The Alekhine for the Tournament Player

LEV ALBURT
ERIC SCHILLER

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Preface

The Alekhine Defence has had a number of fairly thorough treatments in the post-Fischer era, beginning with Eales and Williams (1972), Bagirov (several volumes, most recently in 1979), and Hort (1980). There have been so many interesting new games that it is difficult to squeeze all of the relevant material into a single volume. The authors have decided to economise in three ways.

First of all, we have selected those lines which we consider to be viable, or nearly viable, for Black. Even so, we have found room for a number of interesting new approaches, including the hypermodern handling 2 ... Qg8, recent treatments of the Four Pawns Attack involving g7-g6, and much new theory in the fianchetto lines in general.

Second, we have incorporated lines with the interpolation h3, Nh5 (after 1 e4 d5 f6 2 e5 Qd5 3 d4 d6 4 f3 Ng4 5 e2 e6 6 0-0 Nf7 7 c4 Qb6) into the material which lacks these moves. The principle underlying our decision was that the interpolated moves are so rarely relevant that they are best ignored except where they have a direct influence on the conduct of the game. This decision led to the discovery of many new plans, which had only been considered in one handling (i.e. with or without the interpolation). The benefits are not free, however, as there is the small matter of knowing when the moves have been included and when they have been omitted. In Chapter 2 we found it easier to assume that the moves were usually played, and have indicated with bracket notation (- h3, Nh5) when they have been omitted. In Chapter 3 we adopted the opposite approach because it seems that there is a definite tendency to capture on d6 without first hitting the bishop. The small amount of confusion this will cause is, we hope, negligible in the face of the unity of ideas which has never before been seen in the treatment of the main lines of the Alekhine.

Finally, we have had to keep Illustrative Games to a minimum. Most of our games have come from the praxis of the authors. The games
accompanying the main lines are Lev Alburt's. Grandmaster Alburt has played the Alekhine exclusively for almost his entire career. Eric Schiller's experience is more limited, but involves the more radical approaches to the Alekhine plan. The games are presented in Chapter 1, and should be studied carefully in order to obtain an understanding of key tactical and strategic ideas.

The reader should pay close attention to the sorts of strategies which are successful in the Alekhine, and those which lead to defeat. The configurations of pawns and pieces in each case should be examined so that an intuitive feeling of the appropriateness of each plan can be felt. There are no golden rules or maxims, no universals, simply tendencies which fall out as a result of pawn structures and piece placements. "Thematic breaks" can be disastrous if employed at the wrong time. "Ugly" moves can prove quite effective when the position demands them. These statements are true of all openings, of course, but are especially relevant to the Alekhine because of the high degree of tension in the opening.

In this regard we can point out that familiarity with the opening is worth quite a bit, and even "inferior" positions can be played with confidence against opponents who are not conversant with the strategic ideas of the opening. The study of the games of Anatoly Karpov is recommended for its help in raising consciousness of the dangers of the opening. Karpov, more so than any other living player, knows where the weaknesses of the Alekhine lie and is masterful in their exploitation. For fresh and original ideas the games of Bent Larsen and Vlastimil Hort are useful. But stick to the modern masters when working on the Alekhine, as the mature handling of the opening did not really arise until the mid-1960s. The classical games provide excellent tutoring in the middlegame, but often contain misguided opening play. There is no substitute for sitting down and playing the Alekhine, however. Try out a number of defensive formations, sometimes fianchettoing the $\text{f}8$, sometimes not. You may lose a few games at first, but success will come with familiarity. _Crescat scientia, vita excolatur!_

This book has been a long time in the making and the authors would like to express their gratitude to the following persons who have provided invaluable help: Pierre Lunais and Bob Wade for research assistance; Bob Wade, Paul Lamford and Ray Keene for their patience; Emil Shen, Karl Erik Karlsson and Jeff Kastner for advice and
assistance; the faculty of the Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago for their forebearance when work on the book diverted Mr. Schiller from his linguistics endeavours; Ralph Inforzato for general assistance (and pizza), without which the book would never have been completed, and George Szaszvari for excellent proofreading. The manuscript underwent a number of significant revisions, and without the help of flexible software by Batteries Inc. our task would have been much more difficult. Special thanks are due to Don Vance for lending his printer.

Although the authors were forced, at times, to disagree with Vlastimil Hort and Vladimir Bagirov, we are indebted to their efforts for a good deal of analysis. Unfortunately, the literature on the Alekhine is one of the poorest in terms of attribution of ideas, and it was beyond our abilities to sort out who was responsible for which innovation. We have tried to indicate directly or in accompanying prose whenever we introduce an idea which we consider to be completely original.

Lev Alburt
Eric Schiller
## Symbols and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>+</td>
<td>check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
<td>double check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!</td>
<td>good move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!!</td>
<td>outstanding move</td>
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<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>weak move</td>
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<td>??</td>
<td>blunder</td>
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<tr>
<td>!?</td>
<td>interesting move</td>
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<td>?!</td>
<td>risky/dubious move</td>
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<tr>
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<td>White win</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Black win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-½</td>
<td>drawn game</td>
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<td>± ⊕</td>
<td>White/Black has a slight advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td>± ⊔</td>
<td>White/Black has a clear advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td>±± ⊔⊔</td>
<td>White/Black has a winning advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-0</td>
<td>castles (kingside)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-0-0</td>
<td>castles (queenside)</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1</td>
<td>Olympiad</td>
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<tr>
<td>1Z</td>
<td>Interzonal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Zonal</td>
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1 Illustrative Games

The goals of the Alekhine Defence are simple: destroy the White centre without getting destroyed in the process. But the execution is not simple. In this chapter we will explore some of the ideas of the Alekhine Defence as put into practice by the authors and other contemporary practitioners. The handling of the Black side has evolved considerably since Alekhine first played 1...\( \text{2f6} \) at Budapest 1921. We make no attempt to discuss the history of the opening, as this would require far more pages than we have at our disposal. Instead, we have chosen games which illustrate the strategic concepts behind some of the more positional variations. Those variations which rely mainly on tactics are covered in detail in the relevant chapters of this book.

van Riemsdyk-Alburt
Santiago 1981

This game is theoretically important. It shows the way White can get a big advantage against 13...a6, and will probably encourage players of the White side to adopt 13 b4 as frequently as 13 \( \text{2d3} \). The middlegame is illustrative of the attacking possibilities available to both sides, and the danger that White faces if he acts too slowly. Note how White gets good chances by playing on the queenside and by sacrificing not on the kingside, as is customary, but in the centre.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & e4 & \text{2f6} \\
2 & e5 & \text{d5} \\
3 & d4 & \text{d6} \\
4 & \text{2f3} & \text{g4} \\
5 & \text{e2} & \text{e6} \\
6 & 0-0 & \text{e7} \\
7 & \text{c4} & \text{b6} \\
8 & \text{e3} & 0-0 \\
9 & \text{c3} & \text{d5} \\
10 & \text{c5} & \text{xf3} \\
11 & \text{gf} & \text{c8} \\
12 & \text{f4} & \text{c6} \\
\end{array}
\]

Preferable are 12 ...\( \text{h4} \) and 12 ...\( \text{g6} \).

13 b4 a6?! (1)

This move was successfully employed by Bagirov, but van Riemsdyk refutes it with his next move.
2 Illustrative Games

White keeps the b-file closed.
Black needs at least one line in
order to launch a counterattack
and exchange some pieces, especially
rooks. By trading off pieces Black
can reduce pressure along the g-
and h-files.

14 f5! ef
15 f4!!

Now White's advantage is clear.

15 ... Qb8

A rather uncomfortable move
to make, but the pawn must be
defended somehow.

16 Qd3?!

After the game van Riemsdyk
found the strong plan 16 Qf3 c6 17
Qb3 intending to take the d-pawn
with the knight. In spite of the
material advantage it is almost
impossible for Black to restrain
the pawn phalanx. During the
game, however, White preferred
to play for mate, and this led to a
double-edged position.

16 ... Qd7

If 16 ... g6, 17 Qxf5 is a typical,
and effective, attacking method.

17 Qf3 Qd8

This preserves the c6 square for
a knight retreat.

18 h4! Qf8
19 h5 Qc6
20 a3 Qb8e7

21 a2 b6
22 cb

White should have played 25
Qf2 intending Qh4.

25 ... Qc3!
26 Qxf5

After 26 Qxf5 Qh8! the pins are
decisive.

26 ... Wa4
27 Qe2?!

27 Qf3 would have caused
Black more problems.

27 ... Wxa3
28 Qf3 Qdc6
29 Qg4
29 e6 would have been met by 29 ...f6. White can obviously try a piece sacrifice, but to no effect.

29  ...  \( \text{\textit{W}} \text{xb4} \)  8  dc  bc

29  ...  \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xd4} \) would have been even stronger.

30  \( \text{\textit{F}}5 \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xd4} \)  10  \( \text{\textit{E}} \text{e7} \) f6 was comparatively better, although White still holds a great advantage after 11 \( \text{\textit{L}} \text{e4} \).

31 \( \text{\textit{A}}f4 \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xe2}+ \) \( \text{\textit{C}} \text{xe3} \)

32 \( \text{\textit{A}} \text{xe3} \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{c5} \)

33 \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{d4} \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{c6} \) I underestimated this move, seeing only 11 ef?!! with complications.

34 \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{f4} \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xd4} \)

35 \( \text{\textit{F}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xd4} \)

36 \( \text{\textit{C}} \text{xd4} \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xd4} \) 0-1

Shirazi-Alburt 13 \( \text{\textit{A}} \text{g4}! \) \( \text{\textit{A}} \text{h6} \) (3)

Lone Pine 1981

1  \( \text{\textit{B}}4 \)

2  \( \text{\textit{B}}5 \)

3  \( \text{\textit{B}}4 \)

4  \( \text{\textit{B}}5 \)

5  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{c4} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{c6} \)

6  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{e2} \)

I have faced this move before – in the First League of the USSR Championship in Ashkhabad 1978, where S. Makarichev played White. After 6 ... \( \text{\textit{W}} \text{a5} \) I won a pawn, but White obtained a strong initiative. Makarichev won the game in a brilliant manner. Here I temporarily resisted the temptation to take the pawn, but in the end I grabbed it in an even worse situation.

6  ...  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{b6} \)

7  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{c3} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{xe3} \)

Better was 7 ... \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{c}6 \) 8 \( \text{\textit{D}} \text{xd5} \) cd 9

14 \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{xe6}!! \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{de} \)

15  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{f} \)

16  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{g1} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{f}8 \)

17  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{e} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{a6} \)

18  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{g5} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{xg5} \)

19  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{xg5} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{c7} \)

20  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{0-0-0} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{xc4} \)

21  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{xc4} \) \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{e}8 \)

22  \( \text{\textit{B}} \text{d3} \)

1-0
At the Reykjavik International Open in 1982 the authors had an opportunity to investigate thoroughly the Alekhine Defence. Here are Grandmaster Alburt’s interesting games from that event, and Klaus Bischoff’s contribution will be presented a little later on.

**Sigurjónsson-Alburt**  
*Reykjavik 1982*

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<th>Reykjavik 1982</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>e4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>e5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>d4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>c4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ef3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>h3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ef2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0-0 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 ... \( \text{\#}f5 \)

10 ... e5 is best met by 11 \( \text{\#}g5! \), prompting Black to misplace his queen or else weaken his kingside after 11 ... f6 or 11 ... \( \text{\#}f6 \). 10 ... d5 fails to 11 c5 \( \text{\#}c4 \) 12 b3 \( \text{\#}a5 \) when the black knight is severely misplaced on the edge of the board.

11 \( \text{\#}e3 \)

For 11 \( \text{\#}f4 \) see Schneider-Alburt (below). 11 d5? is a blunder which loses the c-pawn after 11 ...

\( \text{\#}a5 \) 12 \( \text{\#}d2 \) \( \text{\#}c8 \).

11 ... d5

12 c5 \( \text{\#}c4 \)

13 \( \text{\#}x\text{c}4 \)

On 13 ... \( \text{\#}c1 \), Black can play 13 ... b6! 14 g4 \( \text{\#}c8 \) 15 b3 bc! 16 bc cd 17 \( \text{\#}d5 \) d3! 18 \( \text{\#}d3 \) \( \text{\#}xa1 \), Janosević-Hort, Skopje 1967. The active counterplay stemming from 13 ... b6! constitutes the tactical justification of 12 ... \( \text{\#}c4 \).

13 ... dc

14 \( \text{\#}a4! \) e5! (5)

This position offers approximately equal chances for both sides. White has more space and greater manoeuvrability for his knights. Black, on the other hand, has a preponderance of centre pawns.
14 ... \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xd4 loses material: 15 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xd4 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xd4 16 \textit{f}d1 e5 17 \textit{w}xc4 and 18 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xd4, or 16 ... \textit{d}d3 17 \textit{x}d3! cd 18 \textit{w}xd4.

In order to appreciate the text move it is necessary to take a look at the line 14 ... \textit{d}d3 15 \textit{f}d1 (6) met by 15 ... \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}d4! and now both 16 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}d2 \textit{d}d3! and 16 \textit{w}xc4 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xf3+ 17 gf \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xf3 are good for Black. On 16 \textit{f}e1, Black has 16 ... b5! 17 \textit{f}xb5 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xb5 18 \textit{w}xb5 \textit{w}xd5 and Black also stands well, while 17 cb \textit{w}xb6 would leave the White b-pawn under pressure. The move 14 ... e5! waited a long time to make its debut, however, and did not enter literature until quite recently.

15 \textit{f}d1!

Sigurjónsson finds the right move at the board. If 15 de? Black can play 15 ... \textit{d}d3 16 \textit{f}d1 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xe5 with a comfortable game.

15 ... ed

16 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}xd4

On 16 \textit{w}xc4 Black’s best is 16 ... \textit{e}e6, as 16 ... de and 16 ... dc both seem to be inadequate.

16 ... \textit{f}xb5

17 \textit{f}xd4

18 \textit{w}xc4 \textit{f}xf2+!

19 \textit{f}xf2 (7)

A capsule history of the diagrammed position should not only provide you with a better understanding of this variation but will also give you a general appreciation of the process by which chess theory evolves.

In the mid-1970’s Lev Alburt and some of his colleagues demonstrated the superiority of the White position after 15 ... f5 16 d5 or 15 ... e5 16 d5 \textit{$\mathcal{Q}$}d4 17 \textit{f}e1! or 15 ... \textit{w}a5 16 \textit{w}xa5 \textit{d}xa5 17 \textit{d}e1 \textit{f}f5 18 g4! \textit{d}7 19 d5! It seems that the advance of the d-pawn caused many problems for Black. They came to the conclusion that an immediate 14 ... e5! would avoid the difficulties which arose in the other lines, since 15 d5? is

White has a queenside pawn
majority, but his king is quite exposed. Chances are roughly level. The powerful Black bishop is incapable of defending the dark squares near the Black king, which can be attacked by a battery of $\text{wc3}$ and $\text{d5}$. Black has a passed d-pawn and a long-range interceptor in his strong bishop. Still, it is tactics, and not positional strategy, that will occupy the centre stage in the coming battle.

19 ... $\text{wf6}$
20 $\text{wd4!}$ $\text{xd4+}$
21 $\text{xd4}$

26 ... $\text{d8}$
27 $\text{b5}$

Alburt had already seen this position in Georgadze-Dvoretsky, USSR 1974, which was agreed drawn at this point. The prevailing opinion was that Black is a touch better. Still, the position of the white king is now an asset, not a liability, and this shift is of considerable importance in the endgame.

28 $\text{a4!}$
29 $\text{d2}$

30 $\text{d1}$!

$\text{b6}$ would invite 29 ... $\text{d1}$? 30 $\text{d1}$ $\text{xd1}$ $\text{d1}$ 31 $\text{b7}$, but after 29 ... $\text{d6}$!! White is in deep trouble, e.g. 30 $\text{a5}$ $\text{d1}$ 31 $\text{d1}$ $\text{b7}$ 32 $\text{b7}$ $\text{b1}$ 33 $\text{a6}$ (Now 33 $\text{b5}$ is not on.) 33 ... $\text{e4}$ 34 $\text{c8}$ $\text{xb7}$.

29 ... $\text{xc2}$
30 $\text{e2}$ (8)

Perhaps the other rook should have been placed here.

22 $\text{b4}$
23 $\text{d5}$
24 $\text{e7+}$ $\text{g7}$

This was a tough decision to make, but Alburt felt that the king should not stray any further from the queenside than it had to, in order to cope with possible endgame foottraces.

