xc5}\) 10.b4 \(\text{b6}\) 11.a4±; 10...\(\text{e7}\) 11.a4± and he exerts a powerful pressure on the queenside; in case of 7...c4 8.\(\text{ac2}\) \(\text{f6}\), Hughes – Lankey, USA 1991, White can also follow with: 9.e5!? \(\text{d5}\) 10.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{g6}\) 11.\(\text{e4}\)±; 10...\(\text{f5}\) 11.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 12.\(\text{f4}\)±; 10...d6 11.f4 h6 12.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{f5}\)± and Black’s defence is quite problematic. The
following line is practically forced and it leads to a calm position with the bishop pair advantage for White: 13...0–0–0 14.fxe6 fxe6 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}x\text{xd6}\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x\text{xd6}\) 16.exd6 \(\text{\textcopyright}\text{xd6}\) 17.a4 \(\text{\textcopyright}\text{df8}\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}\text{xf8}\)\+ \(\text{\textcopyright}\text{xf8}\) 19.axb5 axb5 20.\(\text{\textcopyright}a3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3\)\+; in case of 7...g6 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}e1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e7\) Martin – O’Harney, London 2000, it is very good for White to play energetically: 9.d5 \(\text{\textcopyright}g7\) 10.a4\+; Black cannot contain White’s initiative on the queenside with the move: 7...\(\text{\textcopyright}e7\), because after 8.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright}f5\) – or 8...d6 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}bd2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d7\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) dxe5 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d5\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}e2\) – 9.b3 \(\text{\textcopyright}d5\) 10.a4\+ White is clearly superior on the queenside, Maciejew – Kania, Poland 1994; White’s game is very easy after: 7...d5 8.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright}c6\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}g5\), since he preserves a powerful pressure on the kingside, Sharp – Judd, Isle of Man 1991, or 8...h6 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}bd2\) g5 10.b3 g4 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}e1\) Voulidis – Ducu, Creta 1996.) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}e2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e7\) (About 8...\(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) 9.e5 – see 6...\(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) 7.\(\text{\textcopyright}e2\) c4 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}c2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}f6\) 9.e5; after 8...d5 9.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright}fd7\) – in the line 9...\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe4\) dxe4 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}g5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e7\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe4\)\+ Black’s compensation for the pawn is obviously insufficient – 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}g5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e7\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}h5\) g6 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}h6\)\+ and White has a powerful initiative on the kingside, while Black has no counterplay whatsoever, Bernard – Bialas, corr. 1991, or 10...g6 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}g4\) Mokos – Vodicka, Slovakia 2001.) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}bd2\) 0–0 10.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright}e8\) (10...\(\text{\textcopyright}d5\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) h6 12.b3\+) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) f5 12.exf6 \(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}fg5\), Black lags in development so much that his defence against White’s threats on the kingside is quite

6...cxd4 7.cxd4 əc6 (About 7...əf6 8.əxe2 – see 6...əf6; in answer to 7...d6, Kohut – Kročian, Bratislava 1991, White can exploit Black’s queenside weaknesses with: 8.a4 bxa4 9.əc3±; 8...b4 9.əf4 əf6 10.əbd2±; after 7...d5 8.e5 əc6 9.əc3 əc8 10.əe3 əge7 11.əc1 əg6 12.əg5 əe7 13.əh5± there were a pawn-structure typical for the French Defence and White preserves a kingside initiative, while Black has no counterplay, Grazinys – Andersen, Email 1998; Black weakens his dark squares too much after 7...g6, Brock – Hippe, Neumuenster 1999, after 8.a4 bxa4 9.əc3±; 8...b4 9.əf4± White enjoys a huge lead in development.) 8.əc3 əb4 (Black’s queenside play is absolutely ineffective after: 8...əc8 9.a3 əb6 10.əe3 əa5, Khazankin – Chernetsky, Odessa 2003, because after: 11.d5 əc7 12.əc1 əc4 13.əxc4 bxc4 14.əd4±; 11...əc5 12.əxc5 əxc5 13.əc1±; 12...əxc5 13.əc1 əc4 14.əxc4 əxc4 15.əe5 əc7 16.dxe6 dxe6 17.əxb5++; 14...bxc4 15.b4±, Black’s active pieces have been exchanged, his kingside is not developed well and his queenside has been weakened.) 9.əb1 d5, Utasi – Herrera Perez, Havana 1985, 10.e5 əc8 11.a4 bxa4 12.əxa4±. White’s development is superior, he has a space advantage, while Black’s defence is difficult, because his a6-pawn is weak and the c5-square is vulnerable.

7.əe2

7...cxd4

About 7...c4 8.əc2 – see 6...c4 7.əc2 əf6 8.əxe2; 7...d6 8.əbd2 – see 6...d6 7.əe2 əf6 8.əbd2; 7...h6 8.əbd2 – see 6...h6 7.əe2 əf6 8.əbd2.

After 7...əc6 8.e5 əd5 9.əe4 cxd4 10.əxd5 exd5 11.cxd4 əb6 12.əd1 əe7 13.əc3 əd8 14.əg5! əxg5 15.əxg5± Black’s bishop is bad, his dark squares are vulnerable and the d5-pawn is weak, Douven – Welling, Eindhoven 1983.

In answer to 7...əb6; Zlatanova – Botsari, Athens 1992, White should better play 8.dxc5! əxc5 9.e5 əd5 10.a4 b4 (after 10...bxa4 11.əxa4↑ Black cannot get rid of the e5-pawn, which cramps his position a lot, for example it is too bad for him to play: 11...d6? 12.b4! əc6 13.əa3 əb6 14.b5 əc8 15.əxd6±) 11.c4 əe7 12.əbd2 əbc6 13.əe4± and White has extra space, moreover Black cannot find a safe haven for his king.

7...əe7 8.dxc5!? əxc5 9.b4
\( \text{e7 10.a4 bxa4 (it is even worse for Black to play 10...a5 11.axb5 axb4 12.\text{Ax}a8 \text{Ax}a8, Mikoska – Bock, corr. 2001, after 13.e5 \text{g}4 14.\text{d}d4+; 13...\text{d}d5 14.c4 \text{b}b6 15.\text{e}e3± Black has great problems to develop his knight on b8) 11.\text{xa}a4 0–0 (it is better for Black to play 11...d6 12.d1 c7 13.\text{f}4±, but White enjoys a huge space advantage as well as a powerful queenside pressure) 12.e5 \text{d}d5 13.\text{e}4 g6 14.\text{h}h6 \text{e}e8 15.\text{e}e2± S.Nagy – A.Nagy, Debrecen 1999. Black has weaknesses on both sides of the board, he lacks space and he has no active possibilities whatsoever.} \)

7...\text{c}7 8.\text{b}d2 cxd4 (After 8...d6, Konarkowska – Ranniku, Ohrid 1972, it deserves attention for White to follow with: 9.b3?!, so that he can prepare the undermining move a4, preventing Black from playing c4, for example: 9...\text{e}7 10.a4 cxd4 11.\text{c}xd4 bxa4 12.\text{xa}4 \text{c}6 13.\text{a}a2 0–0 14.\text{a}3±; 11...b4 12.\text{b}2 0–0 13.\text{ac}1± and White has a clearly better position, because of his extra space and superior development. He has ample active possibilities on both sides of the board.) 9.cxd4 \text{c}6 10.a3! \text{g}4?! (It is better for Black to play 10...\text{e}7, but even then after 11.b3! 0–0 12.\text{b}2± White maintains a stable edge, because he has extra space, moreover Black has no active possibilities at all, for example it is too dubious for him to play: 12...\text{h}5?! 13.d5! \text{f}4 14.\text{e}3 exd5 – Black loses after 14...\text{xd}3 15.\text{xc}6 \text{xb}2 16.\text{xb}7+–, this line, which of course is not forced, shows nevertheless the power of White's move 11–15.exd5 \text{xd}3 16.\text{xc}6 \text{xb}2 17.\text{xb}7 \text{ae}8 18.\text{e}5± and White's almighty b7-pawn provides him with a great advantage.) 11.b3 \text{e}7 12.\text{d}2± and Black's defence is very difficult, because of his bad knight on g4, his cramped position and his lag in development, C.Popescu – Pessi, Bucharest 1995.

7...d5 8.e5 \text{fd}7 (It is not good for Black to play: 8...\text{e}4, Chetverik – Krivolapov, Gyongyos 1999, because White can counter that with: 9.\text{e}4?! d4 10.\text{xd}4 \text{c}6 11.\text{e}3 f5 12.f3 \text{g}5 13.a4 b4 14.d2± and he maintains a powerful pressure on the queenside.) 9.\text{g}5 g6 (It is not any better for Black to play: 9...\text{e}7, Shim Ng Min – Smyth, Email 1999, because after 10.\text{g}4! Black's defence is very difficult, for example: 10...h5?! 11.\text{g}3 h4 12.\text{g}4±, or 10...\text{f}8 11.\text{h}5 \text{g}5 12.\text{g}5 \text{c}7 13.\text{d}2 \text{c}6 14.\text{f}3±; 11...g6 12.\text{e}3±, and Black's kingside in both lines is so weak that White is clearly better; it seems more reliable for Black to follow with: 10...g6, but White has a powerful tactical strike after that – 11.\text{xe}6! fxe6 12.\text{x}g6+ \text{hx}g6 13.\text{g}6+ \text{f}8 14.\text{h}6+ \text{h}6 15.\text{h}6+ \text{f}7 16.\text{h}7+ \text{f}8 17.f4 and Black's pieces are totally discoordinated,
so his defence is extremely difficult. White's attack is very dangerous too after: 15...<br>&#916;g8 16. &lt;x/e6+ &lt;x/g7 17.f4→.) 10.&lt;x/f3 &lt;x/e7, Salmi – Bigalke, Tampere 2001. After 11.&lt;x/h3 &lt;x/g7 (in the line<br>11...cxd4 12.cxd4 &lt;x/c6 13.&lt;x/f3 &lt;x/g7 14.&lt;x/h6!± Black remains with a weak light squared bishop and vulnerable dark squares, particularly the c5-outpost) 12.&lt;x/f3 h6 13.&lt;x/e1 &lt;x/c6 14.&lt;x/a3±<br>White's positional advantage is stable, because Black can hardly find a safe shelter for his king, meanwhile his active play on the queenside has only created additional weaknesses.<br><br>8.cxd4 8...&lt;x/c6 8...&lt;x/c6 10.d6 11.&lt;x/bd2 h6, Grabuzova – Frog, Moscow 1991, White can play the simple line 12.&lt;x/h4 &lt;c6 13.&lt;x/b3 0–0 14.&lt;x/fc1↑ and he maintains a powerful pressure on the queenside.) 11.&lt;x/h4 &lt;x/h5 12.&lt;x/e7 &lt;x/e7 13.&lt;x/e3 0–0 14. &lt;x/bd2 &lt;c6 15.&lt;x/fc1 &lt;x/f6 16.&lt;x/b3 &lt;x/e8 17.&lt;x/c2± Sosonko – Sahovic, Amsterdam 1979. White's initiative on the queenside is overwhelming, while Black has no counterplay whatsoever.<br><br>9.&lt;x/c3 d5<br>In response to 9...&lt;x/b8, Brzezicki – Kubien, Wroclaw 1980, White has a powerful countermeasure: 10.e5 &lt;x/g8 (10...&lt;x/d5 11.&lt;x/d5 exd5 12.&lt;x/f4+) 11.a3 &lt;x/e7 12.&lt;x/e4 &lt;x/g6 13.&lt;x/g5± and he has a lot of extra space and superior development.<br><br>It is not so good for Black to play 9...b4 10.&lt;x/a4 d5, Juergens – Weiss, Austria 2001. After 11.e5 &lt;x/e4 (White preserves a stable advantage too after: 11...&lt;x/d7 12.&lt;x/e3 &lt;x/e7 13.&lt;x/d2 &lt;x/a5 14.b3 0–0 15.&lt;x/g4, or 11... &lt;x/e5 12.b3 &lt;x/d7 13.&lt;x/d2± 12... &lt;x/e4 13. &lt;x/e4 de 14.&lt;x/e4 &lt;x/e8 15.&lt;x/e3± 12.&lt;x/e4 dxe4 13.&lt;x/x4 &lt;x/a5 14. &lt;x/e2 &lt;x/c8 15.b3 &lt;x/e7 (Black could have regained his pawn with: 15...&lt;x/f3 16.&lt;x/f3 &lt;x/d4 17.&lt;x/b2 &lt;x/a7 18.&lt;x/a1±, but his lag in development and his weak queenside qualify his position as extremely difficult.) 16.&lt;x/e3± Black's light squared bishop is very powerful indeed, but it does not compensate the
loss of a pawn, since the rest of the black pieces are completely misplaced.

10.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} g5}  \textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} b4} 11.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} e5}  h6 12.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} h4}  g5

Black cannot change much, by playing: 12...\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} xd3} 13.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} xd3}  g5
14.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} xg5±}.

(d i a g r a m)

13.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} xg5}  \textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} hxg5} 14.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} xg5}  e7 15.\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} xf6±} Harikrishna – Wohl, Torquay 2002. White preserves a solid extra pawn.

**Conclusion**

We have analyzed some quite seldom played moves for Black in answer to 1.e4. The "most difficult" task for White to prove his advantage is connected with the move 1...a6, followed by 2...b5. Black is not fighting immediately for the centre indeed, but still he has a clear plan of mobilizing his pieces. The essential drawback of this line is the weakening of Black's queenside. In case he does not follow quickly with the move c7-c5, undermining his opponent's centre, White seizes the initiative on the queenside by playing a2-a4. If Black plays c5 prematurely – White can occupy plenty of space by exchanging on c5, followed by e5 and e\textit{\textsf{\textcolor{Red}{\textsf{\textbullet}}} e4}. The transposition to the French Defence is not favourable for Black either, because White can proceed with his standard kingside play indeed, but he can also seize the initiative on the queenside too due to the weakness of the c5-square. Black's light squared bishop is usually very bad in similar structures of the French Defence, but here, particularly after Black plays d7-d5 – it becomes a total disaster. The other first moves for Black that we have analyzed in this chapter enable White, with simple and logical play in the centre, to obtain easily a great advantage.
2...\textbf{b7}

This is Black’s basic reply in this position and it leads to the Owen’s Defence.

After 2...g6 3.\textit{c3} \textit{g7} 4.f4 the positions which are reached have been analyzed in Chapter 22, book 4.

Black has also tried in practice:

2...\textit{a6}?! 3.\textit{xa6} \textit{xa6} 4.\textit{f3} c5 (About 4...e6 5.0–0 – see 2...e6 3.\textit{f3} \textit{a6}?! 4.\textit{xa6} \textit{xa6} 5.0–0. In answer to 4...\textit{c8} 5.0–0 \textit{b7}, Nimzo 99 – Hiarcs 6.0, 1999, White’s simplest line is 6.\textit{e1} e6 7.c4± and he has a huge space advantage. It is even worse for Black to play 4...\textit{f6}?! 5.e5 \textit{d5}, Sief – Dopey, Internet 1999, because White wins a piece after: 6.c4 \textit{db4} 7.a3 \textit{c6} 8.b4+-, while after 5...\textit{g8} 6.0–0± White’s lead in development is overwhelming. It is quite dubious for Black to try 4...d5, Hotplayer – Boson, Internet 1999, because after 5.\textit{e2} \textit{b8} 6.exd5 \textit{xd5} 7.\textit{c3}± White’s development is clearly superior.) 5.d5 e6, Hooi Soon – Chen, Singapore 2003. Now after 6.0–0 \textit{f6} 7.\textit{e2} \textit{b8} 8.\textit{d1}± White enjoys a space advantage and a huge lead in development.

In answer to 2...c5?! it is too dangerous for White to win a pawn with: 3.\textit{xc5} bxc5 4.\textit{d5} \textit{c6} 6.\textit{xc5} e5\textsuperscript{a}, because Black remains much ahead in development. It is advisable for White to play 3.\textit{f3} and transpose into the Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5 2.\textit{f3} b6 3.d4). It is also good for White to play 3.d5 transposing to the Benoni Defence (1.d4 c5 2.d5 b6?! 3.e4) and Black’s move b6 looks dubious to say the least.

After 2...e6 3.\textit{f3} Black usually transposes to the Owen’s Defence with 3...\textit{b7} (about 3...d5 4.\textit{c3} – see the French
Defence) 4.\texttt{d}3. The rest of the moves are rather questionable:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\texttt{1.e4 b6 2.d4 \texttt{b}7 3.\texttt{d}3} \\
\texttt{3...\texttt{c}6?}! This move enables White to obtain a great space advantage. 4.d5 exd5 (It is hardly better for Black to play 4...\texttt{c}e7. After 5.c4 \texttt{b}7 6.\texttt{c}3 g6 7.\texttt{d}4\underline{\texttt{+}} Rush – Mwango, Luzern 1982, White’s pieces are deployed quite harmoniously.) 5.exd5 \texttt{c}e7 6.\texttt{c}4 d6 7.0–0\underline{\texttt{+}} Grunberg – Lutton, Port Erin 2002. Black has lost plenty of time to place his knight to an unfavourable position and White has a space advantage and superior development;

3...\texttt{a}6?!! It is not so easy for Black’s knight to enter the action from that square; moreover White can develop his pieces with tempo now. 4.c3 \texttt{b}7, Khalidhara – Abdallah, Sanaa 2002, 5.\texttt{d}3\underline{\texttt{+}};

3...\texttt{e}7 4.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{b}7 (in answer to 4...\texttt{a}6, Eliet – Nemety, France 1996, White’s simplest line is 5.c4 d5 – Black must try to support somehow the idea to develop his bishop to the a6-square – 6.exd5 \texttt{xd}3 7.\texttt{xd}3 exd5 8.\texttt{c}3 dxe4 9.\texttt{xe}4 c6 10.0–0\underline{\texttt{+}} and Black will have great problems to complete his development) 5.0–0 d6 6.c3 \texttt{d}7, Mohr – Vojko, Ljubljana 1998, 7.\texttt{e}2\underline{\texttt{+}};

3...\texttt{a}6?!! Black will have problems with his knight at the edge of the board after the trade
of the light squared bishops. 4.\&xa6 \&xa6 5.0–0 \&e7 (In answer to 5...c6, Romero – Castillo Martinez, Aragon 1995, it is advisable for White to play the simple 6.\&e2 \&c7 7.c4± with a huge space advantage. After 5...h6, Cuartas – Coppini, Reggio Emilia 1981, it is also good for White to play 6.\&e2 \&b8 7.d5± and Black has problems to complete his development. He has the same problem after: 5...g6 6.\&e2 \&b8 7.d5 \&g7 8.\&g5 \&e7 9.\&c3± Sosonko – Bohm, Leeuwarden. After 5...c5, Zajac – Morin, corr. 1996, it is the simplest for White to occupy some additional space first with: 6.d5 \&f6 7.\&e2 \&b8 – Black loses a piece after: 7...\&c7?! 8.d6 – 8.\&d1± Black's position is cramped and he lags in development considerably.) 6.\&e2 \&c8 7.\&c3 \&g6 8.\&g5 h6 9.\&e3 \&e7 10.\&ad1 0–0 11.h4. Black's position is squeezed and his pieces are quite misplaced on the queenside, so White can start active actions on the kingside immediately. 11...\&f5 (It is too dangerous for Black to play: 11...\&xh4 12.\&xh4 \&xh4 13.f4 \&e8 14.f5 exf5 15.g3 \&g6 16.exf5 \&f8 17.f6→; 13...d5 14.\&h5 \&g6 15.f5→; 14...\&d8 15.f5 dxe4 16.fxe6±, White has excellent compensation for the pawn, because Black's pieces are rather misplaced.) 12.h5 fxe4 13.\&xe4 \&h8 (after 13...\&f4 14.\&xf4 \&xf4 15.\&e5± Black can hardly coordi-
1.e4 b6 2.d4 2.b7 3.d3

...c7 as well, Krajewska – Tomczyk, Leba 2004. After 5...c3
White is threatening 6...b5, and Black's attempt to prevent that
move with 5...a6, leads after 6.e5
d6 7...f4 to a considerable lead
in development for White.) 5...c3
a6 (after 5...e5 6...b5+...d7
7...xd7+...xd7 8...d2 a6 9.a4
de7 10...c4 Black's queenside
has been weakened and he lacks space, Geenen – Onkoud, France
2003) 6.a4...f6 7...d3 h6 8.0–0
de7 9.h3 0–0 10...e1 exd5 11.
...xd5...bd7 12...f4...xd5 13.
exd5...f6 14.c4... Alekhine –
Koutny, Prague 1935. Black's
defence is very difficult. He has
problems to activate his pieces,
he has no counterplay and he
lacks space.

3...d3

We will now deal in details with: a) 3...f6 and b) 3...e6.

The other moves for Black are
only seldom played:

After 3...c5 White plays 4.d5
and has clearly better prospects
no matter what scheme of devel-
opment Black chooses. In case of
4...e6 White follows with 5.c4 and
the bishop on b7 will be com-
pletely out of play in the nearest
future. You can see some games,
for example in the line: 3...f6
4...e2 c5 5.d5;

In answer to 3...d5 White's
simplest line is 4.e5, for example:
4...a6 (The rest of the moves for
Black have no separate value, or
they are just terrible: 4...f6?
5...h5+ g6 6...xg6+– Zippy –
Giffy, Internet 1993. About 4...
...c6 5.c3 e6 6...f3 – see 1.e4 b6
2.d4...b7 3...d3 c6 4...f3 d5 5.e5
...c6 6...c3; 4...e5 5.c3...c6 6...f3 e6
– see 1.e4 b6 2.d4...b7 3...d3 e6
4...f3 c5 5.c3 d5 6.e5...e6; 4...e6
5...f3 – see 3...e6 4...f3 d5 5.e5;
4...d7 5...f3 e6 – see 3...e6
4...f3 d5 5.e5...d7) 5...xa6...xa6
6.e6! This pawn-sacrifice is quite
typical for similar positions. It
prevents Black from completing
his development; moreover
White now has an excellent tar-
get for attack on the e-file.
6...fxe6 7...e2...c8 8...f3 c6,
Schlosser – Wiedner, Austria
1994. White should not be in a
hurry to regain his pawn, he
must instead complete his devel-
opment first. 9...f4...f6 10.0–0–;

3...f5? This risky move is an
attempt by Black to exploit the
vulnerability of White's g2-pawn.
Black however, weakens his
kingside and comes under an
extremely dangerous attack.
4.exf5...xg2 (it is not any better
for Black to play 4...f6 either,
because after 5...f3± White's
development is superior and
he has an extra pawn that cramps Black’s position considerably, Ploder – Daikeler, corr. 1986) 5.\(\text{g}5+\) g6 6.\(\text{fxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) (The first available game, which was played in this position, ended up in a quick checkmate after: 6...\(\text{xf}6\) 7.\(\text{gxh}5\) + \(\text{hxh}5\) 8.\(\text{g}6\#\) Greco – NN, Europe 1620) 7.\(\text{xf}5\)!

(this is White’s most energetic move, although 7.\(\text{gxh}7\) is also very good) 7...\(\text{xf}6\) (Black loses immediately after 7...\(\text{xf}6\) 8.g7\(\text{hxh}6\) 9.\(\text{g}5++-\) 8.\(\text{h}6!\) \(\text{xh}6\)

(The next variation only transposes to the main line: 8...\(\text{xf}8\) 9.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{xh}1\) 10.\(\text{g}7+\) \(\text{g}7\) 11.\(\text{gxh}7+\) \(\text{f}8\) 12.\(\text{h}6\) +. After 8...e6 9.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{h}6\) 10.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 11.\(\text{gxh}7\) \(\text{e}7\) 12.\(\text{f}3\) + Ploder – Weber, corr. 1988, White remains at least with an extra pawn, moreover Black’s king is stranded in the centre: 8...0-0 9.\(\text{gxh}7+\) \(\text{h}8\) 10.\(\text{g}7+\) \(\text{g}7\) 11.\(\text{g}6+\) \(\text{h}8\) 12.\(\text{g}2\) and White remains with an extra piece, Della Morte – Lopez, Villa Martelli 2000.) 9.\(\text{gxh}7\) \(\text{f}8\) 10.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{xh}1\) (or 10...\(\text{c}1\) 11.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{xb}2\) 12.\(\text{e}2\) and Black has no satisfactory defence against \(\text{g}1\) and \(\text{f}4\) with a checkmating attack for White. It is even worse for Black to play: 11...\(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{e}2\)! \(\text{xb}2\) 13.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 14.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{g}8\) 15.\(\text{g}6++-) 11.\(\text{hxh}6+\) \(\text{f}7\) 12.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{e}6\) (this attempt by Black to run away from the centre with his king is his most stubborn defence, because otherwise he loses immediately: 12...\(\text{xf}8\) 13.

4...\(\text{d}7\) 5.\(\text{d}3\) g6 6.0-0 \(\text{g}7\) 7.\(\text{c}3\) – see 1.e4 g6 2.d4 \(\text{g}7\) 3.\(\text{c}3\) d6 4.f4 b6 5.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 6.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 7.0-0;

It is almost a disaster for Black to play: 4...\(\text{f}6\)? 5.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 6.\(\text{f}5\) +, because he has problems with his development and plenty of weaknesses in the centre, Lopez Escribano – Rivas Perez, Madrid 2002;

Black cannot solve his problems with the purposeful move 4...\(\text{f}5\), because after 5.\(\text{e}2\) fxe4 6.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 7.\(\text{xe}4\) d5 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}6\) 9.\(\text{f}3\) he remains with a backward e-pawn, less space and he lags in development too;

In case of 4...\(\text{f}6\) 5.\(\text{e}2\) e6 6.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{bd}7\) 7.e5 dxe5 8.fxe5 \(\text{d}5\), Pueyo – Iglesias, Oviedo
2003, White can start a dangerous attack with 9.Qe5!→ and it is very difficult to find any satisfactory defence for Black, for example it is too risky for him to play: 9...Qe7 10.Qxe6! fxe6 11.
Kh5+ g6 (it is possibly the best for Black to play: 11...Qf8 12. 0-0+ Qf6 13.exf6 Qxf6 14. 
Qe3±) 12.Qxg6+ hxg6 13.Qxg6+ 
Qf8 14.0-0+ Qf6 15.Qg5! 
Qe8 16.Qh6+ Qxh6 17.Qxh6+ Qf7 18. 
Kh7+ Qf8 19.c4+–; Black has nothing else left but 
4...e5, but White again enjoys extra space and a dangerous initiative after: 5.Df3 Qd7 6.0-0 

3...Qc6 4.c3 e5 (About 4...e6 5.Qf3 – see 3...e6 4.Qf3 Qc6 5.c3. It is not logical for Black to play 4...d5?! 5.e5 a6 6.Qf3 g6 7.0-0 
Qg7, Lyubimov – Hbn, Internet 1998, since after 8.Qe1± Black has problems to organize effective counterplay, because of his lag in development. In answer to 4...g6, Nemet – Heedt, Biel 1998, White’s simplest line is 5.f4 Qg7 6.Qf3 e6 7.0-0 – and he has an obvious advantage in the centre. It is more or less the same after 4...d6, Costa – Gazzera, San Francisco 2001, it looks very good for White to follow with 5.f4 e5 6.Qf3± and he dominates in the centre and his development is superior, or 5...e6 6.Qf3 Qf6 7. 0-0±) 5.d5 (it is worse for White to play 5.Qf3, because after

5...exd4 6.cxd4 Qb4 7.Qc4! Qxe4! 8.Qxf7+ Qxf7 9.Qg5+ Qg6!!
10.Qxe4 Qh4! Black still holds somehow rather surprisingly) 5...Qce7 6.Qf3 Qg6 7.0-0 Qf6 (It is hardly advisable for Black to play 7...h5. After 8.Qbd2 c6 
9.Qc4 Qc7 10.a4 h4 11.Qe1±, Black has great problems to find a safe shelter for his king, Kopec – Day, Ottawa 1984.) 8.Qbd2 d6, Rodriguez Lopez – Munoz Moreno, San Sebastian 1995 (in answer to 8...c6, Turner – Steinbacher, Krumbach 1991, White’s simplest line is 9.Qe1?, for example: 9...Qc7 10.Qc4 b5 11.Qe3 
Qc5 12.a4?, or 10...Qe7 11.Qe3 0-0 12.Qf5±) 9.a4! c6 (White’s initiative develops effortlessly after: 9...a5 10.Qb5+ Qd7 11.Qc4 
Qe7 12.b4±. It is too bad for Black to play: 9...Qf4 10.Qb5+ 
Qd7 11.Qc4 a6 12.Qxd7+Qxd7 13.Qxf4 exf4 14.Qd2±. In the line 9...a6 10.Qe1 Qe7 11.a5 b5 12.c4 
Bxc4 13.Qxc4± Black has no compensation for his queenside weaknesses.) 10.dxc6 Qxc6 11. 
Qb5!±. After the trade of the light squared bishops, White will exploit the weaknesses on d5, f5 and c6-squares even easier. Black falls back in development and he can hardly organize any effective counterplay.

3...g6 4.f4 Qg7 (4...Qf6 5.Qc3 e6 6.Qf3 Qb4 – this idea to transpose to the French defence is dubious for Black, because the move g6 is definitely not a part of it. After 7.Qd2 Qe7 8.a3 Qxc3
9...bxc3 White’s centre is very powerful and he has also the two bishop advantage, so his prospects are clearly superior, Benschop – Tichelaar, Hengelo 1992; 4...e6 5.\textit{f}3 c5 6.c3 c4, Brodie – Alipour, Edmonton 2000, 7.\textit{c}2±; 4...f5, Serpik – Blatny, Los Angeles 2003, after 5.\textit{d}2 \textit{f}6 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}6 7.\textit{c}3 \textit{xe}4 8.\textit{xe}4 e6 9.\textit{f}3±, there arises the pawn-structure, which is typical for the Maroczy system (on opposite flanks) and White preserves a stable pressure.) 5.\textit{f}3 d6 (about 5...e6 6.\textit{c}3 – see 1.e4 g6 2.d4 \textit{g}7 3.\textit{c}3 \textit{b}6 4.\textit{f}4 \textit{b}7 5.\textit{f}3 e6 6.\textit{d}3 – volume 4, Chapter 22. The next line transposes to the Benoni Defence, except that Black’s bishop on b7 is misplaced: 5...c5 6.d5 \textit{f}6 7.c4 0–0 8.\textit{c}3 d6 9.0–0 e6, Buchal – Alber, Hessen 1990. Now White has a great space advantage and better development and he can start active actions in the centre with: 10.e5, for example: 10...\textit{e}8 11.\textit{g}5 exd5 12.e6±, or 10...dxe5 11.fxe5 \textit{g}4 12.\textit{e}2 exd5 13.cxd5 \textit{d}7 14.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}8 15.e6±; 12...\textit{d}7 13.\textit{f}4± White has occupied the centre and his pieces are much better placed. Black can hardly organize any counterplay. It is now too dangerous for him to play: 13...exd5 14.e6 \textit{f}6 15.\textit{g}5! \textit{de}5 16.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}7 17.\textit{f}7+ \textit{h}8 18.\textit{xd}5±; 15...\textit{d}4+ 16.\textit{h}1 \textit{de}5 17.a1 \textit{xd}3 18.\textit{xd}3 \textit{xc}4 19.\textit{f}7+ \textit{h}8 20.b3 \textit{a}6 21.\textit{b}5!++. Black cannot change much with: 6...d6 7.c4 \textit{d}7 8.0–0 \textit{g}6 9.\textit{c}3±, and White dominates completely in the centre, Bobb – Blanco, Ushuaia 2002.) 6.0–0 \textit{d}7 (After 6...c5 7.d5 \textit{f}6 8.c4 0–0 9.\textit{c}3± Leon Hoyos – Hernandez, Havana 2005, there arises a pawn-structure, which is typical for the Benoni Defence, but Black has problems to obtain counterplay, because his light squared bishop is misplaced and he will hardly manage to play b5, while White dominates in the centre completely.) 7.c3 e6 8.\textit{e}1 \textit{c}7 9.a4 0–0 10.a5± Karpov – Georgievski, Skopje 1976. White’s centre is quite reliable and his attacking chances are excellent.

a) 3...\textit{f}6 4.\textit{e}2

![Diagram](image)

4...\textit{c}6

About 4...e6 5.\textit{f}3 – see 3...e6 4.\textit{f}3 \textit{f}6 5.\textit{e}2.

The premature move 4...d5?! enables White to sacrifice a pawn quite typically in order to hamper Black’s development with 5.e5 \textit{g}8 (it is a disaster for Black to play: 5...\textit{e}4? 6.f3+,...
because he loses a piece, but it is almost the same after: 5...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{d}7 \) 6.e6!\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{d}6 \) (after 6...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{fxe6} \)) 7.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3\) Black has problems to complete his development) 7. \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xf7} \) + \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xf7} \) 8.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3\) Guennoun – Ristic, Metz 2001. Black’s king is quite exposed, his e-pawn is very weak and he can hardly complete his development, so his defence is quite problematic.

In case of 4...d6 White should better occupy some more space with 5.f4 e5 6.c3 exf4 (after 6...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{fxd}4 \)) 7.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xd}4 \) d5 8.e5 \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}4 \) 9. \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{d}2\) ! Black’s powerful centralized knight gets exchanged and White’s space advantage is quite obvious, for example: 9...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}6 \) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{gf}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{b}4 \) 11.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{b}1 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{a}6 \) 12.\( \text{\underline{\text{R}}}. \text{e}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xd}2 \) 13.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xd}2\) it is too bad for Black to play: 9...\( \text{\underline{\text{R}}}. \text{h}4 \) + 10.g3 \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{g}3 \) ? 11.\( \text{\underline{\text{R}}}. \text{f}2 \) +, it is hardly better for Black to try: 9...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{b}4 \) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{gf}3 \) c5 11.0–0\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}6 \) 8.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{R}}}. \text{e}7 \) 9.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{bd}2\) ±, because White’s pieces are deployed harmoniously and he has a better development and a powerful centre, Monsterkiller – Hehe, Internat, Internet 1999.

In answer to 4...c5, White should better occupy some more space with 5.d5 and he has a clear advantage, for example: 5...e5 6.f4?! d6 7.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}3 \) a6 8.a4 exf4 9.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{bd}7 \) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}7 \) 11.0–0 0–0 12.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{d}2\) White’s development is superior and he has a space advantage too, so Black has problems to organize counterplay, Lobron – Balinas, Manila 1982;

5...e6 6.c4 b5 (it is worse for Black to play 6...d6 7.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}7 \) 8.f4 exd5 9.cxd5 0–0 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3\) ± and White’s development is much better and his centre is powerful, Vatter – Hottes, Hamburg 1987) 7.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3 \) (It is too dangerous for White to accept the pawn-sacrifice, because after: 7.dxe6 dxe6! 8.cxb5 c4 9.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}2 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{bd}7 \) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}5\), Black’s activity more than compensates his missing pawn.) 7...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xc}4 \) 8.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xc}4 \) exd5 9.exd5+ \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}7 \) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xe}2+ \) 11.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xe}2 \) d6 12.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}1\) Black’s situation is very difficult, because of his cramped position and his weakness on d6, while White dominates on the e-file and he has the better development, Nikolenko – Minasian, Cappelle la Grande 1995;

Black has great defensive problems after: 5...g6 6.f4 \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{g}7 \) 7.c4 d6. White has a much better development and it is high time that he acquired some more space with: 8.e5 dxe5 9.fxe5 \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{df}7 \) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}3 \) e6, Thiemonds – Peuker, corr. 1989 (It is premature for Black to castle 10...0–0?! because of the move 11.e6!, for example: 11...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}6 \) 12.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{g}5\) ±; 11...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{fxe}6 \) 12.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xe}6+ \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{h}8 \) 13.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{h}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}8 \) 14.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{g}5 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}6 \) 15.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{e}6 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}8 \) 16.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{xg}7\) ± or 13...\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{f}6 \) 14.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}3 \) \( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}8 \) 15.\( \text{\underline{R}}. \text{h}4\) ±). Now, White had better complete his development, preserving the option to castle on either side of the board: 11.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{c}3 \) 0–0 12.\( \text{\underline{\text{Q}}}. \text{g}5\) ±. White has extra space and very active pieces and
accordingly he has much better prospects.

5.c3

5...e5

In answer to 5...g6, Phillips – Knight, Burlingame 1998, White can occupy additional space with 6.f4  \( \text{g7} \) 7.\( \text{f3} \)±.

5...e6 6.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e7} \) (After 6...d6, White can seize the initiative on the queenside with: 7.b4 a5 8.b5 \( \text{b8} \) 9.0–0 \( \text{bd7} \), Gaggiotti – Nardi, Italy 1995. White has occupied plenty of space on the queenside and now he can start active actions in the centre: 10.\( \text{d1} \) e5 11.\( \text{bd2} \)± and Black can hardly protect his e5-pawn, because of his lag in development. It is even worse for him to try: 10...\( \text{e7} \) 11.e5! \( \text{xf3} \) 12.gxf3 \( \text{d5} \) 13.f4±, because White remains with extra space, better development and a couple of active bishops. All that compensates amply the minute weakening of his castling position.) 7.a3 0–0? (It is possibly better for Black to play: 7...d6 8.0–0 0–0 9.e5±; 8...e5 9.\( \text{d1} \) 0–0 10.b4↑.) 8.e5 \( \text{e8} \) 9.h4! White begins a kingside attack. 9...f6 10.\( \text{g5} \)! g6 (Black gets checkmated by force after: 10...\( \text{xf5} \) 11.\( \text{xh7} \) 12.\( \text{hxg5} \) 13.\( \text{h8} \) 14.\( \text{h5} \) 15.g6++; Black’s defence is also very difficult after: 10...f5 11.\( \text{h5} \) h6 12.\( \text{g6} \) 11.\( \text{xh7} \) \( \text{f7} \) 12.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 13.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{g7} \) 15.\( \text{h5} \)– Bley – Mayer, corr. 2004.

6.\( \text{f3} \) d6

It is worse for Black to play here: 6...\( \text{d6} \) 7.0–0 h6, Leventic – Mihailecz, Kaposvar 2001, because White can emphasize the unfavourable placement of Black’s bishop on the d6-square with: 8.\( \text{bd2} \) 0–0 9.\( \text{c4} \)±.

6...\( \text{exd4} \) – the reduction of the tension in the centre is definitely in favour of White after: 7.e5 \( \text{d5} \) 8.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{a5} \) (In case of 8...\( \text{de7} \) 9.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{c8} \) 10.0–0 \( \text{d8} \) 11.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{e6} \) 12.f4± Rade – Lovric, Pula 2000, White preserves a long-lasting positional pressure, because he has superior development and extra space, besides Black’s king remains stranded in the centre. It is hardly better for Black to play: 8...\( \text{d3} \) 9.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{de7} \), Stefansson – Balinas, New York 1989. After 10.0–0 \( \text{g6} \) 11.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 12.\( \text{f5} \)± Black has problems to evacuate his king away from the centre.) 9.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{e7} \), Koo – Blatny, Las Vegas 2001 (after 9...c5?! 10.\( \text{f5} \) g6 11.\( \text{f3} \)± Black remains with too many weaknesses, Marciano – Blatny, Internet 2001) 10.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 11.0–0↑, and White’s e5-pawn cramps his enemy’s posi-
tion a lot, moreover Black’s light pieces are very passive and he cannot organize any counterplay at all.

7.0–0

7...d7

Black’s main idea here is to maintain his pawn on the e5-square.

Black’s main idea here is to maintain his pawn on the e5-square.

Some pawn-structure similar to the Indian Defence (1.d4 d5 2.c4 d6 3.Qc3 Qbd7 4.e4 e5 5.d5 e7), except with a weakened queenside, arises after 7...e7 8.d5 Qb8 9.c4 0–0 10.Qc3 Qbd7 11.Qe3 Qe8 12.Qd2 g6 (Black has no other possible counterplay), but here in the game Chiburdanidze – Jackova, Elista 2004, White could have parried Black’s possible counterplay on the kingside with: 13.Qh6 Qg7 14.f4!? exf4 (14...Qf6 15.f5±) 15.Qxf4 Qf6 16.Qf3 Qe7 (It is worse for Black to play: 16...Qe5 17.Qxe5± and White’s initiative on the queenside develops much faster than Black’s counterplay.) 17.Qae1 Qe5 18.Qxe5 Qxe5 19. Qxe5 Qxe5 20.Qf2± and Black is dominant over the important outpost on the e5-square, but White has instead the crucial d4-outpost and he can seize the initiative on both sides of the board. Black’s light pieces have no possibilities to be activated.

8.Qa3 h6

In answer to 8...e7, Epishin – Blatny, Bastia 2003, White’s plan to bring his bishop to the d5-square seems quite effective too: 9.Qd1! Qf6 (9...0–0 10.Qc4 exd4 11.cxd4 Qa5 12.Qd3±) 10.Qc4 0–0 11.Qd5 Qe7 12.Qc2 exd4 13.cxd4 Qa5 14.Qxb7 Qxb7 15.Qb4±, Black’s c6 and d5-squares are weak and White’s space advantage promises him better prospects.

9.Qd1 a6 10.Qc4!

White brings his bishop to the d5-square and it exerts a powerful pressure from there on both sides of the board.

10...Qe7 11.Qc2 g6 12.Qd5 Qg7 13.Qb4 Qdb8 14.Qxe5 dxe5

15.b3! White thus completes his development. 15...0–0 16. Qa3 Qe8 17.Qc2±. It becomes
very difficult for Black now to develop his queenside pieces somehow. 17...d7 18.e3 c8 19.h4+. Black’s queenside pieces are isolated and they cannot join in the defence of the black king. The game soon entered an endgame with two extra pawns for White. 19...b5 20. xg6 b4 21.f5 e6 22.g4 h7 23.xe6 xe6 24.f4 f6 25.d5 g6 26.xg6 fxg6 27. xg7 xg7 28.b2 a7 29. xc7 f7 30.d5 a5 31.a3 1–0 Mitkov – Blatny, Kansas 2003.

b) 3...e6

Black takes the d5-square under control and prepares the pawn-break c7-c5. We have already mentioned that 3...c5 immediately is much worse for Black, because White pushes his pawn to d5 and obtains a stable advantage.

4.f3

We will analyze now: b1) 4.h6, b2) 4.c6, b3) 4.e7, b4) 4.e7, b5) 4.g6, b6) 4.d6, b7) 4.d5 and b8) 4.f6. Black’s main defence 4...c5 will be analyzed in our next chapter.

Black has played in several games the strange move 4...b4+?!, but after 5.c3 White has an extra tempo in comparison to line b3.

The move 4...a6 looks like a waste of time. After 5.0–0, Black has tried many different moves, but his position is quite cramped and he lags in development in all the variations: 5...g6 (5...e7 6.c4 f6 7.c3; 5...e7, W.Stein – G.Laszlo, Eppingen 2004, 6.c4 g6 7.c3; 5...f6 6.h4 e7 7.e5 f5 8.g5± Crafty – Guest, Internet 1999; 5...d6 6.e2 d7 7.c3 e7 8.g5 c8 9.bd2± Henri – Vantet, Noisy le Grand 2000) 6.c4 g7 7.c3 e7 8.e5± Alexopoulos – Johnson, East Somerset 1985.

b1) 4...h6

This move does not contribute to Black’s development and White obtains easily a stable advantage.

5.e2

In answer to 5...c5, Fernandes – Cordovil, Lisbon 1999, it seems logical for White to occupy some
additional space after: 6.d5 exd5 (It is even worse for Black to play: 6...\textit{L}f6 7.c4 d6 8.dxe6 fxe6 9.e5\textpm) 7.exd5+ \textit{e}e7 8.c4\textpm Black’s position is cramped and his light pieces have no good prospects, therefore the arising endgame is very difficult for him.

5...d6, Romagnoli – Bini, Caorle 1989, 6.0–0 g6 7.\textit{d}d1 \textit{g}7 8.c3\textpm and White has a powerful centre and a great lead in development.

5...\textit{e}e7 6.c4 g5 7.\textit{c}c3 \textit{g}7 8.\textit{e}e3 \textit{c}6 9.h3\textpm White has extra space and better development, Becker – Liu Xiao You, Recklinghausen 2003.

5...g5 6.\textit{c}c3 d6 7.\textit{e}e3 \textit{g}7 8.0–0 \textit{e}e7 9.h4 g4 10.\textit{d}d2 h5 11.f3 gxf3 12.gxf3\textpm and White has a solid centre and a powerful kingside initiative, Bakhmatov – Liu Xiao You, Recklinghausen 2003.

After 5...\textit{e}e7, Engerer – Joos, Eisenberg 1998, it seems very good for White to play 6.0–0 d6 7.e5\textpm and Black has great problems to develop his kingside.

6.0–0 \textit{e}e7

Mayerhofer – Innreiter, Austria 2000.

White’s pieces are quite well centralized and so he can start active actions with: 7.e5 \textit{d}d5 8.\textit{e}e4 b5 9.a4 b4 10.c4 bxc3 11.\textit{b}xc3\textpm. White enjoys a space advantage, he has better development and he can seize the initiative in the centre as well as on both flanks.

b2) 4...\textit{c}c6 5.c3

5...\textit{e}e7

It looks like Black only loses time with the move 5...h6, Pohorsky – Petek, Litomysl 1994. After 6.0–0\textpm, White is threatening to push back his enemy’s pieces with 7.d5.

5...\textit{c}c7 6.0–0 g6 7.\textit{e}e1 \textit{g}7 8.\textit{d}d2 f6 9.a4\textpm Haba – Philidius, Internet 2005. White has a powerful centre and a queenside initiative.

5...d6 6.0–0 e5 7.\textit{e}e2 a6 8.\textit{d}d1\textpm Wellendorf – Opitz, Germany 1998. Black has played the pawn-move e5 in two tempi and that makes his defence much more difficult in comparison to line a (3...\textit{f}f6 4.\textit{e}e2 \textit{c}c6 5.c3 e5).

5...\textit{g}ge7 6.0–0 \textit{g}6 7.\textit{e}e1 \textit{e}7, Jorma – Kalsi, Espoo 1993,
after 8.\(\text{c}6\)d2 0–0 9.\(\text{c}6\)f1± Black’s position is solid, but very passive.

5...\(\text{h}5\)?! 6.\(\text{c}6\)e2 \(\text{e}7\) 7.d5± White has a great space advantage and much better development, Peltomaki – Kalsi, Finland 2001.

In answer to 5...\(\text{c}6\)f6, White occupies additional space with 6.e5 \(\text{c}6\)d5 7.c4 \(\text{c}6\)d4?! (it is better for Black to play 7...\(\text{c}6\)d7 8.\(\text{c}6\)de7 8.\(\text{c}6\)c3±) 8.\(\text{c}6\)e2 \(\text{e}7\)? (Black’s only defence was 8...a5 9.\(\text{c}6\)c3±) 9.a3 \(\text{c}6\)a6 10.b4 \(\text{c}6\)ab8 11.d5+- and White remained with an extra piece, Karasek – Mayer, corr. 2004.

5...\(\text{c}6\)e7 6.0–0 0–0 0–0 7.b4 \(\text{h}6\) 8.a4±, White’s attack on the queenside seems much more effective than Black’s counter threats, Lampen – Kalsi, Tamperë 1994.

After 5...g6, Hewitt – Bankays, Coventry 2005, it seems logical for White to play 6.\(\text{c}6\)g5 \(\text{c}6\)c8 (It looks quite strange for Black to try: 6...\(\text{c}6\)ce7 7.0–0 \(\text{h}6\) 8.\(\text{h}4\)h4±, because he can hardly complete his development. It is too bad for Black to play: 6...\(\text{c}6\)ge7 7.\(\text{c}6\)f6 \(\text{c}6\)g8 8.\(\text{c}6\)g5±, or 6...f6 7.\(\text{e}6\)e3 \(\text{c}6\)g7 8.\(\text{c}6\)bd2 \(\text{c}6\)ge7 9.\(\text{c}6\)h4± and White can seize the initiative on the kingside due to his lead in development.) 7.0–0 \(\text{c}6\)g7 8.d5±.

6.0–0 \(\text{d}6\)

In answer to 6...\(\text{c}6\)f6 it seems logical for White to continue with 7.e5 \(\text{c}6\)d5 8.c4 \(\text{c}6\)db4 9.\(\text{c}6\)e2±.

7.d5 exd5 8.exd5 \(\text{c}6\)b8 9.\(\text{c}6\)e1 \(\text{h}6\)

After 9...\(\text{c}6\)xd5 10.\(\text{c}6\)b5+ \(\text{c}6\)c6 11.\(\text{c}6\)xc6+ \(\text{c}6\)xc6 12.\(\text{c}6\)d5± White regains his pawn and maintains his superior development.

10.\(\text{c}6\)c4± De Castro – Sin Kuen, Hong Kong 1972. White has extra space and excellent development. In addition – the light squares are quite weak in Black’s position.

b3) 4...\(\text{c}6\)e7 5.0–0

5...\(\text{c}6\)f6

After 5...\(\text{h}6\)?! 6.e5! Black has problems to develop his kingside: 6...\(\text{c}6\)g5 7.\(\text{c}6\)bd2 c5 8.\(\text{c}6\)xg5 hxg5 9.\(\text{c}6\)e4± Bibik – Stodola, Hlinsko 1993.

5...d6 6.\(\text{c}6\)e2 \(\text{c}6\)d7 (about 6...\(\text{c}6\)f6 7.e5 – see 4...d6 5.0–0 \(\text{c}6\)f6
1.e4 b6 2.d4 \textit{c}b7 3.\textit{c}d3 e6 4.\textit{g}f3

6.\textit{e}e2 \textit{c}c7 7.e5) 7.\textit{d}d1 \textit{g}g6 8.e5 \textit{d}d5 9.\textit{e}e4 \textit{c}6 10.c4 \textit{c}c7, Sou-
pizon – M.Johnson, Groningen 1999. Now, after the simple line:
11.exd6 \textit{x}xd6 12.\textit{e}e5\pm White maintains a stable advantage,
because of the weak black \textit{c}6-
pawn and the passive deploy-
ment of Black’s pieces.

5...g5 6.c4 \textit{d}6, Nowicki –
Nagrocka, Germany 2000. White
has acquired considerably more
space and now it seems quite
logical for him to complete his
development with 7.\textit{e}e3, for
example after 7...g4 8.\textit{f}fd2 \textit{f}f6
9.\textit{c}c3\pm White is already quite
well prepared to start active ac-
tions on the queenside, while
Black has not completed his de-
velopment yet.

5...\textit{h}h6?! 6.\textit{x}xh6 \textit{g}xh6 7.\textit{c}c1
\textit{g}5 8.\textit{x}xg5 \textit{hxg5} 9.\textit{e}e3 \textit{e}7
10.\textit{d}d2\pm DarkUfo – Hanna,
Chess.net 1998. White has a
space advantage and superior
development. He can proceed
with active actions on both sides
of the board.

After 5...c5, there arises a
pawn-structure, which is quite
typical for the Sicilian Defence,
except that Black has lost time
for the move \textit{e}7 and he has
failed to develop his kingside,
6.\textit{c}c3 \textit{xd}4 7.\textit{xd}4 \textit{c}6 8.\textit{xc}6
\textit{xc}6 9.e5! \textit{e}7 10.\textit{e}e1 d5 11.
\textit{g}4\pm Dietrich – Wagner, Email
2000.

6.e5 \textit{d}d5

It is too dubious for Black to
play 6...\textit{g}4?! , because after 7.h3

h5? (it is better for Black to play
7...\textit{h}h6 8.c4\pm) 8.hxg4 \textit{hxg4} 9.
\textit{h}h2\pm Black’s compensation
for the pawn is insufficient, Kunte

Still, it is slightly better for
Black to play: 6...\textit{e}4, Crafty –
Dlugy, ICC 1998, 7.\textit{bd}2 \textit{xd}2
(7...d5 8.\textit{e}e2 – see line \textit{b}8)
8.\textit{xd}2 0–0 9.\textit{h}5\uparrow.

7.a3 c5

Or 7...c6 8.c4 \textit{c}7 9.\textit{e}e2\pm,
Slowman – Cytebs, Internet
1999.

8.c4 \textit{c}7 9.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5
9...\textit{bxc}5 10.\textit{c}3\pm.

10.\textit{c}3 d5 11.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5
12.\textit{e}4 \textit{c}7, Schubert – Bre-
beck, Ratingen 1993, and here
after the simple move: 13.\textit{g}5\uparrow
White either occupies the impor-
tant d6-outpost, or he weakens
Black’s kingside considerably.

b4) 4...\textit{e}7 5.0–0

(diagram)

5...\textit{g}6

About 5...\textit{bc}6 6.c3 – see
4...\textit{c}6 5.c3 \textit{ge}7 6.0–0.

5...\textit{g}6 6.\textit{e}1 \textit{g}7 7.\textit{bd}2 d6
8.\textit{f}1 \textit{d}7, Menacher – Tober,
Austria 2002, 9.\textit{g}3 0–0 10.\textit{c}3\pm.
White preserves a long-lasting positional pressure, because of his solid pawn-centre, besides Black has no active counterplay.

5...d6 6...e1 (it is also possible for White to play 6.c4 d7 – see line b6 6...e7) 6...d7 (6...g6 7.c3 g7, Yavas – Meyer, Germany 1992, 8.dbd2 d7 9.f1 0–0 10.g3 7...bd2 h6 (7...g6, Alvarado – Dive, Bled 2002, 8.f1 g7 9.g3 – see 5...g6) 8.f1 a6 9.g3 g6, Marco – Claverie, Buenos Aires 2004, 10.e3 g7 11.d2±.

6.e3 e7

It is even worse for Black to play 6...c6?! , restricting his only active piece. 7.bd2 Koehler – Stein, Kassel 2000.

7.c4 0–0

8.c3 h4. Black’s knight on g6 is evidently misplaced, but its exchange leads to even more powerful initiative by White. 9.xh4 xh4 10.g4± Buzeti – Banic, Ljubljana 2002.

b5) 4...g6 5...g5?!

5.c8

5...e7? This move enables White to simply crush Black’s kingside position. 6.f6 g8 7.g5 h6 8.h7 g7 9.d2 g5 10.h4 d5 11.e5 d7 12.hxg5 hxg5, MacDonald – Zarkovic, Auckland 1998, and here the quickest win for White was the line: 13.xg7 xg7 14.f6+–.

It is hardly good for Black to play 5...f6, because after 6.e3 g7 7.h4± White’s active plan on the kingside is easy to accomplish, because of his dominance in the centre, Wohlfart – Keckes, Goetzis 1997.

5...e7. This bishop-move does not combine too well with the move g6 and White easily achieves a great advantage with rather simple moves. 6.f4 d6 7.c4 f6 8.c3 g5 9.e3 g4 10.d2 c6 11.b3± Balinov – Wais, Vienna 1999.

6.c4 g7 7.c3 c6
It is hardly any better for Black to play: 7...d6 8.0-0 d7, Torre - N.Gaprindashvili, Kuala Lumpur 1994. After 9...d2 h6 10.e3 g6 11.h3 White controls completely the centre and Black's counterplay is non-existent.

8.d5 e5 9.xe5 xe5 10.d2 g7

11.0-0-0 h6 (11.e7 12.h6! 0-0 13.h4=) 12.h4 e5 (12...d6 13.c2±) 13.d6 g5 (13...cxd6 14.b5 f6= 15.c2±) 14.g3 cxd6 15.b5 f8 16.c2± Rublevsky - Chernyshov, Ohrid 2001. White regains his pawn and he remains with a great advantage, because Black has so many weaknesses to worry about.

b6) 4...d6 5.0-0

5...d7

About 5...e7 6.e2 – see 4...e7 5.0-0 d6 6.e2; 5...e7 6.e1 – see 4...e7 5.0-0 d6 6.e1.

5...g6 6.g5!? f6 (It is not good for Black to play 6...e7 7.f6 g8, Antonini - Hirt, Paris 1994, after 8.g5! h6 9.h7+ White has a powerful pressure along the weak dark squares on the kingside. After 6...e7, Bresciani - Berlusconi, Lombardia 1991, White's most logical move seems to be 7.f4+, because Black's bishop on e7 is obviously misplaced, while his pawn is on the g6-square. In answer to: 6...e8, Agliullin - Terpugov, Novokuznetsk 1998, White can transpose to line b5, with 7.c4 g7 8.c3 d7 9.d2±) 7.e3 h6 8.d2 f7 (8...g4 9.f4 e5 10.g3±) 9.c4 g7 10.c3 0-0, Martin Valentin - Pertinez, Spain 1999, and here White's best move is 11.c5†, with a powerful initiative on the queenside.

5...f6 6.e2 e7 (after 6...d7 White should better play 7.d1!, with the idea to follow with e5, for example: 7...e7†, Israel - Ratel, France 2003, 8.e5! d5 9.g5 f6 10.exf6 gxf6 11.d2±; 8...dxe5 9.dxe5 d5 10.a3! - Black has great problems with the safety of his centralized knight: 10...c5 11.c4 b3 12.cxd5 a1 13.b5±; 10...c5 11.c4 c7 12.e4±; 10...d8 11.c4 e7 12.e4±, or 7...e8, Souza - Koffer, Paranagua 1993,
8.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{Q}e7\) 9.c3 0–0 10.e5 \(\text{Q}d5\) 11.\(\text{Q}e4\)±; 8...e5 9.\(\text{Q}c4\) exd4 10.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Q}e5\) 11.\(\text{Q}g5\)± 7.e5 \(\text{Q}f7\) (7...\(\text{d}e\) 8.dxe5 \(\text{Q}f7\) 9.\(\text{Q}d1!\) \(\text{Q}d5\) 10.\(\text{Q}c3\) c5 11.\(\text{Q}xd5\) exd5 12.e6 \(\text{Q}f6\) 13.\(\text{Q}g5\)–+ Wosch – Becker, Email 2002) 8.c4 0–0 (It is worse for Black to play 8...d5 9.cxd5 \(\text{Q}xd5\) 10.\(\text{Q}c3\) \(\text{Q}b7\), Poetschke – Caels, Willingen 1999, because after 11.\(\text{Q}f4\)± White is totally dominant in the centre and he can exert powerful pressure along the c-file. All that might combine into a dangerous kingside attack.) 9.\(\text{Q}c3\) \(\text{Q}e8\) 10.\(\text{Q}e4\) \(\text{Q}xe4\) 11.\(\text{Q}xe4\) \(\text{Q}a6\) 12.\(\text{Q}g4\)± Demkovich – Semenova, Kiev 2003. White has a stable advantage, because of his extra space and kingside pressure.

6.c4

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

6...\(g6\)

After 6...c5 7.d5 e5 8.\(\text{Q}c3\) g6, Exposito – Gonzalez Zamora, Manresa – Gonzaga 1998, there arises a pawn-structure, which is typical for the Benoni Defence (the closed variation – 1.d4 c5 2.d5 e5), except that White has several extra tempi and the logical way to exploit that is to play: 9.a3±, seizing the initiative on the queenside.

6...\(\text{Q}e7\) 7.\(\text{Q}c3\) e5 (about 7...g6 8.\(\text{Q}g5\) – see 6...g6; 7...h6 8.\(\text{Q}e3\) a6 9.b4 g5 10.d5 \(\text{Q}g6\) 11.\(\text{Q}d4\)± Canfell – Wohl, Auckland 2005) 8.d5 \(\text{Q}g6\) 9.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}e7\) 10.b4± White’s initiative develops obviously faster than Black’s counterplay, Sicars – Konik, Wiesbaden 2000.

6...h6 7.\(\text{Q}c3\) \(\text{Q}e7\), Benkiar – Slimani, Algiers 2000 (7...g6, Isonzo – Bini, Montecatini Terme 1994, 8.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}g7\) 9.\(\text{Q}d2\)±). After 7...\(\text{Q}e7\), Schmitz – Kramusch, Germany 1993, it is logical for White to continue with: 8.\(\text{Q}e3\) g5 9.\(\text{Q}d2\)±, and he has an extra tempo in comparison to the line 6...g6.) Now, it seems very good for White to play: 8.d5 e5 (8...\(\text{Q}gf6\) 9.\(\text{Q}d4\) \(\text{Q}c5\) 10.\(\text{Q}c2\)±) 9.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}gf6\) 10.\(\text{Q}d2\)± and he has occupied more space and his initiative on the queenside is quite obvious.

6...\(\text{Q}gf6\) 7.\(\text{Q}c3\) e5 (7...\(\text{Q}e7\) 8.\(\text{Q}f4\) 0–0 9.\(\text{Q}c2\) g6 10.\(\text{Q}ad1\)± White has a stable edge, due to his centralized pieces, Kosmowksi – Wieszczycki, Suwalki 2000) 8.d5 \(\text{Q}e7\), Debowiak – Trabszys, Krynica 2001 (Black’s active move 8...\(\text{Q}c5\) only facilitates White’s initiative on the queenside: 9.\(\text{Q}c2\) a5 10.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{Q}e7\) 11.\(\text{Q}b1\) 0–0 12.a3 \(\text{Q}c8\) 13.b4 axb4 14.axb4 \(\text{Q}b7\) 15.\(\text{Q}a4\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 16.\(\text{Q}c6\)± Bank – Lauridsen, Festegue 1991). White can now transpose to the game Chiburandizde – Jackova, Elista 2004, which we
have analyzed in our line a, with 9.\(\text{dx}e3\) 0–0 10.\(\text{dx}d2\)±, White’s queen is now on the d1-square, but that does not affect the evaluation of the position.

7.\(\text{dx}c3\) \(\text{g}7\) 8.\(\text{dx}g5\)

8...\(\text{dx}e7\)

White’s initiative runs smoothly after: 8...f6 9.\(\text{dx}e3\) \(\text{dh}h6\) 10.c5! \(\text{dx}c5\), Grimm – Scherer, Stetten 1988, and now the excellent resource 11.\(\text{wh}b3\)! emphasizes Black’s difficulties, caused by his lag in development and lack of space, for example: 11...\(\text{dh}f8\) 12.\(\text{dx}d1\) \(\text{cx}d4\) 13.\(\text{dx}d4\)± and Black’s king remains in the centre and he has no piece-coordination at all, so his extra pawn is practically immaterial. It is even worse for Black to play: 11...\(\text{dh}e7\) 12.\(\text{dx}b5\)±, because White regains his pawn and preserves his positional advantage. It is almost the same after: 11...\(\text{cx}d4\) 12.\(\text{wh}xe6+\) \(\text{df}8\) (12...\(\text{dh}e7\) 13.\(\text{dx}d4\) \(\text{dx}c5\) 14.\(\text{dh}b5+\) \(\text{df}8\) 15.\(\text{dh}3\)→) 13.\(\text{dx}d4\)±, because Black is faced with a difficult defence in a position with material equality.

9.\(\text{wh}d2\) \(\text{h}6\) 10.\(\text{ex}e3\) \(\text{df}6\)

10...\(\text{g}5\) 11.\(\text{dx}d5\) (after 11...e5 12.\(\text{bx}e5\) \(\text{dx}g6\) 13.c5 \(\text{bx}c5\) 14.bxc5 \(\text{dx}c5\)± White’s initiative is clearly ahead of Black’s eventual counterplay, Marciano – Garcia Illundain, Suances 1997) 12.\(\text{dx}d4\) \(\text{wh}e7\) 13.\(\text{dx}b5\) \(\text{dh}c5\) 14.\(\text{dx}c7\) a5 15.b3 0–0 16.a3 \(\text{dh}a4\) 17.b4 \(\text{dx}b3\) 18.\(\text{dx}b3\) \(\text{ax}b3\) 19.\(\text{wh}2\) \(\text{ex}d5\) 20.\(\text{ex}d5\) \(\text{f}5\) 21.\(\text{dx}b3\) \(\text{f}4\) 22.\(\text{dx}d2\) \(\text{g}4\) 23.\(\text{a}e1\) \(\text{wh}4\) 24.\(\text{fx}c3\) Oll – Spassky, Tallinn 1998. White wins a pawn and maintains a clear advantage in the centre, while Black has problems to create any counterplay.

10...a6 11.\(\text{a}d1\) \(\text{wh}8\) (In case Black plays actively with: 11...\(\text{g}5\) 12.\(\text{h}3\) e5 13.\(\text{a}b1\) \(\text{g}6\) 14.\(\text{wh}2\) \(\text{wh}e7\) 15.\(\text{dx}d5\)± he only creates additional weaknesses, Porto – Carvalho, Rio de Janeiro 2000.) 12.\(\text{fe}1\) \(\text{wh}7\) 13.a4± Black’s strange queen-maneuver has just helped White to start active actions on the queenside, Andrade – Carvalho, Rio de Janeiro 1999.

11.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{d}5\)

12.\(\text{cx}d5\) \(\text{ex}d5\) 13.e5 \(\text{fe}4\) 14.\(\text{w}c2\) \(\text{xc}3\) 15.bxc3± Ibragimov – Stefanova, Pulvermuehle 2000.
White has extra space and he can build up a powerful initiative on the kingside, so his positional pressure is long-lasting.

b7) 4...d5 5.e5

5...c5 — this idea to exchange the light squared bishops is losing too much time. 6.\(\mathcal{a}xa6 \mathcal{c}xa6\) 7.c4!? c6 8.cxd5 \(\mathcal{c}xd5\) 9.0-0 \(\mathcal{e}e7\) 10.\(\mathcal{c}c3 \mathcal{d}d7\) 11.\(\mathcal{e}e4\pm\) Pavlovic – Rosic, Yugoslavia 2000. White has extra space and he can seize the initiative on both sides of the board.

It is too passive for Black to play 5...\(\mathcal{d}d7\), and White can exploit that with the standard attacking move: 6.\(\mathcal{g}5! \mathcal{e}e7\) (6...g6 7.h4 \(\mathcal{c}e7\) 8.h5\(\pm\); 6...h6 7.\(\mathcal{h}h5 \mathcal{e}e7\) 8.\(\mathcal{c}xf7\)\(\mp\) 7.\(\mathcal{g}g4\)\(\pm\) and again White has extra space and a powerful initiative on the kingside.

5...\(\mathcal{e}e7\) 6.b4?! \(\mathcal{g}6\) 7.c3 c5 8.a3 \(\mathcal{e}e7\) 9.h4!\(\uparrow\) White has squeezed his opponent completely on the queenside with a quite standard maneuver and now he can attack safely on the kingside. 9...\(\mathcal{c}xh4\) 10.\(\mathcal{c}xh4\) \(\mathcal{c}xh4\) 11.\(\mathcal{g}g4 \mathcal{e}e7\) 12.\(\mathcal{x}g7 \mathcal{f}8\) 13.\(\mathcal{x}h7\)\(\pm\) Struik – Van Leent, Hoogeveen 2002. Black has no compensation for the pawn at all.

5...\(\mathcal{c}c6\) 6.0–0 \(\mathcal{e}e7\) (in answer to 6...\(\mathcal{g}g6\) 7.c3 \(\mathcal{g}g6\), Espina – Villar, Oviedo 2003, it is good for White to follow with 8.\(\mathcal{g}g5! \mathcal{e}e7\) 9.\(\mathcal{h}h5 \mathcal{d}d7\) 10.\(\mathcal{x}e6\)\(\mp\); 9...\(\mathcal{c}xg5\) 10.\(\mathcal{x}g5 \mathcal{d}d7\) 11.\(\mathcal{d}d2\)\(\pm\) and White has the two bishop advantage and extra space) 7.c3 \(\mathcal{d}d7\) 8.\(\mathcal{e}e2\) g6?! This move weakens the dark squares, but Black has problems to create counterplay anyway – White is threatening with active actions on both sides of the board. 9.b4 h5 10.a4 a5 11.b5 \(\mathcal{a}7\), Dietz – Forbrich, Germany 1989. It is very favourable for White to exchange the dark squared bishops in that position: 12.\(\mathcal{g}5!\) 0–0–0 13.\(\mathcal{b}d2\)\(\pm\) and Black has no counterplay whatsoever.

6.c3 \(\mathcal{c}c6\)

In response to 6...\(\mathcal{e}e7\), Jashangir – Flaga, Chicago 1996, White’s simplest reaction is the standard move 7.a3\(\uparrow\).

6...\(\mathcal{e}e7\) 7.0–0 \(\mathcal{d}d7\), Zila – Sandor, Hungary 2002, and again the typical move: 8.a3! c4 9.\(\mathcal{c}c2\)\(\pm\) deprives Black of any counterplay on the queenside.

The move 6...g6?! weakens the dark squares on the kingside: 7.0–0 \(\mathcal{c}6\) 8.\(\mathcal{g}5! \mathcal{e}e7\) 9.\(\mathcal{x}e7 \mathcal{g}x7\) 10.\(\mathcal{b}d2\)\(\pm\) Demko – Majling, Martin 1996.

After 6...\(\mathcal{d}d7\) 7.\(\mathcal{e}e2\) a5 (7...\(\mathcal{c}c6\) 8.a3 \(\mathcal{e}e7\), Gaensmantel –
Seyffer, Germany 1990, 9.b4\+)
8.0–0 \tla6, Gosztola – Fellegi, White obtains a powerful pressure in the centre and on the queenside after: 9.\tla6 6dxa6 10.c4! cxd4 10...dxc4 11.d1 b6 12.b2 c7 13.c4 b5 14.\tle8\) 11.d1 \tcc8 12.cxd5 b4 13.dxd4 \txd5 14.d5.

The move 6...\tcd7 is too passive and White can proceed with the standard kingside attack with: 7.g5! g6 8.h4 cxd4 9.cxd4 f6? (9...c8 10.c3\); 9...h6 10.h5\) 10.dxe6\) Righi – Kgshe, Thessaloniki 1988.

6...h6 7.0–0 \te7 (if 7...d6, McLure – Caels, Thessaloniki 1984, then after 8.a3!\), White prevents Black's counterplay on the queenside and he has excellent chances to develop a powerful initiative on the kingside) 8.e3 c6 9.bd2 a6, Zrinscak – van Gellecom, Kleve 1999. Now after 10.a3 c4 (10...d7 11.b4\) 11.c2 d7 12.e1\), White's kingside attack runs unopposed and Black has no counterplay at all.

6...cxd4 7.cxd4 \tb4+, Arias Torio – Sanchez Gonzalez, Asturias 2000, and Black's bishop is misplaced on the b4-square, while its exchange for White's knight is definitely not in Black's favour. The simplest line for White should be: 8.c3! e7 9.0–0\)

After 6...c7 7.0–0 \tc6 8.e3 c4 9.c2 b5 10.g5 h6 11.h5\) White manages to obtain the typical kingside pressure for positions of this type, Brodbeck – Von Zimmermann, Wuerttemberg 1995.

6...f6 7.\te2 \tc6 8.exf6 xf6 9.g5 f7 10.0–0\) Haecker – Swemers, Erfurt 1998. Now, opening of files in the centre is clearly in favour of White, because of his lead in development.

6...c4 7.c2 e7 (Black's defence is even more difficult after: 7...b5 8.0–0 a5 9.g5 g6 10.f3\) Lipschuetz – Burille, New York 1889.) 8.0–0 d7 9.g5! h6 (Black can save his position against White's attack neither with: 9...f5 10.xf5 exf5 11.e6\) Lopez Martinez – Aguilera Olivar, Zaragoza 1999, nor with: 9...g6 10.f3 f5 11.xf5 gxf5 12.xe6\) \( \) 11...exf5 12.e6\) 10.h5 g6 11.h3 f5 12.xf5 gxf5 (it is too dangerous for Black to open files in the centre: 12... exf5 13.e6\) 13.h5 e7 14.b3\) g7 15.h3\). Black has no counterplay whatsoever.

The move 6...c8 is connected with the idea to trade the "bad" bishop, but it still takes too much time: 7.0–0 a6 8.g5 xd3 9.xd3 g6, Thomas – Pueplichhuisen, Kleve 2001, and now after the energetic move 10.c4!, with eventual developments like: 10...h6 11.f3 dxc4 12.xc4 a6 13.c2 c6 14.e4\) White dominates completely in the centre.

7.0–0 \te7
7...c8 8.e3 g6 9.e2 cxd
10. cxd4 \textit{Q}ge7, Huistra – Amesz, Hengelo 1996. White’s most direct way to exploit the weakness of the dark squares is: 11. \textit{Q}g5 \textit{Q}g7 12. \textit{Q}c3 h6 (It is worse for Black to play 12...0–0 13. \textit{B}e3\pm, because White then has excellent attacking chances.) 13. \textit{B}h4 0–0 (or 13...g5 14. \textit{B}b5 0–0 15. \textit{Q}d6\pm) 14. \textit{B}c3. 

7...cxd4 8. cxd4 a6 9. \textit{B}c3 b5 10. \textit{B}e1 \textit{B}c8 11. \textit{B}e2 \textit{B}b4 12. \textit{Q}d2 \textit{Q}e7 13. \textit{B}c1\pm Fernando – Rita, Portugal 2000. Black’s light squared bishop is very bad and his dark squares on the kingside are quite vulnerable.

7...\textit{Q}e7 8. a3 \textit{Q}d7 (it is clearly worse for Black to play 8...\textit{Q}h6, Azua – Garcia, Buenos Aires 2002, because after 9. \textit{Q}xh6 gxh6 10. b4\pm Black’s bishop pair does not compensate his kingside weaknesses), Bloemhard – Muris, Soest 1999, and here after the standard reaction 9. b4\uparrow Black has no counterplay.

After 7...\textit{Q}d7 8. \textit{B}e1 c4 9. \textit{B}c2 0–0–0 10. b3\pm White preserves excellent attacking chances, Simonsen – M.Nielsen, Copenhagen 2002.

7...\textit{Q}h6 8. \textit{B}e1 g6 9. \textit{B}g5 \textit{B}c7, Kuebel – Hoose, Bad Neustadt 1990, and here after the simple line: 10. \textit{Q}f6 \textit{B}g8 11. \textit{Q}g5\pm White has a powerful initiative on the kingside.

The move 7...c4 – reduces the tension in the centre and deprives Black of any counterplay. 8. \textit{Q}c2 b5 (It is not any better for Black to play: 8...\textit{Q}ge7 9. \textit{B}e1 \textit{Q}g6 10. \textit{Q}g5 \textit{Q}e7 11. \textit{B}h5 \textit{B}xg5 12. \textit{Q}xg5 \textit{B}c7 13. \textit{B}d2\pm Lapis – Sviridov, Havirov 1968. White remains with a two bishop advantage and a possibility for active actions on both sides of the board.) 9. \textit{Q}g5 \textit{Q}e7 (the move 9...h6, Studer – Baertsch, Wangs Pizol 1996, loses for Black after: 10. \textit{B}h5\uparrow g6 11. \textit{B}xg6\++) 10. \textit{B}d7 11. \textit{Q}xf7\++; 10...hxg5 11. \textit{B}xh8 \textit{Q}h6 12. \textit{B}d2\++) 10. \textit{B}g4 g6 (or 10...\textit{Q}h6 11. \textit{B}h5\pm and Black loses a pawn) 11. \textit{B}f4\pm and Black is forced to enter a very difficult endgame.

8. a3 \textit{Q}g6

In answer to 8...\textit{Q}c7, Brajnikov – Smyth, Email 2000, it is again very good for White to play 9. b4\pm.

8...c4 9. \textit{B}c2 \textit{Q}f5 10. \textit{B}e1 \textit{Q}e7 11. \textit{B}bd2 0–0, Liew – Heesen, Email 1999, and now after 12. \textit{B}f1 b5 13. \textit{B}e3\uparrow White manages to trade Black’s only active piece and he can build up slowly and patiently his kingside initiative.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.3\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\end{center}

This position was reached in the game T.Schmid – Okan, Germany 1995. After White’s logical
reaction: 9.b4 e7 10.e1 0–0 11.bd2 White has no counter-play and White's kingside initiative develops unopposed.

b8) 4...f6 5.e2

This is the most popular move for White and it is his standard reaction against f6 in this opening.

5...d5

The other moves for Black are either very dubious, or they just transpose to lines that we have already analyzed:

About 5...c5 6.c3 – see 4...c5; 5...d6 6.0–0 e7 7.e5 – see 4...d6 5.0–0 f6 6.e2 e7 7.e5;

5...c6?! 6.e5 d5 7.c4 b4+? 8.f1 de7 9.a3+– Ivanchuk – Olejarczyk, Warsaw 1999;

5...b4+? 6.c3 e7, Wernsmann – Westermann, Willengen 2001, 7.e5 d5 8.a3 c5 9.0–0 cxd4 10.c4 e7 11.xd4; 5...e7 6.0–0 0–0? (6...c5 7.c3 – see 4...c5; 6...d6 – see 4...d6; 6...h6?!, Schuermann – Mittag, Germany 1993, 7.e5! d5 8.c4 b4 9.e4+; 6...d5 7.e5 de4 8.bd2 – see 5...d5; 7...fd7 8.c4!? dxc4 9.xc4 a6 10.c3 b5

11.xd3 b6 12.e4 c6 13.d1 0–0 14.c2 h6 15.e3 d7 16. ac1 d8 17.d5!– Khalifman – Bauer, Internet 2004) 7.e5 d5 (7..e8 8.c4 f5 9.c3 g5 10.d5 g7 11.e3 f4 12.d2+ White has a powerful centre and a huge lead in development, Alle – Ciemnyjewski, corr. 1998. It is not any better for Black to play: 8...d5, Erler – Karpoff, corr. 1984, 9.cxd5! xd5 10.c3 d7 11. g5+; 10...d8 11.f4+ and White has a great space advantage and good prospects for initiative on both flanks.) 8.e4 g6 9.h6! (it is bad for White to play the seemingly attractive line: 9.c4? b4 10.xb7 c8c6, because now he must already think about how to equalize, H.Hoffmann – Breuer, Goerlitz 1999) 9.e8 10.a3+ Morawietz – Bohn, Herxheim 1993. White has extra space and excellent attacking chances.

6.e5 fd7

6...e4 7.bd2 xd2 (Black's compensation for the pawn is quite insufficient after the rest of the moves: 7...a5? 8.xe4 dxe4 9.xe4+ Gerke – Koch, Dortmund 2000, or 7...f5?, Hafner – Schroeder, Hamburg 1997, 8.xf6 xf6 9.xe4+ 8.xd2 h6. This is an attempt by Black to seize the initiative on the kingside. (About 8...c5 9.c3 – see line a, chapter 3. Black only weakens his dark squares with the move: 8...g6, Ebert – Butz, Gross Gerau 2000. After 9.g5 e7 – it is even
worse for Black to try: 9...\( \text{d7} \) 10.\( \text{f6} \) \( \text{g8} \) 11.\( \text{g5}^+ \) – 10.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) 11.h4\( ^+ \) Black can hardly defend his kingside successfully. After 8...\( \text{c6} \) 9.0-0 \( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 11.\( \text{e1}^+ \) Black has no counterplay at all, Vazelaki – Seitan, Athens 1999. In answer to 8...\( \text{e7} \) White should better play 9.b4!? c5 10.bxc5 bxc5 11.\( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 12.0-0 \( \text{c8} \) 13.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{a6} \) 14.\( \text{wh5}^+ \) and he maintains a powerful pressure on the kingside, Doluhanova – Agudova, Alushta 2005. After 8...\( \text{d7} \), Leitao – Mascarenhas, Sao Paulo 1999, it seems very good for White to continue with: 9.b4!? c5 10.c3 \( \text{e7} \) 11.0-0\( ^\text{t} \) 9.0-0 \( \text{c6} \) 10.c3 g5 11.\( \text{e1} \) h5 12.f4\( ^+ \) Schmitz – Ziabari, Troisdorf 2000. Black’s play was too risky and it led to a great lag in development and weakening of plenty of important squares.

7.\( \text{g5}^+! \) \( \text{e7} \)

The other moves for Black are clearly worse.

After 7...c5? 8.\( \text{xe6} \) fxe6 9.\( \text{wh5}^+ \) \( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{g5}^+ \) Black resigned in the game Mastrokoukos – Klokas, Nikea 2002.

The move 7...\( \text{e7}^? \) loses a pawn after 8.\( \text{xh7}^+ \) Shipman – Cooke, New York 1991.

It is also bad for Black to play 7...g6, because that move only weakens the dark squares and creates a target for White to attack on the kingside. 8.h4! \( \text{e7} 

(8...h5? 9.\( \text{xe6}^+ \) ; 8...\( \text{c6}^? \) ! 9.\( \text{e7} \) 10.h5 \( \text{g7} \) 11.h6\( ^+ \) Streitberg – Nagrocka, Dortmund 1989; 9...\( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g5} \) 11.\( \text{g5}^+ \) Ostojic – Vlahovic, Belgrade 2005, White has the two bishop advantage, extra space and an easy attacking plan on the kingside. His positional pressure will be long-lasting.) 9.h5 \( \text{g7} \) (After 9...\( \text{h6} \) 10.hxg6! \( \text{xg5} \) 11.\( \text{f8} \) 12.f4 \( \text{h4}^+ \) 13.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{c6} \) 14.\( \text{h5}^+ \) White regains his piece and remains with an extra pawn) 10.h6 \( \text{f8} \), Bussek – Jaeger, Germany 1995, and here the simple move 11.\( \text{f3}^+ \) emphasizes the weakness of the dark squares on Black’s kingside.

8.\( \text{g4} \) h5

8...\( \text{g6} \) 9.h4 h5 10.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 11.\( \text{f3}^+ \) Gleizerov – Filipovic, Ljubljana 2000.

9.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f8} \), Comp Deep Junior – Akopian, Dortmund 2000. Now, after the natural move 10.\( \text{f3}^\uparrow \), White manages to exchange the dark squared bishops and he maintains a powerful pressure on the kingside.
Chapter 3

1.e4 b6 2.d4 ♗b7 3.♘d3 e6 4.♘f3 c5 5.c3

5...♗f6

About 5...d5 6.e5 – see 4...d5 5.e5 c5 6.c3, Chapter 2, line b5.

Black has also tried:

5...♗g6?! This move only weakens the dark squares and White should better exploit that with the move: 6.♗f4! ♗g7 7.♗d6+ Shankar – Jayaraj, Madras 1997;

5...♗e7 6.h4! ♗bc6 (in answer to 6...♗c7, Liebert – Milovanovic, corr. 1985, it seems quite logical for White to continue with his kingside actions with: 7.h5! d5 8.e5 cxd4 9.cxd4 ♘a6 10.♗xa6 ♗xa6 11.h6=) 7.a3 d5 8.e5 c4 (8...h6, Mrkvicka – Mehlhorn, corr. 2000, 9.b4!=; 8...♗c8 9.h5 cxd4 10.cxd4 ♗f5 11.♗xf5 exf5 12.♖g5 ♗d7 13.h6= Alonso – Scholbach, Email 2000) 9.♖c2 h6 10.h5 ♗d7 11.♕h4 0–0–0 12.♗e3 f6 13.f4 ♗b8 14.♗d2 ♗a8, Sveshnikov – Tseshkovsky, USSR 1980, and here White’s simplest way to obtain an overwhelming advantage is: 15.♖e2! followed by 0–0–0 and g4=, so he preserves a powerful pressure on the kingside, while Black has no counterplay at all;

5...c4?! This move reduces the tension in the centre and thus White has a free hand for active actions on both flanks. 6.♗c2 ♗c7 (About 6...d5 7.e5 – see 4...d5 5.e5 c5 6.c3 c4 7.♗c2 Chapter 2, variation b5); 6...b5 7.0–0 g6 8.♗e1 ♗g7 9.♗f4 d6 10.a4 a6 11.♖a3=, and Black can hardly defend his queenside weaknesses, because of his great lag in development, Ruggeri – Rota, Crema 2000. 6...♕f6 7.e5 ♘d5 8.♗bd2 b5 9.♗e4 ♗c7= 10.♗f5! h6 11.♗xf7 ♗xf7 12.♖h5+ ♗g8, Stangl – Hoose, Bad Nau-}

stätt 1990, and here White wins with 13.♗d6=, because Black is forced to give up his queen, since otherwise after: 13...♗xd6 14.♕e8+ ♗f8 15.♗g6= he simply gets checkmated. White main-
tains a dangerous attack after: 9...\textit{e}7 10.\textit{g}5 f6 11.exf6 gxf6 12.\textit{e}5! →. Evidently, Black's best choice is the move 9...h6, but even then after 10.b3↑ his defence remains extremely difficult.) 7.0–0 \textit{e}7 (It is hardly any better for Black to play: 7...\textit{f}6 8.\textit{e}1 d5 9.e5 \textit{fd}7 10.\textit{g}5! \textit{e}7 11.\textit{h}5±, because White remains with the two bishop advantage and a dangerous kingside initiative, Brueckner – Josuttis, Pienneberg 1997. Or 7...\textit{e}7 8.\textit{e}2 \textit{f}6 9.\textit{g}5! d6 10.\textit{bd}2 b5 11.e5! dxe5 12.dxe5± Kirsch – Happe, Germany 1995. Following 9...d5 10.e5 \textit{g}4 11.h3±, White leads in development and exerts a powerful pressure on the kingside, Astrom – Eriksson, Sollentuna 1995.) 8.\textit{e}1 \textit{g}6 9.h4 h5 (White’s initiative will be much more effective in case he manages to place a pawn on the h5-square, for example: 9...\textit{e}7 10.\textit{h}5 \textit{f}8 11.\textit{bd}2; 9...d6 10.h5 \textit{e}7 11.\textit{e}2 \textit{d}7 12.\textit{a}3±; 9...d5 10.h5 \textit{e}7 11.\textit{e}5 \textit{bc}6 12.\textit{f}4±; 11...f6 12.\textit{a}4+ \textit{bc}6 13.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 14.exd5 exd5 15.\textit{f}4±. Black lags in development considerably in all variations.) 10.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}6 11.\textit{bd}2 b5, Panno – Sarkany, Los Polvorines 1980, and here after the simple move 12.e5±, White has occupied the centre and he is quite well prepared to play on either side of the board, while Black can hardly find any counterplay;

5...\textit{c}7 6.0–0

Black has plenty of possibilities in this position, but they are either quite dubious, or they simply transpose to lines that we have already analyzed.

About 6...\textit{f}6 7.\textit{e}2 – see 5...\textit{f}6 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}7 7.0–0; 6...d6 7.\textit{e}2 \textit{d}7 8.d5 – see 5...d6; 6...c4 7.\textit{c}2 – see 5...c4 6.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}7 7.0–0.

The position after 6...\textit{e}7 7.\textit{e}2 \textit{f}6 has been tested in numerous games, but strangely enough White has never played 8.e5!, for example, 8...\textit{d}5 (in case of 8...\textit{g}8 9.\textit{a}3± White remains with a huge lead in development) 9.a3! and White is threatening to capture the centralized enemy knight with the move 10.c4, and Black’s defence against that seemingly primitive threat is far from easy. For example after: 9...\textit{c}6 10.c4 \textit{c}7 11.\textit{c}3± Black’s pieces on the queenside are so disordinated that he has problems defending against 12.\textit{e}4.

In case of 6...h6 7.\textit{e}2 \textit{e}7, Vujicic – Dimitrijevic, Belgrade 2003, White’s simple line 8.\textit{a}3! a6 9.dxc5 bxc5 10.e5 \textit{bc}6 11.\textit{c}4± enables him to occupy
plenty of important squares in the centre.

The move 6...cxd4?! looks quite dubious, because White has excellent chances to dominate on the key open c-file with: 7.cxd4 Qf6 (after 7...d6 8.Qc3 Qf6 9.Qg5 e7 10.Qc1 Qd7 11.e5! White's lead in development was so overwhelming that the game ended in just several moves: 11...Qd5 12.Qb5 Qc6 13.Qxd5 exd5 14. Qe1! Qxg5 15.exd6+ Qf8 16. Qxg5 1–0 Prevenios – Wall, corr. 1963) 8.Qc3 a6 9.Qg5 Qc6, Machin – Khalid, Kuala Lumpur 1996, and here after 10.Qc1± White completes his piece-development and preserves the option to break in the centre.

6...Qe7 7.Qa3! a6 8.Qxc5 Qxc5, Ramos – Popp, Email 1998 (It is not better for Black to play: 8...Qxc5 9.Qc4 Qc7 10.Qe3 Qc8 11.Qd4±, because White maintains his huge lead in development.) and here White can play the simple line: 9.e5 Qbc6 10.Qe1 Qg6 11.Qc4±;

5...cxd4 6.cxd4

About 6...Qf6 7.Qe2 – see 5...Qf6;

6...Qb4+ 7.Qc3 Qe7 (7...Qf6 8.Qe2 – see 5...Qf6; 7...h6 8.0–0 Qf6 9.Qe2 – see 5...Qf6) 8.a3 Qxc3+ 9.bxc3 0–0 10.0–0± and Black has no compensation for White's couple of powerful bishops, Huesmann – Wauthier, Belgium 1992;

6...Qa6 7.Qxa6 Qxa6 8.0–0 Qf6 9.Qc3 Qb4 10.e5± and White has a huge lead in development and he dominates in the centre, Braga – Del Campo, Pico 1996;

After 6...g6 7.0–0 Qg7 8.Qc3 Qe7, Zavgorodny – Kutsykh, Nikolaev 2001, White can emphasize the weakness of the dark squares by bringing his knight to the d6-outpost: 9.Qb5 0–0 10. Qd6 Qa6 11.Qf4±;

The move 6...h6 – is too slow. 7.0–0 Qc6 8.Qc3 Qb4 9.Qb1 Qf6, Hebden – Jager, Ramsgate 1984. After 10.a3 Qc6 11.e5 Qg8 12.d5± Black might not even manage to complete his development;

6...Qc6 7.Qc3 Qc8 (Black only loses time after: 7...Qb4 8.Qe2 Qe7 9.a3 Qa6 10.0–0 Qf6, Gruss – Bantle, Plzen 1998. In case of 11.e5 Qd5 12.Qxd5 exd5 13.Qe3 Qc7 14.Qd2± White's advantage is stable, because of his dominance in the centre and his enemy's weak d5-pawn. 7...d6, Tognella – Szirmay, Budapest 2002, 8.d5 exd5 9.exd5 Qe7+ 10. Qe3 Qe5 11.Qb5+ Qd8 12.0–0±. White's development is superior and Black's king is stranded in
the centre. It is hardly any better for Black to play: 9...\textit{\&}e5 10.\textit{\&}b5+ \textit{\&}d7 11.0-0±, because thus he can not complete easily his development.) 8.0-0 \textit{\&}d6 (it is worse for Black to follow with 8...d6?! 9.\textit{\&}a4 d5 10.exd5 exd5 11.\textit{\&}e1+ \textit{\&}e7 12.\textit{\&}f5 \textit{\&}a8 13.\textit{\&}e5 1-0 Pandavos - Trikaliotis, Athens 1989) 9.d5 \textit{\&}e5 10.dxe6 dxe6 11.\textit{\&}b5+ \textit{\&}f8 12.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}xf3+ 13.\textit{\&}xf3 \textit{\&}xf4 14.\textit{\&}xf4± and White has maintained a huge lead in development, Martinez Uceda - Vicioso Sanchez, Email 2000;

6...d6 7.0-0 \textit{\&}e7 (Black should not opt for: 7...g6 8.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}g7, Dubois - Blackburne, London 1862, since the line 9.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}e7 10.\textit{\&}d2± emphasizes the weakness of the dark squares, because of White's superior development and his powerful centre.) 8.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}f6 9.\textit{\&}e1 0-0 10.\textit{\&}c2 \textit{\&}c6 11.a3± Doric - Fenske, Schwarzach 1999. White is now quite well prepared for active actions in the centre;

5...d6 6.0-0 \textit{\&}d7 (6...\textit{\&}f6 7.\textit{\&}e2 - see 5...\textit{\&}f6 6.\textit{\&}e2 d6 7.0-0; 6...\textit{\&}e7 7.\textit{\&}e2 - see 5...\textit{\&}e7; 6...\textit{\&}e7?! 7.\textit{\&}b5+! \textit{\&}c6 8.\textit{\&}xc6+ \textit{\&}bx8 9.d5 exd5 10.exd5 \textit{\&}a5 11.\textit{\&}e1± and White leads in development and he has extra space, moreover Black's king has no safe shelter, Rijnarts - Van Beek, Leiden 1997. It is even worse for Black to play: 7...\textit{\&}bc6 8.d5--; or 7...\textit{\&}d7 8.\textit{\&}xc5±.) 7.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}e7 (About 7...\textit{\&}gf6 8.\textit{\&}d1 - see 5...\textit{\&}f6; 7...\textit{\&}e7 8.\textit{\&}d1 - see 5...\textit{\&}e7. Following 7...a6, Wittmann - Herrmann Velden 1995, White should try to prepare the pawn-break e4-e5, occupying additional space. The best way to do that is to play the move 8.\textit{\&}d1±. In case Black plays 7...h6, Polak - Stratil, Czech Republic 1991, it is again good for White to continue with 8.\textit{\&}d1± having the idea to play e4-e5 up his sleeve. In answer to 7...\textit{\&}c7, Ubezio - Tagnon, Forli 1993, White's simplest way to maintain his advantage is: 8.d5 e5 9.b4± and he has a powerful initiative on the queenside, while Black has no counterplay. It is even worse for Black to play: 8...\textit{\&}e7 9.dxe6 fxe6 10.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}xg5 11.\textit{\&}h5±.) 8.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}g6 9.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}e7 10.\textit{\&}bd2 0-0 11.e5 d5 (after 11...\textit{\&}xf3 12.\textit{\&}xf3 d5, Major - Movsesian, Prague 1995, White should strive to open files in the centre, because of his two bishop advantage: 13.c4 dxc4 14.\textit{\&}xc4 cxd4 15.\textit{\&}xd1±) 12.\textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}e8 13.\textit{\&}f5 14.exf6 \textit{\&}xf6 15.\textit{\&}ef3± Danielei - Khachian, Pasanauri 1997. Black must worry about his weak e6-pawn, his vulnerable e5-square, as well as his bad bishop on b7 and his compromised kingside;

5...\textit{\&}e7 6.0-0 d6 (About 6...\textit{\&}f6 7.\textit{\&}e2 - see 5...\textit{\&}f6; 6...\textit{\&}c7 7.\textit{\&}e2! \textit{\&}f6 - see 5...\textit{\&}c7 6.0-0 \textit{\&}e7 7.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}f6; 6...g5? This idea is too dubious for Black - White develops his pieces in the centre, while Black only weakens his
We will now deal in details with the lines: a) 6...d5, b) 6...cxd4 and c) 6...e7.

