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Caro-Kann: Smyslov System 4...d7

by

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Translated and Edited by Ken Neat

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Conventional Signs

!       good move
!!      excellent move
!?      move deserving consideration
?!      dubious move
?       incorrect move
??      blunder
±       clear advantage for White
+-+-+-+-+-+-+ clear advantage for Black
±±      slight advantage for White
±±±     slight advantage for Black
=       equal position
1-0     White wins
0-1     Black wins
½-½     draw
Ch      Championship
corr.   correspondence game
CT      Candidates Tournament
IZ      Interzonal Tournament
OL      Olympiad
WC      World Championship
Introduction

The popular branch of the Caro-Kann Defence, characterised after 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 Cc3 dxe4 4 Cxe4 by the developing move 4...Cd7, enjoys the reputation of having been a favourite defence of the classic World Champions. Introduced by the famous chess researcher of the first third of our century, Aron Nimzowitsch, this continuation forms the basis of a promising system of play, in which Black, despite his somewhat passive position, avoids serious positional concessions and can gradually hope for equality, which is fully in accordance with the classical views on playing the opening.

Therefore it is no accident that in the 1940s it drew the attention of one of the pre-war World Championship contenders Salo Flohr, and that in the 1950s and 1960s it was actively developed by two excellent ‘defenders’, the seventh and ninth World Champions Vasily Smyslov and Tigran Petrosian. The variation could well have been named after them both (in fact Petrosian’s claim is perhaps the stronger, as he played it throughout his career), but in the West the name of the Smyslov System has become customary.

In recent years this variation has become a major weapon in the black repertoire of the twelfth World Champion Anatoly Karpov.

With ...Qg6 (or ...Qdf6) Black plans to drive away or exchange the centralised white knight, avoiding the doubled pawns after 4...Qf6, as well as the positional concessions that arise after the bishop development 4...Qf5. Then ...e7-e6 leads to a pawn structure where Black’s main way of freeing his game is by preparing the advance ...c6-c5, which can lead to White gaining a queenside pawn majority and the long-term prospect of obtaining an outside passed pawn in the endgame.

One drawback to the system is the delay in the development of Black’s light-square bishop, which he often has to fianchetto in analogy with the Rubinstein Variation in the French Defence, an operation that takes time and allows White a persistent initiative, based on his occupation of e5 with a knight. However, despite the
outward passivity of Black’s position, the absence of pawn weaknesses enables him, with accurate play, to maintain the balance, as though confirming the philosophical thesis, that drawbacks are sometimes the consequence of virtues. This was sensed most subtly by the World Champions, and in the years when the variation was being established, in the games of Smyslov and Petrosian their opponents’ attempts to gain an advantage by simple means were equally simply parried by Black, as he imperceptibly eroded White’s initiative. With the development of more complicated variations, Black was also able to find counter-actions. Here are a few examples from the early experience of the World Champions.

experience in his game with Gligoric: 8...e6 9 b3 d6 10 We2 d7?! (10...c7) 11 d2 a5? (11...xe5) 12 xf7!, and Black came under a strong attack – cf. Game 38.

8 ... e6
9 g5 e7
10 0–0–0

Game 1
Matanovic-Petrosian
USSR v. Yugoslavia 1959

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 c3 dxe4
4 xe4 d7
5 f3 g6
6 xf6+ xf6
7 c4 f5
8 w2

Matanovic carries out the plan with queenside castling (nowadays 8 0–0, to support the knight at e5, is more usual), being under no doubt that Petrosian would have prepared for 8 e5, where in the analogous 1957 match he had an unfortunate

10 ... g4!

Simplicity is the basis of beauty, and the outwardly simple means, with which Petrosian outplays his opponent, allow his play to be compared with the strategic masterpieces of Capablanca, the third World Champion. With this exchange of White’s most important piece – the knight, which was aiming for e5 – he demonstrates a subtle understanding of the position.

11 h3 xf3
12 xf3 d5
13 xe7

After 13 d2 Black can launch a counterattack: 13...b5 14 b3 a5.

13 ... xe7
14 he1

14
Even Bobby Fischer himself was unable to shake Petrosian’s position (Bled 1961): 14 \( \text{\textit{b}}1 \text{\textit{d}}8 \) 15 \( \text{\textit{e}}4 \) b5 16 \( \text{\textit{d}}3 \) a5 17 c3 \( \text{\textit{w}}d6 \) 18 g3 b4 19 c4 \( \text{\textit{f}}6 \), and Black maintained the balance.

14 \ldots \text{0—0} \\
15 \textbf{\textit{\textit{b}}1} \text{\textit{ad}}8 \\
16 \text{\textit{bb}}3 \text{\textit{f}}6 \\
17 \text{\textit{we}}2? \\

White is labouring under an illusion. Had he appreciated the change in the situation, he would have exchanged queens by 17 \( \text{\textit{wx}}f6 \) \( \text{\textit{xf}}6 \), with prospects of a draw. But he is still thinking about the initiative, as indicated by his pawn offensive on the kingside.

17 \ldots \text{\textit{d}}7 \\
18 c3 \text{b}5 \\
19 g3 \text{\textit{fd}}8 \\
20 f4 \\

It was not yet too late to think about equalising with 20 \( \text{\textit{x}}d5 \).

20 \ldots \text{b}4 \\

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{\textit{w}} & \textbf{\textit{e}} & \textbf{\textit{f}} & \textbf{\textit{g}} & \textbf{\textit{h}} & \textbf{\textit{i}} & \textbf{\textit{j}} & \textbf{\textit{k}} \\
\hline
\textbf{\textit{a}} & \textbf{\textit{b}} & \textbf{\textit{c}} & \textbf{\textit{d}} & \textbf{\textit{e}} & \textbf{\textit{f}} & \textbf{\textit{g}} & \textbf{\textit{h}} \\
\hline
\textbf{\textit{b}} & \textbf{\textit{c}} & \textbf{\textit{d}} & \textbf{\textit{e}} & \textbf{\textit{f}} & \textbf{\textit{g}} & \textbf{\textit{h}} & \textbf{\textit{i}} \\
\hline
\textbf{\textit{c}} & \textbf{\textit{d}} & \textbf{\textit{e}} & \textbf{\textit{f}} & \textbf{\textit{g}} & \textbf{\textit{h}} & \textbf{\textit{i}} & \textbf{\textit{j}} \\
\hline
\textbf{\textit{d}} & \textbf{\textit{e}} & \textbf{\textit{f}} & \textbf{\textit{g}} & \textbf{\textit{h}} & \textbf{\textit{i}} & \textbf{\textit{j}} & \textbf{\textit{k}} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

21 \textbf{\textit{\textit{w}}f3?!} \\

For the sake of his illusory initiative, White allows a weakening of his queenside pawns. Of course, 21 \( \text{\textit{x}}d5 \text{\textit{x}}d5 \) 22 cxb4 was necessary.

21 \ldots \text{bxc}3 \\
22 \text{bxc}3 \text{c}5! \\

Now Black firmly seizes the initiative. If 23 c4 he was intending 23...\( \text{\textit{xb}}4 \) 24 dxc5 \( \text{\textit{d}}3 \).

23 \text{\textit{e}}5 \text{\textit{xd}}4 \\
24 \text{\textit{x}}d5 \text{\textit{xd}}5 \\
25 \text{\textit{xd}}5 \text{\textit{xd}}5! \\

A further subtlety. Here the isolated pawn is not a weakness, whereas after 25...\( \text{\textit{x}}d5 \) 26 \( \text{\textit{x}}d4 \) White can successfully defend.

26 \text{\textit{xd}}4 \text{h}6 \\
27 g4 \\
27 \text{\textit{xd}}5 loses to 27...\text{\textit{b}}8+ 28 \text{\textit{c}}2 \text{\textit{b}}6.

27 \ldots \text{\textit{c}}7 \\
28 \text{\textit{\textit{fl}}} \text{\textit{b}}8+ \\
29 \text{\textit{\textit{a}}1} \text{\textit{a}}3 \\
30 \text{\textit{\textit{c}}2} \text{\textit{e}}8 \\
31 \text{\textit{b}}4 \\

31 \ldots \text{d}4! \\

Again a simple solution. By exchanging his d5 pawn for the pawn at
h3, Black takes play into a won queen ending.

32 \( \text{exd}4 \) \( \text{e}1+ \)
33 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{exd}1+ \)
34 \( \text{wx}d1 \) \( \text{w}c3+ \)
35 \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{w}h3 \)
36 a4 h5
37 \( \text{gxh}5 \) \( \text{w}f5+ \)
38 \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{wx}f4 \)
39 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{w}f5 \)
40 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{h}7 \)
41 \( \text{d}2 \) 0–1

Game 2
Simagin-Smyslov
Moscow 1963

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \)
4 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \)
5 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{gf}6 \)
6 \( \text{g}5 \) e6
7 \( \text{e}2 \)

Fully in the manner of Vladimir Simagin, who was a grandmaster with an original style of play. The main continuation is 7 \( \text{we}2 \).

7 ... h6
8 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \)
9 0–0

9 \( \text{f}4 \) is also not dangerous:
9 ... \( \text{xf}4 \) 10 \( \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 11 \( \text{d}3 \) b5 12 \( \text{b}3 \) c5 with complete equality.

9 ... \( \text{c}7 \)
10 \( \text{c}3 \)

Usually this knight is played to g3. At c3 it as though provokes Black into trying to seize the initiative, which Smyslov immediately does.

10 ... b5
11 \( \text{d}3 \) b4
12 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \)
13 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \)
14 \( \text{d}3 \)

Obviously, without good reason White cannot concede the advantage of the two bishops (14 \( \text{we}2 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 15 \( \text{we}4 \) \( \text{b}7 \)). But now Black implements ...c6-c5, the main strategic idea of the variation.

14 ... 0–0
15 \( \text{we}2 \) \( \text{b}7 \)
16 \( \text{d}2 \) c5
17 \( \text{dxe}5 \) \( \text{xc}5 \)
18 h3

Preventing the transition into an endgame after 18 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{h}5 \), with the threat of exchanges on f3.

18 ... e5
19 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{a}5 \)
20 \( \text{c}4 \)

If 20 \( \text{d}2 \) there would have followed 20...e4! 21 \( \text{c}4 \) (or 21 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \)) 21...\( \text{d}5 \) 22 \( \text{xd}6 \) exd3 23 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 24 \( \text{xb}7 \) dxc2 with advantage to Black.
20 ... \textit{\(\text{Ec8}\)}
21 \textit{\(\text{Kf1}\)} \textit{\(\text{b8}\)}
22 \textit{\(\text{Qd2}\)}
If 22 \textit{\(\text{b3}\)} Black has the good reply
22...\textit{\(\text{Cc7}\)} with the threat of 23...c4.
22 ... \textit{\(\text{Cc7}\)}
23 \textit{\(\text{b3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cc6}\)}
24 f3

\textbf{24 ... e4!}

A decision opening of the position, clearing the a8-h1 diagonal.

25 fxe4

After 25 f4 there could have followed 25...a5 26 a4 \textit{\(\text{a6}\)} 27 \textit{\(\text{Wf2}\)}
\textit{\(\text{Ff8}\)} 28 \textit{\(\text{Gf1}\)} (28 \textit{\(\text{b6}\)} \textit{\(\text{Dd6}\)} 29 \textit{\(\text{xa5}\)}
e3 30 \textit{\(\text{Xe3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Hf8}\)} 31 \textit{\(\text{Wf2}\)} \textit{\(\text{Ee2}\)} is crushing) 28...\textit{\(\text{Dd5}\)} with a positional advantage for Black (Smyslov).

25 ... \textit{\(\text{Dxe4}\)}
26 \textit{\(\text{Gf1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Gf6!}\)}

It is important to retain control of d5.

27 \textit{\(\text{Dd4}\)} a5
28 \textit{\(\text{Gad1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Ga6!}\)}
29 \textit{\(\text{Wf3}\)}

If 29 \textit{\(\text{Wf2}\)} then 29...a4 is decisive, since after 30 \textit{\(\text{Gd5}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xd5}\)} 31 \textit{\(\text{Xd5}\)}

\textit{\(\text{Wxc2}\)} White cannot play 32 \textit{\(\text{Cc5}\)} on account of 32...\textit{\(\text{Xc5}\)}!

29 ... \textit{\(\text{Wxf3}\)}
30 \textit{\(\text{Gxf3}\)} \textit{\(\text{a2}\)}
31 \textit{\(\text{Hf1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xf3}\)}
32 \textit{\(\text{Cc4}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cc6}\)}
33 \textit{\(\text{Cc2}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xb2}\)}
34 \textit{\(\text{Cc1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cc6}\)}
35 \textit{\(\text{Cc6}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xxc6}\)}
36 \textit{\(\text{Eg3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xe8}\)}
37 \textit{\(\text{Ef5}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xh7}\)}
38 \textit{\(\text{Hf1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Xe3}\)}
39 \textit{\(\text{Dxe3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cd4}\)}
40 \textit{\(\text{Ee1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Ee6}\)}
0–1

\textbf{Game 3}

\textbf{Bronstein-Petrosian}

\textit{Moscow 1967}

1 \textit{\(\text{e4}\)} c6
2 \textit{\(\text{d4}\)} d5
3 \textit{\(\text{Cc3}\)} \textit{\(\text{dx e4}\)}
4 \textit{\(\text{Dxe4}\)} \textit{\(\text{Dd7}\)}
5 \textit{\(\text{c3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Dgf6}\)}
6 \textit{\(\text{Eg3}\)} e6
7 \textit{\(\text{Ef3}\)} c5
8 \textit{\(\text{Cc3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cxd4}\)}
9 \textit{\(\text{Db3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Dc7}\)}

Nowadays the more active development 9...\textit{\(\text{Cc5}\)} is normally preferred.

10 0–0 \textit{\(\text{Dd5}\)}
11 \textit{\(\text{Cc2}\)} \textit{\(\text{Dd7}\)}
12 \textit{\(\text{Ee1}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cc6}\)}
13 \textit{\(\text{Df3}\)} \textit{\(\text{Cc7}\)}
14 \textit{\(\text{Wxe2}\)} \textit{\(\text{h6}\)}
15 \textit{\(\text{Cc2}\)} g5!?

One of Petrosian's favourite stratagems was to delay castling, with the aim of saving as much time as
possible for carrying out a concrete plan. Here, with his king for the moment out of reach, he begins an attack on the kingside, but on this occasion, as they say, it is a case of diamond cut diamond. Bronstein cleverly finds a way of keeping the opponent’s king in the centre.

16 \(\text{Ac1}!\)

In Nimzowitsch’s terminology, a ‘mysterious’ rook move: in the event of 16...g4 17 \(\text{Af4}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 18 cxd4 it comes alive.

16  ...  \(\text{d5}\)
17  b4   \(\text{f4}\)
18  \(\text{xf4}\)  \(\text{gxf4}\)
19  \(\text{f5}!?\)  \(\text{f8}\)

Petrosian believes in the impregnability of his position, and the exchange 19...\(\text{exf5}\) 20 b5 \(\text{g8}\) 21 bxc6 \(\text{xc6}\) 22 \(\text{xf5}\), which breaks up his pawn structure, does not suit him.

20  b5  \(\text{e7}\)
21  \(\text{xe7}\)

21 \(\text{e5}!\) is more energetic.

21  ...  \(\text{xe7}\)
22  \(\text{e5}\)  \(\text{d6}\)

23 \(\text{xf7}!\)

White begins a sudden attack, but in surprising fashion Black finds defensive resources.

23  ...  \(\text{xf7}\)
24  \(\text{b3}!\)  \(\text{f6}\)

Observing these optimistic king manoeuvres, one gains the feeling that hovering over the position is the spirit of the first World Champion Wilhelm Steinitz, who used to assert that the king was capable of defending itself. Black parries the threat of 25 \(\text{xe6}\) 26 \(\text{xe6}\) 27 \(\text{g7}\) 28 \(\text{f8}\) 28 \(\text{e6}\).

25  \(\text{cd1}\)  \(\text{ad8}\)
26  \(\text{g4}\)  \(\text{hg8}\)
27  \(\text{h5}\)  \(\text{g7}\)
28  \(\text{xe6}\)  \(\text{h7}\!\)

After 28...\(\text{xe6}\) 29 \(\text{xe6}\) the linear attack of the heavy pieces is decisive.

29  \(\text{f5}+\)  \(\text{g6}\)
30  \(\text{f7}+\)  \(\text{g7}\)
31  \(\text{f5}+\)

By repeating moves Bronstein acknowledges the brilliance of Petrosian’s defence.
31 ... \textit{hg6}
32 \textit{wh7+} \textit{gg7}
33 \textit{wf5+} \textit{gg6}
34 \textit{wh7+} \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}

\textbf{Game 4}
\textbf{Parma-Smyslov}
\textit{Lugano Olympiad 1968}

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 \textit{dc3} dxe4
4 \textit{dx4} \textit{dd7}
5 \textit{dc4} \textit{gf6}
6 \textit{gf5} e6
7 \textit{we2} \textit{bb6}
8 \textit{dd3} h6
9 \textit{dd5f3} c5
10 dxc5

10 ... \textit{bd7}!

The exclamation mark is for Smyslov’s invention. Before this only 10...\textit{xc5} had been played.

11 \textit{xe5}

On encountering a new idea, Parma avoids the critical move 11 b4.

11 ... \textit{xe5}

12 \textit{xe5} \textit{wa5+}
13 \textit{dd2} \textit{xc5}
14 \textit{d3} \textit{xe5+}
15 \textit{xe5} \textit{c5}
16 \textit{db5+?!}

This assists Black’s development. The immediate 16 \textit{e2} is better.

16 ... \textit{e7}
17 \textit{e2} \textit{e4}
18 \textit{d3} \textit{d6}
19 \textit{e3} \textit{d7}

The lost tempo has also cost White the initiative. The game is equal.

20 \textit{dd4} f6
21 \textit{f3} \textit{c6}
22 0–0–0 \textit{hc8}
23 h4 b6

If 23...e5 there would have followed 24 \textit{he1}.

24 \textit{he1} \textit{c5}
25 \textit{g4} \textit{d7}
26 \textit{b1}

In the event of 26 \textit{d4} Black maintains the balance by 26...\textit{d3}.

26 ... \textit{xd3}
27 \textit{x3d3} e5
28 \textit{x7d7} \textit{xd7}
29  $\textsf{c}c3$  $\textsf{c}c7$
30  $\textsf{d}e6d1$  $\textsf{d}d8$
31  $\textsf{d}e1$  e4!?

Black is already fighting for the initiative. If 32 $\textsf{d}d4$ there follows
32...e5!

32  $\textsf{d}d5$  $\textsf{e}e7$
33  c4  $\textsf{xd}d5$
34  $\textsf{xd}d5$  $\textsf{d}d6$
35  h5  $\textsf{e}e8$
36  $\textsf{d}d2$  $\textsf{c}c5$
$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}$
PART I: 5 \( \text{g5} \)

1 \( e4 \) \( c6 \)
2 \( d4 \) \( d5 \)
3 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{dxe4} \)
4 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{d7} \)
5 \( \text{\textit{g5}} \)

This paradoxical move was first suggested by Igor Zaitsev during preparations with Karpov for the 1980 World Championship Match against Korchnoi. The idea is to regroup the forces with the aim of occupying e5 with a knight, the bishop being developed at d3, and without the loss of time (that occurs after 5 \( \text{\textit{c4}} \)). The point is that Black cannot tolerate for long the knight on its aggressive post at g5, and is forced to assist the manoeuvre \( \text{\textit{g5-f3-e5}} \), where it will be supported by the other knight.

The solidity of this manoeuvre is reinforced tactically. Black cannot immediately drive the knight away with 5...\( h6 \)? on account of the possible sacrifice 6 \( \text{\textit{e6}} \)! \( \text{\textit{a5}} \)+ 7 \( \text{\textit{d2}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 8 \( \text{\textit{d3}} \), and now 8...f\( \text{xe6} \)? fails to 9 \( \text{\textit{h5}} \)+ 10 \( \text{\textit{e5}} \), winning the queen (Nunn-Kir.Georgiev, Linares 1988), while if 8...\( \text{\textit{gf6}} \) White has the promising piece sacrifice 9 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) f\( \text{xe6} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{g6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 11 \( \text{\textit{e5}} \) with a strong attacking position, since it is not easy for Black to develop his pieces.

Black’s main replies are 5...\( \text{\textit{gf6}} \) (Chapters 1-3) and 5...\( \text{\textit{df6}} \) (Chapter 4).

After 5...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) the knight does not participate in the battle for the centre, and this allows White to gain control of the central squares: 6 \( \text{\textit{lf3}} \) g\( \text{6} \), and now:

(a) 7 c\( \text{3} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 8 \( \text{\textit{b3}} \) \( \text{\textit{h6}} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) 0–0 10 0–0 \( \text{\textit{f5}} \) 11 \( \text{\textit{d1}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 12 g\( \text{3} \) \( \text{\textit{d6}} \) with an equal game (Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988);
(b) 7 \( \text{\textit{d3}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 8 0–0 \( \text{\textit{h6}} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{el}} \)
\( \textsf{C}7 \) 10 c3 \( f5 \) (or 10...0–0 11 \( e5! \)\n\( d5 \) 12 \( f3 \) \( f5 \) 13 \( h3 \pm \) 11 \( e4 \)\n\( g4 \) 12 h3 \( xe4 \) 13 \( xe4 \) \( f6 \) 14 \( f4 \) \( d8 \) 15 \( e2 \) \( bd5 \) 16 \( e5 \) with\na clear positional advantage (Britton-
Arkell, British Ch 1992);

(c) 7 h4 (this flank attack is also
possible) 7...\( h6 \) (7...\( h6 \) is risky: 8 \( xf7! ? \) \( xf7 \) 9 \( e5+ \) \( g7 \) 10 h5!) 8
\( h5 \) \( g4 \) 9 \( hxg6 \) \( hxg6 \) 10 \( xh6! \) \( xh6 \)
(10...\( xh6? \) is bad on account of 11
\( xf7! \) \( xf7 \) 12 \( e5+ \) 11 \( xf7 \) \( xf7 \)
12 \( e5+ \) \( g7 \) 13 \( xg4 \) \( d6 \) 14 f4!
\( af8 \) 15 \( d2 \) \( f6 \) 16 0–0–0 with a
dangerous attack for the sacrificed ex-
change (Ulibin-Lokotar, USSR 1988).
1: 5...\( \texttt{\#gf6} \) 6 \( \texttt{\#d3} \) e6 7 \( \texttt{\#f3} \) \( \texttt{\#d6} \) 8 0-0

\[ \begin{align*}
1 & \texttt{e4} & \texttt{c6} \\
2 & \texttt{d4} & \texttt{d5} \\
3 & \texttt{\#c3} & \texttt{dxe4} \\
4 & \texttt{\#xe4} & \texttt{\#d7} \\
5 & \texttt{\#g5} & \texttt{\#gf6}
\end{align*} \]

The main and most natural reply.

6 \( \texttt{\#d3} \)

6 \( \texttt{\#c4} \) is considered in Chapters 5-8 under the move order 5 \( \texttt{\#c4} \) \( \texttt{\#gf6} \) 6 \( \texttt{\#g5} \).

6 \( \texttt{\#f3} \) e6 7 \( \texttt{\#d3} \) transposes into the main line. It should be mentioned that, as in many other instances examined below, here too 6...h6 is risky. For example, Demarre-Andruet, France 1989, continued 7 \( \texttt{\#e6} \) fxe6 8 \( \texttt{\#d3} \) \( \texttt{\#a5} \) 9 \( \texttt{\#d2} \) \( \texttt{\#h5} \) 10 \( \texttt{\#e2} \) g5 11 g4! \( \texttt{\#xg4} \) 12 \( \texttt{\#e5} \) \( \texttt{\#dxe5} \) 13 dxe5 \( \texttt{\#g8} \) 14 0-0-0 with a very strong attack for White.

6 ... e6

Without first completing his development, it is practically impossible for Black to drive the knight away painlessly, since White is able to develop a dangerous attack by sacrificing his knight on e6:

6...h6?! 7 \( \texttt{\#e6!} \) \( \texttt{\#a5+} \) 8 \( \texttt{\#d2} \) \( \texttt{\#b6} \) 9 \( \texttt{\#f3} \) fxe6 10 \( \texttt{\#g6+} \) \( \texttt{\#d8} \) 11 0-0 c5?! (more cautious is 11...\( \texttt{\#c7} \) 12 \( \texttt{\#e1} \) b6 13 c4 \( \texttt{\#b7} \) 14 \( \texttt{\#e5} \) \( \texttt{\#xe5} \) 15 dxe5 \( \texttt{\#d7} \) 16 \( \texttt{\#f4\#} \), Malinin, Poleschuk) 12 c4 cxd4 13 \( \texttt{\#xd4} \) e5 (13...\( \texttt{\#xd4} \) 14 \( \texttt{\#a5+} \)) 14 c5! \( \texttt{\#xc5} \) 15 \( \texttt{\#a5} \) and White won (Tall-Oll, Riga 1986).

6...c5?! 7 \( \texttt{\#f3} \) cxd4 (7...\( \texttt{\#b6} \) 8 \( \texttt{\#e5!} \)) 8 0-0 h6?! (the drawbacks to 8...\( \texttt{\#b6} \) were revealed by Tal-Meduna, Germany 1989: 9 \( \texttt{\#c4} \) e6 10 \( \texttt{\#e1} \) \( \texttt{\#e7?!} \) 11 \( \texttt{\#xf7} \) \( \texttt{\#c7} \) 12 \( \texttt{\#xe6} \) \( \texttt{\#c5} \) 13 \( \texttt{\#c4} \) with a clear advantage to White, but even after the superior 10...\( \texttt{\#b4} \) 11 \( \texttt{\#xf7} \) \( \texttt{\#xe1} \) 12 \( \texttt{\#xh8} \) \( \texttt{\#b4} \) 13 \( \texttt{\#xd4} \) he still has the advantage) 9 \( \texttt{\#e6!} \) \( \texttt{\#b6} \) 10 \( \texttt{\#e1} \) \( \texttt{\#c5} \) 11 \( \texttt{\#xc5} \) \( \texttt{\#xc5} \) 12 \( \texttt{\#xd4} \) a6 13 c3 e6 14 \( \texttt{\#f4} \) \( \texttt{\#c7} \) 15 \( \texttt{\#c2} \) \( \texttt{\#d7} \) 16 \( \texttt{\#f5!} \) with a strong attack (Tsheshkovsky-Khalifman, Tashkent 1987).

6...\( \texttt{\#c7} \) 7 \( \texttt{\#f3} \) (7 \( \texttt{\#e2} \) is insufficient for an advantage: 7...e6 8 \( \texttt{\#f4} \) \( \texttt{\#d6} \) 9 \( \texttt{\#d2} \) \( \texttt{\#xf4} \) 10 \( \texttt{\#xf4} \) 0-0 11 0-0 0 e5=, Nunn-Tal, Skelleftea 1989, although 9...e5! was more vigorous) 7...h6 8 \( \texttt{\#e6} \) fxe6 9 \( \texttt{\#g6}+ \) \( \texttt{\#d8} \) 10 0-0 \( \texttt{\#d6!} \) (10...\( \texttt{\#b6} \)? 11 \( \texttt{\#g3} \) \( \texttt{\#b7} \) 12 \( \texttt{\#f4\#} \), De Firmian) 11 \( \texttt{\#e2} \) (interesting is 11 c4 c5 12 \( \texttt{\#e5} \) \( \texttt{\#xe5} \)
13 dxe5 wxe1 14 wxd1+ 0-0 15 b5+ a6 15 af4!, when it is not apparent how Black can complete his development without losing material, Malinin, Poleschuk) 11...g5 12 b5 0-0 13 dxe5 wb4 14 c4 b6 15 d1+ d7 16 e3 with advantage to White (Lauk-Lokotar, Eesti 1992).

6...e6 7 b6 h6?! (7...g4 is better: 8 h3 Exf3 9 xf3) 8 Exf7! e5+ g8 10 g6 e6 11 0-0 d4 12 f4 d6 13 f5 with an attack.

The fianchetto plan 6...g6 weakens the kingside, allowing White to make use of his knight at g5, e.g. 7 0-0 f3 g7 8 w2 0-0 9 h4 h6 (the attack is also unpleasant after 9...h5 10 0-0 dxe5 11 dxe5 d5 12 e6 f5 13 g4!) 10 h5! Exh5 11 g4 a6 12 e6! df6 13 wxe6+ f7 14 xg6 w8 15 g5 d5 16 gxf6 d5 17 h7+ 1-0 (W.Watson-Meduna, Prague 1992).

7 1f3 d6

Black must keep a close watch on the attacking mechanism of the d3 and g5, which may go into operation in the event of the weakening move ...h7-h6:

7...h6 8 b6, and now:

(a) 8...fxe6 9 b6+ d7, when all the same the king has got past through the d8 square, and White develops his forces, maintaining an attack with 10 f4 (also possible is 10 0-0 c7 11 c5! dxe5 12 f4 d7 13 h5 d8 14 dxe5 d7 15 c5 d8 16 c7, Malinin, Poleschuk, but if White plays 11 c5, then after 11...d8! Black can defend – cf. Game 5, Wolff-Granda Zuniga, New York 1992) 10...w5+ 11 c3 d8 12 0-0 d7 13 c5 d8 14 d3 d7 15 d5 c8 16 b4 w6 17 a7 and White’s initiative fully compensates for the sacrificed piece (McDonald-Summerscale, London 1994);

(b) 8...w7 9 0-0 fxe6 10 b6+ b8, when we consider:

(b1) 11 f4, when:

(b11) 11...w4 12 a3 x2 13 w2 d5 14 a2 and Black was in difficulties (Geller-Meduna, Sochi 1986), but 12...w6 13 c4 c5
\[ \text{Wxb2 was more accurate, and therefore 12 We2!± would have been stronger (Rogers);} \]

(b12) 11...b5 (to prevent c2-c4) was played by Kasparov in his famous game with the computer Deep Blue (New York 1997), but after 12 a4! \( \text{Axb7 13 Aae1 Axd5 14 Aeg3 Aec8 15 axb5 cxb5 16 Wd3 Aec6 17 Aef5 exf5 18 Aex7 Axe7 19 c4 he resigned; } \)

(b13) 11...Aed5! 12 Ag3 Wb4 13 Aee1 (or 13 We2 Ae7 14 c4 A5b6 15 A5e5 Aef8 16 a3 Waa4 17 Aif7+ Axf7 18 Axf7 Axc4 and Black defends, Gallagher-Miralles, Geneva 1988) 13...Ae7 14 We2 Axf6 15 c4 Axe7 16 a3! Wb3 17 Ad3 Aef5? (correct was 17...Aef8 18 Aed1 Ad7 19 A5e5 Axe8, successfully defending) 18 Axf5! exf5 19 Aae6! Wb6 20 c5 Axc5 21 Awd6+! with a winning position (Chandler-Hübner, Biel 1987);

(b2) 11 c4! Wd6 12 We2 Wc7 13 Aed1! Aed6 14 We5 Aef8 15 Wf4 with a complete bind (Leko-Bakhtadze, Las Palmas 1995) – Game 6.

7...Wc7?! 8 We2 h6 9 Ag6! (a hint that Black’s f7 is inadequately defended) 9...hxg5 10 Axf7+ Ag8 (after 10...Axf7 11 Aexe5 Ag6 12 Wd3+ the king is drawn out of its shelter) 11 Aexe5 Ab6 12 g3! (weaker is 12 Aexe6?! Aexh2! 13 0–0 Ah5 as in Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1987) 12...Ad7 13 Aexe6 Aexe 14 Aef5 Aef7 15 Aef4 Wc7 16 Wxe7+ Aexe7 17 0–0 Ag8 18 b3! and White creates dangerous threats (Van der Wiel).

7...Ae7 8 We2 (the practically unexplored 8 Axf7?! also comes into consideration: 8...Wxf7 9 Ag5+ Ag8 10 Aexe6 Ab4+ 11 Af1! We7 12 Ac7 Ab6 13 Axa8 Axa8 14 c3 with the better chances for White) 8...h6 9 Aexe6 fxe6 10 Ag6+ Aif8 11 0–0 (not 11 Aexe6? Waa5+ 12 Ad2 Wd5+) 11...Ab6 (or 11...Ad6 12 Ag5 Wf7 13 f4 Ag8 14 Ad2 Ag8 15 Af7+ with a strong attack, Nadasan-Sedrakian, Armenia 1992) 12 Ag5! with a dangerous initiative for White:

(a) 12...Aeg8 13 c4! (13 a4?! Ad7 14 a5 Adb5=, Z.Almasi-Kumaran, Koprivgar 1994) 13...Ag7 14 Ae3 Ae8 15 Ac2 with dangerous threats (Z.Almasi);

(b) 12...Wc7 13 c4 Ad7 14Af4 Wc8 15 Ac1 (weaker is 15 Afe1 Ae8 16 Aexe8 Wxe8 17 Wd3 Wh5! 18 Ag6+ Aif7 19 Aexh8+ Aexh8 20 Aeb3 Ad8†, Chandler-Arkell, London 1988) 15...Ae8 16 Ac3 Adb7 17 Ag3 Aexe5 18 dxe5 Ad7 19 Wg4 with an attack for White (Karpov).

8 0–0

This move restricts White’s possibilities, although even here
accurate play is demanded of Black. The main continuation 8 \textit{\texttt{W}e2} is considered in Chapters 2 and 3.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
8 & \ldots & h6 \\
9 & \textit{\texttt{A}e4} & \textit{\texttt{A}xe4} \\
10 & \textit{\texttt{A}xe4} & 0-0 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The plan with queenside castling comes seriously into consideration:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
10...\textit{\texttt{D}f6} & 11 & \textit{\texttt{A}d3} b6 12 \textit{\texttt{A}e1} \textit{\texttt{A}b7} \\
13 b3 \textit{\texttt{W}c7} & 14 & \textit{\texttt{A}b2} c5 15 dxc5 \textit{\texttt{W}xc5} \\
16 \textit{\texttt{A}xf6} gxf6 & 17 & \textit{\texttt{A}e4} 0-0-0 with equal chances (Emms-Tisdall, Gausdal 1996). \\
11 & \textit{\texttt{C}3} & \textit{\texttt{E}5} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

White also retains a solid initiative after 11...\textit{\texttt{C}5} 12 \textit{\texttt{D}c2} \textit{\texttt{W}c7} 13 \textit{\texttt{A}e1} \textit{\texttt{A}d8} \\
14 h3 \textit{\texttt{D}f6} 15 \textit{\texttt{W}e2} cxd4 16 \textit{\texttt{A}xd4} \textit{\texttt{A}h2+} 17 \textit{\texttt{A}h1} \textit{\texttt{D}f4} 18 \textit{\texttt{A}b5} \textit{\texttt{W}b8} 19 a4! (Kamsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1991).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
12 & \textit{\texttt{D}c2} & \textit{\texttt{E}8} \\
13 & \textit{\texttt{A}e1} & exd4 \\
14 & \textit{\texttt{A}xe8+} & \textit{\texttt{W}xe8} \\
15 & \textit{\texttt{W}xd4} & \textit{\texttt{W}e7} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Although the position looks quiet, Black has a hard job to equalise, since he is behind in development. Thus if 15...\textit{\texttt{W}e2} White has the unpleasant manoeuvre 16 \textit{\texttt{A}d2}! \textit{\texttt{A}c5} 17 \textit{\texttt{W}h4} \textit{\texttt{W}e7} 18 \textit{\texttt{A}g5}, while after 15...\textit{\texttt{A}c5} Black has to reckon with an attack on h6: 16 \textit{\texttt{W}h4} \textit{\texttt{D}f8} 17 \textit{\texttt{A}xh6}! gxh6 18 \textit{\texttt{E}e1} (Gallagher-Huss, Switzerland 1994).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
16 & \textit{\texttt{B}f4} & \textit{\texttt{B}xf4} \\
17 & \textit{\texttt{W}xf4} & \textit{\texttt{B}g8} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Weaker is 17...\textit{\texttt{D}f6}?! 18 \textit{\texttt{A}e1} \textit{\texttt{A}e6} 19 \textit{\texttt{A}b3}.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
18 & \textit{\texttt{A}e1} & \textit{\texttt{A}e6} \\
19 & \textit{\texttt{D}d4} & \textit{\texttt{E}8} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Or 19...\textit{\texttt{A}d8} 20 h4 with the initiative for White (Kasparov-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988) – \textit{Game 7}.

Smirin-Khalifman (Moscow 1989) now continued 20 g3 \textit{\texttt{W}d8} 21 \textit{\texttt{A}d1} \textit{\texttt{A}h3}! 22 \textit{\texttt{D}f3} \textit{\texttt{W}e7} 23 \textit{\texttt{W}d6} \textit{\texttt{W}e2} 24 \textit{\texttt{W}d3} \textit{\texttt{W}e6} 25 \textit{\texttt{A}b3} \textit{\texttt{W}f6} with equal chances.

More energetic was 20 \textit{\texttt{D}xe6}?! \textit{\texttt{D}xe6} 21 \textit{\texttt{W}e4} with a slight but enduring advantage for White (Khalifman).

\begin{center}
\textbf{Game 5}
\textit{\texttt{W}olff-\texttt{G}randa Zuniga}
\textit{\texttt{N}ew York 1992}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
1 & \textit{\texttt{E}4} & \textit{\texttt{C}6} \\
2 & \textit{\texttt{D}4} & \textit{\texttt{D}5} \\
3 & \textit{\texttt{D}d2} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In recent years this move has been played much more often that 3 \textit{\texttt{D}c3}. Since all the same Black has no better reply than 3...\textit{\texttt{D}xe4}, White effectively excludes the plan with 3...\texttt{g6},
followed (after e4-e5) by the attack on his centre by ...c6-c5, which can now be neutralised by c2-c3. It is worth mentioning that this plan, introduced by grandmaster Gurgenidze, was successfully employed by Petrosian against Fischer in the 1970 'Match of the Century'.

3 ... dxe4
4 ∆xe4 ∆d7
5 ∆d3 ∆gf6
6 ∆g5 e6
7 ∆f3 h6

A committing move, provoking the following knight sacrifice.

8 ∆xe6 fxe6
9 ∆g6+ ∆e7
10 0–0

10 ∆f4, controlling the h2-b8 diagonal, is stronger – cf. the analysis.

10 ... ∆c7
11 ∆e1 ∆d8
12 c4

White is aiming for a complete bind. After 12 ∆xe6 ∆d6 Black threatens 13...∆f8 and so White is forced to retreat.

12 ... ∆b4
13 ∆e2 ∆f8
14 ∆e5 ∆xg6
15 ∆xg6 ∆e8
16 c5 ∆a5?

As Granda Zuniga rightly indicated, Black should have cleared his own pieces that were obstructing his king: 16...∆f7! 17 ∆e5 ∆h5 18 ∆c4 b5 19 ∆e5 ∆d7 20 a4 bx a4 21 ∆xa4 a5 22 f3 ∆e7, and White’s attack does not compensate for the sacrificed piece.