25 $\text{xc8}$ $\text{cd}$

Now the picture has changed considerably. White has two connected passed pawns, situated far from the Black king. His rook is well positioned and his king can blockade the black pawns. Al

26 $\text{xa7}$

The game is now even, and
concluded in a draw after 33 ...
\( \text{\#d5} 34 \text{\#g3} \text{\#g2} 35 \text{\#b6} \text{\#f6} 36 \text{\#d4} \)
\( \text{\#e6} 37 \text{\#c5} \text{\#d7} 38 \text{\#b5} g5 39 \)
\( \text{\#d6} f5 40 \text{\#xf5} \text{\#xh3} 41 \text{\#h6} \)
\( \text{\#e6} 42 \text{\#d4} \text{\#c6} 43 \text{\#e5} \text{\#b3} 44 \)
\( \text{\#f6} \text{\#xb6} 45 \text{\#xg5} \text{\#c5} 46 \text{\#f6} \)
\( \text{\#d4} 47 \text{\#g7} 1/2-1/2 \)

**Schneider-Alburt**

*Reykjavik 1982*

1 e4 \text{\#f6} 2 e5 \text{\#d5} 3 d4 d6

4 \text{\#f3} g6 5 \text{\#e2} \text{\#g7} 6 c4 \text{\#b6} 7 ed cd 8 h3 0-0

9 0-0 \text{\#f5} 10 \text{\#c3} \text{\#c6} 11 \text{\#f4} h6!

This threatens ... e5, which, if played immediately, would allow White to seize the initiative with 12 \text{\#g5!} \text{\#d7} 13 de de 14 c5!

The plan with 11 ... d5 is not good here, as the presence of White’s bishop on f4 rather than e3 alters the picture considerably: 12 c5 \text{\#c4} 13 b3! \text{\#a5} 14 \text{\#c1} b6 15 cb ab 16 \text{\#d2} \text{\#b7} 17 \text{\#b5} \text{\#c8} 18 \text{\#c3} \text{\#d7} 19 \text{\#fc1} f6 20 \text{\#c7!} and Black is lost, Karpov–McKay, Stockholm 1969.

12 \text{\#d2}

This is the most consistent move. In his teens, Karpov preferred 12 \text{\#e3} to the text, reasoning that now that Black has been provoked into weakening his kingside with 11 ... h6 White can respond to 12 ... e5 with 13 d5. After 12 \text{\#e3} Alburt intended 12 ...

... d5! 13 c5 \text{\#c4}, transposing back to the Sigurjonsson game with an extra, if insignificant, tempo (h6).

12 ...

If Black defends the pawn with 12 ... \text{\#h7} White has the opportunity to play 13 d5! \text{\#a5} 14 b3 with a big superiority in space and development.

13 \text{\#e3} d5!

14 \text{\#xd5?!}

This was an ill-fated innovation. Better is the thematic 14 c5 \text{\#c4} 15 \text{\#xc4} dc 16 d5 \text{\#b4} 17 h4 \text{\#d3} 18 hg! hg 19 \text{\#xg5} \text{\#xd5!} which led to a draw in Adorjan-Eales, Groningen 1970.

14 ...

\text{\#xd5}

15 cd \text{\#xd5} (9)

![Diagram](image)
Black stands a little better. He has the smoother development coupled with strong pressure on White’s crippled, isolated d-pawn. These factors outweigh White’s potential exploitation of his opponent’s vulnerable kingside.

16 $\text{hac}1$ $\text{hfd8}$!
Black could probably snatch the a-pawn, but it seems a waste of time given the vulnerability of the kingside.

17 $\text{c4}$ $\text{we4!!}$

On 18 $\text{xf7}$+ $\text{xf7}$ 19 $\text{xe5}$ $\text{xd4}$! Black wins, while on 18 $\text{xe5}$ $\text{hg}$ 19 $\text{xf7}$+ Black can win a piece for two pawns with 19 ...

$\text{g8}$! 20 $\text{xe5}$ $\text{xd4}$. 18 ...

$\text{xe3}$!

19 $\text{fl}$

What else? All other tries are easily refuted: 19 $\text{xe5}$ (19 $\text{gh}$ $\text{xf3}$; 19 $\text{xe5}$ $\text{xe2}$ mate) 19 ...

$\text{wg4}$! 20 $\text{fl}$ $\text{hg}$ 21 $\text{h2}$! $\text{xd4}$ 22 $\text{xh4}$ $\text{xd4}$ 23 $\text{gh}$ $\text{xb2}$ 24 $\text{bl}$ $\text{c3}$ with a much better endgame.

19 ...

$\text{g4}$! 20 $\text{h2}$ $\text{e6}$ 21 $\text{d3}$ $\text{wh4}$ 22 $\text{f3}$ $\text{h5}$ 23 $\text{h5}$ $\text{d5}$ 24 $\text{e2}$ $\text{g6}$ 25 $\text{c1}$ $\text{g4}$! 26 $\text{h2}$ $\text{g3}$! 27 $\text{fg}$ $\text{xd4}$ 28 $\text{fl}$ $\text{f5}$ 29 $\text{d3}$ $\text{wxe3}$! 30 $\text{xd5}$ $\text{xd5}$ 31 $\text{f1}$ $\text{wd6}$ 0-1.

Ivanović-Alburt
Reykjavik 1982

1 $\text{e4}$ $\text{df6}$
2 $\text{e5}$ $\text{dd5}$
Black has a clear advantage. His initiative is of greater value than White’s bishop pair. In addition, Black has the more compact pawn structure and safer king position.

11 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&e6}} \)

During the game I also considered 11 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&f5}} \), which is the most active post for the bishop. After 12 g4 \( \texttt{\textit{\&e6}} \) Black’s 11th move becomes a \textit{zwischenzug} to provoke another White pawn weakness. I rejected the idea on the grounds that White would be able to use the extra g4 push to his advantage after 13 f4, followed by \( \texttt{\textit{\&f1}} \) and f5. Analysis supports the decision: 13 ... 0-0-0 (threatening 14 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&xc4}} \)) 14 b3 (not 14 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&d5}} \)) 14 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&d4}} \) (threatening 15 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&xe2}} \)) 16 \( \texttt{\textit{\&xe2}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\&xg4+}} \) 15 \( \texttt{\textit{\&xd4}} \) (on 15 h3, 15 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&h5}} \) is strong.) 15 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&xd4}} \) and the dual threats of 16 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&xf4}} \) and 16 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&hd8}} \) give Black a decisive edge.

Note that 11 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&xe5}} \) is inferior, giving away Black’s advantage after 12 \( \texttt{\textit{\&d4}} \) f6 13 \( \texttt{\textit{\&xe5}} \) fe. Black’s extra pawn is then valueless.

12 \( \texttt{\textit{f4}} \) 0-0-0

13 b3 \( \texttt{\textit{\&d7?}} \)

On 13 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&d4}} \), 14 g3! gives White a solid position which is difficult to crack. Thus the difference between 11 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&f5}} \) 12 g4 \( \texttt{\textit{\&e6}} \) and 11 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&e6}} \) becomes apparent. By inserting the \textit{zwischenzug} 11 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&f5}} \), Black provokes a fatal weakness in the pawn structure. Nevertheless, after 13 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&d7}} \) the game gradually peteres out into a drawish equality. Black can still retain some initiative in this position with 13 ... f6! 14 ef ef and ... a5 and ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&h8}} \). Even here the Black bishop would be better placed on f5.

14 \( \texttt{\textit{\&e1}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\&f5}} \)

This is necessary in order to prevent 15 \( \texttt{\textit{\&e4}} \) followed by 16 \( \texttt{\textit{\&c5}} \) or 16 \( \texttt{\textit{\&g5}} \).

15 \( \texttt{\textit{\&f2}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\&hd8}} \)

16 \( \texttt{\textit{\&f3}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\&f6}} \)

Black stops 17 \( \texttt{\textit{\&g5}} \) and even threatens to penetrate with 17 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\&b4}} \). His control of the open d-file is illusory, since all potential invasion points along that file are adequately guarded by enemy pieces. White’s bishop pair neutralises Black’s temporary initiative. The game remains evenly balanced.

17 \( \texttt{\textit{\&c5}} \) fe

18 \( \texttt{\textit{\&xe5}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\&xe5}} \)

19 fe \( \texttt{\textit{\&d2}} \)

20 \( \texttt{\textit{\&e3}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\&c2}} \)

21 \( \texttt{\textit{\&hc1}} \) (1/1)

![Chess Diagram](image-url)
This prevents Black from doubling on the second rank.

22 ... \( \texttt{Hxe1} \)
22 \( \texttt{Hxc1} \) \( \texttt{Qd7} \)

32  \( \texttt{hg} \)
32 \( \texttt{h4!} \) would have led to a

drawish endgame after 32 ... \( \texttt{Qf5+} \)

33 \( \texttt{Qxf5} \) \( \texttt{Qxf5} \).

32 ...

\( \texttt{Qxg4} \)

The bishop gets shut in after 23 \( \texttt{Qxa7? b6} \). On 23 \( \texttt{Qxe7? Ke8} \) and

24 ... \( \texttt{Qxe5} \), when Black seizes the

initiative.

23 ... \( \texttt{c5} \)

24 \( \texttt{Qc3} \) \( \texttt{Qb8!} \)

The knight is headed for the

strong outpost at d4.

25 \( \texttt{a3} \) \( \texttt{Qe6} \)
26 \( \texttt{g4} \) \( \texttt{Qe6} \)
27 \( \texttt{b4} \) \( \texttt{b6} \)
28 \( \texttt{bc} \)

White is anticipating a future

rook invasion along the b-file.

28 ... \( \texttt{bc} \)

Threatening 30 ... \( \texttt{Qe2} \) and 31 ...

\( \texttt{Qxc4+} \). The powerful position of

the black knight compensates for

the white bishop pair.

30 \( \texttt{Qd3} \) \( \texttt{h5} \)

The essential difference between

the white and black armies is the

bishop versus knight factor. It is a

tried and true maxim that bishops

are preferable to knights when, as

in this case, there are pawn

clusters on both wings. By playing

30 ... \( \texttt{h5} \) Black is attempting to
dissolve all of the kingside pawns

and create a more favourable

situation for his knight.

31 \( \texttt{Qxg6} \) \( \texttt{hg} \)

Black starts to take control of

the game with this move, limiting

the squares available to White's

rook and king. White cannot

carry out his plan of 35 \( \texttt{Qb1} \), 36

\( \texttt{Qe4} \) and 37 \( \texttt{Qb7} \) due to 35 ...

\( \texttt{Qxd3+!} \) 36 \( \texttt{Qxd3} \) \( \texttt{Qf5+} \).

35 \( \texttt{Qg1} \) \( \texttt{Qh8} \)

The game concluded: 36 \( \texttt{Qf1} \)

\( \texttt{Qh4!} \) 37 \( \texttt{Qg3} \) \( \texttt{Qd7} \) 38 \( \texttt{Qd3} \) \( \texttt{Qd4} \) 39

\( \texttt{Qd2} \) \( \texttt{Qh2+} \) 40 \( \texttt{Qd1} \) \( \texttt{Qa2} \) 41 \( \texttt{Qxd4} \)

cd 42 \( \texttt{Qe2} \) \( \texttt{Qf5} \) 43 \( \texttt{Qg5} \) \( \texttt{Qe6} \) 44 \( \texttt{c5?} \)

\( \texttt{Exa3} \) 45 \( \texttt{Qb5} \) \( \texttt{Ec3} \) 46 \( \texttt{c6} \) \( \texttt{Qxe5} \) 47

\( \texttt{Qg2} \) \( \texttt{Qb3} \) 0-1

Here are two interesting games

from the past which we feel show

important facets of the Alekhine

strategy:
Dominguez-Tatai  
Las Palmas 1972

1  e4  d5  
2  c4  d6  
3  d4  Bb6  
4  dxe5  Bxe5  
5  e3  Bb6  
6  Bg5  Bg7  
7  Be2  0-0  (13)

This well-timed thrust in the centre threatens to open up the game and prey on the weakness of the pawn on d4. White's reply is forced.

8  c5  d5  
9  Bd2  

The plan involving the liquidation of the bishop on g7 by Bd2 and Bh6 is rarely effective in these lines because White's centre, particularly d4, is just too weak. If White wishes to adopt this plan, he should ensure that the support of d4 by the knight on f3 is not undermined by ... Bg4, thus 9 h3 was called for.

9  ...  Bg4!  
10  a3  

A ridiculous move. The knight on a3 cannot support the d-pawn by going to c2, because this would render the pawn on c4 very vulnerable. In any event, the move is much too slow. 10 b3 would have been far more sensible.

11  Bf3  

This overprotection of the pawn on d4 makes little sense. White should certainly have initiated operations on the queenside with 13 b4. 13 h3, getting rid of the kingside problem once and for all, also comes into consideration.

11  ...  Bf6  
12  c5  
13  Bd1  

The hole at e4 is glaring, especially with the white knight spectating at a3.

14  b4  
15  Bb2  (14)

14  ...  e5!
A classic example of the central break. Perhaps White thought that the rook on d1 would discourage such activity.

16 de

Not 16 dxe5 dxe2 17 wxe2 dc3, winning.

16 ... dxf3

17 dxf3 wxe5

18 wb3

Notice how quickly Black’s forces have entered the battle. White cannot take time out to capture on e4: 18 dxe4 df3+!!

19 dxf3 dxb2.

18 ... dxf3+

19 gf dc3

20 db1

If White acts to save the rook he still finds himself in a bad position: 20 dd3 de2+ 21 dh1 wff6 22 dh2 d4. But the exchange sacrifice is even worse.

20 ... dxd1

21 xd1 d4

The rest is just technique: 22 df4 de8 23 dd2 wff6 24 dg3 wfe6 25 dc4 he7 26 dg2 h5 27 h4 dd8 28 b5 dd5 29 wb4 g5! 30 hg bxg5 31 dh1 ec7 32 he1 wd5 33 re8+ dh7 34 wb1 hg6 35 dd6 dxec5 0-1.

Toran-Korchnoi
Uppsala 1956

1 e4 df6
2 e5 dd5
3 d4 d6

White has tried a number of other plans here, although none has been proved dangerous:

a) 15 db1 de8 7 16 de2 (16 g4 can be answered by 16 ... e5!) 16 ... df5 17 wd2 dxe3 18 wxe3 wa5 19 a4?! b6! 20 fd1 wb4 ½ Barry-Hentinen, Graz 1978.

b) 15 dc1 de8 7 16 de2 df5 = Schmidt-Jansa, Marianske Lazne 1962.

c) 15 wd2 de8 7 16 db5?! df5 17 dg4 a6 ½ Browne-Fischer, Zagreb 1970.

d) 15 g4 f5 16 de2 was played in Noskov-Diuban, USSR 1968, where
Black went wrong with 16 ... f4 and fell into a bad position. 16 ... 
\( \text{\textit{g8e7}} \) would have been better, intending to break with an eventual ... e5.

15 ... \( \text{\textit{a6!}} \)

This slows the white attack just enough to give Black a good game. If White takes time out for the obvious 16 \( \text{\textit{b1}} \), Black will respond with 16 ... \( \text{\textit{w6f}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{d2 e7}} \) \( \text{\textit{g8e7}} \), and then ... \( \text{\textit{f5}} \). The pawn on b4 is poisoned, of course: 15 ...

\( \text{\textit{xb4?!}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{w3b!!}} \) ±.

16 \( \text{\textit{b5}} \) \( \text{\textit{ab}} \)
17 \( \text{\textit{xb5}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8e7}} \)
18 \( \text{\textit{ag5}} \)

If White jumps onto d6 with his knight he runs into 18 ... b6!

18 ... \( \text{\textit{wa5}} \)
19 \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \)
20 \( \text{\textit{wd3}} \) \( \text{\textit{dc6}} \)
21 \( \text{\textit{a4}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6 (16)}} \)

Black is piling the pressure on the dark squares in the centre. This is a very thematic procedure in such positions.

22 \( \text{\textit{cb?!}} \)

22 \( \text{\textit{fcl}} \) is far more solid.

22 ... \( \text{\textit{xb6}} \)
23 \( \text{\textit{fd1}} \) \( \text{\textit{a5}} \)
24 \( \text{\textit{wc3?!}} \)

White is playing aimlessly. The passed pawn is a weakness and his pieces are completely uncoordinated. A better try would have been 24 \( \text{\textit{d2 fa8}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{d1}} \), although after 25 ... \( \text{\textit{xb5!}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{xb5}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb5}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{ab}} \) \( \text{\textit{xa1}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{bc}} \) \( \text{\textit{ec1}} \)

Black would have a clear advantage.

24 ... \( \text{\textit{fa8}} \)

25 \( \text{\textit{ec1 (17)}} \)

A brilliant conception which exploits the full power of the bishop and doubled rooks. On 26 \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \), 26 ... \( \text{\textit{xa4}} \) is unbearable.