Black has also tried in this position the moves:

6...c8 – with the idea to trade the light squared bishops after a6. 7.d5! d6 (7...e4 8.c4±) 8.b5+ bd7 9.dxe6 fx6 10.e5! xf3 (10...dxe5? 11.xe5 xg2?!) 12.g1 d5 13.c4 b7 14.g5–) 11.xf3 dx5 12.d2 e7 (12...a6 13.c4±) 13.a6 d8 14.c6± Baklan – Kopylov, Donetzk 1998. White exerts a powerful pressure along the weakened light squares as well as against his enemy’s weak central pawns. His two bishop advantage is very promising too;

6...c4 7.c2 b5 (Black’s other possibilities are worse for him: 7...e7?! Ziane – Butny, Oak Park 1996, because after the simple line: 8.e5 d5 9.xc4 White wins a pawn and Black can hardly claim any compensation for it, for example: 9...a6 10.b3 c6 11.e4 c8 12.d1 0–0 13.d3± and White evacuates his king away from the centre quite easily. After: 7...d5 8.e5 d7 9.g5± White’s pressure on the kingside is overwhelming, Stoppel – Scheyka, Germany 1994. Black can hardly equalize with: 7...c7 8.g5 e7 9.bd2 b5, Connell – Bisby, Hastings 1995, because after: 10.e5 d5 11.xe7 xe7 12.a4± White dominates in the centre and he can seize the initiative on both
sides of the board.) 8.0–0 _succ7 9._g5 0–0 10._bd2 d6 11.e5 dxe5 12.dxe5 _c5 13._e4 g6 14._h4+ and White’s attacking chances are just excellent, Cabrera – Velez, Isla Guitart 1994;

6..._c7 7.0–0 _c6 (7..._e7 8.e5! – see 6..._e7 7.0–0 _c7 8.e5!; The strange piece-sacrifice 7..._g4? 8.h3 h5 was tested in the game Rohl – Denson, Dos Hermanas 2003. White could have captured that knight without too much of a risk, for example: 9.hxg4 hxg4 10._e5 cxd4 11.cxd4 _c6 12._f4 _xd4 13._xg4+–. In answer to 7...d6, in the game Prueske – Maisels, Germany 2002, White obtained a great advantage occupying plenty of space with the help of the move e5: 8._e1 _bd7 9.e5 dxe5 10.dxe5 _d5 11.a3 g6 12.c4 _e7 13._c3 a6 14._e4+– and the powerful centralization of White’s pieces restricts Black’s possibilities considerably. After: 7...d5 8.e5 _e4 9._bd2 _xd2 10._xd2 _c6 11._ab1 _e7, Palau – Berra, Rosario 2002, the standard move for White 12.b4+ deprives Black of any counterplay whatsoever.) 8.d5 exd5 (It is hardly any better for Black to try: 8..._e5 9._xe5 _xe5 10.f4 _h5 11._xh5 _xh5 12.e5+ and White squeezes Black’s kingside completely, due to the terrible threat g4.) 9.exd5+ _e7 10.c4 d6 11._c3+ Buchnicek – Nedela, Czech Republic 2004. Black’s defence is extremely difficult, because of the lack of space and the problematic development of his pieces;

6..._c6 7.d5 _a5 (White’s initiative develops unopposed after: 7..._e7 8.c4 d6 9._c3 e5, Feller – Gaczi, Budapest 2001. White can now activate his pieces quite energetically after: 10._c2! _g6 11._a4+ _d7 12._g5! _e7 13._h5+. Black has problems to complete his development. For example he loses after: 12...h6 because of 13._xf7! _xf7 14._g4 with a non-standard double attack against d7 and e6. It is too bad for Black to play: 8..._g6? 9.e5 _g4 10.h3 _h6 11._c3 _f5 12._xf5 _xf5 13.0–0 _e7 14._e1+, because he is left with almost nothing to move, Baklan – Hermesmann, Hamburg 1999.) 8.c4 exd5, Baches Garcia – Carbonell Bofill, Barbera del Valles 2003 (8...b5 – this is an attempt by Black to seize the initiative, but it can be easily parried by White, because of the misplaced black knight on the a5-square. 9.cxb5 c4 10._c2 _b4+ 11._d2 _xd2+, Maccapani – Isonzo, San Marino 1998. Now, it is very good for White to continue with: 12._bd2 exd5 13.exd5+ _e7 14.b4+; 13..._f8 14.d6 _b8 15.b4+. After 8...d6 9._c3 e5 10.0–0 g6 11._c2 _c8 12.a3+ White begins active actions on the queenside and Black has not even completed his development yet, Roehmild – Grote, Lippstadt 2000.) 9.exd5+ _e7 10._c3 _g4
(10...g6 11.dbc3 cg7 12.db6!+) 11.dbf4 cxe2+ 12.dbxe2 0–0–0 (12...d6 13.dbc3+ 13.dbg5 de8+ 14.dbf3 dh6 15.dbc3 fd6 16.dbhe1+. Black has no space and his pieces are disordered, so his defense is extremely difficult;

6...d6 7.0–0 h6, De Vreesse – Gommers, Gent 1996 (About 7...de7 8.dbd1 – see 6...de7; the move 7...g6?! – weakens the dark squares on the kingside and does not contribute to Black's development. 8.dbd2 dbd7 9.e5+ Hanisch – Morlock, Pforzheim 1999. 7...dbd7 8.dbd1 cxd4 9.cxde de7 10.dbc3+ S.Vaja – Sargeeva, Baile Herculane 1994. White enjoys a huge lead in development and he can seize the initiative on both sides of the board.) Now, it is good for White to follow with: 8.dbd1 – he thus prepares the pawn-break e4-e5 and it is useful for his rook to occupy the d-file, for example: 8...dbd7 9. dbd2 de7 (After 9...cxd4 10.cxde db8, White should not be in a hurry to start active actions and he should develop his queenside first. 11.b4 de7 12.db2+. Black has no possibilities for active actions and it is too dubious for him to try, for example: 12...d5 13.e5 dbh5 14.dbh3+, because he is now forced to weaken additionally his kingside due to the threat g4.) 10.e5 dxe5 11.dxe5 dbd5 12.dbc4+ dc7 (Black is trying to exploit the temporary vulnerability of White’s e5-pawn) 13.dbb5! dbc6 14.dbxc6 dbxc6 15.dbc4+. All Black’s pieces are quite passive; moreover White enjoys a great space advantage.

a) 6...d5 7.e5

7.dbd4

In answer to 7...dbd7, White should better follow with 8.dbg5! After White’s central pawns have been fixed on dark squares, Black's move 8...dc8, with the idea to try to exchange the light squared bishops seems to be the most purposeful. (White maintains a great advantage after the trade of the dark squared bishops: 8...de7 9.dbxe7 dbxe7 10.0–0 dbc6 11.dbh1 0–0 12.dbd2+ – and Black’s bishop on b7 has no good prospects. In the variation: 8...dbc7 9.0–0 dc6 10.dbd2 h6 11.dbh3 0–0–0 12.dbd4! c4 – after 12...cxb4 13.cxb4 dbxb4 14.dbc1= White preserves excellent attacking chances – 13.dbc2 g5 14.db5 dba5, Konstantinopolsky – L.Muchnik, Moscow 1966, and White maintains his advantage with energetic actions on the kingside: 15.h4! g4 16.dbh2 h5 17.dbg5 db8 18.dbc3 dbg7 19. dbc1+ and Black’s pieces are iso-
lated on the queenside, so he will hardly manage to defend his kingside, or 15...gxh4 16.\textsubscript{Q}xh4 \textsubscript{Q}a3 17.\textsubscript{Q}h5! \textsubscript{Q}df8 18.\textsubscript{Q}ab1\pm and Black has great problems to defend against the march of White's f-pawn. It is even worse for Black to play: 17...\textsubscript{Q}b2 18.\textsubscript{Q}xf7\pm and he will have problems defending his e6 and h6-pawns.)

9.0−0! \textsubscript{Q}a6, Morales – Cardenas, Havana 1999 (It is worse for Black to play 9...cxd4 10.cxd4 \textsubscript{Q}a6, because of 11.\textsubscript{Q}c1! \textsubscript{Q}b7 12.\textsubscript{Q}c2 h6 13.\textsubscript{Q}h4 g5 14.\textsubscript{Q}xa6 \textsubscript{Q}xa6 15.\textsubscript{Q}g3\pm, and the exchange of Black's bad bishop cannot equalize for him, because his kingside has been considerably weakened. It is better for Black to play immediately: 9...h6! 10.\textsubscript{Q}f4! cxd4! 11.cxd4 \textsubscript{Q}a6 12.\textsubscript{Q}c1 \textsubscript{Q}b7 13.\textsubscript{Q}c3 \textsubscript{Q}xd3 14.\textsubscript{Q}xd3\pm, but White still remains with a stable advantage, because of his superiority in the centre, excellent development and his domination on the c-file. It is too bad for Black to try: 10...g5? 11.\textsubscript{Q}e3 \textsubscript{Q}a6 12.\textsubscript{Q}e1? \textsubscript{Q}xd3 13.\textsubscript{Q}xd3 with the idea to follow with f4\pm. Black should not experiment with: 10...\textsubscript{Q}a6? 11.c4! dxc4 12.\textsubscript{Q}xc4 cxd4 13.\textsubscript{Q}xa6 \textsubscript{Q}xa6?? 14.\textsubscript{Q}e4++; 13...\textsubscript{Q}xa6 14.\textsubscript{Q}xd4 \textsubscript{Q}e7 15.\textsubscript{Q}c3\pm.) 10.c4! – this is White's most energetic move. He has a much better development, so he should attempt to open files in the centre: 10...dxc4 (it is much worse for Black to play: 10...cxd4 11. cxd5 \textsubscript{Q}c5 12.\textsubscript{Q}xa6 \textsubscript{Q}xa6 13.\textsubscript{Q}xa6 \textsubscript{Q}bxaxa6 14.d6\pm, because he has great problems to develop his kingside) 11.\textsubscript{Q}xc4 \textsubscript{Q}xc4 12.\textsubscript{Q}xc4 \textsubscript{Q}c6 (Black cannot manage to simplify the position with the move 12...\textsubscript{Q}a6, on the contrary – that move only helps White to centralize his queen: 13.\textsubscript{Q}c2 \textsubscript{Q}c6 14.\textsubscript{Q}e4\pm) 13.dxc5 \textsubscript{Q}xc5 (After 13...\textsubscript{Q}cxe5 14.\textsubscript{Q}xe5 \textsubscript{Q}xe5 15.\textsubscript{Q}e4 f6 16.cxb6 axb6 17.\textsubscript{Q}c1\pm Black's centralized knight does not compensate the weaknesses on b6 and e6; moreover his king remains still stranded in the centre, so White has a stable advantage as a result.) 14.\textsubscript{Q}e4 0−0 15.\textsubscript{Q}c3\pm. White has preserved his space advantage and his pieces are developed quite harmoniously.

8.\textsubscript{Q}bd2 \textsubscript{Q}xd2

After 8...cxd4 9.\textsubscript{Q}xe4 dxe4 10.\textsubscript{Q}xe4\pm Black will have no compensation for the pawn that he is bound to lose quite soon, Hiltmann – Koch, Dortmund 2001.

9.\textsubscript{Q}xd2

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

9...\textsubscript{Q}c6

About 9...\textsubscript{Q}e7 – see variation c5a.
1.e4 b6 2.d4 \$b7 3.\$d3 e6 4.\$f3 c5 5.c3 \$f6 6.\$e2

The move 9...a5, Eliet – Gemmes, Chambery 1994, enables White to play aggressively: 10.\$g5 \$e7 11.\$h5 g6 12.\$h6 \$f8 13.\$h3\$. Black’s purposeful move 9...\$c8, Hawes – Adebayo, Elista 1998, enables White to begin active actions on the kingside with: 10.\$g5! (it is worse for White to play 10.b4 \$a6! 11.b5?! c4=) 10...\$a6 11.\$h5 \$b7 12.\$xa6 \$xa6 13.0–0±.

9...h6 – this is an attempt by Black not to let White’s knight to the g5-square, Sosa – Slimani, Dubai 1986, 10.b4?! That is a standard measure by White to restrict Black’s counterplay on the queenside, before starting an attack on the kingside. After for example: 10...c4 11.\$c2 \$e7 12.\$h4\$ White maintains his space advantage and a powerful kingside initiative, while his opponent has no counterplay at all.

It is hardly better for Black to try: 9...\$xd4 10.\$xd4 \$c6 11.\$c1±, because White can easily sustain his initiative on both sides of the board, while Black is almost helpless, Mariani – Scialdone, Italy 1995.

The move 9...c4 – has been tested in practice quite often, nevertheless it is illogical, because Black’s light squared bishop would remain out of action for a long time and White’s kingside initiative develops unopposed. 10.\$c2 \$e7 (In answer to 10...\$c6, Gruskovnjak – Surfek, Portoroz 1995, it is very good for White to follow with: 11.\$g5! \$e7 12.\$h5 g6 13.\$h6 \$f8 14.\$h3±. White has provoked weakening of Black’s kingside and he is now quite well prepared for an onslaught against it after for example: 14...\$e7 15.\$g3 b5 16.\$h4\$ 11.h4 b5 12.\$g5 h6, Krug – Barnstedt, Germany 2001, 13.\$h5! g6 (13...0–0 14.\$xe6! fxex6 15.\$g6 \$f5 16.g4+) 14.\$xg6 fxg6 15.\$xg6 \$d7 16.\$xe6 \$c7 17.\$f7±. Black has great problems to counter White’s powerful passed pawns on the kingside.

10.a3!

This is a very purposeful move. White intends to prepare b4 and that would prevent Black’s counterplay on the queenside.

10...a5

The other possibilities for Black are clearly worse:

10...\$c8?! 11.b4! \$e7 12.0–0 0–0 13.\$g5 \$xg5 14.\$xg5± and White has the two bishop advantage and excellent attacking chances, Krivec – Kovacic, Bled 1999;

10...c4 – this move gives White a free hand for aggressive actions on the kingside: 11.\$c2 b5 12.\$g5 h5 13.h4 \$e7 14.\$f3± Docihev – Siempos, Halkida 2001.

11.\$h4 h5

11...\$e7 12.\$h3! h6 (12...0–0? 13.\$xh7++) 13.\$g3 \$f8 14.h5±.

12.0–0 c4

In answer to the more logical
move 12...\textit{\textbf{a}}e7, it deserves attention for White to sacrifice a pawn with: 13.\textit{\textbf{d}}g5?! \textit{\textbf{x}}xg5 14.\textit{\textbf{x}}xg5 cxd4 15.cxd4 \textit{\textbf{d}}xd4 16.\textit{\textbf{d}}e3 \textit{\textbf{c}}c6 17.\textit{\textbf{b}}b5 \textit{\textbf{e}}c8 18.\textit{\textbf{e}}ac1\textit{\textbf{x}}. Black's pieces are dis coordinate and his king is quite unsafe. White therefore has an excellent compensation for the pawn, since it is too dangerous for Black to castle, for example: 18.0–0 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d3 g6 20.\textit{\textbf{xc}}x6 \textit{\textbf{xc}}x6 21.\textit{\textbf{xc}}x6 \textit{\textbf{xc}}x6 22.\textit{\textbf{d}}xe6! \textit{\textbf{b}}b5! 23.\textit{\textbf{xb}}x5 fxe6 24.\textit{\textbf{c}}c6± and White has an overwhelming advantage, because he dominates on the only open file.

13.\textit{\textbf{c}}c2 \textit{\textbf{a}}4 14.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5±

Black has no counterplay whatsoever, while White easily exchanges Black's only active piece opening the position in the centre and on the kingside: 14...\textit{\textbf{e}}e7 15.\textit{\textbf{ae}}e1 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 16.\textit{\textbf{xe}}e7 \textit{\textbf{xe}}7 17.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5! \textit{\textbf{g}}g8 18.\textit{\textbf{d}}d1 b5 19.\textit{\textbf{f}}f4 g6 20.\textit{\textbf{f}}f5! \textit{\textbf{xf}}x5 21.\textit{\textbf{xf}}x5 0–0–0 (Black loses too after: 21...\textit{\textbf{exf}}5 22.e6 fxe6 23.\textit{\textbf{exe}}e6+ \textit{\textbf{e}}e7 24.\textit{\textbf{f}}fe1 \textit{\textbf{a}}a6 25.\textit{\textbf{exe}}e7 \textit{\textbf{exe}}e7 26.\textit{\textbf{exe}}e7 \textit{\textbf{xe}}e7 27.\textit{\textbf{we}}e2+ \textit{\textbf{wd}}d7 28.\textit{\textbf{we}}e5+) 22.\textit{\textbf{h}}h3 \textit{\textbf{h}}h6 23.\textit{\textbf{xf}}x7 1–0 Leitao – Mascarenhas, Sao Paolo 2000.

b) 6...cxd4 7.cxd4

Black has two basic lines here: \textbf{b1) 7...b4 and b2) 7...\textit{\textbf{c}}c6.}

He has also tried in practice: 7...d5 8.e5 \textit{\textbf{e}}e4 (About 8...\textit{\textbf{b}}b4 – see 7...\textit{\textbf{b}}b4; 8...\textit{\textbf{fd}}d7 9.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5! \textit{\textbf{e}}e7 10.\textit{\textbf{xe}}x7 \textit{\textbf{exe}}7 11.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3 a6 12.0–0 \textit{\textbf{c}}c6 13.a3± and Black's light squared bishop has no good prospects and he cannot create any effective counterplay, Samraoui – Gillen, Email 2000.) 9.0–0 \textit{\textbf{e}}e7 10.\textit{\textbf{bd}}d2 \textit{\textbf{xd}}x2 11.\textit{\textbf{xd}}x2 0–0 12.b4! This strong move prevents Black's light pieces from any active actions. 12...a5 13.b5 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 14.\textit{\textbf{e}}e1 \textit{\textbf{e}}e8 15.\textit{\textbf{f}}f5 16.\textit{\textbf{fx}}f6 \textit{\textbf{xf}}f6 17.\textit{\textbf{f}}f5± and White's advantage is quite stable, because his light pieces are much more active than Black's, moreover Black's king position has been compromised, Pastor Pons – Mimon, Spain 1993;

Following 7...\textit{\textbf{c}}c8, Black intends to trade the light squared bishops and then enter a pawn-structure similar to the French Defence. This however, takes too much time and Black fails to play d5 altogether. 8.0–0 \textit{\textbf{a}}a6 9.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3
\[ \text{1.e4 b6 2.d4 \,$\textit{\&}$b7 3.\,$\textit{\&}$d3 e6 4.\,$\textit{\&}$f3 c5 5.c3 \,$\textit{\&}$f6 6.\,$\textit{\&}$e2} \]

\[ \text{\,$\textit{\&}$xd3 10.\,$\textit{\&}$xd3 \,$\textit{\&}$a6 (10...\,$\textit{\&}$b7 11.d5 \,$\textit{\&}$a6 12.\,$\textit{\&}$g5 \,$\textit{\&}$c5 13.\,$\textit{\&}$e2\, Wagman – Turchi, Caorle 1981) 11.a3! \,$\textit{\&}$c7 12.\,$\textit{\&}$g5 \,$\textit{\&}$a6 13.\,$\textit{\&}$e3 \,$\textit{\&}$e7 14.\,$\textit{\&}$ac1 h6 15.\,$\textit{\&}$xf6 \,$\textit{\&}$xf6 16.d5\, Black has managed to trade a couple of light pieces, but that has hardly facilitated his defence, because the rest of his pieces are definitely misplaced, Simonovic – Batanjac, Golubac 2003;\]

The move 7...\,$\textit{\&}$e7 does not seem logical, since Black thus reduces the tension in the centre. White gets the wonderful c3-square for his knight as a result, because Black has refrained from playing the active move 7...\,$\textit{\&}$b4 and he has placed his bishop to a passive position instead. 8.\,$\textit{\&}$c3! (This move is much more precise than 8.0–0 transposing to the line 6...\,$\textit{\&}$e7 7.0–0 cxd4, because now Black cannot play anymore the variation 8...d5 9.e5 \,$\textit{\&}$e4; moreover he must constantly worry about the possibility of White playing d5.) 8...d6 (It is too bad for Black to play instead: 8...\,$\textit{\&}$c8 9.0–0 0–0 10.\,$\textit{\&}$g5 h6 11.\,$\textit{\&}$h4 \,$\textit{\&}$e8 12.\,$\textit{\&}$ac1\, and White has already completed his development, while Black has problems to accomplish that, Pochchev – Batanjac, Nis 1996. After 8...0–0 9.0–0 d6 10.\,$\textit{\&}$d1 \,$\textit{\&}$bd7 11.e5?! \,$\textit{\&}$xf3 12.gxf3 \,$\textit{\&}$e8, Balzar – Hols, Nordwalde 1988, the simple move 13.f4\, provides White with a huge space advantage and a couple of powerful bishops. On top of that, he preserves excellent attacking chances having in his plan the pawn-breaks f5 or d5. Black will hardly manage to exploit White’s weakened king position, since he does not have a single active piece at the moment.) 9.0–0 \,$\textit{\&}$bd7 10.\,$\textit{\&}$f4 0–0, Schmid – Mischustov, Abensberg 1987 (In answer to 10...a6 11.h3 0–0, Roumegous – Dewitte, Belfort 2004, it deserves attention for White to continue with 12.a4!!, because Black has no active play at all. His attempt to exploit the weakness of the b4-square with the move 12...\,$\textit{\&}$b8 leads to a very favourable opening of the game for White after: 13.\,$\textit{\&}$fd1 \,$\textit{\&}$c6 14.e5\, The other possibility for Black is too slow: 10...\,$\textit{\&}$f8, Karlsson – Knutsson, Karlskrona 1997, and the simplest way for White to exploit that is by playing: 11.e5 dxe5 12.dxe5 \,$\textit{\&}$d5 13.\,$\textit{\&}$xd5 \,$\textit{\&}$xd5 14.\,$\textit{\&}$fd1\, Black has problems to evacuate his king away from the centre, for example: 14...\,$\textit{\&}$c8? 15.\,$\textit{\&}$b5+ \,$\textit{\&}$d7 16.\,$\textit{\&}$xd5! exd5 17.e6++; or 14...\,$\textit{\&}$d7 15.\,$\textit{\&}$e4! \,$\textit{\&}$xe4 16.\,$\textit{\&}$xe4 \,$\textit{\&}$c8 17.\,$\textit{\&}$a4++; or 14...\,$\textit{\&}$g6 15.\,$\textit{\&}$b5+ \,$\textit{\&}$f8 16.\,$\textit{\&}$e3\,.) White can try now to seize the initiative on both sides of the board and the most logical way to do that is by playing: 11.\,$\textit{\&}$fd1!! with the following eventual developments: 11...a6 12.e5 dxe5 (12...\,$\textit{\&}$h5 13.\,$\textit{\&}$e3 g6 14.\,$\textit{\&}$h6\, 13.dxe5 \,$\textit{\&}$d5 14.\,$\textit{\&}$xd5 exd5 (14...\,$\textit{\&}$xd5 15.\,$\textit{\&}$xa6 \,$\textit{\&}$xf3
16.gxf3 a7 17.b5+ 15.d4+. White maintains a stable edge due to his extra space and the great activity of his pieces.

**b1) 7...b4+ 8.c3**

![Chess Diagram](image)

8...d5

This seems like an improvement for Black in comparison to line a – because he has already developed his bishop to b4; nevertheless the premature exchange on the d4-square enables White to exploit the open c-file and to seize the initiative on the queenside.

The rest of the moves for Black lead to an overwhelming advantage for White quite easily:

8...a5?! 9.0–0 0–0 10.g5 e7 11.e5 d5, Breuer – Rudolph, Gruenheide 1996, and now after: 12. e4 g6 13.xe7 xe7 14. c4 White wins the central pawn;

8...c8?! – Black loses too much time by trying to exchange the light squared bishops: 9.d2 a6 10.xa6 xa6 11.b5 xd2 12.xd2 d8, Bebersdorf – Elzinger, Bayern 1996, 13.a4± and Black’s king remains stranded in the centre for too long, while White maintains excellent attacking chances;

8...c7?! 9.d2 xc3 10.xc3 d6 11.c1 e7 12.0–0± Kalwasinski – Schmidt, Copenhagen 1997. White preserves a powerful positional pressure with his mobile pawn-centre and two powerful bishops;

8...d6 9.0–0 0–0? (This move enables White to sacrifice material in a typical fashion, but even after the best for Black: 9...xc3 10.bxc3 bd7 11.a3 c7 12.e5+, his king remains in the centre and the a3-f8 diagonal is too weak – the absence of the dark squared bishop is quite telling, Yagupov – Merzliakov, St. Petersburg 2004.) 10.e5! dxe5 11.dxe5 xc3 12.bxc3 d5 13.xh7+ White’s attack is quickly checkmating, Magide – Saiz, Terrassa 1996;

8...h6 9.0–0 (Once again it is not good for Black to follow with 9...xc3, because after 10.bxc3 0–0 11.e5 h7 12.a3 e7 13.d6± White’s powerful dark squared bishop exerts a tremendous pressure against Black’s position, Fomina – Mariano, Manila 1992.) 9...0–0 10.e5 e8 11.a3 e7 12.d5 exd5 13.d4± Franco – Valle, Seville 2004. White has excellent attacking chances;

8...0–0 9.0–0 c6? (about 9.d6 – see 8...d6) 10.e5 e8 11.xh7+ h8 (in case Black
captures the bishop, he cannot save the game even if he sacrifices his queen: 11...\textit{hxh7} 12. \textit{g5+} \textit{g6} 13.\textit{d3+} f5 14.\textit{e2!} \textit{xg5} 15.\textit{xg5} \textit{h6} 16.\textit{g3+} \textit{h4+} 17.\textit{g6} 18.\textit{f4+). 12.\textit{c2 e7} 13.\textit{g5} 1–0 Otto – Rudolph, Leipzig 1997. \hline
\textbf{9.e5 \textit{e4} 10.0–0!}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram 1}
\end{center}

White sacrifices a pawn and he remains with a huge lead in development and a long-lasting initiative.

\textbf{10...\textit{xc3}}

10...\textit{xc3}?! – this capture is even worse for Black: 11.bxc3 \textit{xc3} 12.\textit{e3} \textit{c6} 13.\textit{a3} b5, Diaz – Bolivar, Barranquilla 1999. White now recaptures his pawn and he maintains his advantage, because of the misplaced black bishop on the b7-square: 14.\textit{xc1} b4 (White's attack is quite dangerous after: 14...\textit{wa5} 15.\textit{d6 e4} 16.\textit{xe4 dxe4} 17.\textit{g5!}) 15.\textit{xb4} \textit{xb4} 16.\textit{xc3±.}

\textbf{11.bxc3 \textit{e7}}

It is quite questionable for Black to play here: 11...\textit{xc3}, Karlik – Snorek, Czech Republic 2000. After 12.\textit{b5+!} \textit{c6} (12...\textit{d7} 13.\textit{g5} \textit{b8} 14.\textit{ac1+}) 13. \textit{xc6+} \textit{xc6} 14.\textit{c2} \textit{xd4} 15. \textit{xd4} \textit{xa1} 16.\textit{c6+} \textit{f8} 17. \textit{a3+} \textit{g8} 18.\textit{xa1 e8} 19.\textit{b5} \textit{c7} 20.\textit{d1±} White's two active light pieces are clearly stronger than Black's rook on h8.

\textbf{12.\textit{e3} \textit{c6}}

It is too risky for Black to follow with 12...0–0, because after 13.\textit{d2} \textit{c7} 14.\textit{ac1} \textit{c6} (14...\textit{f5} 15.exf6 \textit{xf6} 16.\textit{g4↑} 15.\textit{wh5} g6 (15...\textit{h6?} 16.\textit{wh6f+} 16.\textit{h3↑} White preserves superior attacking chances.

\textbf{13.\textit{d2} \textit{c8}}

White maintains a powerful pressure even after: 13...h5 14. \textit{b3} \textit{c8} 15.a4±.

\textbf{14.\textit{b3} \textit{a3}}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram 2}
\end{center}

15.\textit{g4} g6 16.\textit{g5±} Kuporosov – Turikov, St Petersburg 2001. White's centre is very solid and he can easily seize the initiative on both sides of the board.

\textbf{b2) 7...\textit{c6} 8.a3}

(diagram)

8...\textit{e7}

The move 8...\textit{a5}?! – is a typical loss of time. After 9.\textit{bd2}

\textbf{10.0–0 0–0 11.b4 \textit{c6} 12.}

\footnotesize
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\( \text{b2}^\pm \) Black is deprived of any counterplay, Houpt – Maciuliewicz, Email 1998.

The possibility 8...g6?! – weakens the dark squares. There was only one game played in that line and Black fianchettoed his knight in it, but his position remained clearly worse after that: 9.\( \text{Cc3} \) d5 10.e5 \( \text{C}h5 \) 11.g4 \( \text{C}g7 \) 12.\( \text{C}h6^\pm \) Leimeister – Stock, Zeilsheim 2000.

After 8...\( \text{Cc7} \) 9.\( \text{Cc3} \) \( \text{Ca5} \) 10.\( \text{C}g5 \) \( \text{Cb3} \) 11.\( \text{C}d1 \) \( \text{Cc8} \) 12.0–0\( \pm \) it is quite unclear how Black can develop his kingside, because his knight on b3 remains out of play, Kaufman – Tesh, Fredericksburg 1998.

It is not good for Black to play: 8...\( \text{Cc8} \), Romanova – Abramchuk, Kiev 1997, because after 9.\( \text{Cc3} \) \( \text{Ca5} \) (9...\( \text{C}e7 \) 10.e5 \( \text{Cd}5 \) 10.\( \text{C}xd5 \) \( \text{exd}5 \) 11.b4\( \pm \)) 10.\( \text{C}f4^\pm \) – White has a huge space advantage, a superior development and a mobile pawn-centre.

8...d5 9.e5 \( \text{Ce4} \) (after 9...\( \text{Cd}7 \), White’s plan to neutralize Black’s activity on the queenside is quite clear and his initiative on the kingside might become really dangerous for Black: 10.0–0 \( \text{Ce7} \) 11.b4 a6 12.\( \text{Cb}d2 \) 0–0 13.\( \text{Cb}3 \) b5 14.\( \text{Cd}2 \) \( \text{Cb}b6 \) 15.\( \text{Cc}5 \) \( \text{Bb}8 \) 16.\( \text{C}c2 \) \( \text{C}c4 \) 17.\( \text{Cd}3 \) g6 18.\( \text{C}h6^\pm \) Vooremaa – Ivanovic, Tallinn 1979) 10.\( \text{C}bd2 \) \( \text{C}xd2 \) (The strange move 10...\( \text{C}g5 \) is in fact only a loss of time after: 11.b4 \( \text{Ce7} \) 12.h4 \( \text{Cx}f3^+ \) 13.\( \text{C}xf3 \) \( \text{C}d7 \) 14.\( \text{C}f4^\pm \) White’s advantage is just overwhelming, because of his powerful kingside initiative and Black’s non-existent counterplay. It is quite instructive to see how White materializes all that: 14...f5 15.\( \text{Cc}e3 \) h6 16.h5! \( \text{C}c8 \) 17.\( \text{C}g1! \) \( \text{C}d8 \) 18.g4 \( \text{fxg}4 \) 19.\( \text{C}xg4^+ \) Ostojic – Markovic, Jahorina 2000.) 11.\( \text{C}xd2 \) \( \text{Ce}7 \) 12.b4 a6 13.0–0 0–0 14.\( \text{C}fc1 \) b5 15.\( \text{Cc}3 \) h6 16.\( \text{Cc}2^\pm \) Damjanovic – Cafferty, Birmingham 1977. Black’s pieces are quite dis-coordinated, he has no active possibilities and his kingside has been weakened considerably. White easily manages to organize a decisive attack in a flash.

9.\( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{Ca5} \)

After 9...d6 10.0–0 a6, Rida-meya Tatche – Koksch, Dresden 2004, it looks quite attractive for White to prepare a break in the centre with the help of the move: 11.\( \text{Cd}1 \), for example: 11...0–0 12.e5 \( \text{Cd}7 \) 13.\( \text{Ce}4 \) g6 14.\( \text{C}h6^\pm \).

In answer to 9...0–0, Mescher – Seberry, Toowoomba 1986, it is very strong for White to follow with 10.e5, for example: 10...\( \text{Ce}8 \) (it is too bad for Black to play: 10...\( \text{Cd}5 \) 11.\( \text{C}xd5 \) \( \text{exd}5 \) 12.h4! h6 13.\( \text{C}h3 \rightarrow \) and White’s attack...
is just crushing, while 12... $\text{xc8}$ loses after: 13. $\text{xe7+ dxe7}$ 14. $\text{g5+}$ - 11.d5 exd5 12. $\text{xd5}$ Black's pieces are misplaced, while the position is open and White has an important two bishop advantage.

White's game is very easy after: 9...d5 10.e5 $\text{d7}$ 11.0-0 a6 12. $\text{e3}$ b5, Melzer - Straub, Mannheim 1994. It is now quite logical for White to follow with 13. $\text{f4}$, bringing his queen to the g-file and Black is bound to face serious problems.

10. $\text{g5}$

White provokes weakening of Black's kingside and that might become a telling factor in the future battle.

10...h6 11. $\text{f4}$ d6 12. $\text{b4}$ $\text{c6}$

13.d5 exd5 14.exd5 $\text{b8}$, Timman - Huebner, Jerusalem 1967, 15. $\text{b5+}$! (This move deprives Black of his castling rights, because now it is too bad for him to play: 15... $\text{bd7}$ 16. $\text{c6++}$ and there is no satisfactory defence against 17. $\text{b5}$.) 15... $\text{f8}$ 16. $\text{c4}$+. White remains with a great space advantage; moreover Black cannot coordinate easily his pieces, because of the unfavourable placement of his king.

c) 6... $\text{e7}$ 7.0-0

We will analyze now: c1) 7... $\text{cxd4}$, c2) 7...d6, c3) 7... $\text{c6}$, c4) 7...0-0 and c5) 7...d5.

About 7... $\text{c7}$? 8.e5! - see 5... $\text{c7}$ 6.0-0 $\text{e7}$ 7.$\text{e2}$ $\text{f6}$ 8.e5!

Black has tested in several games the strange move 7...h6?! White can exploit that obvious loss of time with the help of the energetic move: 8.e5!? $\text{d5}$ 9.c4 $\text{c7}$ (9...$\text{b4}$ 10.$\text{e4}$ $\text{c7}$ 11.a3+) 10.dxc5 $\text{xc5}$ (10...$\text{xc5}$ 11.$\text{d1}$ $\text{c6}$ 12.$\text{c3}$+ 11.$\text{c3}$ 0-0 (11...d5 12.exd6 $\text{xd6}$ 13.$\text{d1}$+ 12.$\text{e4}$ $\text{e7}$ 13.$\text{f4}$+ and Black's defence is quite difficult because of his misplaced knight on c7, his lack of space and no possibilities for any active counterplay.

The move 7... $\text{c8}$ - is connected with the idea to trade the light squared bishops. 8.$\text{e1}$ d5 (It seems more purposeful for Black to try: 8...$\text{d4}$ 9.$\text{d4}$ d5 10.e5 $\text{e4}$ 11.$\text{bd2}$ $\text{xd2}$ 12. $\text{x}d2$ $\text{a6}$, but after 13.$\text{ac1}$
Chapter 3

\[ b7 14.c3! \text{xd}3 15.\text{xd}3\pm \] White dominates on the only open file and he enjoys a space advantage too.) 9.e5 \text{e}4 10.\text{bd}2 \text{xd}2 11.\text{cx}d2 \text{a}6 12.c4! dxc4 13.\text{xc}4 \text{xc}4 14.\text{xc}4 \text{a}6, Gamer – Dobosz, Karlsruhe 2003, and now White maintains a powerful pressure after 15.\text{c}2!, for example 15...\text{d}7 (it is worse for Black to play 15...\text{c}6 16.\text{e}4 \text{c}8 17.\text{g}4\pm) 16.\text{e}4! 0–0 (16...\text{d}8 17.\text{g}4\pm) 17.\text{g}5 \text{ae}8 18.d5! exd5 19.\text{xd}5\pm, and in connection with the great activity of White’s pieces and the powerful threat 20.e6, his prospects are clearly superior.

**c1) 7...\text{cxd}4 8.\text{cxd}4**

\[ \]

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8...0–0

8.d5 9.e5 – see line c5.

Black has also tried:

8...d6 9.\text{c}3 a6, Baeuml – Wunder, Germany 1998. White should better prepare the pawn-break e5 and the simplest way to do that is by playing: 10.\text{d}1 0–0 (10...b5 11.e5 \text{d}5 12.a4\pm) 11.e5 \text{d}5 12.\text{e}4 g6 13.\text{h}6\pm;

8...\text{c}6 9.a3 d6 (9...d5 10.e5 – see variation c5. It is quite dubious for Black to play 9...\text{a}5?! 10.\text{bd}2 \text{c}8 11.b4 \text{c}6, Turna – Moroff, Schmidten – Weil der Stadt, Pokal 1988, because after 12.\text{b}2\pm it becomes clear that Black has lost two tempi. Following: 9...\text{c}8 10.\text{bd}2 0–0 11.\text{e}1 d6 12.b4 \text{c}7 13.\text{b}2\pm Black lacks space and he has no active play at all, Gruenberg – Strobel, Germany 1985.) 10.\text{c}3 \text{a}5, Sequera – Fraschini, Buenos Aires 1991. It is of course favourable for Black to trade pieces, because his position is cramped, so White should better preserve the dark squared bishops: 11.\text{g}5 \text{c}8 12.\text{ad}1 0–0 13.\text{e}5\pm and White maintains superior attacking chances.

9.\text{c}3 d6

In case of 9...d5 10.e5 \text{e}8, Pedersen – Gatland, Bergen 2004, it is advisable for White to follow with the standard resource: 11.a3 \text{c}7 (11...a5 12.\text{e}3\pm) 12.b4\pm, and Black has been deprived of any counterplay.

The passive line 9...a6, Zozulia – Matsko, Alushta 1998, enables White to start active actions in the centre and on the kingside with: 10.e5 \text{e}8 (10...\text{d}5 11.\text{e}4 g6 12.\text{h}6\pm) 11.d5! exd5 12.\text{c}2\pm.

In answer to 9...\text{c}6, Sovratnik – Galaxia, Internet 2004, it is again good for White to proceed with: 10.e5 \text{e}8 (10...\text{d}5 11.\text{xd}5 exd5 12.\text{e}1\pm) 11.d5 exd5 12.\text{xd}5\pm and he has the
two bishop advantage and he dominates in the centre.

10.\texttt{\textdollar}d1 \texttt{\textdollar}bd7, Wittmann – Gockner, Oberwart 2000. White has prepared the pawn-break in the centre quite well and after: 11.e5 \texttt{\textdollar}xf3 12.gxf3 \texttt{\textdollar}e8 13.f4± he could have obtained a great advantage. The activity of White’s pieces more than compensates his somewhat weakened kingside.

\textbf{c2) 7...\textdollar}d6 8.\texttt{\textdollar}d1!}

The idea of that move is to prepare e5 – and the white rook on the d1-square turns out to be quite handy in that case.

8...\texttt{\textdollar}c7

It is worse for Black to play 8...\texttt{\textdollar}bd7, Pantev – Peev, Tetnven 1991. The juxtaposition of the rook and the queen enables White to play aggressively: 9.e5! \texttt{\textdollar}xf3 10.\texttt{\textdollar}xf3 dxe5 11.dxe5 \texttt{\textdollar}xe5 12.\texttt{\textdollar}b5+ \texttt{\textdollar}ed7 (12...\texttt{\textdollar}fd7 13.\texttt{\textdollar}b7± 13.\texttt{\textdollar}b7 \texttt{\textdollar}c8 14.\texttt{\textdollar}f4± – and Black has great problems to avoid the deadly pin.

8...\texttt{\textdollar}c8, Rehm – Schemm, Nuremberg 1987, 9.e5! \texttt{\textdollar}d5 10.\texttt{\textdollar}exd6 \texttt{\textdollar}xd6 11.\texttt{\textdollar}b5!± and once again, just like in the variation 8...\texttt{\textdollar}bd7, White’s rook on d1 is placed extremely well and Black loses his castling rights.

After 8...\texttt{\textdollar}xd4 9.\texttt{\textdollar}xd4 0–0 10.\texttt{\textdollar}c3 \texttt{\textdollar}bd7, Guido – Aleksic, Porto San Giorgio 1995, it deserves attention for White to follow with: 11.e5!? \texttt{\textdollar}d5 (11...\texttt{\textdollar}xf3 12.gxf3 \texttt{\textdollar}e8 13.f4±) 12.\texttt{\textdollar}e4 g6 13.\texttt{\textdollar}h6↑ and White has a dangerous initiative.

9.e5! \texttt{\textdollar}fd7

In case of 9...\texttt{\textdollar}d5 10.a3± Black is forced to play with his queen once again in order to manage to save his knight, which gets ousted to a passive position as a result.

It is also quite illogical for Black to open a file on which his opponent’s rook has already been placed: 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 \texttt{\textdollar}fd7 (10...\texttt{\textdollar}d5 11.a3 \texttt{\textdollar}c8 12.e4 \texttt{\textdollar}c7 13.\texttt{\textdollar}c3±) 11.\texttt{\textdollar}a3 a6 12.\texttt{\textdollar}c4±. Black’s position is cramped, his king remains in the centre and his attempt at castling leads to a terrible position after: 12...0–0 13.\texttt{\textdollar}g5! For example, Black loses after: 13...\texttt{\textdollar}xg5 (or 13...\texttt{\textdollar}xf3 14.\texttt{\textdollar}xf3 \texttt{\textdollar}xg5 15.\texttt{\textdollar}xh8 \texttt{\textdollar}c6? 16.
\( \text{\#xh7+--) 14. \#xh7+! \#xh7 15.} \\
\( \#xg5 \#h6 (15...\#g6 16.\#g4+) \\
\( 16.\#e3! \#g6 17.\#g3 \#h6 (17... \\
\( \#h5 18.\#h3+) 18. \#h4+ \#g6 \\
\( 19.\#h7+! \#g5 20. f4+--. \\
\text{10.\#a3 a6} \\
\text{About 10...dxe5 11.dxe5 – see} \\
\text{9...dxe5.} \\
\text{11.\#f4 dxe5} \\
\text{11...d5 12.c4+}. \\
\]

12.\#xe5+. White has a superior development and an abundance of space.

c3) 7...\#c6 8.dxc5!?

8...\#xc5

It is worse for Black to try: 8...\#xc5 9.e5 \#d5 10.b4!, because White has a powerful queenside initiative due to his great space advantage. 10...\#e7 11.a3 f5 12.c4 \#c7 13.\#b2 0–0 14.\#bd2! White redeployes his knight to the b3-square and it will support the pawn-offensive from there. 14...\#e8 15.\#fd1 g5 16.\#b3 \#h8 17.b5 g4 18.\#e1 \#d8. Black’s pieces do not help in any way the advance of the pawns and White’s position is therefore quite safe. 19.\#c2 \#g5 20.a4± Gligoric – Filipovic, Podgorica 1996.

9.e5 \#d5 10.c4 \#b6

It is hardly any better for Black to play: 10...\#db4 11.\#e4 f5 12.exf6 \#xf6 13.a3 \#a6 14. \#f4. Black’s pawns in the centre are a liability and his knight on a6 has no good prospects in the nearest future. 14...0–0 15.\#d6 \#e7 16.\#xe7 \#xe7 17. \#c3 \#c7 18.\#ad1+. White exerts a powerful pressure along the central files. 18...\#ad8 19.\#e3 \#e8? (19...\#a5 20.\#xb7 \#xb7 21.\#fe1±) 20.\#d5– Slipak – Rodriguez, Vicente Lopez 2001. White has won a pawn and subsequently he pressed easily his advantage home.

11.\#c3 \#c7

The risky move 11...f5?! only weakens the kingside. The game Thorhallsson – Poettinger, Liechtenstein 1996, ended in a quick disaster for Black: 12.exf6 gxf6 13.\#h4 0–0 14.\#g4+ \#h8 15. \#g6+ hxg6 16.\#xg6 1–0, since the checkmate is unavoidable.

11...d6 compromises Black’s centre as well as his queenside, 12.exd6 \#xd6 13.\#d1 \#e7 (13... \\
\( \#d4 14.\#xd4 cxd4 15.\#b5±)
14.\( \square e4\)± Fingerov – Shevchenko, Odessa 2001.

The pseudo-active move 11...g5?! leads only to the creation of additional weaknesses after: 12.\( \triangle b5\) g4 13.\( \triangle g5\) a6 14.\( \triangle d6+\) \( \triangle x d6\) 15.\( \text{ex} d6\) \( \text{w} f 6\) 16.\( \triangle e 4\)± Thinius – Scherer, Hoeckendorf 2004.

12.\( \triangle b 5\) \( \text{w} b 8\) 13.\( \triangle g 5\)↑

Black's d6-pawn is very weak and White's lead in development provides him with a long-lasting advantage.

13.\( \triangle c 8\)

Black can hardly solve the problem with his development with the move 13...f6. After 14.\( \text{ex} f 6\) \( \text{gx} f 6\) 15.\( \triangle h 4\) a6 16.\( \triangle g 3\) e5 17.\( \triangle c 3\) \( \triangle d 4\) 18.\( \triangle x d 4\) \( x d 4\) 19.\( \text{wh} 5+\) \( \text{hd} 8\) 20.\( \text{be} 4\)± his central pawns are vulnerable, his king is quite unsafe and his pieces are rather discoordinated.

14.\( \triangle x e 7\) \( \text{b} 6 x e 7\) 15.\( \triangle a d 1\) a6 16.\( \triangle c 3\) \( \triangle g 6\)

17.\( \triangle e 4\)± Filipenko – Filipovic, Ljubljana 2000. Black's pawns on a6, d7 and c5 are very weak and he has a mountain to climb before he completes his development.

c4) 7...0–0 8.e5

8...\( \triangle e 8\)

Strangely enough, the centralization of the knight practically loses outright: 8...\( \text{d} 5\) 9.\( \text{we} 4\) g6 10.\( \text{h} h 6!\) (White's advantage is not so overwhelming after the seemingly attractive line: 10.\( \text{c} 4\) \( \text{b} 4\) 11.\( \text{w} x b 7\) \( \text{w} c 6\) 12.\( \text{a} e 4\) \( \text{b} 8\) 13.\( \triangle x c 6\) \( \text{b} 7\) 14.\( \triangle x b 7\) \( \triangle c 2\)± Goerke – Peschel, Solingen 2000) 10...\( \text{e} 8\) 11.\( \triangle b d 2\)±. Black has problems to defend against the oncoming attack and in the game Palkovi – Bosiocic, Kostrena 2001, he was just crushed: 11...\( \text{c} 8\) 12.\( \text{w} g 4\) \( \text{c} 6\) 13. a3 \( x d 4\) 14.\( x d 4\) \( \text{c} 7\) 15.\( h 4\) d6 16. h5 \( \text{h} 8\) 17.\( \text{f} 4?\)–.

9.\( \text{d} x c 5\) \( b x c 5\)

The move 9...\( \triangle x c 5\) enables White to sacrifice a piece with in a typical fashion: 10.\( \text{h} h 7\)→\( \text{h} h 7\) 11.\( \text{g} 5+\) \( \text{g} 6\) 12.\( \text{d} 3+\) f5 13.\( \text{g} 3\) \( \text{c} 8\) 14.\( \text{xe} 6+\) \( \text{f} 7\) 15.\( \text{g} 5+\) \( \text{g} 6\) 16.\( \text{h} 4\) \( \text{f} 6\) 17.\( \text{ex} f 6\)±. After that forced line, White has remained with an extra pawn and excellent attacking chances against Black's “centralized” king.

10.\( \triangle b d 2\) d5
Chapter 3

It is worse for Black to play 10...f5, Wright – Caels, Dubai 1986, because after 11.\(d\)c4 \(\text{d}c6\) 12.\(\text{f}e3\)\(+=\) his pawns on c5, d7 are weak, the d6-square is vulnerable and he has no active play at all. In case he pushes f4 – that would open the b1-h7 diagonal for White.
11.\(\text{exd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\)

Black has tried in practice two retreats of the knight in that position: c5a) 8...\(\text{d}e4\) and c5b) 8...\(\text{f}d7\).

**c5a)** 8...\(\text{d}e4\) 9.\(\text{c}bd2\) \(\text{xd2}\)
10.\(\text{xd2}\) a5
Black prevents radically the move b2-b4, which constrains his actions on the queenside, but that does not solve all his problems.

In case of 10...\(\text{c}c6\), White should better play 11.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{c}c7\) 12.\(\text{ac}1\) c4 13.\(\text{c}c2\) a5 14.\(\text{g}g5\) g6 15.\(\text{f}3\)\(+=\) and he has a powerful pressure on the kingside, Knors – De Bruycker, Antwerp 1998.

10...\(\text{c}c8\) 11.\(\text{g}5\)! \(\text{a}6\) (it is even worse for Black to play: 11...\(\text{f}8\), Giesen – Gazic, Germany 2003, because after 12.c4 \(\text{dxc4}\) 13.\(\text{xc4}\)\(+=\) he lags in development considerably) 12.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{xd3}\) 13.\(\text{xd3}\) \(\text{xe7}\) 14.c4 dxc4 15.\(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{a6}\) 16.\(\text{c}1\)\(+=\) and Black must worry about the safety of his king, despite the fact that there is not much material left on the board, B.Schmidt –

10...cxd4 11.cxd4 0-0 (it is hardly better for Black to opt for: 11...Qc6 12.Qfc1 Qc8 13.a3 0-0 14.b4 Qd7, Raubal – Froschh, Austria 1995, because his pieces remain passive and White has a powerful initiative after: 15. Qc2?! f5 16.exf6 Qxf6 17.Qd3 g6 18.b5±) 12.b4 a5 13.b5± and White has managed to squeeze Black’s position completely, Pastor Pons – Miron, Spain 1993.

White’s pawn move b4 is quite unpleasant for Black after his other possibilities too:

10...0-0 11.b4 Qc6 (It is worse for Black to play: 11...cxb4 12. cxb4 Qc6 13.a3 Qd7 14.Qac1 f5 15.exf6 Qxf6, Faybish – De Bruycker, Antwerp 1999. After 16.Qc3±, Black is forced into a long and strenuous defence, due to his “bad” bishop and the weakness on e6.) 12.bxc5 bxc5 13.dxc5 h6 (White’s attack is too dangerous after: 13...Qxc5 14.Qxh7+ Qxh7 15.Qg5→, while in case of 13...Qc7 14.Qe3 Qa5 15.Qd4 Qxc5 16.Qg3↑ his kingside initiative is all too powerful.) 14. Qab1 Qb8 15.Qd4 Qa5 (it is slightly better for Black to play 15...Qc7 16.Qc2±) 16.Qg4 Qh8, Tischendorf – Damm, Hessen 1997. White wins by force now: 17.Qxh6! gxh6 18.Qh5 Qg5 (18... Qg7 19.Qxe6+-) 19.f4++;

10...h6, Parveen – De Jesus Elista 1998, 11.b4! Qc6 (After 11...c4 12.Qc2± White’s hands are free for actions on the king-

side. It is too dubious for Black to continue with: 11...a5 12.bxc5 bxc5 13.Qab1 Qa6, Schelle – Schramm, Freising 2001. Now after 14.dxc5 Qxd3 – 14...Qxc5 15.Qxb8± – 15.Qxd3 Qxc5 16. c4± Black’s weaknesses on the queenside and in the centre are quite telling and his defence is even more difficult, because of his lag in development.) 12.bxc5 bxc5 13.Qab1 Qb8 14.dxc5 Qxc5 15.Qd4† White’s initiative is very powerful, because Black’s king is stranded in the centre. 15...Qxd4 (It is possibly better for Black to play: 15...Qc7 16. Qg4±, but even then his defence on the queenside is quite problematic.) 16.cxd4 Qxd4 17.Qg4 Qxe5 18.Qfe1 Qc7 (18...Qd6 19. Qa4++) 19.Qxe5 Qxe5 20.Qf4 Qd4 21.Qb5++. White remains at least with an extra piece.

11.Qfe1 Qa6 12.Qb5+!

That move forces Black’s knight to a passive position.

12...Qxb5 13.Qxb5+ Qd7

14.c4!

This move opens files in the centre and that is White’s most energetic method to exploit his
lead in development.

14...dxec4 15.\textit{Wxc4 0−0 16.d5!}
Black's pawn-structure on the
queenside is compromised after
this move and White maintains
his advantage in practically ev-
ery possible endgame.

16...exd5 17.\textit{Wxd5 Ae8 18.}
e6!
White preserves excellent at-
tacking chances, by opening his
opponent's castling position.

18...fxe6 19.\textit{Axe6 Af6 20.}
Af5 Ae7 21.Aae1 Ad7 22.Ac2
Ed6

This position was reached in
the game Bryson – Miles, Mos-
cow 1994, and the opponents
agreed to a draw, while in fact after: 23.Ac4\textsuperscript{±} Black's defence is extremely difficult.

\textbf{c5b) 8...Af7}

\textbf{9.a3}
In comparison to line \textbf{a} (6...d5
7.e5 Af7d7 8.Ag5\textsuperscript{!}), White does
not have now the maneuver Ag5;
nevertheless he has excellent
chances to seize the initiative.

\textbf{9...a5}
White was threatening to
deprive his opponent of any
counterplay on the queenside, so
Black prevented that.

9...c4 – this is hardly the best
move for Black, because White's
development is clearly superior
and he has an abundance of
space to maneuver. All that
indicates – White's initiative on the
kingside should be much more
effective than Black's counter-
play on the queenside, 10.Ac2 b5
11.Ae1 h5 12.f4 g6, Gretarsson
– Vidarsson, Iceland 2002, and
now after the simple line: 13.Ac2
Ac6 14.Af3! a5 15.Ag5\textsuperscript{±} White
remains with a stable advantage.

In case of 9...Ac6 10.b4 Black
has tried in practice several dif-
f erent lines, but they lead more
or less to similar positions. White
preserves excellent chances to
exert a powerful pressure on the
kingside:

10...a5 11.b5 Ac7 12.a4 c4
13.Ac2 Ac7 14.Ag5\textsuperscript{±} Wright – Partsi, Melbourne 2002;

10...Af8 11.Ac3 Ag6, Grujic
A\textbackslash bd2 c4 13.Ac2 0–0 14.b5 Ac5
15.g3\textsuperscript{±};

10...cxd4 11.cxd4 0–0 12.Ac3,
Canfell – Broekhuijse, Canberra
2005, 12...Ac8 13.Ad2\textsuperscript{±};
10...0–0 11.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}c7 12.\textit{\&}bd2 \textit{\&}ae8, Schulz Knappe – Hauck, Mehlingen 1992, 13.\textit{\&}e3±;
10...h6, Lehtivaara – Pyyhaeal, Raah, 1987, 11.b5 \textit{\&}a5 12.\textit{\&}bd2 c4 13.\textit{\&}c2 a6 14.a4±;
10...g5, Borgo – Miezis, Saint Vincent 2003, 11.b5 \textit{\&}a5 12.\textit{\&}bd2 c4 13.\textit{\&}c2 a6 14.a4 g4 15.\textit{\&}e1 h5 16.f3±;
10...a6, Lanau – Antonano Fernandez, Zaragoza 2002, 11.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}c7 12.h4±;
10...c4 11.\textit{\&}c2 h6 (11...\textit{\&}f8 12.\textit{\&}e1 a5 13.b5 \textit{\&}b8 14.a4± Madl – Kinics, Hungary; 11...\textit{\&}c7 12.\textit{\&}g5 a6 13.\textit{\&}bd2 h6 14.\textit{\&}xe7 \textit{\&}xe7 15.h4 0–0 0–0 16.h5± Rocher – Scherer, Neumuehl 2003) 12.a4 \textit{\&}c7 13.h4 0–0 0–0 14.h5 \textit{\&}dg8 15.\textit{\&}a3 \textit{\&}f8 16.\textit{\&}f4± Belov – Rozanov, St. Petersburg 2004.
10.c4!
It seems quite logical for White to open files in the centre, because he leads in development; moreover Black has weakened his queenside with his previous move.
10...0–0
It is possibly better for Black to play here: 10...dxc4!? 11.\textit{\&}xc4 \textit{\&}c6 12.dxc5 bxc5! 13.\textit{\&}d1 \textit{\&}c7, Konikowski – Gawehe, Internet 2000. It looks very strong now for White to continue with 14.\textit{\&}b5!, depriving Black of any tactical chances connected with the move g5, for example 14...0–0 15.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}fd8 16.\textit{\&}c3± – and White enjoys a space advantage and a better pawn-structure.
11.cxd5 \textit{\&}xd5 12.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}b7
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Conclusion

The Owen’s Defence leads to an interesting and complicated struggle in positions that are not so well analyzed and tested in practice. Still, Black practically surrenders the centre to his opponent and falls behind in development, so it becomes quite difficult for him to fight for equality. In the great majority of variations, it is quite enough for White, in order to obtain a huge advantage, to deploy his pieces according to the following scheme – $\text{d}3$, $\text{e}2$, 0–0 and $\text{d}1$.

Should Black try to transpose to a pawn-structure typical for the French Defence – his light squared bishop becomes really “bad”. The attempts to trade it usually lead to a loss of plenty of time and White gains total control over the centre as a result. In case Black tries to deploy his pawns in a hedgehog-formation – a6, b6, d6, e6 etc. – his position becomes too passive and he has no real chances for any counterplay. It is more interesting for Black to try to fight for the centre with the help of the pawn-move e5, but then his bishop on b7 becomes terribly misplaced.
Nimzowitsch Defence
1.e4 \(\triangleleft c6\) 2.\(\triangleleft f3\)

In this part of the book we are dealing with Black’s peculiar opening experiment – the move 1...\(\triangleleft c6\) (Nimzowitsch Defence). This seldom played move has not been analyzed extensively yet. Its main idea is to avoid the popular theory; nevertheless the game often transfers to some other well-known openings. In fact, Black often suffers from these transpositions, because of the premature placement of the knight to the c6-square. It usually comes under the pin – \(\triangleleft f1-b5\), or under an early pawn-attack d4-d5 and Black loses tempi in the process.

After 2.\(\triangleleft f3\), Black sometimes chooses 2...\(\triangleleft f6\), or 2...f5 (Chapter 4). In case Black plays 2...d5, (Chapter 5), then after 3.exd5, it turns out that he has entered a not so favourable variation of the Scandinavian Defence. Similarly after 2...g6 3.d4 (Chapter 6), there arises a line of the King’s Indian Defence, which is not advantageous for Black either. White can play d4-d5 at an opportune moment and he gains one or two tempi by attacking the knight, so he seizes a long-lasting initiative.

We have devoted our Chapter 7 to Black’s most principled variation 2...d6.
We are going to analyse in this chapter: a) 2...\textit{f6} and b) 2...\textit{f5}.

About 2...e5 – see the volume dealing with 1...e5.

2...e6 3.d4 – see 1.e4 e6 2.d4 \textit{c6} 3.\textit{f3}.

\textbf{a) 2...\textit{f6} 3.e5 \textit{g4}}

3...\textit{d5} transposes, after 4.d4 d6, to the Alekhine Defence.

It is too bad for Black to play: 3...\textit{e4}, because of 4.d3 \textit{c5} 5.d4 \textit{e4} 6.d5, and White obtained a huge space advantage, while Black’s knights were circling around the board.

3...\textit{h5} does not seem logical. After the natural line: 4.d4 d5 5.c4, Black can hardly defend his position in the centre without losing material. It is a disaster for him to play: 5...e6? 6.g4+–, as well as 5...\textit{e6} 6.\textit{g5}±, therefore he has nothing better than: 5...\textit{g4} 6.cd \textit{d5} 7.\textit{c3} \textit{a5} (or 7...\textit{f3} 8.\textit{d5} \textit{d1} 9.\textit{c7} \textit{d8} 10.\textit{a8} \textit{g4} 11.\textit{e3}, and White is threatening \textit{d5} and \textit{h3} and he has a winning position) 8.h3±, and Black’s position is very difficult. He has no coordination of forces at all.

It is also not attractive for Black to play: 3...\textit{g8}, because that knight-maneuuvre has wasted two tempi and White obtains a great advantage by playing simply: 4.d4 d6 (4...e6 5.\textit{d3} d5 6.\textit{c3} \textit{g6} 7.\textit{g5} \textit{e7} 8.\textit{e7} \textit{cxe7} 9.\textit{d7} a6 10.\textit{f4} \textit{h5} 11.\textit{d2} \textit{f5} 12.0–0 \textit{d7} 13.\textit{h3} \textit{e7} 14.\textit{d7} \textit{g7} 15.\textit{d5}± Kluger – Korody, Tatatorovas 1935) 5.\textit{c3} \textit{g6} (5...f6? 6.\textit{f4} \textit{h6} 7.\textit{h6} \textit{g6} 8.\textit{e5} \textit{d5} 9.\textit{g5}+–; 8...\textit{g7} 9.\textit{b8} 10.\textit{d4} 0–0 11.\textit{d5}+–) 6.\textit{xd6} \textit{cxd6} 7.\textit{d5} \textit{e5} 8.\textit{d4} \textit{g7} 9.\textit{b5}+ \textit{d7} 10.\textit{f4} \textit{g4} 11.\textit{xd7}+ \textit{xd7} 12.\textit{h3} \textit{h4} 13.\textit{g4}± Tomescu – Pizzuto, Spain 1999.

It is not any better for Black to play: 4...d5 5.c3 \textit{f5} (5...\textit{g4}
6.h3 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) 7.\( \mathcal{g}f3 \) and White has the bishop-pair. 6.\( \mathcal{h}h4 \) \( \mathcal{x}xb1 \) (6...\( \mathcal{e}e4 \) 7.e6 fxe6 8.\( \mathcal{d}d2 \), and White has an excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn; 6...\( \mathcal{e}e6 \) 7.\( \mathcal{d}d3 \) \( \mathcal{w}d7 \) 8.f4 \( \mathcal{g}g4 \) 9.\( \mathcal{c}c2 \) e6 10.h3 \( \mathcal{h}h5 \) 11.g4 \( \mathcal{g}g6 \) 12.f5\( \pm \) 7.\( \mathcal{x}xb1 \) e6 8.\( \mathcal{g}g4 \) \( \mathcal{d}d7 \) 9.\( \mathcal{d}d3 \) 0–0 10.b4 \( \mathcal{b}b8 \) 11.0–0 f6 12.f4\( \pm \), and White organized shortly a powerful kingside attack in the game Mueller – Fend, Hessen 1999.

4.d4 d6

After 4...e6 5.c3, the game resembles the French Defence except for Black's bad knight on g4. White has a stable advantage and a huge lead in development.

4...d5 5.h3 \( \mathcal{g}h6 \) 6.\( \mathcal{x}xh6 \) gxh6 7.c3 \( \mathcal{f}f5 \) 8.\( \mathcal{d}d3 \) \( \mathcal{x}xd3 \) 9.\( \mathcal{w}xd3 \) \( \mathcal{w}d7 \) 10.\( \mathcal{b}bd2 \) e6 11.\( \mathcal{f}f1 \) \( \mathcal{e}e7 \) 12.\( \mathcal{g}g3 \) 0–0 13.\( \mathcal{h}h5 \) \( \mathcal{d}g8 \) 14.g4 \( \mathcal{g}g6 \) 15.0–0–0 Arino Lison – Palomar, Zaragoza 2004. White can easily exploit Black's weaknesses on the kingside.

After 4...g6 5.h3 \( \mathcal{g}h6 \) 6. d5 \( \mathcal{b}b8 \) 7.\( \mathcal{f}f4 \), White's edge is obvious, moreover Black has only one developed piece and that is his knight on the h6-square...

5.h3 \( \mathcal{h}h6 \) 6.\( \mathcal{c}c3 \)

Now, no matter what Black plays – he is faced with great difficulties, for example:

6...dxe5 7.d5 \( \mathcal{b}b8 \) 8.\( \mathcal{x}xe5 \) \( \mathcal{f}f5 \) 9.\( \mathcal{xf}f3 \) g6 10.\( \mathcal{xf}f7 \) \( \mathcal{xf}f7 \) 11.g4 \( \mathcal{g}g7 \) 12.gxf5 \( \mathcal{xf}5 \) 13.\( \mathcal{d}d3 \) \( \mathcal{d}d7 \) 14.\( \mathcal{e}e4 \) \( \mathcal{e}e8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{g}g5 \) \( \mathcal{a}a6 \) 16.0–0 \( \mathcal{b}b4 \) 17.\( \mathcal{c}c1 \) \( \mathcal{c}c3+ \) 18.\( \mathcal{xc}d3 \) \( \mathcal{f}f8 \) 19.\( \mathcal{c}c5 \) \( \mathcal{xc}3 \) 20.\( \mathcal{xc}d3 \) \( \mathcal{d}d6 \) 21.\( \mathcal{xe}7 \) – Romero Holmes – Narciso Dublan, Terrassa 1994;

6...a6 7.exd6 \( \mathcal{xd}6 \) 8.d5 \( \mathcal{e}e5 \) 9.g3 \( \mathcal{f}f5 \) 10.\( \mathcal{g}g2 \) \( \mathcal{xf}3+ \) 11.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) e5 12.0–0 \( \mathcal{e}e7 \) 13.\( \mathcal{e}e4 \) \( \mathcal{d}d8 \) 14.b3 0–0 15.\( \mathcal{b}b2 \) f6 16.\( \mathcal{a}a1 \) \( \mathcal{h}h8 \) 17.\( \mathcal{e}e2 \) \( \mathcal{e}e8 \) 18.\( \mathcal{c}c4 \) \( \mathcal{d}d6 \) 19.\( \mathcal{c}c5 \) \( \mathcal{f}f7 \) 20.\( \mathcal{h}h2 \) \( \mathcal{b}b8 \) 21.f4 Kolev – Bosch, Spain 1995;

6...e6 7.\( \mathcal{b}b5 \) \( \mathcal{f}f5 \) 8.\( \mathcal{d}d2 \) a6 9.\( \mathcal{c}c6+ \) \( \mathcal{b}x\) 10.\( \mathcal{g}g5 \) \( \mathcal{e}e7 \) 11.\( \mathcal{xe}7 \) \( \mathcal{xe}7 \) 12.0–0 0–0 13.\( \mathcal{e}e4 \) \( \mathcal{b}b4 \) 14.\( \mathcal{f}f1 \) \( \mathcal{h}h4 \) 15.b3 \( \mathcal{d}d8 \) 16.\( \mathcal{e}e4 \) \( \mathcal{xf}3+ \) 17.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) dxe5 18.dxe5 \( \mathcal{d}d2 \) 19.\( \mathcal{c}c3 \) \( \mathcal{g}g5 \) 20.\( \mathcal{c}c5 \) \( \mathcal{f}f4 \) 21.\( \mathcal{d}d3 \) \( \mathcal{g}g5 \) 22.h4 Romero Holmes – Ramírez, Spain 1993.

b) 2...\( \mathcal{f}f5?! \)

Black is trying to occupy the centre just like in the Latvian Gambit. White can easily obtain the advantage. His main idea is
to exploit the dark-squares and particularly the e5-outpost.

3. exf5 d5

In case of 3...d6, White’s simplest line to get the advantage is with the natural move 4.d4, and the game might continue with for example: 4...@xf5 5.d5 @b4 (it is not any better for Black to play: 5...@e5, Veingold – Kiltti, Helsinki 1997, 6.@xe5 dxe5 7.@h5@±) 6.@d4 @d7, Aldrete – Dunne, corr. 1989, 7.@c4 @f6 8.@c3 c5 9.dxc6 bxc6 10.a3 @d5 11.@xd5 @xd5 12.0–0, and White has a huge lead in development and good attacking chances.

It seems better for Black to play: 3...@f6, but White still obtains a huge advantage after: 4.d4 d5 5.@d3 @e4, J. Martinez – Costantini, Email 2001 (otherwise White simply remains with an extra pawn) 6.@e5! @xf5 7.@xc6 bxc6 8.@d2, and Black’s central pawns are immobile and therefore his defence is very difficult.

4. @b5! @xf5

Black has tried in several games, and quite successfully at that, the move 4...a6, but after the simple: 5.@xc6 bxc6, Wallace – V.Smirnov, Doberl 2000, 6. @d4, White preserves a solid extra pawn. After, for example: 6...@d6 7.@h5 @d8 8.d3, Black’s king remains in the centre and White’s lead in development enables him to start soon a successful kingside attack.

It is just terrible for Black to play: 4...d4, because after the natural move: 5.@e5, he cannot defend against the threats @h5 and @f3, for example: 5...@d5 6. @h5+ g6 7.fxg6 @f6 8.g7+ @xh5 9.gxh8@+– Snarheim – Carlstrom, Hallsberg 1998.

The other possibility for Black leads to a transposition: 4...@d6 5.d4 @xf5 6.@e5 (see the main line).

5.@e5

5...@d6

5...a6 (This is a definite loss of time, because White was planning to exchange on c6 anyway.) 6.@xc6+ bxc6 7.0–0 e6 (7...@d6 8.d4 @f6 9.c4 @d7 10.@f4 @xe5 11.@xe5 @g6 12.@d2 @c2 13.@f3 @d3 14.@h5+ @d8 15.@f3@±) 8.d3 @d6 9.@h5+ g6 10.@e2 @h4 11.@d2 @f6 12.@f3 @h5 13.@e1 0–0 (13...@g4 14.h3 @xe5 15. @xe5 @xe2 16.@xe2 @xe5 17. @xe5 h5 18.@e3 – Black is faced with a difficult fight to save the draw, despite the simplifications. He has plenty of weaknesses on both sides of the board and his bishop is much weaker than White’s bishop.) 14.h3 c5, Lau – Gross, Germany 1997, and here
after 15...\textit{\&}e3!??, threatening g4 (immediately, or preceded by \textit{\&}h6), Black has grave problems to save his light-squared bishop.

5...\textit{\&}d7 6.\textit{\&}xc6 bxc6 (It is not any better for Black to play: 6...\textit{\&}xc6 7.0–0 \textit{\&}f6 8.\textit{\&}e2 g6 9.\textit{\&}d4 \textit{\&}d6 10.\textit{\&}c3 a6 11.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}h5 12.\textit{\&}g5 h6 13.\textit{\&}h4 \textit{\&}h7 14.\textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}g7 15.\textit{\&}fe1 \textit{\&}f6 16.\textit{\&}xf6 \textit{\&}xf6 17.\textit{\&}xd5+– Pirrot – Gross, Germany 1991.) 7.0–0 \textit{\&}f6 8.d4 e6 9.c4 dxc4 10.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}d6 11.\textit{\&}g5 0–0 12.\textit{\&}e2±, and Black will hardly be able to defend his pawn weaknesses, Schmaltz – Gross, St. Ingbert 1994.

6.d4 \textit{\&}f6

After 6...e6, Hadjief–Rittler, Austria 1995, White wins with: 7.\textit{\&}h5+ g6 8.\textit{\&}e2, and it is impossible for Black to defend against the threat g4, without material losses.

6...\textit{\&}d7 7.\textit{\&}xc6 (It is also good for White to play: 7.\textit{\&}xd7 \textit{\&}xd7 8.0–0 0–0–0 9.\textit{\&}e1 a6 10.\textit{\&}a4 e6 11.c3 \textit{\&}d6 12.b4±, and White maintains the two-bishop advantage and good attacking chances.) 7...bxc6 (White has a stable edge after: 7...\textit{\&}xc6 8.\textit{\&}c3 0–0–0 9.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}e8 10.\textit{\&}f4±, because of the powerful e5-outpost and the attacking prospects on the queenside.) 8.0–0 \textit{\&}f6 (It is worse for Black to play: 8...\textit{\&}f6 9.c4 e6, Alexopoulos – Ryan, Washington 1994, 10.\textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}d6 11.c5++, and Black is practically stalemated.) 9.b3 \textit{\&}e6 10.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}f5 11.\textit{\&}a4 \textit{\&}e4 12.\textit{\&}xd7 \textit{\&}xd7 13.f3 \textit{\&}f6 14.\textit{\&}c5+ \textit{\&}e8 15.\textit{\&}e1, and White is easily winning, Yemelin – Kii, Jyvaskyla 1999.

6...a6 7.\textit{\&}xc6+ bxc6 8.0–0 \textit{\&}f6 (8...g6 9.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}h6 10.\textit{\&}xh6 \textit{\&}xh6 11.c4 0–0 12.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}f7 13.\textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}ab8 14.c5 \textit{\&}f6 15.\textit{\&}d2± 9...\textit{\&}g7, Holmsten – Kiltti, Tampere 1998, and here White’s simplest line was 10.\textit{\&}d2, threatening \textit{\&}f7±.) 9.c3 (It is more aggressive for White to follow with: 9.c4 \textit{\&}d7 10.\textit{\&}f4±.) 9...\textit{\&}d7 10.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}xe5 11.\textit{\&}xe5 \textit{\&}d7 12.\textit{\&}d2 e6 13.b4 \textit{\&}d6 14.\textit{\&}e1 0–0 15.\textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}f7 16.\textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}g6 17.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}d3 18.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}ae8 19.\textit{\&}h1 \textit{\&}c2 20.\textit{\&}a5 \textit{\&}a4 21.\textit{\&}b7 \textit{\&}xe5 22.\textit{\&}xe5 \textit{\&}h8 23.\textit{\&}c5± Mисиано – Schmid, Bien 2002.

7.0–0 \textit{\&}d7

About 7...a6 8.\textit{\&}xc6 bxc6 – see 6...a6 7.\textit{\&}xc6 bxc6 8.0–0 \textit{\&}f6.

8.\textit{\&}xc6 bxc6 9.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}xe5

9...\textit{\&}b4 – this move does not change much concerning the type of position as well as the character of the fight. 10.b3 \textit{\&}xe5 11.\textit{\&}xe5± Bericat – Anda, Email 2001.

After 9...c5 10.\textit{\&}c3 c6 11.\textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}xe5 12.\textit{\&}xe5 \textit{\&}g6 13.dxc5 \textit{\&}xc2 14.\textit{\&}d4 e6 15.\textit{\&}e3, White had a
decisive advantage in the game: Jonkman – Lutton, Port Erin 2004.

10.\textit{\underline{x}}xe5 \underline{\textit{d}}7

It is not better for Black to play: 10...\underline{g}g6 11.c3 \underline{\textit{c}}2 (11...\underline{b}b8 12.b3 \underline{b}b7 13.\underline{e}e1 e6 14.\underline{e}e3±) 12.\underline{f}f3 \underline{b}b8 (12...\underline{e}e4 13.\underline{g}g3 \underline{x}g3 14.\underline{x}g3 \underline{d}d8 15.\underline{d}d2 \underline{d}d3 16.\underline{f}e1± Wadsack – Hainzinger, Austria 1996) 13.b4 \underline{e}e4 14.\underline{g}g3 \underline{x}g3 15.\underline{x}g3 \underline{b}b7 16.\underline{d}d2 \underline{c}c2 17.\underline{b}b3± Burchfield – Manarin, corr. 2001.

(diagram)

White has plenty of moves to prove his advantage, but we will recommend to you the most principled line: 11.\textit{\underline{d}}d2 with the idea of occupation of the dark-squares. 11...e6 12.\textit{\underline{b}}b3 \underline{d}6

13.\underline{e}e1 0–0 14.\underline{d}d2 \underline{a}ab8 15.\underline{e}e3 \underline{f}f7 16.\underline{a}ae1 a5 (After 16...\underline{e}e4 17.f3 \underline{x}xe5 18.dxe5 \underline{f}f5 19.\underline{d}d4 \underline{x}c2 20.\underline{c}c5 \underline{b}b5 21.\underline{c}c1\underline{w}, White has an excellent compensation for the pawn – he has a powerful knight on c5 and active play on the dark squares.) 17.c3 \underline{b}b5 18.\underline{c}c5 \underline{x}c5 19.\underline{d}xc5 \underline{b}b5 20.\underline{g}g3 \underline{g}6 21.\underline{d}d4, and White is dominant on the dark squares, Pavasovic – Daus, Deizisau 2004.

\textit{Conclusion}

The variations, which we have analyzed in this chapter, are very seldom played in practice. This is because Black makes considerable positional compromises at a very early stage of the game. He falls behind in development and surrenders the centre in line a, so he often even fails to survive until move twenty. His complex of dark squares is weakened irrevocably in line b and White can exploit that with accurate play and occupy them quite effectively.
Chapter 5

1.e4 \( \square_c6 \) 2.\( \square_f3 \) d5

We have now a line from the Scandinavian Defence, but quite unfavourable for Black. His knight on c6 is misplaced and White easily obtains a great advantage:

3.exd5 \( \square_d5 \) 4.\( \square_c3 \) \( \square_a5 \)

It is too bad for Black to play: 4...\( \square_e6 \) 5.\( \check{\square}e2 \) \( \square_g6 \) 6.\( \square_b5 \) \( \square_d8 \) 7.d4, and White has much better development, while Black’s king is stranded in the centre.

The other possibilities are not promising for Black either, for example: 4...\( \square_d7 \) 5.d4 e6 6.\( \check{\square}b5 \) \( \check{\square}d6 \) 7.\( \check{\square}e4 \), or 4...\( \check{\square}c5 \) 5.d4, and White has a huge lead in development.

It is more stubborn for Black to play: 4...\( \check{\square}f5 \), with the idea to counter the natural move 5.d4 with 5...\( \check{\square}b4 \), but even then after: 6.\( \check{\square}b5+ \) c6 (It is worse for Black to play: 6...\( \check{\square}d7 \) 7.\( \check{\square}d7 \) \( \check{\square}d7 \) 8.0–0; 7...\( \check{\square}d7 \) 8.0–0, and White has a clear advantage.) 7.\( \check{\square}a4 \) \( \check{\square}d5 \) 8.0–0 \( \check{\square}xc3 \) 9.bxc3 e6 10.c4 \( \check{\square}f6 \) 11.\( \check{\square}e5 \), and White’s position is clearly better, because of his more harmonious development and his dominance in the centre, but naturally Black was not forced to lose immediately – 11...\( \check{\square}d6?? \) 12.g4 1–0 D.Fernando – Berges, Cappelle la Grande 2001.

4...\( \check{\square}d8 \) 5.d4 \( \check{\square}f6 \) (The other moves for Black are worse: 5...\( \check{\square}e5 \), 5...\( \check{\square}g4 \), 5...\( \check{\square}f5 \), or 5...\( g6 \), because after each one of them White plays 6.d5 occupying space and gaining a huge lead in development. Meanwhile, after 5...\( e6 \), the game transposes to the Rubinstein variation (1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.\( \check{\square}c3 \) dxe4 4.\( \check{\square}xe4 \)) of the French Defence, in which White has two extra tempi in addition to the rest of his positional pluses.) 6.\( \check{\square}b5 \) e6 (It is bad for Black to play 6...\( \check{\square}f5?? \) 7.d5 a6, Kasianczuk – Dudel, Kolobrzeg 2001, because after 8.\( \check{\square}a4 \) b5...
9.\(\text{cxb5 axb5} 10.\text{\textit{cxb5 }d7} 11.\text{dxc6, his queenside pawns are about to disappear altogether. It is hardly better for him to try:} 6.\text{\textit{d7} 7.0-0 a6, Huddleston – Hickman, Churchill 2000, because now:} 8.\text{\textit{xc6} xxc6} 9.\text{\textit{cxe5}, leads to an overwhelming advantage for White in development, for example:} 9.\text{\textit{d5} \textit{xd5}} 10.\text{\textit{xd5} c4}, or 9.\text{\textit{f6} d6} 10.\text{\textit{f4}}, or 9.\text{\textit{d7} e1 \textit{f5} f3 c8 g5 xe2; 13.\textit{d5+}; 10.\textit{e6} 11.\textit{g5} d6 12.\textit{f3} 0-0 0-0 13.\textit{ad1+}. Again, it is not so good for Black to continue with: 6...a6 7.\textit{xc6+ bxc6} 8.0-0 e6, Jimenez – V.Gonzalez, Cuba 1976, after 9.\textit{e5 b7} 10.\textit{e3 b8} 11.\textit{e2 d6} 12.\textit{da4} Black's queenside pawns are too weak, just as well the c5-square and his two bishops are not a sufficient compensation.) 7.0-0 \textit{d7} (It is not any better for Black to play: 7...\textit{e7} 8.\textit{e5 \textit{d7}, McNamara – Jackson, Detroit 1994, 9.\textit{xc6 bxc6} 10.\textit{a4+}; 9...\textit{xc6} 10.\textit{xc6} bxc6 11.\textit{f3} Black's weaknesses on the queenside are considerable and he will have to survive a long and difficult defence without any counterplay. It is not logical for him to play: 7...\textit{b4}, Barnsley – Braakhuis, Email 2001, 8.\textit{e5 \textit{d7} 9.\textit{xc6 bxc6} 10.\textit{f3} 0-0 11.\textit{g5}; 9...\textit{xc6} 10.\textit{xc6 bxc6} 11.\textit{f3 d7} 12.\textit{e7} 13.\textit{f4 d5} 14.\textit{e5+}; 12...\textit{xc3} 13.\textit{xc3} 0-0 14.b3@) 8.\textit{g5 d7} 9.\textit{xd7+ \textit{xd7} 10.\textit{e1 h6} 11.\textit{h4 g5} 12.\textit{g3 g6?!} (It is more stubborn for Black to defend with 12...\textit{g7}, but even then his defence is quite problematic: 13.\textit{b5 d5} 14.\textit{c4} 15.\textit{d5}! \textit{f6} 16.\textit{dxe6 fxe6} 15.\textit{d5} 1-0 Kawaciukova – Fonseca, Cappelle la Grande 1995.

4...\textit{d6} 5.d4 leads to a line of the Scandinavian Defence with a queen on d6. Black now has problems to parry the threat 6.d5, because his knight has been developed to c6 a bit too early, for example he loses after: 5...e6? 6.\textit{b5 d8} 7.\textit{f4}. Therefore it is better for Black to play: 5...\textit{f6} (Or 5...\textit{g4} 6.\textit{b5 d7} 7.\textit{f4 e8} 8.\textit{e2 a6} 9.\textit{c3 e6} 10.0-0 \textit{d6} 11.h3 \textit{xf3} 12.\textit{xf3} and White's bishop pair and his lead in development guarantee that his advantage will soon become decisive, Temprano – Ricard, Sant Boi 2000. It is a disaster for Black to play: 6...\textit{e6+} 7.\textit{e5}! \textit{exe5} 8.\textit{xc7+ \textit{d7} 9.\textit{xc6 xd1} 10.\textit{xf8+ \textit{f8} 11.\textit{xh1}, or 7...\textit{exe5} 8.\textit{dxe5 xd1} 9.\textit{xc7+ \textit{d7} 10.\textit{xa8 xc2} 11.\textit{b5 e6} 12.\textit{d3 b4+ 13.\textit{e2 \textit{g7, Bezo – Hlinka, Slovakia 2003, 14.\textit{hc1 \textit{f5} 15.a3 \textit{a5} 16.b4–} 6.\textit{b5 \textit{d8} (6...\textit{d7}, Brookshire – Cunningham, Email 2002 and here White could have achieved a great advantage with: 7.\textit{e5! \textit{exe5} 8.\textit{dxe5 \textit{xd1} – it is even worse for Black to play 8...\textit{g4} 9.\textit{f4+} 9.\textit{xd1 \textit{g4} 10.\textit{xc7+ \textit{d8} 11.\textit{xa8 \textit{xf2+} 12.\textit{e1 \textit{axh1} 13.\textit{e3}–, because White will easily evacuate his knight

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away from the corner, while the same task for Black seems impossible. Obviously it is better for Black to try: 7...\textit{\texttt{Nd}}d8 8.\textit{\texttt{Nf}}f4 \textit{\texttt{Nc}}d5 9.\textit{\texttt{Be}}c4!+, but White’s lead in development is overwhelming.) 7.d5 \textit{\texttt{Nc}}b4 8.c4

And now:

in answer to 8...\textit{\texttt{e}}6, Filev – Karakehajov, Sofia 2004, White’s simplest line is: 9.\textit{\texttt{Nf}}f4! \textit{\texttt{Na}}6 10.\textit{\texttt{d}}d6 c6! (after 10...\textit{\texttt{c}}xd6 11.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xd6+ \textit{\texttt{Nd}}xd6 12.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xd6 \textit{\texttt{Nd}}xd6 13.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xd6 \textit{\texttt{De}}4 14.\textit{\texttt{Ne}}a3±, White’s couple of powerful bishops and his pawn-majority on the queenside provide him with a stable advantage) 11.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}c3! \textit{\texttt{Nh}}5 12.\textit{\texttt{Be}}5! \textit{\texttt{f}}6 13.\textit{\texttt{Nd}}2! \textit{\texttt{g}}6 14.\textit{\texttt{g}}4 \textit{\texttt{fxe}}5 15.\textit{\texttt{g}}xh5 \textit{\texttt{Nd}}xd6 16.\textit{\texttt{Ng}}4±. Black lags in development and his king is quite vulnerable, his pawns are weak and his pieces are rather disordinated. All these factors are much more important than Black’s extra pawn;

The attempt to seize the initiative by a pawn-sacrifice with: 8...\textit{\texttt{e}}5 9.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xe5 \textit{\texttt{a}}6, L.Nemeth – Sherwood, Email 2003, can be parried by White with the simple line: 10.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}e2! \textit{\texttt{e}}7 (10...\textit{\texttt{c}}c2+ 11.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xc2 axb5 12.\textit{\texttt{Be}}b3! bxc4 13.\textit{\texttt{Bb}}5+ \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 14.\textit{\texttt{Bc}}c4±) 11.\textit{\texttt{c}}c4 c5 12.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}2± and Black has no compensation for the pawn whatsoever;

8...\textit{c}6! 9.\textit{d}xc6 \textit{\texttt{a}}5?! (It was practically forced for Black to enter an inferior endgame with: 9...\textit{b}xc6! 10.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xd8+ \textit{\texttt{Nd}}xd8 11.\textit{\texttt{Na}}3 \textit{\texttt{f}}5 12.\textit{\texttt{Be}}4±) 10.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{e}}4? (Black’s only playable possibility here was: 10...\textit{b}xc6 11.a3 \textit{\texttt{c}}xb5 12.\textit{\texttt{c}}xb4 \textit{\texttt{e}}7 13.c5± 11.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xb4 \textit{\texttt{xb}}4+ 12.\textit{\texttt{d}}2 \textit{\texttt{b}}8 (after 12...\textit{\texttt{d}}d8 13.\textit{\texttt{c}}xb7 \textit{\texttt{xb}}7 14.a3± the game goes into an endgame, in which White remains with a solid extra pawn) 13.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}7+ \textit{\texttt{d}}d8 14.\textit{\texttt{d}}5 1–0 Bojkov – Panbukchian, Pleven 2005.

After 4...\textit{\texttt{h}}5 5.\textit{\texttt{b}}5 \textit{\texttt{d}}8 6.d4±, White is threatening 7.\textit{\texttt{Nf}}4, moreover Black’s king is stuck in the centre and that provides White with a stable advantage. Black’s most logical move now is 6...\textit{\texttt{f}}6, Parma – B.Larsen, Zagreb 1965 (He cannot prevent the accomplishment of White’s plans with: 6...\textit{\texttt{Nc}}4? 7.\textit{\texttt{Nf}}4 \textit{\texttt{xf}}3 8.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xf3 \textit{\texttt{xf}}3 9.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}xf3 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 10.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}7 \textit{\texttt{c}}8 11.\textit{\texttt{d}}5 \textit{\texttt{xd}}4 12.0–0–0--; 11...\textit{\texttt{e}}8 12.0–0–0–, because White remains with an extra pawn in the endgame and a better development, Wittmann – Moser, Wuerstemberg 2000. It is too dubious for Black to try: 6...\textit{a}6?! 7.\textit{\texttt{Nc}}3 \textit{\texttt{f}}5 8.\textit{\texttt{e}}2 \textit{\texttt{g}}6, Mecking – Fernandez, Las Palmas 1975, because after: 9.\textit{\texttt{h}}4 \textit{\texttt{f}}6 10.\textit{\texttt{xf}}5 \textit{\texttt{xf}}5 11.\textit{\texttt{g}}4 \textit{\texttt{g}}6
12.\(\textit{f}3\) White has two powerful bishops and Black has great problems to secure the safety of his king, which has been deprived of the right to castle). It seems now quite interesting for White to try the move 7.d5?! , which has never been tested in practice yet.

See some lines:

7...\(\textit{exd}5\) 8.\(\textit{f}4\) e5 9.\(\textit{c}4\) \(\textit{exd}1\) 10.\(\textit{exd}1\) + \(\textit{d}6\) (after 10...\(\textit{d}7\) 11. \(\textit{xe}5\) \(\textit{exe}5\) 12.\(\textit{xe}5\) White exerts a powerful pressure along the central files) 11.\(\textit{exd}6\) \(\textit{cxd}6\) 12.\(\textit{exd}6\) + \(\textit{c}7\) (12...\(\textit{d}7\) 13. \(\textit{e}3\) ) 13.\(\textit{exe}6\) + \(\textit{b}6\) \(\textit{c}6\) 14.\(\textit{exe}5\) \(\textit{h}5\) (in case of 14...\(\textit{e}8\) 15.\(\textit{exe}7\) \(\textit{e}7\) 16.0–0\(\textit{e}5\). White’s compensation for the exchange is more than sufficient – he has two pawns and a couple of powerful bishops, moreover his piece-co-ordination is excellent.) 15. \(\textit{xf}7\) + \(\textit{xf}4\) 16.\(\textit{Axh}8\) \(\textit{b}8\) 17.\(\textit{b}3\) \(\textit{fg}2\) + 18.\(\textit{d}2\) \(\textit{dh}4\) 19.\(\textit{df}7\) and Black can hardly prove that his compensation for the pawn is sufficient;

7...\(\textit{e}5\) 8.\(\textit{f}4\) \(\textit{xf}3\) + 9.\(\textit{wf}3\) \(\textit{xf}3\) 10.\(\textit{gf}3\) \(\textit{d}7\) 11.\(\textit{xc}7\) + \(\textit{c}8\) 12.\(\textit{e}5\) \(\textit{xd}5\) 13.0–0–0 e6 (the other possibilities for Black are even worse: 13...a6?! 14.\(\textit{xd}5\) \(\textit{axb}5\) 15.\(\textit{xb}5\) \(\textit{ec}6\) 16.\(\textit{xc}6\) \(\textit{xc}6\) 17.\(\textit{xc}5\) \(\textit{b}7\) 18.\(\textit{d}1\) + and White remains with an extra pawn in the endgame; 13...\(\textit{f}6\) 14.\(\textit{xd}5\) \(\textit{xe}5\) 15.\(\textit{c}5\) + \(\textit{d}8\) 16.\(\textit{h}3\) + and Black would probably fail to neutralize the great activity of White’s pieces without losing material) 14.\(\textit{g}1\) \(\textit{f}6\) 15.\(\textit{d}6\) + \(\textit{xd}6\) 16.\(\textit{xd}6\) \(\textit{g}5\) 17.\(\textit{c}4\) Black’s defence will be extremely difficult, because of his weak kingside pawns and his considerable lag in development.