17 ∆a4 ∆d5
18 ∆e5 ∆d7
19 a3 b5
20 ∆c2 ∆b8
21 ∆h7 ∆c7
22 ∆xg7 ∆xe5
23 ∆xe5 ∆c8
24 ∆xh6 ∆c7
25 ∆d2 ∆b7
26 a4?!

The three pawns fully compensate for the knight, and their rapid advance by 26 h4!? would have given White very real chances.
39 \( \text{Kd}e3 \) \( \text{Kf7} \)

40 \( \text{f}5? \)

An oversight in time trouble. After 40 \( \text{d}5! \) \text{cxd}5 41 \( \text{We}2 \) White would have broken through to the enemy king.

40 \ldots \( \text{Kh5} \)

41 \( \text{Axe6} \)

White has to reconcile himself to the loss of the exchange, since 41 \( \text{Wf4?} \) fails to 41...\( \text{Bg}4 \).

41 \ldots \( \text{Wxe6} \)

42 \( \text{Axe6} \) \( \text{xf3} \)

43 \( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{hg}8 \)

44 \( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{Xg}3+ \)

45 \( \text{Qf}4 \) \( \text{g}8+ \)

46 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{Xh}4 \)

47 \( \text{He}7+ \) \( \text{a}6 \)

48 \( \text{f}7 \) \( \text{f}3 \)

49 \( \text{He}6 \) \( \text{Xf}7 \)

50 \( \text{Xc}6+ \) \( \text{a}7 \)

51 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{e}7+ \)

52 \( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{eh}7 \)

0–1

A new move. Before this 11 \( \text{f}4 \) used to be played.

11 \ldots \( \text{Wd}6 \)

It is not easy for Black to develop his pieces. After the more ‘active’ 11...\( \text{Wb}4 \) Leko was intending 12 \( \text{We}2 \) \( \text{Ad}6 \) 13 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 14 \( \text{d}2! \), including his bishop in the attack with gain of time.

12 \( \text{We}2 \) \( \text{C}7 \)

13 \( \text{Ad}1 \) \( \text{d}6 \)

14 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \)

15 \( \text{f}4 \)

15 \ldots \( \text{x}e5?! \)

After this it is not possible to free the king.

15...\( \text{b}6 \) was better, not fearing 16 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \), while 16 \( \text{f}7+ \) can be met by 16...\( \text{xf}7 \) 17 \( \text{xd}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 18 \( \text{xf}7 \) \( \text{f}8 \) or 18...\( \text{e}7 \).

16 \( \text{dxe}5 \) \( \text{g}8 \)

17 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \)

18 \( \text{g}4! \) \( \text{c}5 \)

Or 18...\( \text{c}7 \) 19 \( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{c}5 \), when 20 \( \text{d}6 \) is again decisive.

19 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{xb}2 \)

20 \( \text{Ad}1 \) \( \text{c}7 \)
5...\(\text{Qf6}\) 6 \(\text{d3}\) e6 7 \(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{d6}\) 8 0-0

21 \(\text{Wxe6}\) 22 \(\text{Ad7+}\) 1-0

Game 7
Kasparov-Karpov
Amsterdam 1988

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 \(\text{Qd2}\) dxe4
4 \(\text{Qxe4}\) \(\text{Qd7}\)
5 \(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qgf6}\)
6 \(\text{Ad3}\) e6
7 \(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Ad6}\)
8 0-0

One of the first famous clashes between the twelfth and the thirteenth World Champions takes place on a reserve field. The main continuation is 8 \(\text{We2}\).

8 ... h6
9 \(\text{De4}\) \(\text{Qxe4}\)
10 \(\text{Axe4}\) 0-0

As shown in the analysis, the plan with queenside castling can also be considered.

11 c3! e5
12 \(\text{Ac2}\) \(\text{He8}\)
13 \(\text{He1}\) exd4
14 \(\text{Hxe8+}\) \(\text{We8}\)
15 \(\text{Wxd4}\) \(\text{We7}\)
16 \(\text{Af4}\) \(\text{Axf4}\)
17 \(\text{Wxf4}\) \(\text{Af8}\)
18 \(\text{He1}\) \(\text{Ae6}\)
19 \(\text{Ad4}\) \(\text{Ad8}\)

After 19...\(\text{He8}\) White can maintain a slight advantage by 20 \(\text{Qxe6?!}\) \(\text{Qxe6}\) 21 \(\text{We4}\).

20 h4 \(\text{Wc5}\)
21 \(\text{He3}\) \(\text{Wd6}\)

22 \(\text{Qxe6}\)

22 ... fxe6?!

White’s symbolic advantage now assumes real proportions, and it is instructive to follow the World Champion’s technique in capitalising on it. After the natural 22...\(\text{Qxe6}\) 23 \(\text{We4}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) Black would have maintained the status quo.

23 \(\text{Wg4}\) \(\text{Wd2}\)
24 \(\text{Ab3}\) \(\text{Wh8}\)
25 \(\text{He2}\) \(\text{Wd6}\)
26 g3 a6
27 \(\text{Qg2}\) \(\text{He8}\)
28 \(\text{He3}\) \(\text{He7}\)
29 \(\text{Hf3}\) \(\text{Ad7}\)
30 \(\text{Wh5}\) \(\text{Wc7}\)
31 \(\text{We5}\)

The key to Black’s position is now apparent – it is the f7 square, and by subtle manoeuvring Kasparov has added a spatial advantage to his positional one. The invasion on f7 is yet to come.

31 ... \(\text{Ad8}\)
32 a4 b5
33 \(\text{We4}\) \(\text{Wc7}\)
in the strength of the minor pieces becomes more apparent in view of the e6 pawn.

47 . . .  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  

After 52... 53  54 in view of the threat of 55 \textit{g8}+ Black is again forced to concede space.

53  
53... is more active, although after 54  55 the defence would have merely been prolonged.

Now, however, White combines threats to the enemy king with the advance of his c-pawn.

54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
61  
62  
63 1–0
2: 8 \(\text{\&} e2\) h6 9 \(\text{\&} e4\) \(\text{\&} xe4\) 10 \(\text{\&} xe4\) f6

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 \(\text{\&} c3\) dxe4
4 \(\text{\&} xe4\) d7
5 \(\text{\&} g5\) g6
6 \(\text{\&} d3\) e6
7 \(\text{\&} f3\) d6
8 \(\text{\&} c2\)

10 \(\text{\&} xe4\)

After the capture on e4 with the queen Black is no longer able to carry out the freeing move ...e6-e5 and is obliged to switch to ...c6-c5.

10 \(\text{\&} xe4\) is harmless: 10...\(\text{\&} c7\) 11 \(\text{\&} d2\) b6 12 0-0-0 \(\text{\&} b7\) 13 c4 0-0-0 14 \(\text{\&} c3\) \(\text{\&} e8\) 15 \(\text{\&} e1\) \(\text{\&} f6\) 16 \(\text{\&} c2\) c5 with equal chances (Roiz-Speelman, Oviedo 1992).

10 ... \(\text{\&} f6\)

The other fashionable continuation 10...\(\text{\&} c7\) is considered in Chapter 3.

Also deserving of a special mention is 10...c5, a move which Karpov, keenly seeking defensive resources, has recently employed several times:

(a) 11 \(\text{\&} d2\) \(\text{\&} c7\) (weaker is 11... \(\text{\&} f6\) 12 \(\text{\&} b5+\) \(\text{\&} d7\) 13 \(\text{\&} x b 7\) \(\text{\&} b8\) 14 \(\text{\&} x d 7+\) \(\text{\&} x d 7\) 15 \(\text{\&} a 6 \pm\), Psakhis-Meduna, Trnava 1988) 12 0-0 c4 13 e2 \(\text{\&} f6\), and after 14 \(\text{\&} h 4\) \(\text{\&} d 7\) 15 \(\text{\&} e 5\) \(\text{\&} x e 5\) 16 dxe5 \(\text{\&} x e 5\) 17 \(\text{\&} f 3\) 0-0

White prepares queenside castling and takes control of the e5 square, restricting the possibility of Black freeing his queen’s bishop by means of ...e6-e5.

8 ... h6
9 \(\text{\&} e 4\)

Here the knight sacrifice no longer works: 9 \(\text{\&} x e 6 ?!\) fxe6 10 \(\text{\&} g 6 + \) \(\text{\&} e 7\) 11 0-0 \(\text{\&} f 8\) 12 \(\text{\&} d 3\) \(\text{\&} d 7\) 13 \(\text{\&} e 5\) \(\text{\&} e 8\) 14 f4 \(\text{\&} d 8\) 15 c4 \(\text{\&} c 7\) 16 \(\text{\&} d 2\) \(\text{\&} c 8\), and Black successfully evacuates his king (Arnason-Ostenstad, Torshavn 1987).

9 ... \(\text{\&} x e 4\)
3 \( \mathcal{A} \)xb7 \( \mathcal{A} \)ab8! 19 \( \mathcal{A} \)f4 \( \mathcal{W} \)b5 20 \( \mathcal{X} \)xb8 \( \mathcal{X} \)xb8 21 \( \mathcal{A} \)f3 \( \mathcal{W} \)xb2 Black’s activity fully compensates for his slight material deficit (Z.Alimas-arpov, Tilburg 1996);
(b) 11 0-0 \( \mathcal{G} \)f6 (11...\( \mathcal{W} \)c7 12 \( \mathcal{W} \)g4 \( \mathcal{W} \)f8, Illescas-Karpov, Dos Hermanas 1997, leads to a position considered in chapter 3, p.43), and now:
(b1) 12 \( \mathcal{G} \)b5+ \( \mathcal{G} \)e7 13 \( \mathcal{W} \)e2 \( \mathcal{W} \)c7 14 \( \mathcal{G} \)c5 \( \mathcal{W} \)xc5 (14...\( \mathcal{G} \)xc5 15 \( \mathcal{W} \)e5+±) 15 \( \mathcal{G} \)e3 \( \mathcal{W} \)c7 16 \( \mathcal{A} \)d4 \( \mathcal{A} \)d8 (Topalov-Karpov, Dos Hermanas 1997), and though in the end Black managed to defend himself, White’s chances look better;
(b2) 12 \( \mathcal{W} \)h4 (a more natural move, actually ruling out the possibility of lack castling kingside in view of the reatended bishop sacrifice at h6) 2...\( \mathcal{X} \)xd4 (at the tournament in Dortmund, 1997, Karpov played 12...\( \mathcal{W} \)c7 against Ivanuchk, and although after 1 \( \mathcal{E} \)e1 \( \mathcal{G} \)d7 14 \( \mathcal{G} \)g5 \( \mathcal{G} \)e7 15 \( \mathcal{X} \)xc5 \( \mathcal{X} \)xc5 16 \( \mathcal{W} \)e5+ he eventually gained a pawn, his position was very dubious) 1 \( \mathcal{E} \)e1! \( \mathcal{G} \)d7 14 \( \mathcal{X} \)xd4 (we must also mention the game Shabalov-Gulko, SA Ch 1996, where after 14 \( \mathcal{A} \)d2 \( \mathcal{X} \)c7 15 \( \mathcal{X} \)ad1 0-0 16 \( \mathcal{W} \)xd4 \( \mathcal{W} \)c5 17 \( \mathcal{E} \)e3 \( \mathcal{W} \)xd4 18 \( \mathcal{X} \)xd4 White obtained e better ending) 14...\( \mathcal{W} \)a5 15 \( \mathcal{G} \)e3, \( \mathcal{A} \)d Black was unable to cope with the unsettling problems (Lautier-Karpov,tel 1997) — Game 8.

11 \( \mathcal{W} \)e2
The aggressive 11 \( \mathcal{W} \)h4 is also sometimes played:
(a) attempts to simply — 11...\( \mathcal{W} \)a5+ 11...\( \mathcal{G} \)d5 12 \( \mathcal{W} \)xd8+ \( \mathcal{X} \)xd8 13 c3 \( \mathcal{G} \)e7 12 \( \mathcal{A} \)d2 \( \mathcal{W} \)h5 13 \( \mathcal{W} \)xh5 \( \mathcal{G} \)xh5 14 \( \mathcal{G} \)e5 0-0 15 0-0-0 c5 16 g4 \( \mathcal{G} \)f6 17 g5! give White the better ending (Hector-Hodgson, London 1991);
(b) 11...\( \mathcal{G} \)e7!, when the threat of ...g7-g5 forced White to sacrifice a pawn by 12 \( \mathcal{G} \)e5 (nothing is achieved by 12 \( \mathcal{A} \)d2 g5 13 \( \mathcal{W} \)h3 e5 or 12 \( \mathcal{A} \)f4 \( \mathcal{A} \)b4+) 12...\( \mathcal{X} \)xe5 13 dx5 \( \mathcal{W} \)a5+ 14 c3 \( \mathcal{W} \)xe5+ 15 \( \mathcal{A} \)e3 b6 (15...c5 16 0-0-0 g5 17 \( \mathcal{W} \)g3! \( \mathcal{X} \)xg3 18 hxg3+!) 16 0-0-0 g5 with sharp play (Kamsky-Karpov, Dortmund 1993) — Game 9.

11 ... b6
Black mobilises his queenside, preparing for the possibility of removing his king there. After kingside castling he risks coming under an attack in view of the weakening h6, with the white g-pawn being assigned the role of a battering-ram:

11...c5 12 dx5 \( \mathcal{A} \)xc5 (12...\( \mathcal{W} \)a5+!? 13 \( \mathcal{A} \)d2 \( \mathcal{W} \)xc5±) t3 \( \mathcal{A} \)d2 0-0 (13...\( \mathcal{W} \)b6 14 0-0-0?! \( \mathcal{X} \)xf2 15 \( \mathcal{W} \)hf1 \( \mathcal{A} \)c5 16 \( \mathcal{A} \)e5 with a dangerous initiative for the pawn) 14 0-0-0 \( \mathcal{W} \)c7
(14...b5 15 g4 .cx5 16  c7 17  d5 b4 18 g5 hxg5 19  xf5 f2 20 1±, Benjamin-Arkell, Reykjavik 1990) 15 g4 e5 (15...  xg4 16  f1±) 16 g5 hxg5 17  xg5 e4! 18  xe4  e8 19  xf6  f4+ 20  d2  xf6 21  wh5  d4 22 c3  xe4! 23  xe4  f4+ with a double-edged game (Smirin-Kharitonov, Svedlovsk 1987).

11...  c7 12  d2 0–0 13 0–0–0 c5 14 g4  d5 15 g5  f4 16  xf4  xf4+ 17  b1 cxd4 18  h1 e5 19 g5  xh6 20  xe5 with the better chances for White (Malishauskas-Oll, Vilnius Zonal 1993).

In this last variation Black can also consider a fashionable method of defence, whereby he ‘sacrifices’ castling for the sake of activity in the centre: 11...  c7 12  d2 b6, and now:

(a) 13  e5 c5?! 14  b5+  e7 15  b7 16 0–0  h8 17 f4  e4 18  e3  f8 19  a1  g8 20  g4 cxd4! (20...  f6?! 21  g3  Kamsky-Anand, Dos Hermanas 1996) 21 cxd4 f5! 22  g6  d5 with an equal game (Kasparov);

(b) 13 0–0–0  b7 14  e5, transposing into variation 2.1.

12  d2  b7

13 0–0–0

White can also consider the preparatory 13  e5  c7 (13...c5 14 dxc5  xc5 15 f4±) 14 f4!, deferring castling:

(a) 14...c5 15 dxc5 (if 15  b5+?! e7=) 15...  xc5 (the alternatives 15...  xc5 16 0–0–0 and 15...  xe5 16 fxe5  d7 17 cxb6 axb6 18  c3 favour White) 16 0–0–0 0–0 17  b1

The two sides have almost completed the mobilisation of their forces, although Black has not yet determined the position of his king. Here three practically equivalent continuations are encountered: 14  e5 (2.1), 14  h1 (2.2) and 14  b1 (2.3).
2.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxe4 4 dxe4 3 d7 5 g5 g6 6 d3 e6 7 f3 d6 8 e2 h6 9 d4 xe4 10 xe4 f6 11 e2 b6 12 d2 b7 13 0–0–0 c7)

14 e5

White immediately occupies e5, and if he should succeed in consolidating the position of his knight, he may be able to develop an unpleasant initiative.

Maintaining the momentum. After 16 f4 hd8 17 he1 d5 the game is level.

16 ... wxc5

After 16 ... xe5? 17 cxb6 c5 18 wxe5! wxe5 19 b4+ the king succumbs.

17 a3

Again a pseudo-sacrifice of the knight (17 ... wxe5? 18 wxe5 xe5 19 b4+) – it is important to detain the king in the centre. In the event of 17 c3 hd8 18 d4 w7 19 he1 f8! 20 c3 a6! 21 d3 b5 (21 ... c5!? 22 xc5+ xc5 23 f4 b5 is also interesting) 22 b1 b4 23 c4 c5 the king is safe and Black has adequate counterplay (Leko-Karpov, Dortmund 1995).

The tactical 17 c6 (17 ... xc6? 18 b4!) is parried by 17 ... xc8! 18 e3 wxe5 19 xb7 c7 20 a6 c5 21 xc5 wxc5 (Leko).

For example: 14 ... 0–0–0 15 f4! c5 6 dxc5 xc5 17 b1 b8 18 he1 5 19 h3 h4 20 a6! xa6 21 xa6 f2 22 f1 g3 23 a4 and White’s entralised knight, controlling the weakened light squares in the black position, gives him the advantage (Deirmian-Spiridonov, Lugano 1989).

14 ... c5

An equally energetic reply. Black islodges the support from under the knight and hopes to slip away with his ing via f8.

15 b5+ e7

16 dxc5
18...\textbf{d}d5

The reinforcement 18...\textbf{h}d8 is too late: 19 \textbf{d}d4 \textbf{d}d5 (19...\textbf{f}8 20 \textbf{b}1 a6 21 \textbf{x}d6! \textbf{x}d6 22 \textbf{c}4 e5 23 \textbf{x}e5 axb5 24 \textbf{x}d6+ \textbf{x}d6 25 \textbf{c}xd6 \textbf{x}g2 26 \textbf{g}1 \textbf{h}3 27 \textbf{x}b5 and White wins a pawn, Ye Jiangchuan-Schlosser, Groningen 1996) 20 \textbf{h}d1 \textbf{f}8 21 \textbf{b}1 with advantage to White – 22 c4 followed by \textbf{x}f7 is threatened (Sutovsky-Nisipeanu, Columbia 1996).

But in the recent game Istratescu-Nisipeanu (Bucharest 1997) after 18...\textbf{d}5!? 19 \textbf{c}6+ (doubling rooks on the d-file should perhaps have been considered) 19...\textbf{f}8 20 \textbf{x}d6+ \textbf{x}d6 21 \textbf{e}5 \textbf{c}5 22 f4 g6 23 \textbf{h}f1 h5 (to prevent g2-g4) Black gained equal chances.

The eighth game of the Kamsky-Karpov match (Elista 1996) now continued 19 \textbf{g}3 \textbf{h}d8 20 \textbf{d}4! with active piece play for White – cf. Game 10.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
1 & e4 & c6 & 2 & d4 \\
2 & d5 & \textbf{c}3 & \textbf{d}xe4 & 3 \\
4 & \textbf{d}xe4 & \textbf{d}7 & 5 & \textbf{g}5 \\
6 & \textbf{g}f6 & \textbf{d}3 & e6 & 7 \\
8 & \textbf{f}3 & \textbf{d}6 & 8 & \textbf{e}2 \\
9 & \textbf{h}6 & 9 & \textbf{e}4 & 10 \\
11 & \textbf{f}6 & 12 & \textbf{x}e4 & b6 \\
13 & \textbf{c}7 & 14 & \textbf{d}6 & \textbf{b}7 \\
15 & 0 & 0 & \textbf{c}7 & 23 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

2.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textbf{c}3 \textbf{d}xe4 4 \textbf{d}xe4 \textbf{d}7 5 \textbf{g}5 \textbf{g}f6 6 \textbf{d}3 e6 7 \textbf{f}3 \textbf{d}6 8 \textbf{e}2 h6 9 \textbf{e}4 \textbf{d}xe4 10 \textbf{x}e4 \textbf{f}6 11 \textbf{e}2 b6 12 \textbf{d}2 \textbf{b}7 13 0–0–0 \textbf{c}7)

14 \textbf{h}e1

White calmly strengthens his position.

14...0–0–0

14...0–0 looks risky, but in Game 11 (Kamsky-Karpov, 12th Match Game, Elista 1996) Black succeeded in parrying White’s attack: 15 g4 c5 16 g5 hxg5 17 \textbf{x}g5 \textbf{f}4! 18 h4?! \textbf{d}d8! with a good game. Ftacnik recommends as better 18 dxc5 bxc5 19 \textbf{g}1, and if 19...\textbf{x}h2 20 \textbf{f}4! \textbf{g}1 21 \textbf{x}g1 \textbf{f}d8 22 \textbf{h}2 with an attack for White.

15 \textbf{a}6 b5!

Forestalling White’s possible activity associated with c2-c4 after 15...\textbf{x}a6 16 \textbf{x}a6+ \textbf{b}8 17 \textbf{w}2, although even here Black’s defensive resources are quite adequate:

(a) 17...\textbf{d}5 18 c4 \textbf{f}4 19 \textbf{w}1 and White’s chances are only slightly preferable (A.Sokolov-Karpov, Belfort 1988) – Game 12;

(b) 17...\textbf{h}e8 18 \textbf{b}1 \textbf{d}7 19 c4 e5 20 dxe5 \textbf{x}e5 and Black equalises (Kuczynski-Sapis, Polish Ch 1989).

15...\textbf{h}e8 16 \textbf{e}5 \textbf{x}e5 17 dxe5 \textbf{d}5 18 \textbf{xb}7+ \textbf{w}b7 is more passive, and here in Woda-Sapis
(Polish Ch 1989) White could have maintained his initiative with 19 \texttt{Wg4}!
\[16 \texttt{Qxb7+ Qxb7} \]
\[17 \texttt{Qb1 Qa8} \]
And now:
\[18 \texttt{Qc1 Qb8} 19 c4 bxc4 20 \texttt{Qxc4 Qb5} 21 \texttt{Qd3 Qh8} with counterplay for Black (McDonald-Hodgson, British Ch 1990); \]
\[18 \texttt{Qc1 Qb7} 19 \texttt{Qd2 Qb4} 20 c3 \texttt{Qd6} 21 \texttt{Qb3 Qd5} with equal chances (Chandler-Adams, Blackpool 1990). \]

\[2.3 (1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \texttt{Qc3} dxe4 4 \texttt{Qxe4 Qd7} 5 \texttt{Qg5 Qg6} 6 \texttt{Qd3} e6 7 \texttt{Qf3 Qd6} 8 \texttt{Qe2 h6} 9 \texttt{Qe4 Qxe4} 10 \texttt{Qxe4 Qf6} 11 \texttt{Qe2 b6} 12 \texttt{Qd2 Qb7} 13 0-0-0 \texttt{Qc7} ) \]

\[14 \texttt{Qb1} \]

White is not in a hurry to disclose his plans, since it is not easy for Black to free himself.

\[14 \ldots 0-0-0 \]

Recently \[14...\texttt{Qd8}, \] whereby Black does not hurry with castling, has become fashionable. He can success-
fully oppose the plan of positional pressure:

(a) 15 c4 0–0, and now:
\[ (a1) 16 g4, \text{ when the open nature of the position allows Black counterplay:} 16...\texttt{Qf4}! 17 \texttt{Qe5 Qxd2} 18 \texttt{Qxd2} (18 \texttt{Qxd2 Qxd2} 19 \texttt{Qh7+ Qxh7} 20 \texttt{Qxd4 c5}?) 18...\texttt{Qxd4} 19 \texttt{Qg1} c5 20 g5 \texttt{Qe4} with a complicated game (Z.Almasi); \]
\[ (a2) 16 \texttt{Qc3 Qfe8} (if 16...\texttt{Qe7}?! \text{ White attacks with} 17 g4 c5 18 \texttt{Qhgl}, Z.Almasi-Adams, Groningen 1995, but 16...c5 is possible – 17 \texttt{Qhe1 Qfe8} 18 dxc5 \texttt{Qxc5} 19 \texttt{Qe5}, Aseev-Epishin, Russia 1997, and now Aseev suggests 19...\texttt{Qf8}?! 20 \texttt{Qg4 Qxg4} 21 \texttt{Qxg4} f5 22 \texttt{Qg6} \texttt{Qf7} with an equal position) 17 \texttt{Qe5} (here too 17 g4 is premature: 17...c5 18 \texttt{Qhgl} \texttt{Qxf3} 19 \texttt{Qxf3 cxd4} 20 \texttt{Qd2 Qd7} 21 \texttt{Qe4} g6! with a sound position for Black – Karpow) 17...c5 18 dxc5 \texttt{Qxc5} 19 f3 a5 20 \texttt{Qc2 Qa6} with a double-edged game (Z.Almasi-Karpow, Groningen 1995); \]
\[ (b) 15 \texttt{Qhe1} 0–0 16 \texttt{Qe5} (16 g4?! \texttt{Qf4} 17 \texttt{Qe5 Qxd4} 18 \texttt{Qxf4 Qxf4} 19 h4? c5, Adams-Speelman, New York 1995) 16...c5 17 f4 cxd4 18 g4 \texttt{Qd5} 19 g5 hxg5 20 \texttt{Qh5} f5 21 \texttt{Qg6 Qf6} 22 \texttt{Qxg5 Qh7} 23 \texttt{Qh5 Qf6} 24 \texttt{Qg1} \texttt{Qe4} with equal chances (Kasparov-Epishin, Moscow 1995); \]
\[ (c) \text{ but after} 15 \texttt{Qhgl}! (preparing an attack in the event of Black castling) 15...c5 16 dxc5 \texttt{Qxc5} 17 a3 Black encounters serious difficulties: \]
\[ (c1) 17...0–0?! 18 g4 \texttt{Qd5} 19 g5! \texttt{Qxf3} (19...hxg5? 20 Qxg5 \texttt{Qxf3} 21 \texttt{Qxf3 Qxf3} 22 \texttt{Qxf6} g6 23 \texttt{Qde1±}) 20 \]
gxf6 g6 (if 20...\textit{W}xf6 White attacks with 21 \textit{A}c3 e5 22 f4!) 21 \textit{A}xh6 \textit{A}xh2 22 \textit{A}h1 \textit{W}xe2 23 \textit{A}xe2 \textit{A}xd1+ 24 \textit{A}xd1 \textit{A}c8 25 f3 with an attack for White (Topalov-Ivanchuk, Las Palmas 1996);

(c2) 17...a5 18 \textit{A}e3 \textit{W}c7 19 \textit{A}b5+ \textit{W}e7 20 \textit{A}d4! with the better game for White (Timman-Leko, Groningen 1996) – Game 13.

A practically unexplored alternative is 14...\textit{A}e8!? 15 \textit{A}hg1 c5 16 dxc5 \textit{W}xc5 17 \textit{A}c3 0–0 18 \textit{A}d4 \textit{W}c7 19 g4 \textit{A}d5 20 g5 h5 21 \textit{A}e5 \textit{A}f4 with equal chances (Wolff-Orlov, USA Ch 1995).

15 \textit{A}a6

15 c4 can be met by 15...c5, although here too after 16 \textit{A}c3 White’s chances are better:

(a) 16...\textit{A}he8 17 \textit{A}he1 \textit{W}b8 18 g3 \textit{A}a8 19 \textit{A}c2 a6 20 dxc5 \textit{A}xc5 21 \textit{A}e5 (A.Sokolov-Spraggett, match (9), Saint John 1988);

(b) 16...\textit{A}hg8 17 \textit{A}he1 \textit{W}b8 18 \textit{A}c2 cxd4 19 \textit{A}xd4 a6 20 g3 (Svidler-Vyzhmanavin, Novgorod 1995).

15 ... \textit{A}d7

Here (with the c-file already cleared for White’s rook) 15...b5?! is too weakening: 16 \textit{A}xb7+ \textit{W}xb7 17 c4 bxc4 18 \textit{A}c1 \textit{A}b8 19 \textit{A}xc4 \textit{A}a8 20 \textit{A}hc1 \textit{A}hc8 21 \textit{A}e5 \textit{A}xe5 22 \textit{W}xe5 \textit{W}d7 23 f3 \textit{A}b6 24 \textit{A}a5 \textit{A}b7 25 b3 and White’s chances are better (Chandler-Speelman, Hastings 1988/9).

16 \textit{A}xb7+ \textit{W}xb7

17 \textit{A}e5

If 17 c4 \textit{A}hd8 18 \textit{A}c3 \textit{A}b8 19 \textit{A}he1 c5 with equal chances (Kudrin-Kamsky, New York 1989).

Now after 17...\textit{A}xe5 18 dxe5 \textit{A}g8 19 c4 \textit{A}e7 20 \textit{A}c3 \textit{A}hd8 21 \textit{A}xd7 \textit{A}xd7 22 \textit{A}d1 \textit{A}xd1+ 23 \textit{W}xd1 c5 24 \textit{W}d6 White has a significant advantage in the ending (Thorsteinsson-Kamsky, Reykjavik 1990).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Game 8 &  \\
Lautier-Karpov &  \\
Biel 1997 &  \\
\hline
1 & e4 \\
2 & d4 \\
3 & \textit{A}c3 & d5 \\
4 & \textit{A}xe4 & \textit{A}d4 \\
5 & \textit{A}g5 & \textit{A}d7 \\
6 & \textit{A}d3 & e6 \\
7 & \textit{A}f3 & \textit{A}d6 \\
8 & \textit{W}e2 & h6 \\
9 & \textit{A}e4 & \textit{A}xe4 \\
10 & \textit{W}xe4 & c5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

This basically thematic attack on the centre has the drawback that Black remains behind in development, and it is not easy for him to secure the position of his king.

11 0–0 \textit{A}f6
12 \textit{\textbf{Wh}4} cxd4
13 \textit{\textbf{Ae}1!}

A useful developing move, putting the black king under ‘X-ray’ (White gains the possibility of \textit{\textbf{Cd}4-f5}).

13 \ldots \textit{\textbf{Cd}7}
14 \textit{\textbf{Ad}x}d4 \textit{\textbf{Wa}5}
15 \textit{\textbf{Ce}3}

15 \ldots \textit{\textbf{Af}8}?!?

It would have been more natural to expect of Karpov his ‘patent’ 15...\textit{\textbf{Ce}7}, but here this loses outright to 16 \textit{\textbf{Af}5+}.

Since later Black’s defence involves trying to exchange queens, it would have been simpler to do this immediately by 15...\textit{\textbf{Wh}5} 16 \textit{\textbf{Wx}h}5 \textit{\textbf{Ax}h}5 17 \textit{\textbf{Af}5} \textit{\textbf{Af}8} 18 \textit{\textbf{Ad}a}d1 \textit{\textbf{Af}6} (18...0–0–0 19 \textit{\textbf{Ax}a}7 \textit{\textbf{Cc}7}?! is also interesting, threatening 20...\textit{\textbf{Ex}f}5 as well as to cut off the bishop’s retreat by 20...b6) 19 \textit{\textbf{Af}4} 0–0–0 20 \textit{\textbf{Ad}6+ \textit{\textbf{Ax}d}6} 21 \textit{\textbf{Ax}d}6, and after 21...\textit{\textbf{Cc}6} or 21...\textit{\textbf{Ad}5} Black has an inferior but defensible ending.

Castling immediately 15...0–0–0?! 16 \textit{\textbf{Ab}3} \textit{\textbf{Cc}7} 17 \textit{\textbf{Ax}a}7 g5 18 \textit{\textbf{Wh}3} e5 19 \textit{\textbf{Wf}3} or after 15...g5 16 \textit{\textbf{Wh}3} 0–0–0 17 \textit{\textbf{Ab}3} \textit{\textbf{Wa}4} 18 \textit{\textbf{Ad}4} e5 19 \textit{\textbf{Wf}3} leaves his kingside irreparably weakened.

16 \textit{\textbf{Af}4} \textit{\textbf{Xf}4}
16...e5 can be met by the simple 17 \textit{\textbf{Ab}3} \textit{\textbf{Wb}4} 18 \textit{\textbf{Ag}5} \textit{\textbf{Xh}4} 19 \textit{\textbf{Xh}4}, with an obvious advantage in the endgame.

17 \textit{\textbf{Wx}f4} \textit{\textbf{Cc}8}
18 \textit{\textbf{Af}3}!

The main theme of White’s strategy is occupation of e5.

18 \ldots \textit{\textbf{Cc}7}
19 \textit{\textbf{Wg}3} \textit{\textbf{Wb}4}

Or 19...\textit{\textbf{Xh}5}? 20 \textit{\textbf{Ce}5}!

20 \ldots g5?!

There was no justification for such an optimistic sortie. 20...\textit{\textbf{Xh}g}8, avoiding weakening the kingside, was more solid.

21 \textit{\textbf{Cc}4}! \textit{\textbf{Xh}d}8?!

If Black is going to suffer, then he might at least have some material in compensation: 21...\textit{\textbf{Wx}b}2 22 \textit{\textbf{Ab}1} \textit{\textbf{Wx}a}2 23 \textit{\textbf{Xb}7} \textit{\textbf{Xh}d}8 24 \textit{\textbf{Wh}3}! \textit{\textbf{Wa}6
(not 24...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wc2}}? or 24...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wa5}}? because of 25 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash dg6+!}) 25 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash bb1}}! h5 26 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash we3}} g4 27 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash ha1}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wb6}} 28 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wh6}}! \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de8}} 29 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wg7}}, and the attack continues (Lautier).

\textbf{22 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wh3}} h5?}

This leads to loss of material. It was essential to return with 22...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash hh8}}, although after 23 b3 White has a clear advantage.

\textbf{23 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash we3}} g4}

\textbf{24 a3!}

The initiative is more important than a pawn; 24 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xa7 b6}} would have left Black with some hopes.

\textbf{24 \ldots \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xb2}}}

\textbf{25 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash ab1 \textbackslash xa3}}}

\textbf{26 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash df7!}}}

By the threat of a discovered check (26...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xf7}} 27 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g6+}) White exposes the enemy king. Black’s attempt to buy him off by giving up the exchange proves fruitless.

\textbf{26 \ldots \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash wc5}}}

\textbf{27 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash df3}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xe3}}}

\textbf{28 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xe3 \textbackslash xd8}}}

\textbf{29 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xb7 a5}}}

\textbf{30 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a7 \textbackslash hc5}}}

\textbf{31 f4 gxf3}

\textbf{32 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xf3 \textbackslash de8}}}

\textbf{33 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de7 \textbackslash ec7}}}

\textbf{34 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de7 \textbackslash ec8}}}

\textbf{35 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de8 \textbackslash ec8}}}

\textbf{36 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de8 \textbackslash dc7}}}

After 36...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b8}} White wins by 37 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xc7}}.

\textbf{37 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de3 \textbackslash e5}}}

\textbf{38 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e2 \textbackslash g6}}}

\textbf{39 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash eb5 \textbackslash f5}}}

\textbf{40 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e2 \textbackslash e6}}}

\textbf{41 h4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash ec6}}}

\textbf{42 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash de6 \textbackslash dc6}}}

\textbf{43 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h5 1–0}}}

\textbf{Game 9}

\textbf{Kamsky-Karpov}

\textbf{Dortmund 1993}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
1  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e4 \textbackslash c6}} \\
2  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d4 \textbackslash d5}} \\
3  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash dc3 \textbackslash dxe4}} \\
4  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xe4 \textbackslash de7}} \\
5  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash eg5 \textbackslash gf6}} \\
6  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d3 \textbackslash e6}} \\
7  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f3 \textbackslash d6}} \\
8  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e2 \textbackslash h6}} \\
9  & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e4 \textbackslash xe4}} \\
10 & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash xe4 \textbackslash f6}} \\
11 & \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash he4 \textbackslash e7!}} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Nowadays the appearance of Karpov’s king at e7 is nothing unusual, but at the time this move created the impression of an exploding bomb. All the participants in the tournament left their games and gathered around the board where the future finalists of the FIDE World Championship in Elista were playing.
White has a strong initiative for the sacrificed pawn, but Karpov is accustomed to defending such situations.

If 20 f4 gxf4 21 d4 Black holds the position by 21...g5 22 e5 Wh4.

Karpov considers the strongest to be 22...c6! 23 e5 Wh7 24 c2 \b7 when the initiative passes to Black. Now, however, Kamsky finds a way of adding fuel to the fire.

The outcome of the game is decided to a certain extent on the d-file, Black’s control of which assists his king, as is seen in the following variation: 24 e5 Wc6! 25 c4 d5 26 Wc3 d4 27 fxg5 hxg5 28 f1 d4 and Black parries the threats (Karpov).

Activity on the d-file was more appropriate: 32 d2! 33 g7+ f7 34 h5 Wd4, counterattacking (Karpov). Now, however, the h-pawn becomes very dangerous.

This is where the difference in the placing of the queens tells. In view of
the threat of the h-pawn's further advance, Black has to agree to their exchange.

36 ... \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xf5}}}

37 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xf5}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d7}}}

38 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{g6?}}}

After 38 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{cl1}}}! in view of the threatened pin Black would have nothing better than 38...\textbf{\textit{\textsf{d4}}}, but then after 39 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xd7}}} he would have to give up a piece, since 39...\textbf{\textit{\textsf{xd7}}} 40 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d1}}} or 39...\textbf{\textit{\textsf{xd7}}} 40 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{h1}}} allows the h-pawn to queen. Now, however, it comes under the firm control of the rook, and matters are decided by Black's pair of connected pawns.

38 ... \textbf{\textit{\textsf{h2}}}

39 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{h7}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e7}}}

40 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d3}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e6}}}

41 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{g1}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f5}}}

42 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{g7+}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f6}}}

43 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xa7}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e4}}}

44 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e2}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f4}}}

45 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{b3}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f3}}}

46 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d1}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f5}}}

47 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{c1}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xh7}}}

48 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{b7}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e5}}}

49 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xb6}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xa2}}}

0–1

\begin{center}
\textbf{Game 10}

\textbf{Kamsky-Karpov}

\textit{Match (8), Elista 1996}
\end{center}

1 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e4}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{c6}}}

2 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d4}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d5}}}

3 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d2}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{dxe4}}}

4 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xe4}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d7}}}

5 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{g5}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{gf6}}}

6 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d3}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e6}}}

7 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f3}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d6}}}

8 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e2}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{h6}}}

9 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e4}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e4}}}

10 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xe4}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{f6}}}

11 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e2}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{c7}}}

12 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{d2}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{b6}}}

13 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{0–0–0}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{b7}}}

14 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e5}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{c5}}}

15 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{b5+}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{e7}}}

16 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{dxe5}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xc5}}}

17 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{a3}}}

The knight offer is a pseudo-sacrifice: 17...\textbf{\textit{\textsf{xe5}}}? 18 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xe5}}} \textbf{\textit{\textsf{xe5}}} 19 \textbf{\textit{\textsf{b4+}}}.
17 ... \textit{\textbf{Wc7}}
18 \textit{\textbf{Af4}} \textit{\textbf{Qd5}}

As mentioned in the analysis, after 18...\textit{\textbf{Hhd8}} 19 \textit{\textbf{Ad4}} \textit{\textbf{Ad5}} (19...\textit{\textbf{Qf8}} 20 \textit{\textbf{Xd6}}) 20 \textit{\textbf{Hhd1}} \textit{\textbf{Qf8}} 21 \textit{\textbf{Qb1}} White threatens 22 c4 followed by \textit{\textbf{Qxf7}} (Sutovsky-Nisipeanu, Columbia 1996).