26 \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb5}} \)
27 \( \text{\textit{ab}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \)
28 \( \text{\textit{wd2}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8}} \)
29 \( \text{\textit{d1}} \) \( \text{\textit{e5}} \)
30 \( \text{\textit{we2}} \) \( \text{\textit{b8}} \)
31 \( \text{\textit{xb1}} \) \( \text{\textit{we5}} \)

Even bishops of opposite colour cannot save this one.

32 \( \text{\textit{g3}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \)
14 Illustrative Games

33 \( \mathcal{g}2 \) \( \mathcal{g}7 \)  
34 \( \mathcal{b}3 \) e4  
35 \( \mathcal{w}a2 \) \( \mathcal{w}d6 \)  
36 \( \mathcal{w}d2 \) \( \mathcal{c}5 \)  
37 \( \mathcal{c}2 \) \( \mathcal{w}e5 \)  
38 \( \mathcal{w}e2 \) \( \mathcal{f}6 \)  
0-1

This move tries to break up the white centre immediately, but does not lead to equality.

11 ... f6

White should play 13 g4 \( \mathcal{x}g4 \) (13 ... \( \mathcal{g}6 \) loses to 14 de! with a crushing position for White)

Returning to contemporary praxis, the following game was played by two lesser known players, but deserves study by anyone who wishes to defend the Alekhine.

14 \( \mathcal{g}1 \). Now Black is in trouble after either 14 ... f5 15 h3 \( \mathcal{x}f3 \) 16 \( \mathcal{w}xf3 \) 0-0 17 \( \mathcal{c}2 \)!, Velimirović-Gipslis, Havana 1971, or 14 ...

De Wit-Nijboer
Dutch Open Championship 1981

13 ... \( \mathcal{x}f6 \)

14 \( \mathcal{d}4 \) 0-0

15 de

Black has a clear advantage after 15 \( \mathcal{x}f5 \) ef 16 \( \mathcal{e}2 \) \( \mathcal{w}e7 \) 17 \( \mathcal{x}b6 \) ab 18 0-0 \( \mathcal{c}5 \), Minić-Vaganian, Erevan 1971.

15 ... \( \mathcal{x}d4 \)

16 \( \mathcal{w}xd4 \) \( \mathcal{w}e7\) (19)

Black wisely keeps the queens on the board, cognisant of the fact
that White is going to have real problems defending his king.

17  c5  \[ad8
18  \[e5  \[d7!
19  \[d5

In a difficult situation White plays for complications. If 19 \[g3
\[xe6 20 \[d5?! \[e5?! 21 \[f4 \[e7
22 \[e2, Black can play 22 ...
\[d3+ 23 \[xd3 \[xd3 with a better position.
19 ...

After 19 ... \[h4+ 20 \[g3 \[xg3
21 hg \[xe6 22 \[xa6 ba 23 \[xc7
White is much better, and the c-pawn may prove unstoppable.

20 \[g3 \[xe6
21 \[f4 \[xc5!

The ‘useless’ ... \[a6 suddenly comes alive to deliver the decisive blow against White’s overextended position. The back-rank black forces are poised to control the three central diagonals, and White’s king is still a sitting duck at e1!

22 \[xc5

On 22 \[xc5 Black wins with 22 ... \[xc5 23 \[xc5 \[d7 24 \[e3
\[d1 25 \[f2 \[d2 and now 26 \[g1 \[c4 or 26 \[xd2 \[xd2 27 \[f3 h5.

22 ...
23 \[xc5 \[c4+
24 \[f2

24 \[e2 would allow 24 ... \[xf4, while 24 \[e2 loses to 24 ...
25 \[g1 \[xf1
26 \[xc7 \[e5

Now it’s all over. After 30 \[xf1 \[e1 White’s flag had fallen, but after 31 ...
\[xb2 32 g3 \[e4 33 \[f1 g4! 34 \[g1 \[e3 there would have been no point in playing on.

(Notes based on commentary by Frans Borm)

The young German Master Klaus Bischoff has been quite loyal to the Alekhine Defence, and has tried to seek out new paths in the Modern Variation. Icelander Gudmundur Sigurjansson is one of his country’s outstanding theoreticians. So when the two of them met over the board an interesting Alekhine naturally developed:

Sigurjansson-Bischoff
Reykjavik 1982

1  e4 \[f6
2  e5 \[d5
3  d4 \[d6
4 \[f3 \[c6
5  c4 \[b6
6  ed ed (20)

After 6 ... cd 7 d5! Black must retreat his knight and allow White to increase his spatial and temporal advantage: 7 ...
\[b8 8 \[c3 \[g4
9 \[e2, Kots-Albur, USSR 1970, or 7 ...
\[e5 8 \[d4!
The elimination of the dark-squared bishops does remove some support from the centre, but it also takes away one of Black’s useful attacking pieces.

13 \( \texttt{xg5} \) \( \texttt{w5} \)
14 \( 0-0 \) \( \texttt{f3e8} \) (21)

7 \( \texttt{e2} \)
White can also obtain a superior position with 7 \( d5! \)

7 ... \( \texttt{e7} \)

7 ... \( \texttt{g4} \) 8 0-0 \( \texttt{e7} \) 9 \( d5! \) \( \texttt{xf3} \)
10 \( \texttt{xf3} \) is clearly better for White.

8 \( \texttt{c3} \) \( \texttt{g4} \)
Black should probably have castled here, but 9 \( d5 \) still guarantees White some advantage.

9 \( \texttt{b3} \)
White defends the c-pawn as Black is threatening to capture at f3. Once again the advance of the d-pawn is a good idea.

9 ... \( 0-0 \)
10 \( \texttt{h3} \) \( \texttt{xf3} \)
10 ... \( \texttt{h5} \) looks better.

11 \( \texttt{xf3} \) \( \texttt{f6} \)
12 \( \texttt{e3} \)
The Alekhine strategy is based on an attack against an over-extended white centre, but here the centre is extremely solid and Black has no effective plan.

12 ... \( \texttt{g5} \)

15 \( \texttt{xc6} \)? bc
16 \( \texttt{f3} \)
Black’s weakened pawns form an attractive target for White operations on the queenside.

16 ... \( \texttt{a5} \)
17 \( \texttt{f1} \) \( d5 \)
Almost forced, in view of the threat of 18 \( \texttt{xe8+ xe8} \) 19 \( \texttt{xc6} \).

18 \( \texttt{cd} \! \) \( cd \)
Black cannot recapture with the knight because of 19 \( \texttt{e1} \). Now White will dominate the e-file.

19 \( \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{e3} \)
20 \( \texttt{xe3} \) \( \texttt{b4} \)
21 \( \texttt{c1} \) \( a6 \)
22 \( \texttt{e2} \! \)
The knight begins its journey toward the weak e6 square.

22 ... \( \texttt{a3} \)
Not 22 ... \( \text{Whd6} \) 23 \( \text{Wc3!} \) and Black is losing.

23 \( \text{Bxc7} \) \( \text{Wha2} \)
24 \( \text{Bb7!} \) \( \text{Wxa5} \)
25 \( \text{Bf4} \) \( \text{Wh8} \)
26 \( \text{Bf6!} \) \( \text{Wxa1+} \)
26 ... \( \text{Bxe8} \) 27 \( \text{We5} \) or 26 ... \( \text{fe} \)
27 \( \text{We5!} \) both win for White.
27 \( \text{Bh2} \) \( \text{Wd1} \)
28 \( \text{We5!} \)

I-0

6 \( \text{Bxg5!?} \)
6 \( \text{Bf4} \) is more common. This move is not dangerous, if handled correctly by Black.

6 ... \( \text{fg} \)
7 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{gh?!} \)

This is the move which introduces all the complications. After 7 ... \( \text{g4} \) the chances are roughly equal.

8 \( \text{Bf4} \) \( \text{g6} \)
9 \( \text{Bxh4} \) \( \text{Bg7} \)

Naturally Black cannot afford to expose the h5-e8 diagonal with ... \( \text{g5} \).

10 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c5} \)
11 \( \text{Bd3} \) \( \text{Wa5+} \)
12 \( \text{Bf1} \) \( \text{cd} \)

This is not mere pawn grabbing. Black follows the standard strategy of undermining the centre. At the same time, White strikes on the kingside.

13 \( \text{Bxh7} \) \( \text{Bxh7} \)
14 \( \text{Bxg6+} \) \( \text{d8} \)
15 \( \text{Bxh7} \) \( \text{xe5} \)

The material is balanced, but Black must find a safe haven for his king.

16 \( \text{Wf3} \) \( \text{c6} \)
17 \( \text{Bxd5} \)

Black would have been happy to see the queens leave the board with 17 \( \text{Wxd5} \) \( \text{Wxd5} \) 18 \( \text{Bxd5} \) since after 18 ... \( \text{e6} \) the knight on d5 would be very embarrassed.

17 ... \( \text{c6} \)
18 \( \text{Wf8+} \) \( \text{d7} \)
19 \( \text{Wxa8} \) \( \text{Bb5+} \)
White had played 26 \(\mathcal{E}e1\) that weapon would have been rendered harmless and White would be able to win without too much difficulty, but White is careless.

\[26 \mathcal{E}e4? \quad \mathcal{E}d5!\]
\[27 \mathcal{E}h7\]

Obviously Black will promote the c-pawn if the bishop on e4 leaves the long diagonal.

\[27 \ldots \quad \text{e}6\]
\[28 \mathcal{E}g5 \quad \mathcal{D}h4?\]

Black has sacrificed a rook but has threats both at a1 and d5. White finds an elegant solution.

\[21 \mathcal{E}b6++!!\]

This addresses both problems. By returning some material White is able to mobilise his remaining forces.

\[21 \ldots \quad \mathcal{W}xb6\]
\[22 \mathcal{F}f3 \quad \mathcal{D}b8\]
\[23 \text{c3!}\]

White strives for open lines at all costs. But he avoids the reckless 23 \(\mathcal{D}xd4 \mathcal{W}xd4 24 \mathcal{W}xb7+\), when after \(24 \ldots \mathcal{W}d8! 25 \mathcal{W}d1 \mathcal{W}d7 26 \mathcal{W}xd7 \mathcal{W}xd7\) Black would have a comfortable game.

\[23 \ldots \quad \text{dc}\]
\[24 \mathcal{D}b1 \quad \mathcal{W}xb1+!\]
\[25 \mathcal{D}xb1 \quad \mathcal{D}c7\]

Black has cleverly sacrificed his queen in order to achieve a position where his opponent’s queen lies uselessly in the corner. He also relies on his ‘secret weapon’ – the pawn on c2. Now if

\[24 \mathcal{E}f5 (24)\]

After all that – material is even again! But White has a loaded battery at f5 and e6.

\[32 \ldots \quad \mathcal{D}d7?\]

Kengis attributes this mistake
to time pressure. After 32 ... \( \text{b7} \)
33 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{c6} \) 34 \( \text{d4+} \) \( \text{c5} \) 35 \( \text{b3+}! \) \( \text{c6} \) the game would be level, while on 35 \( \text{xb5? c2!} \) 36 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{b4} \) the threat of ... \( \text{f4+} \) would have given Black a decisive advantage. Now White wins:

\begin{verbatim}
33 \( \text{d4+} \) \( \text{d6} \)
34 \( \text{xb5+} \) \( \text{e5} \)
35 \( \text{a3} \) \( \text{b4} \)
36 \( \text{b1!} \) \( \text{d6} \)
37 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{a6} \)
38 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{c7} \)
39 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d4} \)
40 \( \text{c2+} \) \( \text{xc2} \)
41 \( \text{xc2} \) \( \text{a5} \)
\end{verbatim}

1-0

Finally, let us consider two examples of the most radical variation of the Alekhine, the so-called ‘Retreat’ variation, which has been successfully employed by Joel Benjamin and co-author Schiller.

Forster-Schiller
Cleveland (England) 1982

\begin{verbatim}
1 \( e4 \) \( \text{f6} \)
2 \( e5 \) \( \text{g8??} \)
3 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d6} \)
4 \( \text{ed} \) \( \text{ed} \)
5 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{c6} \)
6 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \)
7 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{g4} \)
8 \( 0-0 \) \( \text{d7 (25)} \)
\end{verbatim}

If Black plays passively with 8 ... \( \text{e7} \) and then ... 0-0 he will be unable to create any counterplay.

\begin{verbatim}
12 \( \text{f3?!} \)
\end{verbatim}

Is this a blunder or a well-thought out sacrifice?

\begin{verbatim}
12 ... \( \text{xd4} \)
13 \( \text{b5!} \)
\end{verbatim}

On 13 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xa4} \) 14 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{xb5} \) 15 \( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{f5} \) Black is just a pawn up.

\begin{verbatim}
13 ... \( \text{xe2+} \)
13 ... \( \text{f5} \) 14 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 15 \( \text{e3} \) gives Black a big headache:
15 ... \( \text{d5?} \) 16 \( \text{c6+! bc} \) 17 bc \( \text{b6} \) 18 \( \text{xb6} \) wins for White.
\end{verbatim}
14 \( \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\textbf{Q}}x\text{e}2!} \)

On 14 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}x\text{e}2 \) Black replies 14 ...

\( \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\textbf{Q}}f5! \text{ intending } d5 \text{ and } \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d6 \text{ with strong counterplay.}} \)

14 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}f5 \)

If only that knight could be removed from the board ...

15 \( \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\textbf{Q}}e3!} \)

This forces a critical weakness in Black’s position.

15 ...

\( b6 \)

16 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d2 \)

On 16 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}a3 \), 16 ... \( d5 \) keeps the cavalry at bay.

16 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}e8 \)

On 16 ... \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d5 \), 17 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}b3! \) is very strong.

17 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}b3!! \) (27)

\( \text{Diagram} \)

27

\( B \)

17 ...

\( \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\textbf{Q}}c2} \)

In retrospect, perhaps 17 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}\text{e}3 \) would have been better, but at the time it seemed easier to pin the offensive marauder. The game might have continued 18 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d4 \) (threatening 19 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c6+ \) and 20 \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}a6 \) or \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}a7 \) mate) 18 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{W}}e8! \) 19 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xf5! \) (19 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c6+ \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c8 \) 20 \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}a6+ \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d7 \) and

Black survives) 19 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}x\text{e}2 \) 20

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}x\text{e}2 \) \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}xe2 \) 21 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d4 \) \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}e3+ \) 22 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}h1 \)

\( \textsf{\textbf{W}}c3 \) 23 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c6+ \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c8 \) 24 \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}a6+ \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d7 \)

25 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}b8+ \) with a wild position.

18 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d1! \)

19 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xd1 \)

20 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d4 \)

21 \( c4 \)

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}b4!? \)

Desperation.

22 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}e2?! \)

With both sides out of time White replied too quickly, not noticing that the rook on e1 would be protected after 22 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xc6+! \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}b7 \)

23 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xb4 \) \( ab \) 24 \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}xb4! \), so 24 ...

\( d4 \) would not work.

22 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}b7 \)

23 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c6 \)

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c5! \)

23 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c3 \) was not appealing, while after 23 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xe3 \) 24 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xe3 \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}c5 \) White can play 25 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d4! \) \( dc \) 26

\( \textsf{\textbf{W}}xc4 \) \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}d5 \) 27 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}e5! \) intending \( \textsf{\textbf{W}}xc5 \).

24 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xc5 \)

White continues to play a spirited game. On 24 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}xa5 \) Black would simply have retreated his king, leaving White with a lot of hanging pieces.

24 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{W}}xe2 \)

25 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}f2 \)

26 \( c5! \) (28)

26 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}a8! \)

This was Black’s idea all along. Not 26 ...

\( \textsf{\textbf{W}}xb5 \) 27 \( \textsf{\textbf{Q}}e5! \) winning
Illustrative Games 21

Mengarini-Schiller
New York 1980

1 e4 d5
2 ed wxd5
3 c+c3 w+d6
4 d4

By transposition we reach variation B2.

4 ... c6
5 c+c4 g+f6
6 g+ge2!

White prepares g+f4.

27 c+xa5+?! A plausible move, with c6+ in the air, but 27 cb is perhaps stronger. 27 ... cb is then the best reply, as even though Black is tied down he does have threats of Hxb5, simplifying into a better endgame. 27 ... Hxb5 immediately leads to complications which are favourable for White, e.g. 28 c+e5 Wc8 29 bc (29 c+xf7 Hb1!!) 29 ... Wc8 30 c+xf7.

27 ... c+b8!
28 cb Hxb5!
29 bc+ c+c8!
30 c+e1 Hbxa5!

0-1

The last four moves were played in tremendous time pressure. The game may not have been played to perfection, but it is indicative of the level of excitement which can be reached with the 'retreat' variation. The same comment applies to our next example:

11 Wc2
22 Illustrative Games

Not 11 ¤xh5 ¤xh5 when ... ¤xe5 and ... ♙h4+ are in the air.