5.\(\textit{b}5\)

5...\(\textit{d}7\)

5...\(\textit{g}4\) 6.\(\textit{h}3\) \(\textit{d}7\) \(\textit{h}5\) (In case of 6...\(\textit{d}7\) 7.0–0, there arises a position from the main line, except that White’s pawn is on the h3-square. This is either immaterial, or it might even be in favour of White.) 7.g4 \(\textit{g}6\) 8.\(\textit{e}5\) \(\textit{e}4\) (Black has also tried in practice the move 8...0–0–0, Garside – Stewart, corr. 1987, but after 9.\(\textit{xc}6\) \(\textit{xc}6\) 10.\(\textit{xc}6\) \(\textit{e}5\) + 11. \(\textit{f}1\) ± he has no compensation for the pawn.) 9.\(\textit{f}3\) a6 10.\(\textit{c}4\) \(\textit{b}4\) 11.a3 \(\textit{c}5\) 12.d4 \(\textit{a}7\) 13.\(\textit{xe}4\)
1.e4 \( \text{d}c6 \) 2.e5 f3 d5 3.ed \( \text{d}d5 \) 4.c3 \( \text{a}5 \) 5.b5

axb5 14.\( \text{d}xb5 \) b8 15.\( \text{d}f4+ \) Bednarski – Allegro, Sion 1990).

5...\( \text{d}f6 \) – this is a logical developing move, but Black ignores White’s threats just in vain: 6.\( \text{d}e5! \) d7 7.\( \text{d}xd7 \text{d}xd7 \) 8.0–0 e6 9.\( \text{d}xc6 \text{bxc6} \) 10.\( \text{d}f3\pm \) and Black has no compensation for his horribly compromised queenside pawn-structure, Biyiasas – Yearwood, Canada 1981.

5...a6 6.\( \text{d}xc6+ \text{bxc6} \) 7.\( \text{e}e2 \), and later in the game Karpov – Hort, Oslo, 1984, there followed: 7...\( \text{d}f6 \) (or 7...e6 8.0–0 \( \text{d}d6 \) 9.d4 \( \text{d}e7 \) 10.\( \text{d}e4 \) 0–0 11.\( \text{c}4\pm \) and the position remains very difficult for Black, because of the weaknesses of his queenside, Akopian – Kalantarian, Caucasus 1988) 8.\( \text{d}e5 \) e6 (8...\( \text{d}bd7 \) 9.d4 e6 10.0–0 \( \text{d}b4 \) 11.\( \text{d}d1 \) a5 12.\( \text{d}a3 \) \( \text{d}d6 \) 13.\( \text{d}f4\pm \) Lopez del Alamo – Rodriguez Izquierdo, Madrid 2002; 10...\( \text{d}d6 \), Boino – Fontes, Lisbon 1999, now it is correct for White to continue with: 11.\( \text{a}3! \) 0–0 12.\( \text{d}d1\pm \) and Black’s queen is terribly misplaced, so that he is deprived of the only reasonable counterplay, connected with the preparation of the pawn-break c6-c5 – 12...c5? 13.\( \text{d}c4\pm \).

This is the point behind the move 11.\( \text{a}3 \). Later, White will prepare b2-b4 and he will fix Black’s weaknesses.) 8.\( \text{d}e5 \) e6 9.0–0 \( \text{d}d6 \) 10.d4 0–0 11.\( \text{d}d1 \) c5 12.\( \text{d}c4 \) \( \text{d}b4 \) 13.\( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{d}b8 \), and here instead of 14.\( \text{d}g5 \), White had better play: 14.dxc5 \( \text{d}xc5 \) 15.\( \text{d}g5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 16.\( \text{d}e4\pm \).

6.0–0

Black has tried in practice the following moves in this position:

a) 6...\( \text{d}f6 \), b) 6...e6, c) 6...a6 and d) 6...0–0–0.

a) 6...\( \text{d}f6 \) 7.d4 0–0–0

Black loses too much time with the move 7...\( \text{d}e4 \), Bokros – Ganguly, Szeged 1994, 8.\( \text{d}d3! \) \( \text{d}xc3 \) 9.bxc3 e6 (in case of 9...a6 10.\( \text{d}xc6 \) \( \text{d}xc6 \) 11.\( \text{c}4 \) 0–0 12.\( \text{d}e5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 13.\( \text{d}d2 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 14.\( \text{d}e3\pm \) White has a lead in development, he has occupied the centre and he can operate effectively along the open b-file, so he has excellent attacking prospects.) 10.c4 a6 (It is not any better for Black to play 10...0–0–0 11.\( \text{g}5! \) \( \text{e}8 \) 12.\( \text{d}xc6 \) bxc6 13.\( \text{b}1\pm \) ) 11.\( \text{d}xc6 \) \( \text{d}xc6 \) 12.\( \text{d}e5\pm \).

White would have a great advantage after: 7...a6 8.\( \text{d}xc6 \) \( \text{c}xc6 \) 9.\( \text{d}e5 \) e6 (9...\( \text{d}b6 \) 10.d5 \( \text{d}d8 \) 11.\( \text{d}e3 \) \( \text{xb}2 \) 12.\( \text{d}d4 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 13.\( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{a}3 \) 14.\( \text{f}3 \) e6 15.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 16.dxe6+ \( \text{g}8 \) 17.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 18.\( \text{g}4+ \) \( \text{g}7 \) 19.\( \text{e}7\pm \) Gdanski – Pyda, Warsaw 1990) 10.\( \text{d}xc6 \) bxc6 11.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) (It is not so good for Black to play: 11...\( \text{d}d5?! \) Af-
ter 12.\(\text{\textdollar}e4\)! Black’s position becomes extremely difficult – his weaknesses have been fixed and White’s pawn-centre is ready to advance.) 12.b3 \(\text{\textdollar}e7\) 13.\(\text{\textdollar}a4\) \(\text{\textdag}b7\) 14.c4 0–0 15.\(\text{\textdollar}g5\) \(\text{\textdag}d8\) 16.\(\text{\textdollar}ad1\) \(\text{\textdag}fe8\) 17.\(\text{\textdollar}d3\) \(\text{\textdag}d7\) 18.\(\text{\textdollar}xe7\) \(\text{\textdag}xe7\) 19.\(\text{\textdollar}g3\) \(\text{\textdag}de8\) 20.f4\(\pm\) Kholmov – Tibensky, Pardubice 1998.

8.\(\text{\textdollar}e3\)

It is too dangerous for Black to open the b-file, because he might come under a dangerous attack, as it happened in the following short and crushing game: 9...\(\text{\textdollar}xc3\) 10.bxc3 e6 11.c4 a6 12.c5 axb5 13.axb5 \(\text{\textdag}xb5\) 14.\(\text{\textdollar}a8+\) \(\text{\textdollar}b8\) 15.\(\text{\textdollar}a1\) \(\text{\textdollar}c6\) 16.\(\text{\textdollar}a7\) \(\text{\textdollar}d7\) 17. \(\text{\textdollar}e5+\) \(\text{\textdollar}e8\) 18.\(\text{\textdollar}xb8\) \(\text{\textdag}e7\) 19.c4 \(\text{\textdollar}a4\) 20.\(\text{\textdollar}xc6\) \(\text{\textdag}xc6\) 21.\(\text{\textdollar}xb7+\)– Magem Badals – Summerscale, France 1999.

10.\(\text{\textdollar}xe3\) f6 11.\(\text{\textdollar}d2\) e6

It is hardly any better for Black to play: 11...\(\text{\textdollar}b4\) 12.\(\text{\textdollar}a2\) \(\text{\textdag}d6\), Priour – Nava, Internet 2001, because after: 13.\(\text{\textdollar}e4!\) \(\text{\textdollar}e6\) 14.\(\text{\textdollar}f3\) \(\text{\textdollar}f7\) 15.\(\text{\textdollar}c5\)\(\pm\) White has a huge lead in development and excellent attacking chances.

12.\(\text{\textdollar}a2\) \(\text{\textdollar}e5\)

In answer to 8...\(\text{\textdollar}e4\), Szuk – Zaninotto, Budapest 1991, it is advisable for White to follow with 9.a4!, after which the logical line: 9...\(\text{\textdollar}xc3\) 10.bxc3, transposes to the variation: 8...\(\text{\textdollar}d5\) 9.a4 \(\text{\textdollar}xc3\) 10.bxc3.

9.a4 \(\text{\textdollar}xe3\)

13.b4!

This position was reached in a game between the same opponents as early as in the year 1959! White played 13.\(\text{\textdollar}e2\) and later he lost the game. Now, he is demonstrating an improvement and that is a good example of a meticulous home preparation. 13...\(\text{\textdollar}b6\) (Naturally, it is too bad for Black to continue
with: 13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xb4??, because of
14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 and White wins a piece,
but now White's pawn-offensive
on the queenside can hardly be
 countered by Black with any-
thing worthwhile.) \texttt{14.c4 c6}
\texttt{15.c5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c7 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}g6 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c3±}
Mednis – Seidman, New York
1961. Black has the two bishop
advantage, but that is the only
thing he can brag about in this
position. White’s space advan-
tage on the queenside provides
him with excellent attacking

chances.

\textbf{b) 6...e6 7.d4}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

7...\texttt{\textasciitilde}b4

It is even worse for Black to
play: 7...\texttt{\textasciitilde}f6?! 8.d5 exd5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e1+
\texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xh7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xh7 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd5 c6
12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe7 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe7 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f6 (13...
\texttt{\textasciitilde}c5 14.b4) 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe7 15.
\texttt{\textasciitilde}d6+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}e8 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e1+-- Zeitler –
Boerefi\jnn, Bruegge 1978.

7...0–0–0 8.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e2 a6 (It is too
bad for Black to continue with:
8...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 9.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 a6 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c4 h6,
Rafizadeh – M.Nowak, Canberra
2000, because after 11.d5 exd5
12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}b6 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 f5 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d5
\texttt{\textasciitilde}a7 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5++; 13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}f6 14.
\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf7± White remains with a
solid extra pawn; 8...\texttt{\textasciitilde}f6, J.
Emms – Stromer, Cappelle la
Grande 1991, 9.a3 a6 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d3
\texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e4±) 9.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f6 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf4
h6 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}ad1 b5 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 g5 13.
\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5±, White’s prospects in the
centre as well as on the queensi-
side are clearly superior, while
Black’s counterplay on the king-
side will hardly be effective,
Goloshchepov – Weisenburger,

It is quite playable for Black
to try: 7...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d6, Ondersteijn –
Deceuninck, Hengelo 2003, al-
though the bishop can easily
be attacked on that square:
8.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f6 (In case of 8...a6 9.
\texttt{\textasciitilde}c4 0–0–0 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 11.c3±
Black will face the difficult task
of defending against the oncom-
ing dangerous kingside attack.)
9.d5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7! (10...
\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5±) 11.dxe6+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe6
12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b5±.

8.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc3

The move 8...\texttt{\textasciitilde}ge7?! is quite
dubious. It turns out now that
Black’s previous move has been
just a loss of precious time in
the opening. 9.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e4 a6 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d3
\texttt{\textasciitilde}g6 11.c3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d6 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 13.
\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd6+ cxd6 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3± Buchal –

9.bxc3 a6

Black’s position is terrible af-
after: 9...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xc3 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc2 (10...
\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3 11.d5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7
13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5+) 11.d5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 (11...\texttt{\textasciitilde}ce7
12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 14.
\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5++) 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7 13.dxe6
fxe6 (13...\textit{d}xe6 14.\textit{b}b5+−) 14.\textit{f}d1 \textit{e}e8 (14...\textit{c}c8 15.\textit{g}g5+−) 15.\textit{a}c1 \textit{xa}2 16.\textit{xc}7 \textit{xb}3 17.\textit{xe}g7+−.

10.\textit{d}d3 \textit{ge}7

10...\textit{f}f6 11.\textit{c}c4 \textit{h}5 12.\textit{b}b1 0–0–0 13.\textit{c}c3 \textit{he}8 14.\textit{b}b2 \textit{a}a5 15.\textit{b}b4 \textit{c}c6, Vogt – Walter, Erfurt 1973, and White could have won here with: 16.\textit{e}e5! \textit{g}g4 17.\textit{x}xg4 \textit{x}xg2 18.\textit{e}e5 \textit{xf}1 19.\textit{e}e4 \textit{b}6 20.\textit{xf}1+−.

11.\textit{c}c4 \textit{h}5 12.\textit{b}b1 \textit{b}6

13.\textit{f}f4± Jansa – Trapl, Brno 1964. White has a lead in development, a couple of powerful bishops and a mobile pawn-centre.

c) 6...\textit{a}6 7.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6

8.\textit{d}4!

This is much stronger than the move 8.\textit{e}1, which has brought to White better results statistically until now, because in that case Black has a powerful counter-measure: 8...\textit{h}5! 9.\textit{e}e5 \textit{xd}1 10.\textit{xd}1 \textit{d}7 11.\textit{d}4 (or 11.\textit{d}5 \textit{c}c8 12.\textit{xd}7 \textit{xd}7= Boudre – Berges, Marseille 2001) 11.\textit{f}f6 12.\textit{xd}7 \textit{xd}7 ½ Ost Hansen – Sloth, Aarhus 1976.

8...0–0–0

That is the most popular move.

About 8...\textit{f}6 9.\textit{e}e5 – see 6...\textit{f}6 7.\textit{d}4 \textit{a}6 8.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 9.\textit{e}e5.

8...f6?! – Black now controls the important e5-square with his last move, but he weakens the e6-outpost and deprives his knight of a reliable base on f6. His development is slowed down considerably and White can start a dangerous attack. 9.\textit{d}5! 0–0–0 10.\textit{b}4! \textit{xb}4 11.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}5 12.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}c5 13.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xb}5 14.\textit{a}4! \textit{bxa}4 15.\textit{c}4!! \textit{xc}4 16.\textit{b}4 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{xa}4. Black has played several seemingly logical moves and he has won three pawns in the process. On the other hand, his lag in development has become catastrophic and his position is already beyond salvation. The game ended very quickly: 17...\textit{e}5 18.\textit{b}5 \textit{c}5 19.\textit{e}3 \textit{b}6 20.\textit{xc}5 \textit{b}7 21.\textit{xb}6! \textit{xb}6 22.\textit{c}1 \textit{b}8 23.\textit{b}4 1–0 J.Anderson – Aasum, corr. 2000.

If 8...\textit{h}5, then after 9.\textit{d}5, Black has serious problems in all lines, for example: 9...0–0–0
(9...d7 10.d4 f6 11.e1; 9.d8 10.f4 e6 11.xc7 d7 12.dxc6--; 10...xd5 11.xc7 d7 12.e5 xd1 13.xd1 c7 14.d5 10.g5 (White fails to obtain any advantage after: 10.f4 xd5 11.e5 xd1 12.fxd1 e6, Felgaer – N.Vlassov, Moscow 2004. Now, instead of: 13.e4, against which Black should have played: 13...xd1 14.d1 f6=, N.Vlasov recommended the following line as the best for White: 13.xd8+ xd8 14.e4, however, by playing: 14...e8! 15.g5 d5 16.d1 f6 17.c4 h6= Black could have maintained the equality.) 10.h6 10...e8 11.d4 b8 12.e3 b6 13.f4 b7 14.c4; 10...f6 11.e5 xd1 12.xd1 e8 13.f1; 11...e8 12.xh5 xh5 13.e3; 10...xd5 11.xd5 h6 12.d4! f6? 13.b6+ xb6 14.c3+ b8 15.e5+ a7 16.xf6++; 12...hxg5 13.f1 d6 14.a7 g4 15.a8+ d7 16.xb7++; 13...b8 14.c5 c6 15.f4++; 14...d7 15.xc7+ 11.e5 hxg5 (11...xd1 12.d1 e8 13.e3 12.xh5 xh5 13.dxc6 f6 14.xd1 e8 14...xd1+ 15.xd1 fe 16.d8++) 15.cxb7. 8...e6 9.e5 xd6, Deviatkin – Vlassov, Moscow 1999, and here White would have achieved a great advantage with: 10.xc6 bxc6 11.g4! f8 (11...g6 12.f3 e7 13.f6 f8 14.e4; The following pawn-sacrifice is not as good for Black as it seems: 11.e7 12.xg7 h5 13.g3 g8 14.h6 f5 15.d2 h5 16.e1 h4 17.e4!, for example: 17...0-0-0 18.d3 b7 19.b4 a7 20.a3! d5 21.c5 12.f3 e7 13.e4 f5 14.e2. 9.e5 e8

White's most convincing way to obtain a huge advantage in that position is the energetic move:

10.b4!

which was played in the game Emms – Kristensen, Esbjerg 1996.

10...xb4

That capture of the pawn seems to be the most principled.

In this game Kristensen refrained from taking the pawn and there followed: 10...b6 11.e3 e6 (11...xb4 12.e4 e6 13.h1 e7 14.c5) 12.b1 b6 13.c4 b6 14.a5 xc3 (14...d6 15.f3 c6 16.d5) 15.b3 xb4 16.xc3 xc3 17.xb7 b7 18.b1+ a8 19.b3 xd4 (19...xc5 20.a3 b6 21.a6+ b8 22.d5++) 20.xd4 b5 (20...xd4 21.cxe6++) 21.c4++. 11.f3 xd4 12.b1! c6

12...xe5 13.xb7+ d7 14.b2++;
13...\textbf{xf4}! White’s attack is extremely powerful, as you can see in the following lines: 

13...\textbf{g5}?! \(13...\textbf{e6} 14.e5 a7 15.e8\# c8 16.d1+ c7 17.d3++; 16...d7 17.xd7\# \) \textbf{g3} g4 (14...h6 15.xb7! xxb7 16.\textbf{x}b1++) 15.xg4 h5 (15...\textbf{g}7 16.\textbf{e}4 and White has excellent compensation for the pawn.) 16.\textbf{xf5} e6 (16...d7 17.a5 hxg4 18.xa6!++; 17.xg4 18.e5 \textbf{e}6 19.xh8++) 17.a5 \textbf{d}6 18.xb7\#.

d) 6...0–0 7.e1

7...a6 7...e6 8.d3!? – and White can develop a dangerous queenside initiative, so he does not need now to place his pawn on the d4-square.

7...f6 – this move is too tentative. White would not mind Black’s occupation of the centre, because he has a huge lead in development and a quite promising play on the queenside.

8.xc6 xc6 9.d5 e8

10.b4 b6

This sacrifice with the idea to open the b-file is quite standard. It is very dangerous for Black to accept the sacrifice now and even later:

10...\textbf{xb}4?! 11.f3 \textbf{d}6 12.\textbf{b}1 c6 (12...c6? Renner – Porth, Germany 1994, 13.h3+! \textbf{d}7 14.e3++) 13.d4 \textbf{f}6 (13...d4 14.b6+ \textbf{b}8 15.a3 f5 16.e3 \textbf{f}4 17.d3++; 13...e7 14.d3 b5 15.f4 a7 16.e3++) 14.g4+ e6 (14...\textbf{b}8 15.g3++) 15.e4+–.

11.d3 \textbf{f}6

11...\textbf{f}6 12.f3 \textbf{d}4 13.a2 \textbf{d}4 14.c2 \textbf{b}4 (13...e6 14.a1 c5 15.b5 a5 (14...\textbf{e}4 15.c6 \textbf{e}4++) 15.a3! \textbf{e}6 (15...d5 16.a3 c6 17.d4 \textbf{c}7 18.d5 cxd5 19.b6+ \textbf{b}8 20.dxd5++) 16.b4 \textbf{c}7 17.d4 18.c5 a4 19.g3 \textbf{h}3 19...d5 20.d4++) 20.e4+–.

White has wonderful compensation for the pawn after: 11...\textbf{xb}4 12.d2 \textbf{d}4 13.f3 \textbf{f}6 (13...f6 14.a1 a5 15.a3 \textbf{a}8 16.d4! \textbf{d}5 17.d4++; 14...f5 15.xb7+! \textbf{d}7 16.d5++; 14...c6 15.d4 c5 16.d5 xf5! xf5 17.xf8++) 14.a1 \textbf{e}7 (14...c6 15.d4 e6 16.d4 xxe4 17.xe4 \textbf{c}5 18.a7++; 16...d5 17.e3 xe3 18.fxe3 \textbf{a}7 19.b6++;
15...b5 16.\(\mathcal{C}\)a5 \(\mathcal{D}\)d6 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b3!? \(\mathcal{W}\)g4
18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3\(\rightarrow\); 16...\(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 17.a4 b4
18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b3 \(\mathcal{H}\)h5 19.\(\mathcal{W}\)xh5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xh5
20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)a2\(\rightarrow\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4 16.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4
f6 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 b6 (17...\(\mathcal{W}\)a8 18.\(\mathcal{W}\)e4
f6 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b7, and White’s attack is
very dangerous.) 18. \(\mathcal{Q}\)c4 \(\mathcal{D}\)d6
(18...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b8 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6
\(\mathcal{D}\)d6 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd6 exd6 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 \(\mathcal{W}\)b7
23.\(\mathcal{W}\)e8 \(\mathcal{W}\)c8 24.\(\mathcal{W}\)f7, and Black
can hardly complete his develop-
ment. For example, he loses im-
mediately after: 24...\(\mathcal{W}\)d8 25.
\(\mathcal{Q}\)xb6 cxb6 26.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e1\(\rightarrow\), or 25...\(\mathcal{W}\)b7
26.a4\(\rightarrow\) 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6,
and here the move 20...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b8,
transposes to the line that we
have just analysed.
(diagram)
12.\(\mathcal{W}\)g4+ e6, Sermek – Semrl, Ljubljana 1999 (12...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b8? 13.
\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 f5 14.\(\mathcal{W}\)xf5 \(\mathcal{W}\)f6 15.\(\mathcal{W}\)e4–
Saltaev – Vlassov, Moscow 1996).
After: 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c4, Black has prob-
lems, for example: 13...\(\mathcal{W}\)d4 (13...
\(\mathcal{W}\)xb4 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)a3 \(\mathcal{W}\)xc3 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf8\(\pm\);
13...\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b1!\(\rightarrow\) 14.\(\mathcal{W}\)d4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d4
15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b1\(\pm\), and Black is clearly
worse, despite his two-bishop
advantage, because of his lag in
development. White has a pow-
erful pressure in the centre and
on the queenside.

**Conclusion**

The variations that we have analyzed in this chapter lead to po-
sitions, which are quite similar to the Scandinavian Defence, except
for the early developed black knight on the c6-square. White needs to
play energetically and he often sacrifices a pawn with b2-b4. It is
much more difficult to defend in similar positions than to attack, so
White’s chances are clearly superior in all variations.
Chapter 6  
1.e4  \( \diamond c6 \) 2.\( \diamond f3 \)  g6

\[ \text{3.d4} \]

In this chapter we examine positions which are typical for the King’s Indian or Modern Benoni. Black usually loses a tempo or even two so White gets the edge without significant problems.

We will deal in details with:

a) 3...d6 and b) 3...\( \diamond g7 \).

3...\( \diamond f6?! \) leads after 4.e5 to quite unfavourable for Black lines from the Alekhine Defence.

3...d5?! leads to a bad version of the Scandinavian. The clumsy move g6 and prematurely developed knight ensure a solid advantage to White. 4.exd5 \( \varnothing \)xd5 5.\( \diamond c3 \) \( \varnothing \)a5, Sietio – Saarinen, Tampere 1994 (5...\( \varnothing \)h5?! 6.\( \varnothing \)b5 \( \varnothing \)d8 7.\( \varnothing \)f4\( \varnothing \) White deprived the opponent of castling and wins a pawn, Angskog – Bahram, Osterskars 1995; 5...\( \varnothing \)d7 6.d5 \( \varnothing \)d8 7.\( \varnothing \)f4\( \varnothing \) White gained more space and a great lead in development. Black’s attempt to reduce the tension by exchanges brought about a quick mate. 7...c6 8.dxc6 \( \varnothing \)xd1+ 9.\( \varnothing \)xd1 bxc6 10.\( \varnothing \)b5 \( \varnothing \)e6 11.\( \varnothing \)g5 \( \varnothing \)h6 12.\( \varnothing \)xe6 \( \varnothing \)xf4 13.\( \varnothing \)d8# Brynell – Kallerholm, Rodeby 1998; 5...\( \varnothing \)d8 – perhaps this is the most resilient defence. 6.d5 \( \diamond \)b8 7.\( \varnothing \)b5+ \( \varnothing \)d7 8.\( \varnothing \)c4 \( \varnothing \)g7 9.0–0 \( \varnothing \)f6 10.\( \varnothing \)e1\( \varnothing \) White maintains a lasting pressure due to his spatial advantage and better development, Jowett – Granovsky, Dos Hermanas 2004), when the most enterprising continuation is 6.\( \varnothing \)b5! \( \varnothing \)d7 (6...a6 7.\( \varnothing \)xc6+ bxc6 8.\( \varnothing \)e5\( \varnothing \)) 7.d5 \( \varnothing \)e5 8.\( \varnothing \)xe5 \( \varnothing \)xb5 9.\( \varnothing \)f3 \( \varnothing \)f6 10.d6\( \varnothing \). Black is badly lagging behind in development which should probably cost him some material.

a) 3...d6 4.d5 \( \diamond \)b8

It is worse for Black to play: 4...\( \varnothing \)e5 5.\( \varnothing \)xe5 dxe5 6.\( \varnothing \)b5 \( \varnothing \)d7, because after 7.\( \varnothing \)d3, White’s advantage is obvious – he is domi-
nant in the centre, his pawn-structure is superior and he has better development. We'll see in the following examples that a temporary lead in development cannot compensate Black for the sacrificed pawn: 7...\(\text{\underline{g}}7\) 8.\(\text{\underline{w}}b3\) \(\text{\underline{f}}6\) 9.\(\text{\underline{x}}d7\) + \(\text{\underline{w}}xd7\) 10.\(\text{\underline{w}}xb7\) 0–0 11.\(\text{\underline{f}}3\) a5 (11...\(\text{\underline{f}}b8\) 12.\(\text{\underline{w}}a6\) \(\text{\underline{h}}5\) 13.0–0 \(\text{\underline{f}}4\) 14.\(\text{\underline{g}}3\) \(\text{\underline{b}}6\) 15.\(\text{\underline{c}}4\) \(\text{\underline{h}}3\) + 16.\(\text{\underline{g}}2\) + J.Bednarski – Rossin, Hannover 1976) 12.\(\text{\underline{w}}b3\) \(\text{\underline{f}}b8\) 13.\(\text{\underline{c}}4\) \(\text{\underline{b}}4\) 14.\(\text{\underline{e}}2\) \(\text{\underline{h}}5\) 15.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) \(\text{\underline{b}}6\) 16.\(\text{\underline{a}}3\) c6, Milic – Ivkovic, Sarajevo 1958, when simplest seems 17.\(\text{\underline{c}}4\) \(\text{\underline{b}}b8\) 18.\(\text{\underline{x}}c6\) \(\text{\underline{x}}c6\) 19.g3+. It is unclear how Black could activate his minor pieces.

5.\(\text{\underline{c}}4\) \(\text{\underline{g}}7\)
5...\(\text{\underline{f}}6\) 6.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) \(\text{\underline{g}}7\) 7.\(\text{\underline{e}}2\) only leads to a transposition.

6.\(\text{\underline{e}}2\)

6...\(\text{\underline{f}}6\)
6...\(\text{\underline{g}}4\) 7.0–0 \(\text{\underline{d}}d7\) (7...\(\text{\underline{x}}f3\)?! looks dubious. After 8.\(\text{\underline{x}}f3\) \(\text{\underline{f}}6\) 9.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) + Ruderfer – Timoschenko, Kiev 1970, arises the same position which we analyse after the moves 6...\(\text{\underline{f}}6\) 7.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) \(\text{\underline{g}}4\), but White have saved a tempo on h3)
8.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) e5 (again 8...\(\text{\underline{x}}f3\) 9.\(\text{\underline{x}}f3\)
\(\text{\underline{g}}6\) 10.\(\text{\underline{g}}5\) + saves White a tempo on h3, R.Garcia – Figueroa, Buenos Aires 1963) 9.\(\text{\underline{b}}1\) \(\text{\underline{g}}6\) 10.b4 0–0 11.\(\text{\underline{e}}3\) \(\text{\underline{e}}8\) 12.c5+. White has the bishop pair advantage and an attack on the queenside, J.Rubinstein – Figueroa, Mar del Plata 1968.

6...\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) leads to the Benoni with two extra tempi for White. That ensures him the edge against all defences, for instance: 7.0–0 \(\text{\underline{f}}6\) (7...\(\text{\underline{d}}d7\) 8.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) \(\text{\underline{g}}6\) 9.h3 0–0 10.\(\text{\underline{f}}4\) + ) 8.\(\text{\underline{c}}3\) 0–0 9.h3 a6, Thorsteins – Ivkovic, Bela Crkva 1983. Now simplest is 10.\(\text{\underline{f}}4\) \(\text{\underline{bd}}7\) 11.\(\text{\underline{d}}2\) +, when e7-e6 or b7-b5 are difficult to achieve and without these breaks Black will sooner or later perish with insufficient space.

6...e5 7. \(\text{\underline{c}}3\) \(\text{\underline{e}}7\) (7...\(\text{\underline{f}}6\) – see 6...\(\text{\underline{f}}6\); in answer to 7...\(\text{\underline{d}}d7\), White is not obliged to transpose to the main KID lines by castling. He has instead 8.g4 a5 9.\(\text{\underline{e}}3\) \(\text{\underline{c}}5\) 10.\(\text{\underline{g}}1\) b6 11.h4 \(\text{\underline{f}}6\) 12.\(\text{\underline{d}}2\) + Praszak – Ciruk, Suwalki 1999. Black is at a loss to find a sensible plan while the opponent has a clear-cut plan on the queenside; 7...\(\text{\underline{g}}4\) 8.h3 \(\text{\underline{x}}f3\) 9.\(\text{\underline{x}}f3\) \(\text{\underline{e}}7\) 10.g4 a5 11.h4 h6 12.\(\text{\underline{e}}3\) + White has a stable edge due to his spatial advantage, a strong bishop pair and an evident attacking plan on the left wing opposed to Black's total lack of counterplay, Araya – Figueroa, Mar del Plata 1991) 8.h4 (8.0–0 0–0 leads to the Classical main line of the KID – 1.d4
\[ \text{Chapter 6} \]

\[ \text{\&f6 2.c4 g6 3.\&c3 \&g7 4.e4 d6} \]
\[ 5.\text{\&f3 0–0 6.\text{\&e2 e5 7.0–0 \&c6} 8.d5 \&e7} \text{– this is not bad for White of course, but he could try for more) 8...h6 9.h5 g5 10.\&h2 c5 11.\&g4 f5 12.exf5 \&xf5 13.\&f1 \&d7 14.\&e3 \& J.Rubinetti – Figueiroa, Buenos Aires 1966. Black is left with a bad dark-squared bishop and weak light squares. That cannot be counter-weighted by transferring the knight to d4 because White could exchange it at any moment.} \]

\[ 7.\&c3 \]

The arising position is with a typical King’s Indian structure. White’s two extra tempi guarantee him the advantage in all the lines.

\[ 7...0–0 \]

In the game Romanishin – Sale, Slovenia 1999, after 7...c6 8.0–0 0–0 9.h3 \&a6 10.\&e3 e5 11.\text{dxc6 bxc6} 12.\&a4 \&e8 13.b4 c5 14.\text{\&xe8 \&xe8} 15.b5 \&ac7 16.a4 f5 17.a5, White was clearly better thanks to his well-advanced passed pawn. Black’s d6-pawn was quite vulnerable too. His light-squares were very weak and particularly the d5-outpost.

The line 7...\&bd7 is of no practical importance, because it only transposes to the lines (7...0–0 8.0–0 \&bd7), that we will deal with later.

7...c5?! leads to the Benoni Defence and Black has already lost two important tempi with the manoeuvre \&b8–c6–b8, and you can see a game as an example later (see 7...0–0 8.0–0 c5).

After 7...\&a6, White obtained a stable edge with quite simple means in the game Silseth – Lundkvist, Gausdal 1992: 8.0–0 \&c5 9.\&c2 a5 10.\&e3 b6 11.\&ad1 0–0 12.\&d4 \&d7 13.h3±.

7...e5 8.0–0 0–0 9.\&g5 h6 10.\&h4 \&bd7 11.\&d2± Rogers – Sitanggang, Hong Kong 1982. The game is similar to positions from the Petrosian System of the King’s Indian Defence, except that White has two extra tempi.

7...\&g4 8.0–0 0–0 9.\&g5 \&bd7 10.h3 \&xf3 11.\&xf3 h6 12.\&e3 \&e8 13.\&d2± L.Hazai – Zakic, Budapest 1991. White has the two-bishop advantage and extra space. He has the initiative on both sides of the board.

\[ 8.0–0 \]

\[ \text{8...\&bd7} \]

8...a5 – this move only weakens b5 since Black fails to secure his knight on c5. 9.\&e3 \&bd7 (on 9...\&a6 10.\&d2 e5 11.a3 h6 12.b4± White realised the thematic push b2–b4, whilst Black has nothing to boast with on the opposite flank, Kocskes – Mate, Budapest 1995) 10.\&c2 \&c5 (10...
8...\text{g}4 – this move only presents the opponent with the bishop pair advantage without anything in return. 9.h3 \text{xf3} 10.\text{xf3} \text{bd7} 11.\text{e}3 c6 (11...e5 12.b4 \text{e}8 13.c5 f5 14.c6± Likavsky – Felcic, Tatranske Zruby 2001 – White's threats in the centre and on the queenside are very dangerous whilst it is difficult for Black to organise counterplay. 11...c5 12.\text{d}2± leads to Benoni structures. White is able to play at any part of the board and the enemy is doomed to wait, Pham Minh – Phung Nguyen, Hanoi 2002. After 11...a5 12.\text{c}1 b6 13.a3 h6 14.\text{c}2 \text{h}7 15.b4± Black has nothing to oppose to White's queenside initiative, Huss – Mikavica, Zurich 1989.) 12.\text{b}3 \text{c}7 13.\text{ac}1 \text{fe}8 14.a3 e6 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.\text{fd}1 \text{eb}8 17.\text{c}2 a5 18.\text{a}4 \text{e}8 19.\text{b}1 \text{b}7 20.g3 \text{ab}8 21.b3± Jansa – Nikolic, Vrnjacka Banja 1978. Black is without counterplay. The opponent will double rooks on the d-file and will gradually prepare a decisive kingside attack.

Black’s plan to push b7-b5 will create plenty of weaknesses for him.

8...c6 9.\text{b}1 a6 (After 9...\text{g}4 10.\text{e}3 \text{xf}3 11.\text{xf}3, in the game Kleist – Davis, New York 2001, there arose a position from the Benoni Defence. White had a stable advantage, which was quite typical for that pawn-structure. He also had a couple of extra tempi in comparison to the usual lines.) 10.a3 b5 11.cxb5 cxb5 12.\text{d}4 e5 13.dxe6 \text{xe}6 14.\text{e}3 \text{e}7 15.\text{b}3 \text{h}8 16.a4 e5 17.\text{c}2 \text{e}6 18.\text{a}3 \text{c}6 19.\text{fd}1± Aseev – Petit, Ubeda 1996.

8...c5. White can easily occupy the centre in the Benoni Defence, especially with several extra tempi. 9.h3 \text{a}6 10.\text{f}4 \text{c}7 11.e5±, Strikovic – Del Rey, Mondariz 1995.

8...e6 9.dxe6 (It is possibly better for White to try: 9.\text{g}5 h6 10.\text{e}3.) \text{xe}6 10.\text{d}4 \text{c}6 11.\text{e}3 \text{d}7 12.\text{c}1 \text{xd}4 13.\text{xd}4±, and White has extra space, Gleizerov – Rossi, Padova 1999.

8...\text{a}6 9.\text{e}3 \text{d}7 (9...\text{c}5 is not better. After 10.\text{c}2 a5 11.\text{ad}1 \text{g}4 12.\text{d}4 f6 13.h3 \text{e}5 14.\text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 15.\text{e}3± Gritsak – G.Kuzmin, Swindica 1999, White possesses a clear plan for organising an attack on the queenside. He is going to push b4 whilst the opponent is deprived of counterplay. Alternatively, 10...\text{g}4 11.\text{d}4 e5 12.dxe6 \text{xe}6 13.\text{g}7 \text{g}7 14.\text{ad}1± ensures White a small, but lasting edge due to his spatial advantage and possibilities for active play all over the board, Baumgartner –
Tibbert, corr. 1989.) 10.\texttt{c1 e8} 11.a3 e6 12.dxe6 (It is more logical for White to play 12.b4!? exd5 13.exd5\texttt{±}, and he has a clear advantage due to the quite misplaced black knight on the a6-square.) 12...\texttt{xex6} 13.\texttt{d4 e8} 14.f3, and once-again Black has problems typical for the King’s Indian Defence in positions after an exchange on d4, Kiriakov – Nisipeanu, Santo Domingo 2003.

8...e5 9.\texttt{g5} (The Petrosian System in action again...) 9...h6 10.\texttt{h4 bd7} (10...g5 11.\texttt{g3 h5} 12.\texttt{e1 f4} 13.\texttt{g4 d7} 14.\texttt{c2 f6} 15.\texttt{xc8 xc8} 16.\texttt{e3\texttt{±}} Radziewicz – Nemcova, Wuppertal 1998) 11.\texttt{d2 e8} (Following 11...a6 12.b4\texttt{±} White is way ahead in his attack, Huss – Hamed, Thessaloniki 1984. A logical answer to 11...c5, Rogers – Sitanggang, Hong Kong 1982 is 12.a3\texttt{±}, preparing b2-b4 with a strong bind on the queenside.) 12.b4 \texttt{f8}, Galýas – B.Nagy, Budapest 2003. Now the spatial advantage and lead in development enable the thematic breakthrough 13.c5\texttt{±} without any further preparation.

\texttt{9.e3}

\texttt{9...c6}

By this move Black is planning to open up the c-file. However White is better prepared for play on the queenside so his chances for taking over the open file are higher.

Alternatives are:

9...a5 10.\texttt{c2} – see 8...a5 9.\texttt{e3 bd7} 10.\texttt{c2}; 9...\texttt{c5} 10.\texttt{c2} – see 8...a6 9.\texttt{e3 c5} 10.\texttt{c2}.

9...\texttt{e8}. This move has no independent significance. One way or another Black will transfer the play to the King’s Indian or Modern Benoni. 10.\texttt{c2} c5. In the current game he preferred the Modern Benoni. White shows yet another way to convert the two extra tempi into an advantage: 11.\texttt{d2 a6} 12.\texttt{ad1 c7} 13.h3 e6 14.dxe6 fxe6 15.\texttt{f3 f8} 16.\texttt{d2\texttt{±}} Tisdall – Ng, Jakarta 1997;

9...c5 – this is another way of transposing to the Modern Benoni. 10.\texttt{d2 e5} (To 10...\texttt{e8}, Dupont – Avron, France 2002, White could take over the centre by 11.f4. Now Black’s attempts to generate counterplay fail, e.g. 11...\texttt{b6} 12.\texttt{b1\texttt{±}} or 11...\texttt{d4} 12.\texttt{f2 xf2} 13.\texttt{xf2 e6} 14.\texttt{f3\texttt{±}} with excellent prospects in the centre or on either flank.) 11.h3 a6 12.a4 b6 13.f4 \texttt{ed7} 14.\texttt{f2 b7} 15.\texttt{g3 e5} 16.f5 with a kingside attack and a solid space advantage, Lysyj – Turdialiev, Denizli 2004;

9...e6 – Black is suffocating because of lack of space, but
opening up central files favours White who is ahead in development. 10...c2 a6 (hardly better is 10...d5 e5 11...dxe5 dxe5 12...f1 exd5 13.cxd5±. White's initiative in the centre and on the left wing is clearly outweighing the enemy's counterplay on the other side of the board, Seidl – Kamal, Schlosspark 1996) 11...d1 e8, Zimmer – Puster, Germany 1996, 12.h3± Black is unable to set up an active plan whilst the opponent could advance in the centre and on the queenside;

9...e5 – at the surface this looks like the Classical KID, but White has two extra tempi! 10.d2! – a typical KID manoeuvre, which is aimed at utilising a future weakening of the a5 or b6 squares. 10...e8 (10...h8?! wastes yet another tempo – 11.b4 e8 12.c5 f5 13.f3 g8 14.c6 df6 15.cxb7 xxb7 16.c4 h5 17.a5± Kleeschaetzky – H. Urban, Germany 1995) 11.b4 a5, Brond – Stella, Mar del Plata 1967 (11...f5 12.f3 f4 13.f2 g5 14.c5 df6 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.c4 f7 17.a4± Longren – Nazarian, USA 1996, leads to a pet line of V. Korchnoi against the KID with two extra tempi at that!), when simplest is 12.a3 f5 13.f3± – the move a7-a5 only has weakened Black's queenside;

9...g4 10.d4 g5 (or 10...gf6 11.h3 c5 12.e3 a6 13. d2± Salata – Cierny, Rimavska Sobota 1975, again we have the Modern Benoni with two extra tempi for White) 11...e5 dxe5 (not any better is 11...dx5 12.e3 f5 13.f3 df6 14.c5±, when White's initiative on the left side of the board is outpacing Black's play on the kingside, Belli Pino – Carvajal, La Paz 2000) 12.c5 d7?? (12...dx5 13.xc5 f5) 13.f4 1-0 Azevedo – Batista, corr. 1998.

10.h3

10...e8

Alternatives are:

10...c7 11.e1 c5 12.e5 df4 13.xe4 xe4 14.d3 c5 15.f1 cxd5 16.cxd5 a5 17.c1± White has gained space in the centre which allows him to attack on either flank, Arutjunov – Bannik, Yerevan 1981;

10...a5 11.c1 c5 – the Modern Benoni again. 12.a3 a6 13. d2 b5 14.b4! cxb4 (there is no sufficient compensation for the queen after 14...xa3 15.e5 dx5 16.a1 xb4 17.fb1 e4 18.g5 bxc4 19.a4±) 15.axb4 xb4 16. b1± all the files on the queenside open up in favour of White who is better developed and dominates in the centre, Fajardo – Majul, Barranquilla 1999;
10...\textit{c5} 11.\textit{xc2} cxd5 12.cxd5 \textit{d7} (12...\textit{a5} 13.\textit{xf1} \textit{d7} 14.\textit{xc5} dxc5 15.e5\textpm Lelchuk – Zatulovskaya, Alma-Ata 1980) 13.\textit{ac1} \textit{c8} 14.\textit{b1} a5, H.Kramer – L.Szabo, Zaanstreek 1946, when White could grasp the initiative on the queenside by 15.b4 axb4 16.\textit{xb4}\textpm; 10...a6 11.a4 cxd5 12.cxd5 \textit{a5} 13.\textit{d2} \textit{c5}, Basin – Thomas, Detroit 1991. Black has compromised his queenside. A consistent way of using that seems 14.\textit{d4} \textit{c7} 15.\textit{c2}\textpm with fair chances of taking over the only open file and bright prospects in the centre and on the kingside.

11.\textit{c1} a6

12.dxe6! bxe6 13.e5 dxe5 14.\textit{xc5} \textit{c7}, A.Yegiazarian – Kalantarjan, Yerevan 1995. Black’s pawn chain is ruined, the pieces are ill-coordinated. These drawbacks could be underlined by the calm 15.\textit{e3}\textpm.

b) 3...\textit{g7} 4.d5

(diagram)

The only move for Black here that leads to original positions is:

4...\textit{e5}

4...\textit{b8} 5.c4 d6 transposes to the line a.

5.\textit{xe5} \textit{xe5} 6.c4 d6

About 6...\textit{g7} 7.\textit{d3} d6 – see 6...d6 7.\textit{d3} \textit{g7}.

7.\textit{d3} \textit{f6}

7...\textit{g7} 8.0–0 \textit{f6} 9.\textit{c3} 0–0 10.h3 e6 (White has the better game after 10...\textit{e5} 11.\textit{g5} h6 12.\textit{e3} \textit{h5} 13.\textit{d2} \textit{h4}, Davies – Hoi, Espergaerde 1987, when White could practically force the opponent to part with some material by the simple 14.\textit{b5} \textit{d8} 15.\textit{xh6}\textpm; 14...\textit{f4} 15.\textit{xc7} \textit{xh3}+ 16.gxh3 \textit{xh3} 17.f3\textpm. By a precise defence White should be able to neutralise the enemy threats on the kingside.) 11.\textit{g5} c6 12.\textit{d2} cxd5 13.cxd5 e5 14.a4 a6 15.a5 \textit{d7} 16.a4\textpm Black has nothing to oppose to White’s initiative on the queenside, Kasparov – Lefstein, Catonsville (simultane) 1997.

7...e6 – this move is inconsistent. Black is “threatening” to create himself a stranded pawn on c7 after exchanging on d5. 8.\textit{d2} exd5 9.cxd5 \textit{f6} (relatively better is 9...\textit{g7} 10.0–0\textpm, when White still has more space, better development and easy
play against the c7-pawn) 10. \( \text{\$f3 \text{\$d7 11.\$xe5 \text{\$xe5 12.0-0=}}.} \)

The vulnerable dark squares in Black’s camp ensure a solid advantage to White, I.Ibragimov – Delithanasis, Ano Liosia 1995.

7...\text{c6 8.0-0 g5?!? - this is a logical attempt to bolster up the strong bishop in the centre. (White’s play is easier in the event of 8...\text{\$g7 9.\text{\$c3 \text{\$f6 10.} h3 0-0 11.\text{\$e3 \text{\$d7, Somlai – G. Horvath, Pecs 1998. Now 12.\text{\$f4 \text{\$c7 13.\text{\$f3= keeping all options open seems quite good.}} 9.\text{\$c3 h6 10.\text{\$e3 \text{\$f6 11.\text{\$f3 \text{\$g8 12.\text{\$d2 \text{\$d7 13.\text{\$e2 e6 14.\text{dxe6 \text{\$xe6, Roeder – Van Mil, Germany 2002. Here logical continuation of White’s strategy is 15. \text{\$d4= threatening to swap the light-squared bishop or drop onto f5.}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

7...\text{c5 8.0-0 \text{\$f6 (or 8...\text{\$g7 9.\text{\$c3 \text{\$f6 10.f4 0-0, Malich – G.Gonzales, Leipzig 1973. In the current position White is able to gain space on the kingside and gradually prepare a storm there. 11.f5 \text{\$d7 12.\text{\$e3 \text{\$e5 13.\text{\$e2=}} 9.\text{\$d2 \text{\$h5, Moller – Hertweck, Germany 1994 (in response to 9...\text{\$g4, Dudukin – N.Gavrilov, Bor 2000, White has 10.\text{\$a4+ \text{\$d7 11.\text{\$b3=; or 10...\text{\$d7 11. \text{\$xd7+ \text{\$xd7 12.\text{\$f3= and White is on top on account of the strong bishop pair.) 10.\text{\$f3 \text{\$g7 11. \text{\$e1 0-0 (11...e5 12.dxe6 fxe6 13. e5 0-0 14.\text{\$e4=) 12.h3 e5. The only active try. 13.dxe6 fxe6 (13...\text{\$xe6 14.\text{\$g5 \text{\$b6 15.\text{\$b1=) 14.e5 dxe5 15.\text{\$g5 \text{\$c7 16.\text{\$e4= the extra central pawn hinders Black’s bishop from coming into play.}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

8.\text{\$c3 0-0}

Or 8...\text{\$xc3 9.bxc3 \text{\$e8 10. 0-0, and White has a bishop-pair and in case the game is opened – he will enjoy a stable advantage.}}}

9.\text{\$h6 \text{\$e8 10.\text{\$d2 \text{\$g4 (otherwise White’s bishop will support an eventual kingside attack) 11.\text{\$g5 \text{\$f6 12.\text{\$xf6 \text{\$xf6 13. 0-0 \text{\$d7 14.f4 e6 15.\text{\$h1 \text{\$b6 16.\text{\$ae1 \text{\$d4 17.\text{\$e3= Matulovic – Stojanovic, Yugoslavia 1994.}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

\text{Conclusion}

In this chapter we examine positions which are known from the King’s Indian or Modern Benoni. However Black wasted time on manoeuvres with the queen’s knight which gives White in comparison to the above-mentioned openings important extra tempi for development. Therefore the first players can count on a tangible advantage.
Chapter 7

1.e4 \(\mathcal{c}6\) 2.\(\mathcal{f}3\) d6

3.d4

We will analyse in details: a) 3...\(\mathcal{g}4\), b) 3...f5 and c) 3...\(\mathcal{f}6\).

About 3...g6 – see 2...g6; about 3...e6 4.\(\mathcal{c}3\) – see 1.e4 e6 2.d4 \(\mathcal{c}6\) 3.\(\mathcal{f}3\) d6 4.\(\mathcal{c}3\); as for 3...e5 4.\(\mathcal{b}5\) – see Chapter 17 from our Book 1.

a) 3...\(\mathcal{g}4\)

This move is obviously premature, because after White’s most natural move:

4.d5!

Black is faced with serious problems to solve.

4...\(\mathcal{e}5\)

This reaction seems to be the most logical. White however, obtains a stable advantage with a temporary queen-sacrifice.

4...\(\mathcal{x}f3\)?! – a dubious move. Black is wasting time and gives the opponent the bishop pair advantage. 5.\(\mathcal{x}f3\) \(\mathcal{e}5\) 6.\(\mathcal{b}3\) \(\mathcal{c}8\) (much worse is 6...\(\mathcal{f}6\)?) 7.\(\mathcal{x}b7\) \(\mathcal{xe}4\) 8.\(\mathcal{b}5\)+ \(\mathcal{d}7\) 9.\(\mathcal{x}d7\)+ \(\mathcal{xd}7\) 10.\(\mathcal{c}6\++) 7...\(\mathcal{b}8\) 8.\(\mathcal{a}6\) \(\mathcal{b}4\)+ 9.\(\mathcal{c}3\) g6 10.\(\mathcal{b}5\)+ \(\mathcal{d}8\) 11.a3 \(\mathcal{d}4\) 12.\(\mathcal{e}3\)– Lytchak – Mittag, Germany 1997; Black is unable to regain the pawn: 9...\(\mathcal{x}e4\) 10.\(\mathcal{b}5\)+ \(\mathcal{d}8\) 11.\(\mathcal{b}7\) \(\mathcal{c}8\) 12.a3 \(\mathcal{d}4\) 13.\(\mathcal{e}3\)– Black will hardly finish development, Engelhart – Hallmann, Oeffingen 2002; somewhat better is 8...c6 9.0–0 \(\mathcal{f}6\) 10.\(\mathcal{c}3\)± 8.\(\mathcal{e}3\) \(\mathcal{g}6\) 9.\(\mathcal{d}2\) g6, Basheer – Djikerian, Beirut 2000, when simplest is 10.\(\mathcal{e}2\) \(\mathcal{g}7\) 11.0–0±. Although Black’s position looks very solid, the lead in development and the bishop pair secure an advantage to White.

In case of 4...\(\mathcal{b}8\), Black presents White with two tempi;
moreover his prematurely developed bishop comes under attack too. 5.h3, and now no matter where Black retreats his bishop — White easily obtains a great advantage:

and now no matter where Black retreats his bishop — White easily obtains a great advantage:

5...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} h5 6.e\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f6 7.g4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g6 8.e\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c3 e5 9.dxe6 fxe6 10.e5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} fd7 11.exd6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xd6 12.g\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} 5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f6 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xe6= Radulov — Calvo Minguez, Siegen 1970;

5...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xf3 6.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xf3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d7 (6...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f6 7.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} bd7?! 8.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xb7 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xe4 9.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} a3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b8 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c6=; 7...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c8 8.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} bd7 — see 6...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d7 7.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c8 8.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g6; 6...g6 7.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g7 8.g4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f6 9.h4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} h5 10.g5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} fd7 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d2= Hamdouchi — Picarda, Cannes 1999) 7.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c8 8.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g6 9.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d2 g6 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g7 11.0–0 0–0 12.c3 c5 13.a4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c7 14.a5 a6 15.f4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b8 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e8 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} h6 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d8 19.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g4= Al Modiahki — Eid, Dubai 1995;

5...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c8 — Black is just making fun of the chess-playing axioms and therefore the fact that he got crushed is hardly surprising: 6.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f6 7.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g5 h6 8.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e3 e5 9.dxe6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xe6 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d7 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e7 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c6 13.0–0–0 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c8 14.f4 0–0 15.g4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} h7 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d8 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e8 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} g2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e6 19.h4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} h8 20.g5 h5 21.g6 fxg6 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xg6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d7 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} dg1 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} f8 24.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} de7 1–0 Boleslavsky — Duz-Khotimirsky, Moscow 1942.

5.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xe5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xd1 6.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b5+ c6 7.dxc6

7...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} a5+

This is better than: 7...a6? 8.c7+ axb5 9.cxd8\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} + \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xd8 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xf7 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xf7 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d1, and White remains with a solid extra pawn in the endgame.

8.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c3 0–0–0

8...a6 9.b4! (This is much stronger than: 9.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xb5 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xb5 axb5 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} a6 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} d5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xc6 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xd1, as it was played in the game Doppel — Schindwein, Germany 2000.) 9...axb5 (9...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xb5 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xb5 axb5 11.cxb7 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b8 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xb7 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xd1=) 10.bxa5 bxc6 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xc6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} xc2 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b4! and Black's bishop is completely isolated: 12...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} a4 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} cd5! \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} a5 (13...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c8 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} b8 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} e3= and Black will have problems to stop White's passed a-pawn.) 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c6 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} a8 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textbullet}} c7+
\[ \textcolor{red}{\text{Chapter 7}} \]

\[ \textcolor{red}{\text{d7}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a8}} 17.\textcolor{green}{\text{e3}} 18.f6 18.\textcolor{green}{\text{c1+! b7}} 19.\textcolor{blue}{\text{b6+-}}, \text{and White's position is totally winning.} \]

9.\textcolor{blue}{\text{c4}}

\[ \textcolor{red}{9...\textcolor{red}{\text{c7}}} \]

It is just terrible for Black to continue with: 9...\textcolor{red}{\text{xc3}} 10.\textcolor{red}{\text{bxc3 c2}}, Gaggiotti - Giurato, Gubbio 1999, 11.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a5 xe4}} 12.\textcolor{green}{\text{xb7 e8}} 13.f3 \textcolor{green}{\text{f5}} 14.\textcolor{green}{\text{e3}} \pm.

In case of 9...\textcolor{red}{\text{b4}}, White must play very resolutely and exploiting his lead in development he can organize a powerful kingside attack: 10.a3 \textcolor{red}{\text{c5}} (In the event of 10...\textcolor{red}{\text{xc3}}, White should play like after 9...\textcolor{red}{\text{xc3}}. The fact that the pawn is already on a3 does not make any difference.) 11.\textcolor{blue}{\text{e3}} \textcolor{green}{\text{h5}} 12.\textcolor{green}{\text{xd1}}, and Black is already probably beyond salvation, for example: 12...\textcolor{red}{\text{bxc6}} (12...\textcolor{red}{\text{b8}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb7}} \textcolor{red}{\text{b7}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a5+ a8}} 15.\textcolor{green}{\text{c6+ b8}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{d5+-}}) 13.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xc6 a6}} (13...\textcolor{red}{\text{e6}} hardly helps much against White's attack, the game Spraggett – South, Canada 1976 did not last long: 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{b5! d5}} 15.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xa7+ b8}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{b5 xd1+}} 17.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xd1 dx4+}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{e2 e5}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\text{b6 1-0. There is nothing surprising about that if we see Black's kingside pieces which failed to come into play; Black loses immediately after the greedy: 13...\textcolor{blue}{\text{g6? 14.xa7 xg2 15.b5 e8}}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{f1+-; Black will have to defend against a very dangerous attack after: 13...\textcolor{blue}{\text{f6 14.b5}}, for example: 14...\textcolor{red}{\text{a6}} 15.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a7 b8}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{d3+-}}}) 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{d5 g6 15.a5!! xg2}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{xa6!! xh1}} 17.\textcolor{blue}{\text{e2 d5}} 18.\textcolor{blue}{\text{b5! with unavoidable mate.}}

10.\textcolor{blue}{\text{d5 xc2}}

10...\textcolor{red}{\text{bxc6}} 11.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a6+ b8}} 12.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xc7 xc2}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\text{d2 xe4}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a5+- Donaldson – South, Seattle 1988.}}

10...\textcolor{red}{\text{b8}} 11.\textcolor{blue}{\text{c7 a8}} 12.\textcolor{blue}{\text{cb6+ axb6}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb6+ xc7}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xa8+ xa8}} 15.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xd1+- Ramirez Gonzalez – Mingo Fernandez, Tarrega 1995.}}

10...\textcolor{red}{\text{xc6}} 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{xc6 bx6}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{xd1 cxd5}} 13.exd5 \textcolor{red}{\text{f6}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{e3 e6+ Donaldson – Ambler, Seattle 1988 – and White remains with a solid extra pawn.}}

11.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xc7 xc7}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb7 xe4}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\text{e3 xb7}}

It is not better for Black to play: 13...\textcolor{red}{\text{xf2}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{a5 b8}} (Black loses after: 14...\textcolor{red}{\text{xb7}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb7 xc1+ c6}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xc6+-}}) 15.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xc6 h3}} (15...\textcolor{red}{\text{xb7}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{xe1}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{xc1+ c6}} 18.\textcolor{blue}{\text{xc6 d8}} 19.\textcolor{blue}{\text{b5+-}}) 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{d5 d7 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{xf7 g6}} 18.0-0-0+-, and White's initiative is very dangerous despite the material equality.}}

14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{f3 d5}}
5...exf5 6...xf5 6.d5 6.b4
After 6...e5, Black's developed pieces can be attacked: 7.d4 d7 8.f4 g6 8...e4g4 9.h3 h6 10.g4±, and White's lead in development is overwhelming; 8...h6 9.b5+, and White's knight penetrates the e6-square.) 9.h4±, Black's defence is extremely difficult, because of the problems with the development of his kingside.

It is not better for Black to try: 6...b8 7.d4 d7 8.c4 c6 9.0-0 b5 (9...g4 10...e1 cxd5 11.cxd5 e5 12.f3 d7 13.f4 c6 14.fxe5 dxe5 15.e6 xe6 16.xf6+ gxf6 17.xe6++) 10.dxc6 bxc4 11.cxd7+ bxd7 11...xd7 12.f3 d5 13.xg5++ 12.xe6 a5 13.xe1++.

7.d4 d7
After 7...d7 8.a3 a6 9.a6 ba 10.g5 f7 11...f3±, White dominates in the centre and he has a great advantage, because of the weak light squares in Black's camp.

It is still slightly better for Black to try: 7...c8 8.c4 c6 9.dxc6, but he has great problems to solve with his development: 9...xc6 (9...bxc6 10.0-0 d5 11.b3, and White has a huge lead in development and pressure in the centre.) 10.0-0 xd4 (10...e5 11.b5+ f7 12.a4 g6 13.b3+ g7 14.xf5+ xf5 15.b5! b3+ 16.xf3 xb5 17.e6++) 11.xd4 xc2 12.e1 e5 (12...f5 13.
13. f4 e4 (13... \textit{g}4 14. \textit{b}5, and White has a powerful attack against Black's king stranded in the centre, despite the material equality.) 14. \textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 15. \textit{xe}4+ \textit{xe}4 16. \textit{xe}4+ \textit{d}8 (16... \textit{e}7 17. \textit{e}3+-- 17. \textit{d}5 \textit{d}7 18. \textit{e}3 \textit{e}7 (18... \textit{e}8 19. \textit{d}3 \textit{a}4 20. \textit{d}4±) 19. \textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8 20. \textit{c}6 \textit{d}5 (20... \textit{c}7 21. \textit{b}4!±) 21. \textit{a}5 \textit{d}6 22. \textit{xb}7 \textit{f}6 22... \textit{f}6 23. \textit{xa}7++; 22... \textit{f}8 23. \textit{c}3+-- 23. \textit{d}4+ and White's compensation for the exchange is excellent with a couple of pawns and two all-powerful bishops dominating all over the board.

8. \textit{b}5 c6 9. dxc6 bxc6

Black cannot solve his problems with 9... \textit{xc}6, after the natural reaction: 10. \textit{f}5 \textit{f}5 11.0–0, and White remains with a clear advantage – he has a bishop-pair in an open position, moreover Black must solve the problem of the safety of his king.

10. \textit{a}4 \textit{c}8
10... \textit{g}6 11. a3 e5 12. \textit{xb}4 exd4 13. \textit{xd}4+--.
11. a3 \textit{bd}5
11... \textit{a}6 12. \textit{f}3 \textit{g}4 13. \textit{xc}6+--.
12. \textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 13. \textit{xf}3 \textit{g}4

Black cannot solve the problems of the defence with his other moves either: 13... e6 14. \textit{xf}5 exf5 15.0–0±, or 13... g6 14. c4 \textit{g}4 15. \textit{e}4 \textit{f}5 (15... \textit{f}6 16. \textit{xe}6 \textit{xc}6 17. \textit{xc}6+ \textit{d}7 18. \textit{xd}7+ \textit{xd}7 19. \textit{b}3 \textit{c}5 20. \textit{b}1± 16. \textit{xf}5 gxf5 17. \textit{e}2 \textit{f}6 18.c5±.


c) 3... \textit{f}6 4. \textit{c}3

4... \textit{g}4

Besides that logical move, we will analyse too: 4...d5, 4... \textit{d}7, 4...e6, 4...e5 and even the more logical 4...a6, with the idea to prevent White from playing \textit{b}5, as well as 4...g6, transposing to
the Pirc Defence.

About 4...e6 5.d5 – see 1.e4 e6
2.d4 ♘c6 3.♘f3 d6 4.♗c3 ♘f6
5.d5.

4...d5 5.e5 ♗e4 6.♗d3 ♘f5
7.♗e2 ♘xc3 8.bxc3±.

4...♗d7 5.e5 dxe5 6.dxe5 ♗g4
7.♗f4±.

4...e5 5.♗b5 – this transfers
to the Ruy Lopez and the main
lines have been analysed in our
book 1 (5...♗d7 6.♗xc6 – line a,
Chapter 17, 5...exd4 6.♗xd4 ♘d7
7.♗xc6 – variation b, Chapter
17), now we will analyse some
seldom played lines:

After 5...a6? 6.♗xc6 bxc6
7.dxe5± Luque – Walters, Luzern
1968, White has a solid extra
pawn in the centre;

The same happens to Black after:
5...♗e7? 6.dxe5 dxe5 7.
♗xd8 ♘xd8 8.♗xe5± Redichova –
Suchoradská, Czech Republic
1999;

In case of 5...♗g4?, White's
simplest line is: 6.d5 a6 7.♗a4 b5
8.♗xb5 axb5 9.♗xb5 ♘d7 10.
dxc6+– Krupkova – Jurikova,
Czech Republic 1993;

The move 5...♗d7, does not
help Black's development and its
only merit is that the e5-pawn
has been defended, therefore
White should not be attracted by
the possible doubling of pawns,
instead, he should simply de-
velop his pieces, for example:
6.
0–0 ♗e7 7.♗d5 0–0 8.♗xe7+ ♘xe7
9.♗e1±, as it was played in
the game Stoliar – Antoshin,
Leningrad 1957. White has a
slight, but stable advantage with
his two bishops and complete
dominance in the centre.

4...g6 5.♗b5 (That move em-
phasizes the fact that the de-
velopment of the knight to c6 is still
rather premature for Black.)
5...a6 (It is too bad for Black to
play: 5...♗d7 6.♗e5! dxe5 7.dxe5
♗g4 8.♗e2 ♘g7 9.♗f4 a6 10.♗c4
e6 11.h3 ♘h6 12.0–0–0 ♘f5 13.
♗e4 ♘e7 14.g4 ♘h6 15.♗f6+–
Wojtkiewicz – Stenzel, Nassau
1999.) 6.♗xc6+ (White plays the
following line quite seldom, but
it is still interesting: 6.♗a4!? b5
7.♗b3 ♘g7 8.h3 0–0 9.0–0 e6 10.
a3 ♘b7 11.♗e1 ♗a5 12.♖a2 c5 13.
d5 e5 14.b4 cxb4 15.axb4 ♘c7 16.
bxa5 ♘xc3 17.♗d2 ♘c7 18.c4±
Kozakov – Zajarnyi, Lviv 1998)
6...bxc6 7.h3± (The main de-
fault of Black’s position is that his
pawns in the centre are immo-
bile and they stand in the
way of his own pieces.) 7...♗g7
8.0–0 0–0 9.♗e1 ♘b8 (9...♗d7 10.♗e3
♗b7 11.♗d2 c5, Kacheishvili –
Yilmaz, Ankara 1997, now it is
good to start play against the
weak pawns: 12.dxc5 ♘xc5 13.
♗xc5 dxc5 14.♗g5, for example:
14...♗d6 15.♖ad1 ♘d4 16.♗e2±;
15...♗c6 16.♗d5±; 15...♗b6 16.
♗a4 ♘b5 17.♖xc5 ♘f6 18.♗e3±
Black's bishop pair is not enough
to compensate the lack of pawn,
because White's pieces are very
active. For instance, 18...♗xb2?
fails to 19.♗b1+– with severe
material losses, or 14...♗xc3
15.bxc3 ♘d6 16.♖ad1 ♗e6 17.
\(\text{ex}c5 \text{ex}a2 18.\text{d}d4!\,++;\) 15...f5 16. \text{h}h6 e5 – worse is 16...e6 17.\text{g}g5 \text{e}7 18.\text{ex}f5++ – 17.\text{dx}e5 \text{d}6 18. \text{ex}f5 \text{xf}5 19.\text{g}g4++. White is a sound pawn up.) 12.\text{b}1 h6 (10... \text{d}d7 11.\text{g}g5!? h6 12.\text{h}4 g5 13. \text{g}g3 e5 14.\text{d}xe5 \text{d}xe5 15.\text{d}d3 \text{c}e7 16.\text{a}4 \text{e}8 17.\text{c}3 \text{f}8 18.b3 \text{f}6 19.\text{c}5 \text{g}6 20.\text{bd}1 \text{f}8 21. \text{d}d3 \text{d}6 22.\text{xc}6 \text{xh}3 23. \text{dx}e5 \text{xe}5 24.\text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 25. \text{dx}e5 \text{xe}5 26.\text{xd}6 \text{xd}6 27. gh++ Vuckovic – Petronijevic, Budva 2003.) 11.\text{e}3 \text{h}7 12. \text{d}d3 \text{d}7, Mehlhorn – Diebl, Germany 1996. Now it is a good idea to fix the weaknesses on the queenside by 13.b4! which leaves Black without counterplay, e.g.: 13...e5 14.\text{d}xe5 \text{xe}5 15.\text{dx}e5 \text{e}6 16.\text{a}7 \text{a}8 17.\text{d}d4++. Black had to part with the bishop pair, but not with his weaknesses; 10...\text{b}7 11.\text{g}5 \text{h}6 12.\text{f}4 \text{h}7 13.b4 \text{d}7 (The attempt to activate the bishops by 13...\text{h}5 14.\text{h}2 c5 15.bxc5 dxc5 fails to 16.\text{d}5! \text{xd}5 17.\text{xb}8 \text{xb}8 18.\text{ex}d5++) 14.\text{d}3++. Black has a solid, but very passive position. It is difficult to find counterplay, Hildner – Dunne, Email 1999.

4...a6 5.h3

And now:

5...e6 6.\text{d}3 \text{e}7 7.0–0 \text{h}6 (7...0–0 8.a3 e5, Crespo – Schreurs, IECC 1996, 9.d5 \text{b}8 10.\text{e}2 c6 11.\text{c}4++) 8.a3 0–0 9.\text{e}3 \text{d}7 10.\text{d}2 e5 (10...b5 is dangerous due to 11.\text{e}5 \text{d}5 12.\text{xh}6! gxh6 13.\text{x}d5 \text{xd}5 14.\text{xh}6++) 11.\text{d}5 \text{b}8 12.\text{e}2 c6 13.\text{c}4 \text{xd}5 14. \text{xd}5 a5 15.b4++, White seized the centre and has a lasting initiative on the queenside, Studnicka – Vorsilka, Svetla nad Sazavvou 1998;

The position after 5...e5 occurred in several games. Unfortunately simplification by 6.\text{dx}e5 does not promise an edge: 6... \text{xe}5! 7.\text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 8.\text{xd}8+ \text{xd}8 9.\text{g}5 \text{e}6 10.0–0+ \text{c}8 11.f4 exf4 12.e5 \text{d}7 = Delchev – Drazic, Nova Gorica 2005. That's why I propose the consistent developing move 6.\text{e}3 \text{e}7 (if Black weakens his kingside by 6...g6, trying to transpose to the Pirc, 7.\text{dx}e5! is already a good option). Here my novelty is 7.g4!?, with the following possibilities: 7...h6 8.\text{g}2 \text{d}7 9. \text{e}2++; 7...\text{exd}4 8.\text{xd}4 \text{e}5 (8...0–0 9.g5 \text{d}7 10.\text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 11.\text{h}5 \text{b}8 12.0–0–0++; 8...h6 9.\text{g}2++) 9.f4 \text{g}6 10.\text{e}2++; 7...0–0 8.g5 \text{d}7 (8...\text{h}5 9.\text{g}1++) 9.g1 \text{exd}4 10.\text{xd}4 \text{dx}d4 11. \text{xd}4 \text{e}5 12.\text{e}2+ \text{c}6 (12... \text{hx}h3 13.0–0–0 \text{e}6 14.f4+). Summing up, Black's extra pawn has no influence on the play, whilst the open file h, spatial advantage and advanced pawns on the
kingside promise White good attacking chances.) 13.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{d}x\text{h}3 \) – that is very risky indeed, but otherwise Black could suffer an attack for free, 14.0-0-0x; 5...\text{g}6 6.\text{e}3 \text{g}7 7.\text{d}2

Black tested:

7...\text{h}6 – this move hampers a short castling, Samar – Ilic, Penrith 2003, 8.d5 \( \text{e}5 \) (inferior is 8...\text{b}8 9.a4! \text{bd}7 10.\text{e}2x, White is close to finishing development and beginning active operations on the queenside or in the centre. It is difficult to Black to oppose a sensible plan) 9.\text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 10.0-0-0 b5 (or 10...\text{d}6 11.f3 \text{d}7 12.\text{f}2x) 11.f3 e6 (11...\text{d}6 12.\text{f}2x) 12.\text{c}5 \text{exd}5 13.\text{exd}5 \text{d}7 14.\text{a}3 \text{h}8 15.\text{e}4x Black’s king is stuck in the centre;

7...b5 8.\text{d}3 e5 (or 8...\text{b}7 9.a4 0-0 10.axb5 axb5 11.0-0 b4 12.\text{d}5 e6, De Covery – Foster, Kidlington 1991, when White gets a small, but lasting edge by the calm 13.\text{xf}6+ \text{xf}6 14.c4x with a spatial advantage) 9.\text{dxe}5 \text{dxe}5, Limpert – Diebl, Germany 2004, the opponents signed a draw here, but 10.\text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 11.a4 b4 12.\text{a}2 a5 13.\text{d}1 0-0 14.\text{c}5 \text{e}8 15.\text{e}3x is in White’s favour in view of the overex- tended enemy pawns;

7...e6 8.\text{h}6 0-0 9.\text{g}7 \text{xg}7, Czoeppan – Klee, Wattens 1995, White managed to swap the central defender – the bishop on g7, so he can afford sharp actions: 10.0-0-0 b5 11.\text{e}3 b4 12.\text{e}2 a5 (too slow is 12...\text{e}7 13.\text{g}4! \text{d}7 14.\text{g}5x 13.\text{f}4 a4 14.e5 \text{d}5 (14...\text{d}7 15.h4x) 15.\text{xd}5 \text{exd}5 16.\text{b}5 \text{d}7 17.\text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 18.h4x. The weakness of the kingside dark squares looks a more weighty factor than the far-advanced black pawns on the opposite flank;

7...d5?! 8.e5 \text{e}4, and in this position, in the game Neves – Frazao Portugal 1993, White played 9.\text{d}3x! and after 9...\text{f}5 failed to hold the position. Naturally, it was much stronger for White to play instead the obvious: 9.\text{xe}4! \text{dxe}4 10.\text{g}5 f6 (10...\text{d}5 11.\text{b}3x) 11.\text{exf}6 \text{exf}6 12.\text{xe}4x, and White remains with an extra pawn;

7...0-0 8.d5 \text{a}5 9.a4 e6 10.\text{e}2 \text{exd}5 11.\text{exd}5 \text{c}6, and here instead of: 12.\text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 13.0-0 \text{d}5 14.\text{d}4x Zhuravlov – Donguines, Moscow 1994, it is more precise for White to play: 12.b4 \text{xb}5 13.\text{d}4 \text{xb}4 14.\text{g}7 \text{xc}2+ 15.\text{xc}2 \text{xc}7 16.0-0x, and Black’s three pawns for the piece are not sufficient compensation.

5.\text{e}3
Chapter 7

and Black has five logical moves in that position: c1) 5...d5, c2) 5...e5, c3) 5...g6, c4) 5...a6 and c5) 5...e6.

c1) 5...d5

This is the pet move of Zvonimir Mestrovic.

6.h3 \text{xf3}

6...\text{h5} 7.e5 \text{e4} 8.\text{e2} e6 9.c3 (I can recommend to the fans of extreme sports 9.\text{f4}!! Pavasovic – Kos, Ljubljana 2000, when the best answer 9...\text{b4}+! leads to interesting variations: 10.c3 \text{xc3} 11.bxc3 \text{xc3}+ 12.\text{e2} \text{xf3}+ 13.\text{xf3} \text{xa1} 14.\text{xa1} f6! 15.\text{b5} fxe5 16.dxe5 0–0 17.\text{xe6} bxe6 18.\text{g4}!!+) Despite the original location of White’s king, it seems that the minor pieces are stronger than Black’s rook with pawns.) 9...f6 (after 9...\text{xf3} 10.gxf3 \text{g5} 11.\text{f4} h6 12.h4 \text{f7} 13.d3+ the activity of White’s pieces more than compensate for his pawn weaknesses) 10.\text{f4} \text{f7} 11.\text{d3} \text{e7} 12.\text{c2} f5 13.\text{h4}+ Hagarova – E. Danielian, Batumi 1999.

7.\text{xf3} e6

Black tested also 7...\text{b4}, but following 8.0–0–0 dxe4 9.\text{xe4}

\text{xe4} (worse is 9...\text{xa2}+?! 10.\text{b1} \text{b4} 11.\text{xf6}+ \text{exf6} 12.\text{xb7}+ 10.\text{xe4} \text{d5} 11.\text{xd5} \text{d5} 12.\text{d2} White obtains a clear advantage in the ending due to his bishop pair. He could increase his edge by gaining more space: 12...e6 13.c4 \text{f6} 14.g4 0–0–0 15.\text{e3} \text{b8} 16.g5 \text{d7} 17.h4 h6 18.\text{d3} hgx5 19.\text{hgx5}+ Gibney – Payne, Canada 1999.

8.e5 \text{d7} 9.0–0–0 \text{e7} 10.\text{d3} a6

Black is lagging behind in development so he should refrain from opening up files in the centre by 10...c5 11.dxc5 \text{xe5} 12.\text{b5}+ \text{c6} (or 12...\text{c6} 13.\text{he1}+) 13.\text{g3} a6 14.\text{a4}+

11.\text{a3} c5 12.dxc5 \text{c7} 13.\text{a4} \text{g6}

Dangerous is 13...\text{xe5} 14.\text{f4} \text{h5} 15.\text{he1} \text{c8} 16.\text{b6} \text{xc5} (16...\text{xb6} 17.\text{xe5} forces Black to sacrifice the queen: 17...\text{xd1}+! 18.\text{xd1} \text{a4} 19.b4! \text{c6} 20.\text{g5}! this powerful resource keeps White’s advantage 20...\text{xb4} 21.\text{xc3}+ 17.\text{xd7} \text{xd7} 18.\text{e5} f5 19.\text{xe6}+.

14.f4 \text{xc5} 15.\text{xc5} \text{xc5}
16.\textit{\textbf{ex}}c5 \textit{\textbf{wc}}c5 17.h4± Sveshnikov – Mestrović, Nova Gorica 2004. White is exerting strong pressure on the kingside in a calm position.

\textbf{c2) 5...e5 6.d5}

6...\textit{\textbf{db}}8

After 6...\textit{\textbf{ed}}7 7.h3, White has a stable space advantage and therefore he is clearly better. The following lines confirm that evaluation:

7...\textit{\textbf{bd}}7 8.g4!? \textit{\textbf{fg}}6 (8...h6 9.\textit{\textbf{dd}}2 g5 10.0–0–0± Perez Rodriguez – Salgado Gonzalez, Vila de Padron 2000) 9.g5 \textit{\textbf{gg}}8 10.h4 h6 11.\textit{\textbf{gg}}1 a6 12.\textit{\textbf{dd}}2 h5 13.\textit{\textbf{ee}}2 \textit{\textbf{de}}6 14.0–0–0 g6 15.\textit{\textbf{ee}}1 \textit{\textbf{gg}}7 16.f4 \textit{\textbf{f}}c8 17.\textit{\textbf{dd}}3 \textit{\textbf{fx}}f4 18.\textit{\textbf{xf}}f4 \textit{\textbf{ge}}7 19.\textit{\textbf{dd}}4 \textit{\textbf{ee}}5 20.a4 \textit{\textbf{ff}}8 21.\textit{\textbf{ee}}3 \textit{\textbf{gg}}7 22.\textit{\textbf{dd}}3 b6 23.\textit{\textbf{df}}1 \textit{\textbf{eh}}7 24.\textit{\textbf{xe}}5+ dxe5 25.\textit{\textbf{gg}}3+– Cicak – Kaulfuss, Germany 1995;

7...\textit{\textbf{xf}}3 8.\textit{\textbf{xf}}3 a6 (8...h6 9.\textit{\textbf{dd}}1 \textit{\textbf{gg}}6 10.g3 \textit{\textbf{ee}}7 11.\textit{\textbf{dd}}2 a6 12.\textit{\textbf{dd}}3 \textit{\textbf{dd}}7 13.0–0–0 b5 14.f4± Zatulovskaya – Skaegna, Riga 1968; White is also better after: 9.a4 c6 10.a5±) 9.0–0–0 \textit{\textbf{dd}}7 10.h4 (it is quite effective for White to continue with: 10.g4

\textbf{\textit{\textbf{gg}}}6 11.g5 \textit{\textbf{ee}}7 12.h4 0–0 13.\textit{\textbf{h}}3± 10...h5 11.g3 g6 12.\textit{\textbf{dd}}3 \textit{\textbf{gg}}7 13.\textit{\textbf{ee}}2 0–0, Hagarova – Kriz, Slovakia 1996, and now after the energetic move 14.g4!, he is clearly better: 14...\textit{\textbf{hg}}xg4 15.\textit{\textbf{xf}}4 f5 16.\textit{\textbf{ff}}3±.

7.h3 \textit{\textbf{hh}}5

7...\textit{\textbf{c}}8 8.a4 g6 9.a5 a6 10.\textit{\textbf{dd}}3 \textit{\textbf{gg}}7 11.\textit{\textbf{ee}}2 0–0 12.c4 \textit{\textbf{ee}}8 13.g4± Godena – Di Paolo, Genova 1999.

7...\textit{\textbf{xf}}3 8.\textit{\textbf{xf}}3 \textit{\textbf{ee}}7 9.g4 c6 (9...c5?! 10.g5 \textit{\textbf{fd}}7 11.h4± Mista – Janaszk, Zakopane 2001; 9...0–0 10.h4 \textit{\textbf{dd}}7 11.0–0–0 a6 12.\textit{\textbf{ee}}2 c6 13.g5± \textit{\textbf{ee}}8 14.\textit{\textbf{gg}}3 g6 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.\textit{\textbf{gg}}4 \textit{\textbf{gg}}7 17.h5 f5 18.\textit{\textbf{c}}4+ d5 19.\textit{\textbf{xd}}5+– Felgaer – Liashychov, Ezeiza 2001) 10.0–0–0 (10.g5 \textit{\textbf{fd}}7 11.\textit{\textbf{gg}}1±) 10...\textit{\textbf{a}}5 11.g5 \textit{\textbf{fd}}7 12.h4± Bank – Nielsen, Aarhus 1993.

8.g4 \textit{\textbf{gg}}6 9.\textit{\textbf{dd}}2 c6

9...\textit{\textbf{ee}}7 10.g5 \textit{\textbf{h}}5 (10...\textit{\textbf{fd}}7 11.h4 f6 12.\textit{\textbf{gg}}4 \textit{\textbf{fx}}g5 13.\textit{\textbf{hx}}g5 \textit{\textbf{db}}6 14.0–0–0 c5 15.f4± Fressinet – Kovarick, Montlucon 1997) 11.h4 \textit{\textbf{dd}}7? (11...h6 12.\textit{\textbf{gg}}4±; 11...f6 12.\textit{\textbf{gg}}1± 12.\textit{\textbf{ee}}2 \textit{\textbf{ff}}4 13.\textit{\textbf{xf}}4 exf4 14.h5±.

\textbf{This position was reached in}
the game Nevednichy – Nicolescu, Romania 1992, and White had better play the simple: 10.g5! ∆fd7 (It is not any better for Black to continue with: 10... ∆g8 11.h4 h6 12.∆f3 hxg5 13. hxg5 ∆xh1 14.∆xh1 ∆e7 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.0–0–0±; or 10...h5 11.∆e2 ∆xe2 12.∆xe2 ∆fd7 13.0–0–0±, and Black has managed to exchange the light-squared bishops indeed, but he lags in development considerably; 10...∆h5 11.h4 ∆e7? 12. ∆e2+–; 11...h6 12.∆f3 hxg5 13.hxg5 ∆e7 14.dxc6 bxc6 15. 0–0–0 ∆xg5 16.∆c4±.) 11.h4 h6 12.gxh6 gxh6 13.h5 ∆h7 14. ∆g1±. Black does not have a single piece that can be defined as reasonably placed. White’s advantage in development is overwhelming.

c3) 5...g6

There arise positions from the Pirc Defence and Black’s development of the bishop to the g4-square is evidently premature. White can immediately exploit that with:

6.h3 ∆xf3 7.∆xf3 ∆g7

7...e5 8.∆b5 ∆d7, Varlotta – Nazzari, Uruguay 1960, now White can simplify to a very favourable endgame by the strong move 9.∆c4! ∆f6 (9...f5? 10.exf5 exd4 11.fxe6 ∆de5 12. ∆f7+–) 10.∆xf6 ∆xf6 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.0–0–0± White’s bishop pair and better development doom the opponent to a long unpleasant defence;

7...∆b4?! 8.∆b5+ ∆d7 (8...c6 9.∆a4±) 9.∆a4 c6 10.a3 ∆a6 11.∆b3. Black is by all means worse. After 11...e6 12.h4± White has a strong initiative on the kingside. Apparently the opponent was fed up with his position because he played 11...c5?? 12. ∆xf7# Daamen – van der Vliet, Dieren 1979.

8.0–0 0–0

8...a6?! – this appears to be a waste of time since Black can hardly generate serious threats on the kingside. 9.g4 ∆d7, Burchardt – Micic, Germany 2003, now White prepares f4 by 10.∆g2! e6 (more dangerous is 10...e5 11.dxe5 ∆xe5 12.∆d5±; 11...dxe5 12.f4 ∆d7 13.∆d5±) 11.f4 ∆e7 12.d5 (12.e5 is good too) 12...∆d8 13.∆d2 0–0 14.∆g2 ∆b6 15.∆d3± White has two bishops, a big advantage in space and attacking prospects.

8...e5?! – this dubious move allows White, who is better developed and has a bishop pair, to open up central files. 9.dxe5 ∆xe5 10.∆e2 ∆e7 11. ∆g5 c6, Bizat – Rowe, Erevan
1996, 12.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{w}d2}} h6 13.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{a}e3}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}8}} (Black is on the downgrade, but 13...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d8}} 14.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}4}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}d7}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{w}xd6\pm}} just loses a pawn) 14.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}4}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}d7}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d4\pm}}.

8...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}} 9.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}4}} e5 10.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}xe5}} dxe5, Merklinger – Mueller, Germany 1999, It is still not clear where White’s bishop would be needed, so it is better to delay its deployment. Instead White can start immediately active operations on the kingside. 11.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}3}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d4}} 12.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}4\pm}} Black is doomed to uneasy defence, for instance 12...h5 13.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}g}\texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}h5}} 14.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}b5}} a6 (14...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}xb5}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}b5}} c6 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}2++}}) 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}xd4}} exd4 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}xd4}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}d4}} 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e4\pm}} with a sound extra pawn.

9.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}4}}

\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}}

9...a5?! – perhaps this move is aimed at overtaking the initiative, but in fact it is more a weakening. 10.h4 a4, Alfred – Schu- lien, Ohio 1981, when after 11.g5 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}5}} (11...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}} 12.h5\rightarrow) 12.a3+, Black has little to oppose to the gathering attack on the kingside.

9...a6 10.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}2}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}} 11.h4 (It is even stronger for White to continue with: 11.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}4}}! e5 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.f5\pm, beginning a direct kingside attack.) 11...e5 12.dxe5 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}xe5}} 13.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}d5}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e8}} 14.g5 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e7\pm}} Ciocaltea – Knaak, Bucharest 1975.

9...e5 10.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}xe5}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}xe5}} 11.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}2}} a6 (11...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e8}} – allows White to start active operations in the centre, Pitl – Rogers, Augsburg 2005, 12.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}4}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}c6}} 13.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e5}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}} 14.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}b5\pm}}. It is late for a good advice, for instance 14...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d8}} 15.g5! \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}c8}} 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e2}} gives White full control over the centre. That makes it difficult for Black to parry the imminent attack. At the same time 14...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}xe5}}? is even worse: 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}c6}} bc 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}c6}} \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}e7}} 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}c5++}};

White can afford to play aggressively, because of his extra space and the two-bishop advantage.

9...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}}

9...a5?! – perhaps this move is aimed at overtaking the initiative, but in fact it is more a weakening. 10.h4 a4, Alfred – Schu- lien, Ohio 1981, when after 11.g5 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}5}} (11...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}d7}} 12.h5\rightarrow) 12.a3+, Black has little to oppose to the gathering attack on the kingside.

10.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}4}} e5

It is less logical for Black to play: 10...h6, after which in the
game: Perunovic – Lazic, Herceg Novi 1999, White had an overwhelming attack: 11.\(\text{g}3\) e5 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.\(\text{b}5\) db4 14.g5 c6 15.gxh6 h8 16.h5 h7 17.hxg6+ fxg6 18.\(\text{f}1\) g8 19.\(\text{d}7\) xc7 20.xd4 b5 21.h3 af8 22.xd7 xd7 23.xe5 xe6 24.xh8 xh8 25.d6 xe4 26.xg6 xg6 27.xf4 f4+ 28.b1 b1 e5 29.a3+–.

11.dxe5

This opening of the d-file is very attractive for White. He has the bishop-pair and his queen’s rook has already occupied the d-file, so opening of the centre is definitely in White’s favour.

In the game Walsh – Larsen, Munich 1958, which was won by Black, White here played instead 11.d5.

11...\(\text{c}6\)

We will convince you easily that no matter what Black plays – his position will remain very difficult:

11...dxe5 12.g5 d4 13.h3 c5 14.h5+;
11...\(\text{c}5\) 12.d5 b6 13.h3 g7 14.g5 e8 15.h5+;
11...\(\text{d}5\) 12.h3 d7 (12...


12.h3 b6

After 12...f6 13.e2 d7 14.f3 c6 15.g5 e8 (15...xh3 16.xh3 h5 17.f4 c6 18.d5+) 16.h5, White has the bishop-pair and space advantage. He can easily organize a kingside attack, so we evaluate his position as winning; if 12...a5, then 13.g5 e8 14.h5 d8 15.f4 c6 16.hxg6 hxg6 17.f5, and White has a checkmating attack.

13.f4 c4 (After Black’s other retreats of the knight – 13..c6, or 13..d7, White’s simplest reaction is 14.d2+, with a great advantage for him, because of the bishop-pair, the lead in development and the extra space.) 14.xc4 xc4 15.d4! xd4 16.xd4 (Black’s defence did not become any easier after the exchange of several pieces. White enjoys a space advantage and he can proceed with operations in the centre as well as on the kingside.) 16...b6 17.h5 g5 18.e5 c7 (It is

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not better for Black to play: 18...gxf4 19.\
\textit{c}e4 \textit{h}h8 20.\textit{exd}6 \\textit{cx}d6 21.\
\textit{xd}6 \textit{c}7 22.\textit{h}h6\textit{±}.)

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1.e4 \textit{xc}6 2.\textit{d}f3 \textit{d}6 3.\textit{d}4 \textit{xf}6 4.\textit{xc}3 \textit{g}4 5.\textit{xe}3 \\
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\textbf{c4) 5...a6} \\
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That move looks like a loss of time.

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\textbf{6.h3 \textit{h}5} \\
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6...\textit{d}7? – a weird move, which forces Black to “restart” his king’s knight after 7.e5 \textit{g}8
8.\textit{d}2\textit{±} Dos Santos – Lins, Brazil 1998.

After 6...\textit{xf}3 7.\textit{xf}3 e5 8.0-0-0 \textit{ex}d4 9.\textit{x}d4 \textit{d}7, White plays the spectacular move 11.e5!, and achieves a slight, but long-lasting advantage: 11...dxe5 12.\textit{c}4
\textit{g}5+ 13.\textit{d}2 0-0-0 14.\textit{e}4 \textit{h}6 15.\textit{hd}1 \textit{b}6 16.\textit{xf}7 \textit{d}6 17.
\textit{f}5+ \textit{b}8 18.\textit{g}5 \textit{x}g5 19.\textit{x}g5
\textit{h}6 20.\textit{e}4\textit{±} Donev – Thoma, Goetzi 1997.

White has no problems to obtain an advantage after Black plays 6...\textit{c}8. In the game Fernan-
dez – Padeiro, Bobadela 2002, after 7.\textit{d}2 \textit{g}6 8.0-0-0, White controls the centre completely and can patiently organize a

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\textbf{7.d5 \textit{xf}3} \\
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Black prefers to exchange his bishop immediately, instead of isolating it from the actions in the game.

After 7...\textit{b}8, White can create great problems for Black with the energetic move 8.\textit{g}4?! , which restricts his opponent’s bishop: 8...\textit{g}6 9.\textit{d}2!? e5 10.\textit{f}e \textit{f}e 11.\textit{g}5
\textit{fd}7 12.\textit{g}4 \textit{f}7 13.0-0-0 \textit{c}6 14.f4\textit{±}.

The retreat of the knight in the centre does not look promising for Black at all: 7...
\textit{e}5 8.\textit{g}4! \textit{g}6 9.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}6 10.
\textit{f}4 \textit{ed}7 11.\textit{g}2 (It also looks good for White to continue with: 11.f5?! \textit{h}7 12.\textit{e}2 \textit{g}6 13.0-0-0
\textit{g}7 14.\textit{f}3\textit{±} and Black’s bishop on h7 is a sorry sight.) 11...e6 12.f5 \textit{xf}5 13.\textit{xf}5 \textit{e}7 14.\textit{e}2
\textit{h}7 15.0-0-0 0-0-0-0 16.\textit{dd}1 \textit{g}6 17.\textit{fg}6 \textit{ag}6 18.\textit{ac}4 \textit{a}5 19.
\textit{d}4 \textit{b}6 20.\textit{a}4\textit{±} Erendzhenov – Azahari, Elista 1998.

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\textbf{8.gxf3!} \\
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White exerts such powerful pressure after that unexpected capture, that presently nobody has tried to find any improve-
ment for Black at all in that position.