However, 18...\textit{\textbf{Qd5}}! (Istratescu-Nisipeanu, Bucharest 1997) is a possible improvement.

19 \textit{\textbf{Qg3}} \textit{\textbf{Hhd8}}
20 \textit{\textbf{Qd4}}!

A subtle manoeuvre. White not only threatens to double rooks, but also eyes the weak c6 square.

20 ... \textit{\textbf{Qf8}}
21 \textit{\textbf{Qb1}} a6
22 \textit{\textbf{Qc4}}

Continuing the battle for c6, whereas after the retreat of the bishop Black would have consolidated the position of his knight at d5 by 22...b5.

22 ... \textit{\textbf{We7}}
23 \textit{\textbf{Qc6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxc6}}
24 \textit{\textbf{Qxc6}} \textit{\textbf{Qa7}}
25 \textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} \textit{\textbf{Exd5}}

Black has to agree to an isolated pawn, since if he interposes 25...\textit{\textbf{Qxg3}}? White too can interpose 26 \textit{\textbf{Qxe6}}! \textit{\textbf{Qxf2}} 27 \textit{\textbf{Qf4}} \textit{\textbf{We8}} 28 \textit{\textbf{Qxf7}}!

26 \textit{\textbf{Qxd6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxd6}}
27 \textit{\textbf{Qd4}} b5
28 \textit{\textbf{Qd3}} \textit{\textbf{Qg8}}
29 g3 \textit{\textbf{Qe6}}
30 \textit{\textbf{Qd1}} \textit{\textbf{Qad7}}
31 h4 \textit{\textbf{Qd6}}
32 \textit{\textbf{Qd2}}

One is unlikely to outplay Karpov with prophylaxis, and therefore the vigorous 32 g4!? \textit{\textbf{Qf6}} 33 \textit{\textbf{Qg3}} should have been considered, with some initiative.

32 ... \textit{\textbf{We1+}}
33 \textit{\textbf{Qa2}} \textit{\textbf{We7}}
34 \textit{\textbf{Qf3}} \textit{\textbf{Qe6}}
35 \textit{\textbf{Qe2}} \textit{\textbf{Qc8}}
36 \textit{\textbf{Qd3}} \textit{\textbf{Qc6}}
37 \textit{\textbf{Qb1}} \textit{\textbf{Qe6}}
38 \textit{\textbf{Qe3}} \textit{\textbf{Qc6}}
39 \textit{\textbf{Qd2}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe3}}
40 \textit{\textbf{Qxe3}}

Nothing is promised by 40 \textit{\textbf{Qxe3}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 41 \textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe3}} 42 \textit{\textbf{Qd8+ Qe8}}.

40 ... \textit{\textbf{We6}}
41 \textit{\textbf{Qd2}} \textit{\textbf{Qd6}}
42 g4 \textit{\textbf{Qf6}}
43 g5 \textit{\textbf{Qf3}}
44 \textit{\textbf{Qa2}}

After the exchanges 44 gxf6 \textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} 45 \textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxh4}} 46 \textit{\textbf{Qd8+ Qh7}} the game is equal.

44 ... \textit{\textbf{Qf5}}
45 c3 \textit{\textbf{Qf3}}
46 \textit{\textbf{Qf4}} \textit{\textbf{Qh3}}
47 gxf6
47 ... \textit{We}6!
48 \textit{Wd}4
If 48 hxg7 White has to reckon with 48...d4+ 49 \textit{Qb}1 dxc3, when 50 \textit{Wxc3} fails to 50...\textit{Ed}1+ 51 \textit{Qc}2 \textit{We}2+ 52 \textit{Qb}3 \textit{Ed}3, winning the queen.

48 ... \textit{Wxh}6
49 \textit{Qf}5 \textit{We}6
50 \textit{Qe}5 \textit{Wd}7
51 \textit{Qa}1 \textit{f}6
52 \textit{Qe}3 \textit{Ec}6
53 h5 \textit{Ec}4
54 \textit{Wb}6 d4
55 \textit{Ed}3 \textit{Wf}5
56 \textit{Exd}4 \textit{Exd}4
57 \textit{Exd}4 \textit{Exh}5 58 \textit{Wd}6 \textit{Wf}3 59 \textit{Wxa}6 \textit{Wd}1+ 60 \textit{Qa}2 \textit{Wd}5+ would have led to equality.

57 ... \textit{Wxf}2
58 \textit{We}6+ \textit{Qf}8
59 \textit{Wd}6+ \textit{Qf}7
60 \textit{Wd}7+ \textit{Qf}8
61 \textit{Wd}6+ \textit{Qf}7
62 \textit{Wd}7+
\( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \)

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Game 11} & \textbf{Kamsky-Karpov} \\
\textit{Match (12), Elista 1996} & \\
\hline
1 e4 & c6 \\
2 d4 & d5 \\
3 \textit{Qd}2 & \textit{Qxe}4 \\
4 \textit{Qxe}4 & \textit{Qd}7 \\
5 \textit{Qg}5 & \textit{Qgf}6 \\
6 \textit{Qd}3 & e6 \\
7 \textit{Qf}3 & \textit{Qd}6 \\
8 \textit{We}2 & h6 \\
9 \textit{Qe}4 & \textit{Qxe}4 \\
10 \textit{Wxe}4 & \textit{Qf}6 \\
11 \textit{We}2 & \textit{Wc}7 \\
12 \textit{Qd}2 & b6 \\
13 0-0-0 & \textit{Qb}7 \\
14 \textit{Qhe}1 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Kamsky switches to another of the three main alternatives.

14 ... 0-0
This is considered risky, as White’s attack has something to latch on to – the h6 pawn. The main continuation is 14...0-0-0.

15 g4 c5
One is unlikely to find volunteers willing to play 15...\textit{Qxg}4? 16 \textit{Qg}1 f5 17 h3 \textit{Qf}6 18 \textit{Qxh}6.

16 g5 hxg5
17 \textit{Qxg}5 \textit{Qf}4!
18 h4?!
This natural move in fact reduces the potential of White’s attack, as Black is able to make an energetic counterattack in the centre. 18 dxc5 bxc5 19 \textit{Qg}1! was stronger.

18 ... \textit{Qa}d8!
19 dxe5 bxc5
20 \textit{Qe}3
Now if 20 $\text{g}g1$ Black has 20...c4 21 $\text{h}h4$ 22 $\text{xe}4$ 23 $\text{xd}2$ 24 $\text{xe}2$ 25 $\text{h}h2$ with the better chances.

White’s attack has petered out, and he considers it best to go into a slightly inferior ending.

28 ... $\text{xf}6$
29 $\text{xf}6$ $\text{xe}3$
30 $\text{xf}7+\text{xf}7$
31 $\text{h}h1+!$
32 $\text{d}d2$ $\text{xc}2$
33 $\text{d}d8$

20 ... $\text{d}d4!$

A pretty move, indirectly attacking the h4 pawn, and if 21 h5 Black was planning to seize the initiative by 21...$\text{e}5$ 22 $\text{g}g1$ c4!

21 $\text{g}g1$ $\text{xe}3+$
22 $\text{f}xe3$ $\text{h}h4$
23 $\text{df}1$ $\text{e}5$
24 $\text{f}f2$ $\text{h}h6$

Karpov defends, but it was already the time to launch a counterattack: 24...$\text{h}h2$! Now 25 $\text{xf}6$? fails to 25...$\text{xe}3+!$ 26 $\text{b}b1$ $\text{gxf}6$, 25 $\text{w}e1$ $\text{d}8$ with the threat of 26...$\text{xd}3$ is unpleasant for White, while after 25 $\text{g}3$ $\text{w}xg3$ 26 $\text{xg}3$ $\text{d}7$ Black is a pawn up in the endgame.

25 $\text{g}g3$ $\text{e}4$
26 $\text{fg}1$ $\text{g}6$
27 $\text{f}f1$ $\text{g}7$

33 ... $\text{h}h2+$
33...$\text{f}5!$ 34 e4 $\text{h}8$! was stronger, and now in the event of 35 $\text{b}b7$ $\text{xe}4$ 36 $\text{xc}5$ $\text{h}2+!$ 37 $\text{c}3$ $\text{c}2+$ Black has real winning chances (Vasyukov).

34 $\text{c}3$ $\text{f}6$
35 $\text{b}7$ $\text{f}5$?!

In time trouble Karpov misses the superior 35...$\text{b}1$ 36 $\text{f}3+$ $\text{e}5$ 37 $\text{f}1$ $\text{e}4!$ 38 $\text{xc}5$ $\text{c}2+$ 39 $\text{b}4$ $\text{xb}2+$ (Vasyukov).

36 $\text{xc}5$ $\text{c}2+$
37 $\text{d}4$ $\text{d}2+$
38 $\text{c}3$ $\text{c}2+$
39 $\text{d}4$ e5+
40 $\text{d}5$ $\text{d}2+$
41 $\text{c}4$ $\text{c}2+$
42 $\text{d}5$ $\text{d}2+$
43 $\textit{c4}$  \textit{g5}
44 \textit{e4}!

This move, restricting the bishop, saves the game, since the win of the e4 pawn by 44...\textit{d4}+ 45 \textit{c3} \textit{xe4} merely turns out to be an exchange – 46 \textit{g4}!

44 \ldots  \textit{c8}
45 \textit{c3}!  \textit{d1}
46 \textit{f3}+  \textit{g7}
47 \textit{d3}  \textit{g4}
48 \textit{g3}  \textit{f6}
49 \textit{f2}!  \textit{c1}+
50 \textit{d2}  \textit{a1}
51 \textit{xe4}+  \textit{xe4}
52 \textit{xe4}  \textit{xa2}
53 \textit{c3}  \textit{a4}
54 \textit{b4}  \frac{1}{2}–\frac{1}{2}

### Game 12

\textit{A.Sokolov-Karpov}

\textit{Belfort 1988}

1  \textit{e4}  \textit{c6}
2  \textit{d4}  \textit{d5}
3  \textit{d2}  \textit{dxe4}
4  \textit{xe4}  \textit{d7}
5  \textit{g5}  \textit{gf6}
6  \textit{d3}  \textit{e6}
7  \textit{f3}  \textit{d6}
8  \textit{e2}  \textit{h6}
9  \textit{e4}  \textit{xe4}
10  \textit{xe4}  \textit{f6}
11  \textit{e2}  \textit{b6}
12  \textit{d2}  \textit{b7}
13  0–0–0  \textit{c7}
14  \textit{de1}  0–0–0
15  \textit{a6}

15 \textit{c4} is considered more promising.

15 \ldots  \textit{xe6}

Here 15...\textit{b5} is better, hindering White's play with \textit{c2–c4}.

16  \textit{xa6}+  \textit{b8}
17  \textit{e2}  \textit{d5}
18  \textit{c4}  \textit{f4}
19  \textit{f1}  \textit{g6}

This retreat is forced, as 19...\textit{g5} 20 \textit{g3} \textit{g4} 21 \textit{xe4} \textit{gx3} 22 \textit{xf4}! leads to an advantage for White.

20  \textit{g3}  \textit{e7}
21  \textit{h4}  \textit{h5}
22  \textit{e2}  \textit{d7}
23  \textit{g5}  \textit{f6}
24  \textit{d2}  \textit{hd8}
25  \textit{ed1}  \textit{b7}
26  \textit{b1}  \textit{a8}
27  \textit{a3}  \textit{a6}

27...\textit{b5} 28 \textit{cxb5} \textit{xb5} 29 \textit{e4} has its drawbacks in the form of the weak \textit{c6} pawn, but now all Black's kingside pawns are weak, and the one at \textit{h5} is virtually doomed.

28  \textit{xf6}  \textit{gx6}
29  \textit{e1}  \textit{e7}

Preparing ...\textit{b6–b5}, which was not good immediately because of 30 \textit{d5}. 
30 \( \text{c2} \) b5
31 \( \text{b4} \) w7

As shown by Sokolov, Black could have regained the pawn by 44...\( \text{d2}^+ \) 45 \( \text{b2} \text{x}c1 \) 46 \( \text{x}c1 \text{xb3}^+ \) 47 \( \text{c2} \text{c5} \), but only at the cost of allowing the h-pawn to advance – 48 h5 \( \text{d7} \) 49 h6 \( \text{d}8 \) 50 \( \text{d}6 \), and the f7 pawn is lost.

45 \( \text{c7} \) d4
46 \( \text{xf7} \) d3
47 \( \text{c1} \) d2+
48 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{d3} \)

32 d5!
This breakthrough gives the game a new turn!
32 ... cxd5
White has the advantage after both i2...c5 33 dxe6 \( \text{xd2} \) 34 \( \text{xd2} \) \( \text{xd2} \) i5 \( \text{xd2} \) cxb4 36 e7 \( \text{e}4^+ \) 37 c2 \( \text{xc2}^+ \) 38 \( \text{xc2} \text{g6} \) 39 cxb5, and i2...exd5 33 cxd5 \( \text{xd5} \) 34 \( \text{xd5} \) :xd5 35 \( \text{d}4 \) (Sokolov).
33 cxb5 \( \text{e}8 \)?
Now White wins a pawn for free, but also after 33...\( \text{g6} \) 34 a4 the h5 pawn causes concern.
34 \( \text{wh}5 \) \( \text{g6} \)
35 \( \text{we}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \)
36 b3 \( \text{dc7} \)
37 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{xc2} \)
38 \( \text{xc2} \) a6
39 \( \text{d4} \) axb5
40 \( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{wb6} \)
41 a4 \( \text{wc5} \)
42 \( \text{wd2} \) \( \text{f3} \)
43 \( \text{wc1} \) \( \text{xc1}^+ \)
44 \( \text{xc1} \) \( \text{d8} \)

Black has done everything possible, but the pawn has been firmly blockaded, and if necessary White’s rook can control it from the rear.

49 \( \text{c7}^+ \) \( \text{b}8 \)
50 \( \text{a6}^+ \) \( \text{a}8 \)
51 \( \text{c7}^+ \) \( \text{b}8 \)
52 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xb3} \)
53 \( \text{f8}^+ \) \( \text{a}7 \)
54 \( \text{d8} \) \( \text{b1}^+ \)
55 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e}1^+ \)
56 \( \text{xf3} \) d1\( \text{w}^+ \)
57 \( \text{xd1} \) \( \text{xd1} \)

Despite winning the exchange, the ending is hopeless for Black.
58 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{f1} \)
59 f3 b6
60 g7 c6
61 h5 d6
62 xf6 e7
63 h5 f7
64 g4 g6
65 g3 a1
66 h5+ f7
67 g5 xa4+
68 f5 a5+
69 g4 a4+
70 f4 b4
71 f5 b1
72 h6 g1+
73 h5 f1
74 d6+ e6
75 g6 1–0

15 hgl!
Deterring Black from castling kingside.
15 ... c5
16 dxc5 wxc5
17 a3 a5

In the game Topalov-Ivanchuk (Las Palmas 1996) Black risked castling, but after 17...0–0?! 18 g4 wd5 19 g5 wxf3 20 gxf6 he ended up in a difficult position.
18 e3 c7
19 b5+ e7
20 d4!

In recent times this move has become fashionable, as after 14...0–0–0 15 a6 White is guaranteed a slight but enduring advantage.
20 ... $\text{h}x\text{h}2$?

Over-optimistic, but White also has he advantage after 20...e5 21 f4.

21 $\text{f}5+$ $\text{f}8$
22 $\text{x}d8+$ $\text{x}d8$
23 $\text{d}d1$ $\text{c}7$
24 $\text{d}4$!

Now all of White’s pieces join the attack, and he is also threatening to cut off the retreat of the black bishop at h2.

24 ... e5

If 24...exf5 there follows 25 $\text{x}f6$ $\text{x}f6$ 26 $\text{d}d7$ $\text{e}5$ 27 $\text{x}b7$ with the threats of $\text{c}4$ and $\text{h}5$.

25 $\text{x}b6$! $\text{x}b6$
26 $\text{d}6$ $\text{c}7$
27 $\text{c}4$!

After this diverting move there follows a decisive infiltration by theook.

27 ... $\text{b}8$
28 $\text{b}6$ $\text{c}8$
29 $\text{x}b7$ $\text{x}b7$
30 $\text{d}d6$ $\text{e}7$
31 $\text{c}8+$ $\text{e}8$
32 $\text{f}5$ $\text{h}5$
33 $\text{x}e7$ $\text{x}e7$
34 $\text{d}7+$ 1–0
3: 10...\textsuperscript{w}c7

1  e4  c6
2  d4  d5
3  \textsuperscript{c}c3  dxe4
4  \textsuperscript{c}xe4  \textsuperscript{d}d7
5  \textsuperscript{g}g5  \textsuperscript{g}f6
6  \textsuperscript{d}d3  e6
7  \textsuperscript{f}f3  \textsuperscript{d}d6
8  \textsuperscript{w}e2  h6
9  \textsuperscript{e}e4  \textsuperscript{xe}4
10  \textsuperscript{w}xe4  \textsuperscript{w}c7

A fashionable move. By developing his queen at this natural post, Black prepares \ldots c6-c5. However, here he has to reckon with \textsuperscript{w}g4.

White’s main replies are 11 \textsuperscript{w}g4 (3.1), 11 \textsuperscript{d}d2 (3.2) and 11 0–0 (3.3).

3.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textsuperscript{c}c3 dxe4
4 \textsuperscript{d}xe4 \textsuperscript{d}d7 5 \textsuperscript{g}g5 \textsuperscript{gf}6 6 \textsuperscript{d}d3
e6 7 \textsuperscript{f}f3 \textsuperscript{d}d6 8 \textsuperscript{w}e2 h6 9 \textsuperscript{e}e4
\textsuperscript{d}xe4 10 \textsuperscript{w}xe4 \textsuperscript{w}c7)

11 \textsuperscript{w}g4

The most critical move. By attacking the g7 pawn, White prevents Black from castling, but at the same time his queen is insecurely placed.

11 \ldots \textsuperscript{w}f8

11...g5?! is a risky alternative: 12 \textsuperscript{w}h3! \textsuperscript{g}g8 13 \textsuperscript{d}d2!, and now:

(a) 13...\textsuperscript{f}f8?! 14 \textsuperscript{c}e4 \textsuperscript{g}g7 (after 14...f5?! both 15 0–0 and 15 \textsuperscript{w}h5+ favour White) 15 0–0! \textsuperscript{xd}4 16 \textsuperscript{e}e3!, and the weakening of Black’s kingside causes him problems (Kasparov-Kamsky, Linares 1994) – Game 14;

(b) 13...g4!? (the immediate 13...c5!? is also possible) 14 \textsuperscript{w}e3 (14 \textsuperscript{w}xh6 \textsuperscript{f}f4 15 \textsuperscript{w}h4 \textsuperscript{g}g5 16 \textsuperscript{w}g3 \textsuperscript{f}f4 leads to a draw by repetition) 14...\textsuperscript{f}f4 15 \textsuperscript{w}e2 c5 16 g3 \textsuperscript{xd}2+ 17 \textsuperscript{xd}2 cxd4 18 0–0–0 with an unclear position (Frolov-Ponomariov, Kiev 1997).

12 0–0  c5
Here the topical continuations are
13 \( \text{N}e1 \) (3.11) and 13 c3 (3.12).

After 13 b3 e5 Black gains good
counterplay (Gelfand-Speelman,

3.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{N}c3 \) dx{e}4
4 \( \text{N}xe4 \) \( \text{N}d7 \) 5 \( \text{Ng}5 \) \( \text{g}f6 \) 6 \( \text{K}d3 \)
e6 7 \( \text{Q}f3 \) \( \text{d}d6 \) 8 \( \text{We}2 \) h6 9 \( \text{Q}e4 \)
\( \text{Q}xe4 \) 10 \( \text{W}xe4 \) \( \text{W}c7 \) 11 \( \text{W}g4 \) \( \text{f}f8 \)
12 0–0 c5)

13 \( \text{N}e1 \)

White intensifies the piece pressure
in the centre.

13 ... b6

Removing the central pawn tension
favours White: 13...c4 14 \( \text{Q}f1 \) b5 15
\( \text{b}4 \) 16 b3! c3 17 \( \text{Q}e5 \) \( \text{Q}xe5 \) 18
\( \text{Q}xe5 \) \( \text{Q}e7 \) 19 \( \text{Q}e3 \) \( \text{g}b7 \) 20 \( \text{Q}ad1 \) g6
\( \text{Q}!1 \) h4 h5 22 \( \text{W}f4 \) \( \text{Q}g7 \) 23 \( \text{Q}d6 \)! with a
decisive invasion by the rook (De
Firmian-Gulko, USA Ch 1994).

14 b3

If 14 \( \text{Q}e5 \)?! Black sacrifices the
exchange: 14...\( \text{Q}xd4 \)! 15 \( \text{W}f3 \) (15
\( \text{Q}g6+ \) \( \text{fx}g6 \) 16 \( \text{W}f3+ \) \( \text{Q}f6 \) 17 \( \text{W}xa8 \)
\( \text{Q}xh2+ \) 18 \( \text{Q}h1 \) \( \text{Q}f7 \) 19 \( \text{W}f3 \) \( \text{d}d6 \) favours Black, Forster-Khalifman,
Bad Wörischofen 1996) 15...\( \text{Q}xe5 \) 16
\( \text{W}xa8 \) \( \text{Q}xh2+ \) 17 \( \text{Q}f1 \) \( \text{d}d6 \) 18 \( \text{Q}d2 \)
\( \text{Q}e7 \) (18...\( \text{Q}c5 \) 19 \( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{Q}xd3 \) 20 \( \text{c}x\text{d}3 \)
\( \text{W}b7 \) 21 \( \text{W}xb7 \) \( \text{Q}xb7 \)\( f \), Khalifman) 19
\( \text{W}e4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) and gains good prospects
(Khalifman-Speelman, Hastings 1995).

14 ... \( \text{Q}f6 \)

15 \( \text{W}h4 \) \( \text{Q}b7 \)

16 \( \text{Q}e5 \)

Or 16 \( \text{Q}g5 \) \( \text{Q}xf3 \) (16...hxg5? 17
\( \text{W}xh8+ \) \( \text{Q}e7 \) 18 \( \text{W}xg7 \) \( \text{Q}g8 \) 19
\( \text{Q}xe6+! \) 17 \( \text{Q}xf6 \) \( \text{Q}c6 \) with a
complicated game.

16 ... \( \text{Q}xd4 \)

17 \( \text{W}xd4 \) \( \text{W}c5 \)

The chances are equal (Leko-
Adams, Dortmund 1996).

3.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{N}c3 \) dx{e}4
4 \( \text{Q}xe4 \) \( \text{Q}d7 \) 5 \( \text{Q}g5 \) \( \text{g}f6 \) 6 \( \text{Q}d3 \)
e6 7 \( \text{Q}f3 \) \( \text{d}d6 \) 8 \( \text{W}e2 \) h6 9 \( \text{Q}e4 \)
\( \text{Q}xe4 \) 10 \( \text{W}xe4 \) \( \text{W}c7 \) 11 \( \text{W}g4 \) \( \text{f}f8 \)
12 0–0 c5)

13 c3
Since Black’s plans include the fianchetto of his light-square bishop, White intends to exchange it, for which he reinforces his centre.

13 ... b6
14 Wh4 a7
15 Ae4 xe4

Or 15...e7 16 g5!?±.
16 xe4 Ad8
17 Ae1!

It is important to intensify the pressure in the centre.

The alternatives are more passive:
17 h3 Kg8 18 Ad1 f6 19 wc2 c4!= (Z.Almasi-Palac, Vienna 1996);
17 dx5 dx5 18 We2 e7 19 h3
He8 20 wc2 (20 d4!!?) 20...d3! F
(Illescas-Karpov, Dos Hermanas 1997).

17 ... f6
17...cxd4 is risky: 18 fx4 xh2+ 19 h1 f6 20 f5.
18 Wh4 e7
19 Wh3! g5
20 dx5 bxc5

This is better than 20...xc5 21 d4±.

Z.Almasi-Speelman (Erevan OL 1996) now continued 21 f2 h5 22
d3 f4 23 g3 xc1 24 xxc1 h4 25
e5! with the initiative for White.

11 d2
A useful developing move, preparing queenside castling.

11 ... c5

This is the most critical reply, but 11...b6 has also been played:

(a) 12 wg4 g5 (or 12...f8 13 0–0–0
b7 14 He1 b8 15 f6 f6 16
Wh4 e7 17 d5 c5=, Khalifman-
Epishin, Dos Hermanas 1993) 13 Wh3
Gg8! 14 g4 (14 xh6 f8 15 Wh7
e5!?) 14...b7 15 0–0–0 0–0–0 with a good game for Black (Sion
Castro-Karpov, Leon 1993) – Game
16;

(b) 12 c4 f7 13 We2 c5 14 d5
e5 15 dx5 f6+ 16 Whx5 0–0–0
17 0–0–0 He8 18 Hf1 fxe6 19 Wh6
with the better game for White (Span-
genberg-Servat, Argentine Ch 1994).

12 wg4

Or 12 c3 f6 13 We2 0–0 14 He5
b8 15 0–0 d7 16 fxe1 c6 with
equal chances (Wittmann-Podgaets,
Moscow 1996).

12 ... f8
13 0–0

13 0–0–0?! is weaker on account of
13...c4 14 f2 b5 15 He1 b7, when Black stands better (Rogic-
Arlandi, Makarska 1996).

13 \textit{We}4 is a loss of time: 13...\textit{c}4 14 \textit{Af}1 \textit{Ab}8 15 a4 \textit{b}6 16 \textit{We}2 \textit{a}6 17 g3 \textit{Ab}7 18 \textit{Ag}2 \textit{Ad}5 with equal chances (Ehlvest-Gulko, Novgorod 1995).

13 \ldots \textit{c}4

If 13...\textit{e}5?! there follows 14 dxc5 \textit{Qxc}5 15 \textit{Af}5! with the better game for White.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 14 \textit{Ae}2 \textit{b}5
  \item 15 a4 \textit{g}5
  \item 15...\textit{b}4 can be met by 16 \textit{Qe}5.
  \item 16 \textit{Wh}3
\end{itemize}

A new plan. White hopes to use his heavy pieces more productively.

11 \ldots \textit{b}6

11...\textit{c}5 12 \textit{Wg}4 \textit{Qf}8 transposes into variation 3.1.

12 \textit{He}1

If 12 \textit{Wg}4 Black has the good reply 12...g5 13 \textit{Wh}3 \textit{Qg}8 14 \textit{Qd}2 \textit{Ab}7 15 \textit{Qc}4 0–0–0! 16 \textit{c}3 (16 \textit{Qe}1!?) 16...\textit{c}5 17 \textit{Qxd}6+ (weaker is 17 \textit{Qe}3?! \textit{Qf}4! 18 \textit{Mfd}1 \textit{Qf}6\textsuperscript{t}, Topalov-Tukmakov, Tilburg 1994) 17...\textit{Wxd}6 18 \textit{Qe}3 \textit{cxd}4 19 \textit{cxd}4 \textit{Qf}6 with a double-edged game (Tukmakov).

12 \ldots \textit{Qb}7

13 \textit{Wh}4 \textit{c}5

14 \textit{Qg}5 \textit{Qf}6

14...0–0 would also seem to be possible, since 15 \textit{Qh}7 \textit{Qfe}8 16 \textit{Axh}6 gxh6 17 \textit{Wxh}6 fails to 17...\textit{Axh}2+ 18 \textit{Qh}1 \textit{Qf}4.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 15 dxc5 \textit{Wxc}5
  \item 16 \textit{Qe}4 \textit{Qxe}4
  \item 17 \textit{Qxe}4 \textit{Qxe}4
  \item 18 \textit{Wxe}4 0–0
\end{itemize}

If 18...\textit{Ec}8?! , as played in Z.Almasi-Lalic, Croatia 1996, White
could have gained an advantage by 19 \textit{W}g4!

\textbf{19} \textit{A}e3 \textit{W}c7

The chances are equal.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Game 14} &  \\
\textbf{Kasparov-Kamsky} &  \\
\textit{Linares 1994} &  \\
\hline
1 & e4 \text{ c6} \\
2 & d4 \text{ d5} \\
3 & \textit{A}d2 \text{ dxe4} \\
4 & \textit{A}xe4 \textit{A}d7 \\
5 & \textit{A}g5 \textit{A}gf6 \\
6 & \textit{A}d3 \text{ e6} \\
7 & \textit{A}f3 \textit{A}d6 \\
8 & \textit{W}e2 \text{ h6} \\
9 & \textit{A}e4 \textit{A}xe4 \\
10 & \textit{W}xe4 \textit{W}c7 \\
11 & \textit{W}g4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textit{11} \ldots \textit{g5}?!  \\
An unjustified weakening of the position, as the World Champion subtly emphasises. Here \textit{11}...\textit{f}8 is better.

\textbf{12} \textit{W}h3! \textit{A}g8

\textbf{13} \textit{A}d2!

Not \textbf{13} \textit{W}xh6? \textit{A}f8 \textbf{14} \textit{W}h7 \textit{A}f6 \textbf{15} \textit{W}h3 \text{ g4} \textbf{16} \textit{W}h4 \textit{gx}f3 \textbf{17} \textit{W}xf6 \textit{fxg}2 \textbf{18} \textit{A}g1 \textit{W}xh2.

\textbf{13} \ldots \textit{A}f8?!

Black sounds the retreat, yet \textbf{13}...c5!? (or first \textbf{13}...g4) was possible.

\textbf{14} \textit{A}e4 \textit{A}g7  \\
If \textbf{14}...f5?!, then both \textbf{15} 0–0 \textit{fxe4}?! \textbf{16} \textit{W}xe6+ \textit{A}d8 \textbf{17} \textit{W}xg8 \textit{exd}3 \textbf{18} h4 and the simple \textbf{15} \textit{W}h5+ \textit{A}e7 \textbf{16} \textit{A}g3 favour White.

\textbf{15} 0–0! \textit{A}xd4

\textbf{16} \textit{A}e3 \textit{A}e5  \\
If \textbf{16}...\textit{A}xb2 White sacrifices the exchange: \textbf{17} c3! \textit{A}xa1 \textbf{18} \textit{A}xa1 \textit{A}g6, and develops a strong attack after \textbf{19} \textit{A}d1! f5 \textbf{20} \textit{W}h5 \textit{A}f7 \textbf{21} \textit{A}c2! \textit{fxe}4 \textbf{22} \textit{A}xe4 \textit{A}f8 \textbf{23} \textit{A}xg6+ \textit{A}xg6 \textbf{24} \textit{W}xh6 \textit{We}5 \textbf{25} \textit{A}d4 (Kasparov).

\textbf{17} \textit{Ad}1 \textit{A}f6

\textbf{18} \textit{A}xf6+ \textit{A}xf6

\textbf{19} \textit{Ah}7! \textit{Ah}8

\textbf{20} \textit{W}xh6 \textit{A}e7  \\
If \textbf{20}...\textit{We}7 there is the pretty variation \textbf{21} \textit{A}c5! \textit{W}xh7 \textbf{22} \textit{Ad}8+! \textit{W}xd8 \textbf{23} \textit{W}f8+ with a mating attack.
21 \( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{f}8 \)
22 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \)
23 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \)
24 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \)
25 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{e}7 \)
26 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{c}8 \)
27 \( \text{a}5 \)

Despite White's extra pawn, he has no need to go into an ending, as long as the black king is insecure.

27 ... \( \text{b}6 \)
28 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{a}6 \)
29 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{c}8 \)
30 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}8 \)
31 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \)
32 \( \text{fd}1 \) \( \text{a}8 \)
33 \( \text{c}5! \) \( \text{bxc}5 \)
34 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{c}4 \)
35 \( \text{bxc}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \)
36 \( \text{xa}8 \) \( \text{xa}8 \)
37 \( \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{b}8 \)
38 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \)
39 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{f}8 \)
40 \( \text{f}6 \) 1–0

12 0–0 \( \text{c}5 \)
13 \( \text{b}3 \)

Here 13 \( \text{e}1 \) is more energetic.

13 ... \( \text{e}5 \)

After 13...cxd4 14 \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 15 \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{xf}3+ \) 16 \( \text{gxf}3 \) \( \text{h}2+ \) 17 \( \text{g}2 \) the destruction of White's kingside is more than compensated for by his initiative (Speelman).

14 \( \text{dxc}5 \)

14 c3 cxd4 15 cxd4 \( \text{c}3 \) 16 \( \text{h}4! \) is possible.

14 ... \( \text{dxc}5 \)

15 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{h}5 \)

15...\( \text{xf}5 \) 16 \( \text{xf}5 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 17 \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{g}8= \) is safer.

16 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \)

17 \( \text{h}4 \)

A loss of time, leading to a simplification of the position. More active was 17 \( \text{d}1! \) \( \text{e}7 \) 18 \( \text{g}3! \) \( \text{f}6 \) 19 \( \text{a}3+ \) \( \text{g}8 \) 20 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{f}4 \) 21 \( \text{h}1 \) with the better chances for White (Speelman).

17 ... \( \text{e}7 \)
18 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{f}4 \)
19 \( \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{exf}4 \)
20 \( \textbf{Wh}3 \) g6
21 \( \textbf{A}x\text{c}8 \) \( \textbf{A}x\text{c}8 \)
22 c4 \( \textbf{g}7 \)
23 \( \textbf{A}d4 \) \( \textbf{A}f6 \)
24 \( \textbf{A}b5 \)

7 \( \textbf{Q}f3 \) \( \textbf{d}6 \)
8 \( \textbf{W}e2 \) h6
9 \( \textbf{Q}e4 \) \( \textbf{Q}xe4 \)
10 \( \textbf{W}xe4 \) \( \textbf{W}c7 \)
11 \( \textbf{A}d2 \) b6

11...c5 is more energetic.
12 \( \textbf{W}g4 \) g5!
13 \( \textbf{W}h3 \) \( \textbf{g}8 \)!

24 \( \ldots \) \( \textbf{W}c5 \)
24...\( \textbf{W}a5 \) 25 \( \textbf{A}d1 \) \( \textbf{A}cd8 \) 26 \( \textbf{A}d7 \) \( \textbf{W}xa2 \) 27 \( \textbf{Q}d6 \) \( \textbf{H}hf8 \) 28 c5 \( \textbf{A}d4! \) 29 \( \textbf{Q}xb7 \) \( \textbf{A}fe8! \) is a reliable alternative (Speelman).
25 \( \textbf{A}d1 \) \( \textbf{A}cd8 \)
26 \( \textbf{W}f3 \) \( \textbf{H}he8 \)
27 \( \textbf{A}xd8 \) \( \textbf{A}xd8 \)
28 \( \textbf{W}xb7 \) \( \textbf{A}d2 \)
29 \( \textbf{W}f3 \) a5
30 \( \textbf{Q}c3 \) \( \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2} \)

'À la Kamsky' in a superior version! Now over the course of several moves the capture of the h6 pawn allows Black to develop an enduring initiative, e.g. 14 \( \textbf{W}xh6 \) \( \textbf{f}8 \) 15 \( \textbf{W}h7 \) \( \textbf{Q}f6! \)
14 g4 \( \textbf{b}7 \)
15 0-0-0

And here 15 \( \textbf{W}xh6 \) is dangerous in view of 15...c5 16 \( \textbf{Q}xg5 \) \( \textbf{A}xg5! \) 17 \( \textbf{A}xg5 \) \( \textbf{A}h1 \) 18 0-0-0 c4 with a clear advantage to Black (Karpov).
15 \( \ldots \) 0-0-0
16 \( \textbf{H}he1 \) \( \textbf{f}4 \)
17 \( \textbf{Q}b1 \)

Once again 17 \( \textbf{W}xh6 \) \( \textbf{A}xd2+ \) 18 \( \textbf{Q}xd2 \) \( \textbf{W}f4 \) 19 \( \textbf{A}e4 \) \( \textbf{W}f6! \) 20 \( \textbf{W}h3 \) c5 gives Black the initiative (Karpov).
17 \( \ldots \) \( \textbf{H}8 \)

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**Game 16**
Sion Castro-Karpov
*Leon 1993*

1 \( e4 \) c6
2 d4 d5
3 \( \textbf{Q}d2 \) dxe4
4 \( \textbf{Q}xe4 \) \( \textbf{Q}d7 \)
5 \( \textbf{Q}g5 \) \( \textbf{Q}gf6 \)
6 \( \textbf{Q}d3 \) e6
18 \( \text{c3?!} \)
It was time for White to think of
implifying: 18 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 19 \( \text{g3} \)
\( \text{hxg3} \) 20 \( \text{hxg3} \) c5\( \text{=} \).
18 \( \ldots \) \( \text{b8} \)
19 \( \text{d5} \)

Initiating a series of moves typical of a game between an amateur and a professional.

19 \( \ldots \) cxd5!
20 \( \text{xh8} \) \( \text{xh8} \)
21 \( \text{d4} \) a6
22 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \)
23 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{e5}! \)
24 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{c4} \)
25 \( \text{hxh6} \) \( \text{hxh6} \)
26 \( \text{hxh6} \) \( \text{e5} \)
27 \( \text{f8+} \) a7
28 \( \text{b4} \) \( \text{d2+!} \)
29 \( \text{a1} \) \( \text{e2} \)
30 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{xf2} \)
31 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e2} \)
32 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{hxh2} \)
33 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e2} \)
34 \( \text{h1} \) a5
35 \( \text{c3} \) d4
0–1
4: 5...\(\Box\)df6

This move is an attempt to refute 5 \(\Box\)g5. With his unusual knight move Black tries to release his bishop to take up an active position.

As in the main variations, White's basic plans involve 6 \(\Box\)d3 (4.1), 6 \(\Box\)c4 (4.2) and 6 \(\Box\)f3 (4.3).

4.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\Box\)c3 dxe4 4 \(\Box\)xe4 \(\Box\)d7 5 \(\Box\)g5 \(\Box\)df6) 6 \(\Box\)d3

With this move White does not prevent the active development of the black bishop.