11 ... ♙a5!
12 g4?! 30

12 ¤xf6 followed by 13 ¤xe6 was called for, but White is relying on a kingside pawn storm.
12 ... ¤g6
13 h4?!
13 ¤xf6 followed by 14 ¤xe6 was again the appropriate plan. White simply overlooked the power of Black's reply:

13 ... ¤b4!
14 h5

Perhaps 14 0-0 is the most effective move, leading to highly unclear play. On 14 ♙e3 Blumenfeld analysed 14 ... ♙d5! 15 ¤xd5 cd 16 ¤b3 ♙e8!, which is about as far as I looked in the game, and now he gives further 17 ♙d2 ¤xe5 18 de d4! 19 ♙xd4 ♙d8 or 17 ¤xg7 gg8 18 ♙e5 ♙xc3+ 19 bc ♙xc3 20 ♙d2 ♙e3+! 21 ♙d1 ♙xd2+ 22 ♙xd2 ♙xf3.

14 ... ¤xe5!
15 de ¤xc3+
16 bc ♙xc3+

17 ♙f2 0-0-0 (30)

18 hg Black is winning on 18 ♙ad1 ♙xc2 19 ef ♙xd1 20 ♙xd1 ♙xd1 and 18 ♙g3 ♙d2 19 ♙f1 ♙e4+

18 ... ♙h4 ♙f2. 20 ♙h4 ♙f2.

19 fg ♙d2
20 gf ♙xe2+

A fine desperado sacrifice.

19 ... ♙g4+!

20 ♙h4 ♙f2. 21 ♙xe2 ♙xe5
22 ♙f3 White had to play 22 ♙d3, although even then Black would stand much better.

22 ... ♙f8
23 ♙c4 ♙xf7

0-1
2 Modern Variation: 8 \( \text{c3} \)
(8 h3 \( \text{h5} \) 9 \( \text{c3} \))

This reason we have decided to treat the systems together. We will use the indication (–h3, \( \text{h5} \)) whenever a game is given where the bishop has not been pushed back. Comments as to the importance of the omission will be made as appropriate.

White’s omission of h3 does not radically alter the nature of the struggle. White does not have his “luft” square at h2, but otherwise the position remains the same, since Black almost always captures at f3.

8 \[ ... \] \( \text{h5} \)

There is absolutely no point in capturing on f3, which in addition to ceding the bishop pair only improves the co-ordination of White’s pieces.

Here White can choose between reinforcing the centre or permanently altering the pawn structure by capturing on d6.

9 \( \text{c3} \)

This move is considered best.

(–h3, \( \text{h5} \)) White can try 9 b3 and now the easiest path to
equality is 9 ... de 10 Qxe5 Qxe2 11 Wxe2 c5 12 Qb2 Wc7, Lasker-Flohr, Moscow 1936. After 9 ... a5 10 h3 Qh5 we transpose below.

9 ... 0-0
10 Qe3 d5 (32)

32

The best move. The seeming loss of tempo involved in d6-d5 is not so important. By fixing the centre Black frees his hand on the queenside, while White must try to exploit the b1-h7 diagonal. This will prove difficult, however, as Black threatens to upset the apple cart by capturing on c4. Furthermore, he still possesses the strong defender on h5, which can slide back to g6. Another benefit of ... d5 is that it makes White’s 10th move look a bit silly. 10 ... Qd8d7 is also playable.

There are a number of alternatives:

a) 10 ... a5 has been played, especially when White omits h3. After (– h3, Qh5) 9 ... a5 10 b3 d5 11 c5 Qbd7 we have the Illustrative Game Littlewood-Alburt, Hastings 1980-81, examined in Chapter 1.

There is also a very interesting idea of Dmitri Gurevich: 10 ed cd 11 Wb3! Now Black has to develop his queen’s knight at d7, where it is less usefully posted than at c6. Note that Black is even worse in this variation with 8 h3 Qh5 thrown in, since White will be able to pick up a tempo with Wb5, for example 11 ... a4 12 Wb5! Wc7 13 Rae1 Qd8d7 14 c5 (White should not force the play here. After 14 Qfd1 he would have a slight advantage.) 14 ... dc 15 dc Qd5 16 Qxd5 ed 17 c6 bc 18 Qxc6 Wb8 and Black had a good game in Mokry-Bagirov, Frunze 1983.

b) (– h3, Qh5) 9 ... Qe6 is comparatively better here for Black, because after 10 ed cd 11 d5 ed 12 Qxd5! Qxd5 13 Wxd5 and with the bishop on g4, instead of h5, nothing is hanging.

c) (– h3, Qh5) A more recent attempt is 9 ... a6. Chandler-Hort, Indonesia 1982, continued 10 b3 Qd8d7 11 h3 Qf5!? 12 ed cd 13 Qe1 h6 14 Qd3 Qxd3 15 Wxd3 Qd8 16 Qad1 Qe8 17 Qf4 Qf8, leading to a typical position which is slightly better for White. The inclusion of h3, Qh5 doesn’t hurt Black: 10 ... a6 11 b3 Qd8d7 12 cd ed 13 Wd2 Qf6 14 Qfd1 Qg6 15 d5! gave White only a small edge in the game Chiburdanidze-Bischoff,
Dortmund 1983.
11 c5

There are two alternatives here, but they are manageable:

a) 11 cd ed (All things considered, this is safest. 11 ... Qxd5 12 Wb3 led to interesting play in Lobron-Alburt, New York 1983: 12 ... Qb6! 13 Bfd1 c6 14 a4 a5 15 d5! Qxd5 16 Wxb7 Qd7 17 g4 Qg6 18 Wxc6 Qc8 19 Wb5 Qb8 20 Wc6 Qc8-21 Wb5 Qb8 and a draw was agreed. In the final position White might have considered the speculative 22 Qxd5!? 12 Qd1 (12 Qd2 Qxe2 13 Qxe2 f6 was agreed drawn in Sax-Popov, Warsaw Z 1979. 12 Qd3 Qc6 13 g4 Qg6 14 Qf5 Wc8! 15 Qe2 f6 16 Qg3 f5 17 Qxe5, Gulko-Bagirov, USSR 1977, should be met by 17 ... Qd8.) 12 ... Qxe2 13 Wxe2 Qc6 14 Qd3 Wd7 15 Qad1 Qd8 16 Qc5 Qc8 17 f4 f5 and White had only a slight edge in Plachetka-Bagirov, Korkov 1978.

b) 11 b3 Qc6 (or 11 ... dc 12 bc Qc6 13 Bb1 Qb8! and Black is O.K.) 12 c5 Qd7 13 b4 (if 13 Qe1 Qxe2 then 14 ... b6! gives Black a good game.) 13 ... a6 14 Wb3 f6 15 Qxd5 ed 16 Wxd5+ Qh8 17 e6 Qg6!, Vogt-Neckar, 1976.

11 ... Qxf3

It is necessary to part with the bishop at this time. Failure to do so will be severely punished, e.g. Wijk aan Zee II 1975. Or (h3, Qh5) 10 ... Qd6 11 Bc1 b6 12 c6! Qxc6 13 Qxd5 ±.

Now White has a choice:
A 12 Qxf3
B 12 gf??

A

12 Qxf3 (33)

(- h3, Qh5) In this position the recapture with the bishop is almost as good as in the lines with h3, but White lacks the advantage of the “luff” square for his king. Still, the differences are minimal.

12 ... Qc4

13 Qf4

13 b4 allows Black to exchange White’s bishop on e3 and obtain a good game with 13 ... Qc6 14 b5 Qxe3 15 fe Qxe5 16 de Qxe5 intending ... Qg5 – Analysis.

Now it is Black who has a choice. Despite the fact that more theory has accumulated around A1, we prefer A2.
26 Modern Variation: 8  \( \text{Qc3} \)

A1 13 ...  \( \text{b6?}! \)

A2 13 ...  \( \text{Qc6!} \)

A1

13 ...  \( \text{b6?}! \)

14  \( \text{b3} \)  \( \text{Qa5} \)

15  \( \text{Ec1} \)

Alternatively:

a) 15  \( \text{Qa4?!} \)  \( \text{Qd7?!} \) 16  \( \text{b4} \) (16  \( \text{Qd2} \)  \( \text{c6} = \text{Ciocaltea-Williams, Nice} \) 1974) 16 ...  \( \text{Qc4} \) 17  \( \text{Qc3} \) (17  \( \text{Qe2?!} \)

is an interesting move) 17 ...  \( \text{c6} \) 18  \( \text{Qe2} \)  \( \text{a5} \) 19  \( \text{a3} \)  \( \text{Qxa3!} \) gives Black plenty of play, Klován-Schmidt, Polanica Zdroj 1975.

b) 15  \( \text{b4} \)  \( \text{Qc4} \) 16  \( \text{Ec1} \) (16  \( \text{Ec1} \) a5  \( \text{E Knavek-Pribyl, Olomouc} \) 1975)

16 ...  \( \text{c6}! \) 17  \( \text{Qe2} \)  \( \text{a5}! \) 18  \( \text{Qxc4 dc!} \)

19  \( \text{a3 ab 20 ab} \)  \( \text{Qa6!} \) 21  \( \text{b5} \)  \( \text{b4} \)

22  \( \text{bc bc!} \) 23  \( \text{c7} \)  \( \text{Wxd4} \) 24  \( \text{Wxd4 cd} \)

25  \( \text{Qb5 c3!} \) (Lukin-Bagirov, USSR 1975) and now White should have settled for equality with 26  \( \text{Qxd4!} \).

White can improve, however, with 19  \( \text{b5?!} \), when he can claim a slight advantage.

c) 15  \( \text{Wd2} \)  \( \text{bc} \) 16  \( \text{dc} \)  \( \text{Qac6} \) 17  \( \text{Qa4} \)

\( \text{Qd7} \) was Georgadze-Alburt, USSR 1st League 1973. After 18  \( \text{Qe1} \)

\( \text{Qb8!} \) messy complications would have set in.

15 ...  \( \text{bc} \)

16  \( \text{dc} \) (34)

16 ...  \( \text{Qbc6} \)

16 ...  \( \text{Qbc6} \) deserves attention, e.g.

a) 17  \( \text{Ee1} \)  \( \text{Eb8} \) 18  \( \text{Qa4} \)  \( \text{g5} \) 19  \( \text{Wd2 h6!} \) 20  \( \text{Qb2} \)  \( \text{xf4} \) 21  \( \text{Wxf4} \)

\( \text{g5!} \) 22  \( \text{Qh2?!} \)  \( \text{Qd4} \)  \( \text{±} \text{Rodriguez-Fraguela, Orense} \) 1975.

b) 17  \( \text{Wd2} \)  \( \text{Bb8} \) 18  \( \text{Qe2?!} \)  \( \text{Bb4} \) 19  \( \text{Qe1} \)  \( \text{h6!} \) 20  \( \text{Qc3} \)  \( \text{g5} \) 21  \( \text{Qxg5} \)

\( \text{Wxg5} \) 22  \( \text{Wxg5 hg} \)  \( \text{f} \)  \( \text{C.Fernandez-Fraguela, Cienfuegos II} \) 1975.

17  \( \text{Qe1} \)

Other moves allow Black to initiate operations on the flanks:

a) 17  \( \text{Qb5 a5!} \) 18  \( \text{Wd2} \)  \( \text{Qd7} \) 19  \( \text{Qc3} \)

\( \text{a4!} \) 20  \( \text{Qfd1 ab} \) 21  \( \text{ab} \)  \( \text{Wb8} \)  \( \text{±} \text{Bielczyk-Doda, Poland} \) 1975.

b) 17  \( \text{Wd2} \)  \( \text{Qd7} \) 18  \( \text{Qe1} \)  \( \text{Bb8} \) 19  \( \text{Qa4} \)  \( \text{b4} \)  \( \text{±} \).

c) 17  \( \text{Qa4?!} \)  \( \text{Qd7} \) 18  \( \text{Qe1} \)  \( \text{g5} \) 19  \( \text{Wd2} \)  \( \text{h6} \) intending ...  \( \text{Qxe5} \)  \( \text{±} \text{S.Garcia-Doda, Polanica Zdroj} \) 1975.

17 ...  \( \text{g5} \)

17 ...  \( \text{Qd7} \) (17 ...  \( \text{Qxc5??} \) is met by 18  \( \text{Qxd5} \)  \( ± \)) 18  \( \text{Qxd5! ed} \) 19  \( \text{Qxd5 Qdb8} \) 20  \( \text{b4 a6 21} \)  \( \text{??} \)  \( \text{a7} \)

22  \( \text{Wf3} \)  \( \text{±} \text{Gufeld-Palatnik, USSR} \) 1973.

18  \( \text{Qxd5} \)

18  \( \text{Wd2} \)  \( \text{xf4!} \) 19  \( \text{Wxf4 a5} \) 20  \( \text{Qe2} \) (20  \( \text{a3?!} \)  \( \text{Qe7!} \) 21  \( \text{Qg4} \)  \( \text{g6} \) 22  \( \text{Qa4} \)  \( \text{c6} \) 23  \( \text{f4} \)  \( \text{Wc7} \) 24  \( \text{Wd4} \)  \( \text{Qd7} \)  \( \text{±} \)}.
19 \text{...} \text{a3} 20 \text{b3} \text{Bb8} = \text{Lukin-Bagirov, USSR 1974.}

18 \text{\textit{exg5}} \text{\textit{wxg5}} 19 \text{\textit{exd5}} leads to a sharp game with chances for both sides.

18 \text{...} \text{ed}

19 \text{\textit{exg5}} \text{\textit{wxg5}} (35)

20 \text{\textit{exd5}}

20 \text{\textit{wxd5}} is also possible.

20 \text{...} \text{\textit{h8}}!

21 \text{\textit{We2}}

21 \text{\textit{Ec4?!}} led to disaster in Kavalek-Schmid, Nice Ol 1974:

21 ... \text{a5} 22 \text{e6 fe} 23 \text{\textit{Exe6 d8}}! 24 \\
24 \text{\textit{Wg3}} 25 \text{\textit{Ee7 a6}}! 26 \text{\textit{Exc7 \textit{Ec6}}! \textit{+}}.

21 \text{\textit{b4}} deserves consideration because it creates a strong threat of \textit{b5}. The pin with 21 ... \text{\textit{Ed8}} can lead to tremendous complications.

21 \text{...} \text{\textit{a5}}

22 \text{\textit{We4}} \text{\textit{Ea6}}

23 \text{\textit{f4}}

White has a small edge, but Black should be able to cope.

A2

13 \text{...} \text{\textit{Cc6}}! (36)

14 \text{b3} \text{\textit{D4a5}}

15 \text{\textit{Ec1}}

An unclear position arises after 15 \text{\textit{Dc1}} \text{b6} 16 \text{\textit{D4a4}}, Enklaar-Timman, Dutch Final 1975. We agree with Hort’s recommended 16 \text{...} \text{f6}! 17 \text{\textit{Hg4 f5 18 Hxe2}}. In the resulting position Black’s chances are no worse. Still, we prefer 15 ... \text{\textit{wd7}}, with the same ideas as those presented in the note to the next move.

15 \text{...} \text{\textit{Dd7}}

Hort’s main line is 15 ... \text{b6}, but after 16 \text{\textit{D4a4}}! Black has nothing better than 16 ... \text{\textit{Eg5 17 Hxg5 wxg5}} when White has a small but significant advantage. In this position we prefer 15 ... \text{\textit{wd7}}. Black will then play 16 ... \text{f6}, and if White tries to prevent this then Black can play 16 ... \text{\textit{Eae8}}.

16 \text{\textit{Ee3}}

16 \text{\textit{Ee1}} \text{f6 transposes above.}

16 \text{\textit{Eg4}} is an interesting move
which leads to a very complicated position after 16 ... b6 17 Ʌa4 Ʌb7, Ničevski-Sofrevski, Yugoslavia 1975. Here Hort gives 18 Ʌe2! bc 19 Ʌa6 Ʌcd8! 20 dc c6 intending ... f6 and ... Ʌf7. Perhaps Black should not hasten to play ... b6.

16 ... f6
17 ef Ʌxf6
18 Ʌd2 b6

The chances are equal, Geller-Bagirov, USSR Ch 1979.

B

12 gf (37)

This sharp move was first shown to me (L.A.) by Anatoly Karpov in 1972. Karpov has always played effectively against the Alekhine with White, so it is not surprising that he came up with the best plan here.

12 ... Ʌc8
13 f4!

This is Karpov’s move. Others:

a) 13 Ʌb1 Ʌh4 14 f4 Ʌe7 15 Ʌd3 g6 16 b4 and White had a very slight edge in Huisl-Gralka, Hastings Challengers 1976/77.

b) 13 b4 Ʌc6!? 14 b5 Ʌa5 15 Ʌa4 b6 16 c6 Ʌh4 17 Ʌc2 Ʌh8 18 Ʌh1 Ʌe7 19 Ʌd3 g6 20 Ʌe2 a6 led to an unclear position in Minev-Palatnik, Albena 1975.