8...\(\text{b}8 9.f4 \text{c}6 10.\text{g}2 \text{c}7 11.\text{d}4!  \\
This centralization is quite logical. White exploits his advantage in space and development and prepares opening of the game.

11...\(\text{xd}5 12.\text{xd}5! \text{xd}5 13.\text{xd}5 \text{d}7 14.\text{c}4 \text{f}6  \\
Otherwise, it is not quite clear how Black can develop his kingside.

15.\text{c}1! \text{g}6 16.\text{c}5 \text{xc}5 17. \text{xc}5 \text{d}6 18.\text{a}4+ \text{d}7 (Black does not fare any better after: 18...\text{d}7 19.\text{c}4+) 19.\text{c}6! \text{b}8  \\
(White’s attack is very dangerous too after: 19...\text{b}xc6 20.\text{xc}6 \text{c}8 21.\text{xa}6! (±) 20.\text{b}6 \text{c}8  \\
21.0-0 \text{b}8 22.\text{c}1 \text{d}8 23.\text{d}  \\
\text{g}7 24.\text{xb}7 \text{xb}7 25.\text{xb}7 1-0 \text{Onischuk – Miles, Wijk aan \text{Zee} 1996. Black failed altogether to bring his king to safety in that game.}

\text{c}5) 5...\text{e}6 6.\text{h}3 \text{h}5  \\
White’s attack develops much simpler after: 6...\text{xf}3 7.\text{xf}3, for example: 7...\text{e}7 (7...\text{d}5 8.e5  \\
\text{d}7 9.0-0-0 – see line c1) 8. 0-0-0 0-0 9.g4 \text{d}7 10.\text{h}4 \text{e}5 11.\text{dxe}5 \text{dxe}5 12.\text{g}3 \text{a}5 13. \text{f}4± Vasta – Scalise, Mar del Plata 2002.

7.\text{d}5

7...\text{xf}3 8.\text{xf}3 \text{e}5 (8...\text{xd}5  \\
– see 7...\text{xd}5) 9.\text{e}2 \text{c}6 (9...\text{d}7 10.0-0-0 \text{xd}5 11.\text{d}5 \text{e}7 12.\text{f}4  \\
\text{g}6 13.\text{g}4± Brustkern – Przewoznik, Germany 2002) 10.\text{f}4  \\
\text{ed}7 11.0-0-0 \text{a}5, Vehi Bach  \\
– Gonzalez Maza, Catalunya 1996, when 12.\text{dxe}6 \text{fxe}6 13.\text{g}4 \text{b}5 14.a3 \text{b}4 15.axb4 \text{xb}4 16.\text{c}4±  \\
leads to a big advantage in the endgame.

7...\text{b}8 8.\text{dxe}6 \text{fxe}6 9.\text{c}4 \text{c}6  \\
(9...\text{e}7 10.\text{g}4 \text{g}6 11.\text{g}5 \text{e}5  \\
(11...\text{c}6 12.\text{dxe}6 \text{exe}4 13.\text{d}4±)  \\
12.\text{d}5 \text{xd}5 13.\text{xd}5±) 10.\text{xe}6  \\
\text{e}7 11.\text{b}3 \text{bd}7 (dangerous is 11...\text{exe}4 12.\text{exe}4 \text{exe}4 13.\text{g}4  \\
\text{g}6 14.0-0±) 12.0-0± \text{Hallier – Michel, corr. 2001.}

7...\text{e}5 8.\text{g}4 \text{xf}3+ (Following  \\
8...\text{g}6 9.\text{dxe}5 \text{dxe}5 10.\text{b}5+  \\
\text{d}7 11.\text{dxe}6 \text{fxe}6 12.\text{g}5 \text{e}7 13.\text{exe}7 \text{exe}7 14.\text{xd}7+ \text{xd}7  \\
15.\text{xd}7+ \text{xd}7, Graziano – Jeff, IECG 1997, the knight is clearly
better than the bishop which is boxed in by the pawns. White normally should try to create weaknesses on the kingside by 16.h4 h5 17.Ag1 Ag8 18.Ad1+ Ae7 19.gxh5 Ahx5 20.Ad3±.) 9.Axf3 Ag6 10.0-0-0 Ae7 (10...e5, Charlton – Mathers, Halifax 1999, 11.h4 h6 12.h5 Ah7 13.g5 hxg5 14.Axg5 Ae7 15.h6±; or 11...h5 12.g5 Ad7 13.Ah3±; 12...Ag4 13.Ab5+ Ae7 14.Ad2) 11.dxe6 fxe6 12.e5 Ad7 13.exd6 cxd6 14.Ad4 e5 15.Ae3± the gaping light squares in the centre and clumsy dark-squared bishop provide White with lasting pressure, especially if he manages to swap light-squared bishops, Rahal – Fernandez Montero, Sanlucar 2001.

If Black plays 7...Ae7 immediately, then after: 8.Ab5+ c6 (8...Ad7?! 9.dxe6 fxe6 10.Ac4 Af3 11.Ac4 Af3 12.gxf3! e5 13.f4±) 9.dxe6, he has two moves at his disposal: 9...Axc6 and 9...bxc6.


8.exd5

In this position Black's major options are: c5a) 8...Af3 and c5b) 8...Ae5.

White is on top after 8...Ab8 9.g4 Ag6 10.Ae2! Ae7 11.Ab5+ Bd7 12.Axb7 Ab8 13.Axa7 Xxb2 14.Ac4 0–0 15.0–0–0 Axb8 16.Aa3 Ab6 17.Ab5± Palac – Muse, Tucepi 1996. He has won a pawn and dominates over the weakened light squares.

After 8...Ae7 9.g4 Ag6, Cacho
Reigadas – Rossi, Arco 1998. White can gain the bishop pair advantage. Combined with more space, that guarantees him a lasting initiative. 10.\(\text{c4}\) \text{c6} (10...\(\text{fxd5}?!\) 11.\(\text{xd5}\) \text{e4} 12. \(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{xe1}\hfill\) 13.\(\text{e5}\) \text{g6} 14.\(\text{g3}\hfill\) 11.\(\text{g6}\) \(\text{h6}\) (11...\(\text{gxg6}\) 12.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 13.\(\text{e2}\) \text{e7} 14.\(\text{h4}\pm\)) 12.\(\text{dxc6}\) \(\text{bxc6}\) 13.\(\text{g2}\pm\).

\text{c5a} 8...\(\text{xf3}\) 9.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{e5}\)

Dubious is 9...\(\text{b8}\)? 10.0–0–0 \(\text{e7}\) 11.\(\text{g4}\) 0–0 12.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{fd7}\), Friedrich – Tomescu, Porto San Giorgio 2004. Now White can prepare an extremely dangerous attack by natural moves: 13.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{e5}\) (13...\(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{g3}\hfill\) 14.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{e8}\) (or 14...\(\text{f5}\) 15.\(\text{e2}\) c5 16.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{a5}\) 17.\(\text{b1}\pm\)) 15.\(\text{f4}\)→.

10.\(\text{xe2}\)

10...\(\text{a6}\)

This is the most frequent move although there are also other alternatives:

10...\(\text{e7}\) 11.0–0–0 g6 12.\(\text{e1}\)!
0–0–0 13.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{h6}\) 14.\(\text{e3}\) with a healthy extra pawn, Longares – Cabrera Moreno, Zaragoza – Cabrera Moreno, Zaragoza 1997;

10...\(\text{c6}\) 11.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{e7}\), Kul – Porrasmaa, Rethymnon 2003, when simplest is 12.0–0–0 \(\text{e7}\) 13.\(\text{g4}\) 0–0 14.\(\text{g2}\pm\). Without distracting himself on pawns, White finished development and is going to start an attack against the enemy’s king;

10...\(\text{xd7}\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{e7}\) 12.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{g6}\) 13.\(\text{g4}\) 0–0 14.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{e8}\) 15.\(\text{h4}\pm\) Black’s pieces are cramped on the last two ranks. That makes his defence very difficult, Vujadinovic – Cetic, Tivat 1995;

10...\(\text{e7}\) 11.0–0–0 0–0 12.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 13.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{c5}\) 14.\(\text{f3}\) (also possible is 14.\(\text{g2}\) a5 15.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{fd7}\) 16.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{e8}\) 17.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{b8}\) 18.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{f8}\) 19.\(\text{g3}\) c6 20.\(\text{d4}\)–+) Etchegaray – Hasangatin, Cappelle la Grande 2003; another good alternative is 14.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{e8}\) 15.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f8}\) 16.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{e4}\) – 16...\(\text{fd7}\) ± was better, but Black is struggling anyway, 17.\(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{xe4}\) 18.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{e7}\) 19.\(\text{g1}\) a6 20.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{h8}\), Apicella – Porrasmaa, Chalkidiki 2002, when White had a forced win by 21. \(\text{f6}\) \(\text{c5}\) 22.\(\text{xe7}\)--; 21...\(\text{xf6}\) 22.\(\text{gxf6}\) \(\text{e3}\) 23.\(\text{fxg7}\) \(\text{f3}\) 24. \(\text{h7}\) \(\text{h7}\) 25.\(\text{g8}\) \(\text{h6}\) 26. \(\text{h8}\)\#;
23...\(\text{g7}\) 24.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{f8}\) 25.\(\text{f5}\) \(\text{xd3}\) 26.\(\text{xd3}\)–+) 14...\(\text{a6}\) 15.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{fd7}\)? Bobras – Minasian, Warsaw 2005, this is a blunder, but 15...\(\text{e8}\) 16.\(\text{h4}\)→ was difficult for Black too. In the game after 16.b4 Black could have resigned right away since he would have lost a piece.

11.0–0–0 \(\text{e7}\)

11...\(\text{e7}\) 12.\(\text{e1}\)±.
12.f4!?  \( \square g6 \\
White's attack develops easily after: 12...\( \square ed7 \) 13.g4 0–0 (13...g6 14.h4 b5 15.\( \triangle d4 \) 0–0 16.h5 b4 17.hxg6 bxc3 18.gxh7+ \( \triangle h8 \) 19.g5 cxb2+ 20.\( \triangle b1 \) \( \square e8 \) 21.\( \triangle h3 \) \( \square f8 \) 22.\( \triangle g2 \) 1–0 Hoffman – Fiorito, Villa Martelli 1996) 14.\( \triangle g1 \) \( \square c5 \) 15.\( \triangle f3 \) b5 16.g5 \( \square fd7 \) 17.\( \triangle e2 \) \( \square e8 \) 18.\( \triangle d4 \) \( \triangle f8 \) 19.\( \triangle c6 \) \( \square c8 \) 20.h4 \( \square b6 \) 21.\( \triangle h3 \) \( \square b7 \) 22.g6± D. Schneider – Bachman, Botucatu 2003

13.g4 \( \triangle d7 \)
13...0-0 14.g5 \( \triangle d7 \) – see 13...
\( \triangle d7 \).

14.g5 0–0
14...h6? – this dooms Black's king to a long suffering – preparing a queenside castling is a long work, but in the centre or on the other side it is an easy target. 15.gxh6 gxh6 16.\( \triangle e4 \) \( \square f6 \), Servat – A. Bermejo, Buenos Aires 1997, 17.\( \triangle d4 \) \( \square xe4 \) (17...0–0 18.\( \triangle g1 \rightarrow \) 18.\( \triangle xe4 \) \( \square g8 \) 19.\( \triangle g1 +. \)

15.h4 \( \triangle e8 \) (15...c6 is even worse, in view of 16.h5 \( \triangle h8 \) 17.\( \triangle g2 +. \), when Black's pieces are amazingly helpless. White has more than one way to win the game, Elburg – Schaar, Email 1998) 16.h5± Golubev – Markowski, Biel 1995.

**c5b) 8...\( \triangle e5 \) 9.g4**

After 9...\( \triangle xf3+ \) 10.\( \triangle xf3 \) \( \triangle g6 \) 11.0–0–0, Black lags in development considerably and his lightsquared bishop is endangered to be trapped, or isolated from the actions. His defence is very difficult and we will illustrate that with some lines:

11...\( \triangle d7 \) 12.\( \triangle e2 \) \( \triangle e7 \) 13.f4 f5, Fox – Olsson, Dublin 1998, White forced the opponent into weakening squares along the e–file, e6 is especially appealing, so: 14.\( \triangle b5 \) 0–0 15.\( \triangle d4 \pm \);

11...a6 12.\( \triangle d4 \) (White can achieve a big advantage in another fashion too: 12.h4 h5 13.g5 \( \triangle g4 \) 14.\( \triangle d4 \) \( \triangle e5 \) 15.\( \triangle g3 \) \( \triangle e7 \) 16.\( \triangle f4 \) \( \triangle g4 \) 17.\( \triangle xg7 \) \( \square g8 \) 18.\( \triangle d4 ++ \) Prudnikova – Micic, Plovdiv 2003.) 12...\( \triangle e7 \) 13.\( \triangle e2 \) 0–0 14.f4 h6 15.f5 \( \triangle h7 \) 16.\( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle e8 \) 17.\( \triangle b1 \) \( \square d7 \) 18.\( \triangle e4 + \) – Spraggett – Mohr, Ubeda 1996;

11...\( \triangle e7 \) 12.\( \triangle g2 \) \( \triangle d7 \) (Black does not solve his problems with 12...h5 either. After 13.f4 \( \triangle d7 \)
14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d\textbf{b}5}} a6 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d\textbf{x}d}7+}} \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{d\textbf{x}d}7}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f5}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h7}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e4}}} 0–0 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f6}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xd}4}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{dxd}4}} +– Dgebuadze – Slisser, Dieren 2002, the position of the black bishop on h7 is pathetic.) 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f5}}} (13...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f6}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h4}}} a6 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h5}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f7}}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c5}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g5}} +– Black’s pieces are very passive, his king has stuck in the centre, Moreno Carnero – S. Sanchez, Ayamonte 2002; 13...h6 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} 0–0 15.h4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xd}4}}, G.Mohr – Cander, Bled 2000, when White could have gained a decisive advantage by the enterprising move 16.g5! hxg5 17.f5 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{hxh}5}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xh}4}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xd}1}} +–; Black is beyond salvation also after 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f6}}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xf}6}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xf}6}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f8}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g5}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e7}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{b5}}} a6 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e1}} +–) 14.g5 (It looks attractive for White to play here 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e5}}}, with the idea to penetrate as quickly as possible with the knight to the weakened e6-square, for example: 14...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f6}}} 15.g5, or 14...fxg4 15.hxg4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{hxg}4}} 0–0 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h3}}} h6 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xd}4}} +–) 14...0–0 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c8}}} 16.h4 a6 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h5}} +– Kovacevic – Kostic, Bela Crkva 1990.

10.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{b5}} +– \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{d7}}}}

In answer to 10...\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{d7}}} 11.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} a6, White can play the powerful move: 12.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{f1}} !}, and Black is faced with problems that he can hardly ever solve, for example:

12...\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{h4}}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{d2}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{e7}}} (Black loses immediately after: 13...\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{g5}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{h5}}} 15.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\textit{e2}} +–) 14.0–0–0 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} (White is totally winning too, after: 14...c5 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c6}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{bxc}6}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g4}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{hxg}4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{hxh}1}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g2}} +–) 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{hxh}4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{hxh}1}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h6}}} (Black is not out of the woods either after: 16...h5 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g2}} +–) 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h4}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c1}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g3}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{f3}}} 0–0–0 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d2}}} 1–0 Landa – Summerscale, Ubeda 1999;

or 12...c5 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{dxc6}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xc6}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c8}}} 15.0–0+ Roser – Stroppa, France 1998. White is clearly better, because his light-squared bishop is much better than its black counterpart, meanwhile Black’s d6-pawn is extremely weak.

11.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e7}}}

It is not any better for Black to play: 11...a6 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{a4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e7}}} 13.0–0–0 0–0 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{he1}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c5}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xa4}}} (15...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{b5}}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xb5}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xb5}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xb5}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e4}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{a6}}} +– \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xa6}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xa6}}} +– \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d7}}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d3}} +–) 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xa4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e4}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{g5}}} f6 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xe4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{fxg}5}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{fxg}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d7}}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{d4}}} c5 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xc6}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xc6}}} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{h3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{b8}}} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e8}}} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{c5}}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{e7}}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textit{xa6}}} +– 0 Klovans – Graf, Sverdlovsk 1987.

The game V.L.Ivanov – Nesterov, Moscow 1995 reached this position. White has a great spatial advantage, moreover the only open file, where is Black’s
king, is in his possession too. Evidently Black will hardly succeed in sheltering his king on the queenside because that requires too much time. Therefore White can boldly advance with his pawns on the kingside, threatening to win the light-squared bishop on the way. 12.h4!? h5 (12...h6 13.h5 ♘h7 14.g5 hxg5 15.♗xg5 ♗g6 16.0–0–0±; 12... ♗xg4 13.h5 ♘f5 14.♗d4 ♗xe3 15.♗xe3 g6 16.♕xf5 gxf5 17.0–0–0--; 12...a6 13.♗xd7+ ♗xd7 14.h5 ♘e4 15.♗xe4 ♗xe4 16.♗d4 ♗xg4 17.♗g1 ♗f4 18.h6 0–0–0 19.hxg7 ♘he8 20.♗e3±.) 13.g5 ♗g4 14.0–0–0±. Black's position is very difficult to defend and it is quite hard for him to find any acceptable plan, for example: 14...♗xe3 (14...0–0 15.♗d4±) 15.♗xe3 0–0 16.♗e1 ♗e8 17.♗d4, and despite the fact that Black has the two-bishop advantage his position is dubious. His dark-squared bishop is bad, his position is quite cramped and he can easily become a victim of a crushing kingside attack.

**Conclusion**

We have analysed the most popular lines of the 1...♗c6-system in this chapter. Black's position seems to be quite solid in the main line, nevertheless his defence is very difficult. The main idea of the whole variation – to exert pressure against the d4-pawn with the help of the moves ♗c6 and ♗g4 requires a long, patient and meticulous preparation. White occupies the centre and has a lead in development as well as often the bishop-pair too. Small wonder that Black's position is very difficult after that...
Part 3

Alekhine’s Defence
1.e4 istration 2.e5

The other early development of a black knight – 1...f6 (Alekhine’s Defence) is sounder strategically (Black attacks the e4-pawn) and accordingly it is more popular. It is quite enough to assert that plenty of great chess-masters have played like that, for example: Robert Fischer, Vassily Ivanchuk, Michael Adams, Nigel Short etc...

This opening had been mentioned for the first time at the dawn of the 19th century, nevertheless it began to be analyzed seriously only after Alekhine introduced it into the tournament practice at the beginning of the 20th century. In fact he (Alekhine) was the first to grasp the essence of the real spirit of that opening and he managed to score some especially instructive and impressive wins.

Presently, that opening is typical with the following strategy employed by Black: he usually provokes the advance of White’s pawn-centre and creates the impression that White has achieved a lot. Later however, Black can easily undermine White’s pawn-centre with the move d7-d6.

The strange looking retreat of the knight – 1.e4 f6 2.e5 g8 (Chapter 8) just loses time and the possibility for Black to attack White’s advanced pawns does not justify the wasted tempi.

Naturally, Black should retreat his knight to the centre (2...d5) and after the almost obligatory moves 3.d4 d6, I recommend to White to follow with 4.f3. This move leads to the contemporary system (The Modern Variation) and it is definitely the best for White. He is not in a hurry to repel Black’s knight away from the centre with the move c2-c4 and he completes his
development first, fortifying the e5-outpost in the process.

Following that, Black has several possibilities at his disposal, but they are not all so comparable in value:

for example the line: 4...c6 5.c4 b6 6.e6!? (Chapter 10) leads to a very sharp opening battle with an initiative for White;

after 4...dx e5 5.xe5 (Chapter 11), Black should better play 5...c6, or 5...g6, while the move 5...d7, practically loses the game by force after 6.xf7! and I prove that convincingly in this book;

it is possible for Black to continue with 4...g6 (Chapter 12) – some very strong players like to play that line, for example: grandmasters Vladimir Akopian, Lev Alburt, Rafael Vaganian, Jan Timman...;

and finally – Black’s main defensive weapon is the move 4...g4. Following 5.e2, he can try three more or less equally sensible continuations: 5...c6 (Chapter 13), 5...c6 (Chapter 14) and 5...e6 (Chapter 15).
Chapter 8  1.e4 ćf6 2.e5

2...ćg8

This extravagant move is only very seldom played by Black. It does not lose immediately indeed, but still the waste of several tempi by Black is bound to tell in the future.

Black’s strongest and most natural move 2...ćd5 will be analysed in the next chapters.

In case of: 2...će4?! 3.d3 ćc5 4.d4 će6 (or 4...ća4 5.ćb5 ćb6 6.e6 fxe6 7.ćh5+ g6 8.će5 ćg8 9.ćxe6 ćg7 10.će2 c6 11.ćd3 d6 12.ćc3 ćf7 13.h4 ćg7 14.h5±) 5.f4, White’s space advantage is overwhelming. After: 5...g6 6.d5 Nc5 (It is not any better for Black to play: 6...ćg7 7.ćc3 d6 8.ćf3 ćg4 9.h3 ćxf3 10.ćxf3 c6 11.će3 dxe5 12.0–0–0 ćc8 13.fxe5 ćf5 14.ćf4±.) 7.će3 d6 8.ćd4 f6, and in the game: Moroz – Vavra, Pardubice 1998, White could have achieved an almost winning position by playing: 9.e6 ćh6 10.ćh3 0–0 11.c4 ćc6 12.ćc3 ćb6 (12...b6 13.f5±) 13.ćd2 ća5 14.0–0 ćba6 15.ćb1 b6 16.ćd5 cxd5 17.cxd5 ćb7 18.ćg5 ćg7 19.f5±.

3.d4 d6

3...ćc6?! – this waiting move is played in a situation in which time is very precious: 4.ćd3 d6 (in the line: 4...d5, A.Horvath – Lotharides, Slovakia 2001, 5.ćc3 g6 6.h3 ćg7 7.ćf3 ćf5 8.ćxf5 gxf5 9.e6 fxe6 10.ćg5, Black is also in trouble. It is probably best for him to try: 5...e6, with the idea to transfer to some set-ups typical for the French Defence, but having already lost three tempi in the process...) 5.ćc3 g6 (5...e6 6.ćf3 ćd7 7.0–0 dxe5 8.ćxe5 ćxe5 9.dxe5 ćd4 10.će1 ćc5 11.ćf3 će7 12.ćg3 ćg6 13.će3 ćb4 14.a3+–) 6.ćf3 ćg4 7.ćh3 ćxf3 8.ćxf3 dxe5 9.dxe5 ćg7 10.ćc4 e6 11.ćf4 ća5 (11...ćd7 12.0–0–0 ćb8 13.će4 ćxe5 14.ćd6+ ćxd6 15.ćxd6 ćd8 16.
1.e4 १६ 2.e5 १६ g8 3.d4

\[\text{\textit{He1 g5+ 17. b1 gf6 18. xe6 xe6 19. xe6+ ef7 20. e7+ g8 21. wb3+ d5 22. xd7 b6 23. f3 f5 24. xf5 gxf5 25. e5+ 12.0-0 xe5 13. e4 d7 14. xd7 xd7 15. xe5 xe5 16. xf7+, and White wins.}}\]

3...c5?! – this activity is rather premature and not justified at all. 4.dxc5 a5+ 5.c3 xc5 6.f3 e6 (6...d6 7.exd6 xd6 8.xd6 exd6 9.d5 d8 10.f4±) 7.d3 a6 8.0-0 c7 9. e4 f5. This is how the game Kokkila – Kauma, Vantaa 1997 developed. White could have achieved an overwhelming advantage here opening the position with: 10.exf6 gxf6 (10...xf6 11.fg5 xe4 12.xe4 g6 13. f4 e5 14. d3 d6 15. xg6+ xg6 16. xg6+ f7 17. f6+) 11.xg5! fxg5 (11...h5 12.d6+ xd6 13. g6+ f8 14. f7+) 12. h5+ d8 13. xg5+ e7 14. f4 c6 15. x8 b8 x8 b8 16. e±.

3...c6 4.f3 d5 5.c4 g4 (in case of 5...e6 6.c5, the game transposes to the line 3...e6) 6.cxd5. In the variation: 6...xf3 7.xf3 xd4 8.e4 c5 9.xd4! xd4 10. b5+ d7 11. xd7+ xd7, Black's position is very difficult after: 12. xe2 e6 (12... f6 13.f4 dh6 14. d3 f5 15.g4 dh6 16.h3+) 13.d6 f6 14.f4 fxe5 15.fxe5 c6 16.d3 d5 17.e1 g6 18.e4 dh6 19.d2 c8 20.f3++. It is only slightly better for Black to try: 6...xd5 7.c3 a5 (7...xf3 8.xd5 xd1 9.bxc7 d8 10.xa8 3.g4 11. e3 c8 12.d5 b4 13.c1+ b8 14.c7 xa2 15.c4+-) 8.b5 e6 9.h3 xf3 10.xf3 g7 11.g5 a6 12.a4 d5 13.0-0±.

3...e6 – This move is much more flexible than the moves that we have analysed until now. 4.f3

Black has a choice:

4..c5 – is not satisfactory for Black at all. The simple 5.d5 d6 6.c3, creates great problems for him, for example: 6...e7 (Black loses too after: 6...a6 7.c4 b5 8.dxe6! bxc4 9.exf7+ xf7 10. d5+) 7.d5+ d7 8.dxe6+--.

After 4...d6 5.c3 dxe5 6. xe5 d7 7.f3 g6, we reach by transposition the game Spielmann – Flohr, Prague 1930, that will be analysed in the line: 3...d6 4.f3 dxe5;

It is more promising for Black to follow with: 4...d5 5.c4 c6 (in case of 5...xc4 6.xc4, there is another possible transposition – to the line 3...d5 4.c4 dxc4 5. xc4 e6). White restricts the mobility of Black's bishops. After: 6.c5!? e7 7.a3 xg7 (or 7...b6 8.b4 bxc5 9.dxc5 f6 10.
\[d3\] 8.b4 a6 9.d3 \[f5\] 10.\[xf5\] exf5 11.c3 e6 12.g5 e7 13.xe7 wxe7 14.0-0 0-0 15.d2 f6 16.exf6 wxf6 17.f4 \[ac8\] 18.e1, White’s positional advantage is quite stable. He controls the open file and has a powerful outpost on the e5-square; moreover his knight is obviously stronger than Black’s “bad” bishop.

It is interesting for Black to follow with: 4...b6 5.c4 \[b7\], in order to try to exploit the weakening of the light squares in the centre. After 6.c3, Black has two possibilities. In case of 6...d5 7.cxd5, Black is forced to exchange the important light-squared bishop. After: 7...xd5 (or 7...exd5 8.d3 c7 9.g5 h6 10.h4 a6 11.e6 d6 12.exf7+ xf7 13.e5+ g8 14.h5 e6 15.e2 g5 16.g3--; Slibar – Rabic, Slovenia 1991) 8.xd5 xd5 9.d3 b4+ 10.e2! c6 11.a3 e7 12.e3, White’s position is clearly preferable. He can exert strong pressure on the c-file and Black has problems to complete his development. It is better for Black to try: 6...b4, continuing the fight for the light squares. In the line: 7.d2 e7 8.d3 d5 (8...f5 9.xf5 exf5 10.0-0 0-0 11.d5 xd5 12.\[xd2\] d6 13.ad1\(\pm\) 9.cxd5 \[xc3\] 10.bxc3 xd5 11.0-0 c5\(\pm\), Black can still defend, although White still maintains his initiative;

The position is very interesting after: 3...d5 4.c4:
It is simpler for Black to play 4...c6 immediately, although even then it is not quite clear how he should continue later. 5...c3. The immediate surrender of the centre by Black with: 5...dxc4 (it is too bad for Black to play 5...f5, because of 6.g3b3, while 5...g6 is not solving his problems either. After 6.f3, it is not evident how Black should continue with his development, while the active move 6.f6 can only cause new difficulties for him: 7.cxd5 cxd5 8...d5+ e7 9.e2. Black is already beyond salvation, for example: 9...a5 10.xd2 xb5 11.xb5 xb6 12.e6f6 xf6 13.f4+). presents White with clearly better chances: 6...xc4 e6 7.f3 d7 8.0-0 b6 9.b3 e7?! (9...h6 10.e4 d5 11.d2 b6 12.c1 b7 10.e4 ed5 11.g5 e7 12.c1 h6 13.h4 d7 13...e7 14.xe7 xe7 15.e2 18.e5 Lange - Naumann, Ruhrgebiet 1996;

There is another line for Black that enables him to hold the centre, but still his position remains too cramped and passive. After: 5...e6 6.f3 e7 7.a3 b6 (7...e5 8.c5 b6 9.b4) 8.b3 dxc4 (It deserves some attention for Black to follow with: 8.g6 9.e3 d7 10.e3 h6 11.0-0 e5 9.bxc4 f5 10.g5 e7 10...c7 11.g4 e7 12.e4 g6 13.h4 h6 14.e3 e7 15.h5 e8 16.e2; 10...f6 11.exf6 gxf6 12.e5!? h5 13.e6 h7 14.xf8 xf8 15.e3 11.e7 e7 12.e3 0-0 13.e2, and White’s advantage is considerable;

It seems a bit interesting, but hardly quite correct for Black to play: 4...c5?! 5.dxc5 d4!, in the spirit of the Albin Counter Gambit. (It is worse for Black to play: 5.a5+ 6.d2 xc5 7.xd5, or 5...e6 6.cxd5 exd5 7...e3) 6.a3 c6 6.e6 7.b4 a5 8.g2 axb4 9.axb4 xa1 10.a1 e6 11.d2 7.f4 a5 8.d2. White’s position is clearly preferable, but still the situation on the board remains tense. Now in case of: 8...f5 9.g4 g6 10.a4 d7 11.e2 c8 (11...e5? 12.xd7 xd7 13.xb7 a7 14.c6 e5 15.cxd7+ xd7 16.e5xb7 17.xd4--) 12.xe6 xc6 13. xe6+ bxc6 14.e3 d3 15.h4 h5 16.e6, White has a huge advantage. It is only slightly better for Black to play: 8...a4 9.gf3 c6 10.e4 xc5 11.xc5 a5+ 12.d2 xc5 13.0-0-0 ge7 14.xd4+ and Black loses after: 14...xe5? 15.b3 b6 16.c5+.

4.f3
4...\textmd{g}4

The move 4...\textmd{dxe5}, leads to seemingly simple positions, but Black is not out of the woods yet. (4...h6 5.dxc3 g6 6.h3 \textmd{g}7 7.cxe3 \textmd{c}6 8.exd6 cxd6 9.d5\texttt{\textpm} Unzicker – Bricard, Wildbad 1990.) 5.\textmd{dxe5} \textmd{d}7 6.\textmd{c}3 \textmd{g}6 (6...\textmd{dxe5} 7.dxe5 c6 8.c3 \textmd{a}5 9.\textmd{f}4\texttt{\textpm}) 7.c3 e6 8.\textmd{g}5 c6 (It is slightly better for Black to follow with: 8...h6 9.\textmd{xd7} hxg5 10.\textmd{xf8} \textmd{xf8} 11.0–0–0\texttt{\textpm}) 9.0–0–0 \textmd{e}7 10.\textmd{d}3 \textmd{dxe5} 11.dxe5 \textmd{d}7 (11...\textmd{d}5? 12.\textmd{xe7} \textmd{xe7} 13.\textmd{e}4 0–0 14.c4 \textmd{b}4 15.\textmd{f}6\texttt{\textpm} 12.\textmd{xe7} \textmd{xe7} 13.\textmd{g}3 0–0 14.\textmd{e}4 \textmd{b}6 15.\textmd{f}4\texttt{\textpm} Spielmann – Flohr, Prague 1930.)

It is quite insufficient for Black to continue with: 4...\textmd{d}6. The line: 5.d5  \textmd{d}7 (5...d5 6.c4 \textmd{d}7 7.cxd5 \textmd{c}xe5 8.dxe5 \textmd{xb}5 9.\textmd{g}3 a6 10.a4 \textmd{c}7 11.\textmd{xb}6+) 6.\textmd{c}3, creates great problems for Black. 6...dxe5 (It is slight better for Black to play: 6...a6 7.\textmd{xc6} \textmd{xc6} 8.d5 \textmd{d}7 9.0–0 \textmd{g}4 10.\textmd{f}4\texttt{\textpm}) 7.d5! Now in the line: 7...\textmd{b}4 8.\textmd{xd7}+ \textmd{xd7} 9.a3 e4?! (9...\textmd{a}6 10.\textmd{xe5} \textmd{f}5 11.\textmd{e}2 0–0–0 12.g4 \textmd{f}6 13.\textmd{g}5! \textmd{xf5} 14.\textmd{xf7} \textmd{f}4 15.\textmd{e}6+ \textmd{d}7 16.\textmd{hxh8}\texttt{\textpm} 10.\textmd{xe5} \textmd{f}5 11.\textmd{xf7} \texttt{\textpm}) 10.\textmd{xe5} \textmd{f}5 11.\textmd{xf7} \texttt{\textpm} 12.\textmd{xc}+ 13.\textmd{xf} 15.0–0–0 12.axb4 e6 13.dxe6+ \textmd{xe6} 14.\textmd{h}5+ g6 15.\textmd{b}5 b6 16.\textmd{f}4 \textmd{d}6 17.\textmd{xd6} cxd6 18.\textmd{xc}6 \textmd{f}6 19.\textmd{b}5\texttt{\textpm}, Black loses a pawn.

In case of: 7...\textmd{b}8 8.\textmd{xe5} \textmd{xb}5 9.\textmd{xb}5 a6 (9...c6? 10.\textmd{f}3 \textmd{f}6 11.dxc6+) 10.\textmd{c}3 \textmd{f}6 11.\textmd{f}4 \textmd{bd}7 12.\textmd{d}4 \textmd{xe}5 13.\textmd{xe}5 \textmd{d}6 14.\textmd{d}4\texttt{\textpm}, White has a huge positional edge.

Black plays quite seldom 4...\textmd{f}5, because after 5.\textmd{d}3 he has difficult problems to solve. The trade: 5...\textmd{xd}3 facilitates White’s development. After: 6.\textmd{xd}3 d6 7.0–0 \textmd{c}6 8.exd6!, Black must choose between three possibilities:

8...\textmd{xd}6 9.\textmd{e}1+ \textmd{e}7 10.d5 \textmd{e}5 (It is even worse for Black to play: 10...\textmd{d}8 11.\textmd{c}3 \textmd{f}6 12.\textmd{g}5 0–0 13.\textmd{e}3 \textmd{e}8 14.\textmd{xf}6++) 11.\textmd{xe}5 dxe5 12.\textmd{xe}5 0–0–0 13.\textmd{c}4 \textmd{d}6 14.\textmd{e}1\texttt{\textpm}, and White has an extra pawn;

8...\textmd{xd}6 9.\textmd{c}3 0–0–0 (9...\textmd{f}6 10.d5 \textmd{b}4 11.\textmd{b}5+ c6 12.\textmd{xb}7 \textmd{b}8 13.\textmd{xa}7 cxd5 14.\textmd{e}1\texttt{\textpm}) 10.\textmd{f}5+ e6 11.\textmd{xf}7 \textmd{d}7 12.\textmd{f}4 \textmd{xd}4 (12...\textmd{xf}4 13.\textmd{xf}4 \textmd{xd}4 14.\textmd{e}5 \textmd{e}7 15.\textmd{ad}1 \textmd{xc}2 16.\textmd{d}2 \textmd{b}4 17.\textmd{fd}1++ 13.\textmd{e}5\texttt{\textpm}. It is obviously best for Black to follow with: 8...\textmd{xd}6 9.d5 \textmd{b}4 10.\textmd{b}3 \textmd{a}6 11.\textmd{e}1\texttt{\textpm}.

In case of 5...\textmd{d}7 6.\textmd{c}3 \textmd{c}6, White plays again 7.\textmd{xd}6. Now after: 7...\textmd{xd}6 8.\textmd{e}2+ \textmd{e}7 9.\textmd{xf}5 \textmd{xf}5 10.d5 \textmd{e}5 (10...\textmd{d}8

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11.0-0± 11...b5+ c6 (11...f8 12...xe5 xe5+ 13.e3+-) 12...xb7 xf3+ 13.gxf3 d8 14.e3 c5 15.0-0-0±. White remains with an extra pawn and a better position, while in the line: 7...xd3 8.xd3 exd6 9.0-0 ge7 10.e1 0-0-0 (10...d5 11.a4+) 11.d5 e5 12.xe5 dxe5 13.e5 f6 14.e4 xd5 15.d4 c6 (15...xe3 16.xd7 xd7 17.wh3 d8 18.e3+-) 16.axd5 cxd5 17.c4, his position is nearly winning, because Black cannot play: 17...dxc4, because of 18.xc4+ b8 19.f4+ d6 20.d4+-.

It is possible for Black to continue with: 4...g6 5.c4 d5 6.b3. His position seems solid enough, but there appears a drawback that is quite typical for all the lines that have been analysed in this chapter – Black has almost no counterplay at all. 6...g7 6...g4 7.bd2 e6 8.h3 xf3 9.xf3 d7 10.0-0 e7 11.c3± Roa – Alvarado, Madrid 2000) 7.0-0 e6 (7...c6 8.c4 dxc4 9.xc4 d6 10.h3 0-0 11.c3 b6 12.e1+ De La Riva – Beltran, Barcelona 1995) 8.c4 c6 9.c3 d7 10.e1 0-0 11.f4 h6 12.h4 f5 13.g3 b6 14.d2 a6 15.ad1 c7 16.cxd5 exd5 17.c2 h7. Here, in the game Oll – Djurkovic, Nova Gorica 1999, White found an interesting plan: 18.g2 e6 19.h5, and Black’s position easily turned from worse into hopeless! 19...h8 (19...e7 20.h1 g4 21.xh6 xf3+ 22.xf3 xh6 23.xg6+ fxg6+ 24.g2 g8 25.xh6 xh6 26.xh1 xf2+ 27.xf2 xf8+ 28.g2 g7 29.g4+-) 20. h1 g8 21.hxg6 fxg6 22.xf5 xf5 23.xh6+-.

Now Black has to decide where to move his bishop.

5...h5

The retreat 5...f5 enables White to transpose to some lines that have been analysed in other chapters. For example, the positions after 6.d3 are quite similar to these arising after: 4...g4 5.d3, while 6.g4 g6 (or 6...e4 7.c3 xf3 8.xf3 c6 9.c4+) leads to the line 7.e6 fxe6 8.g5 that we will also analyse later.

The exchange 5...xf3 6.xf3, presents White with the two-bishop advantage:

6...d5 7.b3 b6 (Black loses after 7...c6? 8.xb7 xd4 9.b5+ xb5 10.c6+ xd7 11.xa8+ Garbarino – Slipak, Bariloche 1986) 8.c4 e6 9.cxd5 exd5 10.xd5 c6 11.a3 e7 12.c3 c6 13.d3 d6 14.0-0 e7 15.e3 0-0 16.f4 f5 17.ac1±.

In case of 6...c6 7.b3 (the pawn sacrifice 7.e6 fxe6 is un-
clear because White has no more the knight on the kingside)
7...\texttt{c7} (Black is resisting to stay without castling after 7...\texttt{b6}
8.exd6, for example: 8...exd6
9.\texttt{e3\texttt{e7}} 10.\texttt{d3\texttt{f6}} 11.0-0
\texttt{d5} 12.\texttt{e4\texttt{d7}} 13.\texttt{c3\texttt{f6}}
14.\texttt{e3} or 8...\texttt{xb3} 9.axb3 exd6
10.\texttt{d3\texttt{f6}} 11.0-0\texttt{e7} 12.\texttt{e1}
8.exd6 exd6 9.d4 \texttt{e7}? (It is
better for Black to play: 9...\texttt{d7}
10.d3 \texttt{gf6} 11.0-0\texttt{e7} 12.\texttt{c4
b6} 13.\texttt{c4\texttt{boschma}} – \texttt{etmans,
corr. 2000.}) 10.\texttt{c4}, Black is sud-
denly faced with insurmountable
problems: 10...\texttt{f6} 11.0-0 b5
(Capturing the pawn by 11...
\texttt{xd4} is suicidal: 12.d1 \texttt{xe5}
13.\texttt{xe5 dxe5} 14.\texttt{xf7+ \texttt{xf7}}
15.\texttt{d8+ \texttt{e7}} 16.\texttt{xb7+}; 12...\texttt{c5}
13.\texttt{c3 \texttt{f6}} 14.\texttt{e1+ \texttt{f8}}??
15.\texttt{xf6 \texttt{gxf6}} 16.\texttt{h6+ \texttt{g8}}
17.\texttt{e8#}; 14...\texttt{d8} 15.b4 \texttt{b6}
16.\texttt{g3 \texttt{e8}} 17.\texttt{c3\texttt{c3}}→ 12.\texttt{c1+ \texttt{f8}}
13.\texttt{g3 \texttt{e7}} 14.\texttt{xe7! \texttt{xe7}} 15.\texttt{xd6}
\texttt{d8} 16.\texttt{a3 bxc4} (or 16...\texttt{g8}
17.\texttt{e1 \texttt{f5}} 18.\texttt{xf7+ \texttt{xf7}} 19.
\texttt{b3+ \texttt{g6}} 20.\texttt{e6+ \texttt{g5}} 21.\texttt{f4+}
and White checkmates) 17.\texttt{e1}
\texttt{g8} 18.\texttt{xe7 \texttt{e8}} 19.\texttt{xc4 \texttt{d7}}
20.\texttt{d6++} Berg – \texttt{etmans, corr.
2000.}
6.g4 \texttt{g6}

7.e6!?
According to GM R.\texttt{spiel-
mann} – that sacrifice should be
called “restraining”.
7...\texttt{fxe6} 8.\texttt{c4 \texttt{c8}}
In the event of 8...\texttt{d5} 9.\texttt{d3}
\texttt{xd3} 10.\texttt{xd3} White could play
by analogy with the game of
Klinger.
9.\texttt{g5 d5} 10.\texttt{d3 \texttt{xd3}} 11.
\texttt{xd3}
The extra pawn does not help
Black much. It is even hindering
him to develop harmoniously.
Only a few moves later White is
going to regain the pawn with a
big positional advantage: 11...
\texttt{f6} 12.\texttt{c3 \texttt{c6}} 13.\texttt{f4 \texttt{d7}}
14.0-0 \texttt{g6} (14...0-0-0? 15.\texttt{f7})
15.\texttt{h1 \texttt{h6}} (15...\texttt{d8} 16.\texttt{b5 \texttt{c8}}
17.\texttt{xa7 \texttt{a8}} 18.\texttt{b5 \texttt{c8}} 19.
\texttt{f3±}) 16.\texttt{xe6 \texttt{xf4+}} 17.\texttt{xf4}
0-0-0 18.\texttt{b1 \texttt{b8}} 19.\texttt{e6±}
Klinger – \texttt{buexberd, 
Buende 1985.}

Conclusion

It was easily predictable that the weird retreat of the knight to \texttt{g8}
was not strategically sound. White is naturally developing his pieces
and easily obtains a spatial advantage. In the event when Black’s
bishop leaves the c8-h3 diagonal (5.h3 \texttt{h5}), White could employ a
“restraining” sacrifice on \texttt{e6}. 

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Chapter 9  

1.e4 d6 2.e5 d5 3.d4

This chapter will be devoted to the moves a) 3...e6 and b) 3...d6.

The move 3...d6, leads Black quickly into trouble: 4.c4 d5 (He does not lose a piece outright in case of: 4...d4, but after 5.a3 d5 6.b4 dab8 7.b5 d5 8.d2 c6 9.a4t, Black's position is extremely difficult.) 5.d5 d5 (5...xe5 6.c5 b4c4 7.d4+-) 6.c5 d6xd5 7.a3 and he loses a piece.

Black plays sometimes: 3...c5. Following 4.c4, his knight has two possible retreats. In case of: 4...dxc5 5.dxc5 c6 6.a3 d6, Black regains his pawn indeed, but after: 7.d3 dxc5 8.b2± he has great problems due to the lack of harmony in the development of his pieces. This is particularly evident, concerning his knights, since they have only one good place for maneuvers – the e6-square. In case Black chooses another route for his knight: 4...d4, then after 5.dxc5 he has problems to regain his pawn. In the game R.Byrne – Soltis, Mentor 1977, there followed: 5...a5? (It is better for Black to play 5...d5 6.c3 dxc5, but his position remains again difficult. After 7.d3, he cannot complete his development in a normal fashion, for example he loses immediately after: 7...d8c6?, because of 8.d3 d5 9.a3 d6 10.d4+-) 6.d3 c6 7.d3 g6 8.d4 d7 9.d2 0-0 10.0-0++ and Black cannot regain his pawn at all.

It is premature for Black to try 3...g6. He lags in development then and White can play much more aggressively than I usually recommend...: 4.c4 d6 5.c5 6.ab6 6.d4 c6 7.d3 b6 8.d3 dxc3 9.bxc3 and White preserves excellent attacking prospects. There were interesting developments in the game Sutovsky – Varga, Budapest
1999. It continued: 9...\text{\texttt{a}6} (9...
\texttt{bxc5} 10.\texttt{\texttt{d}}5 \texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}6 11.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} \texttt{f}5 12.\texttt{exf6} 
\texttt{d}5 13.\texttt{\texttt{d}3} \pm) 10.\texttt{\texttt{b}3} \texttt{bxc5} 11. 
\texttt{\texttt{g}5}! \texttt{c}4 12.\texttt{\texttt{f}3}! \texttt{f}6 13.\texttt{exf6} \texttt{exf6} 
14.0–0 \texttt{\texttt{e}7} (in case of 14...\texttt{\texttt{e}7} 
15.\texttt{\texttt{d}2} \texttt{\texttt{d}8} 16.\texttt{\texttt{f}e}1 \texttt{\texttt{g}7} 17. 
\texttt{\texttt{a}4} \pm White’s attack is again too 
powerful) 15.\texttt{\texttt{c}2} \texttt{f}5 (15...\texttt{fxg5} 
16.\texttt{\texttt{e}1} \texttt{\texttt{f}8} 17.\texttt{\texttt{h}3} \texttt{\texttt{f}7} 18.\texttt{\texttt{g}6} 
\texttt{hxg6} 19.\texttt{\texttt{h}8}+ \texttt{\texttt{f}8} 20.\texttt{\texttt{g}7} \texttt{\texttt{f}7} 
21.\texttt{\texttt{g}8}+ \texttt{\texttt{f}8} 22.\texttt{\texttt{g}6}+ \texttt{\texttt{f}7} 23. 
\texttt{\texttt{x}g5} \pm) 16.\texttt{\texttt{e}1} 0–0 17.\texttt{\texttt{e}3} \texttt{\texttt{f}6}? 
(17...\texttt{\texttt{x}g5} 18.\texttt{\texttt{x}g5} \texttt{\texttt{x}g5} 19. 
\texttt{\texttt{x}g5}+ \pm 18.\texttt{\texttt{x}h}7 \texttt{\texttt{x}h}7 19.\texttt{\texttt{h}6}+ 
\texttt{\texttt{g}8} 20.\texttt{\texttt{x}g6}+ \texttt{\texttt{g}7} 21.\texttt{\texttt{g}5} and 
Black resigned.

It is possible for Black to follow with 3...\texttt{c}6. This move is use-
ful for him in several variations of the Alekhine Defence. Some-
times it helps him defend his knight on \texttt{d}5 (for example in the 
line 3...\texttt{d}6 4.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} \texttt{g}6 5.\texttt{\texttt{c}4} \texttt{c}6); some-
times – after the develop-
ment of the bishop on \texttt{c}8 to \texttt{g}4 and its subsequent exchange for 
White’s knight – he thus protects his \texttt{b}7-pawn. On the other hand, 
Black plays that move a bit early and so he reduces his own possi-
bilities – his knight cannot be-
developed to the \texttt{c}6-square any-
more. 4.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} \texttt{g}6 5.\texttt{\texttt{e}2} \texttt{\texttt{g}7} 6.0–0 
0–0 (in case of 6...\texttt{d}6 7.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{\texttt{c}7} 
8.exd6 \texttt{\texttt{x}d}6 9.\texttt{\texttt{c}3} 0–0 10.\texttt{\texttt{e}3} 
\texttt{\texttt{f}5} 11.\texttt{\texttt{d}2} \pm, there arises a 
transposition to the variation: 
3...\texttt{d}6 4.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} \texttt{c}6) 9.7.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{\texttt{c}7} 8.\texttt{\texttt{f}4} 
and White is clearly better. Follow-
ning 8...\texttt{\texttt{e}6} 9.\texttt{\texttt{e}3} \texttt{d}6 10.exd6 
\texttt{\texttt{x}d}6 11.\texttt{\texttt{d}2} \pm, in the game 
Jacob – Gutman, Senden 1999, 
White had the advantage thanks 
to his extra space and superior 
piece-coordination.

Finally, Black has often tried 
in practice the prophylactic move 
3...\texttt{d}6. Here, after 4.a4 a5 
White should better continue with: 5.\texttt{\texttt{b}5}?!., forcing the not so 
useful move for his opponent here: 5...\texttt{c}6 – and as a result 
Black at first cannot attack the 
\texttt{d}4-pawn with the move \texttt{\texttt{b}8-c}6 
anymore and secondly, he cannot 
capture on \texttt{d}6 with the \texttt{c}-pawn, 
in case of a pawn-trade in the 
centre. (Following 5...\texttt{\texttt{c}6} 6.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} 
\texttt{d}5 7.0–0 \texttt{\texttt{g}4} 8.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{\texttt{h}5} 9.\texttt{e}6! \texttt{fxe}6 
10.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{\texttt{g}6} 11.\texttt{\texttt{e}5} \pm, Black’s 
position is very difficult and in an-
swer to 5...\texttt{e}6, White plays 6. 
\texttt{\texttt{x}g}4?! and the development of 
Black’s kingside has been ham-
pered. In the game Bucher – 
Hammer, Switzerland 1997, 
there followed: 6...\texttt{h}5 7.\texttt{\texttt{g}3} \texttt{c}6 
8.\texttt{\texttt{d}3} \pm) 6.\texttt{\texttt{d}3} \texttt{d}5, Tal – Lutikov, 
Moscow 1969, (6...\texttt{g}6 7.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{\texttt{g}7} 
8.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} \texttt{d}6 9.\texttt{\texttt{e}6} \texttt{\texttt{x}d}6 10.0–0 
0–0 11.\texttt{b}3 – or 11.\texttt{\texttt{b}2} with the 
idea \texttt{\texttt{d}2-e}4 – 11...\texttt{\texttt{g}4} 12.\texttt{\texttt{a}3} 
\texttt{\texttt{f}6} 13.\texttt{\texttt{b}2} \texttt{\texttt{d}5} 14.\texttt{\texttt{c}2} \pm. 
After 7.\texttt{\texttt{g}5} \texttt{g}6 8.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{h}6 9.\texttt{\texttt{e}3} \texttt{\texttt{g}7} 
10.\texttt{\texttt{d}2} \texttt{\texttt{a}6} 11.\texttt{\texttt{c}3} \pm White’s advan-
tage is overwhelming. He has 
plenty of extra space; moreover 
Black’s knights are terribly mis-
placed.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{a) 3...\texttt{e}6 4.\texttt{\texttt{f}3}}
  
  (diagram)

  \item 4...\texttt{\texttt{c}6}
\end{itemize}

It is too dangerous for Black
to follow with 4...c5, because in the variation: 5.c4 2b6 6.g5! he has no satisfactory continuations. In case of 6...2c7 7.2c3± White’s threats are extremely dangerous. It is even worse for Black to play: 6...2e7 7.2xe7 2xe7 8.a4, because it turns out that his knight on b6 is misplaced and he is forced to give up a pawn: 8...d5 9.exd6 2xd6 10.b4+-.

4...2e7 5.c4 2b6 6.2c3 d6 7.exd6 cxd6 8.2e2 0-0 (Black has also tested in practice the variation: 8...2d7 9.0-0 2f6 10.a4 0-0, Leskovar – Mazzoleni, Buenos Aires 1994 and here after the logical line: 11.a5 2bd7 12.2b3 e5 13.2d1± White remains with a great space advantage and a superior development, so his prospects are very promising. After 10...a5 11.2b3 0-0 12.2d1 2d7 13.h3 2c8 14.2e3± White dominates in the centre and Black can hardly organize any counterplay.) 9.0-0 2d6d7 (Black’s defence is extremely difficult after: 9...2d7 10.2e3 2a6, Goreskul – Szabo, Gyongyos 1999, because he is faced with serious problems to solve after:

11.2b3 2c7 12.2ac1±. It is even worse for Black to play: 11...2c8 12.a4 2c7 13.2b5 2b8 14.2f4±) 10.2f4 a6 11.b4 b6 12.2b3 2b7 13.2fd1±, Klaus – Pepke, Stetten 1988. White maintains a great space advantage and free piece-development. He has excellent chances to seize the initiative in the centre and on the queenside.

5.c4 2b6

The other possibilities for Black are clearly worse:

5...2b4+? – this seemingly attractive check, with the idea to simplify the position, suddenly loses surprisingly quickly: 6. 2e2! 2b6 (Black loses a piece after his other possibilities: 6...0-0 7.cxd5 exd5 8.a3--; 6...d6 7.cxd5 exd5 8.a3+– Mullen – Stad, Email 1999.) 7.c5 2d5 8.a3 2a5 9.b4+– Zynaps – Dig, Internet 2001. White’s king is presently stranded in the centre indeed, but Black’s compensation for the piece is obviously insufficient, since he cannot open files in the centre so easily;

5...2d7??, Schulz – Klinger, Lingen 2002. White can now achieve an overwhelming advantage in the centre after the logical line: 6.d5! 2b8 (6...2b4 7.2c3 2a6 8.2d3±) 7.2c3 d6 8.exd6 cxd6 9.dxe6 2xe6 10.2d4± and Black’s defence is rather unpleasant, because of the weakness on d6 and his lag in development;

5...2db4?! 6.a3 2a6 7.b4 2e7 (Black tried a really strange
piece-sacrifice in the game Kelbl – Gabucci, Email 2001 – 7...
\( \texttt{\textbf{x}} \texttt{b4}+ 8.\texttt{axb4} \texttt{axb4} 9.\texttt{a3}\texttt{+-} \) 8.\texttt{c3}, White’s superior development and his abundance of extra space provide him with a stable edge, Higgins – Newton, corr. 1995.

6.\texttt{c3}

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6...\texttt{d6}

6...\texttt{d5} – Black loses time like that and he enables White to complete a positional bind with: 7.c5 \texttt{d7} 8.b5 \texttt{e7} 9.0–0± Malijevsky – Novak, Czech Republic. 1996. White has a great space advantage and a superior development.

6...\texttt{b4} – Black’s bishop is not so well placed here. It belongs to the e7-square. 7.\texttt{d3} 0–0? (This is a blunder, but Black’s position is terrible anyway: 7...\texttt{d6} 8.0–0 \texttt{dxex5} 9.\texttt{dxex5} h6 10.\texttt{we2}; 7...\texttt{d5} 8.c5 \texttt{d7} 9.0–0±) 8.\texttt{xh7}+! \texttt{xh7} 9.\texttt{g5}+ \texttt{g6} 10.h4! \texttt{e7} 11.h5+ \texttt{h6} 12.\texttt{c2} \texttt{xc3}+ 13.\texttt{bxc3} f5 14.exf6 1–0 Jones – Smith, corr. 1992.

7.exd6 cxd6 8.\texttt{e2}

That seemingly tentative move is aimed at preventing the pin of the knight, which becomes possible after: 8.\texttt{d3} e5 9.0–0 \texttt{g4}.

8...\texttt{e7}

Black has also tested a line, which weakens the dark squares considerably: 8...\texttt{g6}?! 9.\texttt{g5}! \texttt{e7} (Black would not fare any better after: 9...f6 10.\texttt{c3}±, while in case of: 9...\texttt{e7} 10.\texttt{h6} \texttt{f8} 11.\texttt{c1}, he will have problems with the safety of his king.) 10.\texttt{f6} \texttt{g8} 11.0–0±. Black lags in development and his pieces are dis-coordinated, Ar dovsky – G. Andersen, Dos Hermanas 2003.

9.0–0 0–0

9...\texttt{c7}?! – Black presents White with two valuable tempi for the development of his initiative with this dubious move: 10.d5 exd5, Miller – Noland, Email 1999 and here White can exploit the unfavourable placement of the enemy queen with the move 11.\texttt{b5}!

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Black can counter that with three sensible moves, but they all lead to difficult positions for him: 11...\texttt{d8} 12.cxd5 \texttt{b8} (It looks like Black is arranging the set for a new game... On the other hand
he loses immediately after: 12...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}5 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 \) 14.\( \text{d}6+ \), while 12...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}4 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}4 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xd}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{f}6 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g}3 \pm \) leads to a position in which Black lags in development and he has plenty of weaknesses. He can hardly find a safe haven for his king in the nearest future.) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}3 \) 0–0 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}1 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}7 \) (14...\( \text{\textit{K}} \text{a}6 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}2 \pm \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}1 \pm \) White enjoys a great space advantage and his development is superior;

11...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}8 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{K}} \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}5 \) (12...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}4 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}4 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xd}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{f}6 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g}3 \pm \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}6 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}8 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}2 \pm \) Black’s pieces are so misplaced that his defense will be extremely difficult;

11...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}7 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{K}} \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}5 \) (It is again worse for Black to defend with: 12...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}4 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}4 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xd}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{f}6 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g}3 \pm \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}3 \) 0–0 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}6 \pm \) White remains with a stable advantage, because of his powerful passed pawn in the centre, excellent development and superior piece-coordination.

10.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}3 \)

10...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}5 \)

This is the most logical varia-
tion for Black, but he has tried some other moves in practice too:

10...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{f}5 \) 11.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}5 \), Froeyman – Draftian, Belgium 2001 and now White’s simplest line would have been: 12.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}6 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{g}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}2 \pm \), his advantage is stable and long lasting, because of his excellent development and powerful passed \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}6 \)-pawn, despite the seemingly dangerous black pawn-centre;

After 10...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}7 \), White must find the most logical set-up for his heavy pieces in the centre, in order to prepare \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}5 \), or \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}5 \) at an opportune moment and also to prevent Black’s counterplay connected with \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}6 \)-\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}5 \), and that is – 11.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}1 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{h}8 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}2 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}8 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{fd}1 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{f}6 \) (It is already too late for Black to play 13...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}5 \), because after: 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}5 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{c}4 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xc}4 \text{dxc}4 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}2 \pm \), he will have problems to defend his c4-pawn; additionally he has to be constantly on the alert for White’s possibility to accomplish the pawn-break \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}4-\text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}5 \).) 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}3 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{a}8 \) 16.a3 \( \pm \), White’s initiative on the queenside is running smoothly and Black’s counterplay is nowhere to be seen, Schmitzer – Kuban, Hessen 1990;

The move 10...\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{a}6 \) is too slow. 11.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}5 \text{exd}5 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}5 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xe}5 \text{dxe}5 \), SonnyTom – Backstab, Internet 1998, and here after: 14.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}3 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}7 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{e}4 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{f}6 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{b}6 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{d}7 \) 17.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xf}6+ \) \( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{xf}6 \) 18.\( \text{\textit{Q}} \text{fd}1 \pm \), White remains with a dangerous passed pawn in the centre and
Chapter 9

an excellent development.

11.c5.bd7 12.db1 b6 13.b4±

White’s queenside initiative is very powerful and Black has no counterplay whatsoever, Kanani – Radhy Sol, Dubai 1986.

b) 3...d6 4.of3

We will analyze in this chapter the lines: b1) 4..c6, b2) 4..af5 and b3) 4..db6.

About 4..dc6 – see Chapter 10, 4..dxe5 – see Chapter 11, 4..g6 – see Chapter 12, while the main defence for Black 4..ag4 will be dealt with in chapters 13-15. The move 4..e6, after 5.c4 db6 (it is worse for Black to play: 5..ae7 6.exd6 cxd6 7..d3±) 6.exd6 cxd6 7..d3, transposes to the line – 3..e6.

Black plays only very seldom 4..dd7. He closes temporarily the e8-h3 diagonal for his bishop with this move. Following 5.c4, Black has two possible retreats for his knight, but he is in trouble after both of them:

After 5..dc5b6, White has the typical restricting sacrifice at his disposal: 6.e6!, for example: 6..fe 7.dc3 df6 (7..c5 8.dg5+–; 7..e5 8.dg5 df6 9.dxe5+–) 8..d3 g6, Chatalbashev – Ratel, Creon 2004. White can obtain an overwhelming advantage now by playing energetically: 9.dg5! dg7 10.de2 dd7 (10..e5 11.dxe5 dg4 12.exd6 xd6 13.db5±; 12..exd6 13.0–0± and White’s game against Black’s hanging pawns is quite comfortable, while his opponent’s pieces are disordinated.) 11.0–0 0–0 12. de1 e5 (It is worse for Black to play: 12..de8 13.xh7! xh7 14. dh5+ dg8 15.xg6 df6 16.dh6 df7 17.de4+) 13.dxe5 dx5 14. df3±, because White regains his pawn and he preserves his pressure along the central files;

The retreat of the knight 5..d4b4, enables White to obtain an edge in another fashion: 6.exd6 exd6 7.de2 de7 8.0–0 0–0 9.dg3 db6 (It is possibly better for Black to play: 9..df6, after which White can follow with: 10.a3 dc6 11.h3±. Black has lost plenty of tempi on knight-moves and at the end both his knights went back to where they started from. Meanwhile, the c6-square is not the right place for Black’s
knights in this pawn-structure, because its prospects there are quite questionable. He should have placed it instead on d7, with the idea to transfer it to e6, or g6, via the f8-square.) 10.\$b3 a5 (or 10...\$c6 11.d5 \$e5 12.\$xe5 dxe5 13.\$e3 \$f5 14.\$ad1\pm) 11.a3 \$c6 12.\$e3 and it is not good for Black to follow with: 12...\$f5 13.d5 \$e5 (It is only slightly better for Black to continue with 13...a4 14.\$d1 \$e5 15.\$xb6 cxb6 16.\$xa4\pm, because White still remains with an extra pawn and a superior position.) 14.\$xe5 dxe5 15.d6!\pm and Black loses material.

b1) 4...c6 5.\$e2

After 5.\$e2, the game often transposes to variations, which arise after other move-orders, for example: 5...dxe5 6.\$xe5 c6 6.\$e2; 5...\$g4 6.c4 – see 4...\$g4 5.\$e2 c6 6.c4.

In this chapter, we will only deal with moves that lead to original variations.

5...g6

Or 5...\$d7 6.c4 \$c7 7.exd6 exd6 8.\$c3 \$e7. There were two games, which reached that position – (Almasi – Mozes, Budapest 1991 and Cabrilo – M.Grunberg, Bjeljina 2000) and in both of them White placed his bishop on the f4-square either immediately, or on the next move. This was a bit dubious decision, because the bishop could be attacked by the black knight on the c7-square, for example: 9.\$f4 0–0 10.h3 \$f6 11.0–0 d5 12.\$e1 dxc4 and here White played: 13.\$xc7 (otherwise Black places his knight on d5 and follows with \$e6) 13...\$xc7 14.\$xc4 \$f5, now White could have maintained his initiative with 15.\$e5 with the idea to continue with \$f3. In general, it is even better for White to postpone a bit the development of his dark squared bishop and to play for example: 9.0–0 0–0 10.\$e1!? and h2–h3;

5...\$f5 6.\$h4!? e6 (6...\$e6
7.\$f4\upDelta f4–f5; 6...\$c8 7.exd6 exd6
8.\$xf5 \$xf5 9.0–0 \$e7, now White can follow with the original maneuver 10.\$g4!? \$g6 11.\$c8 and Black will be forced to give up a pawn: 11...a5 12.\$xb7 \$a7 13.\$c8\pm. It is not good for Black to play: 6...\$g6 7.e6! \$b6
8.\$xg6 fxg6 9.0–0 \$f6 10.c4 \$a6
11.\$c3 \$c7 12.d5\pm. His position now is strategically hopeless and the game Royset – Michalsen, Tromsoe 2001, continued with: 12...cxd5 13.cxd5 \$a5 14.b4 \$xb4 15.\$b1! \$xc3 16.\$a4+ \$d8 17.\$b2 b5 18.\$xb5 \$fxd5
from castling short.

7.\textit{exd6} $\text{xd6}$ 8.\textit{c3} $\text{g7}$ 9.\textit{e3}

The arising pawn-structure resembles the line: 4...g6 5.\textit{c4} c6 6.exd6 $\text{xd6}$, which we have analyzed in Chapter 12. The difference is that at first White’s bishop had not been developed to c4, but it was deployed to e2 immediately (it is well placed on that square, because it cannot be attacked by Black on the queenside) and secondly, White has already played c2-c4, so he has ousted Black’s knight away from the centre, but he has weakened his d4-pawn a bit.

9...\textit{ba6}

Black can hardly change anything with: 9...0–0 10.\textit{d2} \textit{ba6} 11.\textit{f4} 12.\textit{h6} $\text{g4}$ 13.\textit{xg7} $\text{xg7}$ 14.d5 and here, instead of the horrible blunder: 14...\textit{xd5}?? 15.\textit{d4}-- Komliakov – Tobak, Koszalin 1999, he had better play: 14...\textit{xf3} 15.\textit{xf3} \textit{cxsd5} 16.\textit{cxsd5} $\text{yd6}$ 17.\textit{d1}+ and White would have only a slight advantage, mostly because of the weakness of the e7-pawn.

10.\textit{d2} $\text{g4}$ 11.0–0 0–0 12.\textit{ad1} \textit{ad8}

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\end{center}
13.\textit{b}c1±. It is useful for White to take his queen away from the d-file in order to defend the d6-square effectively. This position was reached in the game Dolmatov – Petrosian, Moscow 1981. White’s position is clearly preferable. The reason is already quite familiar to us – both black knights are terribly misplaced. The game continued with: 13... \textit{b}5 14.\textit{b}3 (White does not wish to surrender the d5-square to his opponent.) 14...\textit{b}xc4 15.\textit{b}xc4 \textit{b}4 (Black is threatening to capture on \textit{f}3.) 16.a3 \textit{a}5 17.\textit{a}e5 \textit{a}xe5 (Black cannot play 17... \textit{a}xe2, because after: 18.\textit{a}x\textit{c}6! \textit{h}5 19.\textit{a}xe2 \textit{xe}2 20.f3 \textit{a}2 21.\textit{a}a5±, his queen gets trapped after all.) 18.\textit{a}x\textit{g}4 \textit{g}7 19.\textit{a}e2 \textit{a}4 20.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}8 21.\textit{d}5! \textit{f}6 22.\textit{f}3 \textit{cxd}5 23.\textit{d}xd5 \textit{d}xd5 24.\textit{d}xd5. White has created a passed pawn and his advantage has become even more evident as a result. 24...\textit{c}7 25.\textit{x}d8 \textit{d}d8 26.\textit{c}5 \textit{d}3. This move is too risky, because Black weakens his last rank. (He would not have created any counterplay by playing 26...\textit{e}6 either, because of 27.\textit{c}6±.) 27.\textit{b}b1 \textit{b}3 28.\textit{d}1 \textit{e}6 29.\textit{c}6 \textit{a}a3 30.\textit{d}7 \textit{h}5 31.\textit{f}7 \textit{f}8 32.\textit{d}7 a5 33.\textit{g}3 \textit{b}5 34.\textit{c}1 \textit{h}4 35.\textit{b}7 \textit{e}5 36.\textit{c}7+ and White won.

b2) 4...\textit{f}5

(diagram)

This is a good developing move, but it has a definite drawback in comparison to the popular lines for Black. He is not counterattacking effectively White’s pawn-centre.

5.\textit{e}e2 \textit{e}6

The move 5...\textit{h}6 – does not lose outright indeed, but it is hardly necessary at that moment. White does not intend to exchange the bishop on \textit{f}5 and the move \textit{g}5 is not a part of his plans yet. 6.0–0 \textit{e}6 7.\textit{c}4 \textit{d}b6 8.\textit{c}3 (White could have developed his knight too – 8.\textit{c}3, with the idea to develop the bishop – 8.\textit{f}4.) 8...\textit{e}7 9.\textit{c}3 \textit{c}6?? (9...0–0 10.\textit{c}1±) 10.ex\textit{d}6+ – and since Black cannot capture on \textit{d}6, because of \textit{c}4–\textit{c}5 – he can just resign, Juarez – Aima, San Isidoro 1993.

5...\textit{d}xe5 6.\textit{d}xe5 \textit{d}7, Borochow – Bagby, Los Angeles 1929, 7.\textit{f}3 (This retreat is quite typical for similar positions – White wants to avoid the exchange in the centre and the loss of tempi is immaterial.) 7...\textit{e}6 8.0–0 \textit{e}7 9.\textit{c}4 \textit{d}5 \textit{b}6 10.\textit{c}3 and there arises a transposition to a game that we are going to analyze later in this chapter – Lehmann, Leutersdorf 2002.
5...\( \Box c6 \) 6.0–0 dxe5 (6...e6 – see 5...e6; 6...g6. This move does not combine well with \( \Box c8-f5 \). 7.c4 \( \Box b6 \) 8.exd6 cxd6 9.d5 \( \Box e5 \) 10.\( \Box x e5 \) – 10.\( \Box d4 \)?! – 10...dxe5 11.\( \Box c3 \) \( \Box c8 \) 12.\( \Box b3 \) \( \Box g7 \) 13.\( \Box e3 \) and after c4-c5, White’s central pawns become extremely dangerous.) 7.c4?! (in case of 7.dxe5, it is good for Black to follow with: 7...\( \Box d b4 \) – he attacks the c2-pawn and thus he forces a transition to a favourable endgame.) 7...\( \Box f4 \). Black is trying to exploit the temporary placement of his pawn on the e5-square. (He should avoid the line: 7...\( \Box d b4 \) 8.d5 \( \Box c2 \) 9.dxc6 \( \Box x d1 \) 10.\( \Box x d1 \) \( \Box x a1 \) 11.cxb7 \( \Box b8 \) 12.\( \Box x e5 \) – Scrimgour – Fielder, Scotland 1981, because White already has more than enough material for the exchange and he is threatening \( \Box a4 \), while Black’s knight is totally isolated on the a1-square.) 8.\( \Box x f4 \). (It is also interesting for White to try: 8.d5 \( \Box x e2+ \) 9.\( \Box x e2 \) \( \Box d4 \) 10.\( \Box x d4 \) edx4 11.\( \Box e5 \) and Black should better refrain from capturing the pawn with: 11...\( \Box d3 \) 12.\( \Box d1 \) \( \Box x c4 \) 13.\( \Box x d4 \) \( \Box a6 \) 14.\( \Box c3 \)†, because White’s lead in development more than compensates his minimal material deficit, so he should try instead: 11...e6 12.\( \Box x d4 \) c5∞ or 12.\( \Box e1 \) \( \Box e7 \) and Black manages to castle, because it is too dangerous for White to leave his opponent’s passed pawn on the d4-square.) 8...exf4 9.d5 \( \Box b8 \) 10.\( \Box c3 \). It is quite clear now that White will regain the f4-pawn without any problems, since Black can hardly defend it with anything. It is now too difficult for Black to develop his kingside, because White can counter g7-g6 with the move \( \Box d4 \), while in case of 10...e6 (10...\( \Box a6 \) 11.\( \Box d4 \)†) – 11.\( \Box d4 \)† – Black’s lag in development might become disastrous for him.

\[ \text{6.0–0} \]

\[ \text{6...\( \Box e7 \)} \]

6...\( \Box c6 \). Usually, it is not advisable for Black to develop his knight here so early, because White has the possibility d4-d5 at his disposal. 7.c4 \( \Box b6 \) 8.exd6 cxd6 9.d5 exd5 (It is bad for Black to play: 9...\( \Box e5 \)?! 10.\( \Box d4 \) \( \Box e7 \) 11.\( \Box c3 \) 0–0 12.f4. This move is even more energetic than the capture on f5.) 12.\( \Box x c4 \) 13.g4 \( \Box g6 \) 14.f5 exf5 15.gxf5 \( \Box g5 \) 16.fxg6 hxg6 17.\( \Box x c4 \) \( \Box x c4 \) 18.\( \Box e2+ \) – and White remained with a material advantage, Fiori de Azevedo – Nasser, Vitoria 1961.) 10.cxd5 \( \Box e5 \) 11.\( \Box d4 \) \( \Box d7 \) 12.f4 \( \Box g6 \) 13.f5 (It deserved attention for White to try here: 13.\( \Box c3 \), in
order to follow with f4-f5 on the next move: 13...e5 14.f5 e5 15.e6 e6 16.fxe6 0-0 17. e3± and White maintained his pawn on the e6-square.) 13...e5 14.e6 c8 15.e3 g6, Torhola – Houtsonen, Finland 1991, White’s simplest line here was: 16.xf8 xf8 (16...xf5 17.h6 – and Black will have to lose the exchange on the f8-square anyway.) 17.f6+. Black’s king is stranded in the centre and the knight on e5 (which is covering it presently) is something White can easily cope with.

Following: 6...dxe5 7.xxe5, Black has tried in practice:

7...e7 8.c4 b6 9.c3 b8d7 10.f3 c5 (White was threatening c4-c5 and d1-b3.) 11.e3 (11.d5 0-0 12.f4 f6 13.b3 exd5 14.cxd5 c4=) 11...cxd4 12. xd4 g6 13.d2+. White has a slight space advantage and he has better prospects on the queenside. In the game Vogt – Lehmann, Leutersdorf 2002, Black failed to solve his problems after: 13.e8 14.b3 0-0 15.fd1 a6 16.a4 c7 17.b2± – it was quite unclear whether Black really needed his rook on the c7-square. Then he blundered horribly with: 17.e5? and after 18.f3 c5 19.xc5 xc5 20.b4 c7 21.c5 c8 22.ac1 a8 23.d5+– he lost the exchange;

7...d7 8.c4 (It is interesting for White to try here: 8.f3! and only then to follow with c2-c4.) 8...b4 9.d3 h4?! (Black had better exchange on the d3-square once, or even twice: 9.xd3 10.xd3 xd3 11.xd3 e7 12.c3± and White maintains a slight advantage in a calm position; or 9...xd3 10.xd3 h4 11.e2 0-0 0-0 12.e3± and Black has some counterplay along the d-file.) 10.xb4 xb4 11.g3 e7 (It is not good for Black to follow with: 11...h3 12.b3; he had to play instead: 11...f6 12.b3 c5 13.a3 a5 14.xb7 b8 15.xa7 b6 16.a4 cxd4 17.d2 d3 18.f3± and he would have had some compensation for the sacrificed pawn.) 12.a3 a5 13.b4=, Black lost a piece in the game Lepeshkin – Berdichevski, Moscow 1989.

7.c4 b6 8.c3 0-0

The other order of moves is too dangerous for Black: 8...dxe5 9.xe5 0-0 (He had to continue with: 9...d7 10.f3 0-0), Krannich – L.Adams, Mainz 1996, because of 10.g4 g6 11.f4. Black’s bishop is really endangered and in case of 11...f6, White can play: 12.xg6 hgx6 13.c5 d5 14.f5±.

9.f4!?
The usual square for White's bishop in this pawn-structure is – e3, but he is trying to develop his bishop even more actively.

9...dxe5

It was possibly better for Black to have refrained for a while from that exchange, by playing: 9...Qb3 10.exd6 cxd6 11.Qb6 Qf6 12.a4 Qe4 (it is advisable for Black to try here 12...a5 13.bac1±, although the weakening of the b5-square might have some long-term consequences) 13.Qd1 (White had better grab the pawn with: 13.a5 Qxc3 14.bxc3 Qd7 15.Qxb7±) 13...Qd7 14.Qxe4 (Now, it is too late for White to capture the pawn: 14.Qxb7 Qb8 15.Qxa7 Qa8 16.Qb7 Qb8 17.Qa6 Qa8=.) 14...Qxe4 15.Qd2 Qc6 16.Qf1 d5 17. c5 e5 18.Qxe5 Qxe5 19.dxe5 Qxc5 and in the game Kupreichik – Kengis, Sverdlovsk 1984, Black succeeded in equalizing: 20.Qf3 Qg5 21.Qac1 Qb6 22. Qxd5 Qxd5 23.Qxd5 Qf4 24.Qf3 Qxe5=.

10.Qxe5 Qb8 11.Qf3 Qf6

12.Qb3 Qe4

After 12...c5 13.Qad1 Qc8 14.d5↑, the active position of White's bishop on f4 yields dividends – it controls the d6-square in front of the pawn.

13.a4 a5 14.c5 Qd5 15.Qg3 Qexc3 16.bxc3 Qa7

Or 16...b6 17.Qe5 (17.cxb6 cxb6) 17...bxc5 18.Qc6 Qd7 19. Qb5↑.

17.Qe5 Qg5 18.Qf3 Qf6

White enjoyed a space advantage and a superior piece-placement in the game Tseshkovsky – Alburt, Minsk 1976.

b3) 4...Qb6

This prophylactic move is quite popular and it has been tested by grandmasters like P.Leko, D.Bronstein, L.Ljubojevic, K.Sakaev and some others. Black retreats his knight from d5 to the b6-square, since White could have attacked it anyway with moves like c2-c4 and Qf1-c4. He then plans to fianchetto his bishop on f8 and to attack White's pawn-centre. Still, Black loses time by playing deliberately another move with the
same knight.

5.a4 a5

Black can try some other lines, which do not prevent White from playing a4-a5:

5...clave4 6.a5 c6d7 7.h3 (White can obtain a slight advantage, because of his extra space on the queenside, with the line: 7.exd6 cxd6 8.h3 clave5 9.cle2 e6 10.c5 clave7 11.0-0 0-0 12.d6e1 a6 13.d5± Matanovic – Ljubojevic, Yugoslavia 1975) 7...h5 (It is too dangerous for Black to try here: 7...xf3 8.xf3 c6 – because of 9.e6! This is exactly what White had in mind while playing 7.h3. 9...fxe6 10.d3 df6 11.c3 d5 12.a6 b6 and White won a piece after: 13.b5 d7 14. d1! 0-0 0-0 15.a4++, Romeu Alfonso – Benavent, Valencia 1995. In case of: 11...e5 12.a6 b8 13.axb7 xb7 14.dxe5 dxe5 15.d2± – all black pawns are catastrophically weak.) 8.g4 g6 9.e6 fxe6 10.g5 f6 11.h4 (It is less energetic for White to follow with: 11.g2 c6 12.xe6 d7 13.xf8 xf8 14.0-0 a6 15.c4 f7 16.c3 g8 17.f4±. Pilaj – Fahrner, Mureck 2001.) 11...c6 (11...h5 12.d3±; 11...c6 12.a6 bxa6 13.h5 f7 14.xxa6–) 12.h5 f7 13.xf7 xf7 14.g5 d5 15.c4 c7 16.d3± and White already creates powerful threats, for example to capture on h7;

5...c6 6.a5 c7d5. Black’s deliberate loss of two tempi looks a bit strange. Its idea is evidently to maim White’s pawn on a2 to the a5-square and to attack it later, or to exploit the b4-square with his knight sometimes in the future. 7.e2 g6 8.0-0 g7 9.c4 c7 10.exd6 xd6 (We have analyzed a similar position, except with a white pawn on the a2-square, in the line 4...c6 5.e2 g6.) 11.c3 0-0 12.e3 d6a6 13. x1 a4 14.d1 d6, Sigurjons-son – Larsen, Ljubljana 1977, 15.d5 d5 (15...cxd5 16.xd5 d5 17.xa3±) 16.f4 f7 17.d3± – Black’s pieces are horribly misplaced after the pawn-break in the centre;

5...g6 6.a5 c7d7 7.d4 (7. h4!? 7...e6 8.0-0 d5 9.g5 g7 10.e7 xe7 11.e2±. This position resembles the French Defence, but the dark squares on Black’s kingside have been weakened considerably with the move g7-g6. 11...0-0 12.c4 (Opening of the centre is too dangerous for Black.) 12.dxc4 13.d5 c5 14.d5 exd5 15.xd5 d8 16.d2 (it is better for White to follow with 16.xc4 c4 17.e1 18.xa5 18.xb5 d6 19.xb6 xc6 20.c3 d8 21.c4± and his compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient) 16.xe8 17.xc4 c6 (17...xe5 18. xex5 xe5 19.fe1 c6±) 18.e4 xe5 18...cxe5 19.c7+c5 19...xe5 20.ad1± and White pressed his material advantage home in the game Nai- ditsch – Varga, Budapest 1998.

White could have possibly tried on his move 8 another idea:
8.h4, for example: 8...d5 (8...g7 9.g5±; 8...c6 9.e2±) 9.g5 e7 10.d3± and he reaches an even more favourable deployment of pieces in the same pawn-structure.

6.exd6

After the other possible captures on d6 – Black has problems to complete his development:

6...exd6 7.d5. This move makes Black’s kingside development – a hard task to accomplish. In case of e7-e6, Black would remain with plenty of pawn weaknesses, while g7-g6 would be countered with d1-d4 and Black would be forced to weaken additionally his kingside. 7.a6 (We have already mentioned that Black compromises his pawn-structure considerably with: 7...e5?! 8.dxe6 xxe6 9.b5+ c6 10.g5 f6 11.0-0 d5 12.e3 d7 13.c3± Zhidkov – Mikadze, Moscow 1972.) 8.e3 d7 9.g5 (It is not so energetic for White to play instead: 9.c3 c5 10.b3 Hjartarson – Westerinen, Reykjavik 1997.) 9.b4 (9...h6? 10.e6+) 10.c3 g6 11.f3 f6 12.e6 xex6 13.dxe6 e7 14.b5+ f8, Kovalev – Leko, Tilburg 1992. White’s positional advantage is overwhelming in this situation. Black’s king is unsafe and it is inconceivable how he can complete his kingside development. Instead of the quite unclear complications after: 15.0-0 c2 16.xb7 xe3 17.fxe3 b8 18.f3 c8 19.h3 – and Black has fortified his position reliably on the dark squares, it would have been much simpler for White to have protected his c2-pawn first with – 15.c1± and castle only later;

6...xd6 7.c3 g6 8.b5 d8 9.f4 a6 10.e5. Thus, White forces the move f7-f6 and at first it weakens Black’s kingside pawns and secondly it closes the a1-h8 diagonal, which Black plans to exploit at some moment in the future, because he will develop his bishop along it. 10...f6 11.g3 c6 (11.e6 12.d3 c6 13.e2 f7 14.a3 b4 15.e4 h6 16.0-0 d7 17.fae1±. Practically all black pieces are terribly misplaced. Later, in the game Groszpeter – Konopka, Zalakaros 1995, there followed: 17.h8 18.ad1 g8 19.c3 d5 20.c4 b4 21.b3 f5 22.xf5 xf5 23.b1 a6 24.c3 ad8 25.h3 g5 26.d5 c5 27.b5 d7 28.e6+ xe6 29.xe6 d7 30.de1 f8 31.d6 and Black resigned.) 12.c3 e6 13.e4 f7 (Black had better play here: 13...d5±.) 14.xa6 xa6 15.
$\text{e}2$ (White is threatening to checkmate on f6, or to check on the d6-square and Black's position is practically hopeless.)
15...$\text{g}7$ 16.$\text{d}6+$ $\text{f}8$ 17.$\text{x}b7$
$\text{a}8$ 18.$\text{c}5+$ and White remained with an overwhelming positional and material advantage, Rublevsky – Laketic, Novi Sad 2000.

7.$\text{d}3$ $\text{e}7$
Black would not change much by playing: 7...$\text{g}4$ 8.0–0 $\text{e}7$
9.$\text{e}1$ 0–0 10.$\text{bd}2$ $\text{h}5$ 11.$\text{f}1$
$\text{g}6$ 12.$\text{g}3$, Salimaki – Westerinen, Finland 1997.

8.0–0 $\text{e}6$ 9.$\text{c}3$ $\text{g}4$ 10.$\text{bd}2$

White's position is clearly superior, because of his extra space and his harmonious deployment of pieces, Tseshkovsky – Laketic, Tivat 1995.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter some seldom played variations for Black on moves 3 and 4. In general, it is not so sensible for him to avoid the natural 3...d6-move, counterattacking White's centre and contributing to his piece-development, and to try something else on move three. Some of these rarely played lines like 3...$\text{c}6$, or 3...g6 are in fact very dangerous for Black, because White can immediately create dangerous threats.

Following 3...d6 4.$\text{f}3$, Black's seldom played moves: 4...c6, 4...$\text{b}6$ and 4...$\text{f}5$ – usually lead to calm positions with a minimal advantage for White. He often exchanges on d6 and then he develops his kingside. Later, he castles and maintains a slight space advantage.
Chapter 10

1.e4 e5 2.f3 d5 3.d4 d6 4.f3 c6

This seemingly logical move (Black develops a piece and he attacks the e5-pawn.) in the Alekhine Defence has an important drawback – White now has the possibility to attack the knight with d4-d5.

5.c4 d6 6.e6!

That restricting sacrifice is so well-familiar to us by now. Presently, it becomes possible, because Black cannot capture with the bishop, because of d4-d5.

6...fxe6

Black’s extra pawn on e6 only hampers the development of his pieces on both sides of the board in this position. His kingside is also very weak now as well as the e8-h5 and b1-h7 – diagonals in particular.

He usually defends with two different plans in this situation:

The first one is by playing g7-g6 and f8-g7. He manages to develop his kingside in that fashion and to create some counterplay against his opponent’s d4-pawn. White in his turn has a wonderful target to attack on the kingside – the g6-pawn. He can follow with h2-h4-h5 and open the position, introducing his rook on h1 into the actions.

Black’s second possible plan is to get rid of the cramping e6-pawn by playing e6-e5. Thus, he is inclined to return his extra pawn, for example he can counter d4-d5 with c6-d4. Later, he usually manages to play once again e7-e5, thus developing his kingside in a natural fashion.

Sometimes, Black’s two possible plans are combined together – he plays at first g7-g6 and f8-g7 and only then he follows with e6-e5.

7.c3

This is just one of the possible
move-orders for White. Contrary to the two other possibilities – 7.h4 and 7.Qg5 – he develops his queenside first, before the direct attack on the kingside.

So, Black has two different plans: a) 7...e5 and b) 7...g6.

It is not so good for Black to play: 7...Qd7 8.Qg5 Qf6. After 9.d5 exd5 10.cxd5 Qe5 (Naturally, Black cannot expect anything promising for him after the retreat: 10...Qb8 11.Qd3 g6 12. Qxh7 Qxh7 13.Qxg6+ Qf7 14. Qe4 Qxe4 15.Qh5+ Bathke – Ritscher, Germany 1998.) 11.f4 Qf7 12.Qe6 Qd7? (It is somewhat better for Black, but still leading to a bad position, to play: 12...Qxe6 13.dxe6 Qh6, Malada – Marinic, Split 2000, because of 14.Qe2 Qc8 15.g4 Qhg8 16.g5 and he is forced to capture on e6 and give up a piece for a pawn.) 13.Qb5+++ and White wins material. Later, in the game Maisian – Sobolewski, Leningrad 1990, there followed: 13...Qxd5 14.Qxd5 Qxe6+ 15.Qxe6 Qxe6 16.Qxc7+ Qd7 17.Qxa8 Qd8 18. Qe3 Qc6 19.Qc1 and Black resigned.

10...e5

It is not logical for Black to continue with: 10...Qf5. In case he does not intend to play e7-e5, it becomes unclear why he has given up his e6-pawn in the first place. If Black really wants to push e7-e5, he should have done it immediately in order to be able to capture on e6 with the bishop outright without losing an additional tempo. 11.Qe2 h5 12.0-0 Qd7 13.Qe3 e5 14.dxe6 Qxe6 15.Qfe1 Qe7 16.Qd5 Qxd5 17. Qxd5=. Black has already compromised his kingside with the move h7-h5, so he cannot castle short, while his king will come under a very dangerous pawn-onslaught on the queenside. 17...Qf6 18.Qd2 Qf5? (It was better for Black to play: 18...Qf7 19.Qac1=), Bosch – Vis, Den Bosch 1997 and here White could have won the game immediately with 19.Qxb6+-.

11.dxe6 Qxe6

It is too bad for Black to play 11...Qf6, because after 12.Qxf6 gxf6 13.Qd5, he fails to regain
his pawn after: 13...\textsubscript{1}xd5 14.
\textsubscript{1}xd5 c6 15.\textsubscript{1}c4 b5 16.\textsubscript{1}b3 \textsubscript{1}b7
17.dxc6 \textsubscript{2}xc6 18.0-0 0-0-0 19.
\textsubscript{2}f4+- and White’s material adv-
antage has become decisive, Baron Rodriguez – Moya Alba-
dalejo, La Roda 2005.

\textbf{12.\textsubscript{1}e3}

![Diagram](image)

\textbf{12...\textsubscript{2}f6}

The move 12...\textsubscript{2}d7 is with
the idea for Black to castle long. 13.0-0-0 0-0-0 14.\textsubscript{2}b5
\textsubscript{2}b8 15.\textsubscript{2}c3 a6 16.\textsubscript{1}d4 \textsubscript{1}e7
17.\textsubscript{1}xe6 \textsubscript{2}xe6 18.\textsubscript{1}xb6 cxb6
19.\textsubscript{2}xg7 b5\#. Black is trying to
exploit the weaknesses of the
shelter of White’s king. 20.\textsubscript{2}b1
\textsubscript{2}f6 21.\textsubscript{1}h6 bx6 22.\textsubscript{1}xe4 \textsubscript{2}f5+
23.\textsubscript{1}d3 \textsubscript{2}xf2= and the position
is absolutely equal. It looks like
White’s castling on move 13 was
not his best decision.

Having in mind that Black
plans to castle long, it is much
trickier for White to follow with
13.\textsubscript{1}e2!? , in order to counter
13...0-0-0 (Black’s attempt to
win a pawn after: 13...\textsubscript{2}c6, fails
because of: 14.0-0 \textsubscript{1}xc4 15.\textsubscript{1}f3
d5 16.\textsubscript{1}e5\textsubscript{±}) with 14.0-0\textsubscript{±}
and to proceed later with a pawn-of-
fensive on the queenside. In the

game Bor – Ameling, corr. 1985,
after 13.\textsubscript{1}e2, Black played 13...
c5 – trying to exploit the tempo-
rary vulnerability of White’s
c4-pawn. 14\textsubscript{2}f4 (14.\textsubscript{1}e4!? 14...
\textsubscript{1}e7 15.b3 \textsubscript{2}f6 (Black should
have better avoided losing his
casting rights after: 15...\textsubscript{2}f8
16.\textsubscript{2}g3 \textsubscript{2}f6 17.\textsubscript{1}c1 0-0-0 18.
\textsubscript{2}e4\textsubscript{±}) 16.\textsubscript{1}h5+ \textsubscript{1}e7 17.\textsubscript{1}c1 \textsubscript{1}a8
18.\textsubscript{2}e4 \textsubscript{2}d8 19.\textsubscript{2}f3 \textsubscript{2}f7 20.
\textsubscript{2}d3\textsubscript{±}. Black has only com-
promised his own position with
the move c7-c5 and then, in-
stead of castling naturally, he
started performing an artificial
casting. Later, the game fol-
lowed with: 20...h6 (\textsubscript{1}f5
21.\textsubscript{2}d2\textsubscript{±}) 21.0-0 \textsubscript{1}c8 22.\textsubscript{2}f1 b6
23.\textsubscript{2}e4\textsubscript{±} and White had a clear
dedge.

In the game Madl – Halpin,
Canberra 1990, Black somehow
neglected the safety of his g7-
pawn and he played: 12...\textsubscript{1}e7,
with the idea to follow with
\textsubscript{2}f6, in case White captures
that pawn, and to obtain some
counterplay against White’s
queenside. The game continued
with: 13.c5 dxc5 14.\textsubscript{2}xg7 \textsubscript{2}f6 15.
\textsubscript{2}h6 \textsubscript{2}d7 16.\textsubscript{1}e4 \textsubscript{2}e7 17.\textsubscript{2}xf6+
\textsubscript{2}xf6 18.0-0-0\textsubscript{±} (18.\textsubscript{2}xc5 \textsubscript{2}xc5
19.\textsubscript{2}xf6 \textsubscript{2}b4+ 20.\textsubscript{1}c3 \textsubscript{2}e4+ 21.
\textsubscript{2}e2 0-0-0\textsubscript{±}) 18...\textsubscript{1}d8 19.\textsubscript{2}e1 \textsubscript{2}g8
20.\textsubscript{1}c4 \textsubscript{2}g6 21.\textsubscript{2}xe6 \textsubscript{2}xe6 22.
\textsubscript{2}xc5+ and Black lost a pawn.
It would have been even better
for White to have continued with
the immediate capture: 13.\textsubscript{2}xg7,
since it was not good for Black to
capture White’s c4-pawn any-

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way: 13...h6 14.h6 c4 15.
h4 e4 xe3. (otherwise Black
loses a piece after 15.f8 16.
g5+.) 16.xf6+ g7 17.xh7.
Black remains a pawn down, his
king is vulnerable and he cannot
win the exchange, because of
f3-g5+. The game might follow
with: 17.c2+ d2 g8 19.
f6+ e8 20.xc2 xh7 21.d3
e7 22.ae1+.