6 ... \(\Box\)g4

6...h6 would appear to be possible, although it has hardly been studied: 7 \(\Box\)xf7!? (the critical reply, since if 7 \(\Box\)xf3 Black simplifies the position by 7...\(\Box\)xf5! 8 \(\Box\)e5 \(\Box\)xd3 9 \(\Box\)xd3 e6 or 9...\\(\Box\)d5 followed by...\(\Box\)d7) 7...\(\Box\)xf7 8 \(\Box\)f3. Shirazi-Burger (Saint John 1988) continued 8...g5 9 h4 g4 10 \(\Box\)e5+ \(\Box\)g7 11 c3 h5? (11...\(\Box\)e6 was essential) 12 \(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)h7 13 \(\Box\)xh7 \(\Box\)xh7 14 \(\Box\)g5+ \(\Box\)h8 15 \(\Box\)g6+ \(\Box\)g7 16 \(\Box\)xe7+ 1-0.

7 \(\Box\)f3 \(\Box\)h5

A practically forced loss of tempo, since if 7...e6 (7...h6? loses to 8 \(\Box\)xf7! \(\Box\)xf3 9 \(\Box\)g6!) 8 h3 (here 8 \(\Box\)xf7? does not work because of 8...\(\Box\)xf3) 8...\(\Box\)xf3 9 \(\Box\)xf3 \(\Box\)d6 10 0-0 \(\Box\)c7 11 \(\Box\)e2 \(\Box\)f4 12 \(\Box\)xf4 \(\Box\)xf4 13 \(\Box\)ad1 \(\Box\)e7 14 \(\Box\)e5 \(\Box\)d8 15 c3 with a slight but enduring advantage for White (Nunn-Christsiansen, Szirak IZ 1987).

8 c3

Weaker is 8 h3? h6 9 \(\Box\)e4 \(\Box\)xe4
10  \hbe4  \hff6 11  \hdd3  \hxf3 12  \wxf3  
\wxd4, when White loses a pawn.

8  ...  e6

Also interesting is 8...\wec7 9  \wec2  
h6 10  \hde6 (10  \he4  \hxh3 11  \gxh3  
\hd5=) 10...\wd6 11  \hxh8  \hxf3 12  
\hgx6!  \hxg2 13  \hge1  \hxh2 14  \hxg2  
\hxg2 15  \hdxh8  \wh1+, and here,  
instead of 16  \hff1?  \we4+! with advantage  
to Black (Riemersma-Van der  
Wiel, Dutch Ch 1987), 16  \hdd2  \wfd3  
17  \wfb3 maintains equality.

9  \wfb3  \wec7

9...h6 can be met by 10 \wxb7 hgx5  
11  \wxc6+  \hdd7 12  \he5  \hec8 13  \wae4  
with the threats of 14  \hec5 and 14  
\hgx5.

10  \he5  \hdd6

Weaker is 11  \hec4  \hec7  
(11...\hxh2? 12  \hxh2!±) 12  \he5  \hdd7  
13  \hdxh7  \wxd7 14  0-0  \hdf6 15  \mee1  
\mdd8 with equal chances (Van der  
Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988).

11  ...  \he7

11...\hdd5?! 12  \hhg3  f6 13  \hec4!  
favours White.

12  \hhg3  0-0

The chances are equal (Van der  
Wiel).

4.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3  \hec3  \dxe4  
4  \hxe4  \hdd7 5  \hgc5  \hdf6)

6  \hec4

This move forces Black to block  
a2-g8 diagonal.

6  ...  e6

Other ways of defending f7 lead to  
difficulties:

6...\hdd5 7  \hec1f3  g6 8  0-0  \mee7 9  
\mee1 h6 10  \hde4  \hhg4 11  a4 (or 11  \hec5  
\hgx6 12  \hec5 with the initiative for  
White, Psakhis-Am.Rodriguez, Sochi  
1988 – Game 17) 11...\hgx6 12  \hdxf6+  
\hxf6 13  \hec3  \hff8 14  h3  \hdxf3 15  
\hxf3  \hhg7 16  c3  \wd7 17  \wdd3, and  
White’s two bishops give him a slight  
advantage (Spassky-Karpov, Belfort  
1988).

6...\hdxh6 7  c3  \wc7 8  \hec1f3  \hhg4 9  
\wbb3 e6 10  \hde5  \hdd6 11  \hgxg4  
\hxg4 12  h3  \hdxh6 13  \hhxh6? 0-0  
(after 13...\fxe6 14  \hdxh6  \wef7 15  
\hxh6 gxh6 16  0-0-0 the threat of 17  
\he1 puts the black king in danger)  
14  \hec4 \hde8+ 15  \hff1 and White is a  
pawn up (Benjamin-A.Fernandes,  

7  \hec1f3

Also possible is 7 \he2 c5 (or  
7...\hdd6 8  0-0  h6 9  \hec7 10  
\hdd3±) 8  0-0  h6 9  \hec3  a6 10  a4  
\cxd4 11  \hdxd4  \hdd6 12  \we2  \he7 with a  
complicated game (De Firmian-  

7  ...  h6
8 \( \text{Q}h3 \)

8 \( \text{Q}xf7 \) would appear to be insufficient for an advantage: 8...\( \text{Q}xf7 \) 9 \( \text{Q}e5+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 10 \( \text{W}d3 \) \( \text{Q}e7 \) 11 0–0 \( \text{Q}f5 \) 12 c3 \( \text{Q}d6 \) 13 \( \text{Q}g6 \) \( \text{Q}d7 \) 14 \( \text{Q}xh8 \) \( \text{W}xh8 \) with equal chances (Sherzer-Hill, Mamania 1991).

8 ... \( \text{Q}d6 \)

9 \( \text{W}e2 \) \( \text{Q}e7 \)

10 \( \text{Q}d2 \)

Or 10 \( \text{Q}f4 \) c5 11 dxc5 \( \text{W}a5+ \) 12 \( \text{Q}d2 \) \( \text{W}x5 \) 13 0–0–0 \( \text{Q}d7 \) 14 \( \text{Q}b3 \) \( \text{W}c7 \) 15 \( \text{Q}d3 \) \( \text{Q}e6 \) with equal chances (Arakhamia-Ledger, Hastings 1991/2).

Hübner-Karpov (Belfort 1988) now continued 10...\( \text{W}c7 \) 11 0–0–0 b5 12 \( \text{Q}d3 \) a6 13 \( \text{H}e1 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 14 g3 c5 15 dxc5 \( \text{W}x5 \), and here White could have retained somewhat the better chances by 16 \( \text{Q}f4 \)!?

4.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{Q}c3 \) dx4 4 \( \text{Q}xe4 \) \( \text{Q}d7 \) 5 \( \text{Q}g5 \) \( \text{Q}df6 \))

6 \( \text{Q}f3 \)

With this natural move White prevents 6...\( \text{h}6 \)? in view of 7 \( \text{Q}xf7 \)

\( \text{Q}xf7 \) 8 \( \text{Q}e5+ \) \( \text{e}6 \) (8...\( \text{e}8 \) 9 \( \text{Q}d3 \)\+)

9 \( \text{Q}c4+ \) \( \text{Q}d5 \) 10 \( \text{W}g4+ \).

6 ... \( \text{e}6 \)

Other possibilities must also be considered:

6...\( \text{Q}h6 \) 7 c3 \( \text{g}6 \) 8 \( \text{Q}c4 \) \( \text{Q}g7 \) 9 0–0 0–0 10 \( \text{H}e1 \) \( \text{Q}f5 \) 11 \( \text{Q}e5 \) \( \text{Q}d5 \) 12 \( \text{Q}gf3 \) \( \text{W}c7 \) 13 \( \text{Q}b3 \) \( \text{e}6 \)? (13...\( \text{b}6 \)\+)

14 \( \text{Q}c4 \) \( \text{Q}f6 \) 15 g4 \( \text{Q}e7 \) 16 \( \text{Q}f4 \) \( \text{W}a5 \) 17 \( \text{Q}c1 \) with a spatial advantage for White (Smirin-Smyslov, 55th USSR Ch 1988) – Game 19.

6...\( \text{Q}g4 \) 7 h3 (7 \( \text{Q}xf7 \) is insufficient: 7...\( \text{Q}xf3 \) 8 \( \text{Q}xd8 \) \( \text{Q}x1 \) 9 \( \text{Q}e6 \) \( \text{Q}h5 \) 10 \( \text{Q}c7+ \) \( \text{Q}d7 \)?) 7...\( \text{Q}xf3 \) 8 \( \text{Q}xf3 \) e6 9 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{Q}d6 \) 10 \( \text{Q}g2 \) \( \text{Q}e7 \) 11 0–0 0–0 12 \( \text{W}e2 \) \( \text{W}c7 \) 13 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 14 b3 \( \text{H}ad8 \) 15 \( \text{Q}b2 \) and White’s position is preferable (De Firmian-A.Fernandes, New York 1993).

7 \( \text{Q}e5 \)

In A.Sokolov-Spraggett (match (8), Saint John 1988) White played 7 \( \text{W}d3 \) \( \text{Q}d6 \) 8 \( \text{Q}e5 \) \( \text{Q}h6 \)? 9 \( \text{Q}d2 \) a5 and here after 10 \( \text{Q}e4 \) \( \text{Q}xe4 \) 11 \( \text{W}xe4 \) \( \text{Q}f5 \) 12 0–0–0 he could have gained the advantage. However, even after 8...\( \text{Q}xe5 \) 9 dxe5 \( \text{W}a5+ \) 10 \( \text{Q}d1 \)!! \( \text{W}xe5 \) 11 \( \text{W}d8 \) he can transpose into a superior ending.

7 ... \( \text{Q}h6 \)

8 \( \text{Q}d3 \) \( \text{Q}d6 \)

Or 8...\( \text{W}xd4 \) 9 \( \text{Q}xg7 \) \( \text{Q}xf7 \) 10 \( \text{Q}xf7 \) \( \text{b}4 \)? 11 c3 \( \text{Q}f8 \) (11...\( \text{x}c3 \) 12 bxc3 \( \text{W}c3 \) 13 \( \text{Q}d2 \) \( \text{W}d3 \) 14 \( \text{Q}xh8 \) \( \text{W}e4+ \) 15 \( \text{W}e2 \) 12 0–0 \( \text{W}d5 \) 13 cxb4 \( \text{H}xf7 \) 14 \( \text{W}e2 \) and White’s chances are better (Nunn).

9 c3 \( \text{W}c7 \)

10 \( \text{W}e2 \)
Also good is 10 \( \text{g}f3 \text{f}5 11 \text{e}2 \text{e}7 12 \text{g}5 \text{x}e5 13 \text{dxe}5 \text{d}7 14 \text{f}4 \text{c}5 15 \text{c}2 \text{h}6 16 \text{h}5 \) with an attacking position (Watson-Pedersen, Herning 1991).

\[10 \ldots \text{c}5\]

Or 10...0-0 11 \( \text{gf3 f}5 \) 12 \( \text{g}4 \text{e}7 13 \text{h}4 \) with an attack.

\[11 \text{b}5+ \text{e}7\]

11...\( \text{d}7 \) loses by force to 12 \( \text{xd}7 \text{xd}7 13 \text{dxc}5 \text{x}c5 14 \text{xe}6! \)

\[12 \text{b}0\]

White has the better chances (Nunn-Tal, Brussels 1988) – Game 20.

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**Game 17**

Psakhis-Am.Rodriguez

Sochi 1988

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 \( \text{d}2 \text{dxe}4\)
4 \( \text{xe}4 \text{d}7\)
5 \( \text{g}5 \text{df}6\)
6 \( \text{c}4 \text{d}5\)

6...e6 is sounder and more natural.

7 \( \text{f}3 \text{g}6\)
8 0-0 \( \text{g}7\)
9 \( \text{e}1 \) h6
10 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{g}4\)
11 c3 \( \text{gf}6\)
12 \( \text{c}5! \text{c}7\)
13 h3 \( \text{xf}3?!\)

A few moves later Black comes to regret this exchange. Stronger was 13...\( \text{f}5 \) 14 \( \text{e}5\).

14 \( \text{xf}3 \) 0-0
15 \( \text{b}3 \) b6
16 \( \text{d}3 \) b5
17 a4 a6

---

18 \( \text{xf}4!\)

A highly concrete move, based on the weakening of the a2-g8 diagonal, and in particular the g6 square.

18...\( \text{xf}4\)
19 \( \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{h}7\)

Against 19...e6 Psakhis had prepared a whole cascade of sacrifices:

20 \( \text{x}e6! \text{x}e6 21 \text{xf}e6+! \text{h}7 22 \text{gx}6! \text{fx}e8 23 \text{f}5 \text{x}e6 24 \text{e}5+ \text{h}8 25 \text{w}e6. \) But this theme is not yet exhausted.

20 \( \text{axb}5 \text{cxb}5\)

21 \( \text{xf7!} \text{xf7}\)
22 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{g}6! \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d8 \)
If 22...\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{g}6 \) there follows 23
\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d3+ \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g5 \) 24 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e5+ \).
23 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{a}6 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g8 \)
The knight is still taboo in view of
a mating attack: 23...\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{g}6 \) 24 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e4+! \)
\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g5 \) 25 \( h4+ \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}h5 \) 26 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}f5+ \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{h}4 \) 27
\( g3+ \).
24 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}f8 \)
25 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c6 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d5 \)
26 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e2 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d6 \)
27 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{b}5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c8 \)
28 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}b8 \)
29 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}a4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{b}2 \)
30 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{d}6 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{d}6 \)
31 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c4 \) 1–0

Game 18
De Firmian-Karpov
Biel 1990

1 \( e4 \) \( c6 \)
2 \( d4 \) \( d5 \)
3 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d2 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{e}4 \)
4 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{e}4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d7 \)
5 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d\text{f}6 \)
6 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c4 \) \( e6 \)
7 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e2 \) \( c5 \)
8 \( 0–0 \) \( h6 \)
9 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}f3 \) \( a6 \)
10 \( a4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{d}4 \)
11 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}\text{e}4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d6 \)
12 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e2 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e7 \)
13 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c7 \)
14 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d\text{f}3 \) 0–0
15 \( b3 \)

15 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}f4 \) can be met by 15...\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}\text{d}5 \)
16 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g3 \) b6 17 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}a\text{d}1 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}b7 \). A similar
manoeuvre is also possible after 15 a5
− 15...\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}\text{d}5 \) 16 c3 b5.

15...\( b6 \)
16 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}b2 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}b7 \)
17 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}a\text{d}1 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e5 \)
18 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d4 \)
18...\( b5! \)
The position is ripe for active
measures. With this pawn sacrifice
Karpov aims to take the initiative: 19
\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{b}5 \) \( a\text{xb}5 \) 20 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{b}5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}a\text{a}2 \) 21 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c4 \) e5.
19 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{d}5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{d}5 \)
20 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e7 \)
21 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}f\text{e}5 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}b7 \)
22 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{f}6+ \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{f}6 \)
23 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}h8 \)
24 \( c4 \) \( bxc4 \)
25 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d7? \)

An unjustified loss of time. 25 bxc4
\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c6 \) 26 a5 was essential.
25...\( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{b}2 \)
26 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}x\text{b}2 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}g8 \)
27 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}h4 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}h7 \)
28 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e5 \) \( cxb3 \)
29 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}e1 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c8 \)
30 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}d2 \) \( f5 \)
31 \( g4 \) \( g5 \)
32 \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}h3 \) \( \text{\textipa{\textls{-}}}c2 \)
0–1
Game 19
Smirin-Smyslov
55th USSR Ch 1988

1 e4             c6
2 d4              d5
3 Qd2             dxe4
4 Qxe4             Qd7
5 Qg5             Qd6
6 Qf3             Qb6

Here 6...e6 is considered the main continuation, but in his later years Smyslov does not think it advisable to engage in theoretical discussions with young players, and prefers paths that are little-explored.

7 c3             g6
8 Qc4             Qg7
9 0–0             0–0
10 Ae1             Qf5
11 Qe5             Qd5
12 Qgf3             Qc7
13 Qb3             e6?!

14 c4             Qf6
15 g4             Qe7
16 Qf4             Wa5

16...Wd8 was more circumspect.
17 Qc1!             b5?!

And here 17...c5 was more natural.
18 Qd2             Wd8
19 Qb4             bxc4
20 Qxc4             a5
21 Qa3!

Sensibly, Smirin is not tempted by the win of a pawn by 21 Qxe7 Wxe7 22 Qxc6 Wd6, since with the exchange of his dark-square bishop the weakened dark squares in White’s position would give Black more than sufficient compensation.

21 ...             Qa6?

Black underestimates the threats posed by the white bishops on adjacent diagonals. It is true that he was unable to block one of them by 21...Qfd5 on account of 22 Qxd5 cxd5 23 Ac6 Qxc6 24 Qxf8, when he has no compensation for the exchange, but with the ‘ugly’ 21...Qd7 he could have held on.
22 \( \text{xf7!} \) \( \text{xf7} \)
23 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{ed5} \)
24 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{aa7} \)
25 \( \text{xc6} \)

The simple 25 \( \text{xc6} \) was also good enough to win.

25 \ldots \( \text{df4} \)
26 \( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{xa6} \)
27 \( \text{xf7+} \) \( \text{h8} \)
28 \( \text{f3} \) 1–0

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**Game 20**

**Nunn-Tal**

**Brussels 1988**

1 \( e4 \) \( c6 \)
2 \( d4 \) \( d5 \)
3 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{dxe4} \)
4 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{d7} \)
5 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{df6} \)
6 \( \text{lf3} \) \( e6 \)
7 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{h6} \)
8 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{d6} \)
9 \( c3 \) \( \text{c7} \)
10 \( \text{e2} \) \( c5 \)
11 \( \text{b5+} \) \( \text{e7} \)

As mentioned in the analysis, 11...\( \text{d7} \)? loses to 12 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 13\( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 14 \( \text{xe6} \)!

12 0–0 \( \text{xd4?!} \)
12...a6 13 \( \text{d3} \) b6 14 \( f4 \pm \) would have been better.

13 \( \text{cxd4} \) \( \text{f5} \)
14 \( \text{e3!} \) \( \text{xe3} \)
15 \( \text{fxe3?} \)

White has a spatial advantage and

the more active pieces, but with this one move he makes the position obscure. As shown by Nunn, he should have activated his queen: 15 \( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{d5} \) 16 \( \text{g3} \) \( f6 \) 17 \( \text{e4!} \) \( \text{g8} \) 18 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 19 \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 20 \( \text{wh7} \).

15 \ldots \( \text{xe5} \)
16 \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \)
17 \( \text{wd3} \)

17 \ldots \( \text{wxg5?} \)

Suicidal, whereas after 17...a6! 18 \( \text{a3+} \) \( \text{d6} \) 19 \( \text{xd6+} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 20 \( \text{xf7+} \) \( \text{e7} \) 21 \( \text{xe8} \) \( \text{axb5} \) 22 \( g4 \) \( \text{d7} \) 23 \( g5 \) \( \text{hxh8} \) 24 \( \text{gxf6+} \) \( \text{gx6} \) Black had the chance to go into a sound enough ending (Nunn). But ‘on the way’ he could also have considered 22...g5!? 23 \( h4 \) \( \text{a4} \), not losing hope of winning the errant knight.

18 \( \text{a3+} \) \( \text{d8} \)
19 \( \text{ad1+} \) \( \text{d7} \)
20 \( \text{xd7} \) 1–0
PART II: 5 \( \text{c4} \)

5...\( \text{gf6} \) 6 \( \text{g5} \) e6 7 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b6} \)

But the modest exchange 6 \( \text{xf6} \) + \( \text{xf6} \) is also not so harmless. Now the developing 7 \( \text{f3} \) leads to positions examined in Chapter 9 after 5 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{gf6} \) 6 \( \text{xf6} \) + \( \text{xf6} \) 7 \( \text{c4} \). Of independent significance is 7 \( \text{c3} \), a continuation with which it is useful to be familiar.

An active development of this ishop, by which White retains a choice of deploying it on the a2-g8 and b1-h7 diagonals.

5 ... \( \text{gf6} \)

5...\( \text{df6} \) transposes after 6 \( \text{g5} \) to a variation examined in the previous chapter.

6 \( \text{g5} \)

The main continuation. Black cannot get by without playing ...\( \text{b6} \), which removes his control of e5, and, in contrast to the variations examined in Chapters 1-4, the white knight aims to occupy this square, where it will be supported by the other knight.

(a) 7...\( \text{wc7} \), and now:

(a1) 8 \( h3 \) \( \text{f5} \) 9 \( \text{f3} \) e6 10 0–0 \( \text{d6} \) 11 \( \text{e1} \) h6 12 \( \text{e2} \) 0–0–0 13 a4 g5 14 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d5} \) 15 a5 f6 16 \( \text{d3} \) h5, and Black’s action on the kingside proved more effective than his opponent’s on the other side of the board (Short-Adams, Groningen WC 1997);

(a2) 8 \( \text{b3} \) e6 9 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d6} \) 10 0–0 (10 \( \text{g5} \) allows Black to seize the initiative: 10...\( \text{d7} \) 11 0–0 \( \text{e4} \) 12 \( \text{h4} \) g5 13 \( \text{g3} \) g4 14 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 15}
\( \Box c4 \) (5... \( \Box gf6 \) 6 \( \Box g5 \) e6 7 \( \Box e2 \) \( \Box b6 \))

\( \Box f1 \) gxf3 16 \( \Box xe4 \) 0-0-0 17 g3 h5\textsuperscript{f}, Ermenkov-Lago, Palma de Mallorca 1989) 10...0-0 11 \( \Box e1 \) b6 12 \( \Box g5 \) \( \Box b7 \) 13 a4 c5 14 \( \Box xf6 \) \( \Box xf3 \) with equal chances (Bellin-Ostenstad, Gausdal 1990);

(a3) 8 \( \Box e2 \) \( \Box g4 \) 9 f3 \( \Box f5 \) 10 g4! \( \Box g6 \) 11 f4 \( \Box e4 \) 12 \( \Box f3 \) \( \Box d5 \) (or 12...e6 13 0-0 \( \Box xf3 \) 14 \( \Box xf3 \) \( \Box d6 \) 15 a4! \( \Box d5 \) 16 \( \Box d2 \) h5 17 g5 g6 18 a5 a6 19 \( \Box d3 \)! with a great spatial advantage for White, Kostyra-Sapis, Poland 1990) 13 \( \Box g1 \) h5 14 g5 \( \Box xc4 \) 15 \( \Box wc4 \) \( \Box d5 \) 16 \( \Box e5 \) and White's chances are preferable (Irzuibietal-F.Garcia, Spanish Ch 1991);

(b) 7...e6 8 \( \Box f3 \) \( \Box e7 \) 9 0-0 0-0 (here Smyslov has tried 9...b5?! 10 \( \Box d3 \) \( \Box b7 \) 11 \( \Box e2 \) 0-0 12 \( \Box g5 \) a6 13 \( \Box e5 \) \( \Box d5 \) 14 \( \Box d2 \) c5 15 dxc5 \( \Box xc5 \) with a double-edged game, Zhukovitsky-Smyslov, 37th USSR Ch 1969) 10 \( \Box e2 \) \( \Box c7 \) 11 \( \Box g5 \) (11 \( \Box e5 \) b6 12 \( \Box f4 \) \( \Box d6 \) 13 \( \Box g3 \) \( \Box b7 \) 14 \( \Box ad1 \) c5 15 dxc5 \( \Box xc5 \) 16 \( \Box xd6 \)\textsuperscript{f} is also good, Wittmann-Danner, Graz 1991 11...c5 (weaker is 11...\( \Box d5 \)?! 12 \( \Box xe7 \) \( \Box xe7 \) 13 \( \Box e5 \) \( \Box c7 \) 14 \( \Box e4 \)\textsuperscript{f}, Balashov-Smagin, Voronezh 1987) 12 \( \Box ad1 \), and here in Dimitrov-Guerra (Olot 1992), instead of 12...cxd4?! 13 \( \Box xd4 \) \( \Box d7 \) 14 \( \Box e5 \) with advantage to White, Black should have played 12...b6\textsuperscript{f};

(c) 7...g6 8 \( \Box f3 \) \( \Box g7 \) 9 0-0 0-0 10 \( \Box e1 \) (10 \( \Box f4 \) \( \Box g4 \) 11 h3 \( \Box xf3 \) 12 \( \Box xf3 \) \( \Box d5 \) 13 \( \Box g3 \) b5 14 \( \Box d3 \) e6 15 \( \Box e1 \) \( \Box d7 \) 16 h4 17 \( \Box e5 \)\textsuperscript{f}, Boe-Arkell, Ostende 1991) 10...\( \Box d5 \) 11 \( \Box g5 \) \( \Box e8 \) 12 \( \Box d2 \) \( \Box g4 \) 13 \( \Box e5 \)\textsuperscript{f} 14 \( \Box h6 \) \( \Box d6 \) 15 \( \Box xg7 \) \( \Box xg7 \) 16 \( \Box ad1 \). White's chances are preferable (J.Fernandez-Epishin, Logrono 1991).

6 ... \( \Box e6 \)

Blocking the diagonal by 6...\( \Box d5 \) involves a delay in development and allows White to build up a persistent initiative: 7 \( \Box f3 \) h6 (7...e6?! 8 \( \Box e5 \) \( \Box xe5 \) 9 dxe5\textsuperscript{f}) 8 \( \Box e4 \) \( \Box bd6 \) 9 \( \Box b3 \) (also possible is 9 \( \Box d3 \) \( \Box b4 \) 10 \( \Box e2 \) \( \Box f5 \) 11 a3 \( \Box xe4 \) 12 axb4 e6 13 c3 \( \Box d6 \) 14 0-0 \( \Box f6 \) 15 \( \Box d2 \) \( \Box f5 \) 16 f4 0-0 17 \( \Box f3 \)\textsuperscript{f}, Rychagov-Meduna, Manila OL 1992) 9...\( \Box f5 \) 10 \( \Box g3 \) \( \Box h7 \) 11 0-0 \( \Box e6 \) 12 \( \Box e5 \) \( \Box d7 \) 13 f4?! (also good is 13 c4 \( \Box sf6 \) 14 \( \Box f4 \) \( \Box e7 \) 15 \( \Box c2 \) \( \Box x c2 \) 17 \( \Box xc2 \) h5 18 f5 with the better chances for White (Gazik-Meduna, Stary Smokovec 1992) 13...\( \Box c7 \) 14 \( \Box sf6 \) 15 \( \Box h1 \) \( \Box e7 \) 16 \( \Box c2 \) \( \Box x c2 \) 17 \( \Box xc2 \) h5 18 f5 with the better chances for White (Gazik-Meduna, Stary Smokovec 1992).

7 \( \Box e2 \)

White prevents his knight from being driven away (7...h6? 8 \( \Box xf7 \)?) and takes control of e5.
Developing by 7 \( \textcopyright f3 \) allows Black to drive back the other knight to \( \textcopyright e2 \), which assists his attack on the centre: 7...h6 8 \( \textcopyright h3 \) b5 9 \( \textcopyright e2 \) c5 10 \( \textcopyright f3 \) h7 11 a6 a4 b4 12 \( \textcopyright f4 \) d6 13 dxc5 \( \textcopyright x c5 \) 14 \( \textcopyright d3 \) \( \textcopyright x d3 \) 15 \( \textcopyright x d3 \) c7 and Black’s position is preferable SchmittDie-Podgaets, Dortmund 1993).

7 \( \textcopyright e2 \) h6 8 \( \textcopyright f3 \) has the same drawbacks:

(a) 8...\( \textcopyright d6 \) 9 0–0 (or 9 \( \textcopyright f4 \) \( \textcopyright x f4 \) \( \textcopyright x f4 \) 0 \( \textcopyright x f4 \) c7 11 \( \textcopyright d3 \) b5 12 \( \textcopyright b3 \) c5 13 \( \textcopyright x c5 \) \( \textcopyright x c5 \) 14 dxc5 \( \textcopyright x c5 \) =. Miladinovic-Markovic, Cetinje 1990)

(b) 8...c5 9 0–0 \( \textcopyright b6 \) 10 \( \textcopyright b5+ \) \( \textcopyright d7 \) 11 a4 a6 12 \( \textcopyright x d7+ \) \( \textcopyright b x d7 \) 13 \( \textcopyright x d4 \) 14 \( \textcopyright e x d4 \) \( \textcopyright c5 \) with equal chances (Couppe-Spiridonov, Cannes 1992).

7...

7...\( \textcopyright e7 \)!! (preparing queenside castling) was tried in the game Stein-Flohr (Ukrainian Ch 1957). After 8 \( \textcopyright d2 \) b6 9 0–0–0 \( \textcopyright b7 \) 10 \( \textcopyright f3 \) h6 (if 10...0–0–0 11 \( \textcopyright e5 \) with a strong initiative), instead of 11 \( \textcopyright b4 \)? c5! with great complications, White could have retained a positional advantage by 11 \( \textcopyright e4 \).

Now White’s main replies are 8 \( \textcopyright d3 \) (Chapters 5 and 6) and 8 \( \textcopyright b3 \) (Chapters 7 and 8).
5: 8 \( \text{d3} \) h6 9 \( \text{f5} \) f3 c5 10 dxc5 \( \text{x} \text{c5} \)

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This bishop retreat has a tactical basis: 8...\( \text{w} \text{x} \text{d} \text{d} \text{4} \)! 9 \( \text{a} \text{l} \text{f} \text{3} \) \( \text{w} \text{d} \text{5} \) 10 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \)! \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{g} \text{2} \) 11 \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{1} \) \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{7} \) 12 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{f} \text{3} \) \( \text{w} \text{g} \text{4} \) 13 \( \text{e} \text{x} \text{f} \text{7} \) with a dangerous attack for White (Arnason-Helmers, Reykjavik 1982).

8 ... h6

It is best to drive away the active knight as soon as possible. Risky is 8...c5?! 9 dxc5 \( \text{xc} \text{c} \text{5} \) 10 \( \text{a} \text{l} \text{f} \text{3} \) h6 (or 10...\( \text{w} \text{c} \text{7} \) 11 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) 0–0 12 \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{4} \) \( \text{b} \text{4} \) + 13 \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{1} \) \( \text{b} \text{d} \text{5} \) 14 \( \text{g} \text{g} \text{3} \) \( \text{d} \text{6} \) 15 c4 \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{4} \) 16 \( \text{g} \text{g} \text{4} \) ±, Kupreichik-Tamme, Parnu 1975) 11 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{4} \) \( \text{e} \text{x} \text{e} \text{4} \) 12 \( \text{e} \text{x} \text{e} \text{4} \) \( \text{w} \text{d} \text{5} \) 13 \( \text{w} \text{g} \text{4} \) g6 14 0–0 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{7} \) 15 \( \text{e} \text{d} \text{1} \) \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{6} \) 16 \( \text{w} \text{h} \text{4} \) \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{7} \) 17 \( \text{g} \text{g} \text{5} \) \( \text{g} \text{g} \text{8} \) 18 \( \text{e} \text{x} \text{e} \text{7} \) \( \text{e} \text{x} \text{e} \text{7} \) 19 \( \text{w} \text{f} \text{6} \) \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{8} \) 20 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) \( \text{w} \text{c} \text{5} \) 21 \( \text{e} \text{x} \text{g} \text{6} \) \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{5} \) 22 \( \text{e} \text{b} \text{5} \) + 1–0 (Rublevsky-Tataev, Azov 1991).

9 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) f3 c5

9...\( \text{e} \text{e} \text{7} \) 10 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{2} \) \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{d} \text{5} \) 11 0–0–0 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{7} \) is passive. However, if White tries to force matters by 12 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \), then after 12...\( \text{e} \text{x} \text{e} \text{5} \) 13 dxe5 \( \text{w} \text{c} \text{7} \) 14 f4 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{7} \) 15 \( \text{g} \text{f} \text{3} \) 0–0 0–0 16 a3 c5 17 c4 \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{6} \) 18 \( \text{a} \text{a} \text{5} \) \( \text{a} \text{a} \text{4} \) Black equalises (Kupreichik-Smyslov, Moscow 1972).

More subtle is 12 a3!, and after 13 c4 White gains an enduring advantage.

10 dxc5

The main continuation.

The attempt to defend the pawn by 10 \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{3} \) allows Black to exchange this bishop: 10...a6 11 c3 \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{d} \text{5} \) 12 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) \( \text{c} \text{c} \text{7} \) (or 12...\( \text{c} \text{x} \text{d} \text{4} \) 13 \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{d} \text{4} \) \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{4} \) 14 \( \text{w} \text{f} \text{3} \) \( \text{d} \text{x} \text{d} \text{3} \) 15 \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{d} \text{3} \) b5?! 16 \( \text{d} \text{e} \text{2} \) \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{7} \) 17 \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{4} \) ±, Hellers-Rogers, Malme 1993; 15...\( \text{a} \text{d} \text{6} \) 16 \( \text{g} \text{f} \text{3} \) ± was essential) 13 \( \text{g} \text{f} \text{3} \) b6 14 0–0 \( \text{a} \text{d} \text{6} \) 15 \( \text{a} \text{c} \text{1} \), and here in Hellers-Adorjan (Thessaloniki OL 1988) Black could have maintained the balance by 15...\( \text{e} \text{x} \text{e} \text{3} \) 16 \( \text{f} \text{x} \text{e} \text{3} \) \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{7} \) 17 e4 0–0. Therefore 15 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{2} \) ± would have been more accurate.

After 10 \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{4} \) the bishop again comes under attack by the knight: 10...\( \text{b} \text{d} \text{5} \) (if 10...\( \text{c} \text{x} \text{d} \text{4} \) 11 0–0 0–0 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{5} \) 12 \( \text{b} \text{b} \text{1} \) \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{7} \) 13 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{6} \) 14 \( \text{g} \text{f} \text{3} \) White has a dangerous initiative) 11 \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) \( \text{c} \text{x} \text{d} \text{4} \) 12 0–0 0–0 \( \text{w} \text{a} \text{5} \)
13 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{c}c4}} (13 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{d}d4?! \textbf{\textit{w}xa2 14 c4}} comes into consideration, with the initiative for the pawn) 13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c}c3 14 bxc3 \textbf{\textit{w}a3+ 15 \textbf{\textit{b}b1 dxc3 16 \textbf{\textit{b}b5+ \textbf{\textit{d}d7 17 \textbf{\textit{c}xc3 \textbf{\textit{w}xc3}} with equal chances (Gipslis-Marovic, Tallinn 1975).}}}}}

\textbf{10 ... \textbf{\textit{a}xc5}}

The other main continuation 10...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b}d7}} is examined in Chapter 6.

11 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{e}e5}}

White puts into effect the main idea of the \textit{\textbf{\textsc{g}g5}} move. After 12 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{g}f3}} and kingside castling, in a quiet position he will be able to count on an enduring initiative, based on the pressure of the knight at e5.

If 11 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{d}d2}}, planning queenside castling, White has to reckon with counterplay on that side of the board:

(a) 11...0–0 12 0–0–0 \textbf{\textit{a}a4}, with the idea of 13 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{x}h6 \textbf{\textit{w}b6 14 \textbf{\textit{w}e5 \textbf{\textit{w}xb2+}}}}, while after 13 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{b}b5 \textbf{\textit{d}d7 14 \textbf{\textit{c}xc7 \textbf{\textit{w}xc7}}}} (Kir.Georgiev-Adams, Groningen 1993) Black’s chances are preferable, since 15 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{x}h6 \textbf{\textit{c}c6 16 \textbf{\textit{e}e3 \textbf{\textit{w}b6 17 c3 \textbf{\textit{c}xc3+ 18 fxe3 \textbf{\textit{ac8}}}} rebounds on White;}}}

(b) 11...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{w}c7 12 0–0–0 0–0 13 \textbf{\textit{c}c5 \textbf{\textit{d}d7}} (the slow 13...\textbf{\textit{b}d7 14 f4 b6 15 \textbf{\textit{g}f3 \textbf{\textit{b}b7 16 \textbf{\textit{h}he1 \textbf{\textit{d}d6 17 \textbf{\textit{d}d4! a6 18 \textbf{\textit{b}b3 \textbf{\textit{d}d5 19 \textbf{\textit{b}b1 a5 20 g4}} allows White to get his attack in first, Oratovsky-Fridman, Israel 1993)) 14 \textbf{\textit{g}f3 \textbf{\textit{f}c8 15 g4 \textbf{\textit{e}e7 16 g5 \textbf{\textit{h}xg5 17 \textbf{\textit{x}g5 \textbf{\textit{b}b5 18 \textbf{\textit{f}4? \textbf{\textit{x}d3 19 \textbf{\textit{x}d3 \textbf{\textit{f}d5 20 \textbf{\textit{f}f3 \textbf{\textit{xf4 0–1}} (A.Ivanov-Karpov, Moscow 1992).}}}}}}}}}

11 ... \textit{\textbf{\textsc{b}d7}}

12 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{g}f3}}

Black’s main replies are 12...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{w}c7 (5.1)} and 12...\textbf{\textit{c}xe5 (5.2).}}

\textbf{5.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textbf{\textit{c}c3 dxe4 4 \textbf{\textit{x}xe4 \textbf{\textit{d}d7 5 \textbf{\textit{c}c4 \textbf{\textit{g}f6 6 \textbf{\textit{g}g5 \textbf{\textit{e}e6 7 \textbf{\textit{w}e2 \textbf{\textit{b}b6 8 \textbf{\textit{d}d3 \textbf{\textit{h}6 9 \textbf{\textit{f}f3 \textbf{\textit{c}c5 10 dxc5 \textbf{\textit{c}xc5 11 \textbf{\textit{e}e5 \textbf{\textit{bd7 12 \textbf{\textit{g}f3 \textbf{\textit{c}c7}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

\textbf{5.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textbf{\textit{c}c3 dxe4 4 \textbf{\textit{x}xe4 \textbf{\textit{d}d7 5 \textbf{\textit{c}c4 \textbf{\textit{g}f6 6 \textbf{\textit{g}g5 \textbf{\textit{e}e6 7 \textbf{\textit{w}e2 \textbf{\textit{b}b6 8 \textbf{\textit{d}d3 \textbf{\textit{h}6 9 \textbf{\textit{f}f3 \textbf{\textit{c}c5 10 dxc5 \textbf{\textit{c}xc5 11 \textbf{\textit{e}e5 \textbf{\textit{bd7 12 \textbf{\textit{g}f3 \textbf{\textit{c}c7}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

\textbf{12 ... \textbf{\textit{w}c7}}

\textbf{Black fights for control of e5.}

Here White’s main plans are associated with 13 0–0 (5.11) and 13 \textbf{\textit{f}f4 (5.12)}, since the attack on his central knight prevents the plan with queenside castling: 13 \textbf{\textit{d}d2? \textbf{\textit{xe5 14 \textbf{\textit{x}e5 \textbf{\textit{xf2+! 15 \textbf{\textit{x}f2 \textbf{\textit{w}xe5 16 \textbf{\textit{w}xe5 \textbf{\textit{g}g4+, and White loses a pawn (Suetin-Kholmov, Budapest 1976).}}}}}}}}}

\textbf{5.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textbf{\textit{c}c3 dxe4 4 \textbf{\textit{x}xe4 \textbf{\textit{d}d7 5 \textbf{\textit{c}c4 \textbf{\textit{g}f6 6 \textbf{\textit{g}g5 \textbf{\textit{e}e6 7 \textbf{\textit{w}e2 \textbf{\textit{b}b6 8 \textbf{\textit{d}d3 \textbf{\textit{h}6 9 \textbf{\textit{f}f3 \textbf{\textit{c}c5 10 dxc5 \textbf{\textit{c}xc5 11 \textbf{\textit{e}e5 \textbf{\textit{bd7 12 \textbf{\textit{g}f3 \textbf{\textit{c}c7}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

\textbf{13 0–0}
13 ... 0-0

It is important not to overdo the pressure on e5, since after 13...d6?! 14 c4 e7 15 d4! Black may not manage to castle, as 15...0-0 is met by the unpleasant 16 f5! At the same time b5 is threatened, and if 15...a6 there follows 16 xxe6! (this is where the weakening move ...h7-h6 tells), while after 15...c5 16 b5 wb8 17 d1 White's pressure is too great (Gufeld-Bagirov, Tallinn 1981) – Game 21.