13 ... Ʌc6 (38)

(- h3, Ʌh5) 12 ... Ʌh4 13 Ʌd3 g6 14 Ʌg4 illustrates some advantages of not playing h3, since after 14 ... h5 15 Ʌh3 keeps the bishop in check and prevents the developing move ... Ʌ8e7. Meanwhile on 13 ... f5 White is winning after 14 ef g6 15 f7+, van der Wiel-Böhm, Dutch Ch 1979. The basic idea is to leave the knight on b8 defenceless after 15 ... Ʌxf7 16 Ʌg4 Ʌf6 (or e7) 17 Ʌd5.

With h3 and ... Ʌh5 included, however, Black can get away with 13 ... Ʌh4 14 Ʌd3 g6 15 Ʌg4 Ʌh8 16 b4 Ʌc6 17 a3 f5 with a balanced position in Psakhis-Agзамov, USSR Ch 1983.
Some examples:

a) 14 b4 a4 15 b5 (15 b5 c5)

Dorfman-Bagirov, USSR Ch 1978) 15 ... a6! 16 d3 f5!? 17 h2

= We8 18 e8 19 e2 h8 20

b2 w7 and White was only slightly better in Kuzmin-Bagirov, USSR Ch 1978.

b) 14 d3 g6 15 h2 h8 16 g1

b6 17 b5 xd4! 18 xd4 bc =

Tseitlin-Alburt, Odessa 1976.

c) 14 f3 a4 15 b3 b8 16 e8e7 is slightly better for Black since White's bishop does not belong on f3 (it should be on the b1-h7 diagonal), Lerner-Alburt, Odessa 1976.

d) 14 h2!? is an interesting if untested try, e.g. 14 ... g6 15 b5

We7 16 w4 b8 17 g1 with a balanced game = Analysis.

e) 14 f5!? ef leads to very sharp play: 15 f3 f4! 16 xf4 g5 or 15 b3 g5! 16 xb7 xe3 =

Analysis. Of all of these moves we feel that 14 b4 is the most promising for White, although Black is not in any significant trouble.
3 Modern Variation: 8 ed
(8 h3 h5 9 ed)

c6 17 f4 f5. 9 cd is also possible, for example 9 c6 10 ed cd 11
Ec1 d5 12 c5 d7 13 b4 a6 14 a3 f5
15 cd g5 with an unbalanced

8 ed (39) Now White has a number of options:

A 9 c3
B 9 cd
C 9 c3
D 9 b3

Again the inclusion of the moves h3, h5 is generally trivial,
so we deal with these examples (involving 8 h3 h5 or 9 h3 h5)
under the respective 10th move choices (variations A-D).

9 d5 has been suggested. 9 ed may give White a tiny edge, but 9 ... e5 leads to very sharp play.

For 9 cd see the Illustrative Game Tarjan-Alburt, US Ch 1983,
in Chapter 1.

A 9 c3 0-0

9 ... d5 looks very good, e.g.
10 c5 xf3 11 xf3 cd 12 cd

Black equalises easily against
8 b3: 8 c6 9 b2 0-0 10 cd7 11 e4 d5 12 c5 w8 13 cd
dx5 14 cd =.

Another plan is 8 c3. In
the game Pirttimäki-Tomaszewski,
Graz 1981, Black equalised after
8 0-0 9 a4 d5 10 b3 a5 11 cd c6 12 c5 d7 13 cd1 el xel 14
dxe2 wb4 15 cd3 xd3 16 wd3
\( \text{\textcopyright } \text{xe3 13 fe } \text{\textcopyright } \text{c7 } \text{\textcopyright } \text{Palacios-Hecht, Costa del Sol 1972.} \)

40

\[ \begin{array}{c}
10 & \text{\textcopyright bd2} \\
a) & 10 \text{ h3 } \text{\textcopyright h5 11 } \text{\textcopyright c3 d5 12 c5} \\
& 13 \text{ g6 } \text{\textcopyright d7} (13 \ldots \text{\textcopyright c4 transposes to C}) 14 \text{ b4 } \text{\textcopyright f6 15 } \text{\textcopyright d3} \\
& \text{b6 was seen in Pajak-Valenter, World Jr Ch 1980.} \\
b) & 10 \text{ \textcopyright c3 transposes to C.} \\
c) & 10 \text{ a4 comes into consideration:} \\
& 10 \ldots \text{\textcopyright c6! 11 a5 (11 d5 ed 12 cd} \\
& \text{\textcopyright xf3 13 } \text{\textcopyright xf3 } \text{\textcopyright e5 led to an equal} \\
& \text{game in Suetin-Bagirov, Vilnius 1966) 11 } \text{\textcopyright d7 12 a6 ba 13 } \text{\textcopyright xa6} \\
& \text{\textcopyright b4 14 } \text{\textcopyright a4 a5, Mukhin-Bagirov,} \\
& \text{Kiev 1970.} \\
& 9 \text{ \textcopyright bd2 } \text{\textcopyright c6!} \\
& \text{After 9 } \text{\textcopyright bd2 Black should not} \\
& \text{rush to castle, but should bring his} \\
& \text{other knight into the game.} \\
& 10 \text{ b3 } \text{0-0} \\
& 11 \text{ \textcopyright b2} \\
& \text{White cannot insert 11 h3 } \text{\textcopyright h5} \\
& \text{here because Black will not co-} \\
& \text{operate, playing instead 11 } \ldots \\
& \text{\textcopyright f5?! He does not want to} \\
& \text{play 11 } \text{\textcopyright xf3 allowing White to} \\
& \text{recapture with the knight.} \\
& 11 \ldots \text{\textcopyright f6!} \\
& 12 \text{ \textcopyright c1} \\
& \text{Black equalises on 12 b4 e5 13 } \text{\textcopyright xe5 de 14 } \text{\textcopyright xg4 ed 15 } \text{\textcopyright f4 a5!} \\
& 16 \text{ b5 } \text{\textcopyright e5.} \\
& 12 \ldots \text{d5} \\
& 13 \text{ c5 } \text{\textcopyright c8} \\
& 14 \text{ b4 } \text{a6} \\
& 15 \text{ \textcopyright b1 } \text{\textcopyright e7} \\
& 16 \text{ a4 } \text{\textcopyright f5} \\
& 17 \text{ b5 } \text{ab} \\
& 18 \text{ ab (40)} \\
& \text{This position was reached in} \\
& \text{Lederman-Timman, Netanya 1975.} \\
\end{array} \]

9 \text{ \textcopyright bd2 } \text{\textcopyright c6!} \\
10 \text{ b3 } \text{0-0} \\
11 \text{ \textcopyright b2} \\
12 \ldots \text{\textcopyright f6!} \\
13 \text{ c5 } \text{\textcopyright c8} \\
14 \text{ b4 } \text{a6} \\
15 \text{ \textcopyright b1 } \text{\textcopyright e7} \\
16 \text{ a4 } \text{\textcopyright f5} \\
17 \text{ b5 } \text{ab} \\
18 \text{ ab (40)} \\
This position was reached in Lederman-Timman, Netanya 1975.

9 \text{ \textcopyright bd2 } \text{\textcopyright c6!} \\
10 \text{ b3 } \text{0-0} \\
11 \text{ \textcopyright b2} \\
12 \ldots \text{\textcopyright f6!} \\
This position can be reached

where h3 and \text{\textcopyright h5 have been played. (White cannot insert 11 h3} \\
\text{\textcopyright h5 here because Black will} \\
retreat the bishop to f5.) Kuzmin- \\
Alburt, USSR 1976, continued (12 \text{\textcopyright b2}) 12 \ldots \text{\textcopyright g6 13 } \text{\textcopyright c3! a5 14} \\
a3 \text{\textcopyright f6 15 } \text{\textcopyright e1 } \text{\textcopyright b8 16 } \text{\textcopyright f1} where \\
White had a slight advantage, but \\
Black's game is playable.

11 \ldots \text{\textcopyright f5!} \\
In our opinion this is the best 
move and it assures Black of a 
comfortable game. More tourna- 
ment experience is required, but 
an encouraging example is Vogt-
Bagirov, Tallinn 1981, which
continued 12 a3 a5 13  \( \text{B}e1 \text{f}6 \\
14 \text{B}c1 d5 15 c5 \text{B}d7 16 \text{B}f1 b6 \\
17 \text{B}b5 \text{B}c8 18 \text{B}d2 \text{B}e4.

On 11 ... d5 12 c5 \text{B}d7 White might try 13 b4 b6 14 \text{B}b3 \text{B}c7 (Kagan-Birnboim, Netanya 1977) and after 15 \text{B}fc1 he has a slight edge.

Now Black should play 14 ... \text{B}a3!
15 \text{B}xb7 \text{B}a7 16 \text{B}e4 d5 17 \text{B}d3 \text{d}6 with a rather unclear position. Keep in mind that the moves h3 and \text{B}h5 are almost always played earlier, so that the apparent waste of time with \text{B}g4-h5xf3 is unavoidable.

b) 10 ... \text{B}c6 can also be played, and we think that this is the best reply for Black. Jansa-Böhm, Amsterdam (IBM) 1975, saw (with h3 and \text{B}h5 included) 12 d5 ed 13 \text{B}xd5 (better 13 ed, although we prefer Black's position) 13 ... \text{B}xf3 14 \text{B}xf3 \text{Bxc}4 15 \text{B}b3 and now Black could have played 15 ... \text{B}b6 with an excellent game.

10 h3 \text{B}h5 will be discussed in context below.

This sensible developing move remains quite popular.

9 ... 0-0

10 \text{B}e3

10 \text{B}f4 places the bishop on a less useful square:

a) 10 ... a6 11 b3 d5 12 c5 \text{B}xf3 13 \text{B}xf3 \text{B}c8 14 b4 \text{B}b6 15 \text{B}b1 (15 b5?! should be met by 15 ... \text{B}a5) 15 ... \text{B}f6 and now White should play 16 \text{B}e2, which led to an almost equal game in Gaprindashvili-Kushnir, match 1969. The line may be even better when h3 and \text{B}h5 have been played: 12 \text{B}c1! \text{B}xf3 13 \text{B}xf3 \text{Bxc}4 14 b3!, Romanishin-Vukić, Novi Sad 1975.

10 ... \text{B}c6 allows White to seize more territory in the centre with 11 d5, and now:

a) 11 ... ed 12 \text{B}xd5 (also possible is 12 cd \text{B}xf3 13 \text{B}xf3 \text{B}e5 (Sahović-Schmidt, Sombor 1978) 12 ... \text{B}xd5 13 \text{B}xd5 \text{B}b6 14 \text{B}fd1 (14 \text{B}ab1 \text{B}c8! gives Black more counterplay) 14 ... \text{B}c8 15 \text{B}e2 \text{B}a5 (Browne-Hort, San Antonio 1972) and now White should play 16 \text{B}xa5 \text{B}xa5 17 \text{B}c1 \pm. White's edge is much greater if h3 and \text{B}h5 have been played since the bishop will be attacked after 14 \text{B}xd5.

b) 11 ... \text{B}xf3 12 \text{B}xf3 \text{B}e5 13 defe
14 asl4! 0xc4 15 0xe6 0h8 16
0xc6 0xb6 17 0wb3 0f6 18 0ad1

Timman-Bagirov, Tbilisi 1971.
10... a5 transposes to Chapter 2.

Mokry-Bagirov (page 24).
11 0c5 0xf3
12 0xf3

Also possible is 12 gf 0c8 13 b4
0xc6 14 b5 (14 0b1 is better) 14...
0xa5 15 0wa4 b6 16 0ac1 0f6 with
a good game for Black, Georgadze-
12 ... 0c4
13 0d4

Alternatives are:
a) 13 b3 0xe3 14 fe 0c6 15 a3 b6
16 cb ab 17 0b5 0g5 = Radojević-
Bagirov, Polanica Zdroj 1969.
b) 13 b4 0c6! 14 b5 0xa5 15 0wd3
b6 16 0a3! 17 0f4 a6! =

Zlotnik-Bagirov, Baku 1969.
c) 13 0c1 b6 14 b3 0a5 15 0a4!
[+ h3, 0h5] 16 0e3 b6 17 0a4
16, with an unclear position, is
better than 17 ... bc 18 0xc5 0e8
19 0c1 0b8 20 0e2 h6 21 a3 with
a much better game for White,
Spraggett-Alburt, New York 1983)
15 ... b5 (15 ... 0bc6 16 0e3 ±) 16
0c3 b4 =. Black can, of course,
play 13 ... 0c6, and the bishop is
not as useful on cl as it would be
on f4.

13 ... 0c6
14 b3 0d4a5
15 0c1

15 0b1 0f6 16 0e3 b6 17 cb
ab! =.

15 ... b6
16 0a4

In Short-Bagirov, Baku 1983,
where the moves h3 and 0h5 had
been played, 17 cb 0xb6 18 0e3
0ac8 19 0a4 0b8 gave Black a
reasonable game.

16 ... 0f6
17 0e3 b5
18 0d3 (42)

This position was reached in the
oft-quoted game Sax-Hecht, Wijk
aan Zee 1973. After 18 ... b4! 19
0e2 0e7 Black will be able to
equalise with ... 0ac6.

D

9 b3 0c6

Black has two interesting alter-
natives, both of which should
eventually transpose into B.
a7 9 ... 0f6 10 0b2 0c6 11 0d2
0-0 12 0a3?! a5! Blau-Kraidman,
Lugano Ol 1968. White should
probably play 11 0bd2 transpos-
ing to B.
b) 9 ... 0-0 10 0e3! transposes to
A, while 10 a4 a5 11 0c3 d5 is
even.
10 \( \text{c3} \)

10 \( \text{ab2} \) just transposes to B

after 10 ... \( \text{f6} \) 11 \( \text{bd2} \).

10 ... \( \text{0-0} \)

11 \( \text{e3 (43)} \)

Since Black no longer has the possibility of ... \( \text{c5} \), this is clearly the best square for the bishop.

Other diagonals hold less promise:

a) 11 \( \text{b2} \) d5 12 c5 \( \text{xf3} \) 13 \( \text{xf3} \)

\( \text{d7} \) 14 a3 \( \text{f6} \) = Zurakhov-Vishomirskis, USSR 1955.

b) 11 \( \text{a3} \) is interesting. Black’s best defence is probably 11 ...

\( \text{xh3} \) 12 \( \text{xh3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 13 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e8} \), following up with ... \( \text{d5} \). Alternatively, he might try an immediate ...

\( \text{d5} \), answering 12 \( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \)!

13 cd with 13 ... \( \text{xd5} \) 14 \( \text{xd5} \)

ed, with equality.

c) 11 \( \text{d5} \) doesn’t work, either before or after \( \text{h3} \) and \( \text{h5} \).

Consider 11 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{h5} \) 12 \( \text{d5} \) ed 13

\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 14 \( \text{wd5} \) \( \text{f6} \) 15

\( \text{wh5} \) \( \text{xa1} \) 16 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{f6} \) 17 \( \text{d3} \)

g6 18 \( \text{wh4} \) \( \text{g5} \) 19 \( \text{g5} \) h5 20 g4

\( \text{e5} \) and Black has a decisive advantage.

11 ... \( \text{d5} \)

Black should hesitate before deploying his bishop at \( \text{f6} \) (11 ...

\( \text{f6} \)), because it can easily become a target. For example, White can attack the bishop with \( \text{exe4} \) and then transfer the knight to \( \text{g3} \) without loss of tempo.

Routine development allows White to obtain an advantage by advancing his d-pawn.

12 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{c8} \)

Black might well wish to keep \( \text{d7} \) in reserve. After 13 \( \text{b4} \)

\( \text{xb4} \) 14 \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{e6} \) 15 \( \text{xb7} \) Black can choose 15 ...

\( \text{b8} \) 16 \( \text{xb8} \)

\( \text{xd8} \) 17 \( \text{f6} \) (17 \( \text{wa4} \) \( \text{wa5} \)) 17 ...

\( \text{xf3} \) 18 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{wa5} \) = Tal-Vasyukov, USSR 1967.

13 \( \text{b4} \)

13 \( \text{a3} \) just gives Black a tempo in which to play ...

\( \text{f6} \)!

13 ... \( \text{a6} \)

It is not clear that Black need delay the deployment of the bishop: 13 ...

\( \text{f6} \) 14 b5 \( \text{a5} \) 15

\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 16 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{xe2} \) 17 \( \text{xe2} \)

\( \text{xe5} \) 18 \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{c4} \) led to equality in Parma-Still, Lugano Ol 1968.

17 \( \text{xe2} \) has been suggested. We think that Black ought to play 15 ...

\( \text{xf3} \).