13.xf6 gxf6 14.b3 0-0-0

It deserves attention for
Black to try now: 14..c6!? with
the idea to follow with d6-d5. In
the game Mellado Trivino –
Fontana Sotomayour, Zaragoza
2001, White played 15.e2 d5
16.cxd5 b4 17.0-0 xd5 18.
h5+ e7 19.xd5+ xd5
20.h1 hd8=. The weakness of
Black’s f6 and h7-pawns is prac-
tically immaterial in that pos-
tion.

The game becomes very com-
licated after: 15.0-0-0 d5 16.
xb6 axb6 17.cxd5 cxd5 18.xd5
xa2 19.c7+ f7 20.xe6 xe6
21.c4+ f6= – White’s king is
a bit vulnerable indeed, more-
over his extra pawn is not prom-
ising him any serious winning
chances, because of the opposite
coloured bishops present on the
board.

It is better for White to play:
15.a4!?, with the idea to counter
d6-d5 with a4-a5 and to create
an isolated d5-pawn for Black.
White can rely on having a slight
advantage in the endgame in
that case, for example: 15...d5
16.a5 b4 17.d2 d7 (17...
xc3 18.xc3 d7 19.0-0-0± –
White’s couple of powerful bish-
ops provides him with a stable
edge.) 18.cxd5 cxd5 19.b5 xdx2
20.xd2 xg5 21.xd4 f7 22.
f3= and the defects of Black’s
pawn-structure are quite con-
siderable.

15.0-0-0

Now, it is too bad for Black to
play: 15.d5 16.b6 a3+ 17.
c2 axb6 18.cxd5, because
White wins a pawn. In the game
Korneev – Exposito, Seville 2001,
Black played:

15...g7, after which White
redeployed his knight to the d4-
square: 16.b5 b8 17.d4
g4 18.f3 d7 19.d3± and he
had a real advantage in the
endgame, because of his control
over the f5-square. Later, there
followed: 19..de8 20.f4 f5
(This attempt by Black to free
himself backfires.) 21.xf5
fx5 22.xf5 e2 23.d2 xh8
24.e4= and White pressed
easily his material advantage
home.
b) 7...g6

8.h4!?

White begins an immediate attack against Black’s g6-pawn. He has often tried in practice the move 8.\(\text{h}e3\) too, in order to prevent Black’s counterplay against the d4-pawn. The critical line for the evaluation of that move is: 8...\(\text{g}7\) 9.h4 0–0 10.h5 and now 10...e5 11.d5 \(\text{d}4\) 12.\(\text{d}xd4\) exd4 13.\(\text{e}4\)d4 \(\text{d}xd4\) 14.\(\text{c}4\)xd4 e5, after which White fails to organize an effective attack on the kingside. He does not achieve much in the endgame after capturing en passant: 15.\(\text{d}xe6\) \(\text{f}6\). Finally, the game is unclear after: 11. h\(x\)g6 exd4!, for example: 12.g\(h\) \(\text{h}8\) 13.\(\text{e}4\)d4 \(\text{d}xe5\)! 14.\(\text{h}6\)?! \(\text{x}h6\) 15.\(\text{x}h6\) \(\text{f}2\)! 16.\(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{f}8\) (M.Golubev).

I therefore recommend 8.h4, after which Black’s king cannot be fortified so comfortably on the kingside.

Meanwhile that move has a certain drawback, in comparison to 8.\(\text{h}e3\), that is – White does not control the d4-square. Black should try to exploit that immediately.

8...\(\text{g}7\) 9.h5 e5

This is the most principled and practically the only playable move for Black. He cannot afford to castle now, because his kingside is too vulnerable. There are no other useful moves for him available, so he should rely on his only possible counterplay – the attack against White’s d4-pawn.

See what might happen in case Black castles short: 9... 0–0 10.h\(x\)g6 h\(x\)g6 11.\(\text{h}d3\) (White’s straightforward offensive against the g6-pawn is his most aggressive and best line.) 11...\(\text{d}xd4\) (11...e5 12.\(\text{h}xg6\) \(\text{f}5\) 13.\(\text{x}f5\) \(\text{x}f5\) 14.g\(4\)+; in case Black tries to defend his pawn with the queen – 11...\(\text{e}8\), it is good for White to follow with: 12.\(\text{b}5\)+) 12.\(\text{h}xg4\) \(\text{x}d4\) 13.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}2\)+ 14.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 15.\(\text{h}xg6\) \(\text{g}7\), baloo – Hossa, ICC 1998, 16. \(\text{h}5\)+ and White checkmates in several moves.

9...\(\text{d}7\). This move is not so useful for Black, because thus he closes the leeway for his king to run away from danger to the queenside. 10.h\(x\)g6 h\(x\)g6 11. \(\text{h}xh8\) \(\text{h}8\), Lyubimov – Freud, ICS 1997, 12.\(\text{d}3\)+. White wins the g6-pawn; meanwhile Black’s king remains on the d8-square, because in case of: 12...\(\text{f}7\), White would continue with: 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{g}7\) 14.\(\text{x}g6\)+– and his attack would be absolutely decisive.

10.d5 \(\text{d}4\) 11.h\(x\)g6
Black has tried in practice here three possibilities in this critical position: b1) 11...hxg6, b2) 11...f5 and b3) 11...g4.

b1) 11...hxg6
This seems to be a natural move, but Black's king is doomed to roam all over the board after it.

12.\text{\textsf{\texttt{E}}}_xh8+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{E}}}_xh8 13.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d4
White cannot achieve too much after: 13.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d3 c6 14.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xg6+ (It deserves attention for him to play: 14.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc6!? \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xc6 15.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_c5!\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xc5 16.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xg6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d7 17.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_e4 \text{\textsf{\texttt{G}}}_g8 18.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c7 19.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d3\pm. Black's knight is well placed on the d4-square indeed, but his king is rather unsafe.) 14...\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_d7 15.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_e3 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc4 16.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd4 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xb2 (16...\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd4) 17.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd4 17.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_b3 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd4 18.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_e4 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_b6 (18...\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_a5?!?) 19.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xc6 20.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_g8 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_a5\pm - Now, Black's king is under no threats whatsoever and he has the material advantage too, Kiesel – Schindler, Germany 1999.

13...\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd4 14.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d3 c6
This move is aimed at an opening of a safe haven for the black king on the queenside – the c7-square.

15.\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_4 f5
15...\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_xd5 16.\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_xg6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d7 17.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xb6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xb6 18.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_h5 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_f6 19.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd5\pm – Black can hardly complete his development, while: 19...\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_b4+? (19...\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_c7 20.\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_d2) loses, because of 20.\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_d2 \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xb2 21.\text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c1++ and Black's king is utterly defenseless.

It deserved attention for Black to try 15...\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_d7, but White could have countered that with: 16.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d2\uparrow, with the idea to bring the rook into action and to start an onslaught against the enemy king on the queenside too.

16.\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_xf5 gxf5 17.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_h5+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d7 18.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xf5+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c7 19.\text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c5 \text{\textsf{\texttt{G}}}_g8 20.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_e6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_b8

21.\text{\textsf{\texttt{G}}}_5\uparrow. White has an overwhelming attack in a position with material equality. Later, the game Pikula – Todorovic, Cetinje 1993, followed with: 21...\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_xd5 (21...\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc4 22.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc6 bxc6 23.\text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c1\rightarrow d5 24.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xc4 dxc4 25.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_f4\rightarrow) 22.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xe7 a6 23.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xd6+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_a7 24.\text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c5 \text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xg2 25.0-0-0\rightarrow \text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c8 26.\text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_xd5 \text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_a8 27.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d6 \text{\textsf{\texttt{C}}}_c6 28.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_c7+ \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_b8 29.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_b1 d3 30.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xd3 \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xb2 31.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_b3 \text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_a4 32.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_xb2 \text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xb2 33.\text{\textsf{\texttt{B}}}_xh2 \text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_h8 34.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_d5 \text{\textsf{\texttt{A}}}_a4 35.\text{\textsf{\texttt{D}}}_c5

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\( \textsf{d7 36.e7} \) and White proceeded to win with his material advantage.

\textbf{b2) 11...f5}

Black is preparing to castle long.

\textbf{12.exd4 exd4}

\textbf{13.exh7?}

This move has not been tested in practice yet; nevertheless it deserves a great attention. The exchange of the rooks might turn out to be very favourable for White, for example he will be threatening to play \( \textsf{h5+} \) and \( \textsf{h8} \) at some moment.

In answer to 13.gxh7, Black has tried three moves in tournaments:

It is not good for him to follow with: \textbf{13...d7} 14.d3 f8, because White could have obtained a great advantage with: 15.exf5+ xf5 16.h5 g6 17.\( \textsf{g5} \) xh7 18.g4+, although he can also try: 15.e2 e8 16.f4 e5 17.g6 xg6 18.g4+ d8 19.xg6+. White has extra material and a positional advantage too. Later, in the game Campora - Pacorro, Ceuta 1992, there followed: 19.e7 20.g5 f6 21.h3 xg5 22.xg5 e8 23.f5+ xf5 24.xf5+ d8 25.b3 d7 26.e2 f6 27.h6 f7 28.g4 e7 29.ah1 g7 30.f3 c5 31.d3 a6 32.a4 b6 33.a5 b5 34.cxb5 axb5 35.a6 xd5 36.e6+ f8 37.xd6 b4+ 38.e4 a7 39.hh6 and Black resigned;

It is not so clear after: \textbf{13...e6} 14.b5 e7 15.exd4 exd5+ 16.e3 xh7 17.h5+ f8 18.f5 xf5 19.f6 20.xh8+ xh8 21.h6+ g8 22.xf6 xf6 23.cxd5 xb2 24.b1 d4, because Black has a sufficient counterplay, despite White's connected passed pawns, Khruschev – B.Nevednichy, Romania 1999. White can try to find an improvement by playing: 15.\( \textsf{dx} \)xe6!? xe6 (It is not sufficient for Black to play: 15...\( \textsf{xe} \)xe6+ 16.e3 0–0–0 17.exd4 – White wins a pawn and follows that with castling long.) 16.h5+ d7 (16...f7+ 17.e2 xe2+ 18.\( \textsf{xe} \)e2 and White has managed to preserve his h7-pawn, which might become really dangerous in the arising endgame, for example: 18...0–0–0 19.d3 xc4 20.b3 de8+ 21.d1 db6 22.\( \textsf{h} \)h6+, 17.g5 f8 18.0–0 0 xf2 19.d3 xc4 20.xc4 xc4 21.xd4 xd4 22.g4+ e6 23.xd4 xd4 24.xd4 f8, White will hardly be able to win that endgame;

\textbf{13...d7} – this is a logical move and Black completes his development and castles after it.
14.\texttt{\textbf{A}}d3 0–0–0 (14...\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd3 15.\texttt{\textbf{W}}xd3 dxc3 16.\texttt{\textbf{W}}g6+ \texttt{\textbf{B}}f8 17.\texttt{\textbf{H}}h6 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xh6 18.\texttt{\textbf{W}}xh6+ \texttt{\textbf{B}}f7 19.\texttt{\textbf{W}}h5+ \texttt{\textbf{H}}f8 20.\texttt{\textbf{A}}h3+−) 15.\texttt{\textbf{E}}e2 (In case of 15.\texttt{\textbf{A}}b5, Black will play 15...\texttt{\textbf{A}}e6 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xf5 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xf5 17.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd4 \texttt{\textbf{A}}e4+ 18. \texttt{\textbf{A}}e3 \texttt{\textbf{W}}xg2. He regains his pawn with a powerful counterplay against White’s king, for example: 19.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e2 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xc4 20.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e6 \texttt{\textbf{A}}b2 21.\texttt{\textbf{A}}b1 \texttt{\textbf{A}}d8 22.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xf8 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xf8 \texttt{\textbf{A}}e, or 19.\texttt{\textbf{W}}f3 \texttt{\textbf{W}}xf3 20.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xf3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xb2 21. \texttt{\textbf{A}}b1 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xc4+ 15...\texttt{\textbf{A}}e5 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}g3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}e4! 17.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xe4 \texttt{\textbf{A}}de8 18.\texttt{\textbf{A}}f3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7 19. 0–0 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xe4 20.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xe4 \texttt{\textbf{A}}f7 21.\texttt{\textbf{A}}d3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}h5 22.\texttt{\textbf{A}}f4, Pletanek – Podsednik, Czech Republic 1993 and after 22...\texttt{\textbf{A}}h4?!\texttt{A}, Black has a powerful counterplay against his opponent’s king for the sacrificed pawn. So, presently White has not managed to prove any convincing superiority in the 13.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7 variation.

13...\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7

After 13...dxc3 14.\texttt{\textbf{W}}xg7 \texttt{\textbf{A}}d7 15.bxc3 0–0–0 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e3\texttt{A}, White maintains both a material and positional advantage.

14.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7 \texttt{\textbf{A}}d7

Or 14...e6 15.\texttt{\textbf{A}}b5 \texttt{\textbf{A}}e7 16. \texttt{\textbf{A}}xc7+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}xc7 17.\texttt{\textbf{A}}h5+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}f7 18. \texttt{\textbf{A}}h8\texttt{A}+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8 19.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}d7 20. \texttt{\textbf{A}}xd4\texttt{A}− and White remains with a solid extra pawn.

15.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e4 (It deserves attention for White to play here: 15.\texttt{\textbf{A}}d3?! \texttt{\textbf{A}}f8 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e2.) 15...\texttt{\textbf{A}}f8 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}g5 \texttt{\textbf{A}}f6 17.\texttt{\textbf{A}}d3\texttt{A}.

Black’s compensation for the pawn will hardly be sufficient.

b3) 11...\texttt{\textbf{A}}g4

This move pins White’s knight and prepares simultaneously Black’s castling long.

12.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7

It seems attractive for White to try here the queen-sacrifice: 12.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd4?! \texttt{\textbf{A}}xd1 13.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e6, but still that line is by far not the best for him: 13...\texttt{\textbf{A}}b8 (13...\texttt{\textbf{A}}g4 14.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd8 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8 15.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh7 \texttt{\textbf{A}}f5 17.\texttt{\textbf{A}}h6 \texttt{\textbf{A}}f7 18.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xg7 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xg7 19. \texttt{\textbf{A}}b5\texttt{A} 14.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xg7+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}d7 15.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd1 (It is worse for White to play: 15. \texttt{\textbf{A}}xd1 hgx6 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8 17. \texttt{\textbf{A}}e6 \texttt{\textbf{A}}h1 18.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e1 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xc4. ) 15...\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh6 16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8 (16.\texttt{\textbf{A}}h6 \texttt{\textbf{A}}g8\texttt{A}) 16...\texttt{\textbf{A}}xh8 17.\texttt{\textbf{A}}e6 c6. White’s pieces are dis coordinated and despite the favourable material ratio for him (three pieces for a queen and a pawn) – he should better avoid that variation, for example: 18.\texttt{\textbf{A}}c3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}h1 19.\texttt{\textbf{A}}g5 (19.b3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xd5 20.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd5 \texttt{\textbf{A}}c8\texttt{A}) 19...\texttt{\textbf{A}}g1 (19...\texttt{\textbf{A}}c8 20.0–0–0\texttt{A}, \texttt{\textbf{A}}xd5? 21.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xd5 \texttt{\textbf{A}}xd5 22.\texttt{\textbf{A}}b5−; 19...\texttt{\textbf{A}}xc4 20.\texttt{\textbf{A}}xc4+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}bxc4 21.0–0–0 \texttt{\textbf{A}}b6 22.\texttt{\textbf{A}}c5+ \texttt{\textbf{A}}e8\texttt{A}) 20.b3 \texttt{\textbf{A}}c8\texttt{A}.

12...\texttt{\textbf{A}}d7

Black sacrifices temporarily a pawn (presently he does not in-
tend to recapture on h7...) and he opts for some counterplay in the centre, connected with an attack against the f3-square as well as with the undermining pawn-break e7-e6.

13.\&d3

White has also tried: 13.\&e3 0-0-0 14.\&xd4 exd4 15.\&e4 e6\&l, but Black obtains a sufficient counterplay. Later, in the game Behling – Marcinkiewicz, ICCF 1999, there followed: 16.dxe6 \&xe6 17.\&c2 \&xc4 18.\&xc4 \&xc4 (Black's central pawn-mass is no less dangerous than White's passed pawns in this middle game.) 19.0-0-0 d5 20. \&c5 \&c6 21.\&d3 \&b6 22.\&a4 \&de8 23.\&b1 (23.b3 \&d6 \&b5) 23...\&e2 24.b3 \&d6 25.\&f4 \&xf2 26.\&xd5 \&c5 27.\&e7+ \&d8 28. \&c1 \&b5 29.\&xb5 \&xb5 30.\&f5 and here after: 30...\&xg2 and the following eventual developments: 31.\&hg1 \&c3+ 32.\&xc3 \&xg1+ 33.\&xg1 dxc3 34.\&xg7 \&xh7 35.\&e6+ \&e7 36.\&d4\&l – the game should end in a draw.

White was not obliged to capture on d4; he should have tried instead to make a good use of Black's long castling and follow with: 14.a4!? a5 (Black would have to retreat his knight to the a8-square after a4-a5, while the tactical complications after: 14...\&df8 15.a5 turn out to be not in his favour, because after the capture on b6, White is threatening bxa7 and a8\&l: 15...\&xf3+ 16.gxf3 \&xf3 17.axb6++; 15...

16.gxf3 \&xc4 17.\&xc4 \&xf3+ 18.\&f1++; 15...\&xf3 16. axb6! a6 17.\&a4\&l)

15.\&b5 \&xb5. This is the most principled line for Black. (It is too tentative for him to follow with: 15...e6 16.dxe6 \&xe6 17. \&fxd4 exd4 18.\&xd4 \&xc4 19. \&d3 \&xd3 20.\&xd3 \&d5; 19.\&c1 \&xf1 20.\&xf1 \&d5 21.\&g5\&l. Presently, White has managed to preserve his extra pawn, he has protected his king quite reliably and he is ready to exploit the vulnerability of Black's king, for example after: 21...\&f6 22.\&xf6 \&xf6 23.\&b5 c6 24.\&d4\&l.) 16. axb5 e4. Black wins a piece, but White can utilize the open a-file for an attack after: 17.\&d2 (17. \&xa5 exf3 18.gxf3 \&f5) 17...exf3 18.gxf3 \&xf3 19.\&h4 \&g4 – White was threatening to play \&h3 – 20.\&f3 \&f5 21.\&xa5 \&e8 22.\&xb6\&l and Black's kingside has been devastated.

13...0-0-0 14.\&e3

It is not good for White to play: 14.\&xd4 \&xd1 15.\&f5 exd4 16.\&xd7+ \&xd7 17.\&xd1 \&xc4 – because his pawn-centre gets destroyed.

14...\&df8

This move practically forces White to capture on d4.

15.\&xd4 exd4 16.\&e4 \&xf3 17.gxf3 e6

That is Black's only possible counterplay, in case of 17...c6, White would follow with 18.\&c1.

18.dxe6 \&xe6 19.\&e2 d5

Otherwise White would castle
long.

20.c5 dxe4 21.cxb6 axb6 22.AXB4 d3

Black sacrifices a pawn in order to open the long diagonal for his bishop and to obtain some counterplay against his opponent’s king.

In the game Campora – Bischoff, Bad Aibling 1982, following 22...h6 23.f1+, White managed to preserve his h7-pawn and maintained his advantage, despite the opposite coloured bishops. Black’s central pawns are easily blocked on the light squares and White’s king is absolutely safe.

23.AXB4 d8 24.c4 axb2
(diagram)

25.BB1?!

In the game Kindermann – Fleck, Germany 1982, there followed: 25.0–0 f6 26.Af1+. White’s idea is to place his king on f1 and to attack on the queenside, exploiting the power of the bishop on e4. 26...c6 27.Ab1 Bf7 28.Ac4 Bh6 29.Ac4 Bg5+ 30.AC1 Bh5 31.wxh6+ Ac8 32.Bc6 Bxc6 33.Bea7 Bxh7 34.Bb8+ Be7 35.Bxh7 Bh1+ 36.Bc2 Bxh7 and here after the precise move 37.Bb3!±, White could have parried the threats against his king and his material advantage should have been sufficient to win the game.

25...Ac3+ 26.Ac3 Ac3+ 27.Ac2 c6 28.Ac3 Ac3. Black’s last hope to save the game is based on the presence of opposite coloured bishops on the board; nevertheless White’s winning chances remain quite considerable.

Conclusion

The sharp risky move 4...Cc6 gives White the interesting option of a restraining pawn sacrifice: 5.c4 Bb6 6.e6 fxe6 7.Ac3. It considerably weakens Black’s kingside whilst the material advantage is only temporary.

Black usually employs two defensive plans. The first one is linked with an immediate return of the extra pawn for the kingside development – 7.e5 8.d5 Ac4 9.Axd4 exd4 10.Axd4 e5. It leads in the main line to a somewhat better endgame for White.

The second plan is 7.g6, when I recommend the relatively rare move 8.h4!? White starts a direct attack to the enemy king allowing Black’s knight to land on the central square d4. In this line the ruined kingside of Black is a factor which outweighs his counterplay.
Chapter 11

1.e4 $\text{c6}$ 2.e5 $\text{d5}$ 3.d4 $\text{d6}$ 4.$\text{c3}$
dxe5

This move was introduced by A. Alekhine in a simultane game. Later it was revived by one of the best players in the 60-70-ies -- the Danish GM Bent Larsen, who employed it in the Candidates matches in 1965 against B. Ivkov and M. Tal.

Black takes on e5 by his free will seemingly presenting White with a tempo for development of the knight. The idea of this line however is to play $\text{b8-d7}$, when White is faced with a choice -- either to allow an exchange on e5 which leads to simplification, or retreat with the knight back to f3. In the latter case Black regains the tempo.

5.$\text{cxe5}$

Now the most consistent move seems to be a) 5...$\text{d7}$, but in the arisen position White has the sacrifice 6.$\text{xf7+}$ $\text{xf7}$ 7.$\text{h5+}$ $\text{e6}$ 8.c4. White has dragged out the enemy king into the centre of the board and his attack is quite strong. The ensuing variations are very complicated and hazy.

As long as the sacrifice is dangerous for Black, it is sensible for him to delay $\text{b8-d7}$ in favour of some developing move which prevents $\text{xf7}$: b) 5...$\text{e6}$, c) 5...$\text{c6}$ or d) 5...$\text{g6}$.

Worse is 5...$\text{f5}$?! 6.$\text{f3!}$ $\text{e6}$ 7.$\text{d3}$ $\text{c8}$?? (7...$\text{f6}$ was the only move, although in that case White gets a classical pawn majority on the queenside after 8.$\text{xf5}$ $\text{xf5}$ 9.$\text{xf5}$ $\text{xf5}$+ 8.$\text{xf5}$ $\text{xf5}$ 9.$\text{xd5}$ $\text{e6}$ 10.$\text{xb7}$ and that was all in Gofshtein – Gayraud, Saint Quentin 1998.

a) 5...$\text{d7}$

This position became really popular after the Candidates Match for the World Championship – Tal – Larsen, Bled 1965,
although White refrained from the sacrifice there.

6.\( \text{xf7} \)!

We have assumed that the sacrifice is quite correct after an extensive analytical work and rigorous practical testing. White needs to play extremely precisely with great inventiveness, though...

6.\( \text{xf7} \) 7.\( \text{h5}+ \text{e}6 \)

But not 7...g6? 8.\( \text{xd5}+ \text{e}6 \) 9.\( \text{f3} \) -- Afanasiev – Nazarenko, Novokuznetsk 1998.

8.c4 \( \text{f6} \)

It is too bad for Black to play: 8...\( \text{b4} \) 9.a3 \( \text{c2}+ \) 10.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xa1} \) (10...\( \text{f6} \) 11.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{f7} \) 12.\( \text{c2} \) --) 11.\( \text{d5} \), because he gets checked: 11...\( \text{f6} \) 12.\( \text{g5}+ \text{g}6 \) 13.\( \text{d3}+ \text{h5} \) 14.\( \text{e3}+ \text{g4} \) 15.\( \text{g5} \) # B.Wall – J.Wall, Taylorsville 1977.

In the game Pace – Briiffa, La Valetta 1996, Black gave back the piece with: 8...\( \text{7f6} \) 9.\( \text{xd5}+ \text{xd5} \), in order to manage to trade queens, but after: 10.\( \text{xd5}+ \text{xd5} \) 11.\( \text{c4} \) c6 12.\( \text{c3} \) g6 13.0-0 \( \text{d6} \) 14.\( \text{xd5} \) cxd5 15.\( \text{f4}+ \text{c6} \) 16.\( \text{b3} \) --, his position was hopeless.

10.\( \text{e5} \)

White preserves a great advantage in case of: 10...\( \text{b6} \) 11.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f5} \) (11...\( \text{e8} \) 12.c5+ \( \text{xc5} \) 13.\( \text{e3}+ \text{b4} \) 14.\( \text{e4} \)! \( \text{c4} \) 15.\( \text{a3}+ \text{a5} \) 16.\( \text{xc4} \) b5 17.b4+ \( \text{a6} \) 18.\( \text{c5}+ \text{b6} \) 19.\( \text{e6}+ \text{b7} \) 20.\( \text{xe8} \) \( \text{exe8} \) 21.\( \text{xb5} \) --) 12.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 13.\( \text{e6}+ \text{c5} \) 14.\( \text{e3}+ \text{xc4} \) (it is somewhat better for Black to try here: 14...\( \text{d6} \) 15.c5+ \( \text{d7} \) 16.\( \text{xd3} \) 17.\( \text{c5}+ \text{c5} \) -- Bechir – Schirmer, corr. 1985.

Black does not save the game after: 10...\( \text{b8} \), because of 11.\( \text{c5} \)! The developments are quite forced now: 11...\( \text{d7} \) (Black is totally crushed in the rest of the variations. See two of them: 11...\( \text{xc5} \) 12.\( \text{e3}+ \text{d6} \) 13.\( \text{a3} \) c6 14.\( \text{f4}+ \text{c5} \) 15.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{a5} \) 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{a4} \) 17.b4+ \( \text{b6} \) 18.\( \text{e3}+ \text{c7} \) 19.\( \text{b5}+ \text{xc6} \) 20.\( \text{c4}+ \text{d7} \) 21.\( \text{c7}+ \text{e8} \) 22.\( \text{xc8}+ \text{f7} \) 23.\( \text{c4}+ \text{g6} \) 24.\( \text{e6} \) --; 11...\( \text{e5} \) 12.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d4} \) 13.d6 \( \text{xc5} \) 14.\( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{c7} \) 15.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 16.\( \text{b5}+ \text{d6} \) 17.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{a5} \) 18.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c6} \) 19.b4 \( \text{xb4} \) 20.\( \text{c5}+ \text{xc5} \) 21.\( \text{d1} \) --) 12.\( \text{b5}+ \text{c6} \) 13.\( \text{xc6}+ \text{bxc6} \) 14.0-0 \( \text{a5} \)
(Black loses after: 14...\(\mathcal{e}8\) \(15.\mathcal{e}d1+\ \mathcal{c}7 \ 16.\mathcal{h}f4+\ \mathcal{b}7 \ 17.\ \mathcal{a}6+\), Ochsner – Sorensen, Arhus 1985, as well as after: 14...\(\mathcal{c}7\), Ragjalis – Kaunas, USSR 1979, 15.\(\mathcal{f}4+\ \mathcal{b}7 \ 16.\ \mathcal{b}3!\ \mathcal{d}f7 \ 17.\mathcal{e}xc6+\ \mathcal{xc}6 \ 18.\mathcal{f}3+\ \mathcal{xc}5 \ 19.\mathcal{c}1+\ \mathcal{b}6 \ 20.\ \mathcal{b}3+\ \mathcal{a}6 \ 21.\mathcal{c}4+\ \mathcal{b}7 \ 22.\mathcal{d}5+\ \mathcal{a}6 \ 23.\mathcal{c}7--; 16...a5 17.\mathcal{e}xc6+\ \mathcal{xc}6 \ 18.\mathcal{d}1\ \mathcal{xd}1+ \ 19.\mathcal{xd}1+ \) and despite the approximate material equality, Black is lost, because of the helplessness of his king.) 15.\(\mathcal{c}4\ \mathcal{c}7\), Hammar – D.Cramling, Lulea 1980, 16.\(\mathcal{f}4+\ \mathcal{d}8\) (in case of 16...\(\mathcal{b}7\), White continues with his attack by playing: 17.b4 \(\mathcal{a}4\) 18.\(\mathcal{c}3\ \mathcal{a}3\) 19.\(\mathcal{b}5\)!

This move wins. That is just one of the lines: 19...a6 20.\(\mathcal{ab}1\) axb5 21.\(\mathcal{xb}5\) cxb5 22.c6+ and Black loses material: 22...\(\mathcal{xc}6\) 23.\(\mathcal{xb}5+\ \mathcal{a}7\) 24.\(\mathcal{e}3+\ \mathcal{xe}3\) 25.\(\mathcal{f}xe3--;\) 17.\(\mathcal{d}1+\ \mathcal{d}7 \ 18.\mathcal{d}2\ \mathcal{xc}5 \ 19.\mathcal{b}3\ \mathcal{b}6 \ 20.\mathcal{e}3\ \mathcal{c}7 \ 21.\mathcal{c}5\ \mathcal{c}8 \ 22.\mathcal{xd}7\ \mathcal{xd}7\) 23.\(\mathcal{xd}7\)!

It is inconceivable where Black can find an improvement, meanwhile now he falls under a check-mating attack. 24.\(\mathcal{f}4!\ e5\) 25.\(\mathcal{a}6+\ \mathcal{d}8\) 26.\(\mathcal{g}5+\ \mathcal{f}6\) 27.\(\mathcal{d}1+\ \mathcal{d}6\) 28.\(\mathcal{xf}6+ \mathcal{gxf}6\) 29.\(\mathcal{xf}6+\ \mathcal{d}7\) 30.\(\mathcal{g}7+\ \mathcal{e}6\) 31.\(\mathcal{c}4+\ \mathcal{f}5\) 32.\(\mathcal{g}4+\ \mathcal{e}4\) 33.\(\mathcal{g}5\) and White checkmates on the next move.

11.\(\mathcal{f}4\ c5\)

This is the only move for Black.

He loses after 11...e6? 12.\(\mathcal{xe}6\ \mathcal{xe}6\) 13.c5+, or 11...\(\mathcal{e}8?\) 12.\(\mathcal{xe}8\ \mathcal{xe}8\) 13.\(\mathcal{c}3--;\)

In answer to 11...b6, Carrion Lara – Rijksen, Alkmaar 1985

White wins with: 12.\(\mathcal{a}3\) a6 (12...\(\mathcal{f}5\) 13.\(\mathcal{c}5+\ \mathcal{d}7\) 14.\(\mathcal{xe}5\ a6\) 15.\(\mathcal{xb}6\ \mathcal{xb}6\) 16.\(\mathcal{c}4\ b5\) 17.\(\mathcal{d}3\ \mathcal{xd}3\) 18.\(\mathcal{e}6+\ \mathcal{e}8\) 19.\(\mathcal{d}6+\ \mathcal{xd}6\) 20.\(\mathcal{xd}6--;\) 13.\(\mathcal{c}5\) \(\mathcal{xc}5\) 14.\(\mathcal{xe}5++;\)

12.\(\mathcal{c}3\ a6\) 13.\(\mathcal{b}4!\)

Now, Black’s position is beyond salvation after: 13...\(\mathcal{xb}4\).

In the variation: 14.\(\mathcal{c}5+\ \mathcal{xc}5\) 15.\(\mathcal{a}4+\ \mathcal{d}6\) 16.\(\mathcal{b}2\) (Keres) he has no defence against the threats \(\mathcal{c}4+\), or \(\mathcal{d}3\), for example: 16...b5 17.\(\mathcal{d}3\ \mathcal{fg}4\) 18.\(\mathcal{xe}5\ \mathcal{xe}5\) 19.\(\mathcal{h}5\ \mathcal{c}7\) 20.\(\mathcal{axe}5\) and White’s attack progresses and the material is practically equal: 20...\(\mathcal{d}7\) 21.\(\mathcal{e}2\ \mathcal{a}5\) 22.\(\mathcal{d}6\ b3\) 23.\(\mathcal{c}2\ \mathcal{a}4\) 24.\(\mathcal{c}1\ \mathcal{e}8\) 25.\(\mathcal{h}5+\ g6\) 26.\(\mathcal{f}3--;\)

It is not sufficient for Black to defend with: 13...\(\mathcal{c}7\) 14.\(0–0–0\ \mathcal{fg}4\) (14...\(\mathcal{g}6\) 15.\(\mathcal{xe}5+\ \mathcal{xe}5\) 16.d6! \(\mathcal{xc}6\) 17.\(\mathcal{g}3!\ \mathcal{g}5\) 18.\(\mathcal{f}4+\ \mathcal{xf}4\) 19.\(\mathcal{d}5++;\) 15.\(\mathcal{e}2!\ \mathcal{d}7\) 16.\(\mathcal{xe}4+\ \mathcal{d}8\). In the game Votava – Sarkozy, Czechoslovakia 1988, Black failed to find any satisfactory defence after: 17.d6++;
13...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textbf{b6}}} 14.\texttt{\textbf{c1!}}

This quiet move enables White to exploit the pin of the black knight at leisure. There are plenty of possibilities for Black, but White's advantage is more than convincing.

14...\texttt{\textbf{xb4}}

14...\texttt{\textbf{g6}} 15.\texttt{\textbf{d3}}. This variation has been tested in two games:

15...\texttt{\textbf{xc7}} 16.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{h6}} 17.\texttt{\textbf{xe5}} \texttt{\textbf{xe5}} 18.d6! \texttt{\textbf{xd6}}, Duscheck - Gueting, Germany 2001, (18...\texttt{\textbf{xd6}} 19.\texttt{\textbf{cd1+}} and here White's simplest line is: 19.\texttt{\textbf{de4+}} \texttt{\textbf{c6}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{xf6}} \texttt{\textbf{d6}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{e4+}} \texttt{\textbf{c7}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{d5+}} \texttt{\textbf{b8}} 23.bxc5 \texttt{\textbf{xc5}} 24.\texttt{\textbf{b1+}}; or 15...\texttt{\textbf{fg4}} 16.\texttt{\textbf{e2}} \texttt{\textbf{c7}} (16...\texttt{\textbf{f6}} 17.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{xb4}} 18.\texttt{\textbf{fe1}} g5 19.\texttt{\textbf{g3}} \texttt{\textbf{b6}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{h5+}}; 16...\texttt{\textbf{d7}} 17.\texttt{\textbf{e4g4+}} \texttt{\textbf{eg4}} 18.d6 \texttt{\textbf{xb4}} 19.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{bxc5}} \texttt{\textbf{f6}} 18.d6+ \texttt{\textbf{d8}} 19.dxe7+ \texttt{\textbf{xe7}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{d1+}} \texttt{\textbf{d7}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{xe7+}} \texttt{\textbf{xe7}} 22.h3\texttt{\textbf{hN}} Sakai - Jensen, corr. 2001.

14...\texttt{\textbf{g5}} 15.\texttt{\textbf{g3}} h5 (the move 15...\texttt{\textbf{xb4}}, transposes to the main line – see 14...\texttt{\textbf{xb4}} 15.\texttt{\textbf{d3}} g5) 16.bxc5 \texttt{\textbf{xc5}} 17.\texttt{\textbf{g6}} \texttt{\textbf{d4}}, Szilagyi - Krantz, corr. 1991, 18.\texttt{\textbf{c2!}} h4 19.c5+ \texttt{\textbf{d7}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{d1}} \texttt{\textbf{f3+}} 21.gxf3 \texttt{\textbf{xc5}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{e5}} \texttt{\textbf{d8}} 23.\texttt{\textbf{d4}} \texttt{\textbf{b4}} 24.a3 \texttt{\textbf{a5}} 25.d6! \texttt{\textbf{h6}} 26.dxe7+ \texttt{\textbf{xe7}} 27.\texttt{\textbf{c4 e8}} 28.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{e7}} 29.\texttt{\textbf{fe1 f8}} 30.\texttt{\textbf{xe7}} \texttt{\textbf{xe7}} 31.\texttt{\textbf{xf6+}} \texttt{\textbf{xf6}} 32.\texttt{\textbf{e4 c5}} 33.\texttt{\textbf{xe8}} \texttt{\textbf{xc4}} 34.\texttt{\textbf{e4+}} \texttt{\textbf{g7}} 35.\texttt{\textbf{e5+}} \texttt{\textbf{f7}} 36.\texttt{\textbf{eg5+}} \texttt{\textbf{g6}} 37.\texttt{\textbf{d6+}} \texttt{\textbf{e6}} 38.\texttt{\textbf{xe6+}} \texttt{\textbf{xe6}} 39.\texttt{\textbf{xe6+}} \texttt{\textbf{eg5}} 40.f4+.

14...\texttt{\textbf{cxb4}} 15.c5+ \texttt{\textbf{d7}} (15...\texttt{\textbf{xc5}} 16.\texttt{\textbf{b5+}} \texttt{\textbf{d7}} 17.\texttt{\textbf{e6+}} \texttt{\textbf{d8}} 18.\texttt{\textbf{xe5+}} 19.\texttt{\textbf{xe5}} \texttt{\textbf{xc5}} 17.\texttt{\textbf{e2!}} bxc3 (17...\texttt{\textbf{d8}} 18.0-0 bxc3 19.\texttt{\textbf{xc3}} \texttt{\textbf{b4}} 20.d6++) 18.\texttt{\textbf{xc3}} \texttt{\textbf{b4}} (18...\texttt{\textbf{a5}} 19.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{d8}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{fc1}} \texttt{\textbf{a4}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{c7+}} \texttt{\textbf{d7}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{b8+--;}} 18...\texttt{\textbf{b6}} 19.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{d8}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{fc1+}} 19.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{d8}} (19...\texttt{\textbf{e4}} 20.d6 \texttt{\textbf{xe5}} 21.dxe7 \texttt{\textbf{xc7}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{d1+}} 20.d6 \texttt{\textbf{e8}} 21.dxe7+ \texttt{\textbf{xe7}} (21...\texttt{\textbf{xe7}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{d1+}} \texttt{\textbf{d7}} 23.\texttt{\textbf{cd3+}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{d1+}} \texttt{\textbf{d7}} 23.\texttt{\textbf{d5}} \texttt{\textbf{d6}} 24.\texttt{\textbf{xd6}} \texttt{\textbf{xd6}} 25.\texttt{\textbf{xb7}} \texttt{\textbf{b8}} 26.\texttt{\textbf{a7+}.}

15.\texttt{\textbf{d3}} \texttt{\textbf{g5}}

15...\texttt{\textbf{b2}} (15...\texttt{\textbf{b5}} 16.0-0 bxc4 17.\texttt{\textbf{b1}} \texttt{\textbf{g5}} 18.\texttt{\textbf{g3+}} 16.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{d2}}, Rasmussen - Packalen, Hallsberg 2000, 17.\texttt{\textbf{e4+}} \texttt{\textbf{xe4}} 18.\texttt{\textbf{xe4}} \texttt{\textbf{g5}} (18...\texttt{\textbf{d4}} 19.\texttt{\textbf{ce1}} \texttt{\textbf{c7}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{gxh7+}} 19.\texttt{\textbf{g3}} \texttt{\textbf{d4}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{e1+}}.

16.\texttt{\textbf{g3}} \texttt{\textbf{h5}} 17.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{h4}} 18.\texttt{\textbf{xe5+}} \texttt{\textbf{xe5}}

19.f4+ \texttt{\textbf{xf4}} (19...\texttt{\textbf{d6}} 20.fgx5 \texttt{\textbf{h5}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{h7}} \texttt{\textbf{g7}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{e4+}} \texttt{\textbf{c7}} 23.\texttt{\textbf{ehxh5}} \texttt{\textbf{b2}} 24.\texttt{\textbf{e7}} \texttt{\textbf{xc1}} 25.\texttt{\textbf{xh7+}} \texttt{\textbf{b8}} 26.\texttt{\textbf{xc1}} \texttt{\textbf{b2}} 27.\texttt{\textbf{e1+}} 20.\texttt{\textbf{e4}} \texttt{\textbf{b2}} (20...\texttt{\textbf{h5}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{e1+}} Sakai - Petruzelli, corr. 2001; 20...\texttt{\textbf{d4}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{cd1}} \texttt{\textbf{f3}} 22.\texttt{\textbf{xf6}} fxg2 23.\texttt{\textbf{f5+}} 21.\texttt{\textbf{xf6}}

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d4+ (21...exf6 22.c7+ d6 23.ce1+ d4 24.xd6+; 21...f3 22.e1+ d6 23.xf3 d4+ 24.
h1 c7 25.d6= Sakai – Zednik, corr. 2001) 22.h1 h3 23.g3 d6 (23...fxg3 24.hxg3
d6 25.e8+ 24.e8+ d7 25.
e6+ xe8 26.g6+ d8 27.
b6+ d7 28.c2 e8 29.
f4=. Black is now forced to
give up his queen, because of the
threat a4+, but White's at-
tack continues relentlessly.

b) 5...e6

This move is uncommon for
the Alekhine – Black needs his
light-squared bishop for counter-
play against the enemy centre.
He should not bar the diagonal
c8-g4 because all the pieces re-
main too passive.

6. f3

This is the most enterprising.
By attacking f7 White forces the
opponent to lead out the queen
or bring back the knight to f6.

6...f6

6...f6 – a cautious, but
rather passive move. 7.e3
d7 8.d3 xe5 9.dxe5 d7
10.g3=. Black is lagging behind
in development and struggling,
Ruffian 1.0.1 – Hagrid 0.7.56,
France 2002;

6...e7. The queen is impeding
the development of the f8-
bishop, but enables the possibili-
ity of b8-d7, intending a swap
on e5 followed by the manoeuvre
c8-d7-c6 and long castling.
In order to hamper this plan or get
the edge after its realisation
White should play very energeti-
cally. In the game Pinto – Rangel,
corr. 1977 he chose 7.d3 d7
8.0=0 xe5 9.dxe5 d7 10.a3
(10.e4 c6 11.d1 0=0–0 12.c4
b4 13.xd8+ xd8 14.c3
e4 15.xe4 c5=) 11.e4
11.c4 b4 12.e4 c6 (12...c6
13.xc6+ xc6 14.b5 c8
15.e3 xc4 16.xa7! xa7
17.xb7=) 13.b5= to prevent
long castling of the opponent. On
move 10 Black should have played
the consistent move 10.c6, when White can hardly
prove an advantage, for example:
11.e4 0=0–0 12.d1 f5 13.exf6
xf6 14.c4 (14.c4 c5 15.a5
c3=) 14...b4 15.xd8+ xd8
16.e3 h4 17.xc6 xc6= 8.
Also insufficient is 7.c3 d7
8.e4 (8.xd5 exd5 9.xd5 f6=)
8...xe5 9.dxe5 xc3 10.xc3
(10.bxc3 c5=) 10...b4=. Per-
haps White should consider
7.d2? d7 (7...b4 8.b5+c6
9.a4=, like in the game Tal –
Larsen which we examine fur-
ther in this chapter) 8.e4
e5 9.dxe5 h6 (c1-g5 must
be prevented: 9...b4 10.b5+}
This position occurred in the Candidates match Tal – Larsen, Bled (m/6) 1965. Here 11.a3 \( \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{
abla}} \text{d}5 \text{ 12.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xc}6 \text{ stumbles into}} \text{12.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xc}3 \text{ 13.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xc}3 \text{ \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}7,}\text{ threatening a fork on \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}}5}.}} \text{13.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}6 \text{ 14.b5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}8}} \text{ (14...\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xe}4 \text{ 15.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xe}4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}7 \text{ 16.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xa}7?? \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}5 \text{ 17.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{b}3 \text{ b6}} \text{ 18.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{f}3\pm}} \text{ 15.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}7 \text{ 16.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}2\uparrow.}} \text{7.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}3 \text{ h}6\text{ Black's queen is in a predicament. 7...\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}7? \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{f}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}3+- losers immediately, Wall – Rasmussen, Tacoma 1970. 7... \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}3 \text{ 0–0 is not much better (instead 8...\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{b}4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}4\pm is holding) 9.h4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}6 (9...h6? 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{hxg}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{hxg}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}5 12.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{h}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xf}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xf}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{h}8\pm! \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{exh}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xf}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{g}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}2 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{b}4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{h}6 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}2 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{e}4\pm Norevall – Monteiro, Email 2001. 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}3 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{b}4\text{ Worse is 8...\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}7?! \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xd}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xd}7 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xd}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{exd}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}6 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xe}4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}3 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{b}6 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{xe}4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}3\pm Zippy – Pizza, ICS 1994. 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{b}5+\text{ By this move White is defending the pawn on c2 comfortably. 9...\texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{c}6 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{a}4 \texttt{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textcircled{}}}} \text{d}7\text{ (diagram)}}\)
Chapter 11

the cases when Black is trying bluntly to take over the initiative. Three continuations have been tried in practice: c1) 6...\( \text{\textit{f5}}, \text{c2}) 6...\( \text{\textit{g6}} \) and c3) 6...\( \text{\textit{d7}} \).

\textbf{c1) 6...\( \text{\textit{f5}} \) 7.0–0 \( \text{\textit{d7}} \)}

Black has to try trading knights without wasting time.

In the event of 7...e6, Arribas – A. Garcia, Cuba 1995, 8.c4 \( \text{\textit{b4}} \) (8...f6 9.cxd5 fx e5 10.dxc6 \( \text{\textit{xc6}} \) 11.dxe5\( \text{\textit{f5}} \)) White parries the threats and completes development: 9.\( \text{\textit{d3}} \) \( \text{\textit{d6}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) b6 11.\( \text{\textit{g5}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{b3}} \) 0–0 13.\( \text{\textit{e1}} \) \( \text{\textit{a6}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \) – Black’s knights are clumsily placed.

To 8...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) White could exploit the delay of \( \text{\textit{d7}} \) by 9.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{8d7}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \). In a number of variations the bishop on \( f5 \) could be captured, and in any case White is gaining space in the centre and on the kingside. 10...\( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{e5}} \) (11...0–0 12.\( \text{\textit{g4}} \); 11...c5? 12.\( \text{\textit{xd7}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd7}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{g4}} \); 12...\( \text{\textit{xd7}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{dxc5}} \)–) 12.fxe5 0–0 13.d5\( \text{\textit{f}} \) and d5-d6.

\textbf{8.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) h6}

Black secures to his bishop an active position on the important diagonal.

He has tested also 8...e6 9.c4 \( \text{\textit{b4}} \)?! (better is 9...\( \text{\textit{5f6}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{h4}} \) \( \text{\textit{g6}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{xg6}} \) hxg6 12.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \)\( \text{\textit{c2}} \) (yet another example of risky play in the opening) 11.\( \text{\textit{a2}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \). Black wins a pawn, but lands in a difficult position. (Following 11...c5, Vogt – Loeffler, Graz 2002, White could have achieved a big edge with 12.dxc5 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd1}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{xd1}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb4}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{axb4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb1}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{a4}} \)\( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \)–, or 12...Nxc5 13.\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd1}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{xd1}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb4}} \). The knight has stuck in the centre so Black has to go for unfavourable complications: 15.\( \text{\textit{axb4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb1}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \)\( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{a4}} \) 0–0 0–0 18.\( \text{\textit{fd1}} \)–. 12.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) c5 13.\( \text{\textit{xc3}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb1}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{g5}} \) f6 15.\( \text{\textit{xb1}} \) fxg5 16.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \)\( \text{\textit{f1}} \). To 16...\( \text{\textit{e7}} \) White can capture on e6 to win the pawn on g5 too; instead he preferred a domination without regaining material: 17.\( \text{\textit{d1}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 19.\( \text{\textit{ad2}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 20.\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) cb4 21.\( \text{\textit{xb4}} \) h5 22.\( \text{\textit{c5}} \) g4 23.\( \text{\textit{xd2}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 24.\( \text{\textit{e4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d6}} \) 25.\( \text{\textit{c4}} \) \( \text{\textit{g8}} \) 26.\( \text{\textit{xf6}} \)\( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) 27.\( \text{\textit{b5}} \) \( \text{\textit{h8}} \) 28.\( \text{\textit{c6}} \) bc 29.\( \text{\textit{xc6}} \) a5 30.\( \text{\textit{g5}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 31.\( \text{\textit{d8}} \) \( \text{\textit{xg8}} \) 22.\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) – when Black is unable to cope with the threats \( \text{\textit{g5}}\)–e5 and c6–c7, Carlsen – Madsen, Trondheim 2004.

An alternative is 8...g6 9.c4 \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{g4}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{b3}} \) \( \text{\textit{b8}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{ad1}} \) b5 14.\( \text{\textit{cxb5}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb5}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{xb5}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) \( \text{\textit{cxb5}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \). Here the game Weeks – Wohl, Gold Coast 1999 finished in a draw, but Black
would have been unable to avoid material losses after 18...c1±.

9.a3
Depriving the enemy knight of b4.

9...e6 10.c4 d5f6

11.\textit{f}4!?
White is not letting Black’s bishop on an active position (the game Luther – Loeffler, Austria 2002 saw 11.c3 d6=). 11...d\textit{h}5 (following 11...e7 12.c3 0–0 13.d5! White’s initiative is increasing: 13...cxd5 14.cxd5 exd5 15.d\textit{x}d5±. Black cannot take on d5 in view of the double attack of the queen to b7 and f5. Therefore White could at least trade his knight for the e7 bishop, gaining a lasting advantage due to the bishop pair; 14..g5 15.g3 d\textit{h}5 16.d4 d\textit{x}g3 17.hxg3±) 12.e3 d6 (Black has achieved his goal, but now the knight is awkwardly placed)

13.c3 0–0 (13...d\textit{f}4 14.d5 cxd5 15.cxd5 d\textit{x}e2+ 16.d\textit{x}e2 0–0 17.d\textit{d}4±) 14.d5 exd5 15.cxd5 c5 16.d\textit{b}5±. The play is developing to White’s favour. His pieces are considerably more active.

\textbf{c2}) 6..g6 7.c4

7.d\textit{c}7
7..b6 is seldom seen. White had the edge in the game Gilles – Lacroix, Belgium 1992 after 8.a4 d\textit{g}7 9.0–0 0–0 10.a5 d\textit{d}6d7 11.d\textit{f}3 e5 12.d5 cxd5 13.cxd5 d\textit{f}6 14.d\textit{c}3 d\textit{g}4 (14..e4?! 15.d\textit{g}5 d\textit{e}8 16.d\textit{a}4 d\textit{f}5 17.d\textit{b}3±) 15.h3 d\textit{x}f3 16.d\textit{x}f3±.

8.d\textit{c}3 d\textit{g}7 9.d\textit{e}3 0–0
9..d\textit{d}7 10.d\textit{f}3 transposes to the line 6..d\textit{d}7 7.d\textit{f}3 g6.

9..c5 10.d\textit{f}3 cxd4 11.d\textit{x}d4 f6 12.0–0 0–0 13.d\textit{e}3± Kocsis – Mozes, Sarospatak 1995.

\textbf{10.0–0 c5}
10..d\textit{d}7 11.d\textit{f}3 leads again to the line 6..d\textit{d}7 7.d\textit{f}3 g6.

11.d\textit{f}3 cxd4

\[ \text{c5! } \text{c6 14. } \text{d5 } \text{e8 15. } \text{b3 } \text{e6 16. } \text{e3}\pm G. \text{Hernandez – Miles, Linares 1994. White’s pieces are clearly more active. Black finds it difficult to complete development. In the game he chose to buy himself off with some material and gave in the queen for a rook and bishop.} 16...\text{a6} (16...\text{g7 is more natural, but Black is struggling after 17. } \text{ad1 } \text{f6 18. } \text{d6 } \text{a6 19. } \text{g4 } \text{f5 20. } \text{fe5!? } \text{xe5 21. } \text{xe5+ } \text{xe5?? 22. } \text{h6++; 21... } \text{c5 22. } \text{b5 } \text{d7 23. } \text{xd7 a6 24. } \text{a4 b5 25. } \text{d1}\pm 17. } \text{fd1 } \text{xc5 18. } \text{xd8 } \text{xd8 19. } \text{a3 } \text{b6 20. } \text{b4 } \text{e4 21. } \text{c5 } \text{bxc5 22. } \text{xc5 } \text{g7 23. } \text{c1 } \text{b7 24. } \text{d3 } \text{f6 25. } \text{a6 } \text{ab8 26. } \text{xb7 } \text{xb7 27. } \text{g3}\pm. \text{ It is clear now that Black has not enough compensation for the queen.}\]

c3) 6...\text{d7}

![Diagram]

Perhaps this is the most flexible move. It keeps different options open. Its only drawback in comparison to 6...\text{f5} is that the knight is temporarily barring the way to the bishop on c8.

7.\text{f3}!?

We have mentioned already that White often avoids exchanges because Black’s knights are hampering each other.

7...\text{g6}

In case of 7...\text{b5} (aiming to secure the knight on d5) White nonetheless succeeds in ousting the knight with the help of a flank break-through. The game De la Paz – Baburin, Havana 1999 saw further 8.0–0 \text{g6 (8...e6 9.a4 b4 10.c4 } \text{f6 11. } \text{f4}\pm \text{ Szieberth – Varga, Budapest 2001), when White should have continued with 9.a4 b4 10.c4 bxc3 11.bxc3}\pm.

The natural move 7...\text{f6 turned out to be a novelty in the game Najer – Bauer, Internet 2004. Its idea is to develop the bishop to f5 after all. After 8. 0–0 \text{f5 9. } \text{h4 } \text{g6 10. } \text{c4 } \text{b6 11. } \text{c3 e6 12. } \text{g3 } \text{e4 13. } \text{xg6 } \text{xc3 14. } \text{bxc3 } \text{hxg6 15. } \text{b1}\pm the bishop pair advantage and semi-open files provide White with the better prospects. The game went on: 15...\text{d7 16.h4 c5 17. } \text{f3 } \text{cxd4 18. } \text{xd4 } \text{e7 19. } \text{b3 0–0? (19... } \text{xd4, was indispensable, e.g.: 20. } \text{xb7 } \text{d8 21. } \text{b2 } \text{xc4? 22. } \text{xc4 } \text{c4 23. } \text{g7++; 21... } \text{c5 22. } \text{xg7 } \text{h7 23. } \text{a1 } \text{xc4; 22. } \text{b5+ } \text{xb5 23. } \text{xb5 } \text{f6 24. } \text{c6+ } \text{f8 25. } \text{fd1}\pm 20.c5 } \text{d5 21. } \text{xb7 and White pressed home the extra pawn.}\]

8.0–0 \text{g7 9.c4 } \text{c7}

From here the knight retains open the route to e6 and supports
the break b7-b5. Alternative retreats are:
9...\=e5b6 10.a4 \=e6 (10...a5 11.\=e3b3\pm) 11.a5 \=ebd7 12.\=e3c3 0-0
13.\=e3f4\pm;
9...\=e5f6 10.\=e3c3 0-0 11.h3 \=e6b6. Black misplaces the knight
in order to let the bishop out to f5. (Practice has seen also 11...b6
12.\=a4f4 \=b7 13.\=e3d2 \=e8 14.\=ad1 \=f8 15.\=f1e1 e6 16.\=e3\pm -
Black is solid, but passive, Roos - Bruns, Selestat 2000. In the
game Fox - P.Nunn, Kilkenney 1996 Black firstly took measures
against \=e4f4: 11...\=c7c7 12.\=e3e3
\=b6 13.\=e1c1 \=f5 14.\=b3 \=d8
15.\=d1d1 \=e4 16.\=xe4 \=xe4 17.a4
\=f5 18.a5 \=c8 19.\=b4 b6 20.
axb6 axb6, when 21.\=a1\pm is in
White's favour. White had the
interesting option of 13.a4!?,
intending to meet 13...a5 by
14.\=b3\pm \=d5.) 12.a4 \=f4 13.
\=f4c8 14.\=b3\pm. Black is sig-
ificantly cramped, J.Polgar -
Visser, Amsterdam 1990.
10.\=e3c3 0-0
10...\=e6f6 allows the oppo-
ponent to develop actively the bishop to
f4: 11.\=b3 0-0 12.\=d1 \=e8 13.
\=f4 \=d6 14.h3 a6 (This weaken-
ing of the queenside is not ne-
necessary. Black's position is un-
pleasant even without it because
of the lack of counterplay.) 15.a4+
\=h5 16.\=h2 \=h6 (the previous
move was a mistake. Black
should have repaired it by going
back 16...\=e6\pm) 17.c5 \=e8 (17...
\=f5 18.g4++) 18.d5 \=a5 19.\=c4
\=d7 20.\=e5 cxd5 21.\=xd5+-.

The break-through in the centre
was decisive in Delchev - Du-
bois, Andorra la Vella 1999.
11.\=e3

11...\=e6f6

A calm move. Black re-
nounces plans of immediate breaks in the centre like 11...
c5 or 11...e5. Let's investigate
them:

11...c5, Joanovits - Dubois,
Toulouse 1995, leads to difficul-
ties after 12.dxc5 \=xc3 (12...
\=e6, Dunis - Payen, Marseilles 2001,
13.\=c2 \=xc5 14.\=ad1\pm) 13.bxc3
\=e6 14.c6 bxc6 15.\=d4\pm.

11...e5 gives White a power-
ful passed pawn in the centre
without due compensation. (The
insertion of 11...a6 12.a4 is not
helpful. After 12...e5 13.d5 cxd5
14.cxd5 the weakening of b6 is
tangible: 14...\=e8 15.d6 h6 16.
\=c1 \=ef6 17.h3\pm Apicella -
Miles, Linares 1995. The game
saw further 17...\=e8 18.\=b3
\=b8 19.\=d1 \=c6 20.\=b6 \=d7
21.\=c4 e4 22.\=d2 \=e5 - 22...\=f8
23.\=d5 \=xd5 24.\=xd5++ - 23.
\=d5 \=e8 24.\=c7 \=xc7 25.dxc7,
and the pawn on seventh rank
decided the game: 25...\=e7 26.
\( \text{\textcopyright f1, a5 27.d8+ f8 28.c3} \\
\text{xc4 29.xc4 h7 30.cd1 e6} \\
\text{a5 g7 32.e3 c6 33.cd5} \\
\text{e5 34.b4 c2 35.e7 e3 36.} \\
\text{xe5 xe5 37.fxe3, Black resigned) 12.d5 cxd5 13.cxd5 b6} \\
\text{d6 (14...e8 15.d7 xd7} \\
\text{c5+) 15.a4 d7 (15...d4 16.} \\
\text{xd4 exd4 17.cxd4 xd6 18.} \\
\text{xg7 xd1 19.fxd1 xg7 20.a5} \\
\text{d7 21.f3 e5 22.d5+) 16.a5} \\
\text{c8 17.c4 c6 18.xe6 fxe6 19.} \\
\text{g5+ with a small edge, Kreizberg –} \\
\text{Zilberman, Ramat Aviv 2000. 17.d2+} \\
\text{was worth consideration, intending after 17...c6} \\
to defend the pawn on d6 by 18.f3d1.} \\

The leisurely plan 11...b6 \\
12.d2d2 b7 (12...e8 13.ad1 \\
b7 14.h6+ Herrera – Rodriguez Boado, Mondariz 2000) \\
allows White to continue calmly \\
with centralisation, 13.h6 e8 \\
14.ad1 df6 15.h3+ Zurla – \\
Ferretti, Robecchetto 1994. \\

12.h3 e8 \\
To 12...f5, Buchenau – \\
Jugelt, Oldenburg 2000, White \\
could allow the simplification \\
13.d2 e4 14.xe4 xe4 15. \\
ad1 b5 16.b3+, maintaining \\
some edge. He could also think \\
about 13.h4 d7 and only then \\
14.d2+, preventing the trade of 
knights.

12..a6 13.d2 b5 only weakens 
Black’s queenside. White is 
better after 14.e5 b7 15.f3+ 
Beerbaum – Prosch, Mecklenburg 1997.

13.b3 d6
d) 5...g6

![Chess Diagram]

This idea belongs to Bent Larsen. The fianchetto of the dark squared bishop is one of the most typical motives in similar positions. Black is doing it immediately; moreover that he should play the usual preparatory move c7-c6 only in answer to an attack against his knight on d5.

6.g3

This move became fashionable in the middle of the 90ies of the last century. Black now has two good alternatives: d1) 6...d7 and d2) 6...g7.

It is not so precise for him to follow with 6...f5. In case Black plans to fianchetto his dark squared bishop, he had better do it outright and not get distracted by other ideas. Meanwhile, instead of the natural plan with – 7.g2, White can play the more energetic line: 7.e4 d4 8.a4+ (this sharp variation has been tested in games between computers...) 8...dxc6 (8...dxc6 9.g2!? xd4 10.xc6 bxc6 11.0-0 (11.

8.c3 g7 12.e3 4.d6 13.0-0 0-0 14.ad1 (11...g7 12.d1 wb6 (12...f6 13.g5 we6 14. c3, threatening d5) 13.e3 d6 14.d3 0-0 15.d2 and despite Black’s extra pawn, his position is clearly worse, because it is inconceivable how he can complete his development.) 9. xc6 xc6 10.d5 d7 (10...e4? 11.g1 xd5 12.cxd5 xd5 13. g2 – Comet – Sos, Lima 2002) 11.c5! xe5 12.b3 g4 13. d2!±. White is threatening 14. f4 d7 15.h3 f5 16.g4++, moreover Black’s b7-pawn is under attack.

d1) 6...d7

In case Black intends to play like that, without the preliminary move c7-c6 (and that might be purposeful for him in case he intends to follow with c7-c5 at some moment), he should do it immediately, because otherwise White will attack his knight with the move f1-g2 and c7-c5 will become impossible unless Black retreats his knight on d5 beforehand.

7.g2

White’s attempt to play analogously to line-d2 fails – after 7.f3 g7 8.g2, Black plays 8.c5 (about 8...0-0 9.0-0 c6, Moroz – Miroshnichenko, Alushta 1999, 10.e1 – see line d2) and he obtains more than sufficient counterplay, for example; 9.0-0 0-0 10.c3 xd4 11.xd4 e7 12.e1 e8, Finkel – Loeffler, Tel
Aviv 1995. It is quite unclear how White’s play can be improved, for example after 13...b3, Black plays: 13...e5 (13...a5 14.a4±) 14...f3 w7 and if 15.g5, then 15...h6 16...xd5 (16.e4 xe4 17.xe4 f6 18.g2 h6 and c8-e6) 16...xd5 17...xd5 hgx5 18.xg5 and Black’s compensation for the pawn is satisfactory, for example: 18...e6 19.f3 f6 20.e3 f7 21.d2 f5 22.a4 d5 23.e2 f4 24.c5 b6 25.b4 e4 – because the light squares around White’s king are extremely vulnerable.

White therefore should not retreat his knight away from the e5-square and he should better continue with his development with 7.g2.

7...xe5 8.dxe5 c6 9.0–0 g7 10.e2 e6

It is a bit sharper for Black to try: 10...h5!? He can follow that with the move c8-g4, or open the h-file with h5-h4. 11.c4 b6 12.a3 (so that the e5-pawn is not hanging after d4) 12...g4 13.f3 e6 14.f4 c8 15.b3 h4 16.c2 hgx3 17.hgx3 h3 18.e3± and it turned out later that Black could not make any good use of the open h-file. White exchanged queens and then his space advantage and the unfavourable placement of Black’s bishop on g7 became quite telling factors: 18...e6 19.h2 0–0–0 20.ad1 xg2 21.xd8+ x8 22.xg2 d7 23.g4 c5 24.d1 x1d1 25.xd1 d7 26.f3 d3 27.xd3 xxd3 28.a3 e6 29.g5 d7 30.c2 b6 (the exchange on b5 is of course unfavourable for Black, but otherwise he cannot untrap his knight from the d3-square) 31.e3 c5 32.xc5 bxc5 33.d3± and White succeeded in winning that endgame, Glek – Loeffler, Germany 1994.

11.b3 c8

Or 11...c7 12.b2± - White will easily manage to protect his e5-pawn, then he will follow with f3, or e4 and later he will play c2-c4. The chances of Black finding any effective counterplay are just miniscule.

12.b2 h3 13.d2 xg2 14.xg2 0–0 15.c4 c7

16.e4±. White’s space advantage is practically unopposed. The game Wolff – de Firmian, New York 1996, continued with: 16...f5 17.f4 e6 (Black is forced to play like that if he wished to preserve his queen on the f5-square, or 17.ad8 18.g4↑, followed by f4–f5.) 18.f3 (It is too bad for White to play: 18.g4 xf4+ 19.f2 xe2+ 20.gxf5 gxf5 21.xe2 fxe4–+) 18...h5
19.h3 \h6 20.\a1 (Black can counter 20.\ad1 with 20...\ad8, but not 20...h4 21.\c1 hxg3 22.\xg3, because his queen gets trapped. Now, White should better continue with: 20.\a3 \fe8 – 20...\d4 21.\d3 ± – 21.\xe7 \xe7 22.\d6. That is the point – Black must give his extra piece back: 22...\xf4+ 23.\xf4 \e6 24.\a1, with the idea to follow with f4-f5 and White's initiative is very powerful. After the move in the game, White was slightly better indeed, but the fight remained extremely sharp.) 20...\ad8. It is not so easy now for White to create any threats against his opponent's queen after that move, because Black has additional resources – \e6-d4 and \ff5-d3 in answer to \e4-g3. (In case of 20...h4, White plays 21.\c1 and Black cannot capture on g3 anyway.) 21.\f2 h4 22.g4

(It is worse for White to follow with: 22.\ef1 \d4 23.g4 \xf3 24.\xf5 \xf5 25.\e5 \d2; 23.\xd4 \xd4 – because it is Black who has the initiative.) 22...\xf4+ 23.\h2 \e6 (or 23...\c8 24.\c1 \d3 25.\e3 \xh3 26.\xh3 \xe3 27.\xe3 \e4+ 24.\c5 \c8 25.\c1 \b6 (or 25...g5 26.\xf4 \xf4 27.g5 \xg5 28.\f5 \g1 f6 30.\fg2 \h7 31.\g4 and White is threatening \c5-e6; 27...\g7 28.\xf4+ – White's initiative is very powerful) 26.\e4 \d3 27.\e3 \xh3 28.\xh3 (28.\xh3 \xe3 29.\xe3 \e6) 28...\xe3 29.\xe3

\e6 30.\f4 \f5 (30...\f6 31.\h6 \f7 32.\xf6 \xf6 33.\xf6+ \xf6 34.\xf6 \f6 35.\xh4+-) 31.\xh4 (31.\g5 \f4+ 32.\h4 \f4 33.\xe6 \f4 31...\xe3 32.\xe3 \f4 (32...\e5 33.\g5 \f4 34.\xe4, and there happened a transfer to a queen and pawn endgame, which was clearly better for White and he won it after: 34...\g7 35.\g5 \c5? (\c5...\b5) 36.a3 \a6 37.a4 \f7 38.\e3 \g7 39.a5 \c6 40.axb6 \xb6 41.\h3 \g8 42.\d3 \f7 43.\d5+ \f8 44.e6 and Black resigned.

\d2) 6...\g7 7.\g2

7...0-0

This is Black's most natural defence.

About 7...\c6 8.0-0 0-0 – see 7...0-0 8.0-0 \c6.

It is too bad for Black to play: 7...\c6? 8.\xc6 \xc6 9.c4 \b4 10.a3 – Kristjansson – Nielsen, Copenhagen 2003.

After the aggressive line for Black: 7...\b4 8.\f3 \f5 (He has an interesting alternative here: 8...\xd4?! 9.c3 \xf2+ 10.\xf2 \xd1 11.\xd1 \c2 12.\a3 \xa1
Chapter 11

13.\( \text{h}f4\) 9.\( \text{a}a3\) \( \text{c}8\)c6 10.0–0
0–0 11.c3 \( \text{d}d3\)? White can obtain
a great advantage with: 12.
\( \text{h}h4\)±.

8.0–0 c6

Black’s attempts at complicating matters end up in White’s
courage after: 8...\( \text{b}b4\), Radovano-

ovic – Trifunovic, Richmond 1995,
9.\( \text{f}f3\) \( \text{f}5\) 10.\( \text{a}a3\) \( \text{c}8\)c6 11.c3
\( \text{d}d5\) (11...\( \text{d}d3\)?! 12.\( \text{h}h4\)±) 12.
\( \text{h}h4\)±, or 8...c5 9.dxc5 \( \text{b}b4\) 10.
\( \text{e}e2\) \( \text{c}7\) (10...\( \text{e}e5\) 11.\( \text{e}e5\)
\( \text{c}x\)c2 12.\( \text{h}h6\) f6 13.\( \text{c}c3\) \( \text{x}a1\) 14.
\( \text{xf}8\) \( \text{x}f8\) 15.\( \text{d}d2\) \( \text{a}a6\) 16.\( \text{e}e4\)
\( \text{e}e6\) 17.\( \text{a}x\)a1 \( \text{c}8\) 18.b4±) 11.c3
\( \text{xc}5\), as it was played in
the game Plaskett – Valvo, New York
1979. White could have main-
tained his advantage with the
help of the variation: 12.\( \text{x}g6\)!
hgx6 13.\( \text{cxb}4\) \( \text{xb}4\) 14.a3 \( \text{b}b6\)
15.\( \text{c}c3\) \( \text{c}c6\) 16.\( \text{d}d5\) \( \text{d}d8\) 17.
\( \text{g}5\)± – and his activity in
the centre spells danger for Black.

9.\( \text{e}e1\)

\begin{center}

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}

\end{center}

9...\( \text{f}f5\)

Among the other possibilities
for Black I will mention:
9...\( \text{d}d7\) 10.\( \text{f}f3\) b5 (or 10...
\( \text{c}7\)f6 11.c3 a5 12.a4 \( \text{f}5\) 13.
\( \text{bd}2\) \( \text{b}6\) 14.\( \text{b}3\)±. In the game

Spraggett – Brodeur, Quebec
1983, there followed: 14...\( \text{c}4\)
15.h3 \( \text{d}5\) 16.\( \text{f}1\) \( \text{d}6\) 17.\( \text{c}5\) h5
18.\( \text{h}4\) e6 19.\( \text{d}3\) \( \text{e}4\). Black
cannot make any pawn-breaks
and the activity of his pieces is
just temporary. 20.\( \text{f}3\) g5. This
aggression on the kingside is
not justified. 21.\( \text{a}3\) g4 22.
hxg4 hxg4 23.\( \text{f}e5\) f6. Black’s g4-
pawn is doomed anyway. 24.
\( \text{x}g4\) \( \text{f}7\) 25.\( \text{g}2\) \( \text{d}6\) 26.\( \text{a}1\)
\( \text{h}8\) 27.\( \text{e}3\) \( \text{x}e3\) 28.\( \text{x}e3\)±
and White gradually materialized
his positional and material
advantage.) 11.\( \text{c}3\) (White should
prefer to develop his knight to
the d2-square. It can go to e4 from
there as well, but Black will be
deprived of the possibility to ex-
change it. Meanwhile, White
might like to play c2-c4 with a
knight on d2 at some moment.)
11...e6 (it is better for Black to
exchange on c3, doubling White’s
pawns) 12.\( \text{e}4\) \( \text{c}7\) 13.c3 \( \text{b}7\)
14.\( \text{b}3\)± Lhagvasuren – Hoang
Thong, Singapore 1995;

or 9...\( \text{e}6\) (still, the f5-square
is preferable for that piece,
because the bishop is quite vul-
nerable on the e6-square) 10.c3 \( \text{d}7\)
11.\( \text{d}3\) \( \text{f}5\) 12.\( \text{a}3\) \( \text{d}3\) 13.
\( \text{xd}3\) e6 14.\( \text{c}2\) \( \text{b}6\) 15.a4±.
Later, in the game Fercce –
Visintin, Nova Gorica 1997,
Black managed to push e7-e5
indeed, but White’s couple of
bishops turned out to be ex-
trremely powerful after that:
15...a5 16.\( \text{a}3\) \( \text{c}7\) 17.\( \text{e}2\) e5
18.dxe5 \( \text{xe}5\) 19.\( \text{c}2\) h5 20.\( \text{g}5\)
3.d4 d6 4.e3f3 de 5.ex5 g6 6.g3

\[ \text{Fe8 21.\text{ae1} \text{d7} 22.\text{h3} \text{d6} 23.\text{f4} \text{ec4} 24.\text{xc4} \text{xc4} 25.\text{b3} \text{xe2} 26.\text{xe2} \text{d3} 27.\text{f1} \text{and Black lost a pawn.}} \]

10.c3 \text{d7} 11.d3 \text{e8}

Following 11...\text{g4}, White in the game Martinovic – Schroll, Austria 2000, continued with: 12.\text{b3} \text{b6} 13.\text{bd2} \text{fe8} 14.\text{c4} \text{c7} 15.\text{ce5} \text{xf3} 16.\text{xf3} \pm. The inclusion of the moves \text{b3} and \text{b6} was hardly necessary for White. It would have been stronger for him to play 12.\text{bd2} \pm and h2-h3, forcing the exchange on f3.

12.\text{bd2} \text{7f6}

Some experts suggested here 12...e5!? (the lines 12...\text{b6} 13.\text{c4} \text{c7} 14.\text{b3} \pm, or 12...\text{c7} 13.\text{c4} \text{ad8} 14.\text{b3} \text{7f6} 15.\text{ce5} \pm are analogous to the main line, while after: 12...\text{g4} 13.h3 Black must either present his opponent with the two bishop advantage: 13...\text{xf3} 14.\text{xf3} \text{e5} 15.\text{dxe5} \text{dxe5} 16.\text{dxe5} \text{xe5} 17.\text{xe5} \text{xe5}, Holl – Keller, Bayern 2000, 18.\text{b3} \pm, or he must enter unfavourable complications for him: 13...\text{f5} 14.g4 \text{d3} 15.c4 \text{b4} 16.\text{b3} \text{b6} 17.a3 \text{c2} 18.\text{xd3} \text{xa1} 19.b4 \pm) 13.\text{c4} \text{c7} (13...\text{exd4} 14.\text{exe8}+ \text{exe8} 15.\text{d6} \text{e6} 16.\text{xf5} \text{xf5} 17.\text{xd4} \pm; 13...\text{g4} 14.\text{dxe5} \text{exe5} 15.\text{dxe5} \text{exe5} 16.\text{exe5} \text{exe5} 17.\text{b3}! \text{xf3} 18.\text{xf3} \text{b6} 19.\text{e3} \pm 14.\text{dxe5} \text{exe5} (Black fails to regain his pawn after: 14...\text{g4} 15.\text{f4} \text{xf3} 16.\text{xf3} \pm 15.\text{dxe5} \text{exe5} 16.c4 \text{b4} (it is stronger for him to play: 16...\text{b6} 17.\text{xe5} \text{exe5} 18.\text{f4} \text{exe1+} 19.\text{exe1} \pm). It looks like Black’s position is quite acceptable, but after: 17.\text{xe5!} \text{exe5} 18.\text{f4} \text{d3} 19.\text{xe5} \text{exe5} 20.g4! \text{e6} 21.g5 White’s advantage becomes overwhelming. Black’s knight is deadly pinned and he is faced with insurmountable difficulties: 21...\text{f5} 22.\text{e2} \text{e8} 23.\text{h1}! (White thus avoids the trap...) 23...\text{g7} 24.\text{e1} \text{f6} 25.gxf6+ \text{xf6} 26.\text{e3} \pm.

13.\text{c4} \text{c7} 14.\text{ce5} \pm

White’s knight has occupied the important strategical outpost – the e5-square. It can only be ousted from there at the expense of the weakening of Black’s kingside pawns. Meanwhile, White can also repel Black’s pieces from the centre with the help of c2-c4, or h2-h3 followed by g3-g4. These factors as well as White’s space advantage make his position much more promising.

In answer to Anand’s recommendation – 14.\text{b3} \text{ad8} 15.\text{ce5}, just like in the game, Black can play: 15...\text{g4}, trading a
couple of knights, after which 16.\( \text{h}4 \) is not so sensible, because Black’s knight on g4 is not hanging and the bishop can simply go back.

14...\( \text{d}4 \)!

The exchange of a pair of knights would be in favour of the defending side, because of its lack of space – that is Black. It is however worse for him to try the move 14...\( \text{d}7 \), with the same idea, because of: 15...\( \text{xf7} \) 16.g4 e6 17.xf5 exf5\( \pm \).

15.\( \text{h}4 \)

Black is now forced to compromise his pawn-structure, because his knight on g4 is hanging.

15...\( \text{xe5} \) 16.\( \text{xf5} \) gxf5 17.\( \text{dxe5} \) e6

Black should refrain from the line: 17...\( \text{xe5} \) 18.\( \text{xd5} \) cxd5 19.\( \text{xd5} \) \( g7 \) 20.\( \text{xf5} \), because he loses a pawn.

\[ \text{Diagram} \]

18.\( \text{e}2 \). Black’s position is solid enough (White cannot break through easily on either side of the board), but it is still too passive. In the game Anand – Adams, Linares 1994, there followed: 18...\( \text{e}7 \) 19.\( \text{f4} \) (19.c4 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \)) 19...\( \text{d}5 \) 20.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 21.\( \text{e}3 \) 22.b4 23.f2 \( \text{c}8 \)!

(Black is trying to defend his pawn on a7 without creating additional weaknesses – in case of 23...b6, White will follow with 24.a4! \( \text{a}5 \)).

24.a4 \( \text{e}d8 \) 25.a5. White advances gradually on the queenside and in order to obtain some counterplay Black tried: 25...\( \text{f6} \) 26.\( \text{exf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \), weakening his e6-pawn indeed, but thus he activated his dark squared bishop and he obtained some counterplay along the d-file.

27.\( \text{ab1} \) \( \text{c}3 \) 28.\( \text{f1} \) (28.\( \text{ec1} \) \( \text{d}2 \)) 29.\( \text{d}3 \) 29.\( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 30.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{e}3 \text{d}4 \)?! (Black had to play here 30...\( \text{e}8 \text{d}4 \)\( \pm \) – in fact both players made several mistakes in a row for some time...)

31.\( \text{fe1} \) (31.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{f}4 \text{d}5 \) 32.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \)\( \pm \)) 31...\( \text{f7} \) (31...\( \text{xc}4 \)!

32.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{d}7 \)\( \pm \)) 32.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{g}7 \)\( ? \) (32...\( \text{e}4 \text{d}5 \) 33.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 34.\( \text{e}5 \)\( \pm \)– Anand) 33.\( \text{e}5 \)\( + \) 34.\( \text{xd5} \) 34...\( \text{xd5} \) 35.\( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 36.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{fxg4} \) 37.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 38.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{f8} \) (38...\( \text{f5} \) 39.\( \text{h}5 \) \( \text{f7} \) 40.\( \text{g5} \)\( + \)) 39.\( \text{f5} \) and Black resigned.

**Conclusion**

The main idea of the Larsen variation 4...\( \text{dxe5} \) is to propose a trade of knights by \( \text{d}8 \)-d7. Then White should either accept simplification or retreat with the knight. In general White is better off when
maintaining tension with $\mathcal{Q}f3$. In that case he maintains a spatial advantage.

The immediate 5...$\mathcal{Q}d7$ in answer to 5.$\mathcal{Q}xe5$ allows a sacrifice on f7, when Black’s king is dragged out to e6. Analytically and practically Black has a hard time in that branch. Our investigation does not show an acceptable defense for him.

Beside 5...$\mathcal{Q}d7$ we consider in this chapter 5...e6, 5...c6 and 5...g6. All of them prepare $\mathcal{Q}b8-d7$.

The first one – 5...e6 – boxes in the bishop on c8. By 6.$\mathcal{A}f3$ (which is harmless in the other lines due to $\mathcal{A}c8-e6$) White forces back to f6 the d5-knight. The other defenses of f7 by the queen are to the detriment of development.

The move 5...c6 bolsters up the knight on d5 and prepares $\mathcal{Q}b8-d7$. We recommend 6.$\mathcal{A}e2$ with two possible plans for Black – to develop the bishop to f5 followed by e7-e6, or fianchetto the other one on g7. In both cases White plays c2-c4, finishes development and maintains an edge due to his spatial advantage.

Finally Black could play 5...g6 without wasting time on 5...c6. Then I recommend the modern continuation 6.g3!? In answer to 6...$\mathcal{Q}d7$ White should refrain from the usual retreat to f3 in favour of 7.$\mathcal{A}g2$, allowing the opponent to trade on e5. The fine point is that commonly Black can follow up with c7-c5 which is impossible against a White bishop on g2.

In the main line 6...$\mathcal{A}g7$ White meets $\mathcal{Q}b8-d7$ with $\mathcal{Q}f3$ to proceed with $\mathcal{A}f1-e1$, c2-c3, $\mathcal{Q}b1-d2$ and to c4-e5 at an opportunity. Black's position is very solid, but he is unable to break-through favourably in the centre. That secures some spatial advantage to White.
Chapter 12

1.e4 .df6 2.e5 .df5 3.d4  d6 4.df3  g6

This system is quite popular. Similarly to many other openings where Black fianchettoes his dark-squared bishop, the second player cedes the centre, but only to counter-attack it later by pieces. Main characters in this design are bishops on g7 and g4, a knight on c6 and more seldom, the c-pawn which could be pushed to c5.

Besides, Black’s setup has obvious faults. Flank development of the f8-bishop weakens the square f7. If Black covers that point by the common e7-e6, even more vulnerable would become the square f6 and the whole kingside with it. Therefore a consistent continuation for White is to hit f7 — by dg5 or xc4 and eventually by df3.

5.xc4

Major options are: a) 5...c6 and b) 5...xb6.

Other alternatives are:

5...xe6?! is the worst of them. 6.g5 immediately faces Black with difficulties: 6...dxe5 7.xe6 fxe6 8.dxe5 g7 9.f4 0-0 (9...wd7 10.xc3 xxc3 11.xd7+ xxd7 12.bxc3 xf7 13.e3 xb6 14.e3 d5 15.d4 b6 16.c4 db4 17.c5 Unzicker – Schulze, Dortmund 1992) 10.0-0 c6 11.c3 db4 (11...xc3 12.xe6+ xh8 13. bxc3 xd1 14.xd1 g5 15.g3+ Lambert – Krueger, Wiesbaden 1988) 12.xe6+ xh8, Arnold – Palm, Karlsruhe 1988, when White has 13.xe3 xd1 (13...g5 14.g3 xf4 15.xf4 xd1 16. xad1 xc2 17.c5 xh6 18.b3 2b4 19.a3 xa6 20.xe3+ 14. xad1 xc2 15.c5 b6 16.b3 bxc5 17.xc2 xd4 18.xd3 ab8 19.b3 g5 20.fxg5 xe5 21.xe4; 5...e6?! is also not very good. Although it hardly loses, it weakens the dark squared. 6.0-0 xg7 7.g5 (White had an interesting transposition aimed at preventing the possibility of d5-e7 – 7.xd5 exd5 8.xg5 xd7 9.xc3) 7...wd7 (In White’s favour is
7...f6 8.exf6 \(\text{xf6} \) 9.fxe6 \(\text{xf6} \) 10.\(\text{x}d5 \) exd5 11.e1+ \(\text{f7} \) 12.
\(\text{d}d2 \) 13.c3 c6 14.e3 – Black has a ruined pawn chain and weakened king. A better possibility is 7...\(\text{c7} \), for example:
8.e1 h6 9.e3 f5 10.exd6 \(\text{xd6} \) 11.c3 d7 12.bd2 f6 13.b3 xe3 14.xe3 g4 15.
e1 0–0 16.h3 f6 17.e5 with a small edge, Amed – Rossi, Argentine 2004) 8.\(\text{x}d5 \) exd5 9.c3 c6 (better is 9.dxe5 10.xe5
d6 11.e1 0–0 12.f3 c6 13.
d3 or 10.dxe5 c6 11.e1 0–0 12.d2 – Black's pieces are undeveloped and his kingside is weakened.) 10.e1 0–0 11.exd6
f6 12.f4+. Black is in for a long and possibly difficult struggle to regain the d6-pawn. However it is not too clear how White could break-through. The game Soppe – Houstoun, Buenos Aires 1978 saw further 12.e8 13.d2 f8
14.a4. (This operation is unconvincing. Perhaps White should have tried 14.g3 a6 15.f4
g7 16.h3 g5? 17.xg5 fxg5 18.
g5+ f7 19.xe8 xe8 20.
h5+ or 16.h8 17.e2 xd6 18.
xd6 xd6 19.xd6 xd6 20.
e7+ h6 21.e1 with a clear advantage in the endgame, as well as 14.h3 xe1+ 15.xe1 a6
16.h2 xd6 17.g4 e7 18.
e3 f7 19.f3+) 14...b6 15.b3
f7? This is losing. (15.xh8+ was better since White is unable to double the rooks quickly:
16.e3 f5 or 16.e2 a6) 16.c4
xe1+ 17.xe1 xd6 18.xd6
x6 19.h6+– with mating attack, Perez Garcia – Garcia Fernandez, Orense 2002;
5.dxe5 is also insufficient. After 6.dxe5 (that is why the exchange on e5 is bad – the knight on d5 is under attack) 6...c6
7.c3 e6 (7...xc3? 8.xf7+; 7...e6 leads to a severe weakening of the dark squares, 8.c4
d7 9.g5+ Guski – Al Saad, Vienna 2003) 8.g5

In many variations White puts the enemy bishop out of play by taking on e6, followed by f2-f4 and gets a tangible advantage:
8...xc3 9.xd8+ xd8 10.
exe6 fx6 11.bxc3+ Black is losing at least a pawn with bad position;
8.a5 9.xd2 c4 10.xe6
xe6 (or 10...xe6+ 11.e2
xg2+ 12.f1 fx6 13.c3 e4
14.d4 e3+ 15.xe3 xh1+ 16.g1=+) 11.f4 d7 12.xe6
fx6 13.e2=;
8.d7 9.xe6 (9.f4 could be met by 9.xxf4) 9...fxe6 10.
f4 b6 11.e2? (11.b3. The bishop is a bit misplaced here, 11...h6 12.g3 0–0–0 13.e2
h5 14.h4 xc3 15.bxc3 a5

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16.\textit{\text{	ext{b}2}} \textit{\text{c5}} 17.\textit{\text{c4}} \textit{\text{d5}} 18.0-0 \textit{\text{d}8} 19.\textit{\text{c}1} \textit{\text{x}b}3 20.\textit{\text{a}xb}3. White has already improved his pawn structure on the queenside whilst the enemy bishop is still imprisoned on g7, Breder – Palkovi, Paks 2000) 11...\textit{\text{h}6} (11...\textit{\text{xf}4} 12.\textit{\text{xf}4} \textit{\text{xb}2} 13.0-0 \textit{\text{x}c}3 14.\textit{\text{xe}6} and Black is in great danger since 14...0-0 fails to 15.\textit{\text{ad}1+} \textit{\text{g}4}; 11...0-0 0-0 12.\textit{\text{e}4} and White retains his pawn chain flawless) 12.g3 \textit{\text{xc}3} 13.\textit{\text{b}xc}3 \textit{\text{a}5} (13...\textit{\text{c}5} 14.\textit{\text{e}3} 14.0-0 \textit{\text{c}5} 15.\textit{\text{e}3}. White harmoniously deployed his pieces;

8...\textit{\text{g}7}. This is a second-grade move because after 9.f4 it is unclear what the bishop is doing on g7. Black should not be wasting time. 9...\textit{\text{d}7} 10.\textit{\text{x}d}5 (White can also take on e6 as in the previous variation) 10...\textit{\text{x}d}5 (10...\textit{\text{x}d}5? 11.\textit{\text{xd}5} \textit{\text{cxd}5} 12.\textit{\text{x}d}5 gains a pawn in view of 11...\textit{\text{x}e}5 11...\textit{\text{b}6} (11...h6?! is inconsistent – Black should not urge on the opponent into a favourable to him exchange, 12.\textit{\text{x}e}6 fxe6 13.\textit{\text{g}4} \textit{\text{f}8} 14.0-0 \textit{\text{a}5} 15.h4 h5 16.\textit{\text{e}2}± Svendsen – Rockel, corr. 1990) 12.\textit{\text{x}e}6 fxe6 13.\textit{\text{d}4}±. White has an obvious static advantage because of the g7-bishop and other perceptible drawbacks in Black's position. The counterplay against the f4-pawn and the queenside cannot compensate that. The game P.Cramling –

Alburt, Reykjavik 1984 went on: 13...\textit{\text{c}4} 14.\textit{\text{b}3} \textit{\text{a}3} 15.0-0 (15.\textit{\text{h}4}?) 15...\textit{\text{e}8} 16.\textit{\text{f}2} \textit{\text{a}5} 17.\textit{\text{d}3} b5 18.\textit{\text{c}1} b4 19.\textit{\text{e}2} \textit{\text{b}5} 20.\textit{\text{c}3} bxc3 21.\textit{\text{a}4} (White could have eaten a pawn immediately: 21.\textit{\text{xc}3}!? 0-0 22.\textit{\text{f}2} \textit{\text{d}4} 23.\textit{\text{x}d}4 \textit{\text{c}5} 24.\textit{\text{xc}5} \textit{\text{xc}5} 25.\textit{\text{e}2} \textit{\text{xc}2} 26.\textit{\text{xc}2} \textit{\text{g}5} 27.\textit{\text{g}3}±) 21...\textit{\text{d}4} 22.\textit{\text{xc}4} \textit{\text{d}7} 23.\textit{\text{h}4}! \textit{\text{c}5} 24.\textit{\text{f}2} \textit{\text{h}8} 25.\textit{\text{f}2} \textit{\text{b}4} 26.\textit{\text{e}3} (White's king has supported his knight, thus freeing the queen for \textit{\text{a}6} or h4-h5 planning to capture on g6 or h7) 26...\textit{\text{x}e}5!? 27.\textit{\text{f}xe}5 \textit{\text{b}8} 28.\textit{\text{f}2} \textit{\text{x}e} 29.\textit{\text{e}1} (29.\textit{\text{xc}3}?) 29...\textit{\text{f}8} 30.\textit{\text{f}3} \textit{\text{h}2} 31.\textit{\text{d}4} \textit{\text{c}7} 32.\textit{\text{xc}3} \textit{\text{xc}3} 33.\textit{\text{xc}3} \textit{\text{h}4} 34.\textit{\text{g}1}+.. \textit{\text{x}f} 3 (this is forced since White has created mating threats) 35.\textit{\text{g}x} 36.\textit{\text{d}2} \textit{\text{g}3}+ 37.\textit{\text{f}1} \textit{\text{x}f} 3 38.\textit{\text{e}2} \textit{\text{h}3} 39.\textit{\text{e}2} \textit{\text{e}5} 40.\textit{\text{f}3} \textit{\text{h}2} 41.\textit{\text{d}3} \textit{\text{b}2} 42.\textit{\text{d}5}+ \textit{\text{e}8} 43.\textit{\text{a}8}+ \textit{\text{f}7} 44.\textit{\text{f}1}+. Faced with an imminent mate, Black resigned.

a) 5...\textit{\text{c}6}

This is a good continuation. It was regularly employed at different times by GMs V.Hort, L.Ljubojevic, R.Vaganian, L.Alburt,
A. Baburin, A. Miles, V. Akopian, V. Ivanchuk. Essentially this is the best and perhaps the only way to preserve the knight on d5. After the usual exchange on d6 Black takes by queen and reinforces the knight by all possible means (including b7-b5 in case of necessity). That ensures a very solid, although somewhat cramped position.