14 xe1

White strengthens his control over e5. In the event of 14 f4 d6 it is easier for Black to attack the knight, e.g. 15 h3 xxe5 16 xe5 xe5 17 xe5 d7! (weaker is 17...d8?! 18 ae1 we7 19 f4+, Martin-Ledger, British Ch 1992) 18 f4 wb6+ 19 h2 xb2, although after 20 d1 White has compensation for the pawn (Martin).

Also insufficient for an advantage is 14 d2 d6 (or 14...xe5 15 xe5 d4=) 15 xd7 xd7 16 ae1 fd8 17 e5 b5! with equal chances (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (7), Linares 1987).

14 ... d6

Exchanging a pair of knights does not ease Black’s problems: 14...xe5 15 xe5 d8 16 f4 b6 17 g3 d6 18 ad1 b7 19 c3 ac8 20 b1 d5 21 d4 c5 22 g4 we7 23 xf6+ xf6 24 xe5 with advantage to White, who controls the important central squares (Sznajdik-Spiridonov, Polanica Zdroj 1982).

After 14...b6 15 xd7:

(a) 15...xd7 16 we4 df6 17 xa8 (or 17 wh4) 17...b7 18 xa7 a8 19 xa8+ with advantage to White;

(b) 15...xd7 16 e5 c6 (if 16...fd8 17 f3) 17 xc6 (17 df4!? fd8 18 g3 d6 19 ad1 b7 20 c3± also comes into consideration) 17...xc6 18 f4 and White retains the initiative (Ivanchuk-Karpov, Reykjavik 1991) – Game 22.

15 c4

15 f4 can be met by 15...xe5 (15...h5?! 16 ad2 c5 17 c4 f6! also comes into consideration) 16 xe5 b6 17 f3 b7 18 wh3 fd8 19 ad1 e4 20 xe4 xe4 with equal chances (Barlov-Radulov, Belgrade 1982).

15 ... e7

16 e5

Or 16 d4 c5 with equal chances (Minasian-Vyzhmanavin, Debrecen 1992) – Game 23.

Izeta-Karpov (Dos Hermanas 1993) now continued 16...c5 17 c4 a6
18 a3 b5 19 \( \text{a2} \) \( \text{b7} \) 20 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d4} \) Mad8 22 c3 \( \text{c5} \) with equal chances.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
5.12 (1 \text{e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxe4} \\
4 \text{dxe4 d7} 5 \text{c4 gf6} 6 \text{g5} \\
\text{e6 7 w2 \( \text{b6} \) 8 d3 h6 9 g3} \\
c5 10 dxc5 \text{xc5} 11 \text{e5 bd7} \\
12 \text{gf3 w7})
\end{array}
\]

13 \( \text{f4} \)

14 \( \text{d2} \)

After 14 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{d6} \) 15 \( \text{g3} \) 0–0 16 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 17 \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{d8} \) 18 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{g3} \) 19 hgx3 \( \text{d7} \) (in the mutual flank attacks after 19...b5?! 20 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{b7} \) 21 \( \text{e1} \) b4 22 g4 it is White who gets there first: 22...\( \text{d4} \) 23 g5 hgx5 \\
24 \( \text{g6} \) \( \text{h7} \) 25 \( \text{hxh7} \) 25 \( \text{e} \) 7 1–0, Popovic-Kosic, Novi Sad 1992) 20 \( \text{w5} \) \( \text{ac8} \) the chances are equal (Timman-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988).

14 \ldots \( \text{x} \) \( \text{d2}+ \)

15 \( \text{xd2} \) 0–0

16 \( \text{hd1} \) \( \text{d5} \)

The active 16...\( \text{wb6} \) was tried in the 1993 FIDE World Championship Match, Timman-Karpov. It proved justified only after 17 \( \text{c4}?! \) \( \text{c5} \) 18 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d5} \) (game 1), but after 17 \( \text{c1!} \) \( \text{d5} \) 18 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{c5} \) 19 \( \text{c4} \) (game 3) White’s position was preferable.

But then an improvement was found: 16...\( \text{c5} \) 17 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{d5} \) 18 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xd3+} \) 19 \( \text{xd3} \) b5! with equal chances (game 7).

17 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xe5} \)

17...\( \text{c7f6} \) can also be considered.

18 \( \text{xe5} \)

18 \( \text{xe5} \) is stronger.

18 \ldots \( \text{wa5}+ \)

19 \( \text{c1} \) \( \text{f6} \)

20 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d7} \)

21 c4 \( \text{d4} \)

If 21...\( \text{ac8} \) White gains the advantage by 22 \( \text{c2!} \) \( \text{b6} \) 23 b3.

22 \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{a4} \)

23 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{ad8}! \)

The chances are equal (Topalov-Adams, Belgrade 1995).
5.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ¤c3 dxe4 4 ¤xe4 ¤d7 5 ¤c4 ¤gf6 6 ¤g5 e6 7 ªe2 ªb6 8 ¤d3 h6 9 ¤f3 c5 10 dxc5 ¤xc5 11 ¤e5 ¤bd7 12 ¤gf3)

12 . . .  ¦xe5
13  ¦xe5

The exchange of knights makes things more difficult for Black, since it allows White strong piece pressure in the centre, enhancing his attacking chances.

13 . . . 0–0

Here 13...ªc7 allows White to gain the advantage of the two bishops in an open position. This is especially appreciable in an ending, since he has the possibility of creating an outside passed pawn on the queenside: 14 ²b5+! ²d7 (if 14...²d7 there follows 15 ²f4, not fearing 15...²b4+ in view of the possible typical combination with the sacrifice of both rooks: 16 c3! ²xc3+ 17 bxc3 ²xc3+ 18 ²d2 ²xa1+ 19 ²e2 ²xh1 20 ²xd7+ and White wins) 15 0–0 0–0 (15...²xb5 16 ²xb5+ ²e7 comes into consideration) 16 ²xd7 ²xd7 17 c3 and White’s chances are preferable (Blatny-Adams, Adelaide 1988) – Game 24.

14 ²d2

Preparing the option of castling on both sides. If 14 0–0 Black has the good reply 14...b6!:

(a) 15 ²f3 ²c7 16 ²f4 ²b7 17 ²g4 ²xf3 18 ²xf6+ ²xf6 19 ²xc7 ²b7 with an equal game (Hübner-Lobron, Biel 1986);

(b) 15 ²d1 ²e7 (also possible is 15...²c7 16 ²g4 ²xg4 17 ²xg4 f5 with a complicated game) 16 b4 ²d6 (16...²xb4? 17 ²c6 ²c5 18 ²xb4 ²xb4 19 ²f3±) 17 ²b2 ²b7 18 a3 ²fd8 19 c4 a5 20 b5 ²ac8 and the chances are again equal (Filip).

14 . . . ²d5

Here both ways of castling are possible: 15 0–0–0 (5.21) and 15 0–0 (5.22), although they both involve a pawn sacrifice.

If White avoids castling with 15 f4 b5! 16 ²e3 ²xe3 17 ²xe3 ²b7 18 ²g1 ²fd8 19 g4 ²e4 Black gains equal chances (Tarjan-Rogoff, USA 1985).

5.21 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ¤c3 dxe4 4 ¤xe4 ¤d7 5 ¤e4 ¤gf6 6 ¤g5 e6 7 ªe2 ªb6 8 ¤d3 h6 9 ¤f3 c5 10 dxc5 ¤xc5 11 ¤e5 ¤bd7 12 ¤gf3 ¤xe5 11 ¤e5 0–0 14 ²d2 ²d5)

15 0–0
15 \ldots \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}d4}

Or 15...\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}b5} 16 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}h1} \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}b7} 17 \textit{\textbf{\textfleur}} f4 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}b4} 18 a3 a5 19 axb4 axb4 20 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}d1 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}d8, and here in Mestel-Speelman (Bath 1987) White could have begun an attack with 21 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e1\textsuperscript{!} \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}a2} 22 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}h4 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e7 23 f5.

16 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}f4

The alternative is 16 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}f3} \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}xb2} 17 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}b1 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}a3 18 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c3 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e7 19 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}fd1} \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}c6} 20 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e5 with a strong initiative for the pawn.

16 \ldots \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}xb2}

17 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}ab1!

This is stronger than 17 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}d1 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}c5} 18 c4 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}d4} 19 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b1 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}b6} 20 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}d3 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b7 (20...\textit{\textbf{\textknight}}a6?! 21 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}g3 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e8!\textsuperscript{!} is also good) 21 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}g3 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}ad8\textsuperscript{!} 22 h3 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}fe8}! 23 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c2 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}f8, when Black defends successfully (Khalifman-Tukmakov, 54th USSR Ch 1987).

17 \ldots \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}d4

17...\textit{\textbf{\textknight}}xe5? is weak: 18 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}xe5 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}d7} 19 \textit{\textbf{\textepee}}b5 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}c6} 20 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}xg7\textsuperscript{!} with a strong attack.

Shtengelas-Sokolin (USSR 1987) now continued 18 c4 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}d8} 19 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}fd1}

\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}e7} 20 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c2 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b6 21 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}f3} \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c7 22 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}h3}\textsuperscript{!} with an attack for White.

5.22 (e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c3 dxe4 4 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}xe4} \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}d7} 5 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c4 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}gf6} 6 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}g5} e6 7 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}e2} \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b6 8 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}d3 h6 9 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}f3} c5 10 dx\textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c5 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c5 11 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e5 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}bd7} 12 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}gf3} \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}xe5} 13 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}xe5} 0–0 14 \textit{\textbf{\textdagger}d2} \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}d5})

15 0–0–0

A double-edged plan, which has hitherto been insufficiently explored by the top players.

15 \ldots \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}xa2}

16 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}c3} \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}b5}

In Gaprindashvili-Zaitseva (Tbilisi 1979) Black played 16...\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}a1}+? 17 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c2 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}a4}+ 18 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b1 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}b8} 19 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}c2 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}a6} 20 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}f3} b5 21 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}xh6 b4 22 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}xg7 and lost.

Also inadequate is 16...\textit{\textbf{\textknight}}a3 17 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}e3 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}a1}+ 18 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b1, when White’s attack is more of a reality.

17 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b1!

This is stronger than 17 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}xh6 \textit{\textbf{\textknight}}b7 (17...gxh6? loses after 18 \textit{\textbf{\textdollar}f3} b4 19
8 \textit{d}3 h6 9 \textit{\Delta}5f3 c5 10 dxc5 \textit{\Delta}xc5

\textit{\Delta}b1 \textit{w}a1 20 \textit{w}g3+ \textit{h}8 21 \textit{\Delta}d8!, Bielchik-Sabolshi, Kikinda 1983) 18
\textit{\Delta}d7 \textit{\Delta}xd7 19 \textit{w}g4 \textit{w}a1+ 20 \textit{b}1 g6
21 \textit{\Delta}xd7 \textit{a}3, and now:
(a) 22 bxa3 \textit{wx}c3+ 23 \textit{\Delta}d1 \textit{f}d8
24 \textit{\Delta}d2 \textit{w}a1! 25 \textit{e}2 \textit{w}e5+ 26 \textit{\Delta}d1
\textit{w}a1, forcing a repetition of position
(Chandler-Speeeman, Brighton 1984);
(b) 22 \textit{\Delta}d2 – \textit{Game} 25 (Adorjan-
Flesch, Hungarian Ch 1975).

17 ... \textit{w}a4

Including the queen in the defence
in the event of 18 \textit{\Delta}d3 \textit{w}h4! 19 h3
\textit{b}7 20 \textit{\Delta}d7 \textit{f}d8 21 \textit{\Delta}xf6+ \textit{wx}f6,
when Black’s chances are preferable
(Reimann-Oll, Tallinn 1986).

If 17...\textit{w}a1 there naturally follows
18 \textit{\Delta}xh6!

18 \textit{\Delta}f3! \textit{\Delta}d5
19 \textit{w}g3 \textit{\Delta}h8
20 \textit{\Delta}he1! \textit{b}4

20...\textit{\Delta}f6?? loses to 21 \textit{\Delta}xh6 gxh6
22 \textit{\Delta}d8! \textit{\Delta}g4 23 \textit{\Delta}xf7+ \textit{\Delta}g7 24 \textit{\Delta}e4
1-0 (Diaz-Sieiro, Camaguey 1987).

21 \textit{\Delta}e4! \textit{\Delta}e7

Not 21...\textit{\Delta}b7?? on account of 22
\textit{\Delta}xh6 gxh6 23 \textit{\Delta}h4.

22 \textit{\Delta}g4 g5

Or 22...\textit{\Delta}f6 23 \textit{\Delta}d3!

23 \textit{b}4!

White has a strong attack (Gug-

13 ... \textit{\Delta}d6?!

An imperceptible inaccuracy, the
drawbacks of which were disclosed in
this game. 13...0-0 is the main
continuation.

14 \textit{\Delta}c4 \textit{\Delta}e7
15 \textit{\Delta}d4! \textit{\Delta}e5
16 \textit{\Delta}b5 \textit{\Delta}b8

After 16...\textit{\Delta}d8 17 \textit{\Delta}d1! a knight
nevertheless penetrates to d6:
17...\textit{\Delta}xd3 18 \textit{\Delta}xd3 \textit{\Delta}d5 19 \textit{\Delta}cd6+!
\textit{\Delta}xd6 20 \textit{\Delta}xd5, securing White the
advantage.

17 \textit{\Delta}d1 \textit{\Delta}d7
18 a4! \textit{a}6
19 \textit{\Delta}d4 \textit{\Delta}c7
20 \textit{\Delta}e5!
The knight has triumphantly returned to e5 – White’s positional advantage is obvious.

20 \( \text{d}x\text{d}3 \)
21 \( \text{a}x\text{d}3 \)
22 \( \text{f}4 \)
23 \( \text{a}d1 \)
24 \( \text{w}h5! \)

Preventing 24...0–0, where there follows 25 \( \text{x}x\text{h}6! \) \( \text{f}6 \) 26 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 27 \( \text{g}3 \), with an attack and an extra pawn for White.

24 \( ... \)
25 \( \text{f}3 \)
26 \( \text{g}3 \)
27 \( \text{c}3! \)

Preventing b2-b4, which was possible after 27...\( \text{f}6 \) 28 b4! \( \text{d}5 \) 29 \( \text{d}c6 \) with advantage to White. But now he is able to make a decisive invasion at b5.

28 \( \text{b}5 \)
29 \( \text{c}4 \)
30 \( \text{x}d8+ \)
31 \( \text{x}f4 \)
32 \( \text{d}3 \)
33 \( \text{d}6+ \)

14 \( ... \)
14...\( \text{d}6 \) is more active.

15 \( \text{d}7 \)
16 \( \text{e}5 \)
17 \( \text{c}6 \)
18 \( \text{f}4 \)

Black can consider 18...\( \text{b}4 \) 19 c3 \( \text{e}7 \) 20 \( \text{a}d1 \) \( \text{a}4!? \), fighting for the d-file: 21 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{a}d8 \) (Karpov).
19 \textit{e}d1 \textit{d}d6  \\
20 \textit{d}d2 \textit{c}c7  \\
21 \textit{g}3 \textit{c}c6  \\
21\ldots \textit{e}e7?! 22 \textit{c}c3 \textit{d}d5 23 \textit{c}c4  \\
\textit{c}c5 was more subtle (Karpov).  \\
22 a3 \textit{e}e7  \\
23 \textit{c}c3  \\
White has a classic advantage, first formulated by Steinitz — a pawn majority on the queenside and the possibility of creating there an outside passed pawn. Therefore in the spirit of the position was 23 \textit{c}4! \textit{a}a4 (or 23\ldots a5 24 \textit{c}c3 a4 25 \textit{c}c2 \textit{c}c8 26 \textit{d}d4\textsuperscript{=}) 24 \textit{c}c1 \textit{c}c8 25 \textit{f}f3 \textit{h}h8 26 \textit{f}f1 with the idea of continuing b2-b3 and \textit{b}b2, when White’s chances are preferable.  \\
23 \ldots \textit{c}c7  \\
24 \textit{e}e5 \textit{d}d6  \\
25 \textit{c}c3  \\
Insufficient is 25 \textit{xf}6 \textit{gxf}6 26 \textit{g}4+ \textit{h}h8 27 \textit{d}d4 \textit{e}e7 28 \textit{h}h4 \textit{g}7 29 \textit{g}4+ \textit{h}h8 30 \textit{h}h5 \textit{g}7 31 \textit{xe}6 \textit{xd}3! with equal chances (Karpov).  \\
25 \ldots \textit{e}e7  \\
26 \textit{c}c4  \\
Here too White could have tried to use his queenside pawn majority: 26 \textit{f}3?! \textit{d}d7 27 \textit{b}b4 \textit{f}f6 28 \textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 29 \textit{c}c4.  \\
26 \ldots \textit{c}c6  \\
27 \textit{d}d3 \textit{xd}3  \\
28 \textit{xd}3 \textit{d}d8  \\
29 \textit{d}d1 \textit{d}5  \\
30 \textit{f}f3 b5  \\
Black has finally managed to equalise.  \\
31 \textit{e}e1 \textit{d}d7  \\
32 \textit{e}e5 \textit{f}f8!  \\
33 \textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5  \\
34 \textit{e}e4 \textit{f}5  \\
35 \textit{d}d4 a6  \\
36 \textit{d}d2 \textit{e}e7!  \\
37 \textit{e}e5 \textit{f}f6  \\
38 \textit{b}b8+ \textit{f}f7  \\
39 \textit{a}a8 \textit{d}d6  \\
40 b3 \textit{c}c3  \\
It is useful to exchange the dark-square bishops, but it was better to do this by 40...\textit{g}5! 41 \textit{xe}5 \textit{hx}e5, when the initiative passes to Black.  \\
41 \textit{xe}3 \textit{xc}3  \\
42 \textit{c}c8 \textit{d}d5
If 16 \( \text{Qc}e5 \) Black can return his bishop to d6 or else play 16...\( \text{Qc}5 \).

16 \ldots \( \text{Qc}5 \)
17 \( \text{Qb}5 \) \( \text{Wd}8 \)
18 \( \text{Qd}1 \) \( \text{Qd}7 \)
19 a4?! 

19 \( \text{Qc}3 \) was stronger.

19 \ldots \( \text{a}6 \)
20 \( \text{Qc}3 \)
20 \( \text{Qbd}6 \) can be met by 20...\( \text{Qd}5! ? \).

20 \ldots \( \text{Wc}7 \)
21 \( \text{Qe}5 \) \( \text{Qfd}8 \)
22 \( \text{Qf}4 \) \( \text{Qe}8 \)
23 \( \text{Qg}3 \) \( \text{Qxd}3 \)
24 \( \text{Qxd}3 \) \( \text{Qxd}3 \)
25 \( \text{Qxd}3 \) \( \text{Wc}4 \)
26 h3 \( \text{Qc}8 \)
27 \( \text{Qe}1 ? \)

This loses a pawn in an already equal position. 27 \( \text{Qe}5 \) was correct, occupying the key square in his variation.

15 \( \text{Qc}4 \)

If 15 \( \text{Qf}4 \) White has to reckon with 15...\( \text{Qh}5 ! ? \) 16 \( \text{Qd}2 \) \( \text{Qc}5 \).

15 \ldots \( \text{Qe}7 \)
16 \( \text{Qd}4 \)

15 \ldots \( \text{Qe}7 \)
16 \( \text{Qd}4 \)

27 \ldots \( \text{Qb}4! \)
28 \( \text{Qf}3 \) \( \text{Qxc}3 \)
29 \( \text{Wxc}3 \) \( \text{Wxc}3 \)
30 bxc3 \( \text{Qe}4 \)
31 $\text{Be}5$  $f6$
32 $\text{Bd}4$  $Axc3$
33 $\text{Bxc3}$  $Bxc3$
34 $\text{a}2$  $a5$
35 $\text{Bf}1$  $Bc4$
36 $\text{Bb}2$  $Bc6$
37 $\text{Bd}3$  $Bxa4$
38 $\text{Bc}5$  $Ba1+$
39 $\text{Be}2$  $a4$
40 $\text{Bxe}6$  $a3$
41 $\text{Bb}3$  $0-1$

20 $\text{Wh}3!$  $\text{D}d6$
21 $\text{g}3$

**Game 24**

**Blatny-Adams**

*Adelaide 1988*

21 ... $\text{Be}5$?!

The position is one where Black has to reckon with his opponent setting up an outside passed pawn on the queenside, and therefore exchanges, bringing the endgame nearer, are unfavourable for him. On the other hand, there is still the threat of an attack on the kingside, on which the white bishops are trained. In this respect 21...$\text{D}d5$ 22 $\text{We}4$ $\text{B}f6$ 23 $\text{Wh}4$ $\text{Be}7$ is more accurate.

22 $\text{Be}1$  $\text{Be}8$
23 $\text{a}4$  $\text{Dd}5$
24 $\text{Bb}3$  $\text{Dd}8$
25 $\text{a}5$  $\text{Dd}7$
26 $\text{Ba}4$  $\text{Wxa}5$?

Exchanges aid White’s aforementioned plan. 26...$\text{Dc}7$ 27 $\text{Cc}2$ $\text{Cc}5$ is a tougher defence, although after 28 $\text{Be}3$ White retains the advantage.

27 $\text{Wxb}7!$  $\text{Be}7$

Black has to go voluntarily into a pin, as after 27...$\text{Dc}5$ White gains a
material advantage by the tactical manoeuvre 28 \textit{Wxf7}+! \textit{Wxf7} 29 \textit{Wxe8}+ \textit{Wxe8} 30 \textit{Hxa5}.

28 \textit{Le3} \textit{Hb8}

Taking the game into the technical stage.

29 \ldots \textit{Wc7}
30 \textit{Wxc7} \textit{Hxc7}
31 \textit{Hed1} \textit{Hd8}
32 \textit{b4} \textit{f5}
33 \textit{Hxd7} \textit{Hxd7}
34 \textit{Hxd7} \textit{Hxd7}
35 \textit{Hxa6} \textit{e5}
36 \textit{Hg2} \textit{g5}
37 \textit{Hb6} \textit{d6}

44 \textit{f3} \textit{e4}
45 \textit{fxe4}+ \textit{Wxe4}
46 \textit{b5} \textit{Hd5}
47 \textit{b6} \textit{Hc6}
48 \textit{Hd4} \textit{He7}
49 \textit{c4} \textit{Hd8}
50 \textit{c5} \textit{He7}
51 \textit{He3} \textit{He8}
52 \textit{He4} \textit{He7}
53 \textit{He5} \textit{He8}
54 \textit{He6!} \textit{f3}
55 \textit{b7} \textit{Hc7}
56 \textit{c6} \textit{Hd6}
57 \textit{b8W}+ \textit{Hxb8}
58 \textit{Hxd6} \textit{He8}
59 \textit{Hb6} 1–0

\textbf{Game 25}

\textbf{Adorjan-Flesch}

\textit{Hungarian Ch 1975}

1 \textit{e4} \textit{c6}
2 \textit{d4} \textit{d5}
3 \textit{He3} \textit{dx e4}
4 \textit{Hxe4} \textit{Hd7}
5 \textit{He4} \textit{Hgf6}
6 \textit{Hg5} \textit{e6}
7 \textit{He2} \textit{Hb6}
8 \textit{Hd3} \textit{h6}
9 \textit{Hf3} \textit{c5}
10 \textit{Hxc5} \textit{Hxe5}
11 \textit{Hc5} \textit{Hbd7}
12 \textit{Hgf3} \textit{Hxe5}
13 \textit{Hxe5} 0–0
14 \textit{Hd2} \textit{Wd5}
15 0–0

A double-edged plan. The quiet 15 0–0 is less risky for White.

15 \ldots \textit{Wxa2}
16 \textit{c3} \textit{b5}
17 \textit{\&}xh6

White is drawn into forcing play. More subtle is 17 \textit{\&}b1! \textit{\&}a4 18 \textit{\&}f3! (18 \textit{\&}d3 \textit{\&}h4!) 18...\textit{\&}d5 19 \textit{\&}g3.

17 ... \textit{\&}b7

17...gxh6? loses to 18 \textit{\&}f3.

18 \textit{\&}d7

A diversionary manoeuvre. If 18 \textit{\&}b1 Black defends by 18...\textit{\&}a4!

18 ... \textit{\&}xd7

If 18...\textit{\&}a1+ 19 \textit{\&}b1 \textit{\&}e4 White has the decisive 20 \textit{\&}xg7! \textit{\&}xg7 21 \textit{\&}xc5 \textit{\&}xc5 22 \textit{\&}g4+.

19 \textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}a1+

20 \textit{\&}b1 g6

21 \textit{\&}xd7 \textit{\&}a3

One cannot help asking: who is attacking who?

22 \textit{\&}d2?

It transpires that both White and Black should have been satisfied with perpetual check after 22 bxa3 \textit{\&}xc3+.

22 ... \textit{\&}fd8?

An exchange of mistakes, after which the picture again changes. After 22...\textit{\&}fc8! 23 \textit{\&}d4 \textit{\&}f8 24 \textit{\&}xf8 \textit{\&}xf8 Black would have parried the opponent's threats, while maintaining his own (Adorjan).

23 bxa3 \textit{\&}xc3+

24 \textit{\&}d1 \textit{\&}xd2+

Now White succeeds in defending his king. 24...\textit{\&}d5!? came into consideration.

25 \textit{\&}xd2 \textit{\&}d8

26 \textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}f3+

27 gxf3 \textit{\&}xf3+

28 \textit{\&}c2 \textit{\&}c8+?

In such a mêlée it is not surprising that mistakes are made. After 28...\textit{\&}d3+! 29 \textit{\&}c1 \textit{\&}xa3+ Black would have held on.

29 \textit{\&}b2 \textit{\&}xh1

30 \textit{\&}xg6! \textit{\&}xh2

31 \textit{\&}h5+ 1–0
6: 10...\( \text{bd}7 \)

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{dc}3 \) dxe4 4 \( \text{dx}e4 \) \( \text{dd}7 \) 5 \( \text{dc}4 \) \( \text{dg}6 \) 6 \( \text{dg}5 \) e6 7 \( \text{we}2 \) \( \text{db}6 \) 8 \( \text{dd}3 \) h6 9 \( \text{sf}3 \) c5 10 dxc5 \( \text{bd}7 \) 14 \( \text{df}3 \) \( \text{wx}e5+ \) 15 \( \text{dx}e5 \) \( \text{cc}5 \) (or 15...\( \text{ad}6 \)) 16 \( \text{bb}5+ \) \( \text{we}7 \) with an equal ending (Parma-Smyslov, Lugano OL 1968) – Game 4.

Of course, White can spoil the opponent’s pawn structure by 11 c6 bxc6, but this allows Black to begin active piece play: 12 \( \text{dd}2 \) (or 12 \( \text{dd}2 \) \( \text{dd}5! \) 13 \( \text{de}4 \) \( \text{de}5 \) 12...\( \text{wb}6! \) 13 b3 \( \text{a}3! \) 14 \( \text{e}3 \) (14 \( \text{h}3 \) g5!) 14...\( \text{wa}5+ \) 15 \( \text{dd}2 \) \( \text{wb}6 \) with an equal game (Przewoznik-Sapis, Poland 1988).

White’s critical decision is of course to defend his extra pawn, despite the obvious defects of his queenside pawn structure.

11 b4

Here Black’s counterplay is associated with 11...b6 (6.1), 11...a5 (6.2) or 11...\( \text{dd}5 \) (6.3).

6.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{dc}3 \) dxe4 4 \( \text{dx}e4 \) \( \text{dd}7 \) 5 \( \text{cc}4 \) \( \text{gf}6 \) 6 \( \text{gg}5 \) e6 7 \( \text{we}2 \) \( \text{bb}6 \) 8 \( \text{dd}3 \) h6 9 \( \text{sf}3 \) c5 10 dxc5 \( \text{bd}7 \) 11 b4)

11 ... b6

This obvious frontal attack weakens the c6 square and allows White to activate his knight.

12 \( \text{dd}4 \)

This active move is based on the fact that Black cannot simply capture the pawn: 12...bxc5?? 13 \( \text{cc}6 \) \( \text{wc}7 \) 14 \( \text{wx}e6+! \) fxe6 15 \( \text{gg}6 \) mate! (Perenji-Eperjesi, Hungary 1984).
Also after 12...\(\text{dxc5}\) White gains an advantage practically by force: 13 \(\text{b5+ \text{cd7}}\) 14 \(\text{a3 \text{b7}}\) (14...\(\text{c7}\) 15 \(\text{b2 a6 16 \text{c4+}}\)±) 15 \(\text{gf3 \text{e7}}\) 16 \(\text{b2 a6}\) (16...0-0 17 \(\text{xe6!}\)) 17 \(\text{d3 0-0},\) and here in Kasparov-Bagirov (Tbilisi 1978) White could have built up a powerful attack by 18 \(\text{xe6! xxf3 19 gxf3 fxe6 20 xxe6+ \text{h8} 21 0-0-0 \text{c7 22 hgl \text{f4+} 23 \text{b1 aae8 24 xxd7!±}}\) (Kasparov).

Black usually plays 12...\(\text{d5}\) (6.11) or 12...\(\text{c7}\) (6.12).

6.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\text{c3} \text{dxe4}\) 4 \(\text{xe4} \text{d7} 5 \text{c4gf6 6 g5 e6 7 we2 b6 8 \text{d3 h6 9 5f3 c5 10 dxc5 \text{bd7} 11 b4 b6 12 \text{d4}})\)

12 ... \(\text{d5}\)

In attacking the b4 pawn Black loses time, and the e6 square remains his Achilles’ heel.

13 \(\text{b2} \text{xb4}\)

14 \(\text{exe6!}\)

This sacrifice, analysed by Sap-
\( \text{\textcopyright 5+} \) Black cannot develop without losing material.

\[
6.12 \ (1 \ e4 \ c6 \ 2 \ d4 \ d5 \ 3 \ \text{\textcopyright 3} \ \text{dxe4} \\
4 \ \text{\textcopyright 4} \ \text{xe4} \ \text{\textcopyright 7} \ 5 \ \text{\textcopyright 4} \ \text{g6} \ 6 \ \text{\textcopyright 5} \\
e6 \ 7 \text{\textcopyright 2} \ \text{\textcopyright 6} \ 8 \ \text{\textcopyright 3} \ h6 \ 9 \ \text{\textcopyright 3} \ f3 \\
c5 \ 10 \ \text{\textcopyright x5} \ \text{\textcopyright bd7} \ 11 \ \text{\textcopyright x4} \ b6 \ 12 \\
\text{\textcopyright d4})
\]

12 \ldots \text{\textcopyright c7}

Black maintains the tension, but allows himself to be drawn into forcing play.

13 \text{\textcopyright b5} \text{\textcopyright c6} \\
14 \text{\textcopyright f4} \text{\textcopyright xg2} \\
15 00 \text{\textcopyright b7}

White’s pieces are impending over the black king’s position, and therefore 15...\text{\textcopyright xh1} is not possible on account of 16 \text{\textcopyright c7+} \text{\textcopyright d8} 17 \text{\textcopyright f3} \text{\textg2} 18 \text{\textg1} \text{\textw3} 19 \text{\textd4}.

16 \text{\textc7+} \text{\texte7} \\
17 \text{\textc4!}

This is more energetic than 17 \text{\textc5} \text{\texte4} 18 \text{\texte4} \text{\textxe4} 19 \text{f3} \text{\textxe2} 20 \text{\textxe2} \text{\textxf3} 21 \text{\textxa8} \text{\textxa8} 22 \text{\textd6+} (\text{Fodor-Veress, corr. 1983}).

17 \ldots \text{\textw4} \\
18 \text{\textwxe4} \text{\textxe4} \\
19 \text{\textb5!} \text{\textd8} \\
20 \text{\textc6} \text{\textxf2}

Or 20...\text{\textx6} 21 \text{\textx6} \text{\textxf2} 22 \text{\textf3}! and Black cannot develop without losing material.

\text{Christiansen-Saidy (USA 1975)} now continued 21 \text{\textxd7}+! \text{\textxd7} 22 \text{\textxb7} \text{\textd1+} 23 \text{\textb2} \text{\textd8}, when White could have won by 24 \text{\texte8!} e5 25 \text{\textxe5} \text{\texte6} 26 \text{\textc7}.

\[6.2 \ (1 \ e4 \ c6 \ 2 \ d4 \ d5 \ 3 \ \text{\textc3} \ \text{dxe4} \\
4 \ \text{\textxe4} \ \text{\textd7} \ 5 \ \text{\textc4} \ \text{\textgf6} \ 6 \ \text{\textg5} \\
e6 \ 7 \text{\texte2} \text{\textb6} \ 8 \ \text{\textd3} \ h6 \ 9 \ \text{\textf3} \\
c5 \ 10 \ \text{\textxc5} \ \text{\textbd7} \ 11 \ \text{\textb4})
\]

11 \ldots a5

This attack on the pawns is more justified, since Black has the additional resource of opening the a-file.

12 \text{\textc3} \text{\texte7} \\
12...\text{\textxb4} 13 \text{\textxb4} b6 is premature: 14 \text{\textd4!} \text{\textxc5} 15 \text{\textb5+} \text{\textcd7} 16 \text{\textd2} \text{\textb7} 17 \text{\textgf3} with an unpleasant
pin (Rajhman-Leman, Wolfsberg 1985).

13 a3

It is useful to over-protect the b4 pawn in the event of ...b7-b6. 13 \( \text{\textcopyright d2} \)!? pursues the same aim, but attempts to activate White’s pieces merely create problems for him:

13 \( \text{\textcopyright c4} \)?! 0–0 14 \( \text{\textcopyright h3} \) axb4 15 cxb4 b6 and the pawn structure crumbles in favour of Black (Lukov-Meduna, Varna 1983).

13 \( \text{\textcopyright d4} \) 0–0 14 \( \text{\textcopyright g f3} \) (14 \( \text{\textcopyright b2} \) axb4 15 cxb4 e5!) 14...e5 and Black firmly seizes the initiative (Martin-Meduna, Bad Wörishofen 1988) – Game 27.

13 ... \( \text{\textcopyright d5} \)

14 \( \text{\textcopyright d2} \) axb4

In the event of 14...\( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright c1} \) axb4 16 axb4 White controls the situation on the queenside.

15 cxb4 \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \)

Now after 16 \( \text{\textcopyright a2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright x c3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x c3} + \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright f1} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) Black has some compensation for the pawn (he threatens 19...\( \text{\textcopyright x b4} \)).

6.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) dxe4 4 \( \text{\textcopyright x e4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright d7} \) 5 \( \text{\textcopyright c4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright g f6} \) 6 \( \text{\textcopyright g5} \) e6 7 \( \text{\textcopyright e2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright b6} \) 8 \( \text{\textcopyright d3} \) h6 9 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) c5 10 dxc5 \( \text{\textcopyright d7} \) 11 b4)

11 ... \( \text{\textcopyright d5} \)

Before beginning an attack on the pawns, Black activates his pieces.

12 \( \text{\textcopyright d2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \)

The inclusion of 12...a5 13 c3 is less effective: 13...\( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) 14 \( \text{\textcopyright c1} \) axb4 15 cxb4 \( \text{\textcopyright f4} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright x f4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x f4} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright b1} \) g5 18 \( \text{\textcopyright c2} \) and Black has no compensation for the pawn (Hübner-Lein, Chicago 1982).

In Geller-Speelman (Sochi 1982) Black chose 12...g5 13 c4 \( \text{\textcopyright f4} \) 14 \( \text{\textcopyright x f4} \) gxf4, and after 15 \( \text{\textcopyright d1} \) a5 16 a3 \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) White did not achieve anything. But, as shown by Velickovic, by playing 15 \( \text{\textcopyright b1} \) a5 16 a3 axb4 17 axb4 \( \text{\textcopyright g7} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright h3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright c3} + \) 19 \( \text{\textcopyright f1} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) 20 g3 he could have retained an advantage.

13 \( \text{\textcopyright b1} \) a5

14 a3 g5

After 14...\( \text{\textcopyright c3} \)? 15 \( \text{\textcopyright x c3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x c3} + \)
16 \( \text{Wd2} \text{Wxa3} \) 17 \( \text{Ab5!} \) Black comes under an unpleasant pin.

15 \( \text{De4} \text{Ec3} \)
16 \( \text{Xe3} \text{Xc3+} \)
17 \( \text{Wd2} \text{Wxa3} \)

In the event of 17...\( \text{Ag7?!} \) 18 \( \text{Ee2 Wxd2+} \text{Eg2} \text{Ea4} \text{f5} \text{Ea5} \text{Ee5} \text{Cc4} \text{g6} \) the position is simplified to White's advantage (Dimitrov-Todorcevic, Primorsko 1988).

18 \( \text{Wd4} \text{e5} \)

The queen sacrifice 18...\( \text{Ag8?!} \) 19 \( \text{Ha1 ab4} \text{Ha3} \text{bxa3} \) favours White: 21 \( \text{Ee2 a2} \text{f2} \text{g7} \text{b4} \) (Am.Rodriguez-Tal, Subotica IZ 1987).

19 \( \text{Cxe5} \text{g7} \)
20 \( \text{Ha1} \)

\[ \]

20...\( \text{axb4!} \)
21 \( \text{Axa3} \text{bxa3} \)
22 \( \text{Agf3} \text{0–0} \)

22...\( \text{a2} \text{23} \text{Ed2} \text{0–0} \) followed by ...\( \text{Ee8} \) also comes into consideration.

23 \( \text{Ed5} \text{g4!} \)
24 \( \text{Exf7+ Exf7} \)
25 \( \text{Wd5} \text{gxf3!} \)

After 25...\( \text{Xe5?} \) 26 \( \text{Xe5} \text{Xe5} \)

27 \( \text{Wxe5 Ha6} \text{28} \text{0–0} \text{a2} \text{29} \text{Ha1} \)

White has the advantage (Mestel-Flear, British Ch 1988).

26 \( \text{Wxf7+ Rh8} \)

Now after 27 \( \text{Wc8+ Rh7} \text{28} \text{ag6}+ \) the chances are equal (Flear).