Notice, however, that if \( \text{h3} \) and \( \text{h5} \) have already been played this will not work, since White can answer 15 (16) b5 \( \text{a5} \) with 16 g4!.

15 (16) ... \( \text{xf3} \) will not work under these circumstances; 16 (17)
he $\text{dxe} 2 17 \text{ cb.}$

14 $\text{b1!} \quad \text{f6}$

15 $\text{a4!} \quad \text{8e7}$

Naturally this only works with the bishop on g4, otherwise White wins a piece by advancing his g-pawn – g4-g5.

After 15 ... $\text{xf3} \ 16 \text{xf3} \text{ 8e7}$

17 $\text{b5 ab 18 ab a5 19 e2 f5 20}$

$\text{xd4 21 xd4 xd4 22}$

$\text{xh7+ xh7 23 xd4 c7 24}$

$c4! c4 25 e4! White stood better in Ciocaltea-Westerinen, Dortmund 1973, but Black can improve with 20 ... g6! and then he should not be afraid to give White a passed pawn. Black will play ... b6 and White should not advance his c-pawn until forced to do so, once it can be blockaded without difficulty and the d6 square can be exploited by Black for the redeployment of his pieces.

16 $\text{b5 a5}$

Or 16 ... $\text{xf3} 17 \text{xf3 ab1, as in the notes above.}$

17 $\text{f4 f5}$

17 ... $\text{xf3!}$ is the best move here, in our opinion.

18 $\text{e5 (44}$

The position is unclear, Minić-Hort, Zagreb 1969.

In general, Black must try to preserve the option of capturing on f3, once he has advanced his d-pawn to d5. If White has played h3, Black must always be alert to the possibility of g4 and $\text{e5}.$
4 Modern Variation: 5 \( \text{\textcopyright e2} \),
Odds & Ends

1 e4 \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) on the 4th move, since after 6
2 e5 \( \text{\textcopyright d5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright xe5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright xe2} \) 7 \( \text{\textcopyright xe2} \) White’s
3 d4 advantage is beyond question. d6
4 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright g4} \) A
5 \( \text{\textcopyright e2} \) (45)

5 ... g6

Black cannot expect to achieve
much by mixing two utterly distinct plans (... \( \text{\textcopyright g4} \) and ... g6,
... \( \text{\textcopyright g7} \)).

6 \( \text{\textcopyright g5}! \)

White can certainly go for more
than the small edge granted after
6 h3 \( \text{\textcopyright xf3} \) 7 \( \text{\textcopyright xf3} \) e6 8 ed.

6 ... \( \text{\textcopyright xe2} \)

Retreat is even worse: 6 ... \( \text{\textcopyright f5} \)
7 e6! \( \text{\textcopyright xe6} \) 8 \( \text{\textcopyright xe6} \) fe 9 \( \text{\textcopyright g4} \) c6 10
\( \text{\textcopyright xe6} \) \( \pm \) Zichichi-Herzog, Pascoli
1975.

7 \( \text{\textcopyright xe2} \) de

Also inadequate is 7 .. h6 8
\( \text{\textcopyright xf7} \) \( \text{\textcopyright xf7} \) 9 \( \text{\textcopyright f3+} \) \( \text{\textcopyright e6} \) 10 c4 \( \pm \).

8 \( \text{\textcopyright f3}! \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \)

9 de \( \text{\textcopyright h6} \)

10 \( \text{\textcopyright xf7} \) \( \text{\textcopyright xf7} \)

11 ef \( \text{\textcopyright ef} \)

12 \( \text{\textcopyright xb7} \) \( \pm \)


B

5 ... \( \text{\textcopyright b6} \)
This move seems sensible at first glance. After all, doesn’t it make sense to put the knight at b6, since White will chase it there with c4? But the move c4 is the price for driving the knight from the centre. White must weaken his pawn structure in order to accomplish this task. Now he has the luxury of keeping his c-pawn in reserve.

Not surprisingly, therefore, this line is rare in strong events. Here are some examples of plans for White:

a) 6 0-0 e6 7 ed ed 8 a4 8 d5 exf3 9 g6 e5 10 f4 d5 6 de 6 b3 7 h3 xf3 8 xf3 de 6 d5 b6 7 h3 xf3 8 xf3 de 9 de wd1 10 w3d1 ± Novopashin-Mikenas, USSR Ch 1962. 7 c3! is also strong.

Black must not fall into the trap 8 ... xdx4? 9 wc4!. After 8 ... xe5 9 de Black has no convenient place to put his queen.

White has a clear advantage,


b) 6 g5 xe2 7 xe2 h6 8 e4 e6 9 e6!? xdx4 10 ef+ xf7 11 wd3 e5 12 e3 d5 13 g3 c5 140-0 and now Tseitlin-Karasev, USSR 1967, continued 14 ... d6? 15 f4! c4 16 wd1 ±. After 14 ... xe7 Black would have chances in a very sharp position.

White meets development with development. Now he need not fear the opening of the d-file, since he can recapture on d1 with the rook. Also strong is the immediate

6 c4 db6 7 ed and then 8 d5, exploiting the position of the knight on c6.

7 ... xe5 xe5

8 we2 wd6!

5 ... c6 (46)

This is a very popular alternative to the main lines. It was developed by Salo Flohr. Black builds the
foundation for a break in the centre without closing the c8-h3 diagonal. At the same time the c7 square is made available to the Black forces. On the other hand, the bishop on f8 remains shut in.

White usually limits his choice to:

D1 6 0-0
D2 6 \( \text{\$g}5 \)

There are, however, a number of possible alternatives:

a) 6 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{\$c7!} \) 7 ed ed 8 0-0 \( \text{\$e7} \) 9 \( \text{\$c3} \) \( \text{\$d7} \) 10 h3 \( \text{\$h5} \) 11 \( \text{\%e1} \) 0-0 12 d5 \( \text{\$c} \) Campora-Paulsen, Dortmund 1981. 6 ... \( \text{\%b6} \) is more logical, e.g. 7 \( \text{\$c3?!} \) \( \text{\$xf3} \) 8 gf de 9 de \( w \)xd1+ 10 \( \text{\$xd1} \) g6 (Pajak-Gerbert, World Jr Ch 1980) or 7 \( \text{\$bd2!} \) de 8 \( \text{\$xe5} \) \( \text{\$xe6}! \) (Black can fall into trouble with 8 ... \( \text{\$xe2} \) 9 \( \text{\$xe2} \) \( \text{\$xd4?!} \) 10 \( \text{\$df3} \) intending \( \text{\$g5} \), but he might try 9 ... \( \text{\$d7} \) 9 \( \text{\$e4} \) f6 10 \( \text{\$c5} \) \( \text{\$g8}! \) 11 \( \text{\$f3} \) \( \text{\$c7} \) 12 b3 e5 13 \( \text{\$e4} \) \( \text{\$d7} \) \( \text{\$c} \) Vogt-Bagirov, Riga 1981.

b) 6 ed ed 7 0-0 \( \text{\$e7} \) 8 c4 \( \text{\$b6} \) (we think that 8 ... \( \text{\$f6} \) deserves consideration) 9 b3 \( \text{\$xf3} \) 10 \( \text{\$xf3} \) d5 11 \( \text{\%e1} \) 0-0 with at least equality for Black in Hergott-Paulsen, Graz 1981. Also playable is 9 ... 0-0 10 \( \text{\$c3} \) \( \text{\$e8} \) 11 h3 \( \text{\$h5} \) 12 \( \text{\$f4} \) \( \text{\$f6} \), Wittman-Bagirov, Fruenze 1983.

c) 6 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{\$xf3} \) 7 \( \text{\$xf3} \) de 8 de ed 9 0-0 \( \text{\$d7} \) 10 \( \text{\$e2} \) \( \text{\$c7} \) 11 \( \text{\%e1} \) \( \text{\$c5} \) 12 c3 a5 = Malanyuk-Kengis, USSR 1981.

D1

White continues his development and refrains from rash activities.

6 ... \( \text{\$xf3}! \)
7 \( \text{\$xf3} \) de

This is the point of the variations with ... c6: the b-pawn isn’t hanging.

8 de e6
9 \( \text{\$e2} \)

a) 9 \( \text{\$x}d5 \) cd 10 \( \text{\$e2} \) is harmless in view of 10 ... \( \text{\%c6} \) 11 c3 \( \text{\$c7} \) 12 \( \text{\%d2} \) 0-0 13 \( \text{\$f3} \) \( \text{\%c8} \) 14 \( \text{\$e3} \) \( \text{\$c7} \) 15 \( \text{\$d4} \) \( \text{\$xd4} \) 16 \( \text{\$xd4} \) = Hinteregger-Cramling, Graz 1979.

b) After 9 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{\$e7} \) 10 \( \text{\$xd8}+ \) \( \text{\$xd8} \) it is White who is struggling to maintain equality, e.g. 11 \( \text{\$f4} \) \( \text{\$d7} \) 12 \( \text{\%e1} \) \( \text{\$c7} \) 13 \( \text{\$c3} \) \( \text{\$g6} \) 14 \( \text{\$g3} \) \( \text{\$b4} \) \( \text{\$f4} \) \( \text{\$c} \) Zurachov-Kopylov, Leningrad 1955. Better is 11 \( \text{\%e4} \) \( \text{\$d7} \) 12 f4 \( \text{\$f5} \) 13 g4 \( \text{\$c5}+! \) 14 \( \text{\$g2} \) \( \text{\$e3} \) 15 \( \text{\$xe3} \) \( \text{\$xe3} \), Bajović-Popov, Plovdiv 1982.

c) 9 \( \text{\%e1} \) \( \text{\$d7} \) 10 a3 a5 led to an
even position in Bogdanović-Kovacević, Yugoslavia 1983. Another good line is 10 ... \( \text{wc7} \) 11 \( \text{wc2} \) \( \text{qf5} \). White might wish to investigate 10 \( \text{bd2} \) intending to bring the knight to \( c4 \).

\[ 9 \ldots \text{d7} (48) \]

9 ... \( \text{wc7} \) comes into consideration, for example 10 c4 \( \text{e7} \) 11 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{d7} \) 12 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 13 \( \text{el} \) a5, Santo Roman-Bischoff, Dortmund (World Jr Ch) 1980.

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{W} \\
\text{B}
\end{array} \]

10 c4

10 b3 is too slow and allows Black to obtain immediate counterplay with 10 ... \( \text{c5} \) 11 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{c7} \) 12 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f4} \) 13 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 14 \( \text{f4} \) 0-0-0, Dely-Aster, Prague 1955.

10 \( \text{el} \) is a little more consistent, but after 10 ... \( \text{wc7} \) play will usually transpose below. Still, there are a couple of interesting alternative plans for White:

1. Hort suggests 11 c4 \( \text{c7} \) 12 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{g6} \) 13 \( \text{c3} \) ±.
2. 11 a3 has not seen enough action but we feel that Black can hold his own with 11 ... \( \text{e7} \) 12 b3 \( \text{g6} \) 13 \( \text{b2} \) 0-0-0!

\[ 10 \ldots \text{e7} \]

11 \( \text{g4} \)

11 b3 is still too slow: 11 ... \( \text{g6} \) 12 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{g5}! \) and Black quickly obtained a powerful position in Hardicsay-Suba, Budapest 1976:

13 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 14 \( \text{h1} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 15 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{h4} \) 16 \( \text{h3} \) 0-0-0.

11 \( \text{f4} \) just loses time to 11 ... \( \text{g6} \), e.g. 12 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{wc7} \) 13 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{b4} \) 14 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 15 bc 0-0-0 and Black has a good game, Aronin-Furman, USSR 1952.

11 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{g6} \) 12 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{g5} \) 13 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{h4} \) is fully playable for Black.

11 ... \( \text{wc7} \)

11 ... h5 just transposes below after 12 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{wc7} \) 13 f4.

12 f4 h5

13 h3

Not 13 \( \text{h5} \)? \( \text{f5} \) 14 g3 \( \text{d4}! \) 15 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xh5} \) 16 \( \text{hxh5} \) \( \text{c2} \) with a decisive advantage for Black.

13 ... \( \text{f5} \)

13 ... 0-0-0, Botvinnik-Flohr, Nottingham 1936, is also good for Black.

14 \( \text{xf5} \) ef

15 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c5} \)

Black had a clear advantage after 15 e6?! \( \text{c5} \)!, Galduk-Chuisev, USSR 1950.

16 \( \text{h1} \) \( \text{b6} \)

17 \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \)

18 \( \text{c3} \) 0-0-0
405 \( \mathcal{E}e2 \), odds & ends

Black has a good game, Rakić-Knežević, Maribor 1980.

D2 6 \( \mathcal{D}g5 \) (49)

Against 10 \( f4 \) \( \mathcal{E}e7 \) 11 \( \mathcal{D}e4 \) we recommend the unexplored 11 ... b5.

10 \( \mathcal{E}e1 \) gives fewer problems. Play might continue 10 ... \( \mathcal{E}e7 \) 11 \( \mathcal{D}f3 \) 0-0 12 c4 \( \mathcal{D}5b6 \) 13 \( \mathcal{D}c3 \) \( \mathcal{W}c7 \)

14 \( \mathcal{G}g5 \) \( \mathcal{B}b4 \), as in Short-Kovačević, Hastings 1981-2. Black will be able to redeploys his knights via f8 and c8 and has a good game.

10 \( \mathcal{D}d1 \) is not played very often but leads to rich middlegames, e.g.

10 ... \( \mathcal{E}e7 \) 11 \( \mathcal{D}e4 \) b5?? 12 \( \mathcal{W}g4 \) \( \mathcal{D}xe5 \), Zuckerman-Shamkovich, USA Ch 1978.

White offers a trade of bishops, which, if accepted, will result in additional development for his forces, and, if declined, will force Black to lose time in retreat. Both strategies are adopted frequently by Black.

D21 6 ... \( \mathcal{E}xe2 \)

D22 6 ... \( \mathcal{D}f5 \)??

D21

6 ... \( \mathcal{E}xe2 \)

7 \( \mathcal{W}xe2 \) \( de \)

8 \( de \) \( e6 \)

9 0-0

An interesting alternative is 9 \( \mathcal{W}h5 \) g6 and now:

a) 10 \( \mathcal{W}e2 \) \( \mathcal{D}d7 \) 11 0-0 \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 12 c4 \( \mathcal{D}e7 \) 13 f4 \( \mathcal{D}f5 \) 14 \( \mathcal{D}d1 \) (Sax-Shamkovich, Hastings 1977-8)

14 ... h6 15 \( \mathcal{D}e4 \) \( \mathcal{W}b6+ \) 16 \( \mathcal{W}h1 \) h5. Black will now castle queenside and the game is level.

b) 10 \( \mathcal{W}f3 \) \( \mathcal{W}c7 \) 11 0-0 \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 12 \( \mathcal{D}e1 \)

a) White can play 11 \( \mathcal{W}h5 \), but it is not clear that this provokes a significant weakness in the black camp. Sznapik-Paulsen, Dortmund 1981, continued 11 ... g6 12 \( \mathcal{W}e2 \)

\( \mathcal{D}f5 \) 13 \( \mathcal{D}f3 \) \( \mathcal{W}c7 \) 14 \( \mathcal{D}c3 \) \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 15 \( \mathcal{E}e1 \) h6 16 g4 \( \mathcal{E}e7 \) 17 \( \mathcal{F}d4 \) g5 with an unclear position.

b) 11 b3 is too slow and allows Black to develop a significant initiative on the queenside: 11 ...

h6 12 \( \mathcal{D}f3 \) \( \mathcal{W}c7 \) 13 \( \mathcal{A}a3 \) \( \mathcal{G}g6 \) 14 \( \mathcal{E}e1 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa3 \) 15 \( \mathcal{A}xa3 \) 0-0-0 16 b4 a5!

17 b5 \( \mathcal{D}c5 \) 18 \( \mathcal{W}e3 \) \( \mathcal{D}d3 \), Westerinen-Bagirov, Helsinki 1961.

c) 11 \( \mathcal{D}d1 \) is an interesting new move. After 11 ... \( \mathcal{W}c7 \) 12 f4 \( \mathcal{E}e7 \)
13 \( \textit{\&} e4 \) 0-0 14 \( \textit{\&} \text{bc}3 \) (Matulović-Kovačević, Yugoslavia 1983) Black should probably play 14 ... \( \textit{\&} e5 \), when White will only be able to claim a very small advantage.

11 ... \( \textit{\&} f5 \)
12 \( \textit{\&} d1 \) (50)

12 \( \textit{\&} f3 \) makes little sense before Black has wasted time with ... h6. Unzicker-Schmid, West German Ch 1959, saw 12 ... \( \textit{\&} c7 \) 13 \( \textit{\&} e1 \) \textit{\&} b4 14 \( \textit{\&} d2 \) and now Black should have simply castled short with an even game.