6. exd6 exd6

Of course capturing by pawn is out of question. After 6...exd6 7. axd5 cxd5 Black is "enjoying" a compromised pawn chain, undeveloped pieces and problems with the defence of the d5-pawn. White gets the edge by 8. c3 a6 9. e2 g7 10. b5+ d7 11. f4? or 10...xd5 0-0 11. f4±, when there is no sufficient compensation for the pawn.

7. 0-0 g7

The pin 7...g4 is premature. White meets it with 8. h3 xf3 9. xf3 g7 10. c3, attacking d5,

for example:

10... f6 11. e4! xd4 12. xf7+ xf7 13. g5+ e8 (13... g8 keeps the g7-bishop, but fails under a mating attack: 14. d1 c4 15. b3 b4 16. e3+ ) 14. e6, when in the game Lukin – Yermolinsky, USSR 1979 White regained the piece leaving the opponent with an exposed king. It is possible further 14... c4 (more cautious is 14... d6 15. xg7+ f7 16. h6 d5 17. c3+) 15. xg7+ f7 16. e1 (a good alternative is 16. h6 xc2 17. e3 e4 18. b3+ d5 19. xb7 c5 20. xd5+ dx5 21. f1+ or 16... bd7 17. f1 e5 18. ad1+ 16... bd7 17. e6 xc2 18. a3=. White is winning the e7-pawn with an attack, or the exchange by e6-c7;

10... 11. e4 c7 (11... e7 12. g5) 12. b3 0-0 (12...xd4? 13. c4 b6 14. f6+ e7 15. g5 f8 16. ad1 c5 17. d5! exd5 18. xd4 cxd4 19. f6++. Black could have prolonged his resistance here by 18... c6, intending to parry f6 by e5. However White has the simple 19. h4 dxc4 20. h6+ g8 21. e1 d6 22. xc4 with decisive attack.) 13. c4 e7 14. f4 d8 15. d6 (15. ad1± was worth consideration, depriving Black of the possibility of taking on d4) 15... b6 (15...xd4 promises more chances for creating counterplay, e.g. 16. fd1 c5 17. xb7 b6, when 18. h6 is met by 18...bc6 with unclear play, or 16. xb7 b6 17. d6 d7±) 16. ad1 a5 17. f1 a7. Here instead of 18. c2 d7 19. g3± with spatial advantage,
but quite solid position for Black in Watson – Wohl, Kuala Lumpur 1992, White could have tried 18.d5 exd5 19.cxd5 cxd5 20.\textit{xd5} 21.\textit{x}xd5 \textit{d}d7 22.\textit{g}g5 \textit{f}6 (22...\textit{xc}7 23.\textit{xc}1 \textit{a}7 24.\textit{xf}6\pm) 23.\textit{f}4\pm. The open position underlines the advantage of White’s piece.

8.h3

Generally Black’s design is to raise a light-squared pawn wall by e7-e6 and b7-b5. Therefore he would gladly swap his light-squared bishop after \textit{c}8-g4. White prevents this positional threat.

8...0-0 9.\textit{xe}1

9...\textit{d}7

9...\textit{f}5. After White restrained the enemy bishop by his last move, Black was faced with the problem where to deploy it. He had a plan with b7-b5 and \textit{c}8-b7, but the bishop is rather passive there since White can easily prevent the break c6-c5. By the text move 9...\textit{f}5 Black is aiming at swapping his bishop for the other enemy knight which is apparently bound for e4. Of course White is not obliged to hurry with the knight to the central square. He can attempt to underline the downside of the bishop being on f5 – to push g2-g4 with a knight on d7, and when the bishop retreats to e6, to attack it by \textit{g}5. Summing up, White has a spatial advantage and should avoid exchanges, trying to exploit the defects of the crowded enemy pieces. 10.\textit{bd}2 (An instructive game for this line is Tukmakov – Zhidkov, USSR 1973, which saw 10.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}8 11.\textit{bd}2 \textit{d}7 12.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}7 13.\textit{h}4 a5 14.\textit{g}3 \textit{d}8 15.a4\pm. Further on White, helped by the enemy’s lack of counterplay, gradually advanced his pawns and broke-through: 15...\textit{c}8 16.\textit{e}2 \textit{h}6 17.\textit{h}1 \textit{f}6 18.\textit{c}4 \textit{e}4 19.\textit{h}2 \textit{e}6 20.\textit{ce}5 \textit{b}6 21.\textit{c}4 \textit{d}8 22.\textit{fe}5 \textit{e}6 23.\textit{d}3 b6 24.\textit{ad}1 \textit{d}7 25.\textit{ce}5 \textit{b}7 26.\textit{f}3 \textit{ed}8 27.\textit{g}4 \textit{g}7 28.\textit{c}4 \textit{b}4 29.\textit{f}4 \textit{f}8 30.\textit{g}1. Capturing the bishop on e6 was good too. 30...\textit{d}7 31.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}8 32.\textit{c}5 \textit{f}5 33.d5! bxc5 – Black is struggling also after 33...\textit{xe}5 34.\textit{xe}5 bxc5 35.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 36.\textit{xc}5\pm – 34.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 35.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 36.\textit{d}5 \textit{h}8 37.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}4 38.\textit{xe}7 \textit{b}7 39.\textit{xc}8, and Black resigned) 10...\textit{e}8 (10...a5 should be met by 11.a4\pm, but not 11.\textit{e}4 \textit{xe}4 12.\textit{xe}4 b5 13.\textit{f}1 \textit{d}7 14.\textit{d}2 e6 15.\textit{c}1 \textit{fb}8\textit{c}, where Black achieved his dream setup in Vezzosi – Vaganian, Reggio Emilia 1992) 11.\textit{b}3 b5 12.a4 \textit{d}7. Here the mentioned above downside of the
bishop's stand was highlighted with: 13.g4! \&e6 14.\&e4 \&c7 15.axb5 cxb5 16.\&eg5 \&f8 17.\&xe6 fxe6 18.\&g5+ and Black's position crumbled away: 18...\&d6 19.\&f3 \&b4 20.\&xe6 \&xe6 21.\&xd5 \&e1+ 22.\&g2 \&h8 23.\&f7+ \&g8 24.\&e5 \&xe5 25.\&xe6+ \&h8 26.\&c3 1-0 Magem Badals – Rayo Gutierrez, Ponzerrada 1992.

9...a5. This move raises a difficult question – is it worth playing a7-a5 and provoking a2-a4 at all. The positive side is that the knight on d5 feels more secure since it could meet c2-c4 with \&b4; on the other hand Black’s possibilities for counterplay with b7-b5 are even more restricted. 10.a4 \&a6 11.\&bd2 \&d8 12.\&e4 \&e8 13.c3 \&ac7 14.\&g5=. The transfer of the knight to c7 is hardly good. Even if it reaches e6, it is unclear what the knight is doing on that square. In the game Anagnostopoulos – Dive, London 1994, Black went on manoeuvring dubiously: 14...\&b8 15.\&b3 \&b6 16.\&f4 \&bd5 17.\&g3 \&f5 18.\&c5± b6? 19.\&xd5 \&xd5 (19...\&xd5 20.\&xc7 \&xc7 21.\&a6++) 20.\&xc7 bxc5 21.\&xb8+ and lost the exchange.

9...\&e8 10.\&bd2 \&d7 11.\&b3 \&c7 12.\&e4 h6 (in the current situation this weakening of the kingside proves to be significant since the f7-square is also vulnerable.) 13.c3± b6 (this is passive, Black should have tried 13...\&f8) 14.h4! The pawn squeezes through to h5, since 14...\&xf6 15.\&xf6+ \&xf6 16.\&e5 e6 17.\&f3 \&b7 18.\&hxh6± is in favour of White, who won a pawn whilst the enemy king is in the draught, Demarre – Dubois, France 1989;

9...b5 10.\&b3 \&bd7 11.\&bd2 leads to a transposition of moves, whilst in the case of 10...a5 11.\&a4 b4 White retains the edge by the standard manoeuvre of the knight: 12.\&bd2 \&d7 13.\&e4 \&c7 14.\&g5 e6 15.\&d2± W.Fischer – Caprano, corr. 1997.

10...\&f5 11.a4 b4 is also in White’s favour (after 11...\&d7 12.\&xd5 \&xd5 13.\&c3 \&d4 14.\&xe7 Black would find it difficult to prove that he has enough compensation for the pawn) 12.\&bd2 a5 (also known is 12...\&e8 13.\&c4 \&c7 14.\&e3 \&d8 – Black should have preserved his pawn structure with 14...\&xe3 15.\&xe3± – 15.\&xf5 gxf5 16.\&d3 e6 17.\&g5 \&c8 18.\&d2 \&d7 19.\&h6+, when Black’s king is shaky, Cosma – Safranska, Calimanesti 1992.

Another good option for White is 13.a5 \&d7 14.g4 \&e6 15.\&e4 \&c7 16.\&f5 \&f8 17.\&c5 \&d7 18.\&f3++; 17...\&c8 18.\&xf7±.) 13.\&e2 (The placement of the queen on e2 is questionable. A good alternative is 13.\&c4 \&c7 14.\&g5 \&e8 15.\&d2 \&d7 16.\&h6±, and the typical g2-g4 at an opportune moment.) 13...\&e8 14.\&c4 \&c7 15.\&c5+ (15.\&g5!!?) 15...\&d7 16.\&xf7!? \&xf7 17.g4 \&xg4 18.\&g5+ \&g8 19.hxg4 (19.\&xg4 e5 20.\&e6 \&d6 21.\&g7 \&xg7=)
19...e5 20.♘f3 ♞7f6 (better is 20...♗b6 21.dxe5 ♞xe5 22.f4 ♞xe1+ 23.♘xe1 ♛d7 24.♗e3 ♞e8 25.♘d1↑) 21.dxe5 ♞xe5 22.♗f4 ♞xe1+ 23.♘xe1 ♛d7 24.♗e6 ♛d8 (24...♘e8 25.♘d6 ♛e1+ 26.♕g2 ♛c8 27.♗e3+ ♙d4 25.♗e5 ♙e8 26.♗xc6+ = ♙xe5 27.♘e6 ♙ec7 28.♘xe5 h6 29.♗e6. Faced with heavy material losses, Black resigned in Haslinger – Broomfield, England 2002.

9...h6. Black prevents the fairly annoying pin ♙c1-g5. On the other hand, the move is weakening (although that is still unnoticeable) the kingside without an urgent reason. 10.♗bd2.

Here Black has tried:

10...b6 11.♗b3. Intending c2-c4. (However this retreat was not obligatory. White had the interesting variation 11.♗e2 ♞e8 12.♗e4 ♛c7 13.♗e5+,) 11...♗d7 12.♗e2 ♛c7 13.c4 ♛f6 14.♗xe7 ♞e8 15.♗b4 ♞xe1+ 16.♗xe1. Black has some compensation for the sacrificed pawn – the enemy pieces are placed rather clumsily. Actually, in the game he failed to draw from that. 16...c5 17.♖xc5 ♛xc5 18.♗f3 ♛fe4 19.♗c2 ♛f8 20.♗e3 ♙b7 21.♗d1 ♞c8 22.♗d4 a6 23.♗e3 ♙d7 24.♗e1 ♞e8 25.b3, Ernst – Albutt, Subotica 1987. White successfully regrouped, keeping the extra pawn. On move 22 was the last moment when Black could have evened the pawns, but not the chances: 22...♕a6 23.♗b3 ♛xc4 24.♗xc4 ♛xc4 25.♗b3 ♞c8 (25...♗c5 26.♗d3 ♛c7 27.♗e5±) 26.♗e6± ♛xe6 27.♗xe6+ ♛g7 28.♗d7 (28.♗xc8 ♛xc8 29.♗d8 ♛e6 30.♗h6+ ♛h6 31.♗xf8+ 28...♗xf6 29.♗g4 h5 30.♗d4+ ♛g5 31.♕f3+ ♛h6 32.♕e3+ g5 33.♕f5 ♛c7 34.♕c7 ♛c7 35.♕e4 ♛e4 36.♕xg5±;

10...♗d7 11.♗e4 ♛c7 12.♗f1 (commonly White retreats to b3 in this system – 12.♗b3?!±) 12...b5 13.♗d2 a5 14.♗c1 ♗h7 15.a4 b4 16.c4 ♛f5 17.♗f4 ♛d8 18.♗g3 e6 (18...c5 19.d5±) 19.♗d6 ♛e8 20.♗e5 ♛xe5 21.dxe5 ♙d7 22.c5 f5 23.f4, White has a considerable spatial advantage, Z. Almasi – S.Farago, Budapest 1992;

10...♗f5 11.♗b3 (We already noted that White should maintain tension by avoiding exchanges: 11.♗e4 ♛xe4 12.♗xe4 ♙d7 13.c3 ♙f6 14.♗e1 b5 15.♗f1 e6 and Black achieved his design although his kingside is somewhat weakened, Mokry – Frei- sler, Prague 1986) 11...b5 (Or 11...♗d7 12.♗c4 ♛c7 13.♗e5 – White does not need exchanges if they do not produce new flaws in Black's position, so 13.♗h4?!± was better. That way White
would force the opponent to take on f5 by pawn which spoils his pawn structure – 13...\(\text{\textit{Qxe5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qxe5 ad8}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Qe2 c5=?}}\), when Black equalised in the game Pal – Freisler, Karvina 1985. 12.\(\text{\textit{Qh4}}\) was also interesting: 12...\(\text{\textit{Qe6}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{Qxg6}}\); 12...\(\text{\textit{Qxd4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{Qe4 Qxe4}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qxd4+}}\); 12...\(\text{\textit{Qf6}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{Qd3 e6}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{c4 Qb6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Qe2 ad8}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Qd2+}}\) planning \(\text{\textit{Qd2-c3}}\) – anyway Black will have to capture on f5 by pawn or weaken the kingside by g6-g5.) 12.a4 \(\text{\textit{Qd7}}\) 13.c4. This is not the best option. (13.axb5!?\(\text{\textit{Qxb5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qf1±}}\) 13...\(\text{\textit{Qxc4}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qxc4 Qc7}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Qxe5 Qa8}}\) 16.g4 \(\text{\textit{Qxe5}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Qxe5 Qc8}}\). In the current position despite the weakness on c6 Black is not worse, because the shelter of White’s king is also compromised. In the game Black made several bad moves and went on to lose. 18.\(\text{\textit{Qc2 Qe6}}\) (18...\(\text{\textit{Qd6}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Qd2 Qe8=}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Qd2}}\) (19.\(\text{\textit{Qxg6! Qb4}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{Qc3±}}\) 19...c5 20.\(\text{\textit{Qxd5 Qxd5}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{Qxc5 Qxe5}}\) (21...\(\text{\textit{Qb7=?}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{Qxe5 Qxc5}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{dxc5}}\) Trabert – Delchev, Bastia 1998. Like in the variation \(\text{\textit{Qd7}}\), White should consider 13.\(\text{\textit{Qh4 Qe6}}\) (perhaps it is better to accept some deterioration of the pawn structure: 13...e6 14.\(\text{\textit{Qxf5 gxf5}}\) 15.axb5 exb5 16.c3 \(\text{\textit{Qf6}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Qf3±}}\), then \(\text{\textit{Qf3-e5}}\) and possibly g2-g4; worse is 13...\(\text{\textit{Qxd4}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qxf5 gxf5}}\) 15.axb5) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qe4 Qc7}}\) 15.axb5 exb5 16.\(\text{\textit{a6}}\) (16.\(\text{\textit{Qg6!?}}\) \(\text{\textit{fxg6}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Qc3 Qxc3}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Qe6+ Qh7}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{bxc3 Qxc3}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{Qa3 Qc7}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{Qg3±}}\) 16...\(\text{\textit{Qb6}}\)

17.\(\text{\textit{Qc5 Qc8}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Qxg6 Qe8}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Qxb6 Qxb6}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{Qe5→}}\) with dangerous attack and practically equal material.

10.\(\text{\textit{Qb3}}\)

10...\(\text{\textit{Qf6}}\). Black radically solves the problem of the d5-knight. He retreats it to a safe square and plays b7-b6, \(\text{\textit{Qc8-b7}}\), e7-e6, preparing c6-c5. 11.\(\text{\textit{Qe2 e6}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{Qc3 b6}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{Qe4 Qxe4}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Qxe4}}\) (the queen is heading for f4 or h4) 14...\(\text{\textit{Qb7}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Qf4 Qe7}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Qf6}}\) (16...\(\text{\textit{Qd6}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Qad1± Qh4}}\)\(\text{\textit{h4}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{h4}}\) \(\text{\textit{Qac8}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Qad1 Qfd8}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Qf4±}}\). White generated pressure on the kingside. In the game Komissarow – Labunskiy, Poldolk, 1993 Black erred and lost in few moves: 19...b5 20.c4 (20.\(\text{\textit{h5!?}}\)\(?\) 20...\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{Qxe4 Qg7}}\) (21...\(\text{\textit{Qxg5}±\?) 22.\(\text{\textit{Qh6+ Qg8}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{Qg5 Qb6}}\) (23...\(\text{\textit{Qe8}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{Qe4±}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{Qxe6 Qxe6}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{Qxe6+ Qh8}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{Qf7+}}\) and Black resigned.

10...\(\text{\textit{Qf6}}\). The design of this move is similar to the above-mentioned line 10...\(\text{\textit{Qf6}}\). Black is preparing c6-c5, but he leaves the knight on d5, assuming that c2-c4 does not give White any
advantage. The other knight is useful on f6, because it is preventing the manoeuvre \( \text{\rotate2} b1-d2-e4 \). 11...\text{\rotate2} g5 (11...\text{\rotate2} bd2!? \pm was worth consideration. White’s knight is aiming to reach e5 via c4. This idea became possible since Black’s last move removed the control over that square. The transfer of the bishop to the b8-h2 diagonal is consistent although somewhat lengthy.) 11...b6 12.\text{\rotate2} bd2 \text{\rotate2} b7 13.\text{\rotate2} h4 (13.c4?! \text{\rotate2} c7 14.\text{\rotate2} e2 \text{\rotate2} fe8 15.\text{\rotate2} ad1 \pm) 13...\text{\rotate2} ae8 14.\text{\rotate2} g3 \text{\rotate2} d8 15.\text{\rotate2} e5 (commonly this square is better suited for a knight: 15.\text{\rotate2} e5!? \text{\rotate2} c8 16.c4 \text{\rotate2} c7 17.\text{\rotate2} e2 \pm) 15...\text{\rotate2} c8 16.c3 White is demonstratively calm. (16.c4!? is more enterprising) 16...c5 17.\text{\rotate2} c4 \text{\rotate2} d8 18.\text{\rotate2} e3 cxd4 19.\text{\rotate2} xd4. The game Bondonc – Suba, Timisoara, 1976, showed that even after realising successfully c6-c5 Black should be accurate: 19...\text{\rotate2} xe3 20.\text{\rotate2} xe3 \text{\rotate2} a8 (20...\text{\rotate2} d5?!?) 21.\text{\rotate2} e2 \text{\rotate2} h6 22.\text{\rotate2} g3 \text{\rotate2} c5 (\text{\rotate2} d2...\text{\rotate2} g7) 23.\text{\rotate2} f5 \text{\rotate2} f4 24.\text{\rotate2} xf4 \text{\rotate2} xf5 25.\text{\rotate2} h6 \text{\rotate2} fe8. Here White could have won the exchange by 26.\text{\rotate2} a4 \text{\rotate2} d7 27.\text{\rotate2} d1 threatening \text{\rotate2} gd3.

11...\text{\rotate2} bd2

11...\text{\rotate2} a6 (the idea of this exotic deployment of the bishop is not too clear, moreover that after a couple of moves it retreated back to the common place b7) 12.\text{\rotate2} e4 \text{\rotate2} c7 13.c3 (White could play right away 13.\text{\rotate2} g5 \text{\rotate2} fe8 14.\text{\rotate2} d2 \pm intending to meet 14...e5 by 15.dxe5 \text{\rotate2} xxe5 16.\text{\rotate2} d4 \pm. White wants to capture on d5 and check from f6.) 13...\text{\rotate2} b7 14.\text{\rotate2} g5 \text{\rotate2} fe8 15.\text{\rotate2} d2 a5, Donatti – Soppe, Montevideo 1994, when 16.a4 \pm would have underlined the fact that Black has just wasted time on bishop moves.

11...e6 12.\text{\rotate2} e4 \text{\rotate2} c7 13.c3 \text{\rotate2} b7 14.a4 a6 15.\text{\rotate2} e2 \text{\rotate2} fe8 16.\text{\rotate2} d2 h6 17.c4 bxc4 18.\text{\rotate2} xc4 a5 19.\text{\rotate2} ac1 \text{\rotate2} eb8 20.\text{\rotate2} d1 \text{\rotate2} a7 21.b3 \text{\rotate2} a8 22.\text{\rotate2} c5 (Black has covered everything on the queenside so White is trying to single out new targets on the opposite flank.) 22...\text{\rotate2} xc5 23.dxc5 \text{\rotate2} b7 24.\text{\rotate2} c2 \text{\rotate2} c8 25.\text{\rotate2} h4 \text{\rotate2} e7 26.\text{\rotate2} g3 \text{\rotate2} c7 27.\text{\rotate2} e5 \text{\rotate2} d7 28.\text{\rotate2} h2 (White failed to expand on the kingside) 28...\text{\rotate2} e8 29.\text{\rotate2} c4 \text{\rotate2} xg3+ 30.\text{\rotate2} xg3 \text{\rotate2} b4 31.\text{\rotate2} xb4 \text{\rotate2} xb4 32.\text{\rotate2} cd1 \text{\rotate2} b8 33.\text{\rotate2} d3 \text{\rotate2} f8 34.\text{\rotate2} d6 \text{\rotate2} d7 35.f4 g5 36.fxg5 hxg5 37.\text{\rotate2} e4 \text{\rotate2} e7 38.\text{\rotate2} ed1 \text{\rotate2} e8 39.\text{\rotate2} d6 \text{\rotate2} f8 – Black is able to defend successfully, Herrera – Wohl, Havana 2001. White’s play could be improved. Firstly, he could carry on c2-c4 in one instead of two steps: 13.a4 \text{\rotate2} b7 14.\text{\rotate2} d2 followed by c2-c4. Secondly, similarly to the game Svidler – Akopian, Halkidiki
2002, White could develop the bishop to the more active place 
\( g5 \) – 13.\( \text{\textbd{g}}5 \) compared to 13.c3 
and \( \text{\textbd{c}}1\text{-d2} \).

To 11...\( \text{\textbd{d}}7\text{f6} \), taking e4 under control, White should not play 
12.\( \text{\textbd{e}}4 \) \( \text{\textbd{x}}e4 \) 13.\( \text{\textbd{x}}e4 \) \( \text{\textbd{b}}7 \), M. 
Pavlov – Cibulka, Slovakia 1974 – as I mentioned many times, 
exchanges help Black’s defence.
Better is 12.c4 \( \text{bxc4} \) 13.\( \text{\textbd{x}}c4 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{c}}7 \) 14.\( \text{\textbd{d}}2 \) with prospects for 
pressurising Black’s weaknesses on the queenside, or 12.a4 \( \text{\textbd{b}}7 \) 
13.\( \text{\textbd{e}}5 \) a6 14.\( \text{\textbd{d}}3 \), planning to 
jump to c5.

12.\( \text{\textbd{e}}4 \) \( \text{\textbd{c}}7 \) 13.\( \text{\textbd{g}}5 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 14.\( \text{c}4 \)

Black is ready to carry out the break-through c6-c5. That would 
give him sufficient counterplay, for instance after 14.\( \text{\textbd{h}}4 \) c5 
15.\( \text{\textbd{g}}3 \) \( \text{\textbd{b}}6 \) or 14.\( \text{\textbd{d}}2 \) c5. By the 
text move 14.c4 White is opening 
up the c-file in order to hinder 
Black’s design.

14...\( \text{\textbd{b}}xc4 \) 15.\( \text{\textbd{x}}c4 \) \( \text{\textbd{f}}6 \)

15...\( \text{c}5 \) looks risky: 16.\( \text{\textbd{c}}1 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{a}}c8 \) 17.\( \text{dxc5} \) (17.\( \text{\textbd{c}}5 \)!
\( \text{\textbd{x}}c5 \) 18.\( \text{\textbd{xd}}5 \) \( \text{\textbd{xd}}5 \) 19.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}5 \) \( \text{\textbd{b}}7 \) \( \text{\textbd{a}}3 \) 
17...\( \text{\textbd{x}}b2 \) 18.\( \text{\textbd{c}}2 \) (Imprecise is 
18.\( \text{\textbd{b}}1 \) \( \text{\textbd{c}}3 \) 19.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}3 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{c}}3 \) 20.\( \text{\textbd{e}}3 \) \( \text{\textbd{xf}}3 \) 21.\( \text{\textbd{xf}}3 \) \( \text{\textbd{g}}7 \) \( \text{=} \)).

Worse is 18...\( \text{\textbd{x}}c5 \) 19.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}5 \) \( \text{\textbd{xc}}5 \) due to 
20.\( \text{\textbd{xb}}2 \)! \( \text{\textbd{c}}3 \) 21.\( \text{\textbd{d}}2 \) \( \text{\textbd{xf}}3 \) 22.\( \text{\textbd{f}}6 \) \( \text{\textbd{f}}5 \) 23.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}3 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{xc}}4 \) 24.\( \text{\textbd{e}}5 \) \( \text{\textbd{f}}4 \) 25.\( \text{\textbd{g}}x\text{xf3} \) \( \text{\textbd{xf}}3 \) 26.\( \text{\textbd{c}}3 \) \( \text{=} \).)

18...\( \text{\textbd{g}}7 \) 19.\( \text{\textbd{d}}6 \) (White has also 
the calm alternatives 19.\( \text{\textbd{d}}2 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{c}}6 \) 20.\( \text{\textbd{h}}4 \)!? \( \text{\textbd{g}}3 \) and 19. 
\( \text{\textbd{d}}4 \) \( \text{\textbd{c}}6 \) 19...\( \text{\textbd{c}}3 \) 20.\( \text{\textbd{d}}2 \) \( \text{\textbd{xf}}3 \), 
when instead of the variation of 
A.Finkel 21.gxf3 \( \text{\textbd{xc}}5 \) 22.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}8 \)
\( \text{\textbd{c}}8 \) \( \text{=} \) White should play 21. 
\( \text{\textbd{xc}}3 \)! \( \text{\textbd{a}}8 \) (21...\( \text{\textbd{xc}}3 \) 22.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}3 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{b}}7 \) 23.\( \text{\textbd{h}}6 \) \( \text{=} \)) 22.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}8 \) \( \text{\textbd{xc}}8 \) 
23.\( \text{\textbd{c}}2 \) \( \text{=} \). Black’s compensation 
for the exchange is insufficient.

\( \text{16.\textbd{xf}}6+ \) \( \text{\textbd{xf}}6 \) \( \text{17.\textbd{c}}1 \) \( \text{h}6 \)

18.\( \text{\textbd{h}}4 \) \( \text{\textbd{ad}}8 \)

18...\( \text{\textbd{ac}}8 \)!

\( \text{19.\textbd{b}}3 \) \( \text{\textbd{b}}6 \) \( \text{20.\textbd{c}}2 \) \( \text{\textbd{de}}8 \)

\( \text{21.\textbd{g}}3 \) \( \text{=} \). White has managed to 
prevent the break c6-c5 and is 
able to start processing the 
enemy’s weaknesses. He has a 
clear positional advantage.

The game Svidler – Akopian, 
Halki-
diki 2002 went on 21...\( \text{\textbd{b}}4 \) 22.\( \text{\textbd{a}}3 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{e}}7 \) 23.\( \text{\textbd{e}}5 \) \( \text{\textbd{d}}5 \) (23...\( \text{\textbd{c}}8 \)?) 
24.\( \text{\textbd{xe}}6+ \) 24.\( \text{\textbd{xc}}6 \) \( \text{\textbd{g}}5 \) 25.\( \text{\textbd{h}}4 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{g}}4 \), when best was 26.\( \text{\textbd{xd}}5 \)!
\( \text{\textbd{xd}}5 \) 27.\( \text{\textbd{e}}5 \) \( \text{\textbd{xd}}4 \) (27...\( \text{\textbd{xe}}5 \)
28.dxe5 d4 29.\( \text{\textbd{d}}2 \) \( \text{=} \) 28.\( \text{\textbd{e}}1 \) 
\( \text{\textbd{e}}4 \) 29.\( \text{\textbd{xe}}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \) 30.\( \text{\textbd{d}}7 \) \( \text{e}3 \)
31.\( \text{\textbd{xf}}8 \) \( \text{e}2 \) 32.\( \text{\textbd{e}}1 \) \( \text{=} \) with decision 
advantage (pointed out by 
A.Finkel).

\( \text{b) 5.\textbd{b}6 6.\textbd{b}3 \) 

(diagram)

We will now analyze in details 
the following moves: \( \text{b1) 6.d5,} \)
\( \text{b2) 6.\textbd{c}6} \) and the main line 
\( \text{b3) 6.\textbd{g}7.} \)
It is not so good for Black to play 6...dxe5. After 7.Qxe5, Black will have to restrict the mobility of his bishop with the move 7...e6, moreover this is going to weaken his kingside additionally. 8.Qc3 Qg7 9.0–0 0–0 10.Qe1 Qd7 11.Qf4± Dias – Rain, corr. 1999. It is now unfavourable for Black to capture on e5 (after taking on e5 with the pawn, or with the bishop – the weakness of the complex of dark squares becomes even more evident), while it is inconceivable how Black can develop his pieces without that exchange. It also deserves attention for White to try the move 11.Qg4, in order first to develop the bishop to a more active placement – the g5-square and secondly to activate the queen closer to the kingside.

It is hard to advise Black to opt here for 6...e6. He should defend his f7-square only if White attacks it. 7.Qg5 Qe7 8.Qxe7 Qxe7 9.c3 (This move for White is hardly necessary at that moment – the d4-pawn has not been attacked at all. Instead, he should have simply developed his pieces – 9.Qbd2 Qc6 10.0–0 and his advantage would have been even more clear-cut than in the game.) 9...Qc6 10.Qbd2 Qd7 11.Qe2+. The dark squares are terribly weak in Black’s camp and the horrible mistake 11...Qd8? led to an immediate catastrophe after: 12.exd6 cxd6 13. d5+ Grilc – Zrinski, Stockerau 1991.

6...a5. This move is standard for this variation and it either forces the retreat of the bishop, or the move a2-a4. Now, following this move-order, White has the possibility of a restricting temporary pawn-sacrifice: 7.e6 Qxe6 (It is worse for Black to play here: 7...fxe6 8.Qg5 and because of the threat 9.Qf3, Black is forced to continue with: 9... Qh6 10.Qxe6 Qxe6 11.Qxe6± and White’s bishop is rock-solid on the e6-square. Black loses immediately after: 7...f6?? 8. Qg5++, since he cannot capture on g5, because of the move 9.Qf3 and White checkmates. Black loses at least his rook on h8, Ma.Tseitlin – Safarov, Leningrad 1977.) 8.Qxe6 fxe6. White regains his pawn and maintains his positional achievements. In the game Lukin – Alburt, Beltsy 1974, there followed: 9.Qg5 Qc6 (Black loses a pawn after: 9... Qh6 10.Qxe6 Qd7 11.Qxc7+ Qxc7 12.Qxh6 Qc4 13.c3 Qc6 14. Qa3± Beliavsky – Menvielle, Las Palmas 1974.) 10.Qxe6 Qd7 11.Qe2 Qd8 12.Qxf8 Qxf8 13. 0–0 a4 14.Qe3. Black’s king is
almost defenseless – his dark squares on the kingside are vulnerable and accordingly he cannot castle there, while his queenside has been weakened too, because of the advance of Black’s a-pawn. He will have plenty of problems in the middle game, because of the lack of safety of his king. 14...\textit{d}5 15.c4 \textit{f}4 16. \textit{x}f4 \textit{xf}4 17.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}7 18.d5 \textit{g}4 (White will counter 18...\textit{e}5 not with 19.dxe6 \textit{xe}6 20.\textit{c}3 \textit{f}6=, but with 19.\textit{c}3 and if Black tries to run away with his king 19...\textit{f}8 – 20.f4+=, opening the f-file with the intention to penetrate the f6-square with the knight.) 19.\textit{d}2 \textit{f}4 20.\textit{e}2. Naturally, White should avoid trading queens. 20...\textit{b}6 21.\textit{e}4 \textit{b}7 22.b4 axb3 23.axb3 \textit{xa}1 24.\textit{xa}1 \textit{f}8 25.g3 \textit{e}5 26.\textit{a}8+ \textit{d}8 27.\textit{g}2 \textit{d}4 28.f4 h6 29.\textit{f}2 e5 30.\textit{g}4+=, so finally White managed to expose Black’s weaknesses victoriously.

\textbf{b1) 6...d5}

This move reduces the tension deliberately without any necessity, but it helps Black build a solid defensive line. He loses however, his chances to create any effective counterplay and White can maintain a stable advantage with his wonderful pawn-outpost on the e5-square.

\textbf{7.a4 a5 8.h3}

As usual, it is good for White to prevent the move \textit{g}4 and its trade for the knight on f3.

\textbf{8...\textit{g}7 9.0–0 0–0}

Castling for Black is the most natural follow-up.

It is not good for him to play 9...\textit{d}7 – with the idea to attack White’s a4-pawn, since his pieces will be placed unfavourably then. 10.\textit{c}3 e6, Segers – Hettrler, Baden-Baden 1987, and here instead of 11.\textit{e}2, White had better continue 11.\textit{g}5± with the idea to exploit the fact that Black has weakened considerably the dark squares with his last move.

Black’s other possibilities are only slightly better:

The move 9...c6 – prepares the maneuver of the knight to the c7-square via a6. Meanwhile, the knight on c7 is not such an asset for Black at all. 10.\textit{bd}2. (It is also possible for White to follow with 10.\textit{c}3 and next \textit{c}3-e2-f4.) 10...\textit{a}6 11.\textit{c}3 \textit{c}7 12.\textit{c}2 \textit{f}5 (This move creates permanent weaknesses on Black’s kingside.) 13.\textit{xf}5 \textit{gxf}5 14.\textit{b}3 (This knight is headed via c5 or c1 to d3 and f4 and later if necessary to the h5-square.) 14...\textit{d}7 15.\textit{e}1 e6 16.\textit{g}5±. White maintains a stable advantage
here – his opponent’s position is cramped and he has no clear-cut plan to follow. Black would like to castle, but both his flanks are considerably weakened. Later, in the game Reprintsev – Ryskal, Ukraine 1991, there followed:
16...\texttt{Cc8} 17.\texttt{Qc1} \texttt{Qf8} 18.\texttt{Qd3} \texttt{Qg6} 19.b3 b6 20.c4 (White now has an additional possibility – to prepare c4-c5, or to trade on d5 at an opportune moment.) 20...\texttt{Wb7} 21.\texttt{Wd2} h6 22.\texttt{Wf6} 0–0 (22...\texttt{xf6} 23.\texttt{exf6} \texttt{Wxf6}±) 23.\texttt{Qf4} \texttt{Qxf4} 24.\texttt{Qxf4} \texttt{Qh7} 25.\texttt{Qg7} \texttt{Qxg7} 26.g4 \texttt{fxg4} 27.hxg4 f5 (27...\texttt{fxg4} 28.\texttt{Qg2}) 28.\texttt{Qh4} \texttt{Qh7} 29.gxf5 c5 30.\texttt{Qh2} \texttt{Qad8} 31.\texttt{Qg1} \texttt{Qe8} 32.\texttt{Qg6} and Black resigned;
9...\texttt{Qc6} 10.\texttt{Qc3} 0–0 11.\texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Qf5} 12.\texttt{Qe2} \texttt{Qd7} 13.\texttt{Qg3} \texttt{Qe6} 14.\texttt{Qg5} \texttt{Qae8} 15.\texttt{f4}± (White’s centre is now rock-solid.) 15...\texttt{f6} 16.\texttt{Qxe6} \texttt{Qxe6} 17.c3 \texttt{fxe5} (Black’s position would have been more resistant and reliable after 17...\texttt{f5}, with the idea to remove the queen later and to follow with e7-e6. Well, Black would not have then any counterplay against White straightforward plan – to play \texttt{Wh2}, \texttt{Qg1}, to remove the knight from the g3-square and to follow with g2-g4 and if necessary even h3-h4-h5.) 18.fxe5 \texttt{Qc8} (Black’s queen on e6 was miserably placed, but after its retreat his whole kingside became practically defenseless.) 19.h4 e6 20.h5 \texttt{Qe7} 21.hxg6 hgx6 22.\texttt{Qg4} c5 (otherwise Black loses his g6-pawn after 23.\texttt{Qc2}) 23.\texttt{Qe4}! cxd4 24.\texttt{Qd6} \texttt{Wd7} 25.\texttt{Qxe8} \texttt{Qxe8} 26.cxd4 and Black could have already resigned in the game Ghinda – L.Popov, Warsaw 1979.

Black has experimented with the other possible development of the bishop – 11...\texttt{Qe6} 12.\texttt{Qf4} (White could have also tried the standard maneuver of the knight i.e. 12.\texttt{Qe2}, for example: 12...\texttt{Wd7} 13.\texttt{Qf4} \texttt{Qf5} 14.\texttt{Wh4}!±.) 12...\texttt{Wd7} 13.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qf8} 14.\texttt{Qg5} (it is more logical for White to follow with 14.\texttt{Wh6}!±) 14...\texttt{Qb4} 15.\texttt{Qb5} \texttt{Qac8} 16.c3 \texttt{Qa6} 17.\texttt{Qe3} c6 18.\texttt{Qa3} c5 19.\texttt{Qb5} cxd4 20.\texttt{Qxd4} \texttt{Qc5} 21.\texttt{Qc2} \texttt{Qc4} 22.\texttt{Qc1} f6 23.\texttt{Qg3} (White maintains his dominance in the centre as before.) 23...\texttt{Qf7} 24.\texttt{Qb5} \texttt{fxe5} 25.\texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Qxe5} 26.\texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Qxe5} 27.\texttt{Qxe5} e6 28.\texttt{Qe3}± and Black’s weaknesses on the dark squares are quite evident, Pikula – Petrovic, Jaborina 2001.

10.\texttt{Qe1}

![Chess Diagram]

White’s centre is solid and powerful (Black’s bishop on g7 is practically out of action) and he has excellent attacking prospects on the kingside. He should de-
ploy there his light pieces – the knight on b1 (one of the possible routes is via c3 and e2 to f4 or g3 – depending on circumstances), then the bishop on b3 can be brought into action (after c2-c3 and b3-c2). White can also try c1-f4, d1-d2 and f4-h6 with the idea to weaken the defence of the black king by exchanging the dark squared bishops. Generally speaking, his plan is quite clear. Concerning Black, it is not so easy to give him a good advice. He would hardly achieve anything by preparing c7-c5. Sometimes he brings his knight on b8 to the e6-square (via a6 and c7) in order to control the f4-square, but all that takes a long time and it is hardly effective. Black can try to prepare f7-f6, but that is definitely double edged, since the g6-square gets weakened in the process. White’s advantage might not be so great indeed, but it is so much easier and simpler to play with White in this position.

10...c6
About 10...c6 11.c3 – see 9...c6 10.c3 0-0 11.e1.

It is not good for Black to play 10...a6, because after 11.d2 he is forced to retreat with his knight in order not to lose a pawn – 11...b8, so he loses tempi instead. 12.c3 c6 13.e2 (This move seems to be quite artificial – the e2-square is not the right base for White’s queen and the placement of the black knight on the c4-square is nothing White should worry so much about, for example: 13.e2 c4 and here after the simple line 14.c1± c3, c2 – both sides have lost some tempi on knight-moves (Black) and bishop-moves (White), but the deployment of the black knight on the c4-square seems a bit senseless.) 13...a6 14.e3 c7 15.d2 (This move is like an admission that the development of the queen to e2 was purposeless.) 15...c4 16.xc4 dxc4 17.h6 e6 18.e4±. White has some initiative, but it is not so easy for him to materialize it into something real: 18...f6 19. a1 d5 20.xd5 (20.xg7 xg7 21.exf6+ exf6 22.e7+ f7 23.xd5 xd5 24.xf7+ xf7 25. e2 xb6=) 20...xd5 (20...xd5 21.xg7 xg7 22.exf6+ exf6 23. e2±) 21.h4 (21.exf6 exf6 22. e7 f7 23.xf7 xf7 24.xg7 xg7 25.e3=) 21...xh6 22. xh6 f7 23.h2 a6 24.e3 f5 25.f4 e6 26.g4 g7 27.f3 c6 and since White’s rook on h4 is definitely not an asset to his position and accordingly he is not even better – the opponents agreed to a draw in the game, Smagin – Marinkovic, Cacak 1991.

11.c3 a6 12.e2 c7 13.c3 e6
Black has also tried in practice in this position: 13...c4 with the idea to follow with b7-b5 and to organize some counterplay on the queenside. 14.c2 b5
15.b3 \(\text{Q}b6 16.\text{Q}f4 \text{bxa}4 17.\text{bxa}4 \text{Q}c4.\) Black's knight is beautifully placed here, but in fact it is quite useless – it attacks nothing. 18.\(\text{Q}b1\) (It deserves attention for White now to follow with 18. \(\text{Q}g5!?\) and the threat to sacrifice a piece on h7 forces Black to weaken his kingside. 18...h6 19.\(\text{Q}f3\) and later White will follow with h3-h4-h5 at an opportune moment: 19...\(\text{Q}e6 20.\text{Q}xe6 \text{Q}xe6 21.\text{Q}f4 \text{B}b8 22.\text{c}c1 \text{Q}h7 23.\text{h}4 \text{Q}c8 24.\text{h}5 \text{Q}g4 25.\text{hxg}6+ \text{fxg}6 26.\text{Q}h4 \text{Q}h5 27.e6+.) 18...f6. This move is very risky for Black – he should worry about how to get rid of a white piece on the e6-outpost. (He should have played instead: 18...\(\text{Q}e6,\) but even then White maintains his advantage by playing h3-h4-h5 just in time: 19.\(\text{Q}xe6!?\) \(\text{Q}xe6 20.\text{Q}g5 \text{Q}d7 21.\text{Q}xe6 \text{Q}xe6 22.f4 \text{f}5 23.g4\).) or 19. \(\text{Q}d3 \text{Q}xf4 20.\text{Q}xf4 \text{a}6 21.\text{h}4 \text{B}b8 22.\text{h}5 \text{Q}xb1 23.\text{Q}xb1 \text{Q}b8 24. \text{Q}g5\) and White’s threats on the kingside will surely become quite dangerous soon, for example: 24...\(\text{Q}c7 25.\text{e}6 \text{f}6 26.\text{c}1 - White does not achieve anything with the piece-sacrifice: 26.\text{hxg}6 \text{fxg}6 27.\text{gxh}7+ \text{h}8 28.\text{Q}xg5,\) because of 28...\(\text{Q}d6,\) for example: 29.\(\text{Q}f3 \text{Q}f6 30.\text{Q}e5 \text{Q}xe5 31.\text{Q}xe5 \text{Q}c4- 26...\text{f}5 27.\text{hxg}6 \text{hxg}6 28.\text{Q}g5 \text{c}5 29.\text{Q}h3+ \text{h}6 30.\text{h}3 \text{Q}f6 31.\text{Q}d3 \text{cxd}4 32.\text{cxd}4+ and Black cannot play 32...\(\text{Q}x\text{d}4 33.\text{Q}h7+ \text{f}8 34.\text{Q}f3 \text{Q}xd3 35.\text{Q}h6+ .) 19.\text{e}6 \text{Q}d6 20.\text{Q}d3 \text{f}5.\) This is definitely a bad move and Black’s whole kingside remains defenseless after it. 21.\(\text{Q}g5 \text{a}6 22.\text{Q}g3 \text{c}5 23. \text{Q}xh7 and Black resigned in the game Adams – Dunnington, Haringey 1989, because he has no defence against the checkmating attack: 23...\(\text{Q}xh7 24.\text{Q}xg6+ \text{h}8 25.\text{Q}h5 \text{Q}e8 26.\text{Q}f4 \text{Q}c6 27.\text{h}6 \text{Q}xh6 28.\text{Q}xh6+ \text{g}8 29.\text{Q}f4 \text{f}6 30.\text{Q}g6 \text{Qxe}6 (30...\text{Q}xg6 31.\text{Q}xg6 \text{Q}h8 32.\text{Q}h5+ \text{g}7 33.\text{Q}f7+ and White checkmates) 31.\text{Q}h8+ \text{f}7 32.\text{Q}f8+ \text{Q}xg6 33.\text{Q}xh5++.\) Black should have captured the pawn first: 20...\(\text{Q}xe6\) and after 21. \(\text{Q}xe6\) (but not 21.\(\text{Q}xg6 \text{hxg}6 22. \text{Q}xg6,\) because of 22...\(\text{f}5 23.\text{Q}h4 \text{Q}c7 21...\text{Q}xe6 22.\text{w}e2\) he should give it back: 22...\(\text{Q}c8\) (Black must not try to hang on to the extra pawn with: 22...\(\text{f}7 23.\text{b}7+ \text{d}7 24. \text{d}3+ \text{Q}e8 25.\text{Q}xc4 \text{dxc}4 26. \text{a}3 \text{w}e6 27.\text{Q}d2 \text{Q}d5 28.\text{Q}xe7+ \text{Q}xe7 29.\text{Q}xe7+ \text{Q}g8 30.\text{Q}xg6; 27...\text{Q}xe2 28.\text{Q}xe2 \text{Q}ad8 29.\text{Q}xc4 and Black loses material) 23. \text{Q}xe7 \text{Q}xe7 24.\text{Q}xe7 \text{f}7 25.\text{e}1.\) White maintains a stable advantage – his rooks control both open files.

\[\text{14.}\text{Q}c2 \text{f}5 15.\text{exf}6 \text{exf}6\]

The game Borgo – Varga,
Budapest 1999, followed with: 16.♘f4 ♞d6 17.♗xe6 ♘xe6 18.b3 ♞fe8 19.♗a3 ♞f4 20.♗d3 ♘f8 21.♗xf8 ♘xf8 22.♗d2 ♘xd2 23.♗xd2 ♗f7 24.f3 ♘xe1+ 25.♖xe1 ♘e8. Black managed gradually to equalize at the end. The exchange of knights by White on moves 16-17 in fact facilitated Black’s defence considerably. The side, which has the advantage, should in principle avoid exchanges, unless they lead to something quite substantial.

Instead, White should have played: 16.h4 (eyeing the weakness on g6) 16...f5 17.h5 ♙f6 18.hxg6 hxg6 19.♗f4 (with the idea to trade the defender of the g5-square) 19...♘e8 20.♗xe6 ♘xe6 21.♗g5 ♙f7 22.b3 ♗d7 23.♘e5 ♙f8 24.♗d2± and White is clearly better because of his wonderfully centralized knight.

b2) 6...♗c6

This early development of the knight is quite dangerous for Black, as in so many other lines of the Alekhine Defence, because White can attack it with d4-d5.

7.exd6

This move is with the idea to follow with d4-d5 on the next move, making use of White’s superior development and particularly of the fact that Black’s bishop has not been developed to the g7-square yet.

7...exd6

Opening of the e-file after 7...exd6 might cause great problems for Black: 8.0–0 d5 (as a consequence of the move g7-g6, Black fails to interpose with the bishop 8...♗c7 and then castle, because of 9.♗h6± and he in a real trouble; 8...♗g4 9.♗g5 ♘xf3? 10.♗xf7+ ♘d7 11.♗e1+–) 9.♗e1+ ♘e6 10.c3 ♗g7 11.♗g5± – and Black can hardly defend the e6-square successfully.

He has tried in practice sometimes 7...♗xd6 with the idea to develop his pieces and to undermine White’s centre with e7-e5. White preserves his opening advantage in this case too with: 8.0–0 ♗g7 9.c3 0–0 10.a4!? with the idea to counter 10...a5 with 11.♗a3±, followed by ♗b5 and ♗f4. Black cannot equalize either with: 10...♗g4 11.h3 ♘xf3 12.♘xf3 ♘d7, Magomedov – Cheverik, Cappelle la Grande 1997, 13.♗d2 ♘f6 14.♗c4 ♘d7 15.a5 a6 16.♗e5± and White has an overwhelming advantage (recommended by M.Magomedov). It is much trickier for Black to follow with: 10...♗f5, preventing the move 11.a5, because of 11...♗xa5. White should then play: 11.♗bd2 a5 12.♗e1 and now he is clearly
better after: 12...æe8 13.œe4
æxe4 14.æxe4 and if 14...e5 then
15.œe2 Æd7 16.Æf4 Æe7 17.Æg5±
with a dangerous pin along the
e-file, as well as after: 12...e5 13.
dxe5 Æxe5 14.Æxe5 Æxe5 15.Æf3
Æxd1 16.Æxd1 Æf6 17.Æf4± and
White maintains a long-lasting
initiative in the endgame.

8.d5

8...Æe5

This move compromises
Black's pawn structure, but that
is possibly the least of evils for
him now:

The move 8...œa5 enables
White to play 9.œd4 and thus to
disrupt the harmonious
development of Black's kingside pieces:

9...Æg8 10.0-0 Æd7 11.œe1
Æc7, Golubev – Vanderwaeren,
Leuven 2003, and here instead
of what White played in the
game i.e.: 12.Æg5 h6 13.œd2
œac4 14.œc3±, he had to con-
tinue with: 12.œc3, after which
it would have been a disaster
for Black to play: 12...Æg7 13.Æh4±,
while castling long would have
left his f7-pawn defenseless;

9...œxb3 10.axb3 Æg8 11.c4
Æg7 12.Æf4 Æd7 13.0-0 Æf6
14.œc3±. This position might
have been only slightly worse for
Black had he already castled,
instead of the move Æg8. Present-
ly, he is forced to perform
something like an artificial cas-
tering, weakening additionally his
position. Meanwhile, White has
a free hand to prepare a break-
through on the queenside and in
the centre. The game Penrose –
Cafferty, Brighton 1977, followed
with: 14...a6 15.œe1 Æf8 16.œe3
h6 17.œd4 g5 18.œe3 Æg4 19.
Æxg7+ Æxg7 20.œd4 f6 21.b4 Æf7
22.œa4 Æe5 23.œa3 Æxc4 24.
œxc4 b5 25.œd3 bxa4 26.œd4
œb6 27.œxa4 Æg7 28.b5 Æb7 29.
œc6 axb5 30.œxa8 Æxa8 31.œxe7
f5 32.œd4+ and because of the
line 32...œh7 33.œb6 and Black
loses his d6-pawn – he resigned,
Penrose – Cafferty, Brighton
1977;

Black is not out of the woods
after: 9...f6 either, because that
weakens the crucial e6-square
and it becomes a dreamlike out-
post for White's knight, for ex-
ample: 10.œd2 (forcing the open-
ing of the queenside and Black's
knight on b6 would be a sorry
sight then) 10...œxb3 11.axb3
œg7 12.œa5 Æf5 (Black has no
compensation for the pawn after:
12...œd7 13.œxb6 axb6 14.œxa8
œxa8 15.œxb6±. Now, Black has
serious problems after: 15...œa6
16.œxa6 bxa6 17.œc3 Æf7 18.
œe2± and White remains with a
solid extra pawn in the endgame,
Volzhin – Davies, Dhaka 2001; as
well as after: 15...f5 16.c3 a1
17.0–0 xb2 18.xb27±) 13.c4
0–0 14.0–0 c8 15.e1 e8 16.
bd2 d7 17.c3 a6 18.h4
e5 19.f4 f7 20.xf5 xf5 21.
f3±. White enjoys an over-
whelming positional advantage,
because of Black’s chronical
weakness on the e6-square.
Later, in the game Ponomariov –
Pesotsky, Kiev 1997, there fol-
lowed: 21...c8 22.d3 e5 (oth-
wise White follows with d4-e6)
23.dxe6 xe6 24.dxe4 xe1+
25.xe1 d7 26.e4 f5 27.e7
e7 28.e7 29.e6 xc3
30.bxc3 b5 31.cxb5 axb5 32.f2±
and despite the material equa-
10...g7
Black’s most effective counter
chance then might be the deploy-
ment of his knight to the ideal
d6-square for it, via d7-f5-e8, or
c8, and if necessary b7-b6 (in
case White plays c2-c4), followed
by an advance of the e and f-
pawns.
10...d7 (this is an immediate at-
tempt by Black to improve
the placement of the knight)
11.c3 g7. Later, the game Wil-
der – Boulard, France 1989, fol-
lowed with: 12.e3 0–0 13.f3
f6 14.h3 b6 (14...e8!? 15.
d4±) 15.ad1 b7 16.e1 e8
17.h4 h5 18.e4± and White
maintained his space advantage.
It was however, much more
energetic for him to play: 12.
d6!, exploiting his lead in de-
velopment. Black would have to
worry then about too many
threats (b5, dxe7, followed
by d5, g5) and his defence
would be extremely difficult:
12...f6 (12...0–0 13.g5 f6 14.
dxe7 xe7 15.d5++; 12...c5
13.b5 xb3 14.c7+ f8 15.
axb3 b8 16.dxe7+ xe7 17.
d5, so Black either loses his
a7-pawn, or he has to “central-
ize” his king by placing it on the
e6-square) 13.dxe7 xd1 (13...
\( \text{Chapter 12} \)

\( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe7 14.\text{\textcopyright} g5+ 14.\text{\textcopyright} xd1 \text{\textcopyright} xe7 15.\text{\textcopyright} g5 \text{\textcopyright} e6 16.\text{\textcopyright} d5+ \text{\textcopyright} xd5 17. \text{\textcopyright} xd5\text{±} and Black would not save his e-pawn.

11.\text{\textcopyright} e3?!

White has tried in practice mostly the move 11.a4 in this position. Advancing the a-pawn is not always necessarily advantageous for White, therefore it is possibly better for him not to force Black's knight away from the b6-square immediately. It will have to abandon that square sooner or later anyway. 11...0-0 12.a5 \text{\textcopyright} d7 13.\text{\textcopyright} e3 \text{\textcopyright} f6 14.h3 (14.\text{\textcopyright} c3?! \text{\textcopyright} e8 15.f4 exf4 16.\text{\textcopyright} xf4 \text{\textcopyright} d6 17.\text{\textcopyright} e1 \text{\textcopyright} f5 18.\text{\textcopyright} e5\text{±}) 14... \text{\textcopyright} e8 15.\text{\textcopyright} d2 (15.c4?! \text{\textcopyright} d6 16.c5 \text{\textcopyright} d5 17.\text{\textcopyright} c3 \text{\textcopyright} d4 18.\text{\textcopyright} xd4 \text{\textcopyright} xd4 19.\text{\textcopyright} b5\text{±}) 15...\text{\textcopyright} d6 16.\text{\textcopyright} c4 \text{\textcopyright} c7 17.\text{\textcopyright} e2 \text{\textcopyright} d7 18.\text{\textcopyright} xd6 \text{\textcopyright} d6= – and Black is not worse at all, Mortensen – Hoelzl, Randers 1982.

11...0-0

11...\text{\textcopyright} d7 12.\text{\textcopyright} c3 0-0 13.\text{\textcopyright} f3 \text{\textcopyright} f6 14.h3\text{±} transposes to the variations that we have already analyzed in our notes to Black's move 10 in the game Wilder – Boulard, France 1989.

Now, the idea to advance outright White's queenside pawns is once again on the agenda: 12.c4 \text{\textcopyright} d7 13.c5 \text{\textcopyright} c7 (13...b6 14.c6 \text{\textcopyright} c5 15.\text{\textcopyright} e1 \text{\textcopyright} b3 16.\text{\textcopyright} xb3\text{±}; 15... e4 16.\text{\textcopyright} xce5 bxc5 17.\text{\textcopyright} c3\text{±}) 14.d6 exd6 15.cxd6 \text{\textcopyright} a5 16.\text{\textcopyright} c3\text{±} – White's passed pawn is quite safe now and his pieces are much more active than these of his opponent.

b3) 6...\text{\textcopyright} g7

This is Black's most natural and definitely best move and it has been played by Robert Fischer (well, he tried it only once, but that was in the World Championship match against Spassky back in the year 1972) and it is also a part of the opening repertoire of some leading grandmasters likes L.Alburt, R.Vaganian, J.Timman. Black is already prepared to castle after that move and he plans to attack White's centre with the help of \text{\textcopyright} b8-c6 and \text{\textcopyright} c8-g4.

White can opt for the following plans:

At first, he can play 7.a4 and counter 7...a5 with 8.\text{\textcopyright} e2, 0-0
and h2-h3, protecting his centre;

Secondly, he might (either immediately, or after the inclusion of the moves 7.a4 a5) play \( \text{d}3-g5 \), in order to provoke d6-d5, later he can fortify his centre with f2-f4 and then he can go back with his knight to the f3-square. The critical line for Black, after 7.\( \text{g}5 \), is the move 7...e6 and following 8.\( \text{f}3 \), Black answers with 8...\( \text{e}7 \) and in the line 9.\( \text{e}4 \) dxe5 10.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{b}4+ \) 11.\( c3 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 12.\( \text{f}6 \) 0-0 13.\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{xg}7 \) 14.\( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 15.\( \text{xe}5 \) there arises a slightly better endgame for White, but Black maintains decent chances to equalize. In case of 7...e6, White can again play 8.f4 and Black’s most fashionable variation against that is – 8...dxe5 9.fxe5 c5 10.c3 exd4 11.0-0 0-0 12.cxd4 \( \text{c}6 \) 13.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 14.\( \text{exf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 15.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 16.\( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{f}4 \), it is not easy for White to prove that he has the edge in these forced lines;

Finally, White has a third possibility at his disposal and it has been tested successfully at the highest level by Vishy Anand in his game against Jan Timman in Linares (1992) and that is what we recommend to you.

**7.exd6**

(diagram)

**7...cxd6**

Black plays only seldom the move 7...\( \text{exd}6 \). In the game Vajda – Ducesa, Romania 1995, White maintained the advantage after: 8.0-0 \( \text{e}6 \) 9.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \)

\( \text{xe}6 \) 10.\( \text{e}1 \) (The exchange of the light squared bishops has lost several important tempi for Black.) 10...\( \text{d}6 \) 11.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 12.\( \text{e}4 \) \( d5 \) 13.\( \text{h}6 \) 0-0 14.\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{xg}7 \) 15.\( b3 \) \( \text{d}8 \) and here, instead of the tentative move 16.\( c3 \), White had better play: 16.\( c4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) (16...\( \text{h}5 \) 17.\( \text{d}2 \) \( e6 \) 18.\( \text{b}2 \) it is too bad for Black to try: 17.\( \text{xd}4 \) 18.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( c5 \) 19.\( \text{g}3 \) \( g4 \) 20.\( \text{e}4 \) \( c8 \) 21.\( \text{h}4 \) 17.\( \text{d}2 \) \( e6 \) 18.\( \text{b}2 \) – and Black’s defence is extremely difficult, because of the vulnerability of the long diagonal and White’s threat d4-d5. It is safer for Black to play: 8...0-0 9.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 10.\( c3 \). There arises a position, which is similar to the variation: 6...\( \text{c}6 \) 7.exd6 \( \text{xd}6 \) 8.0-0 \( \text{g}7 \) 9.\( c3 \). White plans to attack Black’s queen by playing \( \text{b}1-d2-e4 \). In the game Arakhamia Grant – Sutter, Geneva 1990, Black tried the immediate pawn-break in the centre 10...\( e5 \) and White should not have played 11.\( \text{a}3 \), as he did in the game, because of 11...exd4 12.\( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \), but try instead: 11.\( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 12.\( \text{f}4 \) and White is clearly better in all lines: 12...\( \text{e}8 \)

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13. dxe5 \( \mathit{\text{x}} \) xd1 14. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xd1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e6 15. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xb3 16. axb3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d5 17. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g3 f6 18. e6\( \pm \), or 16... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d7 17. e6 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c5 18. exf7+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf7 19. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe8 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe8 20. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d2, White preserves his extra pawn in both cases; it is not good for Black to play: 14...\( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe5 15. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d7 16. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) a3\( \pm \) and White is threatening \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c4 and \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) b5.

7...exd6 – Black has never tried that move in practice. Following 8. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g5, he should better play 8...f6, complying with an inferior position. 9. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f4 d5 (9... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f7+ 10. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d2?! \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f8 11. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1\( \uparrow \) – White’s loss of castling rights is not as dangerous as Black’s...) 10.0–0 0–0 11.a4!? (White creates problems for Black now...) 11...a5 (11...g5 12. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c6 13.a5 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c4 14. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xc4 dxc4 15. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e2\( \pm \) 12. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c3. White’s pieces are much better placed than Black’s in that symmetrical pawn-structure; the risky move 12...g5 (in case of 12...\( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c6, White can emphasize the defects of Black’s previous move with the line: 13. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) b5 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f7 14. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1\( \pm \) 13. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g3 g4 14. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1 f5 15. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d3\( \pm \) leads only to a new considerable weakening of his opponent’s position.

Black’s two other possibilities (after 7...exd6 8. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g5) enable White to deprive his opponent of castling rights and while Black manages somehow to accomplish an artificial castling, White will create dangerous threats: 8... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d7 9. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e2+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f8 10.0–0 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c6 11. c3 h6 12. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h4 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g8 (there is no other way for Black to introduce

the rook on h8 into actions) 13. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h7 14. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) bd2. Black has problems developing his queenside; White is threatening to redeploy his knight – \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e4–f6 and in case of 14... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f8 15. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e4 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f5 White can sacrifice a piece: 16. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) eg5+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xg5 17. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xg5+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h8 18. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e6 with the following eventual developments: 18... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e8 19. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f6 (19...\( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe6 20. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe6 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d7 21. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xg6\( \mp \)); 19... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h6 20. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h3 f4 21. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g7 22. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xc8 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xc8 23. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e6+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h7 24. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf4 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf4 25. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf4 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xh3 26. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xh3\( \mp \) 20. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g7 21. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xc8 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xc8 22. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e6+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g8 23. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e7 24. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf8 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf8 25. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe7 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe7 26. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xg6+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h8 27. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xh4 28. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e6 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g7 29. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h5+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g8 30. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g6 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f6 31. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xf5\( \mp \).

It is a bit similar after: 8... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f6 9. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e2+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f8 10. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) h6+ \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g7 11. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e3 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) c6 12. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f4, because White manages easily to create threats against the enemy king, for example: 12... \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e7+ (12...d5 13. 0–0\( \uparrow \) 13. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) f5 14. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e1 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d7 15. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e7 (15...\( \mathit{\text{A}} \) e5 16. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe5 dxe5 17. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) xe5\( \pm \)) 16. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) d4 \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g8 17. \( \mathit{\text{A}} \) g5\( \mp \).

8.0–0

White has exchanged his central pawn and he will have a long-lasting pressure along the e-file; moreover Black’s bishop on g7 is now harmless, because White can easily defend his d4-pawn with the move c2-c3.

Black usually tries to organize his counterplay according to the following scheme: he places his pawn on d5 (closing the di-
agonal for White’s bishop and preventing d4-d5), he deploys his bishop on f5 and the knight on the c6-square and then he opts for the maneuver \( \mathcal{D}c6-a5-c4 \).

**8...0-0**

About 8...\( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 9.c3 0-0 10.\( \mathcal{M}e1 \) – see 8...0-0 9.\( \mathcal{M}e1 \) \( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 10.c3; 8...d5 9.\( \mathcal{M}e1 \) 0-0 10.\( \mathcal{A}f4 \) \( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 11.c3 – see 8...0-0 9.\( \mathcal{M}e1 \) \( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 10.c3 d5 11.\( \mathcal{A}f4 \).

It is too bad for Black to play 8...\( \mathcal{A}g4 \) Stepanov – Tarakanov, corr. 1997, because of 9.\( \mathcal{A}xf7+ \).

**9.\( \mathcal{M}e1 \) \( \mathcal{D}c6 \)**

As for 9...\( \mathcal{A}g4 \) 10.c3 \( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 11.h3 – see 9...\( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 10.c3 \( \mathcal{A}g4 \) 11.h3; 9...h6 10.c3 \( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 11.\( \mathcal{A}e3 \) – see 9...\( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 10.c3 h6 11.\( \mathcal{A}e3 \).

9...\( \mathcal{W}c7 \). This placement of the black queen has some pluses indeed (it supports the maneuver \( \mathcal{D}c6-a5-c4 \)), but it possesses certain drawbacks too – for example the queen can be attacked by White’s knight; after \( \mathcal{D}b1-c3 \), Black would not be able to play d6-d5. 10.a4. White has this possibility now at his disposal, because his opponent has not played \( \mathcal{D}b8-c6 \) yet and he has developed his queen instead a bit prematurely. 10...\( \mathcal{D}c6 \) (10...\( \mathcal{A}g4 \) 11.a5 \( \mathcal{D}c8 \) 12.\( \mathcal{D}c3 \) \( \mathcal{D}c6 \) 13.\( \mathcal{D}d5 \) \( \mathcal{W}d7 \) 14.c3= and White can counter the threat of having his pawns doubled after 14...\( \mathcal{W}f5 \), with the line: 15.\( \mathcal{M}e3 \) \( \mathcal{A}h6 \) 16.h3 \( \mathcal{A}h5 \) 17.\( \mathcal{M}d3 \) \( \mathcal{X}c1 \) 18.\( \mathcal{M}x\mathcal{c}1= \) 11.\( a5 \) \( \mathcal{D}d7 \) 12.\( \mathcal{D}c3 \) \( \mathcal{W}d8 \) 13.\( \mathcal{D}d5= \) – White’s pieces are very active.

**10.c3**

White is defending his d4-pawn. He plans to bring his knight on b1 to the kingside along the route b1-d2-e4, or f1-g3. The bishop on c1 can be deployed to the g5-square, provoking a weakening of Black’s kingside after h7-h6.

In the game that we have already mentioned – Anand – Timman, Linares 1992, Vishy chose another plan – he played 10.h3, in order to ensure the c3-square for himself, because the immediate move 10.\( \mathcal{D}c3 \) would have been countered by Black with 10...\( \mathcal{A}g4 \), pinning the knight and attacking the d4-pawn. Later, the game continued 10...\( \mathcal{D}f5 \) 11.\( \mathcal{D}c3 \) \( \mathcal{W}c8 \) 12.\( \mathcal{A}g5 \) h6 13.\( \mathcal{A}e3 \) d5 14.\( \mathcal{W}e2 \) \( \mathcal{A}a5 \) 15.\( \mathcal{D}c3 \) \( \mathcal{D}bc4 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}c1 \) \( \mathcal{W}b6 \) 17.\( \mathcal{D}f4 \) \( \mathcal{W}e4=?! \) (After 17...e6 18.\( \mathcal{D}h2 \) Black encounters problems with his light-squared bishop so he must concede weakening of his kingside – 18...g5 19.\( \mathcal{W}h5 \). The correct move is 17...\( \mathcal{W}d6 \)! 18.\( \mathcal{D}h4 \) \( \mathcal{D}d7 \) 19.\( \mathcal{D}d3= \) – Anand.) 18.\( \mathcal{D}d2 \) \( \mathcal{X}b3 \) (Black had a better option – 18...\( \mathcal{X}d2 \) 19.\( \mathcal{X}d2 \) \( \mathcal{X}b3 \) 20.\( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) 21.\( \mathcal{W}xc4 \) (19.\( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) \( \mathcal{X}d2 \) 20.\( \mathcal{X}d2 \) e6 21.f3 \( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) 22.\( \mathcal{X}xb3 \) \( \mathcal{X}d5 \)) 20...\( \mathcal{W}d5 \) (20...\( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) 21.\( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) \( \mathcal{X}d5 \) 22.\( \mathcal{X}xb3 \) \( \mathcal{W}d5 \) 23.\( \mathcal{X}g5 \) \( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) 24.\( \mathcal{W}xb3 \) \( \mathcal{X}e4 \) 25.h4) 21.\( \mathcal{X}xb3 \) \( \mathcal{X}f6 \) 22.\( \mathcal{X}f3 \) \( \mathcal{X}g6 \) 23.\( \mathcal{X}f4 \) f5. Black has regained his pawn, but the position is unclear.
Chapter 12

\( \hbar c2 23.\hbar x a 7 \hbar x b 3 24.\hbar x b 7 \hbar b 8 = \) – Anand) 19...\( \hbar a 6 \) (19...dxc4 20.axb3 \( \hbar c 6 \) 21.bxc4=–, 19...\( \hbar x c 4 \) 20.axb3 and 21.f3=–) 20.\( \hbar x b 3 \) dxc4 21.\( \hbar d 1 \) \( \hbar c 6 \) 22.\( \hbar x e 7 \) \( \hbar f e 8 \) 23.\( \hbar x e 8 + \) \( \hbar x e 8 \) 24.\( \hbar e 3 \) \( \hbar b 5 ? \)

(Letting the pawn to d5 turns Black's position hopeless. Black could defend with 24...g5 25.\( \hbar h 5 \) \( \hbar b 5 \) 26.\( \hbar d 2 \) \( \hbar d 5 \) 27.f3 \( \hbar h 8 \) – Anand.) 25.d5=– \( \hbar d 7 \) 26.\( \hbar d 2 \) \( \hbar f 8 \) 27.\( \hbar d 4 \) \( \hbar d 5 \) 28.g4! \( \hbar e 4 \) 29.\( \hbar e 1 \) \( \hbar a 4 \) 30.b3! cxb3 31.axb3 \( \hbar b 5 \) 32.\( \hbar e 3 \) \( \hbar d 6 \) 33.\( \hbar h 5 \) ! and Black resigned.

However on move 14th Black could have introduced on c4 the other knight: 14...\( \hbar c 4 \) ?

The idea of this move is to meet 15.\( \hbar c 1 \) with 15...\( \hbar e 4 \) 16.\( \hbar d 2 \) (16.\( \hbar h 2 \) b5) 16...\( \hbar x d 2 \) 17.\( \hbar x d 2 \) \( \hbar x d 4 \) 18.\( \hbar x d 4 \) \( \hbar x d 4 \) 19.\( \hbar x h 6 \) \( \hbar x b 2 \) 20.f3 \( \hbar f 5 \) 21.\( \hbar x f 8 \) \( \hbar x a 1 \) (21...\( \hbar x f 8 = \) ) 22.\( \hbar x e 7 \) \( \hbar b 6 + \) 23.\( \hbar h 1 \) \( \hbar d 4 \) with good position for Black, Sogaard – Noseda, corr. 1995.

White should better preserve his dark-squared bishop since 15.\( \hbar g 3 \) \( \hbar x e 3 \) 16.\( \hbar x e 3 \) \( \hbar e 6 \) = is only equal.

15.\( \hbar x c 4 \) dxc4 16.\( \hbar d 2 \) (16.\( \hbar g 3 \) \( \hbar e 6 \) 17.\( \hbar d 2 \) \( \hbar h 7 \) ) also does not promise an edge due to 16...\( \hbar a 5 \) (16...\( \hbar h 7 \) 17.d5 \( \hbar e 5 \) 18.\( \hbar x e 5 \) \( \hbar x e 5 \) 19.\( \hbar x h 6 + \) ) with the following illustrative variations: 17.c3 (17.\( \hbar x a 5 \) \( \hbar x a 5 \) 18.\( \hbar d 2 \) \( \hbar c 6 \) 19.d5 \( \hbar e 5 \) 20.\( \hbar f d 4 \) \( \hbar d 7 \) 21.\( \hbar c 3 \) g5 22.\( \hbar a d 1 \) \( \hbar f e 8 \) ; 17.\( \hbar c 3 \) \( \hbar f d 8 \) 18.\( \hbar a d 1 \) \( \hbar d 7 \) 19.\( \hbar x h 6 \) \( \hbar x d 4 \) ) 17...\( \hbar h 7 \) 18.b4 (18.\( \hbar g 3 \) \( \hbar f d 8 \) ) 18...\( \hbar d 5 \) (18...\( \hbar x b 3 \) 19.axb3 \( \hbar b 5 \) 20.\( \hbar w d 1 \) \( \hbar f d 8 \) 21.c4 \( \hbar b 4 \) 22.\( \hbar g 3 + \) \( \hbar e 6 \) 23.\( \hbar c 1 = \) \( \hbar d 4 = \) ) 19.\( \hbar f 4 \) \( \hbar d 6 \) 20.d5 \( \hbar e 5 \) 21.\( \hbar h 4 \) (21.\( \hbar d 4 \) \( \hbar d 7 \) 22.\( \hbar d e 2 \) g5 23.\( \hbar h 5 \) \( \hbar d 3 \) ) 21...\( \hbar d 7 \) 22.\( \hbar d 4 \) (22.\( \hbar c 5 \) \( \hbar x c 5 \) 23.\( \hbar x c 5 \) \( \hbar x e 3 \) \( \hbar d 6 = \) 22...g5 (22...\( \hbar f d 8 \) 23.\( \hbar e 4 = \) ) 23.\( \hbar c 2 = \) (23.\( \hbar h 5 \) gxh4 24.\( \hbar x g 7 \) \( \hbar d 3 \) 25.\( \hbar e 3 \) \( \hbar g 8 \) 26.\( \hbar x d 3 \) \( \hbar x d 3 \) 27.\( \hbar x d 3 = \) 28.\( \hbar h 5 \) \( \hbar x d 5 \) ) 23...\( \hbar g 8 \) 24.\( \hbar f 5 \) (24.\( \hbar h 5 \) gxh4 25.\( \hbar x g 7 \) \( \hbar d 3 \) 26.\( \hbar e 3 \) \( \hbar x d 5 \) 27.\( \hbar x e 7 \) \( \hbar x h 3 = \) ) 24...\( \hbar f 3 = \) 25.\( \hbar x f 3 \) \( \hbar x f 5 \) 26.\( \hbar x f 5 \) \( \hbar x d 4 \) 27.\( \hbar d 4 = \) \( \hbar x f 4 \) (27...\( g x f 4 \) 28.\( \hbar e 6 \) \( f x e 6 \) 29.\( \hbar g 6 + \) \( \hbar h 8 \) 30.\( \hbar x h 6 + \) \( \hbar g 8 \) 31.\( \hbar g 6 + \) \( \hbar h 8 \) 32.\( \hbar h 2 = \) ) 28.\( \hbar x f 4 \) \( g x f 4 \) 29.\( \hbar x e 7 \) \( \hbar f d 8 \) 30.\( \hbar x b 7 \) \( \hbar x d 5 \) 31.\( \hbar x a 7 \) c3\( \hbar x c \) with sufficient counterplay.

As we can witness – the basic problem for White, following Anand's plan (which is very difficult to accomplish, though...) is that the temporary weakness of the d4-pawn precludes the knight-maneuver. Accordingly, it is logical for White to solve once and for all the problem of the defence of the d4-pawn and therefore I recommend the move 10.c3. Concerning White's queen
knight – its transfer to the kingside via d2 and f1 is hardly inferior to that via the c3 and e2-squares.

One more plus of the move I recommend is that in many variations White can avoid the trade of his light squared bishop, because it can retreat to the c2-square at an opportune moment.

The move 10.c3 has a certain drawback too. White controls the centre a bit less with a pawn on c3, instead of a knight and Black has the option to try to push e7-e5 – this is a plan that White must take into account after numerous different move-orders.

![Chess Diagram]

We will now deal in details with: b3a) 10...\f5 and b3b) 10...\g4.

The other possibilities for Black are:

10...d5 11.\f4 \g4 (after 11...\f5 12.\bd2 \c8 13.\e5 \a5, Shilov – Oliwa, Bytom 1995, it deserves attention for White to follow with: 14.\g4!? \xb3 15.axb3 \xg4 16.\xg4± and then \f3-e5) 12.h3 \xf3 13.\xf3 – and after a transposition of moves – there arises a variation that we are dealing with in our line 10...\g4;

10...h6. This move prevents \g5 indeed, but the point is that it is even favourable for White to provoke that weakening of Black’s kingside, sometimes with a move like \c1-g5 and if h7-h6 – \g5-e3. Black is now compromising his kingside voluntarily. 11.\e3 \a5 12.\c2 \bc4 13.\c1. White is not worried by this temporary retreat of the bishop and the loss of tempi. Black will soon lose time himself by retreating with his knight. 13...\e8 14.d5!? (White is threatening to capture the enemy knight with b2-b4.) 14...b5?! (in case of 14...\b6, the placement of Black’s knights is nothing he can brag about, his best decision had to be the move 14...b6) 15.a4 \b6 (after 15...\d7 16.axb5 \xb5 17.b3, White advances his pawns rather quickly: 17...\e5 18.\xe5 \xe5 19.\c4 \d7 20.\c5±) 16.axb5 \d7 17.b3 \e5 18.\xe5 \xe5 (18...\xe5 19.\e3 \xb5 20.\c4++) 19.\xe6 \xb5 20.\e3± de Vreugt – Chigladze, Izmir 2003;

10...\c7 11.\g5 (Or 11.\bd2 \g4 12.h3 \xf3 13.\xf3 e5 14.dxe5 \xe5, McDonald – Soloveykhik, Churchill 2000, and here after 15.\e2±, White has a slight advantage, because of his powerful bishop.) 11...\e8 12.\bd2 \a5 13.\c2 \ac4 14.\xc4 (He should avoid compromising his queenside with: 14.b3 \xd2 15.\xd2 \g4 16.\d1 e6= Kufa–

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Svihel, Czech Republic 1998.)
14...\(\text{\textup{\textsc{c4}}}4\) \(15.\text{\textup{\textsc{e2}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{e6}}} 16.\text{\textup{\textsc{d3}}}+\). White has completed the development of his queenside and he has bright prospects on the kingside:

10...\(\text{\textup{\textsc{a5}}} 11.\text{\textup{\textsc{g5}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{e8}}} (11...\text{\textup{\textsc{x}}b3} 12.\text{\textup{\textsc{x}}e7}+) and here White had better preserve his bishop: 12.\text{\textup{\textsc{c2}}}+, just like in some other lines of the 10.c3 – variation. In the game Burchardt – Epstein, Halle 1974, White did not prevent its exchange and he lost his advantage: 12.\text{\textup{\textsc{bd2}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{x}}b3} 13.\text{\textup{\textsc{axb3}}} d5 (13...\text{\textup{\textsc{f5}}}=) 14.\text{\textup{\textsc{e2}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{e6}}} 15.\text{\textup{\textsc{e3}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{c8}}} 16.\text{\textup{\textsc{h6}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{f6}}} 17.\text{\textup{\textsc{f4}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{d6}}} 18.\text{\textup{\textsc{e5}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{xe5}}} 19.\text{\textup{\textsc{xe5}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{f5}}}+. He then tried to attack on the kingside with \(20.g4\) and that only caused additional weaknesses: 20...\text{\textup{\textsc{g7}}} 21.\text{\textup{\textsc{fxe4}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{c8}}} 22.h3 h5 23.\text{\textup{\textsc{h6}}} f6 24.\text{\textup{\textsc{xg6}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{xf7}}} 25.\text{\textup{\textsc{h6}}} hxg4 26.\text{\textup{\textsc{h2}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{f5}}} 27.\text{\textup{\textsc{f4}}} gxh3 28.\text{\textup{\textsc{g4+}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{f8}}} 29.\text{\textup{\textsc{xh3}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{g6}}} 30.\text{\textup{\textsc{h1}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{f7}}}+;

10...e5 11.\text{\textup{\textsc{g5}}} (It is too early for White to go into an endgame: 11.\text{\textup{\textsc{dxe5}}} dxe5 12.\text{\textup{\textsc{xd8}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{xd8}}} 13.\text{\textup{\textsc{g5}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{d7}}}; 13.\text{\textup{\textsc{g5}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{e8}}} 14.\text{\textup{\textsc{bd2}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{e6}}} 15.\text{\textup{\textsc{e4}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{xb3}}} 16.\text{\textup{\textsc{axb3}}} f5 17.\text{\textup{\textsc{df6}}} – 17.\text{\textup{\textsc{d6}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{eb8}}} – 17...\text{\textup{\textsc{xf6}}} 18.\text{\textup{\textsc{axf6}}} e4 19.\text{\textup{\textsc{d4}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{e5}}} 20.\text{\textup{\textsc{xe5}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{xe5}}}+ Cesari – Verrasca, Ostia 1996. White does not achieve anything substantial after: 11.h3 h6 12.a4 \(\text{\textup{\textsc{f5}}} 13.a5 \text{\textup{\textsc{d7}}} 14.a6 \text{\textup{\textsc{bxa6}}} 15.\text{\textup{\textsc{xa6}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{b6}}} 16.\text{\textup{\textsc{a1}}} e4?! 17.g4 \text{\textup{\textsc{xf3}}} 18.gx5 \text{\textup{\textsc{f6}}} 19.\text{\textup{\textsc{xf3}}}+ Rosmann – Piepho, Germany 1997. He proved to be much better in that line indeed, since Black could regain the f5-pawn only by weakening his pawn-structure considerably. It would have been much better for Black however, to have played 16...a5\(\text{\textup{\textsc{e2}}}+\) and it would turn out that White’s queenside operation with a4-a5-a6 had been just pointless.) 11...\text{\textup{\textsc{c7}}} 12.\text{\textup{\textsc{a3}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{g4}}} 13.h3 xfx3 14.xfx3 exd4 15.xb5 \text{\textup{\textsc{d7}}} 16.xd4+ \text{\textup{\textsc{xd4}}} 17.cxd4 \text{\textup{\textsc{e8}}} (17...\text{\textup{\textsc{xd4}}} 18.\text{\textup{\textsc{e7}}}+) 18.\text{\textup{\textsc{f6}}} \text{\textup{\textsc{xe1}}}+ 19.exe1 \text{\textup{\textsc{e8}}} 20.xe8+ \text{\textup{\textsc{xe8}}} 21.h2\(\text{\textup{\textsc{e2}}}+\) and White maintained a slight advantage in the endgame, Vetter – Ziegler, Germany 1984.

\(\text{\textup{\textsc{b3a}}} 10...\text{\textup{\textsc{f5}}}\)

Black develops a piece to a natural square and he also plans to exchange White’s light squared bishop in case it retreats to c2.

11.\text{\textup{\textsc{g5}}}
4. \( \triangle f3 \) g6 5. \( \triangle c4 \) \( \triangle b6 \) 6. \( \triangle b3 \) \( \triangle g7 \) 7. ed

\( \triangle a8 = \) Mont – Oppedal, California 1993 – and White cannot claim any real edge after the exchange of the bishops.) 13...\( \triangle d7 \)
(13...\( \triangle c8 \) 14. \( \triangle f3 \uparrow \) e5 15. \( \triangle e4 \rightarrow \))
14. \( \triangle f3 \pm \) – thus White makes use of the fact that Black cannot play 14...e6, because of 15. \( \triangle e4 \) and he must defend his f7-pawn with an only move: 14...d5, giving up his d-pawn.

11...d5 12. \( \triangle \) bd2 \( \triangle \) d6 13. \( \triangle \) f1 \( \triangle \) ac8 14.a4 (It deserves attention for White to try 14.h3!? \( \triangle \) fe8 15. \( \triangle \) g3 \( \triangle \) e6 16. \( \triangle \) e2 \pm – and Black’s bishop on e6 or d7 would not be placed favourably at all.) 14...
\( \triangle \) fe8 15.a5 \( \triangle \) c4 16. \( \triangle \) g3 \( \triangle \) g4 17. \( \triangle \) xc4 dx4 18.h3 \( \triangle \) e6 19. \( \triangle \) e4 \( \triangle \) c7 20.d5 \( \triangle \) cd8 21.d6 \( \triangle \) e8 22.
\( \triangle \) e2 f6 23.\( \triangle \) f4 \( \triangle \) d5 (It would be better for Black to play 23...\( \triangle \) f7 \( \infty \), taking the bishop to safety.) 24.
\( \triangle \) ad1 \( \triangle \) f5 25.\( \triangle \) g3 \( \triangle \) xf4 26.\( \triangle \) xd5 exd6 27.\( \triangle \) xe8+ \( \triangle \) xe8 28.\( \triangle \) xe8+ \( \triangle \) f7 29.\( \triangle \) e1 (The move 29.\( \triangle \) e2\pm could have forced Black to go into an endgame an exchange down after: \( \triangle \) xf3 and \( \triangle \) xe8.) 29...a6 30.
\( \triangle \) e4 \( \triangle \) f8 31.\( \triangle \) ed2 \( \triangle \) e5 32. \( \triangle \) d4\pm – and White’s rooks are slightly better than the queen, because of the numerous weaknesses in Black’s position, Rossmann – Birnbaum, Germany 1999.

12.\( \triangle \) h4

12.\( \triangle \) e3 \( \triangle \) a5 13.\( \triangle \) bd2 \( \triangle \) xb3 14.axb3 \( \triangle \) g4 (Black had better attack the other white bishop with the move: 14...\( \triangle \) d5\= with approximately equal chances.) 15.h3 \( \triangle \) xf3 16.\( \triangle \) xf3 d5 17.\( \triangle \) f4 e6

18.\( \triangle \) e3 \( \triangle \) h7 19.\( \triangle \) f3\± Emms – Etchegaray, Cappelle la Grande 1994.

12...\( \triangle \) d7

This is the most energetic move for Black – he prepares the thematic pawn-break in the centre e7-e5. He has also tried in practice: 12...\( \triangle \) c8 13.\( \triangle \) bd2 d5 14.\( \triangle \) f1 g5 (This move eliminates the attack against the e7-square, but it weakens the kingside.) 15.\( \triangle \) g3 e6 16.\( \triangle \) e3 \( \triangle \) e8 17.h4 g4 18.\( \triangle \) xf5 exf5 19.\( \triangle \) e5 \( \triangle \) f6 20.\( \triangle \) c2 \( \triangle \) xe5 21.\( \triangle \) dxe5 \( \triangle \) xh4 22.\( \triangle \) xf5 \( \triangle \) c4, S. Diaz – Simonetti, San Fernando 1992, and here White could have a practically winning position after the line: 23.b3 \( \triangle \) c3 24.\( \triangle \) xg4+ \( \triangle \) g5 25.e6\±.

13.\( \triangle \) bd2 \( \triangle \) fe8

Black has already prepared the break e7-e5 and White should seriously consider what he should counter that with.

14.a4?!?

This move is with the idea to attack Black’s knights and to preserve an important diagonal for the bishop.

There has been only a single game played in that line and
it continued with: 14.\(\text{df}1\) e5 15.\(\text{dxe}5\) (15.\(\text{e}3\) exd4 16.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xe}1\) 17.\(\text{wx}e1\) \(\text{xf}5\) 18.cxd4 \(\text{xd}4\) 19.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 15...dx5 16.\(\text{xd}7\) (16.\(\text{e}3!\)?) 16...\(\text{xd}7\) 17.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 18.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 19.\(\text{e}4\) e4, but at the end it was only Black who could be better, Poetschke – J.Diaz, Wiesbaden 1988.

It is not so good for White to play: 14.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{a}5\), because then he should comply with the exchange of the bishop, since in case of 15.\(\text{c}2\) Black follows with: 15...g5 16.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xe}4\) 17.\(\text{xe}4\) f5 18.\(\text{c}2\) f4 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}x\text{g}3\) 20.\(\text{fxg}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 21.\(\text{wh}7+\) \(\text{f}8\) 22.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{f}6\).

14...\(\text{a}5\)
14...a5 15.\(\text{xe}f7\).
15.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{ac}8\)

16.\(\text{g}3\)
16.b4 \(\text{ac}4\) 17.a5 \(\text{b}2\) 18.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{d}3\).

The move 16.\(\text{e}4\) possesses the drawback that Black has some tactical ideas at his disposal, connected with capturing on e4, followed by \(\text{g}6\)-\(\text{g}5\) and \(\text{f}7\)-\(\text{f}5\)-\(\text{f}4\): 16...\(\text{ac}4\) (16...d5 17.\(\text{c}5\); 16...\(\text{xe}4\) 17.\(\text{xe}4\) d5 18.\(\text{e}2\)) 17.b3 \(\text{a}5\) 18.b4 (18.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{xe}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}4\) g5 20.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{f}5\) 21.\(\text{e}2\) f4 22.\(\text{b}4+\) \(\text{ac}4\) 23.a5 \(\text{a}8\) 24.\(\text{d}2\) d5?) 18.\(\text{ac}4\) 19.a5 \(\text{b}2\) 20.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 21.\(\text{fd}2\) \(\text{xe}4\) 22.\(\text{xe}4\) b6 (22...\(\text{d}3\) 23.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 24.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xe}1\) 25.\(\text{xf}7+\) \(\text{h}7\) 26.\(\text{f}6\)) 23.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{xb}6\) 24.\(\text{c}2\).

16...\(\text{a}4\)
16...\(\text{ac}4\) 17.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 18.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 19.\(\text{xc}1\) (but not 19.c4 \(\text{g}4\) 19...d5 20.\(\text{e}5\).

17.\(\text{xf}7+\) \(\text{xf}7\) 18.\(\text{xa}4\).
Black has not solved the problem with his knight on a5 yet; moreover his kingside has been slightly compromised.

b3b) 10...\(\text{g}4\)

11.\(\text{h}3\)
It also deserves attention for White to continue with: 11.\(\text{bd}2\) e5 12.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{f}5\) 13.\(\text{f}1\) exd4 14.cxd4 d5 15.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 16.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 18.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}4\) 19.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 20.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 21.\(\text{xe}5\) – and Black remains with a “bad” bishop and vulnerable dark squares, Zhelnin – Oliwa, Katowice 1995.

11...\(\text{xf}3\)
11...d7. Such a loss of time does not cause any immediate
worries indeed, but it can hardly be justified. 12.\(\text{g}5\) (White could have tried 12.\(\text{b}2\) too.) 12...
\(\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{e}4\)? (In the game Gysi – Arnold, corr. 1997, there followed: 14.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{a}5\) 15.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{xb}3\) 16.\(\text{axb}3\) \(\text{xg}4\) 17.\(\text{xg}4\) h6 18.\(\text{h}4\) a6 19.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 20.\(\text{ae}1\) e5 21.f4 – Black's pawn is pinned and he has serious problems. 21...\(\text{e}6\) 22.fxe5 dxe5 23.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{ce}8\) 24.dxe5 \(\text{c}5\) + 25.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 26.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 27.\(\text{f}3\) ±. Instead of 20...e5, Black had to defend with: 20...e6=.) 14...\(\text{c}7\). (White was threatening to capture on d6.) 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{a}5\) 16.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{ac}4\) 17.\(\text{d}3\) ±. White has completed the development of his queenside, he has prevented e7-e5, because he can counter that with a check from the f6-square and he is slightly better.

The move 11...\(\text{xf}5\) – is once again a direct loss of time. 12.\(\text{g}5\) h6 13.\(\text{h}4\) g5 (this is a serious weakening of the kingside) 14.\(\text{g}3\) e5. White maintains now a clear advantage after: 15.dxe5 dxe5 16.\(\text{bd}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 17.h4! g4 18.\(\text{d}4\)! \(\text{xd}4\) 19.cx\(\text{d}4\) ±. In the game Otero – Wohl, Havana 2001, there followed: 19...\(\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{d}6\) 21.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 22.h5 \(\text{hx}5\) 23.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{e}7\) 24.dxe5 \(\text{g}6\) 25.e6 f5 26.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}8\) 27.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{h}7\) 28.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{g}5\) 29.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 30.\(\text{xf}5\) and Black lost a pawn and soon after that the game as well.

12.\(\text{xf}3\)

12...\(\text{e}5\)

The inclusion of the moves 12...a5 and 13.a4 can hardly be useful for Black. The weakening of the queenside is quite unnecessary for Black in this case. 13...d5 14.\(\text{g}5\) h6 (Black should better avoid the creation of additional weaknesses – 14...\(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) ±, followed by \(\text{g}3\) and \(\text{f}3\).) 15.\(\text{h}4\) g5 16.\(\text{g}3\) e6 17.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{a}7\) (This prevents White’s move \(\text{b}5\) indeed, but Black’s knight gets terribly misplaced.) 18.\(\text{e}5\) (18.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 20.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 21.\(\text{e}3\) ±) 18...\(\text{bc}8\), E.Join – San Sebastian, Tarbes 2003, and here after the interesting line for White: 19.\(\text{c}2\) f6 20.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}7\) 21.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 22.\(\text{h}7\) \(\text{f}8\) 23.\(\text{e}2\) ± – Black’s kingside remains extremely vulnerable.

In case of 12...e6, instead of 13.e3 d5 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 15.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{d}6\), Glaser – Rufenacht, corr. 1994 – it becomes clear that White’s bishop on e3 is misplaced, so he must continue with: 13.\(\text{f}4\) ± \(\text{g}3\) and after 13...d5 the game transposes to the line: 12...d5.