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**Game 26**

**Van der Wiel-Balashov**

**Malta Olympiad 1980**

1 \( \text{e4} \text{c6} \)
2 \( \text{d4} \text{d5} \)
3 \( \text{Ed2} \text{dxe4} \)
4 \( \text{Edxe4} \text{Ed7} \)
5 \( \text{Edc4} \text{Ed6} \)
6 \( \text{Edg5} \text{e6} \)
7 \( \text{Wg5} \text{Ed2} \)
8 \( \text{Ed3} \text{b6} \)
9 \( \text{Ed5f3} \text{c5} \)
10 \( \text{dx5} \text{Ed7} \)
11 \( \text{b4} \text{b6} \)
12 \( \text{Ed4} \)

12...\( \text{Ed5} \)

A questionable move, although it has given Black reasonable results in practice. 12...\( \text{Wc7} \) looks more natural.
13 \textit{b2} \textit{xb4}

14 \textit{e4}

The evaluation of this variation largely depends on the evaluation of the knight sacrifice 14 \textit{xe6}! analysed by Sapfirov.

14 \ldots \textit{a6}

15 \textit{w3} \textit{xc5}

15...\textit{xc5}! is stronger, not fearing 16 \textit{xe6}?! \textit{xe6} 17 \textit{g6+ e7} 18 \textit{f7+ d7}.

16 \textit{xa8}?

Now Black’s well mobilised pieces develop a strong attack. It was still possible to simplify the position by 16 \textit{c6}! \textit{xe4} 17 \textit{xd8 xc2+} 18 \textit{d1 xd8+} 19 \textit{xc2}, although after 19...\textit{d3+} the activity of Black’s pieces gives him the better chances.

White’s ‘castles’ are stuck in their corners.

22 \textit{e4} \textit{e5}!

23 \textit{c3} \textit{d6}

24 \textit{f4}

White should have brought up his rook: 24 \textit{f3 d3} 25 \textit{d1}, although after 25...\textit{b4}! the attack continues.

24 \ldots \textit{c4}

25 \textit{d3}

25 \ldots \textit{a3+!}

26 \textit{xa3} \textit{xd3+}

27 \textit{c2} \textit{b4}

28 \textit{wb3} \textit{e8}

29 \textit{d1} \textit{c3}

30 \textit{f2} \textit{xb3+}

31 \textit{axb3} \textit{xc2+}

32 \textit{xc2} \textit{w5+}

0–1

Game 27
Martin-Meduna
Bad Wörishofen 1988

1 \textit{e4} \textit{c6}

2 \textit{d4} \textit{d5}

3 \textit{d2} \textit{dxe4}
4 \(\triangle x e4\) \(\triangle d7\)
5 \(\triangle c4\) \(\triangle g f6\)
6 \(\triangle g5\) e6
7 \(\check{W}e2\) \(\triangle b6\)
8 \(\triangle d3\) h6
9 \(\triangle 5f3\) c5
10 dxc5 \(\triangle bd7\)
11 b4 a5
12 c3 \(\check{A}e7\)
13 \(\triangle d4\)

White should lend additional support to the b4 pawn by 13 a3 or 13 \(\check{A}d2\).

13 \ldots \ 0-0
14 \(\triangle g f3\) e5
15 \(\triangle f 5\) e4
16 \(\triangle x e 7+\)

Or 16 \(\triangle x e 4\) \(\triangle x e 4\) 17 \(\check{W}e 4\) \(\triangle x c 5!\)
18 0-0 \(\triangle f 6\) and Black has the initiative.

16 \ldots \ \(\check{W}x e 7\)
17 \(\check{A}c 4\) axb4
18 cxb4 b6
19 \(\check{A}f 4\) \(\check{A}h 5\)
20 \(\check{A}d 6\) \(\check{W}f 6\)
21 \(\check{A}d 4\)

After doing well up to this point, Black unexpectedly falls for the bait. He should first have prepared the gathering of the ‘harvest’: 21...bxc5! 22 bxc5 \(\check{W}x d 4\) 23 0-0 \(\triangle x c 5\) 24 \(\check{A}d 1\) \(\triangle d 3\), after which White stands badly.

22 0-0 \(\triangle e 5\)
23 \(\check{W}x h 5\) \(\triangle x c 4\)
24 \(\check{A}f d 1\) \(\triangle d 2?\)

An over-committing move, which leaves the knight ‘hanging’. Stronger was 24...\(\check{W}f 6!\) 25 \(\check{A}x f 8\) e3 26 \(\check{W}e 2\) \(\check{W}x f 2+\) 27 \(\check{W}x f 2\) exf2+ 28 \(\check{A}x f 2\) \(\check{W}x f 8\) 29 cxb6 \(\check{A}x b 6\) 30 \(\check{A}d 6!±\) (Martin).

25 \(\check{A}x f 8\) e3
26 \(\check{W}e 2!\) exf2+
27 \(\check{W}x f 2\) \(\check{W}x f 2+\)
28 \(\check{A}x f 2\) \(\check{A}e 4+\)
29 \(\check{A}e 3\) \(\check{A}b 7\)
30 \(\check{A}e 7\) bxc5
31 \(\check{A}d 8+\) \(\check{A}x d 8\)
32 \(\check{A}x d 8\) cxb4
33 \(\check{A}d 4\) \(\check{A}e 3\)
34 g3 \(\check{A}c 8\)
35 \(\check{A}a 5\) \(\check{A}e 6\)
36 \(\check{A}x b 4\) \(\check{A}x a 2\)
37 \(\check{A}d 2\)

21 \ldots \ \(\check{W}x d 4?\)
After his incorrect 24...\(d\)d2?

Black has picked up as much material as possible, but he is obliged to play without his knight at a2.

37 ... \(g\)5

38 \(e\)e5 \(g\)7

39 \(f\)f1 \(g\)6

40 \(f\)f6+ \(g\)7

41 h4 \(h\)7

42 \(x\)xe6! \(x\)xe6

43 h5 \(g\)8

44 \(x\)xe6 \(h\)8

45 \(f\)f6 1–0
On the a2-g8 diagonal the bishop has no less a future than on the adjacent one, especially as the d4 pawn is immune (8...\textit{Wx}d4? 9 \textit{\textbf{Q}f}3 and 10 \textit{\textbf{Q}e}5).

8 \ldots h6

Here too there is no point in delaying this move. The flank operation 8\textit{\textbf{a}5} 9 c3! (there is no point in obstinately maintaining the bishop’s diagonal: 9 a3 a4 10 \textit{\textbf{Q}a}2 c5 11 dxc5 \textit{\textbf{Q}xc}5 12 \textit{\textbf{Q}f}3 \textit{\textbf{W}e}7 13 0-0 0-0 14 \textit{\textbf{Q}e}5 h6 15 \textit{\textbf{Q}f}3 \textit{\textbf{W}b}d7 16 \textit{\textbf{Q}d}3 \textit{\textbf{W}d}6 17 \textit{\textbf{W}e}1 \textit{\textbf{W}e}8 18 \textit{\textbf{Q}d}2 e5!=, Suetin-Wilson, Berlin 1991) 9...a4 10 \textit{\textbf{Q}c}2 a3 11 b3 \textit{\textbf{W}bd}5 12 \textit{\textbf{Q}d}2 \textit{\textbf{W}d}6 undertaken in Kasparov-Speelman (Linares 1992) does not bring Black any particular gains. White could have gained an advantage by 13 \textit{\textbf{Q}e}4.

9 \textit{\textbf{Q}f}3 a5

9...c5 is examined in Chapter 8.

Here the main continuations are 10 c3 (7.1), 10 a3 (7.2) and 10 a4 (7.3).

7.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \textit{\textbf{Q}c}3 dxe4 4 \textit{\textbf{W}xe}4 \textit{\textbf{Q}d}7 5 \textit{\textbf{Q}c}4 \textit{\textbf{Q}gf}6 6 \textit{\textbf{Q}g}5 e6 7 \textit{\textbf{W}e}2 \textit{\textbf{W}b}6 8 \textit{\textbf{W}b}3 h6 9 \textit{\textbf{Q}f}3 a5)

10 c3

White prepares to withdraw his bishop onto the b1-h7 diagonal.

10 \ldots c5

An important moment. Black is not averse to winning an important tempo by \ldots c5-c4, and therefore he does not hurry with the natural 10...a4 11 \textit{\textbf{Q}c}2:
(a) 11...a3 12 b3 c5 13 d2 wc7 14 c1 ed6 15 de5 0–0 16 gf3 cxd4 17 cxd4±, and the further advance of Black’s pawns has in fact restricted his possibilities on the queenside (Matkovic-B.Nikolic, Yugoslav Ch 1991);

(b) 11...c5 12 dxc5 xc5, when Black has to reckon with the loss of a pawn after 13 wb5+ bd7 14 xa4, or positional pressure by 13 de5 wc7 14 gf3 bd7 15 f4!;

(c) 11...bd5 12 d2 wb6! 13 b1 c5 14 dxc5 xc5 15 de5 0–0 16 gf3 wc7 17 b6 18 bc1 b7 with an equal game (Anand–Epishin, Biel IZ 1993), but here too improvements for White are possible, e.g. 18 d3!? b7 19 ed4 with slightly the better chances.

11 a3

J.Polgar–Gulko (Moscow OL 1994) went 11 d2 a4 12 c2 wc7 13 c1 d6 14 de5 bd5 (aiming at c3; Black is already threatening ...a4-a3) 15 a3 b6 16 gf3 0–0 17 c4 de7 18 c3 cxd4 19 xd4 b7 20 0–0 c6 21 c3 fd8 22 fd1 xe5 23 xe5 c5 24 h1 xd1+ 25 xd1 fd8 with an equal game.

11... wc7!

An important move, controlling e5.

12 h3

After 12 de5?! cxd4 13 cxd4 Black has a choice:

(a) 13...a4 14 c2 d7 15 xd7 xbxd7 — Game 28 (Kasparov–Kar- pov, Linares 1994);

(b) 13...xa3!? However, Makarychev has dispelled the mirage of this move, showing that 14 xh6! gives White the better chances after both 14...xb2 15 wb2 xh6 16 gf3, and 14...xh6 15 xa3 wc1+ 16 d1 fd5 17 gf3 f6 18 d3.

12... d7

13 0–0

This position was thoroughly studied in the Short–Gulko match (New York 1994).

13 cxd4!

In the 3rd game Gulko discovered that 13...d6?? was unpromising: 14 dxc5 wc5 (14...xc5 15 f4±) 15 de3 wc7 16 d4 with strong pressure for White – Game 29.

14 f4

Or 14 xd4 d6 and now 15 f5?! xh2+ 16 h1 f8 17 g3 exf5 favours Black.

14... d6

15 xd6 xd6

16 fd1

In the 5th game Short gained the better chances after 16 xd1 0–0 17 xd4 wc5 18 fd1 c6?! 19 de5, but in analysis an improvement for
Black was found: 18...\(\texttt{\#b5}\)! 19 \(\texttt{\#e5} \texttt{\#bd7}\)!

\[
\begin{array}{c}
16 \ldots \\
17 \texttt{\#xd4} \\
18 \texttt{\#f4} \\
\end{array}
\]

Also possible is 18...\(\texttt{\#b5}\) 19 \(\texttt{\#e1}\) (19 \(\texttt{\#xe6}\) ? \(\texttt{fxe6}\) 20 \(\texttt{\#xe6\#}\) 21 \(\texttt{\#e5}\) \(\texttt{\#e8\#}\) 19...\(\texttt{\#c4}\) 20 \(\texttt{\#c2}\) \(\texttt{\#bd7}\) with equal chances (Gulko).

The seventh game of the Short-Gulko match now continued 19 \(\texttt{\#xb5}\) \(\texttt{\#xb5}\) 20 \(\texttt{\#e1}\) \(\texttt{\#bd7}\) with equal chances.

7.2 (1 \(\texttt{e4}\) \(\texttt{c6}\) 2 \(\texttt{d4}\) \(\texttt{d5}\) 3 \(\texttt{\#c3}\) \(\texttt{dxe4}\) 4 \(\texttt{\#xe4}\) \(\texttt{\#d7}\) 5 \(\texttt{\#c4}\) \(\texttt{\#gf6}\) 6 \(\texttt{\#g5}\) \(\texttt{e6}\) 7 \(\texttt{\#e2}\) \(\texttt{\#b6}\) 8 \(\texttt{\#b3}\) \(\texttt{h6}\) 9 \(\texttt{\#f3}\) \(\texttt{a5}\))

\[
\begin{array}{c}
10 \texttt{a3}
\end{array}
\]

White maintains his bishop on the a2-g8 diagonal.

\[
10 \ldots \texttt{a4}
\]

If 10...\(\texttt{\#e7}\) White has the good reply 11 \(\texttt{\#d2}\)! \(\texttt{\#bd5}\) 12 \(\texttt{c4}\) \(\texttt{\#c7}\) 13 \(\texttt{\#c2}\) 0–0?! (more circumspect is 13...\(\texttt{b5}\) 14 \(\texttt{\#e5}\) \(\texttt{\#b7}\) 15 \(\texttt{c5}\) \(\texttt{\#cd5}\) 16 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\), Bagirov) 14 \(\texttt{\#e5}\) \(\texttt{\#xd4}\) 15 \(\texttt{\#c3}\) \(\texttt{\#d8}\) 16 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\) \(\texttt{\#ce8}\) 17 \(\texttt{g4}\) \(\texttt{b5}\) 18 \(\texttt{g5}\) \(\texttt{hxg5}\) 19 \(\texttt{\#xg5}\) \(\texttt{\#a6}\) 20 \(\texttt{\#f3}\) with a strong attack (Tal-Speelman, Subotica IZ 1987).

10...\(\texttt{g6}\) is another idea of Speelman:

(a) 11 \(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{\#g7}\) 12 \(\texttt{\#e5}\) 0–0 13 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\) \(\texttt{c5}\) 14 0–0 a4 15 \(\texttt{\#c2}\) \(\texttt{cxd4}\) 16 \(\texttt{\#d1}\) \(\texttt{\#e7}\) 17 \(\texttt{cxd4}\) \(\texttt{\#bd5}\) 18 \(\texttt{\#d2}\) \(\texttt{\#d8}\) with an equal game (Gavrlikov-Speelman, Interzonal Play-off Match, London 1985);

(b) 11 \(\texttt{\#d2}\)! (a much sharper reply, which according to Pieterse virtually refutes 10...\(\texttt{g6}\)) 11...\(\texttt{\#g7}\) 12 0–0 0–0 13 \(\texttt{h4}\) \(\texttt{\#c7}\) 14 \(\texttt{\#h3}\) \(\texttt{\#bd5}\) 15 \(\texttt{c4}\\#\) (Kupreichik-Tukmakov, 54th USSR Ch 1987).

\[
11 \texttt{\#a2} \texttt{c5}
\]

After 11...\(\texttt{\#e7}\) 12 \(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{c5}\) White maintains a slight advantage:

(a) 13 \(\texttt{dxc5}\) \(\texttt{\#bd7}\) 14 \(\texttt{\#d4}\) \(\texttt{\#xc5}\) 15 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\) 0–0 16 \(\texttt{\#f4}\) \(\texttt{\#xd4}\) 17 \(\texttt{cxd4}\) \(\texttt{\#d5}\) 18 \(\texttt{\#d6}\) \(\texttt{\#e8}\) 19 0–0 (Cabrilo-Spiridonov, Varna 1983);

(b) 13 \(\texttt{\#f4}\) \(\texttt{\#d6}\) 14 \(\texttt{\#g3}\) \(\texttt{\#xg3}\) 15 \(\texttt{hxg3}\) \(\texttt{cxd4}\) 16 \(\texttt{\#xd4}\) 0–0 17 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\) \(\texttt{\#c7}\) 18 0–0–0 (Suetin-Ciric, Budva 1967).

\[
12 \texttt{\#f4}
\]

Karpov in his prime preferred 12 \(\texttt{c3}\), when after 12...\(\texttt{\#bd5}\) 13 \(\texttt{\#e5}\)! it is dangerous to win a pawn by 13...\(\texttt{cxd4}\) 14 \(\texttt{cxd4}\) \(\texttt{\#a5}\) 15 \(\texttt{\#d2}\) \(\texttt{b6}\) 16 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\) \(\texttt{\#xb2}\) 17 0–0 \(\texttt{\#c3}\) on account of 18 \(\texttt{\#c4}\)! Petrovsky replied against him 12...\(\texttt{\#d7}\) 13 \(\texttt{\#e5}\) \(\texttt{cxd4}\) 14 \(\texttt{cxd4}\) \(\texttt{\#e7}\) 15 \(\texttt{\#gf3}\) 0–0 16 0–0, but could not cope with the difficulties – Game 30 (Karpov-Petrosian, Tilburg 1982).
After 12...\(\text{a}e3\) Smyslov suggested 12...\(\text{a}bd5\), which has become a standard reaction to the bishop’s development. Here Black has no problems:

(a) 13 \(c3\) \(\text{a}e7\) (also possible is the more active 13...\(\text{w}c7\) 14 \(\text{a}e5\) \(\text{a}d6\) 15 \(\text{g}f3\) 0–0, with a sound position for Black, Karpov-Kavalek, Turin 1982)

(b) 13 \(\text{d}e5\) \(\text{a}a5+\) 14 \(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{b}6\) 15 \(\text{c}d4\) \(\text{a}7\) with equal chances (I.Gurevich-Epishin, Biel IZ 1993).

12...\(\text{a}bd5\)

With 12...\(\text{a}d6\) Black can also count on an equal game:

(a) 13 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{cxd}4\) 14 0–0–0 \(\text{w}c7\) 15 \(\text{a}xd4\) \(\text{xg}3\) 16 \(\text{h}xg3\) 0–0 17 \(\text{g}f3\) \(\text{a}a5\) 18 \(\text{h}e1\) \(\text{bd}5\) 19 \(\text{d}e5\) \(\text{b}6\) 20 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 21 \(\text{w}f2\) \(\text{h}5\) with equal chances (Ivanchuk-Karpov, Monaco 1994);

(b) 13 \(\text{d}e5\) \(\text{cxd}4\) 14 0–0–0 \(\text{xe}5\) (after 14...\(\text{w}c7\) 15 \(\text{x}d4\) \(\text{xe}5\) 16 \(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 17 \(\text{xe}5\) in the endgame the weakness of the \(a4\) pawn is felt) 15 \(\text{xe}5\) 0–0 16 \(\text{x}d4\) \(\text{bd}5\) 17 \(\text{c}4\) \(\text{w}c7\) with equal chances (Hazai, Lukacs).

13 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{a}5+\)

14 \(\text{d}d2\) \(b5\)

15 \(\text{g}f3\) \(b4\)

Black can also consider 15...\(\text{c}4\) 16 0–0 (16 \(c3\) \(\text{a}xa3\) 17 \(\text{x}c4!\) \(\text{x}b2\) 18 \(\text{x}b5+\) \(\text{d}d7\) 19 \(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{xc}3=\))

16...\(\text{b}7\) 17 \(c3\) \(\text{e}7\) 18 \(\text{b}1\) 0–0–0 19 \(\text{c}2\) \(\text{a}6\) with a complicated game (Hazai, Lukacs).

16 \(\text{c}4\)

Or 16 0–0 \(\text{a}6\) 17 \(\text{c}4\) \(\text{bxa}3\) 18 \(\text{bxa}3\) \(\text{cxd}4\)! with equal chances.

Ivanchuk-Karpov (Tilburg 1993) now continued 16...\(\text{a}6\) 17 0–0 \(\text{bxa}3\) 18 \(\text{x}a3\) \(\text{cxd}4\) 19 \(\text{a}a1\) \(\text{c}7\) 20 \(\text{xd}4\) 0–0 with equal chances.

7.3 (1 \(e4\) \(c6\) 2 \(d4\) \(d5\) 3 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 4 \(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 5 \(\text{c}4\) \(\text{g}f6\) 6 \(\text{g}5\) \(e6\) 7 \(\text{w}e2\) \(\text{b}6\) 8 \(\text{b}3\) \(h6\) 9 \(\text{f}3\) \(a5\))

10 \(a4\)

White nips in the bud Black’s threat of ...\(a5-a4\).

10...\(c5\)

11 \(\text{f}4\)

The most energetic move, with which White fights for control of e5 — the key square in many similar variations. But it is also useful to be acquainted with his other possibilities:

11 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{w}c7\) 12 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}6\) (or 12...\(\text{cxd}4\) 13 \(\text{x}d4\) \(\text{c}5\) 14 \(\text{g}f3\) 0–0 15 0–0 \(\text{d}8\) 16 \(c3\) \(\text{d}7\) 17 \(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{w}c5\) 18 \(\text{d}4\), and White, who
intends to strengthen his control of the centre by f2-f4, has the better chances, Ivanchuk-Epishin, Biel 1993) 13 
Qg3 0-0 14 0-0 Qbd5 (it is useful to exchange the important bishop; weaker is 14...Qd8 15 c3 Qd7 16 
dxc5 Qxc5 17 Qxc5 Qxc5 18 Qd4 with advantage to White, Ivanchuk-
Epishin, Tilburg 1993) 15 c4 Qxe3 16 
fxe3 b6 17 Qc2 with slightly the better chances for White (Hazai,
Lukacs).

11 dxc5 Qbd7 12 Qe5 Qxe5 13 
Qxe5 Qd7 14 We2 Qxc5 (the alternative is 14...Qxc5 15 Qc4 Qe7 
16 Qf3 0-0 17 Qh5 0-0 18 h4 b5 19 Qc2 Qxe3 20 Qxa6 Qc5 21 Qd3 and 
White's position is slightly preferable (Belyavsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1993).

11 ... Qd6

Or 11...Qxd4 12 0-0 0-0 Qbd5 13 
Qe5 Qd6 14 Qxd4 0-0 0-0 15 Qg3 b6 
16 Qb5 Qa6 17 Qf4 and White stands better (Watson-Adams, London 
1989).

12 Qg3!

For the moment White should not be in a hurry to occupy e5:

12 Qe5 0-0. Here in Tal-Petrosian, (41st USSR Ch 1973) – Game 32, 
there followed 13 0-0-0?! c4 14 
Qxc4 Qxa4 15 Qh3 Qb6, when 
Black already stood better, but even 
after 13 Qh3 Qxe5 14 dxe5 Qfd5 his 
chances are not worse.

12 Qe5 0-0 13 Qg3 Qc7 14 Qg3 
Qbd5 15 dxc5 Qxc5 16 0-0 b6 17 
Qfd1 Qa6 with equal chances (Anand-Karpov, Monaco Blind 1994).

12 ... 0-0

In the event of 12...Qxg3?! 13 
hxg3 Qc7 14 Qe5 cxd4 15 Qg3 0-0 
16 g4! the opening of the h-file assists 
White's attack (Mikh.Tseitlin-
Spiridonov, Prague 1985).

13 Qe5

White also retains the initiative 
with 13 Qd1 Qbd5 14 Qe5 – Game 
33 (Mikh.Tseitlin-Lutz, Budapest 
1989).

13 ... Qe7

14 Qg3

Or 14 0-0-0 cxd4 15 Qg3 Qd7 16 
Qxd7 Qxd7 17 Qxd6 Qxd6 18 
Qxd4 Qf4+ 19 Qb1 Qc5 with equal 
chances (Karpov).

14 ... Qbd5

15 0-0

15 ... Qh5?!

This leads to the creation of an 
isolated pawn. Black should have 
maintained the tension with 15...b6? 
16 Qxd5!

White played less strongly in 
Anand-Karpov (Linares 1994) – 16 
Qe1 Qc7 17 Qad1 Qxg3 18 hxg3
\( f6 \) 19 \( c4 \) \( e7 \) 20 \( e5 \) \( c6 \), and Black achieved an equal game.

Now after 16...\( \text{xg3} \) 17 h\text{xg3} exd5 18 dxc5 \( \text{xc5} \) 19 \( \text{fe1} \) White’s chances are preferable (Karpov).

### Game 28
Kasparov-Karpov
Linares 1994

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xe4} \)
4 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{d7} \)
5 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{gf6} \)
6 \( \text{g5} \) e6
7 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b6} \)
8 \( \text{b3} \) h6
9 \( \text{f3} \) a5
10 c3 c5
11 a3 \( \text{c7} \)
12 \( \text{e5} \)!

A committing move. 12 \( \text{h3} \) is simpler.

12 ... cxd4
13 cxd4

At the time it was thought that Black had missed a good opportunity here with 13...\( \text{xa3} \), but, as shown in the analysis, after 14 \( \text{xh6} \)! White gains the better chances.

14 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{d7} \)
15 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{bxd7} \)
16 \( \text{d1} \)

As a result of his poorly played opening, White has been saddled with an isolated d-pawn, and Black can freely use the d5 square as a transit point. For the moment White tries to cover the c-file, which is controlled by Black.

16 ... \( \text{d6} \)
17 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{d5} \)
18 \( \text{d2} \) b5
19 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{xc3} \)
20 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{f6} \)
21 \( \text{d3} \)

21 ... \( \text{d5} \)!

Showing a subtle understanding of the position. After 22 \( \text{xb5}+?! \) \( \text{e7} \) Black is fully mobilised and he threatens 23...\( \text{xc3} \).

22 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{e7} \)!
Karpov’s favourite move in this variation.

23 e1
24 e2! Hh8?! 

Over-hasty. Karpov considers that he should have developed his initiative with 24...f4+! 25 xf4 xf4 26 xc4 bxc4 27 a1 Hd8 28 Hd1 g5, although after 29 g3 f6 30 e3 White is soundly enough placed.

25 g3 Hxd3+
26 Hxd3 b4

27 a1!

The World Champions are as though competing with each other to see who can play more subtly. With this pawn sacrifice White succeeds in exchanging the targets of Black’s attack.

27 ... bxa3
28 bxa3 Hb3
29 c2! Hxa3
30 Hxa3 Hxa3
31 e1 b2
32 Hxa4 Hxa4
33 Hxa4 xd4

34 f4!

The concluding move of the manoeuvre begun with 27 a1! The advance of the black pawns is blocked at a distance.

34 ... d6
35 f3 f5
36 h4! b2
37 g4! fxg4+
38 xg4 Hf6+
39 f3 Hf5
40 Hc2 Hf6
41 h5 ½–½

Game 29
Short-Gulko
Match (3), New York 1994

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 c3 dxe4
4 xxe4 d7
5 c4 g6
6 g5 e6
7 e2 Hb6
8 Hb3 b6
9 5f3 a5
10 c3 c5
11 a3 Hc7
12 Hh3 Hd7
13 0–0 Hd6?!

In the 7th game of the match Gulko played the stronger 13...cxd4!

14 dxc5 Hxc5
15 Hc3 Hc7
16 Hd4 Hg4?!

An unsuccessful sortie. Had Black anticipated his opponent’s reply, he would have preferred 16...0–0!? 17 e5+.
17 \( \texttt{\underline{\texttt{d2}}} \) \( \texttt{\underline{\texttt{d6}}} \)

An admission of his mistake. After 17...\( \texttt{xh2} \) the knight will be unable to return.

18 \( \texttt{h1} \) 0–0?

To castle into such an obvious attack is suicidal. 18...\( \texttt{c6} \) 19 \( f4 \) 0–0–0 was correct.

19 \( \texttt{xf6} \) \( \texttt{gxf6} \)
20 \( \texttt{g4+} \) \( \texttt{h7} \)
21 \( \texttt{e4} \) \( f5 \)
22 \( \texttt{f6+} \) \( \texttt{h8} \)
23 \( \texttt{h4} \) \( \texttt{g7} \)
24 \( \texttt{ad1} \) \( \texttt{e5} \)

25 \( \texttt{h5+} \) \( \texttt{h7} \)
26 \( f4 \) \( \texttt{h8} \)
27 \( \texttt{g5+} \) 1–0

The knight is taboo (27...\( \texttt{hxg5} \) 28 \( \texttt{f6+} \) \( \texttt{g7} \) 29 \( \texttt{wxg5} \) mate), while if the king moves, the rook joins the attack: 27...\( \texttt{g8} \) 28 \( \texttt{f6+} \) \( \texttt{xf6} \) (28...\( \texttt{g7} \) 29 \( \texttt{gh7} \) 29 \( \texttt{h6} \) \( \texttt{g5} \) 30 \( \texttt{wxg5}+ \) \( \texttt{h8} \) 31 \( \texttt{d3} \) (Short).

---

**Game 30**

**Karpov-Petrosian**

**Tilburg 1982**

1 \( \texttt{e4} \) \( \texttt{c6} \)
2 \( \texttt{d4} \) \( \texttt{d5} \)
3 \( \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{dxe4} \)
4 \( \texttt{xe4} \) \( \texttt{d7} \)

Was it this game that saw the baton of the variation being passed from the ninth World Champion to the twelfth?

5 \( \texttt{c4} \) \( \texttt{gf6} \)
6 \( \texttt{g5} \) \( \texttt{e6} \)
7 \( \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{b6} \)
8 \( \texttt{b3} \) \( \texttt{a5} \)
9 \( \texttt{a3} \) \( \texttt{a4} \)
10 \( \texttt{a2} \) \( \texttt{h6} \)
11 \( \texttt{f3} \) \( \texttt{e5} \)
12 \( \texttt{c3} \) \( \texttt{d7} \)

12...\( \texttt{bd5} \) can be answered by 13 \( \texttt{de5} \), when it is dangerous to win a pawn by 13...\( \texttt{cxd4} \) 14 \( \texttt{cxd4} \) \( \texttt{a5+} \) 15 \( \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{b6} \) 16 \( \texttt{gf3} \) \( \texttt{xb2} \) 17 0–0 \( \texttt{c3} \) on account of 18 \( \texttt{c4!} \) (Karpov).

13 \( \texttt{e5} \) \( \texttt{xd4} \)
14 \( \texttt{cxd4} \) \( \texttt{e7} \)
15 \( \texttt{gf3} \) 0–0
16 0–0 \( \texttt{e8} \)
17 \( \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{bd5} \)
18 \( \texttt{fc1} \)
Black was intending ...b7-b5, and after 18 ♘c4 ♘b8 White would be obliged to exchange the light-square bishops. But now 18...b5 would weaken the c6 square: 19 ♘c6 ♘xc6 20 ♘xc6 with advantage to White.

18 ... ♘b6
19 ♘c4 ♘c6
20 ♘e1

25 ... ♗xe5?!

Although Black’s position is cramped, why aggravate the situation? An eventual ...c6-c5 would have eased his defence.

26 dxe5 ♘d7
27 g3! ♗f8
28 ♘ed1 ♘d7
29 ♗e4 ♗b7
30 ♘c2 ♘ab8
31 ♘dd2 ♗e7
32 ♗g2 ♗a5
33 h4 ♘d7
34 ♘e2 ♘d5
35 ♘d4 ♘xd4
36 ♘xd4 ♗d5?

With this move Black blunders away a pawn. After 36...♗b7 he could have put up a tough resistance, although White’s positional advantage is obvious.

37 ♘xc6 ♗a8
38 ♘c4 ♗b7
39 ♘c2 ♗b6
40 ♗b5 ♗g6
41 ♗d6 ♗a8
42 ♘c6 1–0
Game 31
Liberzon-Smyslov
Biel Interzonal 1976

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 ♗c3 dxe4
4 ♗xe4 ♗d7
5 ♗c4 ♗gf6
6 ♗g5 e6
7 ♘e2 ♗b6
8 ♘b3 h6
9 ♗f3 a5
10 a3 a4
11 ♗a2 c5
12 ♗e3 ♗bd5!

16 . . . b6
17 0–0 ♗b7
18 ♗d2 ♗d6
19 dxc5

After 19 ♗fe1 cxd4 White is left with an isolated pawn, but the surrender of the pawn centre also gives Black active piece play.

19 . . . bxc5
20 ♗d3 ♘fd8
21 ♗fe1 ♗b6
22 c4?

In defending against 22 . . . c4, White loses a pawn. He should have reconciled himself to 22 ♗ad1 c4 23 ♗b1 ♗d5, when Black’s position is only slightly more pleasant.

Black has equalised.

13 c3 ♗e7

Black can also play the more active 13...♗c7 14 ♗e5 ♗d6 15 ♗gf3 0–0, with a sound position (Karpov-Kavalek, Turin 1982).

14 ♗e5 0–0
15 ♗gf3 ♘c7
16 ♗c4

After 16 0–0 b5! (17 ♘xb5? ♗a6) Black threatens to advance ...b5–b4.

22 . . . ♗xf3!
23 ♗xf3 ♘xh2+
24 ♗xh2 ♗d6
25 ♗g4 ♘xd3
26 ♗xf6+ ♗xf6
27 ♗xh6 ♘xe2
28 ♗xe2 ♗xc4
29 ♗e1 ♗e5

After this lively skirmish Black succeeds in retaining his extra pawn,
since if 30 $\text{hx}c5$? there follows $30...\text{d}d1+$ $31 \text{g}h2 \text{g}g4+$.

30 $\text{ae}3$ $\text{d}d3$
31 $\text{xc}4$ $\text{d}d5$
32 $\text{ec}2$ $\text{a}5$
33 $\text{d}d2$ $\text{a}8$
34 $\text{e}e3$ $\text{b}8$
35 $\text{xa}4$ $\text{xb}2$
36 $\text{xb}2$ $\text{xb}2$
37 $\text{a}8+$ $\text{g}7$
38 $\text{a}4$ $\text{c}4$
39 $\text{f}1$ $\text{xe}3+$
40 $\text{fxe}3$ $\text{f}5$

$\text{c}2$ $\text{f}4$ $47 \text{exf}4 \text{xf}4+$ it is much more difficult to defend.

46 $...$ $\text{a}2$
47 $\text{g}4$ $\text{e}4+$
48 $\text{g}3$ $\text{fxg}4$
49 $\text{xf}4$ $\text{f}2$
50 $\text{c}6+$ $\text{e}5$
51 $\text{c}5+$ $\text{e}6$

If 51...$\text{d}6$ there follows 52 $\text{f}5$.

52 $\text{c}6+$ $\text{d}5$
53 $\text{c}8$ $\text{f}3$
54 $\text{d}8+$ $\text{c}5$
55 $\text{c}8+$ $\text{b}5$
56 $\text{c}7$ $\text{f}6$
57 $\text{c}8$ $\text{xe}3$
58 $\text{f}4$ $\text{e}1$
59 $\text{c}7$ $\text{e}3$
60 $\text{f}3$ $\text{f}5$
61 $\text{c}8$ $\text{f}2$–$\text{f}2$

Things have reduced to a rook ending where White's outside passed pawn, together with the compact grouping of the black pawns within his king's sphere of influence, give him good drawing chances.

41 $\text{e}2$ $\text{f}6$
42 $\text{a}7$ $\text{e}5$
43 $\text{f}3$ $\text{e}4$
44 $\text{c}7$ $\text{xa}4$
45 $\text{xc}5$ $\text{e}5$
46 $\text{g}3!$

Restricting the mobility of the black pawns. After the careless 46

Game 32
Tal-Petrosian
41st USSR Ch 1973

1 $\text{e}4$ $\text{c}6$
2 $\text{d}4$ $\text{d}5$
3 $\text{c}c3$ $\text{dxe}4$
4 $\text{xe}4$ $\text{d}7$
5 $\text{c}4$ $\text{gf}6$
6 $\text{g}5$ $\text{e}6$
7 $\text{e}2$ $\text{b}6$
8 $\text{b}3$ $\text{a}5$
9 $\text{a}4$
Tal radically halts the advance of the black a-pawn.

9 $...$ $\text{h}6$
10 $\text{f}3$ $\text{c}5$
11 $\text{f}4$ $\text{d}6$
12 $\text{e}5$
At the present time, not without the
influence of this game, 12 $\text{g3}$! is considered strongest.

12 ... 0–0

13 0–0–0?!

A risky decision, since the king is less secure here. 13 $\text{h3}$ is sounder, although after 13...$\text{xe5}$ 14 $\text{dxe5}$$\text{f5}$ Black’s chances are not worse.

20 $\text{hg1}$

20 $\text{wd3}$ is met by the same reply as in the game.

20 ... a2

The tempting 20...$\text{c3}$ (with the threat of 21...a2) could have been answered by 21 $\text{xf6}$$\text{xf6}$ 22 $\text{wd3}$.

21 $\text{b2}$$\text{xc4}$

22 $\text{wc4}$$\text{d5}$

23 $\text{e4}$ f6

24 $\text{f4}$?

In a difficult position White overlooks an intermediate check, but even after 24 $\text{g3}$ f5 25 $\text{e5}$$\text{f7}$ the threat of ...$\text{c3}$+ cannot be parried without losing the knight.

24 ... $\text{a3}$+

25 $\text{a1}$$\text{xf4}$

26 $\text{h4}$$\text{f7}$

27 $\text{g4}$$\text{a5}$

Now if 28 $\text{xf4}$ there follows 28...$\text{b2+}$. White resigns (0–1).

<table>
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<td>13</td>
<td>$\text{d1}$</td>
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13 \(\text{\&}e5\) is also good.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
13 \ldots \text{\&}bd5 \\
14 \text{\&}e5 \text{cxd4} \\
15 \text{\&}gf3 \text{\&}b4+ \\
16 \text{\&}f1 \text{\&}d7 \\
16...\text{\&}d7!?\ can\ also\ be\ considered.
\end{array}
\]

Black fails to take account of the changed situation – the weakening of
the a2-g8 diagonal. He should have preferred 21...\text{\&}c8 22 h5=.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
22 \text{\&}c7! \text{w}e7 \\
22...\text{\&}xc7 23 \text{\&}xc7 \text{\&}c8 24 \text{\&}xd7!!\ is\ also\ bad.
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
23 \text{\&}xd5 \text{exd5} \\
24 \text{w}xe7 \text{\&}xe7 \\
25 \text{\&}xd5 \text{\&}h7 \\
26 \text{\&}c7 1-0
\end{array}
\]
8: 9...c5

1 e4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 Qc3 dxe4
4 Qxe4 Qd7
5 Qc4 Qgf6
6 Qg5 e6
7 Qe2 Qb6
8 Qb3 h6
9 Qf3 c5

Qe5 (11 c6 is insufficient to retain the initiative: 11...bxc6 12 Qh3 Qe7 13 0-0 Wb6 14 Qf4 Qa6 15 c4 c5 16 Qd3 0-0=, Suetin-Petrosian, Moscow 1959) 11...Qxe5 12 Wxe5 Wa5+ 13 Qd2 Wxc5 14 We2 Qe7 15 Qf3 0-0 16 Qe5 b6 17 f4 Qb7 18 0-0-0 Qad8 19 Qhe1 Qe4 20 Qe3 Wc7 with a complicated game (Van der Wiel-Mittelman, Leeuwarden 1995).