12 \( \textit{\&} f4 \) tempts fate: 12 ... \( \textit{\&} e7 \) 13 \( \textit{\&} g3 \) g5! 14 \( \textit{\&} g3 \) h5 and Black had a crushing attack in Saigin-Furman, USSR 1952.

Since the capture on e2 leads to inferior positions, much attention has been given over to this line in recent times. The tempo lost in retreat has some compensation in the awkward placement of the knight on g5. We focus on some of these new ideas in the material below.

7 7 \( \textit{\&} d3 \)

7 e6 has lost its sting: 7 ... \( \textit{\&} e7 \) (7 ... \( \textit{\&} x e 6 \) 8 \( \textit{\&} x e 6 \) \textit{\&} e 9 \( \textit{\&} g 4 \) ±) 8 g4 (8 \( \textit{\&} d 3 \) \textit{\&} a 6 !; 8 \( \textit{\&} h 5 + ? ! \) g6 9 g4 \( \textit{\&} x c 2 ! \) 10 \( \textit{\&} x c 2 \) gh 11 \( \textit{\&} x h 7 \) \textit{\&} b 6 \div Wachon-Zuk, corres 1968) 8 ... \( \textit{\&} g 6 \) 9 \( \textit{\&} d 3 \) (9 \( \textit{\&} x e 6 \) \textit{\&} d 7 10 \( \textit{\&} f 4 \) costs too much time: 10 ... \( \textit{\&} f 7 \) 11 c4 \( \textit{\&} b 6 \) 12 b3 e5, Turn-Keres, USSR 1945) 9 ... \( \textit{\&} x d 3 \) 10 \( \textit{\&} x d 3 \) g6! and Black has a comfortable game, e.g. 11 0-0 \( \textit{\&} h 6 ! \) 12 \( \textit{\&} x e 6 \) \textit{\&} d 7 13 \textit{\&} e 2 \( \textit{\&} x c 1 \) 14 \textit{\&} x c 1 \textit{\&} a 6 !

7 \( \textit{\&} g 4 \) leads to rather messy positions after 7 ... \( \textit{\&} x g 4 \) 8 \( \textit{\&} x g 4 \) de 9 de, but Black can obtain a satisfactory game with 7 ... \( \textit{\&} d 7 ! ? \)
42 5 \( \text{e2, odds \& ends} \)

8 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 9 ed ed 10 0-0 \( \text{e7} \)

11 \( \text{e1} \) 0-0 12 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 13 \( \text{bc3} \)

\( \text{xc3} \), Svenn-Krüger, Dortmund 1981.

7 a3 has been seen recently: 7 ...

h6 8 \( \text{f3} \) de 9 de e6 10 c4 \( \text{e7} \) 11

\( \text{d7} \) 12 f4 and now Black should play 12 ... \( \text{e4} \) followed by 13 ...

\( \text{f5} \) or even 13 ... c5!? with a good game for Black.

7 ... \( \text{xd3} \)

8 \( \text{xd3} \) de

8 ... h6 is an interesting alternative, e.g. 9 \( \text{h3} \) de 10 de e6

11 0-0 \( \text{d7} \) 12 f4 \( \text{b6} \) 13 \( \text{h1} \) hg! 14 \( \text{xh8} \) \( \text{f4} \) 15 \( \text{xf4} \) gf 16

\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 17 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d6} \) 18 \( \text{c3} \) 0-0-0 with a wild position in which

White’s position is slightly better, Bayramigli-Grün, Graz 1981.

9 de

Less clear is 9 \( \text{f3} \)? f6 10 \( \text{xh7} \) ed 11 0-0! e5 12 c4 \( \text{c7} \) 13 f4

(Vasyukov-Bagirov, USSR Ch 1967) 13 ... \( \text{d7} \)! 14 \( \text{h5} + \text{d8} \) 15 fe \( \text{e8} \).

9 ... h6

10 \( \text{f3} \)

Also unclear is 10 \( \text{xf7} \)? \( \text{xf7} \) 11 c4 \( \text{a5} + \) 12 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{b4} \) 13 \( \text{f5} + \)

\( \text{g8} \) 14 a3 c5 and White probably has no more than equality.

10 ... e6

11 0-0 \( \text{d7} \)

12 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{c7} \)

13 c4 \( \text{e7} \)

14 \( \text{c3} \) (52)

On 14 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 15 \( \text{g3} \) 0-0-0 16

\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b4} \)! Black stands better.

52

14 ... \( \text{g6} \)

15 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{c5} \)

This is our improvement on 15 ... \( \text{dxe5} \) 16 \( \text{exe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 17 \( \text{g3} \),

which gives White a large advantage.

The final position holds chances for both sides and deserves practical tests.

53

5 ... \( \text{e6} \) (53)

Both White and Black have sought improvements on 6 0-0 \( \text{e7} \) 7 c4 \( \text{b6} \), which is covered in previous chapters. We examine:
5 \( \text{h2, odds \& ends} \) 43

1. h3
2. 2 e5
3. 6 \( \text{a}g5 \)
4. 6 c4
5. 6 \( c3 \)
6. 6 0-0!

6 \( \text{h3} \)

This is just another way of transposing to the main lines. Black should just play 6 ... \( \text{h5} \), as original methods are not effective (contra Hort).

6 ... \( \text{xf3}\)?
7 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{de} \)

Black can try for equality with 7 ... \( c6 \) 8 c4 \( \text{db}6 \). But 8 ed looks good for White. 7 ... \( \text{dc6} \) is also possible.

8 \( \text{c4}! \)

Now White is clearly better.

6 ed \( \text{xd6?!} \)

6 ... \( \text{cd} \) is also pretty good, giving Black equal chances.

7 \( \text{d5} \)

Although the knight is posted more auspiciously than in lines with \( \text{d3}-\text{g5} \), the price is too high - the loss of central domination.

7 ... \( \text{xe2} \)
8 \( \text{xe2} \) 0-0
9 0-0 \( \text{xe5} \)
10 \( \text{de} \) \( \text{dc6} \) (54)

Here White should play 11 c4. Instead, Zlotnik-Kupreichik, Batumi 1969, saw 11 a3? \( \text{wh4} \) 12 f4 \( \text{ad8} \) 13 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 14 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{d7} \) with a better game for Black.

W

6 \( \text{g5} \)

This move is harmless if handled properly.

6 ... \( \text{f5}! \)

Black can get into trouble if he captures the bishop: 7 ... \( \text{xe2} \) 8 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{c6} \) 8 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 9 0-0 \( \text{db6} \) 10 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 11 b3 d5 12 \( \text{b2} \) and White was better in Kovačević-Vukić, Yugoslav Ch 1979. This is a good example of why Black wants to keep the bishops on the board in most lines of the 4 ... \( \text{g4} \) systems.

7 \( \text{d3} \)

White logically strives to exchange the bishops, but while the movement of the knight on f3 contributes something to his initiative, the second move of the bishop is a mere loss of tempo. Therefore Black can now afford to exchange the bishops, as the white queen will not move to the most apposite
5  

Worthy of consideration is 8 ...

de 9 de, as in Martinović-Tatai, Pamporovo 1982, which continued
9 ... h6 10 Qf3 c6 11 0-0 Qd7 12
Ec1 Wc7 13 We4 with a slight edge for White. 9 ... Qe6 is stronger.

9  Qf3  Qc6
10  0-0  de
11  de  Qb6
12  We4  Wd5
13  Wf4  Wc4
14  Wg3 (55)

8  Qg5!?

8 Qbd2 is ±, according to Hort, but it actually just transposes to
Chapter 3.

White might also try 8 h3.

Fedorowicz-Alburt, New York 1983, continued 8 ... Qxf3 (8 ...
Qh5!?) 9 Qxf3 Wd7 10 b3 d5 11 c5
Ec8 12 b2 Qc6 13 Wd2 g6 with an even game.

8 ...  Qxe2

8 ... Qf5!? deserves practical tests.

9  Wxe2  Qe7
10  Qf3  0-0
11  0-0  Qc6
12  b3  Qf6

Black has a comfortable game.

Koblenz-Mikenas, Baku 1944.

Black should meet 13 b2 with 13 ... d5!

8  Qc3  Qxc3

The position holds chances for both sides. Black has compensation
for the pawns, Dieks-Böhm, Dutch Ch 1978.
7... \( \text{bc} \) \( \text{Qd7} \)
Black has a healthy pawn
structure and a good game.
6
6... 0-0!
This is the most common move.
Now Black has a wide selection of
moves, most of which are simply
inferior.
6...
\( \text{\textbf{Qe7}}! \)

The other candidates are:
a) 6... \( \text{Qb6} \) 7... c4 will transpose to
Chapter 2 or 3 after 7...
\( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \), but
7... a4 comes into consideration.
White can now abstain from c4,
playing \( \text{\textbf{Qc3}}, \text{\textbf{Ec1}} \), etc. See also
Chapter 4, B.
b) 6... \( \text{Qc6} \) is a reasonable
alternative to the text. After 7 c4
\( \text{\textbf{Qb6}} \) 8 cd cd 9... \( \text{\textbf{Qc3}} \)
\( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \), the game
could head toward Chapter 3, but
White can play more sharply with
9 cd! 7... \( \text{\textbf{Qde7}} \) cedes a small edge
to White via 8 \( \text{\textbf{Va4}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qd7}} \) (8...
d5 9... \( \text{\textbf{Qc3}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qd7}} \) ±
Bannik-Mikenas,
USSR 1949) 9 ed cd 10 \( \text{\textbf{Ed1}} \) d5 11
\( \text{\textbf{Qc3}} \) dc 12 \( \text{\textbf{Wxc4}}! \)
c) 6... \( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \) wastes precious time
and allows White to obtain the
advantage with 7 h3 \( \text{\textbf{Qxf3}} \) 8... \( \text{\textbf{Qxf3}} \)
6... c4, Nunn-Tarik, Lucerne OI
1982.
d) 6... c6 comes into cosideration,
for example 7 c4 \( \text{\textbf{Qc7}} \) 8 ed \( \text{\textbf{Qxd6}} \) 9
\( \text{\textbf{Qc3}} \) 0-0 10 \( \text{\textbf{Wb3}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Wc8}} \)
11... \( \text{\textbf{Qe4}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \)
17... \( \text{\textbf{Qf4}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Ed8}} \) 13... \( \text{\textbf{Qd1}} \)
14... \( \text{\textbf{Qe8}} \) 14... \( \text{\textbf{Wc3}} \)
15... \( \text{\textbf{Qf6}} \) 17... \( \text{\textbf{Qc3}} \)
\( \text{\textbf{Qd6}} \) and a draw was agreed

in Sznapik-Chekhov, Banja Luka
1983. White was slightly better
throughout the game, but Black
was never in any real danger of
losing.
e) 6... a6 was tried in De Firmian-
Alburt, USA Ch 1983. By playing
6... a6 Black threatens to capture
on f3 and c4, thus avoiding the
main lines with \( \text{\textbf{Qc3}} \). An important
facet of the move is that the a7
square is available for the rook.
Still, the tempo counts: 7 c4 \( \text{\textbf{Qb6}} \)
ed cd 9... \( \text{\textbf{Qbd2}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qc6}} \)
10 b3 d5 11
\( \text{\textbf{Qb2}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \) with a slight edge for
White. Christiansen suggests
8... \( \text{\textbf{Qg5}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \) 9... \( \text{\textbf{Qxe7}} \)
\( \text{\textbf{Wxe7}} \) 10 ed cd
11... \( \text{\textbf{Qb3}} \) but we think that Black
has an even game after 11... \( \text{\textbf{Qc7}} \).
f) 6... \( \text{\textbf{Qxf3}} \) is not entirely without
interest. After 7... \( \text{\textbf{Qxf3}} \) c6 8... \( \text{\textbf{Qe2}} \)
de Black can try 9... \( \text{\textbf{Qe7}} \) 10... \( \text{\textbf{Qf4}} \)
\( \text{\textbf{Qg6}} \), Medina-Giffard, Montpelier
1977. After 8 ed, however, White
will have a small but lasting
advantage in the bishop pair and
the more flexible pawn structure.

Now 7 c4 \( \text{\textbf{Qb6}} \) and 7 h3 \( \text{\textbf{Qh5}} \)
will transpose to Chapters 2 and 3,
but there are alternatives:
a) 7... \( \text{\textbf{Qe1}} \) is a little explored
alternative which may provide a
small edge for White: 7...
\( \text{\textbf{Qxe2}} \)
(much better is 7...
\( \text{\textbf{Qf5}} \) ? \( \text{\textbf{Qxe2}} \)
0-0 9... \( \text{\textbf{Qf3}} \) \( \text{\textbf{Qb6}} \), Bednarski-
A.Zaitsev, Polanica Zdroj 1971)
10... \( \text{\textbf{Qd1}} \).
b) 7 ed will generally transpose to Chapter 3, but Black might try recapturing with the queen with a good game.

c) 7 He1 is a new transpositional move, since after 7 ... 0-0 8 c4 Qb6 we are back in Chapters 2 and 3, Halafian-Semenova, USSR 1983.
5 Modern Variation: Other 5th Moves for White

1 e4 \( \mathcal{E}f6 \\
2 e5 \mathcal{D}d5 \\
3 d4 d6 \\
4 \mathcal{D}f3 \#g4 (57) \\
5 \mathcal{A}d2 de 7 de \#c6, Schmidt-Seifert, corres 1955.

6 d5 is a new move, but novelty is all it has going for it. Vitoliens-Bagirov, Riga 1982, continued 6 ... \#d7 7 e6 fe 8 h3 \#xf3 9 \#xf3 \#e5 10 \#b3 ed 11 cd g6 12 \#c3 \#g7 13 \#e3 c5 14 dc bc 15 f4 \#f7 16 f5 gf with a fine game for Black.

... de (58) 6 ... e6 leads to 'normal' lines.

In this chapter we deal with flotsam and jetsam which need not trouble the player of the black pieces, although it never hurts to be well prepared.

A 5 c4
B 5 h3
C 5 \#c4

5 ed cd leads to the Exchange Variation (Chapter 3).

A 5 c4 \#b6
6 \#e2

Black takes command on

White obviously isn't going to get anywhere by allowing the exchange of queens after 7 de, especially as he will have to recapture with the king to avoid dropping the c-pawn. At the same
time there is no joy 7 \( \text{Q} x e 5 \text{Q} x e 2 \) 8 \( \text{W} x e 2 \text{W} x d 4 \), as 9 0-0 \( \text{Q} x d 7 \) 10
\( \text{Q} x d 7 \) is met by 10 ... \( \text{W} x d 7 \)!, and now White has nothing better than to accept an inferior position with 11 a4 \( \text{W} c 6 \) 12 \( \text{Q} x a 3 \) e6 13 a5 \( \text{Q} d 7 \), since 11 \( \text{Q} c 3 \) e6 12 \( \text{Q} x e 3 \) \( \text{Q} e 7 \)
13 \( \text{B} a d 1 \) \( \text{W} c 6 \) 14 \( \text{g} g 4 \) 0-0 15 \( b 3 \) f5! gave Black an overwhelming advantage in Thomas-Flohr, 1932.

5 ... \( \text{Q} x f 3 \)
6 \( \text{W} x f 3 \) \( d e \)!
6 ... e6 is less good because White can capture on d6: 7 \( e d \)!
\( \text{W} x d 6 \) 8 \( c 3 \) \( e 7 \) 9 \( \text{Q} d 2 \) 0-0 10 \( \text{Q} c 4 \)
\( \text{W} d 8 \) 11 \( \text{Q} d 3 \) \( + \) Cuasnicu-Szmetan, Bratislava 1983.

7 \( d e \) e6 (59)

Even chances are offered by 8 \( \text{Q} g 5 \) \( \text{Q} x e 2 \) 9 \( \text{W} x e 2 \) \( \text{Q} d 5 \) 10
\( \text{W} b 5 + \) \( \text{Q} d 7 \) 11 \( \text{Q} c 3 \) e6 12 \( \text{Q} x g 4 \)
\( \text{Q} e 7 \) or 10 0-0 \( \text{Q} c 6 \) 11 \( \text{Q} d 1 \).

8 ... ef
9 \( \text{Q} x f 3 \) \( \text{Q} x f 3 \)
10 \( \text{W} x f 3 \) \( \text{Q} c 6 \)

After 10 ... \( a b \) 11 \( \text{W} b 7 \) White will have a slight edge, as in the 29th game of the 1935 match between Alekhine and Euwe.

11 0-0

Not 11 bc? \( \text{W} x c 7 \) 12 \( \text{Q} e 3 \) \( \text{Q} d 8 \) 13 \( \text{W} d 1 ? \) e5, Parfenov-Bagirov, Baku 1966.

11 d5 is met by 11 ... \( \text{Q} b 4 \)!
11 ... \( g 6 \)!