12...d5 13.\(\text{f}4\) f6. This is a very risky move – Black tries to
build up a pawn-centre, but it will come under a powerful pressure by White's pieces and the bishop on b3 in particular. In the game G.Kuzmin – Solozhenkin, St. Petersburg 1997, White managed to exploit the power of his bishops and he organized an attack against Black's central pawns: 14.\text{\textlalloy}g3 e5 15.dxe5 fxe5 16.\text{lady}g4 \text{lady}h8 (It is better for Black to play: 16...\text{lady}c8!? 17.\text{\textlalloy}d2 \text{\textlady}xg4 18.hxg4 \text{lady}h8 19.\text{lady}d1 \text{lady}d8 20.\text{lady}f1±.) 17.\text{\textlalloy}a3 \text{lady}d7 18.\text{lady}d1 \text{lady}f6 19.\text{lady}e2±. Black had lost so much time on his maneuver with the knight that he failed to hold his centre. 19...d4 (19...e4 20.\text{\textlalloy}b5 \text{\textlalloy}c8 21.\text{\textlalloy}d6 \text{\textlalloy}c7 22.\text{\textlalloy}xd5+-) 20.\text{\textlalloy}c4 \text{\textlalloy}e8 21.\text{\textlalloy}a4 \text{\textlalloy}d7 (21...\text{\textlalloy}h5 22.\text{\textlalloy}h2 \text{\textlalloy}f4 23.\text{lady}e4 \text{lady}d5 24.\text{lady}xd5 \text{\textlalloy}xh5 25.\text{lady}f6±) 22.\text{\textlalloy}d6 \text{\textlalloy}f8 23.\text{\textlalloy}xc6 bxc6 24.cxd4 and Black resigned, because of the line: 24...\text{\textlalloy}xd4 25.\text{lady}e6++. Instead of 17...\text{\textlalloy}d7, A.Finkel recommended 17...\text{lady}f6 18.\text{lady}ad1 \text{lady}f7, but White could counter that with 19.c4 destroying Black's central pawns. (19.f3 \text{\textlalloy}d8 20.\text{lady}f2 \text{\textlalloy}c8 21.\text{\textlalloy}e2 \text{lady}e7) 19...\text{\textlalloy}d4 (19...h5 20.\text{\textlalloy}g5 dxc4 21.\text{\textlalloy}c2 \text{lady}f6 22.\text{lady}xg6 \text{\textlalloy}xg6 23.\text{\textlalloy}xg6 h4 24.\text{lady}h2± and Black's pawns are quite vulnerable in that endgame, for example: 24...\text{\textlalloy}ad8 25.\text{\textlalloy}e4 \text{\textlalloy}b4 26.\text{\textlalloy}xh7 \text{\textlalloy}d3 27.\text{\textlalloy}e3 \text{\textlalloy}xb2 28.\text{\textlalloy}xd8 \text{\textlalloy}xd8 29.\text{\textlalloy}xe5 \text{\textlalloy}xe5 30.\text{\textlalloy}exf5 \text{\textlalloy}d1+ 31.\text{lady}h2±) 20.cxd5 \text{\textlalloy}xb3 21.axb3 \text{\textlalloy}xd5 22.\text{\textlalloy}c4±, Black's central pawn is very weak, for example: 22...\text{lady}f6 23.\text{lady}e2 (23.\text{\textlalloy}xe5 \text{\textlalloy}xb3 24.\text{lady}h4 \text{\textlalloy}h5) 23...e4 24.\text{\textlalloy}e3± \text{\textlalloy}h6.

If after: 12...d5 13.\text{lady}f4 Black does not play 13...f6, White should better choose the plan with appropriate actions on the kingside – \text{lady}f3-g3, \text{\textlalloy}b1-d2-f3-e5 and h3-h4-h5:

After 13...e6, instead of the somewhat chaotic reaction by White: 14.a4 \text{\textlalloy}c8 15.\text{\textlalloy}a3 a6 16.g4 \text{\textlalloy}d6 17.\text{\textlalloy}c2 \text{\textlalloy}d7 18.\text{\textlalloy}d3 \text{\textlalloy}ac8 19.\text{\textlalloy}g3 \text{\textlalloy}fd8, Kolu – Haara, Finland 1986 – his pawn advances on both sides of the board and the development of the knight to the a3-square are not a part of a consistent plan – he had better play: 14.\text{\textlalloy}d2 \text{\textlalloy}c8 15.\text{\textlalloy}g3 (15.\text{\textlalloy}g4 \text{\textlalloy}d6) 15...\text{\textlalloy}e7 16.\text{\textlalloy}c2±, followed by \text{\textlalloy}d2-f3;

13...\text{\textlalloy}d7 14.\text{\textlalloy}d2 \text{\textlalloy}a5 (Black's tries to play too much with the rook were not convincing at all after: 14...\text{\textlalloy}ae8 15.\text{\textlalloy}ad1 e6 16.\text{\textlalloy}g3 – 16.h4?!± – 16...\text{\textlalloy}d8, Pascoat – Desurmont, Morbion 2004, and here White had to play 17.h4!??, because it was an obligatory move anyway.) and in this position, instead of 15.\text{\textlalloy}c2 \text{\textlalloy}bc4 16.\text{\textlalloy}b3 b6 17.\text{\textlalloy}xa5 \text{\textlalloy}xa5

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18.\textit{\textbf{N}}e2 Nac8 19.\textit{\textbf{N}}ae1 e6 20.h4 b5
21.h5 b4\textsuperscript{\natural} Serra – Pont Mulet,
Palma de Mallorca 2001, White had to try: 15.h4!? Nxb3 16.
axb3\textsuperscript{\pm} – because it was not necessary to
preserve the bishop on b3 from its being exchanged.

\textbf{13.dxe5 dxe5 14.\textit{\textbf{N}}e3}

It also deserves attention for White to play 14.a4?, for ex-
ample: 14...\textit{\textbf{N}}a5 15.\textit{\textbf{N}}a2 Nc8
(15...\textit{\textbf{N}}xa4 16.b4 \textit{\textbf{N}}c6 17.\textit{\textbf{N}}b3
\textit{\textbf{N}}b6 18.b5 \textit{\textbf{N}}e7 19.\textit{\textbf{N}}xb7\textsubscript{\pm}; 15...
\textit{\textbf{N}}c7 16.b4 \textit{\textbf{N}}c6 17.a5 \textit{\textbf{N}}c8 18.
\textit{\textbf{N}}d2\textsuperscript{\pm} 16.b4 \textit{\textbf{N}}c6 17.b5!? (17.
a5!?\textsuperscript{\uparrow}) 17...\textit{\textbf{N}}a5 18.\textit{\textbf{N}}a3\textsuperscript{\pm} with the
threat \textit{\textbf{N}}b4.

[Diagram]

\textbf{14...\textit{\textbf{N}}c7}

It is not good for Black to play what the computers have done
in games between them i.e.: 14...\textit{\textbf{N}}a5, because after: 15.\textit{\textbf{N}}c5
\textit{\textbf{N}}xb3 16.axb3 \textit{\textbf{N}}e8 17.\textit{\textbf{N}}xb3 \textit{\textbf{N}}b8
18.\textit{\textbf{N}}a6 \textit{\textbf{N}}d7 19.\textit{\textbf{N}}b4 \textit{\textbf{N}}f8 20.\textit{\textbf{N}}xf8
\textit{\textbf{N}}xf8 21.b4\textsuperscript{\pm} – White remains
with a solid extra pawn.

14...\textit{\textbf{N}}e7 15.\textit{\textbf{N}}xb6!? ab 16.\textit{\textbf{N}}d2
\textit{\textbf{N}}a5 17.\textit{\textbf{N}}d5 \textit{\textbf{N}}ad8 18. \textit{\textbf{N}}ad1\textsuperscript{\pm}.
White's bishop is presently much better than its black counterpart,
while Black's knight is obviously misplaced too. Later, in
the game Reijnjen – Rozier, England 1998, there followed: 18...
\textit{\textbf{N}}d7 19.\textit{\textbf{N}}f1 \textit{\textbf{N}}c8 (Black should
better play: 19...\textit{\textbf{N}}fd8!? 20.\textit{\textbf{N}}e3\textsuperscript{\pm})
20.\textit{\textbf{N}}e3 \textit{\textbf{N}}dc7? (he should have
simply retreated his rook back...)
21.b4 \textit{\textbf{N}}c6 22.\textit{\textbf{N}}b3++; and here
after \textit{\textbf{N}}d5 Black loses material
unavoidably.

\textbf{15.\textit{\textbf{N}}a3}

The other route for the knight – 15.\textit{\textbf{N}}d2 – enables White to
place it on the e4-square, but it does not create the threat \textit{\textbf{N}}b5.
15...\textit{\textbf{N}}a5 (It is much worse for
Black to defend here with: 15...
\textit{\textbf{N}}h8 16.\textit{\textbf{N}}c5 \textit{\textbf{N}}fd8 17.\textit{\textbf{N}}e4 f5 18.
\textit{\textbf{N}}g5 \textit{\textbf{N}}d7 19.\textit{\textbf{N}}e6 e4 20.\textit{\textbf{N}}e2 \textit{\textbf{N}}e5,
Adithya – Kobernat, Virginia Beach 2005, because White could
have won the game immediately with: 21.\textit{\textbf{N}}xb6 axb6 22.\textit{\textbf{N}}xd7
\textit{\textbf{N}}xd7 23.\textit{\textbf{N}}ed1 \textit{\textbf{N}}d3 24.\textit{\textbf{N}}f3++;)
16.\textit{\textbf{N}}e4 \textit{\textbf{N}}xb3 17.axb3 f5=.

\textbf{15...a6?!}

Naturally, Black must pre-
vant the subsequent maneuver of
the white knight, but he should
have done that only after the pre-
liminary inclusion of the line:
15...\textit{\textbf{N}}a5 16.\textit{\textbf{N}}c2 \textit{\textbf{N}}bc4 17.\textit{\textbf{N}}xc4
\textit{\textbf{N}}xc4 18.\textit{\textbf{N}}g5 h6 19.\textit{\textbf{N}}c1 \textit{\textbf{N}}fd8 and
without the weakening of his
queenside with: 20.b3 \textit{\textbf{N}}b6=, White
will not manage to com-
plete his development.

Accordingly, White should not
retreat his bishop to the c2-
square, but he should better
bring his rook into action: 16.
\textit{\textbf{N}}ad1 \textit{\textbf{N}}xb3 17.axb3 a6 (17...f5 18.
\textit{\textbf{N}}b5\textsuperscript{\pm}) 18.c4 (18.\textit{\textbf{N}}xb6?! \textit{\textbf{N}}xb6 19.
\[ \text{Conclusion} \]

Presently, the 4...g6 variation of the Alekhine Defence is one of the most popular for Black. After 5.\textit{c}4, he has two good lines 5...c6 and 5...\textit{b}6 6.\textit{b}3 \textit{g}7.

In case of 5...c6, White should better play: 6.exd6 \textit{xd}6 7.0—0, after which he completes his piece-development and follows with \textit{d}1-d2-e4. The position is of a semi-open type and White can react successfully, or even prevent altogether, Black’s undermining pawn-breaks c6-c5 and e7-e5.

Following 5...\textit{b}6 6.\textit{b}3 \textit{g}7 — I recommend the line: 7.exd6 cxd6 8.0—0 0—0 9.\textit{e}1 \textit{c}6 10.c3. White trades pawns on d6 indeed and thus he reduces his space advantage on the kingside, but he liquidates Black’s counterplay against the e5-pawn and he obtains the semi-open e-file for his rook.

Black then has two basic plans. The first is to play d6-d5, but White can counter that by completing his development and he can gradually prepare effective kingside operations. He can also exploit the e5-square for his knight in this case.

The other plan for Black is connected with the preparation of e7-e5 and White should either exchange on e5 (particularly in the lines in which Black plays \textit{c}8-g4, because then White has the two bishop advantage), or he can also exploit the drawbacks of Black’s position in some other fashion.
Chapter 13

1.e4 e5 2.d4 d6 3.dxe5 dxe5 4.d4 5.g4

The other possibilities for Black are very seldom played:

5...xf3. White often plays h2-h3 in many lines, because this exchange is considered to be very advantageous for him. So, if Black trades his bishop here, without any need – that is just supposed to be a loss of time.

6.xf3 c6 (or 6...dxe5? 7.c4 b6 8.xb7 exd4 9.c5+ Christ – Grueiittern, Giessen 1991; 6...e6? 7.c4 b6 8.xb7+ Gauche – Carvalho, Guarapuava 1992) 7.c4 – see 5...c6 6.c4 xf3;

5...c8. This move might turn out to be useful for Black in some lines indeed, but still it does not contribute to his development at all. 6.0–0 c6, Thompson – Walls, Aberdeen 2004, 7.h3 h5 8.c4 (it is almost similar after 8.exd6 cxd6 9.e1= e6 10.c4 b6 11.d5) 8...b6 9.exd6 cxd6 10.e1 and if 10...xf3 (10...e6 11.d5), then 11.xf3 xc4 12.e3 and White has an excellent compensation for the pawn, because Black has not completed his development at all and the position is quite opened;

5...e2 c6

This is a natural move and it is an essential part of Black’s plan. It is however too early for him to determine the placement of this knight, because it can easily be attacked by White in many lines either by the bishop on f3 (after the exchange), or by a pawn, after d4-d5.

Black moves also 5...c6 (Chapter 14) and 5...e6 (Chapter 15).

About 5...d7 6.0–0 c6 – see 5...c6 6.0–0 d7.
5...dxe5?! This move is very unsatisfactory for Black, because it enables White to develop his knight to an ideal square with tempo. 6.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe2 7.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe2.

This position is again very difficult for Black – White is threatening to check on b5 and then attack the f7-square:

Black has often tried in practice here 7...c6? and White never managed to find the simple way to obtain a great advantage i.e.: 8.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f3 \(\mathbb{Q}\)f6 9.\(\mathbb{Q}\)b3++ with a double attack against b7 and f7;

Black simply loses a pawn after: 7...e6?! 8.\(\mathbb{Q}\)b5+ \(\mathcal{D}\)d7 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xd7 10.\(\mathbb{Q}\)xb7± M. Shulman – Patrick, Canada 1963, or 7...

\(\mathbb{Q}\)d6? 8.\(\mathbb{Q}\)b5+ c6 9.\(\mathbb{Q}\)xb7 \(\mathbb{Q}\)b4+ 10.\(\mathbb{Q}\)xb4 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xb4 11.\(\mathcal{D}\)a3++ Putz-bach – Engels, Pinneberg 1998;

Following 7...\(\mathcal{D}\)d7? it becomes very effective for White to sacrifice a piece, just like in the lines well-familiar to us from Chapter 11: 8.\(\mathbb{Q}\)xf7! \(\mathbb{Q}\)xf7 9.\(\mathbb{Q}\)h5+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)e6 10.c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f6 (10...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b6 11.d5+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)d6 12.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f5) 11.d5+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)d6 12.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f5.

Here, contrary to the variations in Chapter 11, Black’s bishop is not on c8 and after the unavoidable check on the e6-square – Black’s king would be forced to make a trip into White’s camp...

12...e5 13.\(\mathbb{Q}\)e6+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3+ \(\mathbb{Q}\)b4 15.a3+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)a4 (15...\(\mathbb{Q}\)b3 16.

\(\mathcal{Q}\)d2+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)a4 17.b3+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)a5 18.b4+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)a4 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f5+– 16.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3+ \(\mathbb{Q}\)b3 17.

\(\mathbb{Q}\)f5 e4 (17...\(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 18.\(\mathbb{Q}\)b1+–) 18.

\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 20.

\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc5 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e8 (20...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc5 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d1! \(\mathbb{Q}\)a4 22.b4–) 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3+ \(\mathbb{Q}\)xe3+ 22.

\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d6 23.0–0±.

Black’s only possible reasonable move left is 7...\(\mathcal{Q}\)b6, for example: 8.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3. (Black can now counter 8.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f3 with 8...\(\mathbb{Q}\)d5.)

8...g6 (8...\(\mathbb{Q}\)xd4? 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d8 10.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f3++; 8...e6 9.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f3++;) 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4 (Black has defended against the threat \(\mathbb{Q}\)h5, with his previous move, while now in case of 9.\(\mathbb{Q}\)f3 he has the resource 9...\(\mathbb{Q}\)f6, which in fact is not enough to equalize either.) 9...\(\mathbb{Q}\)d7 (9...\(\mathcal{Q}\)g7? 10.

\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xf7 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e6 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d7 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xg7+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 14.\(\mathbb{Q}\)h6; 9...

\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd4? 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f6+! ef6 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6+) 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e4+ and once again Black cannot play 10...\(\mathcal{Q}\)g7?, because of 11.\(\mathbb{Q}\)xf7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xf7 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5+ and his lag in development has become really critical for his survival.

5...c5. This move is a bit strange, because in the 4...

\(\mathcal{Q}\)g4 line Black usually attacks White’s centre with pieces and not with pawns. There is no direct refutation of that move, but White can maintain his opening advantage in several different ways. There was only one game played in that position – Za-
charias – Sislian, Germany 2002, and there after 6.0–0 Black played the terrible move 6...
\(\text{\textcopyright}x f3\)? and he could have lost the game immediately after: 7.\(\text{\textcopyright}x f3\) dxe5 8.dxc5 e6 9.c4++. Naturally it would have been better for Black to play: 6...
\(\text{\textcopyright}c6\) 7.c4 (7. exd6 \(\text{\textcopyright}x d6\) 8.c4 \(\text{\textcopyright}f4\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}x f4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x f4=;\) 7.h3 \(\text{\textcopyright}x f3\) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}x f3\) dxe5 9.c4 \(\text{\textcopyright}b 6\) 10.dxc5 \(\text{\textcopyright}x d 1\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d 1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x c 4\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}c 3\) e6 13.b3 \(\text{\textcopyright}a 4\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}b 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c 8\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}e 3\) f5=) 7...\(\text{\textcopyright}b 6\)
8.e6 \(\text{\textcopyright}x f3\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}x f3\) cxd4 10.exf7+ \(\text{\textcopyright}x f 7\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}x c 6\) bxc6 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d 4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d 7\)
13.\(\text{\textcopyright}e 3\) c5 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}f 4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g 8\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}c 3\). Black had better capture the pawn: 8...fxe6 9.dxc5 dxc5 and he would have had some counterchances, because of the weakened d4-square.

White however, having in mind that it is unfavourable for Black to capture on f3, could improve his play too with: 6.h3 \(\text{\textcopyright}f 5\) (The move 6...
\(\text{\textcopyright}h 5\) enables White to push e5-e6: 7.dxc5 dxc5 8.e6 fxe6 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}e 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x e 2\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 2\), or 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}g 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x e 2\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d 6\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 6\) 7.\(\text{\textcopyright}h 4\) (7.\(\text{\textcopyright}x c 5\)! dxc5
8.\(\text{\textcopyright}h 4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e 6\) 9.f4 g6 10.0–0\) 7...\(\text{\textcopyright}d 7\) 8.c4 \(\text{\textcopyright}b 4\) 9.a3 \(\text{\textcopyright}a 6\)
10.\(\text{\textcopyright}f 3\) cxd4 (10...e6 11.exd6 \(\text{\textcopyright}x d 6\) 12.dxc5 \(\text{\textcopyright}x c 5\) 13.b4 \(\text{\textcopyright}e 7\)
14.\(\text{\textcopyright}b 2\), or 11.dxc5 dxc5 12.0–0 \(\text{\textcopyright}c 6\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}f 4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e 7\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}c 3\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}b 4\)_. This move isolates Black’s knight on a6 completely and creates the threat for White to capture on d6: 11...dxe5 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c 6\) 13.0–0\). Black cannot protect his d4-pawn anymore and the difference in piece-placement is more than evident. 13...
\(\text{\textcopyright}d 6\) (in case of 13...f6, White can play: 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}h 5+\) g6 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}x g 6\) hxg6 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}x g 6+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d 7\) 17.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d 4+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c 8\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d 8+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x d 8\) 19.b5 \(\text{\textcopyright}x g 2\) – otherwise Black would simply remain a pawn down – 20.bxa6 \(\text{\textcopyright}x a 6\) 21.\(\text{\textcopyright}x g 2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g 8\) 22.\(\text{\textcopyright}d 1+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c 7\)
23.\(\text{\textcopyright}c 3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x g 6+\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}f 3\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}f 4\)
\(\text{\textcopyright}d 7\) 15.c5 \(\text{\textcopyright}f 6\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d 4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\)
17.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\); 5...\(\text{\textcopyright}b 6\). This move is reasonable enough – Black retreats his knight in advance, against the eventual attacks with White’s c4-pawn, or with the bishop on f3, but he loses some time in doing that. 6.h3 \(\text{\textcopyright}x f 3\) (Black only wastes tempi with a line that has been played very seldom in practice: 6...
\(\text{\textcopyright}f 5\) 7.0–0; after 6...\(\text{\textcopyright}h 5\)
7.e6 fxe6 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}g 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x e 2\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 2\), White usually regains his e6-pawn and Black remains in a very bad position, Vidovic – Jankovic, Zagreb 1996.) 7.\(\text{\textcopyright}x f 3\)
\(\text{\textcopyright}c 6\) 7...c6 8.e6 fxe6 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}g 4\) 8.e6 (White’s advantage is only minimal in the endgame after: 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}x c 6+\) bxc6, Olsar – Pac1, Czech Republic 1995, 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}f 3\) dxe5 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}x c 6+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d 7\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d 7+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x d 7\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x e 5\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}c 3\), White’s edge in that line is only superficial.) 8...f6 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}g 4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d 7\) (It is too dangerous for Black to play here: 9...e5 10.d5 – he would not manage to put his knight on d4 anyway, while after: 10...\(\text{\textcopyright}b 4\) 11.c4\)
\(\Delta 0–0\) and f2–f4, White’s light squared bishop is obviously more
valuable than Black's extra doubled pawn.)

10.0–0 g6 11.e1 d8 12.c3 (The move 12.c3, was played in the game Raut – Grunberg, Tusnad 2000, but it was too tentative and enabled Black to play b6-d5-f6.) 12...g7 (Black can hardly equalize after: 12...d5 13.e2 g7 14.f4 a4 15.xe6 xd4 16.xd4 xd4 17.xd5 (It is not sufficient for White to play: 13.e2 d5 14.c4 f6. He cannot achieve anything much after: 13.d3 0–0 14.d5 e8 15.e6+ xe6 16.xe6 f5+2, or 15.dxe6 c6 and White regains his pawn indeed, in both lines, but Black manages to develop his pieces and he obtains a quite sufficient counterplay.) 13.xc3 14.bxc3 (14.dxe6 c6 15.bxc3 xc3 16.b1 c4) 14...xd5 15.xe6 c6 (It is weaker for Black to play: 15...b5 16.d4 f8 17.c4 xe6 18. xe6 b6 19.xd5 xf2+ 20. h2 c6 21.e4, because White's bishop pair is much stronger than Black's rook in this middle game.) 16.e1. White has some compensation for the pawn in- deed, but he can hardly manage to attack Black's king effectively: 16...xc3 (It is possible for Black to play here: 16...e5 17.f3 xc3 18.xd5 xa1 19.d2 d7 20. c3 b1+, or 19.f4 c3 20.fxe5 dxe5 21.f4 c6 22.xc6+ xc6 23.xe5+ f7 and obviously Black's king will find a safe haven.) 17.g5 c6 18.xe7 xe7 19.xd6 0–0 20.xe7 xc2+. White's compensation for the pawn is probably satisfactory in that position, but not more...

It deserves attention for White here to try to transpose the move order i.e. 10.c3!?. Now, Black's bishop is not present on the long diagonal and White's chances to push quickly d4-d5 are considerably greater: 10...g6 (10...0–0. This seems to be a good developing move, but thus Black fails to defend his e6-pawn, because his knight has been deprived of the d8-square and his king gets pinned. 11.h4!? This move is with the idea for White to preserve his bishop on the c8-h3 diagonal. 11.e8 12. d5 d8 13.e3+ and he succeeds in regaining his pawn with a obvious advantage; 10...d8 11.d5+ and White has managed to prepare that important pawn-advance and to capture on e6 without any counterplay for Black.) 11.d5 d8 (11...xd5 12.xd5 h5 13.xc7+ xc7 14.xe6+ 12. d4 g8 13.dxe6 c8 14.h4 g7 15.e4+. Black's position is substantially cramped;
The line 5...\(\text{Qd7?!}\) 6.h3 \(\text{Qh5}\), permits White to sacrifice a pawn on e6, in the standard fashion, in order to restrict Black’s possibilities considerably: 7.e6! fxe6 8.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 9.\(\text{Qg4}\)± Koning – Tern, Munchen 1936 and White regains easily his pawn with a great advantage. There might follow: 10...\(\text{Qxg4}\) 11.cx\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 12.\(\text{Qa4+}\) c6 13.dxc6 bxc6 14.\(\text{Qxc6+}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 15.\(\text{Qxf7}\) \(\text{Qxf7}\) 16.\(\text{Qc3}\)± and Black’s king remains seriously endangered, his e6-pawn is weak, while the material is equal. In order to preserve his extra pawn, Black, on his move eight, must play: 8...\(\text{Qxe2}\) 9.\(\text{Qxe2}\) e5 10.c4 \(\text{Qf5}\) 11.dxe5 \(\text{Qxe5}\) 12.f4 \(\text{Qc6}\) 13.\(\text{Qe6+}\). White has a great lead in development as a compensation for the pawn (Black must still lose plenty of time in order to exchange White’s knight on e6, which is like a bone in his throat) as well as a huge space advantage – more than sufficient compensation altogether. Later, in the game Hodgson – Moon, Internet 1999, there followed: 13...\(\text{Qd7}\) 14.\(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 15.\(\text{Qf5}\) g6 (15...\(\text{Qxe6}\) 16.fxe6 \(\text{Qc6}\) 17.\(\text{Qg5}\)±) 16.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qh5}\) 17.\(\text{Qd5}\) \(\text{Ec8}\) and here White could have won immediately with: 18.0–0 \(\text{Qg3}\) 19.\(\text{Qexc7+}\) \(\text{Qxc7}\) 20.\(\text{Qf6+}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 21.fxg6+ \(\text{Qg7}\) 22.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qc6}\) 23.\(\text{Qxg3+}\), or 18.\(\text{Qxf8}\) \(\text{Qxf8}\) 19.\(\text{Qxe7}\) \(\text{Qg3}\) 20.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qxh1}\) 21.\(\text{Qxc8+}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 22.0–0–0+–.

The move 5...\(\text{g6}\) leads to great difficulties for Black. In general, the moves \(\text{c8-g4}\) and \(\text{g7-g6}\) do not combine well together. 6.\(\text{Qg5}\). This is White’s standard reaction. After the trade on e2, White is threatening to push e5-e6 and in case Black pushes e7-e6 himself – then the weakening of his kingside will become a telling factor, particularly the f6-square. 6...\(\text{Qxe2}\) (Black’s position remains very difficult too after: 6...\(\text{Qf5}\) 7.e6 \(\text{Qxe6}\) 8.\(\text{Qxe6}\) fxe6 9.\(\text{Qg4+}\), for example: 9...\(\text{Qd7}\) 10.\(\text{Qe2}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 11.0–0 \(\text{Qf6}\) 12.\(\text{Qh3}\) \(\text{Qc6}\) 13.c3 – he has defended his extra pawn will all his pieces; nevertheless it is doomed anyway – 13...\(\text{Qg8}\) 14.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 15.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 16.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{Qg7}\) 17.c4 \(\text{Qh8}\) 18.d5 \(\text{Qg7}\) 19.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qa4}\) 20.dxe6 \(\text{Qa5}\) 21.\(\text{Qh1+}\) and Black’s position is quite cramped, while the material is equal, Damaso – Pinheiro, Lisbon 1995.) 7.\(\text{Qxe2}\).

\[\text{Diagram}\]

Black has now plenty of difficult problems to solve – White is threatening e5-e6 or \(\text{Qf3}\) with a double attack against d5 and f7. It is too bad for Black to play: 7...\(\text{Qd7}\)? 8.e6 fxe6 9.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 10.\(\text{Qxb7}\) \(\text{Qc6}\)? 11.\(\text{Qc8#}\) Hernan-
dez – Martis, Bled 2002, as well as 7...dxe5 8...f3 0-0-0 (Black loses immediately after 8...f6?, because of 9...e6 0-0-0 10...xd5!, Varnusz – Ponyi, Salgotorjar 1978.) 9.dxe5 h6 10...xf7! 0-0-0 11.exf6 exf6 12...xb7+ – Jansa – Haik, Kladovu 1980. Black loses material in case of: 7...c6? 8.e6 0-0-0, Kasperek – Maciazek, Kolbrzeg 2001, 9...d2++. In answer to 7...h6, in the game Klovans – Vojtjevic, USSR 1962, there followed: 8...xf7! 0-0-0 9...f3+ 0-0-0 10.c4 0-0-0 11.d5 0-0-0 12...d7 12...g4+ and here after: 12...e8 13...xg6+ 0-0-0 14...f5+ 0-0-0 15.e6 0-0-0 16.b3+ – 0-0-0, White wins again. Black played much better in the game: Mrdja – Joguet, Le Touquet 2001: 7...e6 8.c4 0-0-0 (8...d4? 9...f3 f6 10...xe6 0-0-0 11...xf6 0-0-0 12...a3++) 9...f3 0-0-0 (It is worse for Black to play: 9...e7 10...xb7 0-0-0 11...e4 Sion Castro – Sanchez, Cordoba 1994. It is too bad for Black to try here: 11...dxe5 12.c5, because he loses material; it is only slightly better for him to try: 11...d5 12.cxd5 0-0-0 13...bc3 exd5 14...g5 0-0-0 15.0–0–0, threatening e5–e6, while the capturing on e5 is just suicidal for Black, because of the opening of the e-file.) 10...e4 (Now, it is not so good for White to play: 10...xb7 0-0-0 11...xc6+ 0-0-0, because Black regains his pawn with an excellent game.) 10...e7 11.exd6 cxd6 12...f6+ 0-0-0 13...xf6 0-0-0 and White has a slight edge, because of the weakness of the dark squares in Black’s camp.

6.0–0

We will have a look now at the lines: a) 6...b6, b) 6...dxe5 and c) 6...e6.

The other possibilities for Black are played only seldom: 6...a6 (the idea of that move is not so easy to understand, because White almost never places his bishop on b5 in similar positions anyway) 7...b4 0-0-0 (that placement of the bishop is too passive) 8.c4. This is much more energetic than the exchange on d6, which was tried by White in the game Wood – Murphy, Belconnen, 1996. 8...b6 9.c5. White has this resource thanks to the placement of Black’s bishop on the d7-square. 9...d5 (9...c8 10...b3± and the arising position is just pathetic for Black, because his pieces are totally misplaced.) 10...c4 e6 11...xd5 exd5 12...g5. White has managed to create extremely dangerous threats along the e-file. 12...c8 (or 12...e7 13...xe7 0-0-0 14.exd6 cxd6 15.e1 0-0-0 16...c3++, winning
the d5-pawn) 13.exd6 cxd6 14. 
é+ 
é6 15. 
éc3 

dxc5 16. 

dxe5 – and Black is obviously quite unprepared for the opening of files on the board;

6... 
éd7. This move is useful for Black indeed – he intends to place his rook on d8, or even castle long. 7.exd6 cxd6 8.h3 
éh5 9.c4 
éb6.

In the game Felix – Stanek, Brno 1999, White played 10.b3± and black countered that with a horrible positional blunder: 10... 
éf6?? 11.d5 
éxf3 12. 
éxf3 
ée5 13. 
ée3 
éc7 14. 
éc3± and his position became strategically hopeless due to the gaping weakness on the e6-square. Meanwhile, some more sensible lines for Black were not good enough to equalize either: 10...d5 11. 
éc5 
éc8 12.g4 
ég6 13. 
éc3 e6 14. 
éf4 
ée7 15. b4†, or 10...e6 11.d5 exd5 12.cxd5 
éxf3 13. 
éxf3 
ée5 14. 
ée2±. It is quite interesting for White to try the energetic variation: 10.g4 
ég6 11.d5. He acquires plenty of space and the vulnerability of his king becomes irrelevant. Black’s kingside is not developed at all and that is much more important in addition to the tactical possibilities for White connected with the placement of the black queen on the d7-square: 11... 
éb4 (It is too dangerous for Black to play 11... 
ée5, because of 12. 
éd4 h5 13.f4 
éxb1 14. 
éxb1 
éxc4 15. b3++) 12. 
éh4 (12. 
éd4 e5?) 12... 
éxb1 (12...e5 13. 
éc3 and Black loses after 13... 
ée7? 14. 
éxg6 hxg6 15.a3 
éa6 16.c5++. He should play instead: 13... 
éc8 14. a3 
éa6 15.a4 
éd8 16. 
éxg6 hxg6 17. 
ég2± 
éxc4? 18.a5?) 13. 
éxb1 
éxa2 14. 
éd2 (14. 
ée3!?) 
éb4 15. 
éa1 
éa6 16. 
éb3 
éc8 17. 
éfe1±) 14...a5 15. 
éb3 
éb4 16. 
éxb4 aaxb4 17. 
éxb4† and White opens the position enjoying a great lead in development;

6...h6. This is not the best move for Black, but it is still reasonable – it prevents 
éf3-g5 and thus White fails to obtain immediate advantages exploiting the well-familiar maneuver h2-h3 and after 
ég4-h5 – e5-e6! Meanwhile, Black’s last move is hardly useful for him in case of somewhat different developments on the board. 7.c4 
éb6 8.exd6 exd6 9.h3 
éh5 10. 
éc3 
ée7 11.b3 0–0 12. 
ée3 d5 13.c5 
éc8, Krstevski – Oberrauch, Herculane 1994. It was very strong for White here to continue with 14.b4, occupying space on the queenside with some edge, because it is not good for Black to play 14... 
éxb4, because of 15. 
éb3 a5 16.a3 
éc6 17. 
éxb7 
éa7 18. 
éb3±. Instead, Black should place his bishop on
f6 on move 14 and try to bring his knight on c6 to the f5-square via e7. His position would remain worse anyway;

6...g6 7.h3. This is White's most energetic line in this position, since he deploys his powerful bishop on the long diagonal. 7...xf3 (It is not good for Black to play here: 7...f5 8.e6! The point is that after: 8...fxe6 9.g4 e4 10.h5 h6 11.xe6 d7 12.xh6 xex6 13.c4++; 10...f6 11.d5 c4±, Black loses a piece without any sufficient compensation. It is also unsatisfactory for him to try: 8...db4 9.exf7+ xf7 10.a3 g7 11. c3++; 10...g7 11.d5 e5 12. d4++, because his position would be strategically hopeless, Kleeschaetzky – Jaeger, Ilmenau, 1981.) 8.xf3 dxe5 9.dxe5

11.b3 b8 12.ad1 c8 13.g5 and the game transposes to the encounter Barbitskij – Smelov, St Petersburg 2000, or 11...c8 12.g5 d4 13.xd3 c5 14.f6++; 12...g7 13.xe7 xex7 14.xc6 bxc6 15.a3 e8 16.e3+. 11... g7 (It is too dangerous for Black to capture the pawn: after: 11...d4 12.d1 xe5 13.d2 g8 14.c3++; 12.g5 0–0 (Here however, Black had to try to avoid the immediate disaster by playing: 12...xe5 13.d1 b8 14.xe7 xe7 15.xc6 bxc6++; 14.c3 0–0 15.e4 f6 16.e3 f5--; White still has to prove that he has some compensation for the pawn.) 13.xc6 bxc6 14.a3 f6 (14...e8 15. c3++; and Black remains totally pinned.) 15.exf6 xf6 16.xf6 xf6 17.c3±. Black is left with plenty of weaknesses to worry about, Tischbierek – Kindl, Balatonbereny 1987;

Similarly, after 9...db4 (instead of 9...e6) 10.d2 e6 11.c3 (Possibly, it might be better for White to follow with: 11.a3 d5 12.c4 in order to reach the same position, except with a pawn on a3 and not on the a2-square.)

11...d5 12.c4 de7 13.b3 (13.a4 g7 14.g5 and we witness a transposition to the game Tischbierek – Kindl, Balatonbereny 1987.) 13.b8 14.d1 c8 15.g5 g7 (15...xe5 16.f6 xf3+ 17.e8+ g8 18.c3 c6 19.e4± and despite the missing pawn, White's position is over-
whelming.) 16.\( \text{xf6} \) 0–0 17.\( \text{xf7} \) (17.\( \text{c3?!} \)) 17...\( \text{xf7} \) Barbitskij – Smelov, St. Petersburg 2000 and here White had to play 18.\( \text{c3} \), defending his e5-pawn and maintaining a stable advantage;

6...\( \text{xf3} \) 7.\( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 8.\( \text{dxe5} \) (the arising position is similar to the one that we have already analyzed in the line 6...g6, except that Black cannot develop his bishop to g7. His f6-square has not been weakened, though...) 8...e6 (8...\( \text{db4} \) 9.e6 \( \text{fxe6} \) 10.\( \text{xc6+} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 11.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{d5} \) 12.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f5} \) 13.\( \text{e3} \) g6 14.\( \text{b5} \) 0–0–0 15.\( \text{xa7+} \) \( \text{xa7} \) 16.\( \text{xa7} \) and White remains with a superior pawn-structure and safer king, while the material is equal, Shaposhnikov – Akbaev, Kolontaevo 1998. It was even better for White, instead of exchanging on c6, to play: 10.\( \text{d2} \)!, preventing the trade of queens and threatening to capture on b4 and b7. After 10...\( \text{d6} \), White follows with 11.\( \text{xb4} \)± and it is not good for Black to play: 11...\( \text{xb4} \)? 12.\( \text{xc6+} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) 13.\( \text{h5++} \).) 9.c4 \( \text{de7} \) 10.\( \text{a4} \) (here, just like in the quite similar position in the line 6...g6, White must seriously consider 10.\( \text{b3} \)??) 10...\( \text{d4} \). Black cannot evacuate his knight away from the e7-square; otherwise he cannot complete his development, so he is forced to enter quite unclear complications while having his pieces not developed. 11.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{xb2} \) (11...\( \text{c5} \) 12.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{g6?} \) 13.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{b4} \) 14.\( \text{xc6++} \) P. Sanchez – Burgos, Madrid 2001; Black could have avoided the blunder on his move 12 and played instead: 12...\( \text{b8} \) 13.\( \text{c3} \), but it would have remained quite unclear how he could have completed his development.) 12.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) (12...\( \text{xe7} \)? 13.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{b6} \) 14.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{d8} \) 15.\( \text{xc7+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16.\( \text{c5+} \) \( \text{e8} \) 17.\( \text{c8+} \) \( \text{d8} \) 18.\( \text{c6+} \) \( \text{e7} \) 19.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{xa3} \) 20.\( \text{fd1} \) \( \text{d3} \) 21.\( \text{c7+} \) \( \text{e8} \) 22.\( \text{b8+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 23.\( \text{ab1} \)–. Black cannot change anything with: 17...\( \text{e7} \) 18.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 19.\( \text{fd1} \), because he is forced to give up his rook on d7 in order to avoid being checkmated.) 13.\( \text{xc6+} \) \( \text{f8} \) 14.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 15.\( \text{c3} \). Black lags in development and the b and d-files are opened, so his position is quite unpleasant. His attempt to connect his rooks with 15...g6, would be countered by White with: 16.\( \text{ab1} \) \( \text{c8} \) 17.\( \text{c6} \) \( \text{g7} \) 18.\( \text{b7} \) and Black loses material and his position is very bad too. It is slightly better for him to play 15...c6, but White would follow that with 16.\( \text{fd1} \) and then \( \text{c3-e4} \).

\[ a) \text{6...b6} \]
The main drawback of that unforced retreat is that after the trade on f3, White can exploit the possibility to capture on c6 and that would compromise Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside.

7.h3 \(\text{xf3}\)

White obtains the two bishop advantage after that exchange.

The move 7...\(\text{h5}\), Fioramonti – J.Graf, Geneve 1990 permits the standard sacrifice: 8.e6?! fxe6 9.\(\text{xe3}\) (White could have tried the same idea – to protect the d4-pawn and try to play next \(\text{f3-g5}\), by playing 9.c3 \(\text{d7}\) 10.\(\text{e1}\), in order to preserve the e-file void of pieces. The move 9.\(\text{xe3}\) leads to a postponement of the attack of the e6-square.) 9...\(\text{d7}\) 10.\(\text{c3}\) 0–0–0 (Black should have possibly refrained from the seemingly natural long castle and played instead: 10...\(\text{d5}\) 11.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 12.\(\text{xe2}\) \(\text{d8}\), although even then White would have an excellent compensation for the pawn, because the black king would have remained stranded in the centre.) 11.a4 \(\text{b8}\) (The move 11...a5 compromises Black’s king-position too much: 12.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 13.\(\text{xe2}\) \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{b5}\) h6 15.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{xe6}\) 16.d5 \(\text{xd5}\) 17.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{f7}\) 18.\(\text{a3}\) e6 19.\(\text{b3}\))— and after the capture on d5, White takes on b7 and follows that with \(\text{b3-c3}\).) 12.a5 \(\text{d5}\) 13.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 14.\(\text{xe2}\). The defects of Black’s position have remained (his kingside is not well developed, his pieces are quite passive and his king is potentially vulnerable), while his extra pawn is absolutely immaterial.

7...\(\text{f5}\). The drawback of that retreat of the bishop is that after the exchange on d6, followed by d4-d5, the black bishop can be attacked with tempo with the move \(\text{f3-d4}\). 8.exd6 exd6 (in case of 8...cxd6 9.d5 \(\text{b4}\) 10.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 11.c4, Black can develop his kingside by either pushing his e-pawn forward, creating plenty of weaknesses in the centre, or by playing: 11...\(\text{g6}\) 12.a3 \(\text{a6}\) 13.a4 \(\text{g7}\) 14.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{c8}\) 15.\(\text{c3}\) 0–0 16.\(\text{g5}\), which would lead to an extremely cramped position for him.) 9.d5 \(\text{e5}\), Sponnheim – Appel, St Ingbert 1988, 10.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 11.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{d7}\). White’s advantage is only slight indeed, nevertheless it is quite stable: 12.b3 0–0 13.\(\text{c3}\). White has extra space, while the mobility of the black pieces (particularly the knight on b6 and the bishop on d7) is considerably restricted.

8.\(\text{xf3}\)

8...\(\text{dxe5}\)
In the game Boleslavsky – Mikenas, Leningrad 1962, after 8...e6 9.exd6 wxd6 (in case of 9...cxd6 10.d5± we can see the misplacement of the black knight on the c6-square and after the forced exchange: 10...bx5 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}x\textguillemotright}d5 ex5 12.wxd5± Black’s d6-pawn remains very weak) 10.c3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}7 11.d2 0–0 0 12.wf2 wd7 and White’s attack’s is much faster than Black’s counterplay: 13.a4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}d\textguillemotright}5 14.wc4 whe8 15.d2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}f\textguillemotright}8 16.b4. The game later followed with: 16...d6 17.b5 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}e7 18.a5 df5 and here White could have played 19.wd3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}c3-c4, or even the more aggressive: 19.g4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}h\textguillemotright}h4 20.c4. Both lines win material for White by force and Black has no compensation whatsoever.

9.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}c6+ bxc6 10.dxe5 wxe1

It is not very sensible for Black to play here: 10...wxd5 11.wb2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}d\textguillemotright}7 12.f4 e6 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}c3 wa5 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}e4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}7 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}e3 0–0 0 16.c4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}d8 17.b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}b\textguillemotright}6 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}d1 h6 19.wf2± and it becomes obvious that Black has preserved the queens on the board simply in vain – his queen on a5 is misplaced, just like the rest of his light pieces, Simkin – Petrak, Prague 2005.

11.wxd1 e6

White now begins to restrict the mobility of Black’s pieces.

12.b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}d\textguillemotright}8

Black hardly changes much with: 12...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}7 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}b\textguillemotright}2 0–0 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}d\textguillemotright}2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}f\textguillemotright}d8 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}e4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}f\textguillemotright}8 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}f\textguillemotright}1 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}d\textguillemotright}5 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}4± Traeger – Zeitz, Germany 1990.

13.wxd8+ wxd8 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}b\textguillemotright}2 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}7 15.c4 \textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}8

16.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}3± Wurschner – Cardoso Garcia, corr. 2001. White maintains his space advantage and he controls reliably the central squares. Black’s queenside pawns remain chronically weak. After White centralizes his king, he can prepare a pawn-offensive with f2-f4, g2-g4 etc.

b) 6.dxe5 7.\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}e5

7...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}c\textguillemotright}e5

7...\textcolor{red}{\text{\textguillemotleft}e\textguillemotright}xe2 8.wxe2 wxd4. (It is too dangerous for Black to accept the pawn-sacrifice – he should better trade on e5 and transpose to the main line: 8...wxe5 9.dxe5 – see 7...wxe5; 8...wxd6 9.wc6
\(\text{\textcopyright }\text{xc6 10.c4 \textit{\textcopyright}a6 11.\textit{\textcopyright}e1 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 12.\textit{\textcopyright}c3 e6 13.\textit{\textcopyright}b5!\pm. Black’s lag in development is too great and in the game Malisauskas – Fioramonti, Bern 1992, White exploited that quickly with: 13...0-0-0 14.\textit{\textcopyright}f4 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 15.b4 \textit{\textcopyright}e8 16.\textit{\textcopyright}ab1 \textit{\textcopyright}d6 17.\textit{\textcopyright}xd6 \textit{\textcopyright}xd6 18.\textit{\textcopyright}b3 c6 19.\textit{\textcopyright}a3 \textit{\textcopyright}b6 20.\textit{\textcopyright}xd6+ \textit{\textcopyright}xd6 21.c5 winning a rook; Black does not have any real chances to equalize after: 8...e6 9.\textit{\textcopyright}xc6 bxc6 10.c4 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 11.\textit{\textcopyright}f3 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 12.\textit{\textcopyright}g5 \textit{\textcopyright}e7 13.\textit{\textcopyright}c3 0-0 14.\textit{\textcopyright}ad1\pm, because his doubled pawns are too weak, Kofman – Mikenas, USSR 1942.) 9.\textit{\textcopyright}c4 c5 (It deserved attention for Black to try here: 9...f6 10.\textit{\textcopyright}xd4 fxe5 11.\textit{\textcopyright}xe5 \textit{\textcopyright}d6 12.\textit{\textcopyright}e4 0-0-0, Lausten – Vio, IECC 2000. White still maintains some advantage after: 13.\textit{\textcopyright}a3 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 14.\textit{\textcopyright}a4 a6 15.\textit{\textcopyright}f4\pm, because his pieces are active and his pawn-structure is superior.) 10.\textit{\textcopyright}e3 a6 11.\textit{\textcopyright}c3! e6 12.\textit{\textcopyright}xd4 \textit{\textcopyright}b6. (It is too bad for Black to play: 12...cxd4 13.\textit{\textcopyright}a4+, because his king is forced to go to the e7-square, since after: 13...b5 White has 14.\textit{\textcopyright}xb5+-.) 13.\textit{\textcopyright}b3 cxd4 14.\textit{\textcopyright}a4 \textit{\textcopyright}xa4 (The alternative for Black here is – 14...\textit{\textcopyright}d5 – but after 15.\textit{\textcopyright}xb7 \textit{\textcopyright}e7 16.\textit{\textcopyright}c6+ \textit{\textcopyright}f8 17.\textit{\textcopyright}ad1 \textit{\textcopyright}c8 18.\textit{\textcopyright}xa6 \textit{\textcopyright}xc2 19.\textit{\textcopyright}c6\pm he loses a pawn without any compensation.) 15.\textit{\textcopyright}xb7! \textit{\textcopyright}d5 16.\textit{\textcopyright}xf7+ \textit{\textcopyright}d8 17.\textit{\textcopyright}fe1. Black has some material advantage indeed, but he fails to defend his king in the centre. (White is threatening c2-c4 and in case of \textit{\textcopyright}d6 – \textit{\textcopyright}b7, while the capture on c3 would be countered with \textit{\textcopyright}ad1.) 17...\textit{\textcopyright}c5. (Black could have tried to defend with 17...\textit{\textcopyright}xb2, in order to prevent White’s rook from coming to d1, but his position is hopeless anyway: 18.\textit{\textcopyright}ab1 \textit{\textcopyright}a3 19.\textit{\textcopyright}xg7 \textit{\textcopyright}e8 20.c4 dxc3 21.\textit{\textcopyright}f7+ \textit{\textcopyright}e7 22.\textit{\textcopyright}h6+ \textit{\textcopyright}d6 23.\textit{\textcopyright}xc3 \textit{\textcopyright}c5 24.\textit{\textcopyright}f7+ \textit{\textcopyright}e7 25.\textit{\textcopyright}g7+. Black cannot defend against White’s threats with: 17...\textit{\textcopyright}c5 18.c4 \textit{\textcopyright}d6 19.\textit{\textcopyright}b7+– Korneev – Rojo Huerta, Corunha 2000.) 18.\textit{\textcopyright}ad1 \textit{\textcopyright}c8 19.c3 d3 20.\textit{\textcopyright}b4 d2 21.\textit{\textcopyright}e2 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 22.\textit{\textcopyright}f3+– and Black resigned, because of the unavoidable material losses after the capture on d2, Thorstein – C.Hansen, Reykjavik 1985.

8.dxe5

\[\text{8...\textit{\textcopyright}xe2} \]

8...\textit{\textcopyright}c8?! – is a very strange move. 9.c4 \textit{\textcopyright}b6 10.\textit{\textcopyright}xd8+ \textit{\textcopyright}xd8 11.\textit{\textcopyright}c3\pm Poitras – Hladek, Richmond 2002.

It is possible for Black to try the seldom played move: 8...\textit{\textcopyright}e6 (he is now forced to develop his other bishop on the g7-square, but it is misplaced there, because its scope of action is restricted by...}
the e5-pawn) 9.c4 (9...d2!? d7 10.d3 0–0–0 11.c4 b6) 9...b6 10.b3 (Unfortunately for White, he achieves nothing much with:
10...d4 11.e3 exd5 12.d1 c6 13.c3 c7 14.ac1 f5 and it is quite unclear how he can break through, while Black still has an extra pawn to rely on.)
10...xd1 11.xd1 c6 12.c3 d7 13.f4 g5. This move is sensible; otherwise the g7-bishop is doomed to remain passive. 14.g3 gxf4 15.gxf4 f6 16.h5+ d8 17.e4 (17.e2 fxe5 18.fxe5 c8 19.f4 f5 20.b2 h6=). It is possibly better for White to continue with: 17.exf6! exf6 18.f2 c7 19.b2 f3, e1, d1.)
17...c7 18.b2 h6= (it is too bad for Black to play here: 18...g8+ 19.f2 fxe5? 20.g5+ and in the game Lurje – Wolff, Switzerland 1994, Black lost the exchange, because in case of 20...f5 21.f7 g7, White would follow with: 22.e6+–) 19.exf6 exf6= and White has no real advantage at all. He should better try 12.d2, in order to manage to defend his e5-pawn with his bishop and also later to be able to choose between two maneuvers with the knight d2-f3-d4 (g5), or d2-e4-g5(c5). White maintains a slight advantage in the endgame, for example:
12...d7 (12...g6 13.e4 d7 14.f4=) 13.b2 g6 14.f3 d5, or d4.

It is also acceptable for Black to play: 8...f5 9.c4 b6 (It is worse for him to try: 9...b4 10.a4+ c6. In comparison to the line 9...b6, Black has presented his opponent with an extra tempo for the development of the rook: 11.d1 d7 12.e6! fxe6 13.c2 g6 14.g4 g7 15.e4 c8 16.c3 e5. Black cannot castle anyway, while the retreat of the knight to d8 is too passive. 17.h6 f6 18.h3 d7 19.xd7! xxd7 20.xe6 d8 21.d1 c3 22.xd8+ xd8 23.xf7+ xf7 24.xf3+ f6 25.g4=). Black's king is seriously endangered and his pieces are too passive, so a queen and a pawn are evidently stronger than two rooks, Dannberg – Cafferty, corr. 1965.) 10.b3 e6 (10...d4 11.e3 xe5, Preissmann – Fioramonti, Geneva 1992, 12.d1. Contrary to the similar position in the line 8...e6, Black's bishop does not pin the c4-pawn and he fails to consolidate his position with the move 12...c6, because of 13.c5. In case Black tries to defend his b7-pawn with 12...e4, White plays 13.c3 c6 14.c5 d7 15.b5=–. He is threatening f2-f4 and Black would surely fail to hold on to his extra pawn with his king stranded in the centre.) 11.d1 c8 (It is considerably weaker for Black to play 11...e7?. After 12.c3 g5 13.f3 c6 14.b5! White obtains a decisive advantage: 14...h6 15.d6+ f8 16.e3 c7 17.xf5 exf5 18.c5+ g7 19.d6+- E.Alekseev

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- Kupreichik, Ekaterinburg 2002. It is also bad for Black to try the move: 12...c6, because of the same reason: 13.\(\text{\&}b5\) cxb5 14.\(\text{\&}xb5+\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 15.\(\text{\&}g5++\); Black loses after: 12...\(\text{\&}c5\) 13.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}xe5\) 14.c5 \(\text{\&}xc5?\) 15.\(\text{\&}b5++;\) but he could have possibly defended more stubbornly with 12...a6, preparing either \(\text{\&}e7-b4,\) or \(\text{\&}e7-c5,\) but still after 13.\(\text{\&}e4\) \(\text{\&}b4\) 14.\(\text{\&}xb4\) \(\text{\&}xb4\) 15.\(\text{\&}xb6\) cxb6 16.a3 \(\text{\&}e7\) 17.\(\text{\&}f3\pm\) the endgame is very difficult for Black.) 12. \(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}c2\) 13.\(\text{\&}d4\pm.\) Presently, White prevents Black from castling long. His position is clearly better – he leads in development and he has extra space. Later, in the game Korneev – Panchenko, Berga 1996, there followed: 13...\(\text{\&}g6\) (\(\text{\&}c5\)) 14.h4 c5 (14... \(\text{\&}c5\) 15.\(\text{\&}d1\) 0–0 16.h5 \(\text{\&}xb1\) 17. \(\text{\&}xb1\pm\) 15.\(\text{\&}d1\) \(\text{\&}c2\) 16.\(\text{\&}e1\) \(\text{\&}xb1\) 17.\(\text{\&}xb1\) \(\text{\&}c7\) 18.\(\text{\&}d1\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 19.a3!? (\(\text{\&}b4\)) This is a positional pawn-sacrifice, which is not quite necessary in that situation indeed, but still after: 19...\(\text{\&}xe5\) (or 19...\(\text{\&}xe5\) 20.\(\text{\&}f4\) \(\text{\&}f6\) 21.\(\text{\&}g4\)+ and \(\text{\&}xe6\)) 20.\(\text{\&}f3\) 0–0 21.\(\text{\&}f4\) \(\text{\&}f6\) 22.\(\text{\&}e3\) h6 23.\(\text{\&}f3\) (\(\text{\&}e4\)) 23... e5 24.\(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}b6\) 25.\(\text{\&}g4\) \(\text{\&}d6\) 26.b4 \(\text{\&}he8\) 27.bxc5 \(\text{\&}xc5\) 28.\(\text{\&}e4\) b6 29.\(\text{\&}b5\) \(\text{\&}xa3,\) White could have won immediately with the move 30.\(\text{\&}f3++.\)

9.\(\text{\&}xe2\) \(\text{\&}d7\)

Black should not blunder a pawn with: 9...e6? 10.\(\text{\&}b5+\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 11.\(\text{\&}xb7\) \(\text{\&}d8\) 12.\(\text{\&}c4\) \(\text{\&}b4\) 13.\(\text{\&}g5\) \(\text{\&}c2\) 14.\(\text{\&}xd8\) \(\text{\&}xd8\) 15.\(\text{\&}c3\) \(\text{\&}xa1\) 16.\(\text{\&}d1++\) Hmadi – Srivachirananov, Erevan 1996.

It is also wrong to permit White to push e5–e6: 9...c6?! 10.e6 f5 11.\(\text{\&}g5\) g6 12.\(\text{\&}b6\) 13.\(\text{\&}d1\) \(\text{\&}b8?\) (13...\(\text{\&}c7\) 14.\(\text{\&}c3\pm\)) 14.\(\text{\&}c5\) \(\text{\&}a4\) (14...\(\text{\&}d5\) 15.\(\text{\&}xd5++\) 15.\(\text{\&}c2\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 16.\(\text{\&}c1+\) Zarnicki – Bulcourf, Buenos Aires 1995.

9...\(\text{\&}c8\) (this move is too passive in comparison to 9...\(\text{\&}d7\)) 10.c4 \(\text{\&}b4\) 11.\(\text{\&}e4\) e6 12.\(\text{\&}c3\) \(\text{\&}c6\) 13.\(\text{\&}e1\) g6 (Black would have preferred to avoid playing that move, but in case he had developed his bishop along the a3–f8 diagonal, White had the resource 14.\(\text{\&}g4\).) 14.\(\text{\&}g5\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 15.\(\text{\&}h4\pm\) and Black’s position is difficult, because he cannot castle due to his numerous weaknesses on the kingside, Palac – Gazik, Zillertal 1993.

10.c4

10...\(\text{\&}b4\)

It is not good now for Black to play 10...\(\text{\&}b6\) (his knight is much more passive here in comparison to the c6-square) 11.\(\text{\&}c3\) e6 12.\(\text{\&}g5\) h6 13.\(\text{\&}h4\) \(\text{\&}c6\) 14. \(\text{\&}fd1\) g5 (This move compromises Black’s kingside considerably,
but he cannot solve his problems with: 14...\textcorner b4 15.\textcorner b5 a6 16. \textsquare ac1± and \textcorner d4) 15.\textcorner g3 h5 (It is too bad for Black to play: 15...\textcheckmate xc4 16.\textcheckmate xc4 \textcorner xc4 17. \textcorner b5 \textsquare c8 18.\textsquare ac1 \textdot xb2 19.\textsquare d2 \textdot a4 20.\textcheckmate xc7+ \textqueen e7 21.\textcheckmate d5+) 16. h4 \textqueen e7 17.\textcheckmate xg5 \textcheckmate xg5 18.\textcorner e4 \textqueen e7 19.\textcheckmate f3± Black's position is quite weakened now and in the game Brinckmann - Schoenmann, Bremen 1927, there followed 18...\textqueen e7 19.\textcheckmate f3 \textcorner d7 20. b4 0-0-0 (The move 20...h4 does not help much: 21.\textqueen h2 h3 22.b5 \textcheckmate xc4 23.\textsquare ac1 \textcheckmate xb5 24.\textcheckmate xc7 \textsquare d8 25.\textcheckmate xb7 \textqueen a5 26.\textcheckmate f6+ \textcheckmate xf6 27. \textcheckmate xf6 \textqueen g8 28.\textcheckmate c6++) 21.b5 \textcheckmate xc4 22.\textsquare ac1 \textcheckmate xb5 23.\textcheckmate xf7 \textqueen b4 24. \textcheckmate xe6 \textcheckmate xe4 (24...h4 25.\textcheckmate c4++) 25.\textcheckmate xe7 h4 26.\textcheckmate xc7+ \textcheckmate xc7 27. \textcheckmate d6+ \textcorner c8 28.\textsquare c1+ and White won.

11.\textcorner d1 \textcheckmate f5 12.\textcorner c3 \textcheckmate c6 13. \textcorner e3 a6
Black loses after: 13...\textcheckmate xe5? 14.\textcorner b5 \textsquare c8 15.\textcheckmate d3 \textsquare d8 16. \textcheckmate f5! \textcheckmate xd1+ (16...e6 17.\textcheckmate xd8++) 17.\textcheckmate xd1 f6 (or 17...e6 18.\textcheckmate d3 \textcheckmate d6 19.\textcheckmate f4 \textcheckmate f5 20.\textcheckmate xc7++) 18. \textcheckmate c8+ \textcheckmate f7 19.\textcheckmate xc7++. Following 13...g6? White can simply win a pawn: 14.\textcorner b5 \textsquare c8 15.\textcheckmate xa7 \textcheckmate xa7 16.\textcheckmate xa7 \textcheckmate g7 (after 16...b6 White plays 17.c5+ and Black fails to trap the bishop) 17.\textcorner d4 0-0 18.\textcorner c3 \textcheckmate e6 19.\textcheckmate e4 c6 20. \textcheckmate d4± Kindermann - Siegel, Munich 1993.

14.\textcheckmate f4 e6 (diagram)
15.a3±. White has a better development and plenty of space and his rook is ready to penetrate Black's seventh rank.

c) 6.e6 7.c4

7...\textcorner b6
In case of 7...\textcheckmate f3 8.\textcheckmate xf3 \textcorner b6 (Black loses a piece after: 8...\textcorner db4? 9.d5 \textcheckmate xe5 10.\textcheckmate a4+ c6 11.\textcheckmate x b4+ Kwong - Bailen, USA 1998; 8...\textcheckmate de7 9.exd6 \textcheckmate xd6 10.\textcorner c3 – see 7...\textcheckmate de7 8.exd6 \textcheckmate xd6 9.\textcorner c3 \textcheckmate xf3 10.\textcheckmate xf3) 9.exd6 cxd6 10.\textcorner c3 it is too dangerous for Black to capture the pawn with: 10...\textcheckmate xc4. After 11.d5! White's threats are extremely dangerous: 11...\textcheckmate de5 (11...exd5 12.\textcheckmate xd5 \textcorner b6 13.\textcheckmate b3 \textcheckmate xd5 14.\textcheckmate xd5 \textcheckmate b8 15.\textcheckmate e1+ \textcorner e7 16.\textcheckmate g5 f6 17.\textcorner d2± Reig – Cardona, Spain 2004) 12.dxe6 fx e 6 13. \textcheckmate xb7 \textcheckmate b8 14.\textcorner a6 \textcheckmate e7? (Black
should better try: 14...d5 15.b3 $\triangle b4$ 16.$\triangle a4\pm$ 15.$\triangle x c4$ $\triangle c4$ 16.$\mathbb{W} a4+$ $\mathbb{D} d7$ 17.$\triangle x c4+$ Goe-rens – Kries, Luxemburg 2000. The best for Black here is: 10...
$\mathbb{D} e7$ 11.d5 exd5 12.$\triangle x d5\pm$ Celis – Bulcourf, Buenos Aires 1995, except that following 12...$\triangle x d5$, White must capture on d5 not with the pawn, as in the game, because that only closes the diagonal for the bishop, but with the bishop, or with the queen and then his advantage is considerable.

The move 7...$\mathbb{Q} d e7$ does not contribute to Black’s development. White opens the position with 8.exd6

And now:

8...$\mathbb{D} x d6$ 9.d5! provides a huge advantage for him, for example: 9...exd5 10.cxd5 $\mathbb{Q} x f3$ (10...$\mathbb{D} e 5$
11.$\mathbb{D} e 1$ $\mathbb{Q} g 6??$ 12.$\triangle x e 5$ $\triangle x e 5$
13.$\triangle x g 4$ $\triangle e 7$ 14.$\mathbb{W} a 4+$ $\mathbb{Q} f 8$ 15.
$\triangle e 2\pm$ Keres – Halaczinsky, corr. 1936. Naturally, Black did not need to blunder a piece, but still it is quite unclear how he could have completed his development in this line – in case of 11...$\mathbb{Q} f 3$, White could have made a good use of the transposition of moves and played: 12.$\mathbb{Q} b 5+$ $\mathbb{D} d 7$ 13. $\mathbb{W} x f 8\pm$, after which Black simply has nothing to move.) 11.
$\triangle f 3$ $\mathbb{Q} e 5$ 12.$\mathbb{D} c 3$ $\mathbb{Q} f 7 g 6$ 13.$\mathbb{W} a 4+$
$\mathbb{D} d 7$ 14.$\mathbb{W} x d 7+$ $\mathbb{D} x d 7$ 15.$\triangle e 2\pm$;

Black often tries in practice here: 8...$\mathbb{D} x d 6$ 9.$\mathbb{Q} c 3$ $\mathbb{Q} x f 3$ (It is bad for him to play: 9...0–0–0?
10.$\mathbb{Q} g 5$ $\triangle e 2$ 11.$\triangle x e 2$ and Black’s f7-pawn is defenseless: 11...
$\mathbb{D} x d 4$ 12.$\mathbb{D} c 3$ !f6 13.$\mathbb{D} f 7$ $\mathbb{D} d 7$
14.$\triangle x h 8+$ Djaja – Janosevic, Belgrade 1948, or 9...$\mathbb{D} f 5$? 10.d5
$\mathbb{Q} c 7$ 11.$\mathbb{W} a 4+$ c6 12.c5! $\mathbb{W} x c 5$
13.$\mathbb{W} x g 4+$ Schoenmann – Engel, Hamburg 1932. It is insufficient for Black to try: 9...$\mathbb{D} g 6$!
10.d5! exd5 11.cxd5 $\mathbb{Q} x f 3$ 12. $\mathbb{G} x f 3$! $\mathbb{Q} e 5$ 13.$\mathbb{Q} b 5$ $\mathbb{D} d 7$ 14.f4±
Aronin – Mikenas, USSR 1951 and now it is bad for him to play: 14...
$\mathbb{Q} f 3+$ 15.$\mathbb{W} x f 3$ $\mathbb{W} x b 5$ 16.$\mathbb{W} e 1+$
$\triangle e 7$ 17.f5 $\mathbb{Q} h 4$ 18.$\mathbb{W} x e 7+$ $\mathbb{W} x e 7$
19.$\mathbb{G} g 5+-$, as well as: 14...$\mathbb{D} h 4$
15.$\mathbb{W} x e 5$ $\mathbb{Q} h 3$ 16.$\triangle x c 7+$ $\mathbb{Q} d 8$ 18.
$\triangle e 6+$ $\triangle e 7$ 19.$\mathbb{G} g 5+-$. The move 9...a6 is only slightly better, but in the game Louma – Kricmar, Chomutov 1954, White countered it with: 10.$\mathbb{D} e 4$ $\mathbb{W} d 8$ 11.$\mathbb{D} c 5$
b6 12.$\mathbb{Q} b 3\pm$, he defended his d4-pawn and obtained a slight advantage. Instead, it is more energetic for White to play: 10.d5
exd5 11.cxd5 $\mathbb{Q} x f 3$ 12.$\mathbb{Q} x f 3$ $\mathbb{Q} e 5$
13.$\mathbb{D} e 1\pm$. Black is now forced to castle queenside and White can already operate on the open c-file. The placement of the black knight on the e5-square is a bit unstable too. There might follow:
13...0-0 14.\textit{\textsc{ae}} 3. Now, all attempts by Black to develop his kingside have certain drawbacks too, for example: 14...\textit{\textsc{dc}} 7g6 15.\textit{\textsc{xc}} 1 \textit{\textsc{xe}} 7 16.\textit{\textsc{ae}} 2 and the natural move 16...\textit{\textsc{dh}} 8? is bad, because of 17.\textit{\textsc{fd}} 4 \textit{\textsc{ed}} 7 18.\textit{\textsc{ce}} 4 \textit{\textsc{xb}} 4 19.\textit{\textsc{dc}} 4 \textit{\textsc{xb}} 2 20.d6++; 14...\textit{\textsc{df}} 5 15.\textit{\textsc{df}} 4 \textit{\textsc{xf}} 3+ 16.\textit{\textsc{xf}} 3 \textit{\textsc{d}} 7 17.\textit{\textsc{ac}} 1++; 14...g6 15.\textit{\textsc{dd}} 4 \textit{\textsc{dg}} 7 16.\textit{\textsc{wa}} 7 \textit{\textsc{xf}} 3+ 17.\textit{\textsc{gf}} 3 and White's threats are quite serious now, for example: 17...\textit{\textsc{xc}} 3 18.\textit{\textsc{ac}} 5 \textit{\textsc{d}} 4 19.\textit{\textsc{dc}} 4 \textit{\textsc{he}} 8 20.\textit{\textsc{d}} 5 \textit{\textsc{wb}} 4 21.\textit{\textsc{de}} 4 \textit{\textsc{wb}} 5 22.\textit{\textsc{ec}} 1 \textit{\textsc{xd}} 5 23.\textit{\textsc{cc}} 5++. 10.\textit{\textsc{xf}} 3. Black has tried to hold that position in numerous ways:

He fails to avoid trouble with: 10...\textit{\textsc{xd}} 4 (It is hardly any better for Black to try: 10...\textit{\textsc{wd}} 7 11.d5, Kienhorst – van Bommel, corr. 1997, 11...\textit{\textsc{exd}} 5 12.\textit{\textsc{xd}} 5 \textit{\textsc{e}} 5 13.\textit{\textsc{ae}} 1 \textit{\textsc{xf}} 3+ 14.\textit{\textsc{xf}} 3++, because White enjoys a great lead in development, while the position is quite open, or 10...0-0 11.\textit{\textsc{db}} 5 \textit{\textsc{d}} 7 12.\textit{\textsc{wb}} 3 Matulovic – Knezevic, Bajmok 1975. White is attacking, while Black has no counterplay whatsoever. Later in the game there followed: 12...a6 13.\textit{\textsc{da}} 7+ \textit{\textsc{eb}} 8 14.\textit{\textsc{dx}} 6+ \textit{\textsc{xc}} 6 15.\textit{\textsc{ae}} 3 \textit{\textsc{e}} 8 16.\textit{\textsc{fd}} 1 \textit{\textsc{d}} 8 17.d5 \textit{\textsc{wc}} 8 18.c5++; and White won.) 11.\textit{\textsc{xb}} 7 \textit{\textsc{d}} 8 (11...\textit{\textsc{db}} 8, Ciocaltea – Knezevic, Vrnjacksa Banja 1975, 12.\textit{\textsc{a} 4+ c} 6 13.\textit{\textsc{xa}} 7 \textit{\textsc{d}} 8 14.\textit{\textsc{a}} 6+ 12.\textit{\textsc{a}} 4+ c 6 13.\textit{\textsc{a}} 3 \textit{\textsc{c}} 7 14.\textit{\textsc{xa}} 7 e 5 15.\textit{\textsc{fe}} 1 f 6 16.\textit{\textsc{ad}} 1 \textit{\textsc{ff}} 7 17.\textit{\textsc{dx}} 4 \textit{\textsc{xd}} 4 18.\textit{\textsc{a}} 6 De Firmian – Shamkovich, USA 1994. Black has failed to exploit the unfavourable placement of the bishop on b7 and White remained with an extra pawn in a better position;

Following 10...\textit{\textsc{xd}} 4 11.\textit{\textsc{db}} 5? Black is faced with numerous problems too: 11...\textit{\textsc{wd}} 1 (He loses after: 11...\textit{\textsc{wb}} 6? 12.\textit{\textsc{ae}} 3 \textit{\textsc{a}} 5 13.b4 \textit{\textsc{xb}} 4 14.\textit{\textsc{d}} 2. In the game Pulkkinen – Pitkaenen, corr. 1974, Black came under a dangerous attack after: 11...\textit{\textsc{wd}} 7 12.\textit{\textsc{a}} 4 a 6 13.\textit{\textsc{d}} 1 \textit{\textsc{cb}} 8 14.\textit{\textsc{d}} 4 b 5 15.\textit{\textsc{cb}} 5 \textit{\textsc{xd}} 4 16.\textit{\textsc{xd}} 4 \textit{\textsc{d}} 5 17.\textit{\textsc{xd}} 5 \textit{\textsc{exd}} 5 18.\textit{\textsc{e}} 1+ and here he resigned, because of the line: 18...\textit{\textsc{e}} 7 19.\textit{\textsc{g}} 5 f 6 20.\textit{\textsc{xf}} 6 \textit{\textsc{gx}} 6 21.\textit{\textsc{xf}} 6++. 12.\textit{\textsc{xd}} 1 \textit{\textsc{cc}} 8 13.\textit{\textsc{f}} 4 e 5 14.\textit{\textsc{xe}} 5! \textit{\textsc{xe}} 5 15.\textit{\textsc{xb}} 7 \textit{\textsc{xc}} 4 (15...\textit{\textsc{bb}} 8?? 16.\textit{\textsc{xc}} 7! Cornacchini – Zillmer, IECC 1998) 16.\textit{\textsc{ac}} 1 (this move is much stronger than the immediate win of the exchange: 16.\textit{\textsc{xc}} 8 \textit{\textsc{xc}} 8 17.\textit{\textsc{xc}} 7+ \textit{\textsc{e}} 7 18.\textit{\textsc{dd}} 4++) 16...\textit{\textsc{db}} 6 17.\textit{\textsc{xc}} 7+ \textit{\textsc{xc}} 7 18.\textit{\textsc{xc}} 7+ and Black will still lose his a7-pawn, while he completes his development. His position is terribly bad, indeed.

\textbf{8.exd6 cxd6 9.d5}

\textbf{9...exd5}

Following 9...\textit{\textsc{xf}} 3 10.\textit{\textsc{xf}} 3,
Black loses a pawn after: 10...\textit{c}e5 11.dxe6 \textit{x}xf3+ 12.\textit{w}xf3 fxe6 13.\textit{w}xb7+ Serpik – Massie, Alexandria 1996. He should play instead 10...exd5 11.\textit{d}xd5 \textit{e}7 (In case of 11...\textit{d}xd5, it is good for White to capture with the queen, as well as the possibility: 12.cxd5 \textit{e}5 13.f4 \textit{g}6 14.d4; 13...\textit{d}7 14.\textit{e}1+ \textit{e}7 15.\textit{e}2+ and Black still cannot castle.) 12.\textit{c}3 0–0 13.\textit{f}4+. Black’s pawn-structure is inferior and in case he tries to play actively with: \textit{e}7–f6, White can maintain his material advantage with: 13...\textit{d}7 (It is quite similar after: 13...\textit{f}6 14.\textit{d}xd6 \textit{d}xd6 15.\textit{w}xd5 \textit{e}8 16.\textit{b}5 \textit{e}2 17.\textit{c}7 \textit{c}8 18.\textit{f}e1! \textit{xe}1+. Black cannot capture on b2, because of the check on the e8-square. 19.\textit{xe}1 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{g}3+– Johansson – Freeman, Lugano 1968.) 14.\textit{c}1 \textit{f}6 15.\textit{d}xd6 \textit{d}d8 16.c5 \textit{d}xd5 17.\textit{w}xd5 b6 Svensson – Tagnon, Haifa 1976 and it is quite sufficient for White to play just one precise move – 18.\textit{e}4+ in order to preserve his extra pawn.

10.cxd5 \textit{x}f3

This is practically Black’s only move.

He loses a piece after: 10...\textit{b}4? 11.\textit{e}1+– Shirazi – Kanai, Haifa 1976.

It is a disaster for Black to try: 10...\textit{b}8 11.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}7 12.\textit{e}1 and he can already resign, because of the huge material losses, Posch – Karapetian, Vienna 1999.

It is also too bad for Black to play: 10...\textit{e}7 11.\textit{c}3+ \textit{g}6 (11...\textit{g}6?? 12.\textit{d}4+– Makra – Vodila, Miskolc 1998) 12.\textit{d}4. White’s attack against the g7-square prevents Black from developing his bishop on g7 and it is quite unclear now Black should proceed further: 12...\textit{d}7 13.\textit{e}1 \textit{f}6 14.\textit{a}6+ \textit{e}7 15.\textit{xf}6 \textit{gxf}6 16.\textit{xb}7+– and White won easily with an extra pawn, J.Horvath – Derera, Zalakaros 1993.

11.\textit{gxf}3!?

It is now essential for White to be able to check on the b5-square, just in case, and additionally the doubled pawns would help him restrict Black’s knights.

11...\textit{e}5 12.\textit{b}5+ \textit{bd}7

Following 12...\textit{ed}7, White plays 13.\textit{d}4 and again Black cannot develop his dark squared bishop, because of the loss of the g7-pawn, so he should play: 13.\textit{f}6 14.\textit{e}1+.

Black is now faced with a rather unpleasant choice: 14...\textit{e}7 15.\textit{xf}6 \textit{gxf}6, leaves his bishop on e7 quite passive, due to the doubled pawns, while
14...\textit{d8} enables White to retreat his queen and to play a middle game with a black king stranded on the d8-square. He maintains a huge advantage in both lines:

14...\textit{e7} 15.\textit{xf6} \textit{gxf6} 16.\textit{c3} a6 (16...\textit{d8} 17.\textit{f4} f5 18.\textit{d3} f6 19.\textit{xf5} \textit{xc3} 20.\textit{bxc3} \textit{xd5} 21.\textit{a3} (V.Bagirov) and White has a pair of active bishops in an open position. He has the edge despite the numerous mutual weaknesses.) 17.\textit{e2} \textit{e5} (In case of the immediate 17...\textit{f5}, White can play 18.\textit{f1}!?). He prepares the move \textit{e2-d3,} which would not be good immediately, due to \textit{d7-e5.} 18...\textit{f6} 19.\textit{d3} \textit{fxd5} 20.\textit{xf5} and White’s bishops are quite effective in an open position.) 18.\textit{f4} \textit{g8} 19.\textit{f1} \textit{g4} 20.\textit{d3}! \textit{f5} (following 20...\textit{h2}+ 21.\textit{e2}, Black’s knight might get trapped on the kingside, particularly in case White manages to play f2-f3) 21.\textit{xf5} \textit{h2}+ 22.\textit{e2} \textit{g4} 23.\textit{xe7} \textit{h8} 24.\textit{h1} \textit{f6} 25.\textit{e4} and White remained with an extra pawn, although doubled, in the game Vogt – Uddenfeldt, Skopje 1972;

14...\textit{d8} 15.\textit{d1} g5. This is an attempt by Black to organize some counterplay on the kingside. (He does not weaken his position so much after: 15...\textit{e7} 16.\textit{c3} \textit{c8} 17.\textit{e3} \textit{f5} 18.\textit{e2} \textit{e5}. This is practically the only way for Black to create some counterplay: 19.f4 \textit{g4}+ 20.\textit{e2} \textit{xg4} \textit{xe4} 21.\textit{xb6}+ \textit{xb6} 22.\textit{a4} \textit{h4} 23.\textit{e2} \textit{c7} 24.\textit{h3} \textit{f6} 25.\textit{d1} \textit{d5} 26.\textit{d4} \textit{f6} 27.\textit{b4} and Black has no active play, meanwhile his weakness on b6 is practically defenseless, Kroeger – Junge, Germany 1995.) 16.\textit{c3} \textit{e7} 17.\textit{e3} \textit{g8} 18.\textit{d4} \textit{e4} 19.\textit{f1} g4, Fiorito – Bulcourf, Villa Martelli 1996 and here White should have simply captured the pawn, without chasing ghosts: 20.\textit{fxg4} and Black cannot play: 20...\textit{h3} 21.\textit{f3} 21.\textit{g3} \textit{xe4} 22.\textit{xe7} \textit{xe7} 23.\textit{xc4}+ 22...\textit{xe7} 23.\textit{g4} 24.\textit{f1}+ 23.\textit{fxg3} \textit{xe7} 24.\textit{xc2}. On move 15 Black can also try: 15...\textit{f5}. This is an immediate attempt to create some counterplay with \textit{d7-e5.} 16.\textit{c3} \textit{e5} 17.\textit{f4} \textit{c4}+ 18.\textit{d1} \textit{xe4} 19.\textit{d2}. White makes use of the weakness of Black’s 8th rank. 19...\textit{c7} 20.\textit{d2} (This move is probably even stronger than 20.\textit{xb6} \textit{xb6} 21.\textit{e8} (I.Boleslavsky) 21...\textit{e5} 22.\textit{f6} 23.\textit{c5} 24.\textit{e4} \textit{e4} 25.\textit{e1} \textit{c1}+ with the idea to bring the second rook into the attack against the black king – \textit{e3} (e4)-b3 (b4) and Black is practically helpless.) 22.\textit{e5}+ b6 23.\textit{c3} (23.\textit{e5} b6 24.\textit{e6} \textit{c8} 25.\textit{c3}+.) 23...\textit{xd5} 24.\textit{d6} \textit{b7} 25.\textit{c6} 26.\textit{xe4} \textit{g7} 27.\textit{h3} White has the material advantage, while Black fails to trap the bishop on h8: 27...\textit{f6} 28.\textit{d1} \textit{c6} 29.\textit{d4} \textit{h6} 30.\textit{d4}+ \textit{b5}+ 31.\textit{b3}.–

13.\textit{e1} \textit{e7} 14.\textit{f4} \textit{g6} 15.\textit{f5} \textit{e5} 16.\textit{c3} a6
16...\textbullet h4 17.\textbullet xd7+ \textbullet xd7 18. \textbullet e4+.

16...\textbullet d8 17.f4 f5 18.\textbullet d3 \textbullet f6 19.\textbullet xf5 \textbullet xc3 20.bxc3 \textbullet xd5 21.\textbullet a3↑ (V.Bagirov) and there remain plenty of weaknesses for both sides, but White maintains his advantage thanks to his bishop pair in an open position.

17.\textbullet xd7+ \textbullet xd7
17...\textbullet xd7 18.f4 \textbullet c4 19. \textbullet d4+.

18.\textbullet g5 f6
It is also bad for Black to play: 18...\textbullet f6 19.\textbullet xf6 gxf6 20.\textbullet h1 and he cannot castle 20...0-0, because of: 21.\textbullet e3 \textbullet h8 22.\textbullet h3 \textbullet g8 23.\textbullet xh7+.

19.\textbullet h5+ \textbullet f8
(diagram)

20.\textbullet d2+ Oll – Kaunas, Clichy 1991.

White's advantage is quite clear, because of the vulnerability of Black's king and the lack of coordination of his rooks. The weakness of the e6-square is essential too. The moment White managed to bring his knight to that square, Black's position became just terrible: 19.\textbullet h5+ \textbullet f8 20.\textbullet d2 \textbullet e8 21.\textbullet h3 \textbullet f7 22.\textbullet e3 \textbullet g8 23.\textbullet e2 \textbullet e5 24.\textbullet f4 g5 25. \textbullet g3 h5 26.\textbullet c3 h4 27.\textbullet g2 \textbullet h7 28.\textbullet e6 \textbullet h5 29.f4 g4 30.fxe5+ and White wins a piece, since it is too bad for Black to play: 30...gxh3 31.\textbullet g7+ \textbullet h6 32.\textbullet d2+ \textbullet g5 33.\textbullet xg5+ fxg5 34.\textbullet xe7+.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter some seldom played fifth moves for Black, as well as 5...\textbullet c6.

Still, basically these rarely played moves are not so satisfactory for Black – he does not develop his pieces and White often manages, by playing 6.h3, to force Black's bishop on g4 to get either exchanged for White's knight on f3, or to retreat (but then after \textbullet g4-h5, White has the positionally cramping sacrifice e5-e6 at his disposal). He maintains a long-lasting initiative in both cases.

Concerning the move 5...\textbullet c6 – it is not bad at all, since the knight attacks the e5-pawn. On the other hand, Black's knight on c6 can be easily attacked by White with the bishop (line a), or by the d-pawn (line c), and that helps him preserve his edge. He should often be prepared to press his advantage home in a slightly better endgame.
This system was invented by S. Flohr — one of the greatest players of the 30ies of the 20th century. We have already seen that it is unfavourable for Black, in the Alekhine Defence, to capture on f3 with the bishop, because the white bishop on f3 attacks the b7-pawn and thus White wins important tempi. Black defends the long diagonal in advance with his last move and subsequently he plans to capture on f3 (sometimes even voluntarily, for example in answer to 6.0–0). Later he exchanges pawns on e5, he plays Qb8-d7 and eventually Qd8-c7 and Qd5-e7-g6 — altogether he attacks White’s e5-pawn with all available means. It is a bit uncomfortable for White to defend it successfully and his two bishop advantage turns out to be immaterial in similar positions.

White has several ways to counter that plan and two of them are the most principled. At first — the move 6.Qg5, with the idea to preserve the knight in the arising pawn-structure in order to try to bring it later to the d6-square. Secondly, it is the Levenfish variation, which we recommend — 6.c4 Qb6 7.Qbd2, after which Black fails to reach the desired pawn-structure, since White will still have a knight left on the f3-square, and he would capture on e5 with it, if necessary.

6.c4 Qb6

The immediate exchange on f3 is considered to be bad for Black 6...Qxf3. After 7.Qxf3 Qb6 (7...Qc7 presents White with an additional tempo, because of the attack against the b7-pawn and that is quite undesirable for Black: 8.Qb3 Qc8 9.exd6 exd6 10.0–0 Qe7 11.Qe1± and Black fails to castle, Ghinda – Mozes, Eforie 1987. It is more stubborn
for Black to defend with: 8...b6
9.\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e3+p}}, but the weakening of the long diagonal might become a telling factor in the future.}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#b3}}, Black now fails to accomplish the desired exchange on e5 and White's pressure on the queenside is considerable: 8...\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d7}}} (it is even worse for Black to play here: 8...\text{dxe5} 9.c5 \text{\texttt{\#d5}} 10.\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xb7}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#d7}}} 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xc6+p \ Fleck – Haenisch, Germany 1985}}) 9.\text{exd6}}\exd6 10.0-0 \text{\texttt{\textit{\#e7}}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d1}}} 0-0 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#f4+p}} and the black knight on b6 is totally misplaced, Bielczyk – Zauner, Werfen 1989.}\)

\textit{Chapter 14}

6...\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#c7}}} 7.\text{exd6}

It deserves attention now for Black to try the seldom played move 7...\(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xd6}}} After 8.0-0 \text{\texttt{\textit{\#d7}}} 9.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#c3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#f6}}} 10.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e3}}} e6 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#h3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#h5}}}, Mulet – Lukasiewicz, Bielsko-Biala 1991, White maintains his advantage with: 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e5}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#xe2}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xe2}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#e7}}} 14.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#f4+p}}. It is too dangerous for Black to play: 8...\text{g6} 9.c5!??. This move forces Black to worsen the placement of his queen and it also prepares \(\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d1-b3}}} (It is too tentative for White to play 9.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#bd2}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#g7}}} 10.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e1}}} 0-0 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#h3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#xf3}}} 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xf3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#d7}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e3+p}}} Buckley – Crouch, Monmouth 2002; 9.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e5}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#xe2}}} 10.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xe2}}}, and now not: 10...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e6}}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d5+p \ cxd5?}}} 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#cxd5}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#xd5}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d1+}}, but instead: 10...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#g7}}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d1}}} c5 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#f4}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#xd4=}}) 9...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d7}}} 10.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#b3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#c8}}} (10...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xf3}}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xf3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#b5}}} 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e3+p \Delta a4; \Delta d5)}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e1+}}, White is clearly ahead in development and he has a dangerous initiative. There might follow: 11...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#g7}}} (11...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d5}}} 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#c3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#e6}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#c4+p}}} 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#c4}}} (12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#g5}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#e6}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#g4!?+}}}) 12...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e6}}} (12...0-0 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#xe7+–}}} 12...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e6}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e5+p}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#g5+}}. It is more popular for Black to play here 7...\text{exd6} and that leads to a position similar to the Indian Defence. 8.0-0 \text{\texttt{\textit{\#e7}}} 9.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#c3}}} 0-0 (9...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d7}}} 10.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#h3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#h5}}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e1}}} 0-0 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d5!}}} c5 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#f4}}} a6 14.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#a4+p}}, but Black's possible counterplay is severely restricted – it is difficult for him to prepare b7-b5, as well as to deploy his bishop on e7 to the long a1-h8 diagonal, Campora – Paulsen, Dortmund 1981) 10.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#h3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#h5}}} 11.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#b3}}} \text{\texttt{\textit{\#c8}}} 12.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#d5!}}} c5 (12...\text{\texttt{\textit{\#ba6}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#e3+p}}} 13.\text{\texttt{\textit{\#f4+p}}} A.Rodríguez – D.Cramling, Biel 1988. Black’s knights are misplaced and his d6-pawn is very weak. White exerts a powerful pressure against the queenside of the opponent and that hampers the coordination of Black’s rooks; the queen on c8 is out of action too. All that, in addition to the extra space, makes White's position clearly preferable.}
7...\text{\textit{\textbf{bd2}}}

This move is based on the idea to sacrifice the d4-pawn in case of 7...dxe5 8...\text{\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}} and it is very dangerous for Black to accept that sacrifice as we are going to see quite soon.

Black’s main lines in this position are – a) 7...\text{\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{8d7}}}}} and b) 7...\text{\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}}.

He has also tried here plenty of other moves too. White preserves his space advantage in all lines. His basic strategy is to fortify his centre:

7...\text{\textit{\textbf{xf3}}}. This move does not make much of a sense; there will remain a white knight on f3 anyway, good enough for anything. 8...\text{\textit{\textbf{xf3}}} dxe5 9...\text{\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}} 8...\text{\textit{\textbf{8d7}}} 10...\text{\textit{\textbf{d3}}} e6 11.0-0 \text{\textit{\textbf{e7}}} 12...\text{\textit{\textbf{f4}}} and White maintains a stable space advantage, Torres Sanchez – Uris Escolano, Mislata 1997;

7...g6. We have had enough reasons to be convinced by now that the combination of the moves g7-g6 and \text{\textit{\textbf{c8-g4}}} in the Alekhine Defence is unfavourable for Black as a rule. In the game Reichmann – Rumpl, Finkenstein 1994, White played

8.exd6 exd6 9...\text{\textit{\textbf{e4}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{xf3}}} 10...\text{\textit{\textbf{xf3}}} d5 11.cxd5 \text{\textit{\textbf{b4}}}+ 12...\text{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{xd5}}} 13.0-0 \text{\textit{\textbf{xc3}}} and here the easiest way for him to maintain his advantage would be the move 14...\text{\textit{\textbf{e1}}}+. It is even more purposeful for White to play: 8...\text{\textit{\textbf{g5}}}, for example: 8...\text{\textit{\textbf{exe2}}} 9...\text{\textit{\textbf{exe2}}} dxe5 10.dxe5 h6 11...\text{\textit{\textbf{f3}}} and White’s advantage is overwhelming in connection with the threat e5-e6;

7...d5 8.c5 \text{\textit{\textbf{c8}}} 9.h3 \text{\textit{\textbf{xf3}}} 10...\text{\textit{\textbf{xf3}}} e6 11.0-0 b6 12...\text{\textit{\textbf{g5}}} (This move is with the idea to support the c5-pawn with b2-b4, while in case of a7-a5 – White can play a2-a3. It is however not so advantageous for White to exchange the knights, because of his extra space. He should not be afraid that Black might try to undermine his pawn-chain: 12. b4 a5 13.cxb6 \text{\textit{\textbf{xb6}}} 14.bxa5 \text{\textit{\textbf{xa5}}} 15...\text{\textit{\textbf{d2}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{a7}}} 16...\text{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{e7}}} 17.a4†, or 15...\text{\textit{\textbf{b4}}} 16...\text{\textit{\textbf{xb4}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{xb4}}} 17...\text{\textit{\textbf{b1}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{a5}}} 18...\text{\textit{\textbf{c2†}}} and White has the initiative and a better piece-placement in both cases. Meanwhile, it is even simpler for White, instead of castling on move 11, to play 11...\text{\textit{\textbf{e3†}}, so that he should not worry about the possibility of his centre being undermined.) 12...\text{\textit{\textbf{e7}}} 13. \text{\textit{\textbf{xe7}}} \text{\textit{\textbf{exe7}}} 14.b4 a5 15.a3± and White preserves plenty of extra space, Sicherl – Kertesz, Germany 1992;

7...\text{\textit{\textbf{c7}}} 8.0-0 \text{\textit{\textbf{xd7}}}. Black forces his opponent to capture on d6, but that exchange is quite
favourable for White under the circumstances. 9.exd6 exd6
10.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{xe}2\) 11.\(\text{\textgreek{w}}\text{xe}2+\) \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\) 12.
\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}1\). Now, in order for Black to castle, he should first protect
his bishop with \(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{b}6\)-c8 and that is unfavourable for him:
12...\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{f}1\) 14.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{d}2\)
\(\text{\textgreek{c}}\text{c}8\) 15.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{g}3\) 0-0 16.\(\text{\textgreek{w}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{b}}\text{b}6\)
17.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{a}4\) (17.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{f}5\)+?) 17...\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{a}5\)
\(\text{\textgreek{c}}\text{c}8\) 19.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{d}6\) (19...\(\text{\textgreek{b}}\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{d}5\)+)
20.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{x}b7\) \(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{x}e1+\) 21.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{x}e1\) \(\text{\textgreek{w}}\text{x}b7\)
22.\(\text{\textb}{3}\) and Black remains with plenty of weaknesses in a passive
position, Filipovic – Baldauf, Zuerich 1988. White could have
also preserved his knight on the
d2-square with the idea to deploy
it later on e4: 13.\(\text{\textb}{3}\) \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{e}4\)
with the following eventual developments: 14...0-0 (14...\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{x}e4\)
15.\(\text{\textgreek{w}}\text{xe}4\) \(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{h}6\) 16.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{f}3\) 0-0 17.\(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{g}4\)
\(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{\textgreek{f}}\text{f}4\)+) 15.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{x}f6\) 16.
\(\text{\textgreek{w}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{h}3\) 17.\(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{h}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{h}}\text{5}\) 18.\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\)
19.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\textgreek{g}}\text{g}7\) 20.\(\text{\textgreek{g}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{xd}4\) 21.
\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{ad}1\) \(\text{\textgreek{d}}\text{f}5\) 22.\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{f}6\) \(\text{\textc}{5}\) (22...\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}5\)
23.\(\text{\textg}{4}\)+) 23.\(\text{\textg}{4}\)\(\text{\textg}{4}\). Black lags in
development considerably in both lines, mostly because of the
unfortunate placement of his
knight on the c8-square;

7...\(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{a}6\). This move is with a
purposeful idea – it can be placed
on c5, or to b4, after the exchange
of pawns on e5. That means
White should not present his
opponent with such possibility.
8.0-0 \(\text{\textgreek{a}}\text{d}7\) 9.exd6 (Black's knight
is now deprived of the c5-square.)
9...exd6 10.\(\text{\textgreek{w}}\text{e}1\) and White ob-
tained a small, but long-lasting advantage in the game Nunn –

The game continued: 10...\(\text{\textgreek{e}}\text{e}7\)
11.\(\text{\textd}{5}\) c5 (in case of 11...\(\text{\textc}{xd}5\), be-
sides the natural capture of the
d5-pawn, White has the danger-
asious additional resource: 12.\(\text{\textg}{4}\)
\(\text{\textg}{xe}2\) 13.\(\text{\textw}{xe}2\) \(\text{\textc}{e}5\) 14.\(\text{\textg}{5}\)–with
threats against the g7-square
and along the e-file) 12.\(\text{\textg}{5}\)
0-0 13.\(\text{\textd}{x}g4\) \(\text{\textd}{x}g5\) 14.\(\text{\textd}{xd}7\)
\(\text{\textw}{xd}7\) 15.\(\text{\texte}{e}4\) \(\text{\textd}{xc}1\) 16.\(\text{\textw}{xc}1\)
\(\text{\textd}{ad}8\) 17.\(\text{\texte}{e}3\) \(\text{\textf}{6}\) (17...\(\text{\textf}{f}5\) 18.
\(\text{\textd}{d}2\)+ \(\text{\textee}1\)) 18.\(\text{\textw}{c}2\) \(\text{\textc}{7}\) 19.
\(\text{\textee}1\) \(\text{\textde}8\) 20.\(\text{\texth}{4}\) and White is
again clearly better, at least be-
cause of the difference of the
power of the knights.