10 c3 Wc7 (releasing the pawn tension by 10...cx:d4 allows White to occupy the central squares: 11 Qxd4 Qe7 12 Qgf3 0-0 13 0-0 Qd7 14 Qe5 Qa4 15 Qf4 Wc8? 16 Qg6! Qe8 17 Qxe7+ Qxe7 18 Qf5, and to gain an advantage, Short-Adams, London 1989) 11 Qh3 Qd6 12 dxc5 Qxc5 13 Qf4 Qd6 (13...Wc7 14 Qe5!? 14 Qxd6 Wxd6 15 Qd1 Wc7 16 0-0 0-0 17 Qd4 with some initiative for White (Adams-Vyzhmanavin, Burgos 1993).

10 Qe3 Wc7 11 Qe5 Qd6 12 Qgf3 0-0 13 g4!? (or 13 0-0 a5 14 c4 Qbd7 15 Qxd7 Qxd7=, Stein-Smyslov, USSR 1964) 13...c4 14 Qxc4 Qxc4 15 Qxc4 Qxg4 16 Qg1 Qxe3 17 fxe3 b5 18 Qd3 Qb7 19 0-0-0 f5 20 Qb1 Qd5 with a complicated game (D.Frolov-Krogius, St Petersburg 1994).

10 ... Qbd5

In order to maintain the balance, energetic counterplay is required of Black. With a white rook about to appear on the d-file, the attempt to exchange the dark-square bishops by
10...\textit{d6} involves a certain loss of time: 11 \textit{g3}! \textit{e7} (or 11...\textit{gxg3} 12 \textit{hxg3} \textit{e7} 13 0–0–0 \textit{d7} 14 \textit{e5} cxd4 15 \textit{h4} 0–0–0 16 \textit{hxd4} with the better chances for White, Makropoulou-Dahl, Manila OL 1992) 12 dxc5 \textit{xxc5} 13 \textit{e5} \textit{d7} 14 \textit{gf3} \textit{h5} 15 0–0–0 with the better chances for White (Kasparov-Karapov, Linares 1992) – 	extit{Game 34}.

The recent continuation 10...\textit{a6} (with the idea of sacrificing a pawn: 11 0–0–0 \textit{c4}! 12 \textit{xc4} \textit{xc4} 13 \textit{xc4} \textit{d5} 14 \textit{d2} \textit{b5} 15 \textit{e2} \textit{b7} 16 \textit{e5}, and here in Kurpeichik-Spiridonov, Palma de Mallorca 1989, by playing 16...\textit{xc8}, with the idea of...\textit{e7},...0–0 and...b5-b4, Black would have gained a dangerous attack) has been compromised by the energetic reply 11 \textit{c4}! \textit{d6} (or 11...cxd4 12 0–0–0 \textit{c5} 13 \textit{dxd4} with the initiative for White, Watson-Spiridonov, Palma de Mallorca 1989 – 	extit{Game 35}) 12 \textit{e5} cxd4 13 0–0–0 \textit{xe5} 14 \textit{xe5} \textit{d7} 15 \textit{gf3} \textit{c7} 16 \textit{xd4} \textit{xe5} 17 \textit{xe5} with unpleasant pressure in the centre for White (Cs.Horvath-Kelecevic, Budapest 1992).

11 \textit{e5}

Passive is 11 \textit{g3} \textit{a5}+ 12 \textit{d2} cxd4 13 \textit{gf3} \textit{c5} 14 0–0 0–0 with an equal game (Belotti-Kallai, France 1993).

11...\textit{a5+}

12 \textit{d2}

After the exchange of queens 12 \textit{d2} \textit{xd2}+ 13 \textit{xd2} cxd4 14 \textit{gf3} \textit{c5} 15 0–0–0 0–0 the game is equal (Yang Xian-Adianto, Djakarta IZ 1993).

12...\textit{b5}

The voluntary ceding of the centre leaves White with the initiative: 12...cxd4 13 \textit{gf3} (after 13 \textit{xd4} \textit{c5} 14 \textit{e5} \textit{d7} 15 \textit{h3} 0–0–0 16 0–0 \textit{c6} 17 a4 \textit{d7} the game is equal, Ehlvest-Vyzhmanavin, Novosibirsk 1993) 13...\textit{e7} 14 \textit{e4} 0–0–0 15 0–0–0! (after 15 0–0 \textit{d7} 16 \textit{c4} \textit{b4} 17 \textit{d3} \textit{c6} 18 \textit{c3} \textit{f5} 19 a3 \textit{fd8} 20 \textit{fd1} \textit{e8} 21 \textit{f1} \textit{e4} 22 \textit{e1} \textit{g5} the game is equal, Anand-Karpov, Monaco 1993) 15...\textit{d7} 16 \textit{b1} \textit{b6} 17 \textit{c4} \textit{b4} 18 \textit{e4} \textit{xe4} 19 \textit{xe4} \textit{c5}?! 20 \textit{c2} \textit{c6} 21 \textit{g4} with a dangerous attack for White (Anand-Khalifman, Biel IZ 1993). Stronger is 19...\textit{fd8}!± (Khalifman).

13 \textit{dxc5}

13 \textit{e4} is also interesting: 13...\textit{b6} (or 13...\textit{bxc4} 14 \textit{xc4} \textit{b6} 15 \textit{b4} \textit{xb4} 16 \textit{b1} \textit{a5} with equal chances, Short-Speelman, Hastings 1988/9 – 	extit{Game 36}) 14 \textit{cxb5} \textit{c4} 15 \textit{xc4} \textit{b7} 16 \textit{gf3}?! (16 \textit{f1}!)

![Chess Diagram](attachment:chess_diagram.png)
16...\(\widetilde{Q}\)xc4 17 \(\widetilde{W}\)xc4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)c8 18 \(\widetilde{W}\)d3 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e4 19 \(\widetilde{W}\)e2 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xf3 20 \(\widetilde{W}\)xf3 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d5, and Black has the initiative for the pawn (Anand-Ivanchuk, Moscow Grand Prix 1994).

13 ... \(\widetilde{Q}\)xc5

14 c3

The pawn exchange in the centre has allowed Black to develop his pieces in active positions. He is ready to develop counterplay and therefore White aims to exploit the slight weakening of his opponent’s queenside.

The plan with queenside castling is risky: 14 0-0-0 \(\widetilde{Q}\)b7 15 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e7 (15...\(\widetilde{Q}\)xe4!? is even more energetic: 16 \(\widetilde{W}\)xe4 0-0-0, and 17 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f3?! is bad because of 17...\(\widetilde{Q}\)e3! 18 \(\widetilde{W}\)xd8+ \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd8 19 \(\widetilde{W}\)f4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f5\(\Box_b\), Blatny) 16 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d6+ \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd6 17 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd6 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d8! 18 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e5 (or 18 \(\widetilde{W}\)e5 \(\widetilde{W}\)b6 19 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd5 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd6 20 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xb7 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd1+ 21 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd1 \(\widetilde{W}\)xb7\(\Box_b\), Karpov) 18...0-0 19 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f3 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d7! and Black’s chances are preferable (Shabalov-Karpov, Tilburg 1994).

In J.Polgar-Leko (Vienna 1996) White immediately counter-attacked with 14 a4 and after mass exchanges 14...\(\widetilde{Q}\)b7 15 \(\widetilde{W}\)xb5+ \(\widetilde{W}\)xb5 16 axb5 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xf2+ 17 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xf2 \(\widetilde{Q}\)g4+ 18 \(\widetilde{W}\)e2 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xe5 19 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd5 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd5 20 \(\widetilde{Q}\)g3 gained the better ending thanks to her queenside pawn majority. 14...\(\widetilde{Q}\)d7 would have been more circumspect.

14 ... \(\widetilde{W}\)b6

Also possible is 14...\(\widetilde{Q}\)b7 15 \(\widetilde{Q}\)gf3 \(\widetilde{W}\)b6 16 0-0 0-0 17 \(\widetilde{Q}\)ad1 \(\widetilde{Q}\)ad8 with an equal game (Eichorn-Morgado, corr. 1994).

15 a4!

15 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd5, attempting to give Black an isolated pawn, can be met by 15...\(\widetilde{Q}\)xd5!, not fearing the complications after 16 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xg7 \(\widetilde{Q}\)g8 17 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xh6 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xg2 18 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)b7 19 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f3 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e3 20 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xe3 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xe3 21 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f6+ \(\widetilde{Q}\)e7 etc., while the two bishops give Black a good game in the event of 16 b4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f8 17 a4 bxa4 18 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xa4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)b7.

Ivanchuk-Gulko (Riga 1995) now continued 15...bxa4 16 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xa4+ \(\widetilde{Q}\)d7 17 \(\widetilde{Q}\)c4 \(\widetilde{W}\)d8 18 \(\widetilde{Q}\)f3 0-0 19 0-0 \(\widetilde{W}\)c8 20 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d6! \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd6 21 \(\widetilde{Q}\)xd6 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d8 22 \(\widetilde{Q}\)e5 a5 23 \(\widetilde{Q}\)c2 \(\widetilde{Q}\)c6 24 \(\widetilde{Q}\)d4 \(\widetilde{Q}\)b7 with equal chances.

Game 34
Kasparov-Karpov
Linares 1992

| 1 | e4          | c6          |
| 2 | d4          | d5          |
| 3 | \(\widetilde{Q}\)d2 | dxe4        |
| 4 | \(\widetilde{Q}\)xe4 | \(\widetilde{Q}\)d7 |
| 5 | \(\widetilde{Q}\)g5          | \(\widetilde{Q}\)gf6 |
| 6 | \(\widetilde{Q}\)c4          | e6          |
7 \textit{e2} \textit{b6} \\
8 \textit{b3} \textit{h6} \\
9 \textit{f3} \textit{c5} \\
10 \textit{f4} \textit{d6} \textit{d6} \\
10...\textit{bd5} is the main continuation. \\
11 \textit{g3}! \textit{e7} \\
12 \textit{xc5} \textit{xc5} \\
13 \textit{e5} \textit{d7} \\
14 \textit{gf3} \textit{h5} \\
15 0–0–0 \textit{xg3} \\
If immediately 15...0–0–0, then 16 \textit{xd7} \textit{xd7} 17 \textit{e5}! \textit{xe5} 18 \textit{xe5} is possible, with strong positional pressure. \\
16 \textit{hxg3} 0–0–0 \\

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

17 \textit{h5}! \textit{h5}!
One of Kasparov’s creative discoveries. While pressurising the kingside, the rook also joins the attack on the queenside. The threat is 18 \textit{xf7} \textit{xf7} 19 \textit{xc5}+.

17 ... \textit{e8} \\
18 \textit{xd8}+ \textit{xd8} \\
19 \textit{d2}+ \textit{d6} \\
20 \textit{d3} \textit{c7} \\
21 \textit{g4}! \textit{e8} \\
22 \textit{g5} \textit{f8}?! \\

Were the rook at h1, Black would have 22...h5. However, this total retreat is an unfortunate decision. 22...\textit{b8}! 23 \textit{gxh6 gxh6} 24 \textit{b1}± is stronger.

23 \textit{h4}! \\
The threat is stronger than the execution!

23 ... \textit{b8} \\
24 \textit{a4}! \textit{e7}?! \\
Stronger was 24...\textit{c8}! 25 \textit{b1}?!±.

25 \textit{a5} \textit{d5} \\
26 \textit{b1} \textit{d8}?! \\
And here 26...\textit{g8}?! 27 \textit{c4} \textit{w6} 28 \textit{d4} \textit{hxg5} 29 \textit{c4} \textit{f6} came into consideration (Kasparov).

27 \textit{a6} \textit{wa5} \\
28 \textit{we2}! \textit{d6} \\
29 \textit{axb7} \textit{axb7} \\

Now that Black’s queenside has been destroyed, it only remains for White to bring up the reserves — his rook.

29 ... \textit{xe5} \\
30 \textit{xe5} \textit{xe5} \\
31 \textit{h5}! \textit{f6} \\
32 \textit{a5} \textit{c6}
33 \text{c5} \text{xc5} \\
34 \text{xb7} \text{xb7} \\
35 \text{a6+} \text{c6} \\
36 \text{a4+} \text{d6} \\
37 \text{d3+} \text{d5} \\
38 \text{g3+} \text{e5} \\
39 \text{a3+} \text{c7} \\
40 \text{c5+} \text{d8} \\
41 \text{xa7+} 1-0

\text{Game 35} \\
\text{Watson-Spiridonov} \\
\text{Palma de Mallorca 1989}

1 \text{e4} \text{c6} \\
2 \text{d4} \text{d5} \\
3 \text{c3} \text{dxe4} \\
4 \text{xe4} \text{d7} \\
5 \text{c4} \text{gf6} \\
6 \text{g5} \text{e6} \\
7 \text{e2} \text{b6} \\
8 \text{b3} \text{h6} \\
9 \text{f3} \text{c5} \\
10 \text{f4} \text{a6} \\
11 \text{c4} \text{cxd4} \\
12 0-0 \text{c5} \\
13 \text{xd4} \text{e7}
13...\text{xd4} \text{is risky: 14 f3 } \text{xb2+} \\
15 \text{xb2} \text{d7} 16 \text{e5} \text{with a} \\
\text{dangerous initiative for White.}
14 \text{gf3} 0-0 \\
15 \text{h1} \text{d8} \\
16 \text{c1} \text{d7} \\
17 \text{g4} \text{e5}?! \\

A very clever resource, in accordance with classical rules: a \\
flank attack should be met by a \\
counterattack in the centre.
18 \text{xe5} \text{xd4} \\
19 \text{xd4} \text{f5+}

20 \text{xf5} \text{xd4}

\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}

The subsequent play resembles a \\
fencing contest, in which the decisive \\
hit is landed by Watson.
21 \text{xb6} \text{g4!} \\
22 \text{xg4} \text{g4} \\
23 \text{g7!} \text{g7} \\
Or 23...\text{g5} 24 \text{xg4} \text{xg7} 25 \text{h3!} \\
\text{d7} 26 \text{e7} (\text{Watson}).
24 \text{xg4} \text{f8} \\
25 \text{f4}!

As a result White has three, albeit \\
unconnected, pawns for the exchange, \\
and in addition the black king has not \\
yet found any peace.
25 \ldots \text{d7} \\
26 \text{d7} \text{xd7} \\
27 \text{a3} \text{d8} \\
28 \text{f6} \text{d3} \\
29 \text{c2} \text{d4} \\
30 \text{h6} \text{e8} \\
31 \text{f5} \text{c5} \\
32 \text{h8} \text{f8} \\
33 \text{h5} \text{d6} \\
33...\text{d6} 34 \text{g5} \text{is a tougher \\
defence.}
34 \text{e2} \text{d8}
An interesting idea of Ivanchuk is to sacrifice a pawn by 13...\texttt{\textdaggerdbl}b6 14 cxb5 c4.

14 \textbf{\textdagger}xc4 \textbf{\textdaggerdbl}b6
15 b4!?

With this pawn sacrifice White tries to seize the initiative.

15 ... \texttt{\textdagger}xb4
16 \texttt{\textdagger}b1 \texttt{\textdagger}a5
17 \texttt{\textdagger}b5+ \texttt{\textdagger}d7
18 \texttt{\textdagger}xf6! gxf6
19 \texttt{\textdagger}gf3 cxd4
20 0–0 \texttt{\textdagger}d8

Black’s position looks very hazardous, but there are no real threats.

23 ... f5
24 \texttt{\textdagger}g3?

Now the initiative passes to Black. 24 \texttt{\textdagger}xd7 \texttt{\textdagger}xd7 25 \texttt{\textdagger}c6 \texttt{\textdagger}xd1+ 26 \texttt{\textdagger}xd1 \texttt{\textdagger}a4 27 \texttt{\textdagger}xe7 \texttt{\textdagger}xe4!? 28 \texttt{\textdagger}b2 e5 29 \texttt{\textdagger}a3 \texttt{\textdagger}g7 30 g3 would have led to a double-edged game (Speelman).
24 \ldots \textcolor{blue}{\text{cxb5}}!

25 \textcolor{blue}{\text{cxb5}} \textcolor{blue}{\text{d5}}

26 \textcolor{blue}{\text{b3}} \textcolor{blue}{h5}?!?

27 \textcolor{blue}{\text{d4}}?!

27 \textcolor{blue}{\text{dxe5}}?! should have been ventured.

27 \ldots \textcolor{blue}{\text{f4}}!

28 \textcolor{blue}{\text{f1}} \textcolor{red}{\text{xa2}}

29 \textcolor{blue}{\text{f3}} \textcolor{red}{h4}

30 \textcolor{blue}{\text{gxf5}}! \textcolor{red}{\text{exf5}}

31 \textcolor{blue}{\text{xf4}} \textcolor{red}{\text{h6}}!

32 \textcolor{blue}{\text{a1}}?

White could have picked up a pawn by 32 \textcolor{blue}{\text{xf5}}! \textcolor{red}{\text{hd6}} 33 \textcolor{blue}{\text{f4}}.

32 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\text{d2}}

33 \textcolor{blue}{\text{e2}}?

An oversight. As shown by Speelman, the only way to hold the position was 33 \textcolor{red}{\text{c4}}! \textcolor{red}{\text{hd6}} 34 \textcolor{blue}{\text{xf5}} \textcolor{blue}{\text{f6}} 35 \textcolor{blue}{\text{xf6}} \textcolor{blue}{\text{xf6}} 36 \textcolor{blue}{\text{b3}}, although after 36\ldots\textcolor{red}{\text{d5}} 37 \textcolor{red}{\text{xd5}} \textcolor{blue}{\text{xd5}} the ending is clearly better for Black, who has an outside passed pawn.

33 \ldots \textcolor{blue}{\text{e6}}

34 \textcolor{blue}{\text{xf5}} \textcolor{red}{\text{xe2}}

35 \textcolor{blue}{\text{c1}} \textcolor{blue}{\text{ed6}}

0\text{-}1
PART III: 5  ♜f3  ♜gf6

1 e4  c6
2 d4  d5
3  ♓c3  dxe4
4  ♔xe4  ♔d7
5  ♔f3

The modest 5 c3  ♔gf6 has no independent significance, as 6  ♔xf6+  ♔xf6 7  ♔f3 or 6  ♔g3  c5 7  ♔f3 transposes into other lines.

5 ...  ♔gf6

After 5...  ♔df6 White can play 6  ♔eg5, transposing into variations examined in Chapter 4 (5  ♔g5  ♔dg6 6  ♔f1f3).

Here White’s main continuations are 6  ♔xf6+ (Chapter 9) and 6  ♔g3 (Chapters 10 and 11).

After the sortie 6  ♔eg5 and the soundest reply 6...e6 7  ♔d3, play transposes into variations examined in Chapters 1-3.

After the retreat 6  ♔c3:

(a) Black can equalise using Flohr’s prescription of 6...  ♔b6 7  ♔f4  ♔f5, e.g. 8  ♔d3  ♔xd3 9  ♔xd3  e6 10 0–0  ♔e7 11  ♔f1 0–0 12  ♔g5  h6 13  ♔ge4  ♔bd5= (Antoshin-Flohr, 22nd USSR Ch 1955);
(b) the classical 6...e6 7 d3 (or 7
g3 b6 8 g2 a6 9 e2 e7 10 0–0
0–0=, Spassky-Speelman, London
1982) is also possible:

(b1) 7...e7 8 0–0 0–0 (premature
is 8...c5 9 e2 cxd4 10 xd4 0–0 11
g5 c5 12 ad1 xd3 13 xd3
with the better game for White,
Bronstein-Flohr, USSR 1946) 9 e2
b5! 10 e4 b7 11 e1 c5 12 xf6+
xf6 13 dxc5 xc5 14 g5 h6 15
h4 g5 16 g3 h5 with equal
chances (Bronstein-Razuvaev, Mos-
cow 1978);

(b2) 7...c5 8 e2 cxd4 9 xd4
c5 10 b3 d6? (better 10...e7±)
11 g5 a6 12 0–0–0 e7 13 b1 0–0
14 e4 with an attacking position for
White (Tal-Shamkovich, 40th USSR
Ch 1972).
Nowadays after 7...\$g4 White plays more shrewdly: 8 h3 \$xf3 (if 8...\$h5 Black has to reckon with 9 g4 \$g6 10 \$e5, e.g. 10...\$d7 11 \$xg6 hxg6 12 d5 cxd5 13 \$xd5 \$c7 14 \$g2 \$b8 15 \$e3 and White has two active bishops plus a spatial advantage, Nikolenko-Donchenko, Moscow 1990) 9 \$xf3 \$d5 10 \$e2 e6 11 0–0 \$xf3 (also possible is 11...\$d6 12 \$d3 \$c7 13 \$f3 \$d7 14 \$d1 0–0 15 c4 \$ad8 16 \$b3 \$e7=, Kasparov-Karpov (WC match (14), Seville 1987) 12 \$xf3 \$d6 13 \$d2 0–0 14 \$ad1 \$fd8 15 g3 \$d7 16 \$c1 \$ad8 17 \$g2 \$e7 18 \$e2 \$d5 19 f4 with some initiative for White, although Black’s position is solid enough (Nikolenko-Podgaets, Moscow 1992).

Against the modest 7 c3 Petrosian suggested 7...\$g4. His game with Pilnik (Amsterdam CT 1956) continued 8 \$e2 e6 9 h3 \$h5 10 \$e5 \$xe2 11 \$xe2 \$d6 12 \$g5 \$c7 13 0–0–0 \$d7 14 \$he1 0–0 15 \$b1 \$ae8, and Black solved his opening problems.

\[ 9.1 (1 \ e4 \ c6 \ 2 \ d4 \ d5 \ 3 \ \$c3 \ dxe4 \ 4 \ \$xe4 \ \$d7 \ 5 \ \$f3 \ \$gf6 \ 6 \ \$xf6+ \ \$xf6) \]

7 \$e5

An aggressive sortie: White immediately occupies the key square of the position. Here Black’s main replies are 7...\$d7 (9.11) and 7...\$e6 (9.12).

If he develops with 7...\$f5 8 c3 e6 he has to reckon with the flank attack 9 g4! \$g6 10 h4 \$d6 (weaker is 10...h5 11 g5 \$d5 12 \$xg6 fxg6 13 \$c2 \$f7 14 \$h3 \$e7 15 \$c4 \$f5 16 \$f3 \$d7 17 \$xf5+! with advan-
tage to White, Karpov-Hort, Bugojno 1978) 11 \(\text{We}2\) c5 (or 11...\(\text{Wa}5\) 12 \(\text{Ag}2\) 0–0–0 13 h5\(\pm\), Malishauskas-Kostenko, Warsaw 1993) 12 \(\text{Ag}2\) cxd4 13 h5 dxc3 14 \(\text{Wb}5+\) \(\text{Af}8\) 15 hxg6 with advantage to White (Ciric).

However, 8...\(\text{Cd}7\) comes into consideration. Kavalek-Barcza (Caracas 1971) continued 9 \(\text{Dxf}7\) \(\text{Xf}7\) 10 \(\text{Df}3\) e6 11 g4 \(\text{Wf}6\) 12 gxf5 \(\text{Wf}5\) 13 \(\text{We}3\) c5 14 \(\text{Ah}3\) cxd4 15 cxd4 \(\text{Ab}4+\) 16 \(\text{Af}1\) \(\text{Wb}5+\) 17 \(\text{Ag}1\) \(\text{He}8\) 18 \(\text{Wb}3\) \(\text{Wb}6\) 19 \(\text{Je}3\), although here too White’s chances are preferable.

8 \(\text{Je}3\) \(\text{Dxe}5\) 9 dxe5 \(\text{Af}5\) (winning a pawn by 9...\(\text{Wa}5+\) 10 \(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{Wxe}5\) allows White a lead in development after 11 0–0–0) 10 \(\text{Wxd}8+\) \(\text{Dd}8\) 11 \(\text{Jxa}7\) \(\text{Xc}2\) 12 \(\text{Ab}6\) \(\text{Ma}8\) 13 \(\text{Cc}4\) e6 14 f3 \(\text{Ma}4\) with equal chances (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (2), Linnaes 1987);

8 \(\text{Af}4\) \(\text{Dxe}5\) 9 \(\text{Xxe}5\), and now:

(a) 9...\(\text{Wb}6?!\) 10 \(\text{Ad}3\) f6 (taking the b2 pawn would have left Black seriously behind in development) 11 \(\text{Ag}3\) \(\text{Ae}6\) 12 \(\text{We}2\) \(\text{Af}7\) 13 0–0 e6 14 c3 0–0–0 15 \(\text{Cc}4\) \(\text{Me}8\) 16 b4, and White quickly broke through on the queenside (Larsen-Rogoff, Lone Pine 1978);

(b) 9...\(\text{Af}5\) 10 \(\text{Ad}3\) \(\text{Ag}6\) (stronger than 10...\(\text{Xd}3\) 11 \(\text{Wxd}3\) e6 12 0–0 \(\text{Wd}7\) 13 \(\text{Me}1\) \(\text{Dd}8\) 14 \(\text{Hd}1\)\(\pm\) (De Wit-Bakker, Holland 1985)) 11 0–0 e6 12 \(\text{Me}1\) \(\text{Wb}6\) 13 a4 a5 14 \(\text{Wf}3\) \(\text{Xd}3\) 15 \(\text{Wxd}3\) 0–0–0 with equal chances (Fleck-Meduna, Porz 1988);

(c) 9...\(\text{Wd}5\) 10 c4 (10 \(\text{Je}2\) f6 11 \(\text{Ag}3\) \(\text{Wxg}2\) 12 \(\text{Af}3\) \(\text{Wh}3\) 13 d5 is unclear, Jansa-Radulov, Vrnjacka Banja 1983) 10...\(\text{Wa}5+\) 11 \(\text{Wd}2\) \(\text{Wxd}2+\) 12 \(\text{Xxd}2\) \(\text{Af}5\) 13 \(\text{Ad}3\) with a drawish ending (Hübner-Karpov, Wijk aan Zee 1988);

8 \(\text{Dxd}7\) \(\text{Xd}7\) (or 8...\(\text{Wxd}7\) 9 c3 \(\text{Wg}4\) with further simplification, Smagin-Chernin, Moscow 1988), and the position is completely equal, as even 9 \(\text{Ad}3\) can be answered by 9...\(\text{Af}5\) 10 0–0 (or 10 \(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{Wa}5\)) 10...\(\text{Xxd}3\) 11 \(\text{Wxd}3\) e6 12 \(\text{Af}4\) \(\text{Ad}6\) with an imminent draw (Matanovic-Radulov, Surakarta 1982).
8 ... g6

Also possible is 8...f6 9 c3 f5 10 e2 (or 10 e5 g6 11 g5 d7 12 xg6 hxg6 13 c4 b6 14 b3 d7=, Belyavsky-Lerner, USSR 1980) 10...e6 11 g4 xd3 12 xd3 d6 13 f4 c7 14 f3 0–0–0 15 b4 h5 16 g5 d5 17 0–0 f6 18 gxf6 gxf6 19 d2 with slightly the better chances for White (Grünfeld-Gallagher, Tel Aviv 1988).

9 e3

Or 9 c3 g7 10 f4 (10 e2 can be met by 10...e5 11 dxe5 dxe5 12 xe5 xd1+ 13 xd1 xe5 with simplification) 10...a5 11 d2 0–0 12 e2 e5 13 dxe5 xe5 with equal chances (Karpov-Sosonko, Amsterdam 1980).

9 ... g7
10 d2 b6

If 10...e5, then 11 h6! is unpleasant.

11 e5 e6
12 e2

If 12 0–0–0 Black can risk taking the pawn: 12...xa2 13 b3 a5 14 b2 a4 15 a1 (15 xa2 axb3+ 16 xb3 d5) 15...axb3 16 cxb3 xb3 17 xa8 xa8 18 xb3 0–0 with sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece (Timman).

12 ... 0–0
13 0–0–0 f6

The piece sacrifice suggested by Timman also comes into consideration: 13...xa2 14 b3 a5 15 b2 a4 16 a1 axb3 17 cxb3 xb3 18 xd5+ 19 c4, with unclear consequences.

Timman-Korchnoi (Montpellier CT 1985) now continued 14 d3 c4 15 wc3 xe3 16 fxe3 d5 17 f4 h6 18 hf1 xf4 19 xf4 d6 with equal chances.

9.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxe4 4 xe4 d7 5 f3 gf6 6 xf6+ xf6 7 e5)

7 ... e6

Black chooses a plan of piece development.

8 e2 g6
9 0–0  
10 c4

Passive is 10 c3 0–0 11 ♘f4 ♘d7 12 ♘f3 ♘d5 13 ♙c2 ♗e8 14 ♙ad1 e5 15 dxe5 ♙c7 16 ♘g3 ♘xe5 17 ♘d4 \(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\) (Tal-Agdestein, Wijk aan Zee 1988).

10 ... 0–0
11 ♘e3 ♘e4

11...♘e8 is also played, with the same idea: 12 ♘f4 ♘d6 13 d5 cxd5 14 cxd5 ♘f5! The game is equal (Grünfeld-Dlugy, New York 1985).

To 11...♘d7 White can also reply 12 f4 (if 12 ♘f3 ♘f6 13 h3 ♘e4 14 ♙c1 b5!? 15 cxb5 cxb5 16 ♘xb5 ♘d5 with active piece play for the pawn, Belyavsky-Korchnoi, Montpellier CT 1985) 12...♘xe5 13 fxe5 ♙c7 14 ♙b3 ♙ad8 15 ♙ad1 b5 16 ♙c3 ♙b8, and here in Larsen-Arkell (London 1991) he could have retained some advantage by 17 b3.

12 f4

12 ♙c2 can be met by 12...♘d6 13 b3 c5! 14 ♙ad1 ♘f5 15 d5 ♘xe5 16 dxe6 ♙c7 17 exf7+ ♘xf7 18 g3 ♙af8 19 ♘g4! ♘xe3 20 fxe3 ♙xf1+ \(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\) (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (3), Linares 1987).

12 ... ♔f6

Or 12...♘d6 13 b3 ♙a5 14 ♙c2 ♙fd8 15 ♙ad1 with somewhat the better chances for White (Ivanovic-Watson, Bor 1986) – Game 37.

Psakhis-Tukmakov (54th USSR Ch 1987) now continued 13 ♘f3 ♘f7 14 ♙c2 ♘d6 15 ♘d3 b5 16 b3 bxc4 17 bxc4, and White’s spatial advantage gave him the better chances.
(Black can also consider 10...b5!? 11 \\xd3 \xd3 12 \xd3 0–0 13 \xe5 \xd5 14 g3 \xd8 15 \xb1 \xc8 16 \xd1 c5 with an equal game, Loffler-Lee, Biel 1991), and now:

(a) 11 h3 \xf3 12 \xf3 \xd5 13 \xe7 \xe7 14 \xe1 (or 14 \xb1 \xd8 15 \xe4 b5 16 \xd3 a5 17 c3 \xd6 18 g3 b4 19 c4 \xd6 and Black maintains the balance, Fischer-Petrosian, Bled 1961) 14...0–0 15 \xb1 \xd8 with equal chances (Matanovic-Petrosian, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1959) – Game 1.

(b) 11 \b1 0–0 (if 11...\xd5 Fischer recommended 12 \c1\±, but 11...b5!? 12 \b3 0–0 or 12 \xd3 \d5 comes into consideration) 12 h3 \xf3 13 \xf3 \xd5!? (driving back the bishop; after 13...b5 14 \xd3 \d5 15 \xe3 \ac8 16 g4 \xd8 17 f4 \f8 18 f5 White develops a strong attack, Tiviakov-Adams, match (3), New York 1994) 14 \c1 \g5 15 \xe3 with slightly the better chances for White (Tiviakov).

8 ... e6

9 \xe5

Initially 9 \xe1 was played, but in this case Black can prevent the advance of the knight: 9...g4 10 c3 \xd6 (or 10...\e7 11 h3 \xf3 12 \xf3 0–0 13 g3 b5 14 \f1 \d5 15 h4! \f6 16 \d3\±, Ehlvest-Kharitonov, 55th USSR Ch 1988) 11 \e2 \c7, and now if 12 \xe5 Podgaets recommends 12...\xe5!? 13 dxe5 \d8 14 \a4 \xe5 15 \f4 \f5 16 \c7 \d7 17 \xa7 0–0 18 \xg4 \xg4 19 f3 \f2?! with chances for both sides.

In Short-Gulko (match (1), New York 1994) White played 9 h3 \e7 10 c3 0–0 11 \e2 c5 (11...b5!? 12 \b3 \e4 came into consideration) 12 \f4! \e4 13 \ad1, and here with 13...\b6!? Black could have gained a good game.

9 ... \d6

After the more passive 9...\e7 10 c3 \d7 11 \f4 0–0 12 \e2 \b6 13 \b3 a5 14 a3 \d5 15 \g3 \e8 16 \ad1 White’s position is slightly preferable (Rozentalis-Epishin, Vilnius 1988).

10 \e2

Or 10 c3 \c7 11 \e2 0–0 0 12 \e1 \b8 13 \f4 \d5 14 \g3 h5 with chances for both sides (Akopian-Adams, Manila OL 1992).

10 ... \c7

11 h3

Preparing in the event of 11...0–0 the pawn attack 12 g4 \g6 13 f4.

11 ... h6

12 \e1

12 g4 \h7 13 \xf7 \xf7 14 \xe6+ \f8 is dubious for White.

12 ... 0–0 0

13 \b3 \d5

14 \d2

White’s chances are preferable (Yakovich-Hoogendoorn, Amsterdam 1995) – Game 39.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game 37</th>
<th>Ivanovic-Watson</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bor 1986</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 e4 c6

2 d4 d5
6 $\text{Qxf6 + Qxf6}$

3 $\text{Qc3}$ dxe4
4 $\text{Qxe4}$ $\text{Qd7}$
5 $\text{Qf3}$ $\text{Qg6}$
6 $\text{Qxf6 + Qxf6}$
7 $\text{Qe5}$ $\text{Qe6}$
8 $\text{Qe2}$ g6
9 0–0 $\text{Qg7}$
10 c4 0–0
11 $\text{Qe3}$

11 ... $\text{Qe8}$
11...$\text{Qe4}$ is more active, although after 12 f4 $\text{Qd6}$ the same position is reached.

12 f4 $\text{Qd6}$
13 b3 $\text{Qa5}$
14 $\text{Qc2}$ $\text{Qfd8}$
15 $\text{Qad1}$ $\text{Qac8}$
16 g4 f6
17 $\text{Qd3}$ f5

After 17...$\text{Qf7}$ White has the opportunity to strengthen his position by 18 $\text{Qf3}$.

18 $\text{Qc5}$ $\text{Qf7}$
19 h3 b6
20 $\text{Qd3}$ $\text{Qe4}$
21 $\text{Qe5}$ $\text{Qc3}$
22 $\text{Qd3}$!

22 ... $\text{Qxc2}?!$

White has a spatial advantage, and going into an endgame merely aggravates Black’s problems. His pieces are well enough placed for play in the middlegame, and it would have been better to attack the centre: 22...c5! 23 gxf5 cxd4 with adequate counterplay.

23 $\text{Qxc2}$ $\text{Qc3}$
24 $\text{Qde1}$ $\text{Qxe5}$?

Watson considers 24...$\text{Qxa2}$ 25 gxf5 $\text{Qb4}$! 26 $\text{Qb1}$ $\text{Qd6}$ to be best, when, although Black’s position is still inferior, he can defend.

25 $\text{fxe5}$ $\text{fxg4}$
26 $\text{Qd2}$!

An important intermediate move, after which White wins a piece.

26 ... $\text{Qxa2}$
27 e6! $\text{Qxe6}$
28 $\text{Qxe6}$ $\text{Qxd4}$
29 $\text{Qh6}$ $\text{Qb4}$
30 $\text{Qxe7}$ gxh3
31 $\text{Qg7+}$ $\text{Qh8}$
32 $\text{Qf7}$ h2+
33 $\text{Qh1}$ 1–0
Game 38
Gligoric-Petrosian
USSR v. Yugoslavia 1957

1  e4  c6
2  d4  d5
3  c3  dx e4
4  x e4  d7
5  f3  g6
6  xf6+  xf6
7  c4  f5
8  e5  e6
9  b3

Now White threatens to pursue the bishop: 10 g4 e4 11 f3 g6 12 h4.
9  ...  d6
10  w e2  d7

10...wc7 is more logical.
11  d2

The idea of the knight sacrifice at f7 is, as they say, in the air, but for the
moment it is ineffective: 11 xf7
xf7 12 g4 f6! 13 gxf5 wa5+ 14
d2 w xf5
11  ...  a5?

But now the time is ripe! 11...xe5
12 dx e5 wc7 was essential.

12  xf7!  xf7
13  g4  w f6

If 13...g6 there follows 14
xe6+ and 15 wxd6.
14  gxf5  w f5
15  0–0–0  a4

Otherwise White plays 16 c4.
16  c4  f6
17  hg1  ae8

Black parries the threat of 18
xe6+ wxe6 19 xg7+ while leaving
his rook at h8 for the defence of the
kingside. White’s position is so
impressive, that it seems a miracle
that Petrosian was able to hold out for
a further 55 moves.
18  g5  w e4
19  e3  a3
20  dg1  g6
21  d3  w h4
22  f3  axb2+
23  b1  e7
24  a5  a8
25  e5  fh8

After 25 xa2 26 xa2 xe5
White can play 27 c3.
26  g5  xd4
27  e4  wc5

27...wc3 fails to 28 xe6+! xe6
29 f5+.
28  w h3

As shown by Gligoric himself, here
he chose an inexact move order (28
c4 was more accurate), since now
Black could have played 28...w f5!
28  ...  e5
29  c4  d8
30  w e6  c7

If 30...e7 there follows 31 d1+
ec7 32 xe5.
31 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{Wxf2} \)
32 \( \text{Rf1} \) \( \text{Wg2} \)
33 \( \text{Gg4} \) \( \text{Wh3} \)

34 \( \text{Rd1}?! \)
After the simple 34 \( \text{Rg1} \) Black would have been defenceless. Now in a severe time scramble Petrosian as though gains a second wind.
34 \( ... \) \( \text{Xxf6} \)
35 \( \text{Wxf6} \) \( \text{Wxg4} \)
36 \( \text{Wxd6+} \) \( \text{Rb6} \)
37 \( \text{Be6} \) \( \text{We4} \)
38 \( \text{Bxb2} \) \( \text{g5} \)
39 \( \text{Rb3}? \)
After 39 \( \text{Rd3}! \) the game would have concluded much more quickly.
39 \( ... \) \( \text{g4} \)
40 \( \text{Ff1} \) \( \text{h5} \)
41 \( \text{Ff7} \) \( \text{Wd4+} \)
42 \( \text{Wxd4+} \) \( \text{exd4} \)
43 \( \text{Hf4} \) \( \text{Xd8} \)

The sealed move. 43...\( \text{Je8} \) 44 \( \text{Xxd4} \) \( \text{He2} \) was interesting, when after 45 h3 g3 46 \( \text{d3} \) h4 or 45 h4 \( \text{Hh2} \) 46 \( \text{Hd7} \) \( \text{Xh4} \) it is hard for White to capitalise on his extra piece (Gligoric).