Black cannot equalize by ex-
changing on e5 either: 8...\(\text{\textd}{xe}5\)
9.\(\text{\textd}{xe}5\) \(\text{\textf}{5}\) (it is too bad for
Black to capture the pawn: 9...
\(\text{\textd}{xe}2\) 10.\(\text{\textw}{xe}2\) \(\text{\textd}{xd}4\)? 11.\(\text{\textd}{f}3\)
\(\text{\textc}{5}\) 12.\(\text{\textg}{5}\) \(\text{\textf}{6}\) 13.\(\text{\texth}{5}\) \(\text{\textg}{6}\) 14.
\(\text{\textd}{xg}6\) \(\text{\texth}xg6\) 15.\(\text{\textw}{xg}6+\) \(\text{\textd}{d}7\)
16.\(\text{\textd}{d}1\)+) 10.\(\text{\textb}{3}\) \(\text{\texte}6\)?, Siepelt –
Matthey, Germany 1993, 11.\(\text{\textc}{5}\)
\(\text{\textd}{d}7\) 12.\(\text{\texta}{6}\) \(\text{\textb}{a}6\) 13.\(\text{\textc}{6}\)+.

a) 7...\(\text{\textd}{8d}7\) 8.0-0

\[\text{Diagram}\]

8...\(\text{\textd}{xe}5\)

It is worse for Black to exchange his bishop for the knight

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immediately – 8...\textdiacl{xf}3 9.\textdiacl{xf}3 dxe5 10.dxe5 and now:

10...\textdiacl{c}5 – this move is too optimistic – Black begins maneuvering with the knight before the completion of his development. 11.\textdiacl{c}2 g6 12.\textdiacl{g}5 h6 13.\textdiacl{e}4 \textdiacl{e}6 14.\textdiacl{e}3 \textdiacl{g}7 15.\textdiacl{ad}1 \textdiacl{c}7 16.\textdiacl{f}4± and White had a great advantage in the game Hardicsay – Niehaus, Balatonbereny 1997, but instead by playing: 13...\textdiacl{xe}4 14.\textdiacl{xe}4 e6 15.b3 \textdiacl{d}7, Black could have solidified his position. It is obviously simpler for White to play: 12.b4 \textdiacl{e}6 13.a4 \textdiacl{g}7 (after 13...a5 14.bxa5 \textdiacl{d}7 15.\textdiacl{b}2, Black fails to regain his pawn: 15...\textdiacl{c}7 16.\textdiacl{h}b1 \textdiacl{dc}5 17.\textdiacl{dd}4+ 14.a5 \textdiacl{d}7 15.\textdiacl{b}2 \textdiacl{c}7 16.\textdiacl{e}4± and White maintains his space advantage;

10...e6 – Black’s position remains too bad after that natural move as well. 11.\textdiacl{d}2 \textdiacl{c}5 (This is just a loss of several tempi, but Black’s position is too passive anyway: 11...\textdiacl{c}7 12.\textdiacl{c}3 0–0–0 13.\textdiacl{c}2 h6 14.a4 \textdiacl{b}8 15.a5 \textdiacl{c}8 16.b4±. White attacks on the queenside without any counterplay by Black: 16...g5 17.h3 \textdiacl{g}7 18.\textdiacl{b}2 \textdiacl{e}7 19.\textdiacl{f}e1 \textdiacl{g}6 20.\textdiacl{f}1 \textdiacl{h}g8 21.b5 c5 22.b6 axb6, Delgado – Podobnik, Dos Hermanas 2004 and here White’s simplest line was 23.\textdiacl{a}3, with the idea to double the rooks along the a-file and if necessary to play – \textdiacl{d}3–e4. Black has nothing to counter White’s attack with. He has tried also 12...h6 13.a4 a5 14.\textdiacl{e}1. Black cannot castle anywhere due to his numerous weaknesses on both sides of the board. His counterplay against the e5-pawn is completely fruitless: 14...g5 15.\textdiacl{c}2 \textdiacl{g}7 16.\textdiacl{ad}1. Black cannot capture on e5: 16...\textdiacl{xe}5 17.dxe5 \textdiacl{xe}5 18.\textdiacl{xe}5 \textdiacl{xe}5 19.\textdiacl{h}5 \textdiacl{f}6 20.\textdiacl{b}3++. He has great problems to solve too after: 16...\textdiacl{c}8 17.\textdiacl{d}4 0–0 18.\textdiacl{h}h5– and White’s attack is very powerful, because of the threat to capture on f7, Altshuler – Kopylov, corr. 1970.) 12.\textdiacl{c}2 \textdiacl{e}7 13.b4 \textdiacl{cd}7 14.\textdiacl{e}4 \textdiacl{c}7. The game Grischuk – Smetan, Internet 2000, continued 15.\textdiacl{c}3 \textdiacl{a}4 16.\textdiacl{d}2 0–0 17.\textdiacl{d}1 \textdiacl{ab}6 18.\textdiacl{c}2 g6 19.h4 \textdiacl{fd}8 20.h5 \textdiacl{f}8 (it is better for Black to play here 20...\textdiacl{xe}5 21.\textdiacl{xe}5 \textdiacl{xd}2 22.xh6 f5 23.gxh7+ \textdiacl{xe}7 24.\textdiacl{e}3 \textdiacl{xb}4=) 21.\textdiacl{ad}1 \textdiacl{ed}7 22.hxg6 hxg6 23.g3 \textdiacl{ad}8 24.\textdiacl{g}2 a6 25.\textdiacl{h}1 f5 26.\textdiacl{xf}6 \textdiacl{xf}6 27.\textdiacl{f}4+ \textdiacl{c}8 28.\textdiacl{x}d7 \textdiacl{xd}7 29.\textdiacl{e}5 \textdiacl{d}8 30.\textdiacl{xe}6 \textdiacl{f}4 31.\textdiacl{e}7+. Black’s additional possibility on move 20 is just an episode. Meanwhile, White could have avoided that maneuvering with the bishop left and right: 15.a4 0–0 (15...a5 16.bxa5 \textdiacl{c}8 17.\textdiacl{ab}1=) 16.a5 \textdiacl{c}8 17.\textdiacl{d}3± and Black has no counterplay against White’s attack, which is running smoothly.

9.\textdiacl{xe}5

(diagram)

9...\textdiacl{xe}5

Black can temporarily refrain from capturing on e5 and af-
14.dxe5 \(\text{c}7\) 15.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{Ad}8\) 16. \(\text{e}4\) (It is quite advisable for White to try 16.\(\text{e}4!\)\(\pm\), in order to create the threat \(\text{e}4\)-d6, and at some moment even \(\text{e}2\)-g4 \(\Delta\text{h}6\), with a slight advantage) 16...\(\text{x}g5\) (It is safer for Black to play: 16...g6!? 17.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xd}1\) 18.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{d}8?\) 17.\(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{xd}1\) 18. \(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 19.\(\text{h}4\) (19.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 20.\(\text{ex}f6\) \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}7\) 22. \(\text{e}4=\)) 19...\(\text{g}5\) 20.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{d}6\) (White should better play a middle game and not an endgame, therefore it deserves attention for him to play: 21.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{d}2\) 22.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{xb}2\) 23.\(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{hx}g5\) 24.\(\text{g}4\) \(\uparrow\) and the weakening of Black’s king might become a telling factor in the future, for example: 24...\(\text{d}8\) 25.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 26. \(\text{ex}f6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 27.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xf}4\) 28.\(\text{g}6+\) \(\text{f}8\) 29.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{d}2\) 30.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{hx}4\) 31.\(\text{f}3=\); 29...\(\text{gx}h4\) 30.\(\text{d}8+\) \(\text{f}7\) 31.\(\text{g}8=\)) 21...\(\text{c}8\) and in the game Joachim – Bente, Germany 1993, Black managed to equalize, since he could counter 22.\(\text{d}3\) with 22...\(\text{c}7\) 23.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{f}5\)\(\).\)

10.\(\text{dxe}5\)

10...\(\text{f}5\)

This move is obviously the
best for Black; his bishop is well placed and quite active on that square.

10...\textit{\_e6} 11.\textit{\_b3} g6 12.\textit{\_f3} \textit{\_g7}. In the game Nijboer – Landenbergue, Luzern 1989, White followed with 13.\textit{\_g5} and Black had to play not so passively like: 13...\textit{\_c8} 14.f4 0–0 15.\textit{\_e3} with a great advantage for White, but more actively: 13...\textit{\_d4} 14.\textit{\_xe6} fxe6 15.\textit{\_e3} (15.a4 \textit{\_xe5}; 15.\textit{\_h3} \textit{\_xe5} 16.\textit{\_g4} \textit{\_d8} 17.\textit{\_xe6} \textit{\_d6}) 15...\textit{\_xe5} 16.\textit{\_ab1} 0–0 17.\textit{\_fe1} \textit{\_h8} with some counter chances. Therefore it is better for White to play: 13.\textit{\_f4} 0–0 14.\textit{\_ac1} \textit{\_g4} 15.\textit{\_e3} e6 16.\textit{\_g5} (White needs that knight for the threat to occupy the d6-square.) 16...\textit{\_xe2} 17.\textit{\_xe2} \textit{\_d7} 18.\textit{\_f3} (White should have postponed that retreat – it was wiser for him to try: 18.\textit{\_fd1} \textit{\_c7} 19.\textit{\_d6}±, occupying the outpost on the open file.) 18...\textit{\_c7} 19.\textit{\_e3} \textit{\_b6} 20.c5 \textit{\_c7} (Black should have grabbed the pawn, according to the principle “it is better to suffer for a reason, after all…”): 20...\textit{\_xb2} 21.\textit{\_fd1} \textit{\_b8} 22.\textit{\_b1} \textit{\_xa2} 23.\textit{\_xb7} \textit{\_a6}± 21.\textit{\_fe1} b6 22.\textit{\_xb6} \textit{\_xb6} 23.\textit{\_h6}± and Black remained with numerous weaknesses to worry about in the game, Moutousis – Landenbergue, Haifa 1989.

10...\textit{\_xe2} 11.\textit{\_xe2} e6 12.\textit{\_f3} (It seems more attractive for White to place his knight to an active position – 12.\textit{\_e4}, but Black would counter with: 12...\textit{\_d4}, Auer – Gebhardt, Porz 1990 and White might end up with no compensation for the pawn whatsoever.) 12...\textit{\_e7} 13.\textit{\_d1} \textit{\_c7} (in case of 13...\textit{\_d7}, Fiorito – Szmetan, Villa Martelli 1997, it is better for White to play 14.\textit{\_d4}± and after 14...\textit{\_c7} we reach a position that we will analyze sometime later, in the line 13...\textit{\_c7} 14.\textit{\_d4} \textit{\_d7} 14.\textit{\_d4} 0–0 (Black could have postponed castling for a while: 14...\textit{\_d7} 15.\textit{\_g4} g6 16.\textit{\_h6}±. White’s rook on the g4-square seems a bit awkward, while Black’s king is in the centre, but it is quite functional on the 4th rank. In case of 16...0–0–0, it can attack the f7-pawn with 17.\textit{\_f4} and after the forced line: 17...\textit{\_f6} 18.\textit{\_xf6} \textit{\_xf6} 19.\textit{\_e4} \textit{\_c5} 20.\textit{\_e3}± Black is left with a long-term weakness on the e6-square to worry about. His king cannot remain in the centre forever, after all. In the game Mitrovic – L.Popov, Vrnjaćka Banja 1996, there followed 16...a5 17.\textit{\_b1} \textit{\_c5} 18.\textit{\_f4} \textit{\_d8} 19.\textit{\_h4} \textit{\_d3}. Black’s activity is quite harmless for White. 20.\textit{\_d4} \textit{\_xd4} 21.\textit{\_xd4} \textit{\_c5} 22.\textit{\_f3} \textit{\_d8} and here, instead of the quite unfortunate operation by White: 23.\textit{\_g7} \textit{\_g8} 24.\textit{\_d2}+ \textit{\_c8} 25.\textit{\_h6} \textit{\_d3} 26.\textit{\_xh7} \textit{\_d8} 27.\textit{\_h6} \textit{\_c5} 28.\textit{\_f1} \textit{\_xf2} 29.\textit{\_h2} \textit{\_g4}± he had better continue with: 23.\textit{\_d1}?! \textit{\_c8} 24.\textit{\_g5}± and attack easily Black’s weaknesses.) 15.\textit{\_g4} \textit{\_fd8} 16.\textit{\_h6}. White’s threats on the kingside are quite
dangerous at least because of the fact that Black’s knight on b6 does not participate in the defence at all. 16...\textit{f}8 17.\textit{e}4 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}3 19.\textit{f}4 \textit{f}5? 20.\textit{g}3 \textit{g}6 21.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 22.\textit{d}4+- and White traps Black’s queen, Danailov – Huguet, Zaragoza 1994. It was correct for Black to play 19...\textit{d}7± and in case of 20.\textit{h}g7? \textit{h}5!+, Black wins suddenly a piece and he defends successfully. White could have played stronger, though: 17.\textit{e}3 \textit{g}6 (17...\textit{d}7 18.\textit{h}xg7++) 18.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 19.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}6 20.\textit{exf}6 \textit{xf}6 21.\textit{e}1± and White maintains an obvious positional advantage, since Black’s kingside is extremely vulnerable.

11.\textit{b}3

11...\textit{e}6

11...\textit{c}7 12.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}6 (In case of 12...0–0–0, besides the calmer lines, White can try: 13.c5??, after which it is too bad for Black to play: 13...\textit{d}7 14.\textit{xf}7 \textit{e}6 15.\textit{b}4 \textit{xc}5 16.\textit{xc}7+ \textit{xc}7 17.\textit{bxc}5 \textit{xc}5+ 18.\textit{h}1 \textit{d}4 19.\textit{a}3 \textit{a}1 20.\textit{d}6±, because White remains with a material advantage. Black should better play: 13...\textit{d}5 14.\textit{c}4 \textit{g}6 15.\textit{c}2± but his position remains substantially cramped, because he cannot play e7–e6) 13.g4. This aggressive move is quite playable. (The calmer line: 13.\textit{f}3 \textit{c}5+ 14.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}7 15.\textit{ad}1 0–0, led to a comfortable game for Black in the game Walek – VI. Sergeev, Czech Republic 1999) 13...\textit{g}6 14.\textit{f}5 and the position turns out to be in favour of White: 14...\textit{xe}5 15.\textit{d}3 (15.\textit{fxg}6 \textit{c}5+ 16.\textit{h}1 \textit{h}xg6++; 15.\textit{f}3 \textit{d}6) 15...\textit{d}8 16.\textit{e}4 \textit{xe}4 17.\textit{d}xe4 \textit{d}4 18.\textit{g}5!? (18.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}4) 18...\textit{exf}5 (18...\textit{h}6 19.\textit{fxg}6 \textit{hxg}5 20.\textit{gx}7+ \textit{d}7 21.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}6 23.\textit{h}3±) 19.\textit{g}5 20.\textit{fxg}6 \textit{h}xg5 21.\textit{xf}7+ \textit{d}7 22.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}6 23.\textit{h}3±) 20.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}7 21.\textit{fxg}6 \textit{fxg}5 22.\textit{g}4 \textit{e}7 23.\textit{hxg}5 \textit{e}5 24.\textit{h}ae1++. White refrains temporarly from capturing the piece and he obtains a great advantage in all variations.

12.\textit{g}3

In case Black does not castle short, White’s queen remains a bit misplaced on that square, therefore it deserves attention for him to follow with: 12.\textit{f}3 \textit{c}7 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}7 14.b3 \textit{c}5 15.\textit{a}5 16.\textit{b}2 \textit{h}6 17.a3 0–0 18.\textit{b}4 \textit{e}7 19.\textit{h}3 (It is also possible for White to play here: 19.\textit{ad}4? \textit{h}7 20.\textit{b}3 \textit{a}4 21.\textit{d}4 \textit{ad}8 22.\textit{f}4+) 19...\textit{b}6 20.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}8 and now, instead of the risky line: 21.\textit{d}4 \textit{h}7 22.\textit{c}5 \textit{d}5 23.\textit{f}4 \textit{b}6? Redsvens – Puranen, Jyvaskyla 1993, White could
have tried the solid move 21. \(\text{\texttt{A}}\text{d}1\pm\) with a minimal positional edge.

12...\(\text{\texttt{Cc}}7\)

The move 12...\(\text{\texttt{Cd}}4\) presents White with an additional attractive possibility: 13.\(\text{\texttt{Cb}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Ce}}4\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{Cf}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Xc}}4\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{Ca}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Cb}}5\) (15...\(\text{\texttt{Ca}}6\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{Xc}}6\uparrow\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{xb}7\) \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{d}5\) 17. \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{d}6\uparrow\) \(\text{\texttt{X}}\text{xd}6\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{xg}7\) \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{xe}5\) 19. \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{xe}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Mg}}8\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{M}}\text{e}1\) 0–0–0 21.\(\text{\texttt{M}}\text{e}3\pm\) Rosito – Malbran, Argentine 2003 and Black's king seems vulnerable and he has too many weaknesses.

13.\(\text{\texttt{Ff}}3\) 0–0–0

White continued with 14.\(\text{\texttt{Fe}}3\) and now, instead of 14...\(\text{\texttt{Fe}}7\), L.Bronstein – Malbran, Buenos Aires 1990, 15.\(\text{\texttt{Xg}}7\) \(\text{\texttt{h}}5\) 16. \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{ad}1\pm\), Black could have obtained a powerful counterplay with the move 14...\(\text{\texttt{Da}}4!\) attacking the b2-pawn and White has no ways to obtain any advantage at all: 15.\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}4\) (15.\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{ad}1\) \(\text{\texttt{Xd}}1\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{Xd}}1\) \(\text{\texttt{Xb}}2\uparrow\) 15...\(\text{\texttt{G}}6\) (15...\(\text{\texttt{Xb}}2\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{Xf}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Xf}}5\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{A}}4\uparrow\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{F}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Xb}}2\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{F}}5\) (17.a3 \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{c}5\uparrow\) 17...\(\text{\texttt{Exf}}5\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{Xf}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}3\).

The consequences of the move 14.a4!? are a bit unclear. The following line is in favour of White: 14...\(\text{\texttt{Da}}3\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{Xd}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Xd}}3\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{F}}\text{f}4\) \(\text{\texttt{f}}5\) (16...\(\text{\texttt{B}}\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{G}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\texttt{h}}6\) 18.a5 \(\text{\texttt{Cc}}8\) 19.a6 b6 20.\(\text{\texttt{E}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}7\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{F}}\text{d}4\uparrow\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{G}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{e}7\) (17...\(\text{\texttt{E}}\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{F}}\text{xb}6\) \(\text{\texttt{X}}\text{xb}6\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{G}}\text{g}5\) 18.a5\uparrow, but Black should better react by deploying his knight to the c5-square, since White has weakened his queenside: 14...\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}7\) 15. \(\text{\texttt{G}}\text{c}5\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{G}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Mg}}8\) 17.a6 \(\text{\texttt{X}}\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{x}a7\) c5∞.

It deserves attention for White to continue with:

14.b3, thus eliminating the possibility for Black to go to the a4-square with his knight. There might follow: 14...\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{b}2\) \(\text{\texttt{Cc}}5\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{ad}1\) \(\text{\texttt{Gg}}6\) (or 16...\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}3\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{G}}\text{a}1\) and Black is forced to retreat with his knight) 17.\(\text{\texttt{Xd}}8\) \(\text{\texttt{Xd}}\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{X}}\text{d}1\pm\) White maintains a slight advantage.

b) 7...\(\text{\texttt{Xe}}5\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{Xxe}}5\)

8...\(\text{\texttt{Ff}}5\)

It is too dangerous for Black to capture the pawn: 8...\(\text{\texttt{Xxe}}2\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{Xxe}}2\) \(\text{\texttt{Xd}}\text{d}4\) (instead it is better for Black to play here 9...\(\text{\texttt{E}}\text{e}6\) 10.0–0 \(\text{\texttt{E}}\text{e}7\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\texttt{D}}\text{d}7\) Goloshchapov – Khachatryan, Nizhnij

It seems a bit awkward for Black to play: 8...Qe6 9.Qe4 f6 10.Qc5 Qg8. In case of 11.Qf3, White’s position is superior after capturing on c4, as well as after Black defends his b7-pawn with: 11...Qxc4 12.Qxb7 Qb6 13.b3 (after 13.Qc5, Black would play 13...e5, Payen – Horn, Geneva 1990) 13...Qb4+ 14.Qf1 Qb2 15. Qxb2 Qxb7 16.Qc1± Glek – Forchert, Bad Wiessee 1998. White has lost his castling rights, but that is immaterial. He has managed to develop his pieces, to trade the dark squared bishops and to exert a powerful pressure against Black’s weaknesses: 16...Qd5 17.Qc4 e6 18.Qe2 Qf7 19.h4 Qd7 20.Qh3 Qd6 21.Qd2 Qhe8 22.Qe4 Qc7 23.Qc2 Qf4 24.Qe1 Qg8 25.Qa3 Qa5 26.Qd6 Qxd6 27.Qxd6 Qe7 28.Qhe3 Qf8 29.Qe4 Qd8 30.Qc5± and White’s advantage is only minimal, so that line seems to be quite acceptable for Black;

11...Qc7 12.b3 e5 13.Qe4 Qd8d7 14.dxe5 Qxe5 15.0-0 Qf7 16.Qb2 Qxf3+ 17.Qxf3 Qe7 18.Qe5. (otherwise Black would gradually manage to equalize) 18...Qd5 (V. Bagirov recommended to Black to prevent the sacrifice in this position with the move 18...Qc8, but then after, for example 19.Qe1 0-0 20.Qc2± Black’s knight on c8 is obviously misplaced, while White’s better piece-placement is quite evident.) 19.Qd6+ Qxd6 20.cxd6 Qxd6 21.Qe1+ Qf8 22.Qd4±. White’s initiative for the sacrificed pawn is very powerful. Black’s king is in danger and he cannot improve its position without creating new weaknesses. Presently, the success of Black’s defence hinges on his knight on d5, which defends the squares suitable for penetration. The game continued with: 22...h5 23.a4 Qg8 24.Qa3 Qd8 25.Qc5 b6 (This move has been provoked by White with the maneuver Qa3-c5 and it undermines the stability of the knight on d5.) 26.Qa3 Qc8 27.Qad1 Qc7 28.b4 Qc8 29.Qd3 (Ab5) 29...Qf4 30.Qd6 Qg6 31.Qe4 (Black defence is catastrophically weakened after the retreat of the knight from the d5-square.) 31...h4 32.Qc1. (It deserves attention for White to continue with 32.Qf5, for example: 32...Qb7? 33.Qd8+ Qh7 34.Qe4! and White checkmates; or 32...Qb8 and now it is quite good for White to follow with: 33.Qxg6 Qxg6 34.Qe7 Qb7 35. Qe6+ Qh7 36.Qxb7 Qxb7 37.Qd4
9. \( \text{d} \) f3

9... \( \text{d} \) e8d7

9... e6?! This move turns out to be a grave mistake, since Black should not allow his opponent to play \( \text{d} \) f3-g5. 10. \( \text{d} \) g5! \( \text{d} \) b4+ 11. \( \text{d} \) f1.

Black now loses practically by force after: 11... 0-0 12. \( \text{d} \) g4 \( \text{d} \) g6 13. c5! \( \text{d} \) c8 (In case Black covers the d-file with the move 13...
10...fxe5 11.cxb6 axb6 (Evidently, the following pawn-sacrifice is not quite correct; 11...e6 12.bxa7 3d7 13.dxe5 and Black will obviously fail to regain both pawns – on a7 and on e5 – without paying too dear a price: 13...a5+ 14.d2 b4 15.0-0 dxe2 16.xd2 dxe5 17.c4 xc4 18.xc4 0-0 19.b3± and Black loses his e-pawn, A. Rodriguez – G. Garcia, Bayamo 1989.) 12.xe5 d7 13.f4 3f6 14.c4 d5. Black’s knight is really powerful on this square, but still his weaknesses along the e-file are even more important in this position. Now, instead of the overly aggressive line: 15.g4 3e6 16.g3 b5 17.xb3 g6 18.h4 3g7 19.e2 (19.h5 3xe5 20.xe5 f8=e2) 19...f4 20.xf4 xb3 21.0-0 xa2 22. xa2 =xa2= and Black was even better in the game, Wohlfart – Zimmermann, Germany 1989, White had to continue more prudently with: 15.0-0 b5 16.b3 g6 17.f2 g7 18.h6 0-0 19. f1=±, or 17.g5 g7 18.e1=± and that would have preserved a slight advantage for him.

Or 10...d5 11.c4

And now:

11...g6 12.h4 f7 13.f5 c7 14.g4 g6 15.h6 (White does not achieve anything substantial after: 15.e2 gxf5 16. d6+ xd6 17.cxd6 fxe4 18.dxe7 xe7 19.xg4 d7= 15...hx6 16.xh6 d7 17.e2 0-0-0 18.e6 xe6 19.xe6 b8 20. 0-0-0 g5 21.g3 f8 22.xf8 dx8 23.h4 h6 24.de1 c8= 25. e4= and White had a slight edge in the game, Siklosi – Waldmann, St Ingbert 1989. It looks like White had better castle on move 14, i.e.: 14.0-0 g6 15.h6 xh6 16.xh6 d7 17.a4= and Black’s king will be quite unsafe on the queenside;

11...a6 12.0-0 ac7 13.h4 e6 14.f4 f7 15.e1 e6 16.f5 g6 17.g4 d7. Black’s position is solid enough, despite the fact that it does not seem to be harmonious at all. 18.fxe6+ xe6 19.xe6+ (19.xe6 xe6 20.yb8 b2 21.d2 f5 22.xf5 gxf5 23.xf8 f8=) 19...xe6 20.d3 (but not 20.yb3 xd4 21.yb7+ c7 22.xa8 f3=t, or 21.yh3+ f5 22.de5+ c7 23.f7 f6 24. xh8 xc5 25.xh1 c2=t) 20... c7 21.d2 e8 22.b4 b5 23.cx6 axb6 24.b3 Kurass – Sergeev, Kiev 1986. Black’s knight on d5 is quite solid, but his king looks vulnerable. White can try here: 16.f5 exf5 17.h5+ d7 18. xf7 g6 and now the pawn-break 19.g4=, for example: 19...fxg4 (19...c8 20.gxf5 gxf5 21.yh5 d7 22.d2=) 20.f5 gxf5 21.d3
\texttt{c8} 22.\texttt{gx}5+ \texttt{b}8 23.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{xd}5 24.\texttt{xf}4+ \texttt{xf}4 25.\texttt{x}f4+ \texttt{c}8 26.\texttt{e}6+.

9...\texttt{8d}7 – this move is not so ambitious. Black exchanges the powerful white knight and he does not create any weaknesses yet.

10.0–0 \texttt{xe}5 11.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{e}6

It is also possible for Black to try: 11...\texttt{d}7. This defensive stratagem is quite typical – the powerful pieces of the opponent must be exchanged. 12.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}6 13.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{xe}5 (13...\texttt{e}7 14.d5 \texttt{xe}5 15.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{f}6 16.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{cxd}5 17.cxd5 \texttt{e}5 Otherwise – the position gets opened. 18.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{d}7 19.\texttt{xf}5 \texttt{xf}5 20.\texttt{b}3\texttt{+} 14.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{f}6 (White preserves his initiative after: 14...\texttt{d}7 15.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{f}6 16.\texttt{g}3 0–0–0 17.d5\texttt{+}; 16...\texttt{e}7 17.\texttt{ad}1\texttt{+} \texttt{d}5) 15.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{d}6 16.\texttt{h}5+ \texttt{g}6 17.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{xg}3 18.hxg3 \texttt{d}7 19.d5 \texttt{cxd}5 20.cxd5 \texttt{e}5 21.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{d}6 22.\texttt{b}3 0–0 23.\texttt{x}b7 \texttt{f}7 24.\texttt{ad}1, L.Bronstein – Malbran, Buenos Aires 1993 and Black will fail to regain his pawn, for example: 24...\texttt{fd}8 25.b3 \texttt{xd}5? 26.\texttt{xd}5+–.

12.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{xd}5 (diagram)

13.\texttt{xg}4\texttt{+} A.Sokolov – Zelcic, Torcy 1991. The position has been simplified a bit; nevertheless Black still has problems to solve due to his lag in development. As usual, White has a space advantage. Later in the game there followed: 13...\texttt{d}7 14.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{h}5 (This move is too risky, but Black cannot castle kingside without creating some additional weaknesses: 14...\texttt{g}6 15.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}7 16.\texttt{h}6 \texttt{c}7 17.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{d}6 18.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{xe}5 19.dxe5 \texttt{e}7 20.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{d}8 21.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{xe}7 22.\texttt{d}6\texttt{+}, and White has penetrated the key d6-outpost.) 15.\texttt{e}2 \texttt{d}6 16.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{xe}5 17.dxe5 \texttt{e}7 18.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{c}5 19.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{d}4 20.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{b}6 21.\texttt{c}1 0–0–0 22.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{g}4 (22...\texttt{xe}5 23.\texttt{xf}7\texttt{+}) 23.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{g}6 24.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{e}4 25.\texttt{ex}g7 \texttt{hg}8 26.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{xe}5 27.\texttt{x}f7\texttt{+}. Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient. After 27...\texttt{g}3, White had better play 28.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{dg}8 29.\texttt{xb}6\texttt{+}. Sometime earlier, instead of attacking Black’s pawns along the third rank with the rook, White could have tried: 18.\texttt{f}4 0–0–0 (18...\texttt{g}5 19.\texttt{d}2\texttt{+}) 19.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{g}5 20.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{c}5 21.\texttt{b}4\texttt{+} – and Black would have plenty of weaknesses to worry about.
Conclusion

Black's idea, in the Flohr variation that we have just analyzed, is to exchange his bishop for White's knight on f3 and to follow that with capturing on e5 (d6xe5) and attack White's e5-pawn later in the game. We recommend to you to counter that idea with Levenfish's move 6.\textit{\textbf{bd2}}, after which it becomes senseless for Black to exchange White's knight on f3 with the bishop, since White would capture with the knight and not with the bishop. As a rule, Black usually exchanges on e5 and then White captures with his knight, so Black is faced with a choice.

He can trade bishops on e2 and knights on e5, but then the d6-square becomes terribly weak. This is in fact one of the essential positional drawbacks of the Flohr variation.

Black can also exchange only on e2 and then avoid the trade on e5, but his position remains too passive, nevertheless solid enough.

He can capture on e5 too and then retreat his bishop to the f5-square, but that leads to a considerable space advantage for White.

Finally, Black can try 7...\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} 8.\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} \textit{\textbf{dxe6}}, or 8...\textit{\textbf{f5}} 9.\textit{\textbf{dxf3}} \textit{\textbf{f6}} and then he can exploit the d5-outpost for his pieces, but only at the expense of weakening of his position.

We have recommended to you clear and straightforward ways for White to maintain his opening advantage in all lines.
Chapter 15

1.e4 \( \triangle f6 \) 2.e5 \( \triangle d5 \) 3.d4 d6 4.\( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle g4 \) 5.\( \triangle e2 \) e6

6.h3

Presently, it is considered that the exchange on f3 is unfavourable for Black at this moment, so it is obviously useful for White to include the moves h3 and \( \triangle h5 \), because he not only has an escape-square for his king, but he has an additional resource – g2-g4.

6...\( \triangle h5 \)

The trade for Black 6...\( \triangle x f3 \) 7.\( \triangle x f3 \), enables White to create the threat c2-c4, followed by capturing on b7 and it reduces Black’s possibilities considerably:

Black loses material after: 7...\( \triangle e7 \) 8.c4 \( \triangle b6 \) 9.\( \triangle x b7 + \)— Tarres – Morato, Tordera 1996;

It is slightly better for him to try instead: 7...\( \triangle d7 \). Now, White does not achieve much with: 8.c4 \( \triangle b5 \) 6 9.\( \triangle x b7 \) \( \triangle b8 \) 10.\( \triangle a6 \) dxe5
Knuetter – Gerards, Cologne 1993. It is therefore simpler for him to follow with: 8.exd6 and Black loses a pawn in all variations: 8...\( \triangle x d6 \) (8...c6 9.c4 and c4-c5; 8...cxd6 9.c4\( \pm \) 9.c4 \( \triangle b4 + \) 10.\( \triangle f1 \) – Black has no way to exploit that placement of White’s king – 10...\( \triangle x f6 \) 11.c5 c6 12.\( \triangle b3 \);

7...dxe5? 8.c4 \( \triangle b6 \) (8...\( \triangle b4 \) 9.\( \triangle x b7 \) \( \triangle c8 \) 10.\( \triangle x a8 \) \( \triangle x d4 \) 11.\( \triangle e4 + \) – Dominguez – Abreu, Havana 2001) 9.\( \triangle x b7 \), White has won the exchange and he should only demonstrate accurate technique in order to realize his material advantage, for example: 9...\( \triangle d7 \) 10.\( \triangle x a8 \) \( \triangle b4 \), Solomaha – S.Pavlov, Kiev 2005, 11.\( \triangle f1 \) (11.\( \triangle d2 \) \( \triangle x d2 + \) 12.\( \triangle x d2 \) \( \triangle x a8 \) 13.0-0 \( \triangle x d4 \) 14.\( \triangle g4 \pm \) 11...\( \triangle x a8 \) 12.c5+— and White even wins one more piece;

7...\( \triangle c6 \) 8.c4 \( \triangle b6 \) 9.\( \triangle x d6 \) cxd6 10.d5 exd5 (10...\( \triangle e5 ? \) 11.dxe6 fxe6, Kiernan – Ait Hamido, Thessaloniki 1984. White preserves a great advantage by playing: 12.\( \triangle x b7 \) \( \triangle b8 \) 13.\( \triangle a6 \pm \) 11...
\( \text{Chapter 15} \)

\( \text{\textit{xd5 \textit{xd5 12.\textit{xd5 \textit{wh4. This is an active counterattacking move, but Black should have possibly left his queen on the d8-square and played instead \textit{e7 and 0–0. That can hardly change the evaluation of the position, though: 13.0–0 \textit{e7 14.\textit{e1 0–0 15.\textit{c3. White’s positional edge is stable and long-lasting – his pawn-structure is superior and he enjoys the d5-outpost for his knight. Black’s attempt to complicate matters after: 15...\textit{b4 16.\textit{xb7 \textit{c2 17.\textit{e4 \textit{h5 18.\textit{b1 \textit{f6 19.\textit{d5 \textit{e5 20.c5++ left him without any compensation for the missing pawn, Agdestein – Kopylov, Kiel 2000;}}}}}}}

It is the best for Black to play here: 7...c6 8.c4 \textit{b6 9.\textit{b3. White has defended his c4-pawn and he is already threatening to capture on d6, so Black’s response is practically forced: 9...\textit{x5 (It is useless for Black to play 9...\textit{h4, since the threat exd6 comes again on the agenda.) 10.c5 \textit{d5 11.\textit{xb7 \textit{d7, Seidman – Levy, New York. White’s position is still preferable after: 12.\textit{xc6 exd4 13.\textit{g5. There might follow: 13...\textit{c8 (Black loses after 13...\textit{e7 14.\textit{xe7 \textit{xe7 15.\textit{xd5++ In case of 13...\textit{c8, White should better continue with: 14.\textit{xd5 exd5 15.\textit{xd5 \textit{xc5 16.\textit{e4+ \textit{f8 17.0–0 and Black’s position remains clearly worse due to his lag in development.) 14.\textit{xd5 exd5 15.\textit{xd8. After capturing on d8, White follows with b2-b4 and he obtains two connected passed pawns against Black’s doubles d-pawns. This is clearly quite favourable for White in case of calm developments, so we will analyze the consequences of Black’s attempt to undermine White’s b-pawn with: 15...\textit{xd8 (15...\textit{xd8 16.b4 \textit{e5 17.a3 \textit{xf3 18.gxf3 \textit{e7 19.e2 \textit{e8 20.\textit{d3\textit{e5 17.a3 a5 18.\textit{e2 d3+ (18...\textit{xf3 19.\textit{xf3 \textit{b8 20.\textit{d2 axb4 21.axb4 \textit{b4 22.\textit{a7\textit{a8 18...\textit{b8 19.\textit{xd5 axb4 20.axb4 \textit{d4 21.\textit{a8+ \textit{d7 22.\textit{c1+ 19.\textit{d2 \textit{xf3+ 20.gxf3 \textit{b8 21.\textit{c3 axb4 22.axb4 \textit{b4 23.\textit{a7++. It now has become obvious that the opening of the game can only be favourable for White.}}}}}

\( \text{7.c4 \textit{b6}} \)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure}
\caption{Diagram for 8.exd6}
\end{figure}

8.exd6

Until the middle of the 90ies of the last century, the line 8.0–0 \textit{e7 9.\textit{c3 0–0 10.\textit{c3 d5 11.c5 \textit{xf3 12.gxf3 \textit{c8 used to be considered as the best for White. Later, in connection with the new plan that we recommend to you – this theoretical evaluation has changed.}}

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8...cxd6 9.\textit{c}c3 \textit{e}e7
After 9...\textit{d}d8d7 10.d5 and in case of 10...exd5 (10...e5 11.g4 \textit{g}g6 12.h4, leads by transposition to our main line – see 9... \textit{e}e7.) White can continue, ignoring the eventual loss of the c4-pawn, with: 11.\textit{d}xd5± \textit{x}xf3?! (White remains with a stable positional edge, in case Black does not try anything extraordinary, because of the vulnerability of the d6-square.) 12.\textit{xf}f3 \textit{xc}c4?, but all that is bound to end up in a disaster for Black: 13.0–0 \textit{d}ce5 14.\textit{e}e1 \textit{e}e7 15.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xe}7 16.\textit{xb}b7, since he loses material, for example after: 16... \textit{d}b8 17.\textit{c}c6 0–0 18.\textit{xd}d7 \textit{xd}d7 19.\textit{xe}5++.}

10.d5
This move has appeared relatively recently and it has been recommended by the leading Moldavian theoretician A.Chebanenko. It was tried (in its main line – 10.d5 e5 11.g4) for the first time by V.Bologan in his game against S.Adgstein at the Olympiad in Erevan in 1996. White's idea is somewhat non-standard – he usually plays d4-d5 in this pawn-structure only in case Black's knight is already on the c6-square, since that forces the weakening of Black's pawn-chain. He is thus forced to either capture on d5 and he remains with an isolated d6-pawn, otherwise White would be able to capture on e6 and then both black central pawns e6 and d6 become vulnerable.

The way White is playing now – Black has the option to continue with e6-e5, preserving compact pawn-structure and later he can hope to advance his e- and f-pawns. It is evident why White had refrained to try that until the middle of the 90ies. It turns out however, that Black's central pawns are going nowhere and White can easily prevent f7-f5 with the active move g2-g4 and then he can occupy the important e4-square. In general, this idea leads to positions with a huge space advantage for White and a powerful initiative for him.

10...e5
White is obviously better after: 10...exd5, Alavkin – Bratchenko, Russia 1997, 11.\textit{xd}d5 0–0 12.0–0± and Black's attempt to win a pawn fails after: 12... \textit{xf}f3 13.\textit{xf}f3 \textit{xc}c4, because of: 14.\textit{c}c2 \textit{e}e5 15.\textit{e}e4 \textit{bc}6 (15...\textit{g}g6 16.\textit{c}c7±) 16.\textit{h}h7+ \textit{h}h8 17.f4±.

It deserves some attention for Black to try: 10...0–0 11.dxe6 \textit{xe}6 12.d\textit{d}d4 \textit{f}f7 13.0–0 \textit{d}d6 (or 13...\textit{d}d7 14.\textit{e}e3 \textit{e}e5 15.b3±) 14.\textit{e}e3 \textit{h}h8 15.b3 d5 16.cxd5
exd5. He has relatively lively piece-play and it compensates somehow the vulnerability of his isolated pawn. 17.\textit{d}2 \textit{d}7 18. \textit{f}5 (18.\textit{ad}1 \textit{a}5\textit{z}, planning to continue with \textit{b}4) 18...\textit{f}6. This interesting idea is in the spirit of the Tarrasch Defence. The two bishop advantage is less effective than usual in positions with an isolated d5-pawn. (After 18...\textit{f}6, White preserves a slight advantage with: 19.\textit{ad}1 \textit{e}6 20.\textit{d}4 \textit{xd}4 21.\textit{xd}4 \textit{c}8 22.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 23.\textit{f}3 \textit{b}6 24. \textit{fe}1 \textit{f}7 25.\textit{e}3\textit{z}.) 19.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xe}7 20.\textit{b}5 \textit{e}4 21.\textit{b}2 a6 22.\textit{d}4 \textit{f}6 23.\textit{ac}1 \textit{e}7 24. \textit{a}3\textit{z}. White dominates on the dark squares and he can attack effectively Black’s queenside, so he is clearly better. Later, the game Gongora – Nogueiras, Holguin City 2002, followed with: 24...\textit{ae}8 25.\textit{c}7!? \textit{c}6 26.\textit{xc}6 \textit{bxc}6 27.\textit{xa}6 (It deserved some attention for White to try the more prudent 27. \textit{f}3!!\textit{z}.) 27...\textit{d}4 28.\textit{xc}6 (28.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}5\textit{z}) 28...\textit{e}5. White made a mistake in that position; he retreated his bishop to c1 and relinquished the initiative. Meanwhile, he should have continued with: 29.f4 \textit{e}7 (29...\textit{d}5 30.\textit{c}4 \textit{d}7 31.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 32.\textit{d}1\textit{z}+) 30. \textit{xd}4 and Black cannot win the exchange with: 30...\textit{g}3, because of 31.\textit{d}3 \textit{xf}1 32.\textit{h}6!+-.

11.g4

White must play that move; otherwise Black would castle and follow with f7-f5 and he will have an active position in the centre and on the kingside, while his queenside would be solid enough too. White should not be deterred by the weakening of his kingside by the move g2-g4. He occupies space and he obtains eventually the excellent e4-square for his knight. White’s king is presently quite safe in the centre and he should not be in a hurry to castle. Concerning Black – there is only one way for him to obtain an active counterplay and that is to deploy his knight to the c5-square and to follow that with e5-e4 and after White plays b3-b4 – check with the knight on the d3-square. In case that plan fails, Black would remain in a rather passive, but relatively solid position and he should try to prepare gradually some actions on the queenside.

11...\textit{g}6 12.h4

Black can play in the arising position either \textit{c}1) 12...\textit{h}5, or the more prudent line – \textit{c}2) 12...\textit{h}6.

White remains with an extra pawn in the variation: 12...e4 13.\textit{g}5 0–0 (13...\textit{x}5 14.\textit{x}5...
f6 15.\textit{f4} h6 16.h5 \textit{h7} 17.\textit{b5} \textit{c8} 18.c5!+--; 13...h6 14.\textit{gxe4} 0–0 15.g5 f5 16.gxf6 \textit{xf6} 17.\textit{xf6+} \textit{xxf6} 18.\textit{e3+} Vozovic – Le Thanh Tu, Oropesa del Mar 2001) 14.\textit{gxe4} \textit{e8} 15.\textit{d4±} Messa – Corvi, Italia 1997.

c1) 12...h5 13.g5

This move enables White to cramp his opponent even more and additionally Black is left with another weakness – the h5-pawn.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

13...\textit{d8d7}

It seems quite dubious for Black to play 13...0–0, because of the vulnerability of his h5-pawn that we have already mentioned. Later, in the game Guseinov – Podobnik, Dos Hermanas 2004, there followed: 14.\textit{d2} \textit{d8d7} 15.\textit{xh5} \textit{c8} 16.b3 \textit{c5} 17.\textit{xg6 fxg6} 18.\textit{de4 xe4} 19.\textit{xe4±} and Black had no compensation for the pawn whatsoever.

13...\textit{d6d7} (That is the standard maneuver of the knight to the c5-square, but still it is better for him to play 13...\textit{d8d7}, in order to be able to attack the c4-pawn later.) 14.\textit{e3 a6} 15.a3

\textit{ac5} 16.b4 \textit{e4} 17.\textit{xe4 xe4} 18.\textit{d3 xd3} 19.\textit{xd3 g6} 20.\textit{d2} (This is the natural and powerful redeployment of the knight.) 20...a5 21.\textit{e2} 0–0 22.\textit{e4±}. White enjoys a space advantage and he has a clear-cut plan to attack on the queenside connected with the pawn-advance c4-c5. It is amazing, but Black cannot prevent that plan even with the move: 22...b6 23.c5 bxc5 24.bxc5 \textit{ac5} c6 and Black cannot play 24...\textit{xc5} 25.\textit{xc5 dxc5} 26.d6±. In the game Pinto Coelho – Merg Vaz, Dos Hermanas 2003, Black played 22...\textit{g7} 23.c5 f5? and he lost promptly after: 24.gxf6+ \textit{xxf6} 25.\textit{g5+}–.

13...\textit{f5} 14.\textit{d2} g6 15.\textit{de4 c8} 16.\textit{e3±}. As it often happens in cramped positions like that, Black’s pieces have no good squares and they stand in each other’s way, Nevednichy – Loviczek, Nova Gorica 2002.

After 13...\textit{a6} 14.\textit{e3 b4} (14...\textit{c8} 15.b3 \textit{c5}, Vescovi – Mayer, Bad Zwesten 2001, even after 16.\textit{g1} the game transposes to the main line 13...\textit{d8d7}, except that Black’s knight has come to the c5-square via a6 and not the d7-square. The move 14...\textit{b4} – is an attempt by Black to exploit the placement of the knight on a6.) 15.\textit{c1} e4 16.\textit{d4 d3+} 17.\textit{xd3 exd3} 18.\textit{b5±} Delgado – Almeida, Holguin 2002, and Black’s d3-pawn has become a juicy target. Black cannot compensate its weakness,
because he has practically no targets for a counterattack. The game continued with: 18...\textbf{\textit{d}}7 19.f4 (This is White’s simplest plan to press his advantage home.) 19...0-0 20.\textbf{\textit{f}}3. White is threatening to follow with: f4-f5, 20...\textbf{\textit{f}}5 21.\textbf{\textit{x}}f5 \textbf{\textit{x}}f5 22.\textbf{\textit{e}}4 \textbf{\textit{g}}4 23.\textbf{\textit{f}}5! \textbf{\textit{d}}7 24.\textbf{\textit{d}}2 \textbf{\textit{e}}5 25.\textbf{\textit{x}}g4 \textbf{\textit{x}}g4 26.\textbf{\textit{f}}4 \textbf{\textit{f}}6 27.\textbf{\textit{x}}xe5 \textbf{\textit{x}}e5 28.\textbf{\textit{c}}f1 \textbf{\textit{f}}7 29.\textbf{\textit{x}}d3 a6 30.\textbf{\textit{h}}g1 and Black resigned.

14.\textbf{\textit{e}}3

14...\textbf{\textit{c}}8

14...\textbf{\textit{c}}8. This move is with the idea to place the knight on the c5-square, the queen on f5 and to create the threat to check on d3. In the game Braun – Duemmke, Weilburg 1998, there followed: 15.b3 \textbf{\textit{c}}5 16.\textbf{\textit{g}}1 f5 17.\textbf{\textit{d}}2 0-0 18.0-0-0 \textbf{\textit{e}}4 19. \textbf{\textit{x}}e4 \textbf{\textit{x}}e4\textsuperscript{2}. White plans to castle long, but this idea is not impressive at all, since the king would be quite vulnerable there. He could and should have tried instead: 16.\textbf{\textit{d}}2 \textbf{\textit{f}}5 17.\textbf{\textit{x}}c5 dxc5 18.\textbf{\textit{f}}3, followed by \textbf{\textit{e}}4. Still, the best for White was to counter 14...\textbf{\textit{c}}8 with 15.\textbf{\textit{c}}1! (He could not capture on c4 anyway, because of the pin of the knight. White thus prevents the accomplishment of Black’s plan, because now after 15...\textbf{\textit{c}}c5, White follows with 16.b4± and c4-c5 with a great advantage.

14...a6. The idea of that move is to place the queen on c7, the knight on c5 and then to redeploy the other knight to the d7-square with the object to prepare in the future the undermining pawn-move b7-b5. 15.b3 \textbf{\textit{c}}7 16.\textbf{\textit{d}}3 0-0 17.\textbf{\textit{e}}4 \textbf{\textit{x}}e4 (Naturally, Black was not forced to give his bishop, but he intends to place his knight on c5, while the line: 17...\textbf{\textit{c}}5 18.\textbf{\textit{x}}c5 dxc5 19. \textbf{\textit{x}}g6 fxg6 20.\textbf{\textit{d}}2 \textbf{\textit{c}}8 21.\textbf{\textit{c}}2 \textbf{\textit{h}}7 22.\textbf{\textit{e}}4 is not favourable for him at all.) 18.\textbf{\textit{e}}e4 g6 19. \textbf{\textit{d}}2 \textbf{\textit{c}}5. The game continued with: 20.\textbf{\textit{c}}2 \textbf{\textit{e}}4 21.\textbf{\textit{e}}e4 (21. \textbf{\textit{e}}e4? \textbf{\textit{d}}d5) 21...\textbf{\textit{d}}7 22.0-0 \textbf{\textit{c}}5 (22...\textbf{\textit{h}}7! \textbf{\textit{d}}3.f4 \textbf{\textit{f}}5\textsuperscript{2}) 23. \textbf{\textit{x}}c5!? \textbf{\textit{x}}c5 24.\textbf{\textit{h}}1 \textbf{\textit{ae}}8 25.f4 exf4 26.\textbf{\textit{a}}ae1! \textbf{\textit{c}}8 27.\textbf{\textit{g}}2 \textbf{\textit{g}}4?! (c27...\textbf{\textit{d}}8!? 28.\textbf{\textit{e}}4 \textbf{\textit{c}}7 29.\textbf{\textit{xf}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}5\textsuperscript{2} 28.\textbf{\textit{h}}2? (It was correct for White to follow here with: 28. \textbf{\textit{x}}g4! hxg4 29.\textbf{\textit{e}}4! f5 30.gxf6 \textbf{\textit{xf}}6 31.\textbf{\textit{xf}}4 \textbf{\textit{xf}}4 32.\textbf{\textit{xf}}4 \textbf{\textit{hxh}}4 33.\textbf{\textit{e}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}7 34.\textbf{\textit{g}}2±) 28...\textbf{\textit{d}}8± and Black’s powerful counterplay settled the outcome convincingly: 29.\textbf{\textit{e}}4 f3 30.\textbf{\textit{g}}1 \textbf{\textit{xe}}4! 31.\textbf{\textit{x}}g4 \textbf{\textit{xe}}1+ 32.\textbf{\textit{g}}1 \textbf{\textit{fe}}8 33. \textbf{\textit{f}}2 \textbf{\textit{e}}2 34.\textbf{\textit{g}}3 \textbf{\textit{b}}6 35.\textbf{\textit{f}}1 \textbf{\textit{e}}4 36.\textbf{\textit{h}}3 \textbf{\textit{g}}4! and White resigned, Vescovi – Leitao, Brazil 1998. Of course, White’s play can
be easily improved – the fact itself that he had to capture on e4 with the queen and not with the knight is quite indicative that he did not play well.

It deserved attention, for example, for White to have played: 20.\texttt{\textbullet}c2?! At first, according to the well-known principle, it is better to avoid exchanging pieces when you have a space advantage. Secondly, the bishop prevents reliably Black’s move f7-f5 – his g6-pawn would be hopelessly weak after it. Finally, Black has but one good square for his two knights – the c5-square, so one of the knights is obviously ineffective. 20...\texttt{\textbullet}ac8 (Black cannot change much with: 20...a5 21.\texttt{\textbullet}b1±.) 21.\texttt{\textbullet}c1 \texttt{\textbullet}d8 22.\texttt{\textbullet}f3 a5 23.\texttt{\textbullet}f1 \texttt{\textbullet}bd7 24.\texttt{\textbullet}g2± (this move is recommended by A. Finkel) and White has the advantage. He has restricted Black’s counterplay and he can prepare the plan with b3-b4 at leisure.

15.b3 \texttt{\textbullet}c5 16.\texttt{\textbullet}g1 \texttt{\textbullet}bd7 17.b4±

In case the black knight retreats, White would follow with a2-a3 and then he would try to deploy his knight to e4. After 17...\texttt{\textbullet}e4, White, just like we have mentioned in our notes to Black’s move 13 of the game Pinto Coelho – Merg Vaz, Dos Hermanas 2003, captures on e4, exchanges the light squared bishops and brings his knight to e4 with a clear advantage.

The only way for Black to justify the idea \texttt{\textbullet}c5 is to follow with:

17...e4 18.\texttt{\textbullet}d2 \texttt{\textbullet}d3+ 19.\texttt{\textbullet}f1

Now, it is already too dangerous for White to capture the d3-pawn, because of the possibility \texttt{\textbullet}d7-e5.

19...\texttt{\textbullet}xb4 20.\texttt{\textbullet}dxe4 0–0

21.\texttt{\textbullet}d4↑

Black’s kingside is under threats now, since after the capture on h5 – White can continue with h4-h5-h6 quite dangerously. 21...\texttt{\textbullet}e8 22.a3 \texttt{\textbullet}a6 23.\texttt{\textbullet}xh5 \texttt{\textbullet}xc4 24.\texttt{\textbullet}e2 \texttt{\textbullet}c8. Black is forced to leave his rook en-pris in order to preserve some counter-threats. 25.h5 \texttt{\textbullet}f5 26.\texttt{\textbullet}g3. It might have been better for White to play here: 26.h6 \texttt{\textbullet}f8 27.f3, because his threats on the kingside are quite dangerous (for example \texttt{\textbullet}xg7 and \texttt{\textbullet}f6+), while Black’s counterplay is presently non-existent. 26...\texttt{\textbullet}f8 27.\texttt{\textbullet}e3 \texttt{\textbullet}b6 28.\texttt{\textbullet}xb6 \texttt{\textbullet}xc4 29.\texttt{\textbullet}xe4 \texttt{\textbullet}xe4 30.\texttt{\textbullet}xa7± and Black’s compensation for the exchange is hardly sufficient. Hamdouchi – Baburin, Saint Vincent 2000.
13.\texttt{\textsc{d}3} \texttt{\textsc{x}d3}

Black can also try another idea here - to enable White to trade bishops on g6, but to open the f-file: 13...\texttt{\textsc{c}8} 14.\texttt{\textsc{x}g6} \texttt{\textsc{fxg}6}. He relies to obtain a lively piece-counterplay on the kingside as a compensation for his compromised pawn-chain. 15.\texttt{\textsc{d}2} 0–0 (15...\texttt{\textsc{xc}4}? 16.\texttt{\textsc{a}4}) 16.\texttt{\textsc{b}3} \texttt{\textsc{f}4} 17.\texttt{\textsc{g}5}!±. This is the best way for White to defend his pawn; otherwise his whole kingside gets weakened after the move \texttt{\textsc{f}2}–\texttt{\textsc{f}3}. In the game Bologan – Agdestein, Erevan 1996, White brought his knight to the e4-square, deployed his bishop on e3 and castled long. Then he exploited Black's weaknesses on the kingside: 17...\texttt{\textsc{h}xg}5 (After 17...\texttt{\textsc{h}5}, Black could have closed the h-file, but he would be left without any targets for counterplay.) 18.\texttt{\textsc{x}g}5 \texttt{\textsc{f}f}5 19.\texttt{\textsc{e}e}2 \texttt{\textsc{a}6} 20.\texttt{\textsc{d}e}4 \texttt{\textsc{f}3} 21.\texttt{\textsc{e}e}3 \texttt{\textsc{d}7} 22.0–0–0 \texttt{\textsc{d}c}5 23.\texttt{\textsc{h}h}4! \texttt{\textsc{h}3} 24.\texttt{\textsc{g}3} \texttt{\textsc{d}7} 25.\texttt{\textsc{x}x}3 \texttt{\textsc{x}h}3 26.\texttt{\textsc{c}2} \texttt{\textsc{f}7} 27.a3!+-.. Following b3–b4, Black would have no active pieces whatsoever. 27...\texttt{\textsc{g}4} 28.b4 \texttt{\textsc{x}g}5 29.\texttt{\textsc{x}g}5 \texttt{\textsc{g}5}+ 30.\texttt{\textsc{b}2} \texttt{\textsc{d}7} 31.\texttt{\textsc{g}e}4 \texttt{\textsc{h}4} 32.\texttt{\textsc{x}d}6+ \texttt{\textsc{g}8} 33.\texttt{\textsc{f}3} \texttt{\textsc{f}6} 34.\texttt{\textsc{c}5} \texttt{\textsc{xf}3} 35.\texttt{\textsc{x}g}6 \texttt{\textsc{f}2}+ 36.\texttt{\textsc{b}1} \texttt{\textsc{f}8} 37.\texttt{\textsc{h}5} \texttt{\textsc{g}2} 38.\texttt{\textsc{c}e}4 \texttt{\textsc{g}6} 39.\texttt{\textsc{g}5} \texttt{\textsc{g}3} 40.\texttt{\textsc{h}7}+ \texttt{\textsc{f}8} 41.\texttt{\textsc{e}6}+ and Black resigned.

Black can try the same idea with: 13...\texttt{\textsc{d}8}d714.\texttt{\textsc{x}g}6 \texttt{\textsc{fxg}6} 15.\texttt{\textsc{b}3} (15.\texttt{\textsc{e}e}2!? 0–0 16.\texttt{\textsc{g}5} \texttt{\textsc{h}5} 17.\texttt{\textsc{d}2} \texttt{\textsc{c}5} 18.\texttt{\textsc{d}e}4) 15...0–0 16.\texttt{\textsc{g}5} (Now, contrary to the game Bologan – Agdestein, Erevan 1996, in which Black had counterattacked energetically White's pawns, the g4-pawn was not under any threat, so it deserved attention for White to play 16.\texttt{\textsc{e}3}± - that move might be useful anyway. In case the black queen leaves the d8-square - White can continue even without the move g4-g5 - the h4-pawn would not be hanging then and he can play \texttt{\textsc{d}2}-e4 immediately. Following some waiting move by Black, White can play g4-g5 and he would be in a superior situation in comparison to the game that we have already analyzed.) 16...\texttt{\textsc{h}5} 17.\texttt{\textsc{d}2} \texttt{\textsc{c}5} 18.\texttt{\textsc{d}e}4 (18.\texttt{\textsc{e}e}2!? 18...\texttt{\textsc{b}d}7 19.\texttt{\textsc{e}3} \texttt{\textsc{a}5} 20.0–0. The opponents agreed to a draw here in the game Balogh – Laketic, Novi Sad 2003, but possibly that was at least slightly premature. White's king is completely safe and the weakness of the f5-square is irrelevant. He can counter Black's play: 20...\texttt{\textsc{d}e}4 21.\texttt{\textsc{d}e}4 b5, with 22.\texttt{\textsc{d}d}2± preserving a slight advantage.)
14.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xd3}}}


It is hardly advisable for Black to try here: 14...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c7}}, Guseinov – Aliev, Baku, 2001.}

The move b2-b3 is an integral part of White’s plan anyway, while the placement of the black queen on \textit{\texttt{c7}} is not so advantageous. 15.b3 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{a6}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{e3 \textbf{d7}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{dd2 \textbf{ac5}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{e2 \textbf{df6}} 19.f3 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{a5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c1 \textbf{c8}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xc5 \textbf{xc5}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{de4 \textbf{b4}}} 23.\textit{\texttt{xf6+ \textbf{xf6}}} 24.\textit{\texttt{d2 a6 25.\textit{\texttt{e4 \textbf{xd2+}}} 26.\textit{\texttt{xd2}}}+ and White maintains a clear positional advantage in the endgame.}

The sharp lines after: 14...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c8}}} 15.b3 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{xd4}}} (It deserves attention for Black to play here 15...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{a6}!?}, in order to activate the knight, ignoring White's threat to capture the g4-pawn.) 16.\textit{\texttt{g1 \textbf{h5}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xe7 \textbf{f5}}}}, bring success to White: 18.\textit{\texttt{db5 \textbf{f8}}} (18...\textit{\texttt{e4 19.\textbf{d4}++; 18...\textbf{a6 19.\textbf{a3 e4}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c3}--}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xe7 \textbf{xe7}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{a3 e4 (20...\textbf{d8} 21.\textit{\texttt{exe5 \textbf{a6}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{d2 \textbf{c5}} 23.\textit{\texttt{xc5 dxc5}}} 24.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{e1}--}} Lacau, Rodean – Ionescu, Calimanesti 2000) 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{d4}}++; It is slightly better for Black to play: 17...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{f8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{g1 \textbf{g8}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xd8+ \textbf{xd8}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{e4}}+, but even then he would be in a serious trouble, because of the vulnerability of his king.}

There were two games played in the line: 14...\textit{\texttt{d7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{e3}. In the game Lopez Guaita – Palacios Latasa, Aragon 1999, there followed: 15...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{d7}}} (15...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c7}}. This maneuver now, just like on move 14, is not purposeful. 16.b3 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{d7}} 17.\textit{\texttt{d2}}} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{d4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{d4}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c5}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{d5}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{d2}}}+ followed by the standard maneuver with the knight to the e4-square and in case Black castles short – a direct kingside attack.

15.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{e3}}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c8}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{d2}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{g5}}\textit{\texttt{\textbf{d2}}}+ and White maintains a clear positional advantage in the endgame.

17.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xc5}}}

This exchange leaves Black with a “bad” bishop against White’s knight and it is favourable for White as a rule.

17...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{xc5}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{b3 0–0}}

Or 18...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{c8}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{g3}}} 0–0 20.\textit{\texttt{g5}}

\textit{\texttt{\textbf{d8}}}
\textit{Conclusion}

The move 5...e6 is considered to be the main line in the system 2.e5 \textit{d}d5 3.d4 \textit{d}d6 4.e3 \textit{g}g4 5.e2. Black postpones the development of his knight on b8 and develops his other pieces instead. During the middle of the 90ies of the last century, there appeared a new and quite promising line for White – 6.h3 \textit{h}5 7.c4 \textit{b}6 8.exd6 cxd6 9.c3 \textit{e}7, and now 10.d5!? e5 11.g4!? \textit{g}6 12.h4. White occupies plenty of space on the kingside and thus balances Black's pawn-majority there. On top of everything, White has a wonderful knight on the e4-outpost.

He achieves all that, by weakening his position a bit indeed, but it seems like Black's attempts to attack White's c4 and g4-pawns, as well as the ideas for Black to play e5-e4 and bring his knight to the d3-square are not good enough for him to equalize. White preserves superior chances in all variations.
Part 4

1.e4 e6 2.d4 without 2...d5

Having played the move 1...e6, Black has demonstrated his intention to enter the French Defence. Indeed, after 2.d4, he plays 2...d5 in 99% of the games and I recommend to White to follow with 3.Qc3 etc. – you can study these variations in details if you read our volume 6.

Black is however under no obligation to stick to that move only and he can vary with something else on his move two. Still, it is evident that all similar experiments (with the exception of the move 2...c5) would not bring him any positive results that he can brag about and all of them would lead to positions that are anything else, but French Defence. White, of course, would hardly win the game immediately, but he will maintain a great opening advantage and that is something you can bet on.
We will deal in this chapter with some seldom played lines for Black on move two. They most often lead to transpositions to other openings, for example:

2...c6 3.\(\varnothing\)c3 d5 (about 3...d6 4.f4 – see 2...d6 3.\(\varnothing\)c3 c6 4.f4) 4.\(\varnothing\)f3 – see Book 3, Chapter 5;

2...c5 3.\(\varnothing\)f3 – transposes to the Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5 2.\(\varnothing\)f3 e6 3.d4);

2...\(\varnothing\)f6 3.e5 \(\varnothing\)d5 4.\(\varnothing\)f3 – leads to the Alekhine Defence (1.e4 \(\varnothing\)f6 2.e5 \(\varnothing\)d5 3.d4 e6?! 4.\(\varnothing\)f3);

About 2...a6 3.\(\varnothing\)f3 b5 4.\(\varnothing\)d3 \(\varnothing\)b7 – see 1...a6 2.d4 e6 3.\(\varnothing\)f3;

2...b6 3.\(\varnothing\)f3 – see 1...b6 2.d4 e6 3.\(\varnothing\)f3;

2...g6?! 3.\(\varnothing\)c3 \(\varnothing\)g7 4.h4 – see page 269, Book 4.

Now, the only possible original lines arise after the dubious moves: a) 2...\(\varnothing\)e7!?, b) 2...\(\varnothing\)e7!?, c) 2...d6!?, and d) 2...f5!? All these tries by Black do not contribute to the development of his pieces and the fight for the centre. In fact, the most reasonable move among the seldom played attempts is – e) 2...\(\varnothing\)c6.

a) 2...\(\varnothing\)e7! 3.\(\varnothing\)f3 d6

3...d5 4.\(\varnothing\)c3 – see 2...d5 (Book 6); 3...\(\varnothing\)f6 4.e5 \(\varnothing\)d5 – see 1.e4 \(\varnothing\)f6.

The move 3...a5?! does not help Black’s development and his fight for the centre Naismky – Cerovic, Elancourt 2003, and after the simple move 4.\(\varnothing\)d3\(=\) White’s advantage is more than obvious.

3...c6?! 4.\(\varnothing\)d3 d5 (It is quite against the opening principles for Black to play: 4...a5? Seifert – Plietz, Griesheim 2003, 5.0–0; Black only loses time with the move: 4...c5, Stanning – Petrou, Box Hill 2001, 5.0–0.) 5.e5 f6 6.0–0 b6 Hermann – Engelbrecht, Koenigshofen – Englebrecht, Koenigshofen 1999, and here White’s simplest positional decision is 7.c4\(=\) with a powerful
pressure in the centre.

3...b6 4.\d3 \a6, Beier – Wunder, Schney 1993 (About 4...d5 5.\c3 – see 2...d5; 4...\b7
5.0–0 – see 1.e4 b6 2.d4 \b7
3.\d3 e6 4.\f3 \e7 5.0–0; 4...
\c6 5.c3 h6 6.0–0 d6 7.\bd2 a6
8.\we2 \f6 9.\d1+ Machata – Benova, Kaskady 2002), after
5.c4 d5 (otherwise the move Ba6
would simply remain a loss of
time) 6.exd5 exd5 7.cxd5 \xd3
8.\xd3 \xd5 9.0–0 \f6 10.\c3±
White maintains a great lead in
development.

4.\d3

4...\f6

\a can also try some other
moves:

4...b6 5.0–0 \a6 (5...\b7 – see
1.e4 b6) 6.c4±;

4...\d7?! – this is hardly the
best place for Black’s bishop. 5.
0–0 \c6 6.a3 h6, Besse – Al
Zendani, Bled 2002, and here af-
after 7.e5± Black has serious prob-
lems to complete his develop-
ment;

In answer to 4...\d7, Thiele
– Craggs, Toronto 1997, White’s
simplest line is: 5.\f4 \gf6 6.
0–0 0–0 7.\e2± and he domi-
nates in the centre with a supe-
rior development;

After 4...h6 5.0–0 \f6, Schneider – Daguon, Bad Woerishofen
1992, White maintains his ad-
vantage with practically every
reasonable move, for example: 6.
e5±, occupying additional space;

The move 4...c5?! – leads ei-
ther to a loss of time, or Black is
left with a passive pawn-structure: 5.dxc5 \a5+ (after 5...dxc5
6.e5 \c6 7.c3 \c7 8.e2 \d7
9.0–0± Black has problems to
to obtain any counterplay) 6.\c3
\xc5 7.0–0 \f6 8.\e3± and
White’s lead in development is
overwhelming, Balvanyos –
Verecke, Hungary 1993;

4...\c6 5.c3 \f6, Philip –
Butt, Dubai 1996 (after 5...\f6
Farley – Harewood, Bridgetown
2005, it seems logical for White
to complete his development with:
6.0–0 \ge7 7.\e1 \ge6 8.
\e3± and he is dominant in
the centre, while Black would hardly
create any effective counterplay),
6.0–0 0–0 7.\f4±;

4...c6 5.0–0 \d7, Martin –
Carril, Spain 1998, and here
White should better play the
simple: 6.e5±, maintaining a
great space advantage, mean-
while Black’s light squared
bishop is bound to remain iso-
lated for a long time.

5.0–0 0–0

Jovkova Draganova – Kostov,
Elenite 1986.

6.e5 \xe5 7.dxe5 \f6
Or 7...\d5 8.a3± and White
easily repels Black’s knight away from the centre.

8.\( \mathcal{E}e2 \) \( \mathcal{C}c5 \) 9.\( \mathcal{C}c4 \)±

White’s powerful e5-pawn provides him with a stable edge. He enjoys a space advantage and excellent possibilities for active play in the centre as well as on both flanks of the board.

b) 2...\( \mathcal{A}e7 \)?! 3.\( \mathcal{A}c3 \)

3...\( \mathcal{D}d6 \)

Black has also tried here some other moves, but his knight on e7 is so misplaced, since it hampers the development of his kingside, that Black’s chances to equalize are just superficial.

About 3...d5 4.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \) – see 2...d5 (Book 6).

3...\( \mathcal{F}f5 \), Heral – A. Anderssen, Vienna 1873. This move compromises Black’s kingside and does not contribute to his development. White’s most energetic reaction to it is the move: 4.\( \mathcal{A}g5 \), making a good use of the fact that 4...h6 leads to a difficult endgame for Black after: 5.\( \mathcal{A}h5+ g6 \) 6.\( \mathcal{A}xe7 \) gxh5 7.\( \mathcal{A}x d8 \) \( \mathcal{A}x d8 \) 8.\( \mathcal{E}xf5 \) \( \mathcal{F}xf5 \) 9.0–0–0±.

3...b6 4.f4 g6 (or 4...\( \mathcal{B}b7 \) 5.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \) g6 6.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \)±) 5.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \) \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 6.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \) \( \mathcal{A}b7 \) 7.0–0 c6 8.\( \mathcal{A}e3 \)±, with a great advantage for White in the centre, Petrovic – Cvetkovic, Belgrade 2003.

Black only loses time with the following maneuver of the knight: 3...\( \mathcal{G}g6 \) 4.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \) \( \mathcal{H}h4 \) 5.\( \mathcal{A}g4 \) \( \mathcal{G}g6 \) 6.e5 \( \mathcal{E}e7 \), Kotnycz – Hoeppner, Hassloch 1999, and here after the simple line 7.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \)±, White maintains an overwhelming lead in development.

In answer to 3...g6, White’s simplest variation is: 4.h4! \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 5.h5 d5 6.h6 \( \mathcal{F}f8 \) 7.\( \mathcal{G}g5 \)± and he controls completely the dark squares on the kingside, R. Fischer – Codman, Boston 1964.

4.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \)

White could have also played 4.f4 and after the logical moves: 4...g6 5.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \) \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 6.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \) there arises a position, which we have analyzed extensively in our Book 4, Chapter 24, variation d.

4...\( \mathcal{D}d7 \)

4...\( \mathcal{G}g6 \), Blodić – Zelmer, Kaufbeuren 1998. Having played this compromising move, Black simply provokes his opponent’s response 5.h4± and White’s
kingside initiative is very powerful.

After 4...b6 5.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}g5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}a6} 6.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}xa6} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}xa6} 7.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e2}±, White's lead in development is considerable and he controls the centre completely, Potthammel – Rothsprach, Mecklenburg 1998.

In answer to 4...g6, White can develop a dangerous kingside initiative with: 5.h4 h6 6.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}e3} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}7} 7.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}d2} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}d7} 8.h5 g5 9.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}h2} a6 10.0-0-0 b5 11.f4 gxf4 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}xf4} e5 13.dxe5 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}xe5} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f3} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}3} 15.gxf3±, because his lead in development is huge and he dominates in the centre, A.Potkin – Novotny, Pardubice 2000.

5.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}b6} 6.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}d3} g6

This position was reached in the game Brazdil – Novotny, Plzen 1999. Black lags in development and his kingside has been compromised. White controls the centre completely and he leads in development, so he can easily develop a dangerous initiative on both sides of the board with the help of one of the two standard moves: – 7.h4↑, or 7.a4↑.

c) 2...d6?!

This move is passive indeed, nevertheless it is solid enough.

3.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c3}

3...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}a6}

Black continues with his strange strategy.

His other possibilities are:
3...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e7} 4.f4 – see 2...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e7};
3...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}e7} 4.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f3}, or 4.f4 – see 2...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}e7}; 3...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c6} 4.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f3} – see 1...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e6}
2.d4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c6} 3.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f3} d6 4.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c3}; 3...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f6}
4.f4 – see 1.e4 d6 2.d4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f6} 3.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c3}
e6 4.f4 (Book 4, Chapter 2, variation b);

The strange line: 3...d5?! 4.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}f3}± transposes to the French defence, meanwhile Black has lost an important tempo and that is doubtlessly quite favourable for White;

The move 3...f6? – is only compromising Black's position senselessly. 4.f4± De Souza – Beraldo, Pouso Alegre 1997;
3...f5?! – weakens the a2-g8 diagonal, as well as a complex of squares in the centre: 4.exf5 exf5 5.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}c4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e7}+ 6.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}e2} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e6} 7.d5± Zdravkovic – Mizdalo, Belgrade 2003;
3...c6?! – is just a strange
move, which does not contribute to Black’s development and it is quite useless in the fight for the centre too. After the simple response 4.f4±, White has occupied plenty of extra space, for example: 4...\textit{Q}f6 \textit{e}7 (about 4...\textit{g}6 5.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{g}7 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{e}7 – see Chapter 27, Book 4) 6.\textit{Q}ge2 \textit{b}5 7.0–0 0–0 8.\textit{e}5 \textit{Q}d5 9.\textit{Q}xd5 exd5 10.\textit{c}3 dx\textit{e}5 11.\textit{f}xe5 \textit{g}6 12.\textit{a}4± and White enjoys a space advantage and he has excellent prospects to develop a dangerous initiative on both sides of the board, Crafty – Dlugy, Internet 1995;

3...\textit{\&}d7?! – this is an unfavourable placement for the black bishop and after White’s logical move 4.f4±, Black can hardly find suitable squares for the rest of his pieces;

3...\textit{b}6 4.f4 \textit{b}7 5.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{d}7 (about 5...\textit{Q}e7 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{g}6 7.0–0 – see variation \textit{d}1, Chapter 24, Book 4) 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{Q}e7 (6...\textit{g}6 7.0–0 \textit{g}7 8.\textit{f}5 \textit{Q}e7 – see line \textit{d}1, Chapter 24, Book 4; it is too passive for Black to play: 6...\textit{Q}e7 7.0–0 \textit{Q}gf6 Purdon – Jones, Birmingham 2001, because after 8.\textit{e}5 \textit{Q}d5 9.\textit{Q}xd5 \textit{Q}xd5 10.\textit{c}4 \textit{b}7 11.\textit{f}5± White’s attacking chances are just excellent) 7.0–0 \textit{c}5 (7...\textit{g}6, Hieronymus – Robozyt, Internet 1997, 8.\textit{f}5! exf5 9.exf5 \textit{g}7 10.\textit{g}5±) 8.\textit{f}5± Todorcevic – Egido Navarro, Zaragoza 1999;

3...\textit{g}6 4.f4 \textit{f}6?! – this is a strange and anti-positional move (it is better for Black to follow with 4...\textit{Q}g7 5.\textit{Q}f3 – variation \textit{d}, Chapter 24, Book 4) 5.\textit{Q}f3± Stergiopoulos – Dermitis, Nikea 2001;

3...\textit{Q}d7 4.f4 \textit{Q}e7 (about 4...\textit{b}6 5.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{b}7 6.\textit{d}d3 – see 3...\textit{b}6; 4...\textit{h}4+?! 5.\textit{g}3 \textit{Q}e7 6.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{a}6 7.\textit{g}2 6 8.0–0 \textit{g}7 9.\textit{f}5± Menchaca – Frid, Apertura 1997) 5.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{h}6 (5...\textit{b}6 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{b}7 7.0–0 – see 3...\textit{b}6) 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{a}6 7.0–0 \textit{b}5, Kordts – Luebecke, Email 1999 and here White can begin opening files in the centre quite favourably with the move 8.\textit{f}5±.

4.f4

This move provides White with a space advantage and a superior development.

4...\textit{Q}d7

About 4...\textit{g}6 5.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{g}7 6.\textit{Q}e3 – see Chapter 28, Book 4, 5...\textit{e}6 6.\textit{Q}e3.

5.\textit{Q}f3 \textit{Q}e7

5...\textit{Q}e7 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{h}6, Ventimiglia – Rosenstein, Email 1998, 7.0–0 \textit{Q}gf6 8.\textit{e}6±.

5...\textit{h}6 6.\textit{d}d3 \textit{g}6 7.0–0 \textit{Q}e7, Da Silva Barbosa – Rosenstein, Email 2002, White’s lead in development is huge and he can now start the standard attack in this type of positions with the move: 8.\textit{f}5→.

After 5...\textit{c}5 6.\textit{d}5 \textit{e}5 7.a4 \textit{Q}a5, Wiehagen – Radde, Dortmund 2001, there arises a pawn-structure, which is typical for the Benoni Defence (1.d4 \textit{c}5 2.d5 \textit{e}5), except that Black has already lost a tempo (\textit{e}6–\textit{e}5) 8.\textit{f}xe5 \textit{Q}xe5 (8...\textit{d}xe5 9.\textit{d}d2±) 9.\textit{Q}xe5 \textit{d}xe5 10.\textit{Q}d2± and White’s superior
paw-structure and his dominance in the centre provide him with a stable edge.

6.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{d3} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}}\texttt{6}

This position was reached in the game Huang – Mejico, Singapore 2004. Black’s lag in development is so great that White should better start some decisive actions with: 7.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}}\texttt{5!} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{xf5} (or 7...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}}\texttt{e7} 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}}\texttt{xe6} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}}\texttt{xe6} 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}}\texttt{g5} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}}\texttt{f6} 10.e5++; 7...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}}}}\texttt{h4} 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}}\texttt{xe6} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}}\texttt{xe6} 9.0–0±) 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{xf5} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{7} 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}\texttt{e2}± and Black is already beyond salvation.

d) 2...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}}\texttt{5}?! 

This strange move is somehow fighting for the centre; nevertheless Black compromises his kingside, some squares on the e-file and the a2-g8 diagonal.

3.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{xf5} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{xf5}

After 3...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{f6} 4.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}}\texttt{xe6} d5 5.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{d3}+ Kulbacki – Ball, Lansing 1988, Black’s compensation for the sacrificed pawn is evidently insufficient.

4.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{d3} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}}\texttt{6}

\textbf{Alack can tried here some other moves too:}

4...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}\texttt{g6} 5.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{f3} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}}\texttt{c6} 6.c3 \texttt{d6}, Graetz – Winkelmann, Germany 2000 and after the natural move 7.0–0, White leads in development and he can easily proceed with active actions in the centre as well as on the queenside;

4...d5 5.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{f3} \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}}\texttt{6} 6.0–0 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{7} (White maintains a powerful pressure in the centre too after: 6...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{d6} 7.c4 c6 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{c3} 0–0 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}}\texttt{g5}± Gunter – Benson, St Helier 1999) 7.c4 c6 8.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{c3} 0–0 9.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}\texttt{b3}. Black’s position remains extremely difficult, due to his lag in development and his weak central squares, for example: 9...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}\texttt{b6}, De la Rosa – Sauvin, Switzerland 1993, (Black’s attempt to consolidate on the e4-outpost led to a swift disaster after: 9...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{e4} 10.cxd5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{xc3} 11.dxc6+ 1–0, in the game Keserovic – Ganslmayer, Bad Woerishofen 2001; it is also too bad for Black to try: 9...dxc4 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{xc4}+ \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}\texttt{h8} 11.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{e5}+, because he can hardly preserve the material equilibrium, Da Cruz – Zampronio, Santos 2001) and now Black is bound to face serious problems after the simple move 10.\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}}\texttt{e1}!, for example: 10...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}}\texttt{xb3} 11.axb3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}}\texttt{d6
(or 11...\texttt{b}4 12.\texttt{d}2 and White preserves a huge lead in development and numerous threats) 12.cxd5 cxd5 13.\texttt{x}d5\pm and White wins a pawn;
4...\texttt{d}6 5.c4 \texttt{f}6 6.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{c}6 (it is hardly better for Black to try 6...\texttt{e}7 7.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{g}6 8.\texttt{g}2 \texttt{c}6, Nordstrom – Appelquist, corr. 1967, because after 9.0–0\pm White remains with a space advantage and he dominates on the only open file) 7.\texttt{ge}2 \texttt{e}7 8.0–0\pm Ljubojevic – Dolezal, Prague 1990.

5.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{e}7+
This move even contributes to Black’s lag in development. It is not so better for him to try either: 5...\texttt{g}7 6.0–0 \texttt{e}7 7.e1 0–0 8.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{bc}6 9.d5\pm Garcia Galeote – Guillen Andrinal, Madrid 2002, or 5...\texttt{f}6 6.0–0 \texttt{c}6 7.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{g}7 8.e1+ \texttt{e}7 9.\texttt{e}2\pm. White’s lead in development is overwhelming, Anya Sun – Neo Xiu, Kuala Lumpur 2001.

6.\texttt{f}1!!
This is White’s most energetic decision, although it is quite good enough for him to follow with the simple move: 6.\texttt{e}2\pm.

6...\texttt{f}6 7.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{g}7

8.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{c}6 9.\texttt{d}2 0–0 10.e1 \texttt{d}8 11.h4 \texttt{d}6 12.h5\texttt{–} Sveshnikov – Trajkovic, Pula 1990. All White’s pieces are in action, while Black’s queenside is just “napping”.

e) 2...\texttt{c}6 3.\texttt{f}3

3...\texttt{d}6
In case of 3...\texttt{d}5 4.\texttt{c}3 – see Book 6, Chapter 2 (1.e6 2.d4 d5 3.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{c}6 4.\texttt{f}3).
After 3...\texttt{f}6 4.e5 \texttt{d}5 (It is bad for Black to play 4...\texttt{g}4 – since he loses important tempi and his pawn-structure gets compromised by force: 5.h3 \texttt{h}6 6.\texttt{x}h6 gxh6 7.e3 d6 8.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{d}7 9.\texttt{e}2\pm; 7...f5 8.d5!\pm; 7...d5 8.d3\pm; 7...\texttt{b}4 8.\texttt{d}2\pm Lor – Vio, Email 1999.) after 5.c4, the arising positions are much more typical for the Alekhine Defence – see 1.e4 \texttt{f}6 2.e5 \texttt{d}5 3.d4 e6 4.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{c}6 5.c4.

4.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{f}6
The other possibilities for Black are:

4...\texttt{d}5?! leads to lines similar to the variation: 2...\texttt{d}5 3.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{c}6, except that White has an extra tempo.
4...g6?! 5.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b5} \texttt{\textdollar}h6?! \) (Black's defence is quite difficult after: 5...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d7} \) 6.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}g5!} \texttt{\textdollar}ce7 7.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e2=} \) 6...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e7} \) 7.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e3=} \), because White's lead in development is considerable.) 6.d5\( \texttt{\textdollar}Barraso – Goodson, Email 1999;\)

4...h6 5.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b5} \texttt{\textdollar}d7 \), Schulz – Meierhofer, Internet 2001 and here it seems quite logical for White to occupy some additional space with the help of: 6.d5 exd5 7.ed \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e5} \) 8.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd7=} \) 9.0.0\( \texttt{\textdollar}B;\)

4...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d7} \) 5.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}c4} \texttt{\textdollar}f6, \) Zippy – Arnaque, Internet 1994. Black's light squared bishop is quite misplaced – it stands in the way of his own pieces and White should better open files with the natural reaction: 6.e5 dxe5 7.dxe5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}g4} \) 8.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e2=} \);

4...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}ge7, Raffalt – Koellendorfer, Graz 1991. Now after: 5.d5 \texttt{\textdollar}e5 (it is worse for Black to play 5...exd5 6.exd5 \texttt{\textdollar}e5 7.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e2=} \) 6.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xe5} \texttt{\textdollar}xe5 7.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b5=} \) c6) The endgame is very difficult for Black after: 7...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d7} \) 8.dxe6\( \texttt{\textdollar}B;\)

8.dxc6 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd1=} \) 9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd1} \texttt{\textdollar}xc6 10.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e3=} \), White's pawn-structure is much better and it provides him with a stable advantage;

4...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e7} \) 5.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b5} \) a6 6.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xc6=} \) bxc6 7.0.0 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}f6} \) 8.e5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d5, Ball-\)

hause – Brandes, Germany 1999. Black's pawn-mass in the centre is quite static and his own bishops are ineffective because of that. White should better emphasize his advantage by centralizing his pieces with: 9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e4} \) 0.0 10.c4\( \texttt{\textdollar}B;\)

4...a6 5.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d3} \texttt{\textdollar}e7, Dudine – Rozmann, Trieste 2004 (5...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b4} \) 6.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e2} \texttt{\textdollar}c6 7.0.0 \texttt{\textdollar}e7, Ricardi – Monaco, Buenos Aires 1991. White's simplest way to maintain his edge is by occupying space with: 8.e5 dxe5 9.dxe5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd1} \) 10.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd1} \texttt{\textdollar}d7 11.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}f4=} \); After 5...h6 6.0.0 e5, King Lee – Taoyang, Internet 1999, it seems advisable for White to follow with: 7.d5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}ce7} \) 8.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e2} \texttt{\textdollar}f6 9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}c4=} \) and he leads in development and his plan to seize the initiative on the queenside is quite clear-cut;

Black should better not try to change the pawn-structure after: 8...\( \texttt{\textdollar}f5 \) 9.exf5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}f6} \) 10.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}g3} \texttt{\textdollar}xd5 11.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e1} \) 12.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}h4=} \) 6.0.0 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}f6} \) 7.e5! \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d5} \) (it is even worse for Black to try 7...dxe5?! 8.dxe5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}g4}, because of 9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e2=} \) and Black cannot capture the e5-pawn with: 9...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d4?} \) 10.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd4} \texttt{\textdollar}xd4, since after 11.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}d1=} \) he loses material) 8.exd6 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd6} \) (8...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd6} \) 9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e4} \texttt{\textdollar}d8 10.c4\( \texttt{\textdollar}B;\)

9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e4 \texttt{\textdollar}e7 10.a3=} \) and White's advantage is quite stable due to his extra space.

5.d5

This is White's most energetic reply.

5...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xd5} \)

After 5...\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b8}, \) White's simplest line is: 6.dxe6 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xe6} \) (6...fxe6?! 7.e5 \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}fd7} \) 8.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}g5} \) \( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}e7} \) 9.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}xe7 \texttt{\textdollar}xe7 10.exd6 \texttt{\textdollar}xd6 11.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}b5=} \) 7.\( \textsf{\texttt{\textdollar}g5!}, and now in case Black complies with the exchange on the e6-square, White remains with a stable advantage,
because of his bishop pair. The retreat for Black: 7...\(\text{a}\text{d}\text{7}\) is impossible due to 8.\(\text{c}\text{c}\text{4}\). In case of 7...\(\text{g}\text{g}\text{4}\) 8.f3 \(\text{h}\text{h}\text{5}\), it seems very reasonable for White to continue: 9.\(\text{h}\text{h}\text{3}\), with the idea to follow later with \(\text{f}\text{f}\text{4}\). His further plans include castling long and a pawn-offensive on the kingside.

6.\text{exd5 }\text{e5}

It is hardly any better for Black to play: 6...\text{e7} 7.\text{b5+ }\text{d7} 8.\text{xd7+ }\text{xd7} 9.\text{e3 }\text{f5} 10.\text{d4 }\text{e5} 11.\text{d3 }\text{fxd5} 12.\text{b5+ }\text{d8} 13.\text{xb7+, because White’s development is clearly superior and Black’s king is quite unsafe. White’s prospects as a result are much better, Dorkus – Hellas, Internet 1998.}

7.\text{b5+ }\text{d7}

After 7...\text{c6} 8.\text{xc6 }\text{xc6} 9.\text{exe5 }\text{xb5} 10.\text{c6+, Black’s problems with the coordination of his pieces are quite obvious after: 10...\text{b6} (or 10...\text{c7}) 11.\text{e2+, because he has to find a way to evacuate his king away from the centre, otherwise he loses his b5-pawn: 11...\text{d7} 12.\text{b4+}.}

8.\text{e2 }\text{e7} 9.\text{xd7+ }\text{exd7} 10.\text{e3 0–0–0} 11.\text{h3 }\text{e8} 12.0–0–0 \text{e4}

This position was reached in the game Eggerer – Kleiner, Bayern 1999. White’s advantage could have been emphasized best with: 13.\text{c4 }\text{xc3} (It is clearly worse for Black to play: 13...\text{a6} 14.\text{he1+} and White’s lead in development is overwhelming, or 13...\text{b8} 14.\text{xa7+! }\text{xa7} 15.\text{a4+ }\text{b8} 16.\text{xe4 }\text{b6} 17.\text{d4 }\text{xd5} – Black loses after: 17...\text{xe4? 18. }\text{he1 – 18. }\text{xd5 }\text{xe4} 19.\text{xf7+} and White remains with a solid extra pawn and a superior development.) 14.\text{xc3 }\text{b8} 15.\text{he1+}. Black’s defence is extremely difficult due to his non-developed kingside.

\section*{Conclusion}

The lines, which we have analyzed in this chapter, are very seldom played. Black has great problems in comparison to the standard lines of the French Defence. It is quite enough for White to make natural and simple moves, developing pieces and occupying the centre, in order to maintain an overwhelming advantage.
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