44 \( \text{Cc4} \) \( \text{Cc5} \)
45 \( \text{Bb3} \) \( \text{b5} \)
46 \( \text{Hf5+} \) \( \text{Hb6} \)
47 \( \text{Gf1} \) \( \text{c5} \)
48 \( \text{Hxh5} \) \( \text{c4+} \)
49 \( \text{Bb4} \) \( \text{d3} \)
50 \( \text{Hxb5+!} \) \( \text{Aa7} \)
51 \( \text{Cxd3} \)

51 \( \text{c3} \) does not work, since the loss of the h-pawn leads to a rook ending with a- and c-pawns, which is well known for its drawing tendencies.
51 \( ... \) \( \text{Cxd3} \)
52 \( \text{Hg5} \) \( \text{d2} \)
53 \( \text{Be2} \) \( \text{d1=H} \)
54 \( \text{Axd1} \) \( \text{Axd1} \)
55 \( \text{Hxg4} \) \( \text{d2} \)
56 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{Hxa2} \)
57 \( \text{Cc5} \) \( \text{Hh2} \)

58 \( \text{Bb4}! \)
Cutting off the king at the maximum distance from the passed pawn. After the complacent 58 \( \text{Cd6} \) \( \text{Hb7} \) 59 \( \text{He6} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 60 \( \text{Ff6} \) \( \text{Fd7} \) 61 \( \text{Ag5} \) \( \text{Be7} \) the black king is in the drawing zone.
58 \( ... \) \( \text{Aa6} \)
59 ¿c6  ¿c2+
60 ¿d6  ¿c1
61 ¿e6  ¿c5
62 ¿f6  ¿a5
63 ¿f4  ¿b6
64 ¿g6  ¿c1
65 h5  ¿g1+
66 ¿f7  ¿c7
67 ¿f6  ¿d7
68 h6  ¿h1
69 ¿g7  ¿e7
70 ¿g6  ¿f1
71 h7  ¿f7+
72 ¿h6  1–0

In the event of 15...¿dg8 White follows the same plan as in the game:
16 ¿xd5 cxd5 (16...exd5? 17 ¿xf7)
17 c4! dxc4 18 ¿ac1 ¿xe5 19 ¿xe5 ¿b8 20 b3, opening lines for an attack on the castled position.

16 ¿ad1  ¿g8
17 ¿xd5!  ¿exd5
18 c4  ¿e4?

Allowing a decisive exchange sacrifice. 18...dxc4!? 19 ¿xc4 ¿e6 was essential.

Game 39
Yakovich-Hoogendoorn
Amsterdam 1995

1 e4  c6
2 d4  d5
3 ¿c3  dxe4
4 ¿xe4  ¿d7
5 ¿f3  ¿gf6
6 ¿xf6+  ¿xf6
7 ¿c4  ¿f5
8 ¿e5  e6
9 0–0  ¿d6
10 ¿e2  ¿c7
11 h3  h6
12 ¿e1  0–0–0
13 ¿b3  ¿d5
14 ¿d2  g5
15 ¿h5  ¿h7
19 ¿xe4!  dxe4
20 ¿g4+  ¿d8

If 20...¿b8 there follows 21 ¿d7+ ¿a8 22 ¿f6. But now White strikes a blow from the flank.

21 ¿a5!  b6
22 ¿xe4  f5
23 ¿xc6+  ¿e8
24 ¿e6+  1–0
10: 6 \textit{\texttt{g3}} e6

| 1 | e4    | c6   |
| 2 | d4    | d5   |
| 3 | \textit{\texttt{c3}} | dxe4 |
| 4 | \textit{\texttt{xe4}} | \textit{\texttt{d7}} |
| 5 | \textit{\texttt{f3}} | \textit{\texttt{g6}} |
| 6 | \textit{\texttt{g3}} |     |

This knight retreat leads to more complicated play. From here it can in some cases be included in the attack on the king (\textit{\texttt{g3}}-h5). Black’s main counterplay again involves undermining the centre by ...c6-c5.

6 ... e6

6...c5 is examined in Chapter 11.

The attempt to exploit the ‘awkward’ position of the knight at g3 by 6.h5 can be met by 7 \textit{\texttt{d3}} since 7...h4 runs into the typical attack 8 \textit{\texttt{df5}} h3 9 gxh3 \textit{\texttt{xh3}} 10 \textit{\texttt{we2}} e6 11 \textit{\texttt{g5}} \textit{\texttt{h8}} 12 \textit{\texttt{exe6+}}, while after 7...e6 8 \textit{\texttt{we2}} c5 9 \textit{\texttt{g5}} \textit{\texttt{a5+}} 10 \textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{wb6}} 11 0-0-0 cxd4 12 \textit{\texttt{he1}} \textit{\texttt{c5}} 13 \textit{\texttt{c3!}} dxc3 14 \textit{\texttt{xc3}} White has a strong initiative (Gurgenidze-Kopylov, USSR 1958).

7 \textit{\texttt{d3}}

The more modest 7 \textit{\texttt{e2}} c5 8 0-0 is no less dangerous:

(a) 8...\textit{\texttt{wc7}} 9 c4 cxd4 10 \textit{\texttt{wd4}} b6 11 \textit{\texttt{f4}} \textit{\texttt{c5}} 12 \textit{\texttt{wd3}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 13 \textit{\texttt{ad1}} \textit{\texttt{e7}} 14 \textit{\texttt{d4!}} (after 14 \textit{\texttt{dg5}}? 0-0 15 \textit{\texttt{wc2}} \textit{\texttt{f8}}! 16 b4 \textit{\texttt{wc6}} Black gained the better chances in Conquest-Speelman, Hastings 1995) 14...e5 (or 14...0-0 15 \textit{\texttt{eb5}}) 15 \textit{\texttt{eb3}} \textit{\texttt{wc7}} 16 \textit{\texttt{e3}} 0-0 17 \textit{\texttt{f5}} and White retains a slight, but enduring advantage;

(b) 8...cxd4 9 \textit{\texttt{xd4}} (also interesting is 9 \textit{\texttt{wd4}} \textit{\texttt{e7}} 10 \textit{\texttt{f4}} 0-0 11 c4 b6 12 \textit{\texttt{de4}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 13 \textit{\texttt{c3}}, and here in Westerinen-Christiansen, Wijk aan Zee 1976, Black could have maintained equal chances by 13...\textit{\texttt{c5}})

9...\textit{\texttt{c5}} 10 b3 0-0 11 \textit{\texttt{b2}} a6 12 c4 \textit{\texttt{wc7}} 13 a3 b6 14 b4 \textit{\texttt{e7}} 15 \textit{\texttt{f3}} (or 15 \textit{\texttt{e1}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 16 \textit{\texttt{d3}} \textit{\texttt{fe8}} 17 \textit{\texttt{wc2}}?! \textit{\texttt{f8}}! 18 \textit{\texttt{ac1}} \textit{\texttt{g6}} 19 \textit{\texttt{we2}} \textit{\texttt{f4}} 20 \textit{\texttt{xf1}} \textit{\texttt{ad8}}?!, Waitzkin-Serper, New York 1996; 17 \textit{\texttt{h5!?}}) 15...\textit{\texttt{b7}} 16 \textit{\texttt{xb7}} \textit{\texttt{wb7}} 17 \textit{\texttt{wc2}}, and White’s chances are slightly preferable.

7 ... c5

The most energetic move. Delaying this attack on the centre allows White to retain an enduring initiative: 7...\textit{\texttt{e7}} 8 0-0 0-0 9 \textit{\texttt{wc2}} b6 (9...c5!)

10 c4 \textit{\texttt{b7}} 11 \textit{\texttt{f4}} \textit{\texttt{e8}} 12 \textit{\texttt{ad1}} c5 13 dxc5 bxc5?! 14 \textit{\texttt{e5}} \textit{\texttt{wb6}} 15 \textit{\texttt{h7+}}! \textit{\texttt{xe7}} 16 \textit{\texttt{xd7}} with
advantage to White (Tal-Miles, Porz 1981/2).

8 0–0

Accurate play is also required of Black after the modest 8 c3 cxd4 9
\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{x} \text{d}4 \text{ } \text{c}\text{c}5 \) (the less active 9...\( \text{a} \text{e}7 \)) 10
0–0 \( \text{d} \text{e}5 \) 11 \( \text{c} \text{c}2 \text{ } \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}7 \) 12 \( \text{e} \text{e}1 \text{ } \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}6 \) 13
\( \text{f} \text{f}3 \text{ } \text{w} \text{c}7 \) 14 \( \text{w} \text{e}2 \) allowed White the better chances in Bronstein-Petrosian,
Moscow 1967 – Game 3) 10 \( \text{c} \text{c}2 \):

(a) 10...\( \text{e} \text{e}5 \)?! 11 0–0 0–0 12 \( \text{g} \text{g}5 \)
h6 13 \( \text{a} \text{x} \text{f}6 \) \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{f}6 \) 14 \( \text{e} \text{e}1 \text{ } \text{\textit{c}} \text{d}7 \) 15
\( \text{h} \text{h}5 \) ! \( \text{w} \text{g}5 \) 16 h4! \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{h} \text{h}4 \) 17 \( \text{e} \text{e}4 \text{ } \text{w} \text{e}7 \)
18 \( \text{f} \text{f}5 \) with a strong attack for White
(Tseshkovsky-Bagirov, Telavi 1982);

(b) 10...b6 11 \( \text{e} \text{e}4 \text{ } \text{b} \text{b}7 \) 12 \( \text{a} \text{x} \text{c}5 \text{ } \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}5 \) 13 0–0 0–0 14 \( \text{e} \text{e}1 \) and White’s
chances are preferable (Mark Tseitlin-
Bagirov, Telavi 1982);

(c) 10...0–0 11 0–0 \( \text{w} \text{c}7 \) (or
11...\( \text{a} \text{e}8 \) 12 \( \text{g} \text{g}5 \) a6 13 \( \text{w} \text{f}3 \text{ } \text{a} \text{x} \text{d}4 \) 14
cxd4 \( \text{w} \text{a}5 \) 15 \( \text{e} \text{e}3 \text{ } \text{w} \text{d}5 \) 16 \( \text{w} \text{e}2 \) b6 17
\( \text{b} \text{b}3 \) , Taulbut-Speelman, Hastings 1981/2) 12 \( \text{e} \text{e}1 \text{ } \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}8 \) 13 \( \text{e} \text{e}3 \) b6 14
\( \text{w} \text{e}2 \text{ } \text{b} \text{b}7 \) with equal chances
(Thipsay-Speelman, British Ch 1984)
– Game 40.

Now Black’s main continuations
are 8...\( \text{c} \text{x} \text{d}4 \) (10.1) and 8...\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}7 \) (10.2).

He can also consider the little-
studied 8...\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{d}6 \) 9 dxc5 \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{x} \text{c}5 \)
(9...\( \text{\textit{c}} \text{x} \text{c}5 \) 10 \( \text{h} \text{h}5 \) ) 10 b3 0–0 11
\( \text{b} \text{b}2 \text{ } \text{w} \text{e}2 \text{ } \text{b} \text{b}7 \) 13 \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}4 \text{ } \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}7 \) 14
\( \text{\textit{a}} \text{d}1 \text{ } \text{w} \text{c}7 \) (14...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}5 \) 15 \( \text{b} \text{b}5 \) ) 15
\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e}5 \text{ } \text{c} \text{c}5 \) 16 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e}5 \text{ } \text{w} \text{c}8 \) ! (this is more
accurate than 16...\( \text{w} \text{c}6 \) 17 \( \text{b} \text{b}5 \text{ } \text{w} \text{c}8 \)
18 b4 \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{e}4 \) 19 \( \text{d} \text{x} \text{e}4 \text{ } \text{d} \text{e}4 \) 20 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f}3 \text{ } \text{w} \text{f}3 \)
21 \( \text{w} \text{f}3 \) \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{f}6 \) 22 \( \text{c} \text{c}6 \) with
\( \text{\textit{c}} \text{f}5 \) with a strong attack for White
(Tseshkovsky-Bagirov, Telavi 1982);

10.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}3 \) dxe4
4 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}4 \text{ } \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}7 \) 5 \( \text{\textit{f}} \text{f}3 \) \( \text{\textit{g}} \text{f}6 \) 6 \( \text{g} \text{g}3 \)
e6 7 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}3 \) c5 8 0–0)

8 ... cxd4

A radical decision. Black
eliminates the pawn centre.

9 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{x} \text{d}4 \text{ } \text{c} \text{c}5 \)
If 9...\(\text{c5}\) there is the good reply 10 \(\text{c4}\).

Now White’s knight is attacked and his main continuations are 10 \(\text{c3}\) (10.11), 10 \(\text{b3}\) (10.12) and 10 \(\text{f3}\) (10.13).

The drawbacks to 10 \(\text{e3}\) are emphasised by the manoeuvre ...\(\text{d5}\), e.g. 10...0–0 11 \(\text{e2}\) \(\text{d5}\)! 12 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{xe3}\) 13 \(\text{fxe3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 14 \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 15 \(\text{b5}\) \(\text{b6}\), and Black’s position is already preferable (Cherepov-Petrosian, 28th USSR Ch 1981).

10.11 (1 \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 2 \(\text{d4}\) \(\text{d5}\) 3 \(\text{c3}\)
\(\text{dxe4}\) 4 \(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 5 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 6
\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{e6}\) 7 \(\text{d3}\) \(\text{c5}\) 8 0–0 \(\text{xd4}\) 9
\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c5}\))

10 \(\text{c3}\)

White defends his knight.

10 ... 0–0

Black can give his opponent an isolated d-pawn by 10...\(\text{xd4}\) 11 \(\text{xd4}\) 0–0, but he has to defend carefully:

(a) 12 \(\text{f4}\) \(\text{b6}\) (if 12...\(\text{d5}\)?! 13 \(\text{d6}\) \(\text{e8}\) 14 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{f6}\) 15 \(\text{e5}\) \(\text{d7}\)

16 \(\text{a4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 17 \(\text{a3}\) with an attack, Varavin-Komarov, Novosibirsk 1989)

13 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{d7}\) 14 \(\text{h5}\) \(\text{c6}\) 15 \(\text{e5}\)

\(\text{bd7}\) 16 \(\text{xf6+}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 17 \(\text{e3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 18

\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{e8}\) with an equal game (Plachetka-Meduna, Kralove 1981);

(b) 12 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{a5}\) (or 12...\(\text{h6}\) 13 \(\text{f4}\)

\(\text{b6}\) 14 \(\text{c2}\) \(\text{bd5}\) 15 \(\text{e5}\) \(\text{b6}\) 16

\(\text{d3}\), and here in Tal-Flesch, Ljov 1981, Black risked 16...\(\text{b4}\)? 17 \(\text{d2}\)

\(\text{xc2}\) 18 \(\text{xf6}\) ! \(\text{xa1}\) 19 \(\text{h5}\) and came under a strong attack) 13 \(\text{h4}\) \(\text{h6}\)

14 \(\text{f4}\) \(\text{b6}\) 15 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{b7}\) with equal chances (Howell-Kumaran, British Ch 1990).

11 \(\text{e2}\)

Or 11 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{a}\) 12 \(\text{h5}\) \(\text{xd4}\)! 13

\(\text{cxd4}\) \(\text{a5}\) 14 \(\text{xf6+}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 15 \(\text{d2}\)

\(\text{b6}\) 16 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{d5}\) 17 \(\text{h5}\) \(\text{f5}\) with equality.

11 ... \(\text{b6}\)!

11...\(\text{xd4}\) is premature: 12 \(\text{cxd4}\)

\(\text{b6}\) 13 \(\text{d1}\) \(\text{bd5}\) 14 \(\text{h5}\)?±.

12 \(\text{e4}\)

Weaker is 12 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{d5}\) 13 \(\text{c4}\)

\(\text{xd4}\) 14 \(\text{cxd5}\) \(\text{c5}\)! 15 \(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{xe6}\) with slightly the better chances for

Black.

12 ... \(\text{b7}\)

13 \(\text{xe5}\) \(\text{xc5}\)

14 \(\text{c4}\) \(\text{a}\)

The game is equal (Dvoiris-

Epishin, 58th USSR Ch 1991).

10.12 (1 \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 2 \(\text{d4}\) \(\text{d5}\) 3 \(\text{c3}\)

\(\text{dxe4}\) 4 \(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 5 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 6

\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{e6}\) 7 \(\text{d3}\) \(\text{c5}\) 8 0–0 \(\text{xd4}\) 9

\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c5}\))

10 \(\text{b3}\)
10 ... $\textit{e}7$

This is considered the soundest move.

10...\textit{d}6?! involves a loss of time:
11 $\textit{e}1$ $\textit{c}7$ 12 $\textit{d}4$ $\textit{c}5$ 13 $\textit{b}5$
$\textit{b}6$ 14 $\textit{f}3$ 0–0 15 $\textit{c}3$ $\textit{e}8$ 16
$\textit{ce}4$ $\textit{e}7$ 17 $\textit{b}3$ $\textit{e}5$ 18 $\textit{xf}6+$
$\textit{xe}6$ 19 $\textit{xe}5!$, and White gains the
equal game (Glek-Epishin, Russian Ch 1995).

Tiviakov recommends 11 a4!? and if Black does not prevent the pawn’s
further advance (by 11...a5), but plays, for example, 11...b6, then 12
a5 $\textit{b}7$ 13 a6 $\textit{d}5$ (13...$\textit{c}6$ 14
$\textit{d}4\pm$) 14 c4 $\textit{c}6$ 15 $\textit{d}4$ and White
gains a spatial advantage.

11 ... 0–0
12 $\textit{f}3$ a5

12...$\textit{e}8$, preparing ...$e$6–$e$5, is also
possible, e.g. 13 $\textit{d}2$ $\textit{d}6!$ 14 $\textit{a}5$
(or 14 $\textit{c}3$ $\textit{c}7$! 15 $\textit{h}5$ e5?!)
14...$\textit{c}7$ 15 $\textit{c}3$ $\textit{d}5$ 16 $\textit{d}2$ $\textit{f}6$
with an equal game (Golubev-
Solozhenkin, Le Touquet 1994).

13 a4 $\textit{d}5$

Tiviakov-Adams (match (1), New
York 1994) went 13...$\textit{b}6$ 14 $\textit{d}2$
$\textit{bd}5$ 15 $\textit{b}5$ $\textit{d}7$ (15...$\textit{c}7$ can be
met by 16 c4 $\textit{b}4$ 17 $\textit{f}4$ $\textit{d}6$ 18
$\textit{xd}6$ $\textit{xd}6$ 19 $\textit{ad}1\pm$) 16 c4 $\textit{xb}5$
(weaker is 16...$\textit{b}4$ 17 $\textit{xb}4!$ $\textit{xb}4$
18 $\textit{ed}1$ $\textit{c}7$ 19 $\textit{e}4!$ $\textit{xb}5$ 20
$\textit{xf}6+$ $\textit{xf}6$ 21 $\textit{xb}5$ with advantage
to White, Tiviakov) 17 $\textit{xb}5?!$ $\textit{b}4$
18 $\textit{xb}7$ $\textit{c}2$ with chances for both
sides, but, as shown by Tiviakov,
by playing 17 cxd5 $\textit{c}4$ 18 dxe6 $\textit{xe}6$
19 $\textit{f}5$ White would have retained
the better game.

14 $\textit{b}5$ $\textit{b}4$
15 $\textit{e}2$ $\textit{f}6$

Leko-Epishin (Dortmund 1994)
now continued 16 c3 $\textit{bd}5$ 17 $\textit{d}4$
$\textit{b}6$ 18 $\textit{f}3$ $\textit{d}7$ 19 $\textit{d}3$ $\textit{fd}8$
20 $\textit{e}5$ $\textit{e}8$ 21 $\textit{e}4$ $\textit{xe}4$ 22 $\textit{xe}4$
$\textit{f}6$ with an equal game.
White maintains control over e5.

10 ... 0–0
11 We2 b6
12 Af4
12 Ae4 Ab7 13 Axc5 Axc5 14 Ac4 Wc7 15 Ae5 Ad5= is harmless for Black (Paunovic).
12 ... Ab7
13 Aad1 Wc8
13...Ad5? is not good on account of 14 Ag5! Wc7 15 Ah5 Ah8 16 Ae4 f6 17 Ah4 Ad6 18 c4 Aa6 19 Axd7! with a strong attack for White (Tal-Vasyukov, 32nd USSR Ch 1964/5).
14 Wh1 Ad8
15 Ae5
Or 15 Ag5 Ae7 16 Af5 Af8 17 Ad4 Ae8 18 Ab5 e5 with a good game for Black (Chandler-Wells, England 1985).

Now 15...Axe5 16 Axe5 Wc6 17 f3 Ae7 18 Ae4 Ad7 19 Ac3 Ac5 leads to an unexplored position (Karpov).

10.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 Ac3 dxe4 4 Aexe4 Ad7 5 Af3 Agf6 6 Ag3 e6 7 Ad3 c5 8 0–0 cxd4 9 Axd4 Ac5)

8 ... Ae7

Black does not hurry to release the pawn tension, and retains the option (after dxc5) of recapturing on c5 with his knight.

9 We2

The alternative plan involves the fianchetto: 9 b3 0–0 10 Ab2 (or 10 c4 cxd4 11 Axd4 Ae5 12 Ac2 Wb6 13 Af3 Ad8 14 We2 Afx3+ 15 Wf3 Ad7 16 Ab2 Ac6 17 We2 Wc5 18 a4 Wg5 19 Ac3 h5 20 Ae4 Aexe4 21 Aexe4 h4 22 Aad1 Ac8 with an equal game, Tiviakov-Kamsky, Madrid 1994) 10...b6 11 We2 Ab7 12 c4 Ae8 13 dxc5 Axc5!? (13...bxc5!? comes into consideration) 14 Ag5 We7 15 Aad1 Aad8 16 A5e4 Aexe4 17 Aexe4! Aexe4 18 Aexe4 with some advantage.
to White (Tiviakov-Adams, match (11), New York 1994).

9 ... 0–0
10 ♢d1

The plan of strengthening the centre by 10 c3 b6 11 ♢e5 ♢b7 12 f4 was discredited in the game Evseev-Flohr (USSR 1949), where after 12...cxd4 13 cxd4 ♢xe5 14 dxe5 ♢g4! 15 ♢xh7+ ♢xh7 16 ♢xg4 ♢d4+ 17 ♢h1 ♤ac8 Black gained fine play for the pawn.

10 ... ♢c7
10...cxd4 11 ♢xd4 is less good for Black:

(a) 11...♢e8 12 b3 ♢b6 13 ♢b2 ♢xf8 14 ♢f3 with the better chances for White (Tal-Filip, Moscow 1967);
(b) 11...♢c5 12 ♢c4 ♢c7 13 ♢b5 ♢b8 14 ♢f5! with advantage to White (Schaefer-Szabolcsi, Budapest 1991).

11 c4

11 ... ♢e8

After 11...cxd4 12 ♢xd4 White has active piece play:

(a) 12...a6 13 b3 (13 a3!? b6 14 b4 ♢b7 15 ♢b2± also comes into consideration) 13...♢e8 14 ♢b2 b6 15 ♢h5 ♢b7 16 ♢xe6 with a very sharp game (Kasparov-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988) – Game 41. However, the piece sacrifice is not obligatory. Karpov and Zaitsev recommend 16 ♤ac1!? ♤ac8 17 c5!? (vacating a square for the bishop) 17...bxc5 18 ♢xe6 ♢c6 (after 18...fxe6? 19 ♢xe6+ ♢f8 20 ♢c4 or 19...♕h8 20 ♢f7 Black loses) 19 ♢ef4, when White’s chances are preferable;

(b) 12...♢c5 13 ♢b5 ♢c6 14 ♢c2 b6 15 ♢f5! exf5 16 ♢xe7 ♢b7 17 ♢f3 ♤ae8 18 ♢d6 with advantage to White, who effectively has an extra pawn on the queenside (Aseev-Arkell, Leningrad 1989);

(c) 12...b6 13 ♢b5 ♢c6 14 ♢g5 a6 15 ♢e4 ♢b7 16 ♢d4 ♢c8 17 ♤ac1± (Karpov, Zaitsev).

12 dxc5 ♢xc5
13 ♢c2 ♤cd7!

Black takes control of e5 and brings his knight to the defence of the kingside. After 13...b6 14 ♢e5 ♢b7 15 ♢f4 White has a solid initiative.

14 ♤g5

Preventing 14...b6 due to 15 ♢xh7!

14 ... ♢f8
15 ♢e4 ♢xe4

In the event of 15...♢d7 16 ♢xf6+ ♢xf6 17 ♢d3 ♢xg5 18 ♢xg5 White has a slight but enduring advantage:

(a) 18...♢e5 19 ♢d2 ♢c6 20 b3 with the better chances (Tiviakov-Adams, match (9), New York 1994);
(b) 18...♢ac8 19 ♤ac1 ♢e5 (risky is 19...♢a5 20 ♢d2 ♢xa2 21 ♢b4 ♢c6 22 ♢a3±, Adams) 20 ♢d2 ♢c6
21 b4 b6 22 \( \text{Q}f4 \) \( \text{W}f6 \) 23 \( \text{Q}g5 \) \( \text{W}e5 \) 24 \( \text{N}e1 \) and White’s chances are better (Adams-Karpov, Dortmund 1994).

16 \( \text{Q}xe4 \)

Both sides have chances.

16 \( \text{W}xe4! ? \) is weaker on account of 16...\( f5 \)! 17 \( \text{W}e2 \) \( \text{Q}d7 \) 18 \( \text{Q}f3 \) \( \text{Q}f6 \), when Black’s chances are preferable (Leko-Lutz, Horgen 1994).

**Game 40**

**Thipsay-Speelman**

**British Championship 1984**

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & e4 \\
2 & d4 \\
3 & c3 \\
4 & Qxe4 \\
5 & f3 \\
6 & g3 \\
7 & d3 \\
8 & c3 \\
9 & xd4 \\
10 & c2 \\
11 & 0-0 \\
12 & Ne1 \\
13 & e3 \\
14 & We2 \\
15 & Mad1 \\
16 & b1 \\
17 & We2??!
\end{array}
\]

Otherwise the pin 10 \( \text{Q}g5 \) is unpleasant.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
12 & \text{N}d8 \\
13 & b6 \\
14 & \text{N}b7 \\
15 & a6 \\
16 & Ac8 \\
17 & \text{W}c2??!
\end{array}
\]

A loss of time – 17 \( \text{Q}h5 \) is better.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
17 & \ldots \\
18 & \text{Q}f8 \\
19 & \text{Q}f3?!
\end{array}
\]

19 \( \text{Q}g5 \) is more active, although after 19...\( \text{Q}xd4 \) 20 \( \text{cxd}4 \) White is obliged to play with an isolated pawn.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
19 & \ldots \\
20 & \text{W}xe3 \\
21 & \text{N}xd7 \\
22 & \text{Q}d4 \\
23 & \text{W}c1
\end{array}
\]

White should not have conceded the d-file. 21 \( \text{W}e2 \) was more logical.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
21 & \ldots \\
22 & \text{Q}d5 \\
23 & \text{W}c1
\end{array}
\]

White sounds the retreat, but whereas ‘activity’ by 23 \( \text{W}e5 \) \( \text{W}xe5 \) 24 \( \text{W}xe5 \) \( \text{Q}f4 \) is clearly unfavourable for him, 23 \( \text{W}g5?? \) looks perfectly reasonable (Speelman).

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
23 & \ldots \\
\end{array}
\]

19 \( \text{Q}xe3 \)
24 \( \text{\textit{xe}}4? \)

An oversight, but of course even after 24 \( \text{\textit{f}}3 \) White would have been in difficulties.

24 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{xd}}4! \)
25 \( \text{\textit{cxd}}4 \) \( \text{\textit{xc}}1 \)
26 \( \text{\textit{xc}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{xe}}4 \)

White does not even have the consolation of any pawns in return for his material deficit.

27 \( \text{\textit{f}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{d}}5 \)
28 \( \text{\textit{a}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{f5}}! \)
29 \( \text{\textit{c}}8 \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \)
30 \( \text{\textit{c}}7+ \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \)
31 \( \text{\textit{b}}4 \) \( \text{\textit{g8g6}} \)
32 \( \text{\textit{a}}7 \) \( \text{\textit{c4}} \)
33 \( \text{\textit{b}}7 \) \( \text{\textit{b5}} \)
34 \( \text{\textit{b}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{h4}} \)
35 \( \text{\textit{xa}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{hxg2}} \)
36 \( \text{\textit{f}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{e1}} \)
37 \( \text{\textit{d}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{h3}}+ \)

In conclusion Black weaves a mating net.

38 \( \text{\textit{h}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{d5}} \)
0–1

In recent times Karpov himself has preferred the restrained 11...\( \text{\textit{d5}} \).

12 \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{a6}} \)
13 \( \text{\textit{b3}} \)
13 \( \text{\textit{e4}} \) gives only an equal game after 13...\( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc4}}! \)

13 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{d5}} \)
13...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{b2}} \) \( \text{\textit{b7}} \) is weaker in view of 15 \( \text{\textit{d5!}} \) \( \text{\textit{exf5}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \).

14 \( \text{\textit{b2}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \)
15 \( \text{\textit{h5}} \) \( \text{\textit{b7}} \)
16 \( \text{\textit{xe6}}! \)

An experimental knight sacrifice, which has not been repeated as yet in any high-level games.

16 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{fxe6}} \)
17 \( \text{\textit{xe6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \)
18 \( \text{\textit{hxh7}} \) \( \text{\textit{c5}} \)
19 \( \text{\textit{h3}} \) \( \text{\textit{h7}} \)

Game 41
Kasparov-Karpov
Amsterdam 1988

1 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{c6} \)
2 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d5} \)
3 \( \text{\textit{d2}} \) \( \text{dxe4} \)
4 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d7}} \)
5 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{gf6}} \)
6 \( \text{\textit{g3}} \) \( \text{e6} \)
7 \( \text{\textit{d3}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \)
8 \( \text{0–0} \) \( \text{c5} \)
9 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) \( \text{0–0} \)
10 \( \text{\textit{d1}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \)

20 \( \text{\textit{xcg7+}}? \! \)

White has already sacrificed two pieces, and although the black king is exposed, there are no real threats. It was time to regain some material: 20 \( \text{b4!? g6!} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xe8}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe8}} \)
23 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 24 bxc5 \( \text{xc5} \) with chances for both sides (Karpov, Zaitsev).

20 \ldots \text{g8} 
21 \text{h2}

21 \text{d4}!? was somewhat stronger: 21\ldots\text{c6} 22 \text{xuc5} bxc5 23 \text{d7}+. Now, however, Black creates counter-threats and exchanges several pieces.

21 \ldots \text{c6}!
22 \text{d4} \text{e4}!
23 \text{e1} \text{eg5}
24 \text{g4} \text{a3}!
25 \text{c3} \text{xe1}+
26 \text{xe1} \text{e8}
27 \text{d2} \text{c1}!
28 \text{h4} \text{xd2}
29 \text{xd2} \text{e1}+

29\ldots\text{we6} is simpler, forcing the exchange of queens.

30 \text{h2} \text{e4}?

A mistake, after which White gains a second wind. This move should have preceded by 30\ldots\text{c7+} – 31 \text{f4} \text{e4}.

31 \text{f4} \text{we6}?

Now even Black’s two extra pieces are unable to compensate for his two successive mistakes. He should have reconciled himself to 31\ldots\text{c8} 32 \text{d8+} \text{e8} 33 \text{xe8}+ \text{xe8} 34 \text{wxe5}+! \text{xc5} 35 \text{f6}+ \text{f8} 36 \text{xe8}, when even so White has four pawns for the piece.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

32 \text{d8+!} \text{f7}
33 \text{d7+} \text{f8}
34 \text{wxe6} \text{xe6}
35 \text{hxe6} \text{e7}
36 \text{exe7} \text{e7}
37 \text{g4} \text{e4}
38 \text{g3} \text{b1}
39 \text{a3} 1–0 (time)
11: 6...c5

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ∆c3 dxe4 4 ∆xe4 ∆d7 5 ∆f3 ∆gf6 6 ∆g3 c5

18 ∆xd4 ∆xc1 19 ∆xc1 ∆b8 20 ∆c4 a5 with equal chances (Georgiev);
(b) 13 ∆g5 0-0 (if 13...h6 Black has to reckon with the attack 14 ∆xf7!? ∆xf7 15 ∆xe6+ ∆f8 16 ∆f5)
14 ∆xe6 ∆d5 (after 14...fxe6 15 ∆xe6 ∆b6 16 dxc5 ∆xc5 17 ∆xc5+
White has the initiative: 17...∆h8 18 ∆xb7 ∆xb7 19 ∆e3 ∆xb2 20 ∆b1
∆ad8 21 ∆e1!, Golubev) 15 ∆xd5 ∆xd5 16 dxc5!, and White’s position
is preferable (Golubev-Savchenko, Bucharest 1996).

11.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ∆c3 dxe4 4 ∆xe4 ∆d7 5 ∆f3 ∆gf6 6 ∆g3
c5)

7 dxc5

A fashionable continuation, by which Black hopes to manage without
having to play ...e7-e6 (in the event of 7 ∆d3).

White’s main continuations here are 7 dxc5 (11.1) and 7 ∆d3 (11.2).

After 7 ∆c4, apart from the simple 7...∆b6 8 ∆b5+ ∆d7, Black can also
implement the extended fianchetto with 8 ∆e2 e6 9 0-0 a6 10 c4 bxc4 11
∆xc4 ∆b7 12 ∆e1 ∆e7, after which his pieces are well mobilised:

(a) 13 b3 0-0 14 ∆b2 ∆b6
(14...cxd4 15 ∆xd4 ∆a5= is also possible) 15 ∆fl ∆c8 16 ∆c1 ∆bd5
17 ∆e5 cxd4 (or 17...∆b6 18 ∆c4±, Kir.Georgiev-Gulko, Groningen 1994)

The critical reply, with which White hopes to extract positional gains.

7 ... e6
8 c6

Black’s idea is justified if White tries to defend his pawn: 8 b4 b6 (8...a5?! 9 c3 axb4 10 cxb4 b6 11 a4 bxc5 12 b5! favours White) 9 Ac2 (9 Ab5!? bxc5 10 Ac6 Ab8 11 b5 comes into consideration) 9...bxc5 10 b5 Ab7 11 c4 Ac7 12 Ab2 Ad6 13 a4 a5 14 Ac2 h5 15 Af1 (15 0-0-0 Af4+ 16 Ab1 h4 17 Af1 h3 18 g3 Ae4 with a good game for Black) 15...0-0-0 16 Ad2 Af4 17 Ab3? Ae4! 18 Ac3 g5 19 Axe5 Axe5+ 20 Axe5 g4 and Black gained the advantage (Tiviakov-Adams, Ischia 1995).

Instead of 17 Ad3? Adams suggests 17 Ac3, but here too after 17...g5 18 Ab3 g4 19 Axe5 Ab8 20 Axd8 Axd8 21 Ah4 Ag5 22 0-0 Ah4 Black has a good game.

8 ... bxc6

9 Ae2

If 9 Ad3 Black has the good reply 9...Ac5.

9 ... Ac7

9...h5, threatening a flank attack, is also interesting, e.g. 10 Af1 Ac5 11 Ae3 Ag4 12 h3 Aexe3 13 Aexe3 Aexe3 14 fxe3 Ab6 15 Ad4 e5? 16 Ac3 Ab8 17 0-0-0, and White’s control of the d-file gives him the advantage (Vogt-Speelman, Altenstieg 1994). 15...Axtd4 16 Axd4 is sounder, although here too White has the better endgame.

Tiviakov-Gulko (Groningen 1994) now continued 10 0-0 Ae7 11 c4 0-0 12 Ad2 a5 13 Ae3 Ab4 14 Ac2 Axc3 15 Abxc3 Ab7 16 Ad4 c5 17 Ab5 Wb5 18 Axe5 Axex5 19 f4 Ag4 20 Af3 Axf3 21 Axf3, with slightly the better ending for White.

11.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 Ac3 dxe4 4 Axe4 Axd7 5 Af3 Agf6 6 Ag3 c5)

7 Ad3

As in the main variation, White continues his development.

7 ... cxd4

After 7...g6 8 0-0 Ag7 White can defend his centre with 9 c3, not fearing the creation of an isolated pawn, since he can advantageously use the pressure of his rooks on the e- and c-files, e.g. 9...0-0 10 Ae1 cxd4 11 cxd4 b6 12 Ae2 Ad5 13 Ag5 Ab7 14 Ac1 Ac8 15 Ab5! h6 16 Axc8 Axc8 17 Ac1 Ad8 18 Ad2 Ac7 19 Ae5 Ad6 20 Ae6, and the occupation of the weak c6 square gives him the advantage (Apicella-Arkell, Capelle la Grande 1991)

8 Axd4 g6

An alternative is 8...Ac5 9 Ab5+ Ac7 10 0-0 a6 (less good is
10...\texttt{\texttildelow} xb5?! 11 \texttt{\texttildelow} xb5 a6 12 \texttt{\texttildelow} d4 g6 
13 \texttt{\texttildelow} e3 \texttt{\texttildelow} d5 14 \texttt{\texttildelow} f3 e6 15 \texttt{a}d1 \texttt{\texttildelow} f6 
16 \texttt{\texttildelow} df5! with advantage to White, Hausner-Luce, Prague 1992) 11 
\texttt{\texttildelow} xd7+ \texttt{\texttildelow} xd7 12 b3 g6 13 \texttt{\texttildelow} b2 \texttt{\texttildelow} g7 
14 \texttt{\texttildelow} e2 0–0 15 \texttt{\texttildelow} e1 \texttt{\texttildelow} e8 16 \texttt{\texttildelow} d1 
with slightly the better chances for White (Luther-Arkell, Leningrad 1989).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cc}
10 & c3 \\
11 & e1 \\
or & \texttt{c}5 12 c2 g4 13 \texttt{\texttildelow} d2 \\
& c8 with equal chances (Zapata-
& Spiridonov, Moscow 1989).
12 & c2 \\
13 & g5 \\
\end{tabular}
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Here in Aseev-Lutz (Budapest 1989) Black could have maintained the balance by 13...\texttt{\texttildelow} c7.
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Caro-Kann
Smyslov
System 4...Nd7

The Smyslov Variation of the Caro-Kann is one of the most solid and dependable openings for Black. It is a favourite of many top players, including FIDE World Champion Anatoly Karpov and the British No. 1, Michael Adams, both of whom have used the system to defeat many top-class opponents.

This book presents an objective, detailed coverage of all the lines of the Smyslov System, with special attention devoted to the most dangerous attacking systems available to White - such as that used in Deep Blue's sensational match-clinching victory over Garry Kasparov.

Grandmaster Eduard Gufeld is one of the most colourful characters in international chess. His entertaining style of play and lively annotations have gained him many fans around the world. His previous books for Cadogan include The Modern French Tarrasch and An Opening Repertoire for the Attacking Player.

Oleg Stetsko has earned a reputation as a researcher and theoretician of the highest order.