This gives Black equal chances in the upcoming middlegame.

B

5 h3

White forces Black’s hand immediately, thereby easing his mental burden considerably. Nevertheless, positions which arise in this line tend to be complicated, but not always in White’s favour. As long as Black keeps his wits about him there is nothing to be afraid of.

5 ... \( \text{Q} x f 3 \)
6 \( \text{W} x f 3 \) \( d e \)!

Now White can pursue a number of options, but none of them present any real danger to Black.

a) 8 \( a 3 \) c6!? 9 \( \text{Q} d 2 \) \( \text{Q} d 7 \) 10 \( \text{W} g 3 \) \( \text{Q} e 7 \) = L.Steiner-Koblenz, USSR 1937.

b) 8 \( \text{Q} c 3 \) \( \text{Q} x b 4 \) 9 \( \text{Q} b 5 + c 6 \) 10 \( \text{Q} a 4 \)
\( \text{W} a 5 \) 11 0-0 \( \text{Q} d 7 \) = Marić-Knežević, Kraljevo 1967, but White might improve with 9 \( \text{W} e 4 \), intending \( a 3 \), so perhaps Black should stick to the less ambitious 8 ... \( \text{Q} b 4 \) 9 \( \text{W} g 3 \) \( \text{Q} x c 3 \).

c) 8 \( \text{Q} c 4 \) \( \text{Q} c 6 \) 9 \( \text{W} e 4 \) (9 \( \text{Q} b 5 \) is met by 9 ... \( \text{Q} b 4 \), while 9 \( \text{W} e 2 \) is
countered by swinging the knight to d4, where it can be protected by removing its companion to b6) 9 ... Qd7 10 Qe3 Qf5 (a useful move which allows the knight to operate on the kingside) 11 0-0 Wh4! 12 Wh4 Qxh4 13 Qb5 Qf5 14 Qxe6+ bc 15 Qd2 Qxe3 16 fe Qd8 and Black had an endgame advantage in Zhuravlyev-Alburt, Odessa 1974.
d) 8 Qd2 is even less ambitious and yields equality to 8 ... Qd7 9 Wh3 c6, Kotkoris-Olafsson, Athens 1969, but Black can go for more with 9 ... Qc5 10 Qc3 Qxc3 11 bc Qe4 12 Qe3 Qxe3 13 Qx3 Qd5! 14 Qc4 Wh5!

c) 8 Wh4 Qd7! 9 Qc4 (Hort quotes Pietsch-Liebert, East Germany 1961: 9 Qe2 c6 10 0-0 Wh7 11 f4 g6 12 a3 a5? 13 c4 Qe7 14 Qc3 without providing a remedy. Our prescription is 12 ... h5 13 c4 Qe7, transferring the knight to f5) 9 ... Qb5! 10 Qe2 (castling is safer: 10 0-0 Qc5 11 Wh2 Qxc4 12 Whxc4 Qd5 13 Wh2 Wh4, Pavlenko-Bagirov, USSR 1972) 10 ... Qc5 11 Wh4 Qd5 (Paoli-Bagirov, Baja 1971) 12 Wh3?! with a sharp position in which Black’s chances are at least equal.

f) 8 Wh3 can be met by 8 ... h5 or by 8 ... Qd7. Hort gives the following line: 8 ... Qd7 9 Qe2 c6 10 Qa3 Wh5+ 11 Qd2 Qb4 12 c3 Qxa3 13 ba Qe7 14 Whx7 Qg8 15 Whx7 Qxe5. The final position is good for Black.

g) 8 g3 is entirely out of character, despite having been employed by Rubinstein against Spielmann (Moscow 1925): 8 ... Qc6 9 Qh5 Qd7 10 Qe4 Qc5 11 c3 0-0 12 b4 Qb6 13 0-0 f5 14 ef Qxf6 15 Qe2 e5 and Black stood better.

5 Qc4

This is an unusual moment to develop the bishop at c4, as the pin on the knight on f3 is made more potent.

5 ... e6

6 h3

Something must be done about the pin. White was crushed in Garrison-Wygrecki, USA 1983, after 6 Qxd5? ed 7 c4 de 8 de Qb4+ 9 Qc3 c6 10 Wh3 Qa6 11 Qd4?! Qc5!

6 ... Qh5

7 Wh2 Qb6

8 Qb3 Qc6

9 g4 Qg6

10 Qc3 (60)
50 Other 5th Moves for White

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Black stands slightly better because of White’s pawn structure weakness, Adorjan-Alburt, USSR 1970. One good plan for Black is to advance his h-pawn.
6 Modern Variation: 4 ... g6

1 e4 .gf6  
2 e5 .gf5  
3 d4  d6  
4 ff3  g6 (61)  
5 c4  gb6 (62)  

The fianchetto of the bishop on f8 is a sensible alternative to the pin of the knight on f3. Black hopes to increase pressure along the a1-h8 diagonal, while leaving deployment of the bishop on c8 to a later time. On the other hand, f7 is now weak and White can try to exploit this to his advantage.

A 5 c4  
B 5 fc4!  
C 5 fg5  

5 fe2 fg7 6 0-0 0-0 7 fg5 h6 8 fe4 gc9 cd g4 10 fg5 de11 fxg4 

Now White has a choice:

A1 6 fc3  
A2 6 ed  

It is important to remember that variation A2 often arises by transposition from 4 c4 gb6 5 ed cd 6 ff3 g6.

A1  

6 fc3  
7 fe3  
7 ff4 lead to an unclear position after 7 ... fg4 (7 ... fc6?! and 7 ... 0-0 are reasonable alternatives) 8 h3 fxk3 9 xk3 fc6, Marić-Despotović, Yugoslav Ch 1968. 7 fc2 transposes below.  
7 ... fc6?!
Perhaps Black should consider 7... $\textit{g4}$ 8 $\textit{h3}$ $\textit{xf3}$ 9 $\textit{xf3}$. In any event, Black can simply play 7... 0-0!, when White has nothing better than to transpose to A2 with $\textit{8 ed}$.

$\textit{8 e2}$

There are two promising alternatives:

a) $\textit{8 e6!}^? \textit{fe} 9 \textit{h4 e5} 10 \textit{d5} \textit{b8} 11 \textit{h5} \textit{f5}$ 12 $\textit{g5} \pm$ Christoffel-Tartakower, 1946.

b) For $\textit{8 ed} \textit{cd} 9 \textit{e2} 0-0$ see A2.

$\textit{8 ... 0-0}$

$\textit{9 e6!}^? \textit{fe}$

$\textit{10 h4 e5}$

$\textit{11 d5}$

White has a strong attack, H. Perez-Volman, corres. 1972.

A2

$\textit{6 ed} \textit{cd}$

$\textit{7 e2}$

Black has nothing to fear from:

a) $\textit{7 h3} \textit{g7} 8 \textit{b2} 0-0 9 \textit{e2}$ (9 $\textit{d3} \textit{e5}! \mp$) 9... $\textit{d6}$ 10 0-0 $\textit{e5} =$.

b) $\textit{7 c3} \textit{g7} 8 \textit{e3} 0-0$ and now:

b1) $\textit{9 a4 d5} 10 \textit{c5} \textit{d4} 11 \textit{xc4} \textit{dc}$

b2) $\textit{9 d2}$ allows 9... $\textit{g4}$, threatening to double White's pawns. 9... is also playable.

b3) $\textit{9 c1}$ tries to get in d5 without allowing doubling of the c-pawns. Black can play 9... $\textit{d5} 10 \textit{c5} \textit{d4} 11 \textit{xd5} \textit{xe3} 12 \textit{xc3} \textit{wa5+}$ with compensation for a pawn.

c) $\textit{7 e3} \textit{g7} 8 \textit{d2} \textit{g4} 9 \textit{d5}$ (9 $\textit{h6} 0-0 10 \textit{ha4} \textit{e5}! \mp$ Messing-Gipslis, Belgrade 1968) 9... $\textit{h6}$ 10 $\textit{e4} \textit{d5}! 11 \textit{xc5} \textit{xc4} 12 \textit{xc4} \textit{dc}$

13 0-0 $\textit{b6} \mp$ Mukhin-Roguljis, USSR 1976.

d) $\textit{7 h3} \textit{g7} 8 \textit{c3} 0-0 9 \textit{e3} \textit{d6}$ 10 $\textit{c1}^? (10 \textit{d2}$ allows Black to equalise with 10... $\textit{d5}!$, e.g. 11 $\textit{c4} 12 \textit{xc4} \textit{dc} 13 0-0 \textit{f5}$, Karklins-Manetti, Lone Pine 1972)

10... $\textit{d5} (10... \textit{f5} 11 \textit{d5}! \mp$ Pytel-Liebert Debrecen 1969, or 10... $\textit{e5}$ 11 $\textit{de} \textit{de} 12 \textit{c5} \textit{d7} 13 \textit{xc4} \textit{h6}$, Modr-Neckar, Prague 1983) 11 $\textit{c5}$

$\textit{d4} 12 \textit{xc4} \textit{dc} 13 0-0 \textit{b6} (13 ... \textit{f5} 14 \textit{b3} \textit{d3} 15 \textit{e1} \textit{xd4} 16 \textit{xd4} \textit{xd4} 17 \textit{bc} \mp$ Gipslis-Ciocaltea, Bucharest 1968). We consider the position after 13... $\textit{b6}$ to be fully equal.

B

$\textit{7 ... g7 (63)}$

$\textit{8 0-0}$

White can delay castling, of course, but he gains nothing thereby, as in similar variations discussed above:
8 h3 \( \square c6 \) 9 \( \square b2 \) 0-0 10 \( \square bd2 \)
(\( \text{Janošević-Ghidzavu, Niš 1972} \))

... d5! 11 c5 \( \square d7 \) intending ... \( \square xc5 \) with an equal game.

b) 8 \( \square e3 \) 0-0 9 \( \square d2 \) see Illustrative Game Dominguez-Tatai in Chapter 1.

8 \( \square c3 \) 0-0 9 \( \square e3 \) \( \square d6 \) and now:

d1) 10 \( \square c1 \) d5 11 c5 \( \square c4 \) 12 \( \square xc4 \) dc + Walther-Larsen, 1961.

d2) 10 h3 d5 11 c5 \( \square c4 \) 12 \( \square xc4 \) dc 13 0-0 \( \square f5 \) transposes below; 13

h3 \( \square a5 \) 14 \( \square c1 \) \( \square d8 \) 15 0-0
(Petkevich-Zukhovitsky, USSR 1969) 15 ... \( \square e6 \) !

c) 9 h3 \( \square d7 \)? (9 ... \( \square c6 \) is perhaps better: 10 \( \square e3 \) d5 11 c5

\( \square c4 \) 12 \( \square xc4 \) bc 13 \( \square a3 \) \( \square e6 \) 14

\( \square e2 \) \( \square a5 \) 15 \( \square fd1 \) b6 = Krnić-Begovac, Sombor 1976. 10 h3

transposes back to the text)

10 \( \square e3 \) (10 \( \square c3 \) e5 11 \( \square b5 \) \( \square e7 \) gives an unclear position with chances for both sides) 10 ... e5

11 de \( \square xe5 \) 12 \( \square xe5 \) \( \square xe5 \) 13

\( \square c3 \) \( \square e6 \) = Krnić-Kovačević, Sombor 1976.

9 ... \( \square c6 \) (64)

\[ 
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\]

\( 64 \)

\( \text{w} \)

10 h3

10 \( \square e3 \) allows Black to success-
fully deploy the bishop on c8:
10 ... \&g4! 11 b3 (11 d5 \&xf3 12 \\
\&xf3 \&e5 is completely equal)
11 ... d5 (Black might wish to
investigate 11 ... h6, e.g. 12 \&d2
\&h7 13 \&e1 \&xe2 14 \&xe2 e5 15
f4? ed 16 \&xd4 d5! \& Alexander-
Tartakower, 1939) 12 c5 \&c8
(12 ... \&xf3 13 \&xf3 e5 14 \&e2 e4
15 \&g5! f5 16 \&h3 \&± Slipak-
Darcyl, Bratislava 1983 and now:
   a) 13 \&c1 e6 14 \&e1 (14 h3 \&xf3
15 \&xf3 \&g17 16 \&e2 \&f5 =
Schmidt-Jansa, Marianske Lazne
1962) 14 ... \&xe2 15 \&xe2 \&g87
16 \&f3 \&f5 = Rytov-Byshev,
USSR 1978.
   b) 13 \&d2 e6 14 \&ad1 \&g87 15
\&h4 \&xe2 16 \&xe2 b6! Kuipers-
Kavalek, Beverwijk 1967.
   c) 13 h3 \&xf3 14 \&xf3 e6 =/\& see
Illustrative Game Toran-Korchnoi
in Chapter 1.
   d) 13 b4! a6 14 \&b1 (14 a4 \&xb4!;
14 \&b3 e6 15 \&fd1 \&g87 16 b5
\&a5 17 \&b4 ab 18 \&xb5 \&ec6! \& Zuidema-Hort, Orebro
1966; 14 \&d2 e6 15 \&fd1 \&g87 =
Westerinen-Hort, Leningrad 1967)
14 ... e6 15 a4 \&g87! 16 b5 ab 17 ab.
Now Radov-Panbuckian, Bulgarian
Ch 1975, continued 17 ... \&a5
18 b6, where the game would have
been double-edged after 18 ... \\
\&xf3!, but 17 ... \&xf3 seems more
precise, although it is likely to
transpose to the game.
10 ... \&f5! (65)
to the text, but 13 \( \text{\#e3} \) is clearly inferior: 13 ... \( \text{\#xc5!} \) 14 \( \text{\#xd5} \)
\( \text{\#e6} \) 15 \( \text{\#c1} \) \( \text{\#xd5} \) 16 \( \text{\#c4} \) \( \text{\#a5} \) 17
\( \text{\#d2} \) \( \text{\#xa2} \) 18 \( \text{\#b4} \) \( \text{\#b2} \) 19 \( \text{\#c3} \)
\( \text{\#a3} \) \( \equiv \) Dubinsky-K.Grigorian, USSR 1971, or 15 \( \text{\#c3} \) \( \text{\#xd4} \) 16
\( \text{\#c1} \) \( \text{\#xe2}+ \) intending ... \( \text{\#a5} \) \( \equiv \)
Pelitov-Bobotsov, Bulgaria 1968.

13 ... \( \text{\#e4!} \)
14 \( \text{\#a4} \) \( e5! \) (66)

Black stands better. Minev-
Bobotsov, Varna 1968, continued
15 \( \text{dc} \) \( \text{\#xe5} \) 16 \( \text{\#xe5} \) \( \text{\#xe5} \) with a
clear advantage for Black.

A22

11 \( \text{\#e3} \)
This is the most popular
continuation in contemporary
praxis.

11 ... \( d5! \)
12 \( c5 \)

Other moves also give Black a
good game:
a) 12 \( \text{b3} \) \( dc \) 13 \( bc \) \( e5! \) 14 \( \text{de} \) \( \text{\#xe5} \)
15 \( \text{\#xe5} \) \( \text{\#xe5} \) or 14 \( d5 \) \( e4! \)
b) 12 \( cd \) \( \text{\#xd5} \) 13 \( \text{\#xd5} \) \( \text{\#xd5} \) 14
\( \text{\#a4} \) \( \text{\#d6} \) 15 \( a3 \) \( \text{\#fd8} \) \( \equiv \) Garcia-

Jansa, Moscow 1968.

12 ... \( \text{\#c4} \)
13 \( \text{\#xc4} \)
White has no choice:
a) 13 \( \text{\#c1} \) saves the bishop but at
high cost: 13 ... \( b6! \) 14 \( g4 \) \( \text{\#c8}! \)
with better chances for Black,
Janošević-Hort, Skopje 1968. Even
worse is 14 \( \text{cb} \) \( \text{\#xb6} \) 15 \( \text{\#b5} \) \( \text{\#d6} \)
16 \( \text{\#e1} \) \( \text{\#f6!} \) 17 \( \text{\#h6} \) \( \text{\#fc8} \) \( \equiv \)
Buyukgokrscu-Radashkovich, Teesside
1974.

b) 13 \( \text{\#b3} \) \( \text{\#a5} \) 14 \( \text{\#b4} \) \( b6! \) 15
\( \text{\#g5} \) \( h6 \) \( + \) Mikhailchishin-Bobotsov,
Athens 1968.

13 ... \( dc \) (67)

14 \( \text{\#a4} \)
White cannot afford to weaken
his centre further with 14 \( d5 \): 14 ...
\( \text{\#b4} \) 15 \( \text{\#d4} \) \( \text{\#d3}! \) interrupts the
communication of his pieces.
After 16 \( \text{\#xg7} \) \( \text{\#xg7} \) 17 \( \text{\#e1} \) \( \text{\#c8}! \)
Black had the better game in

14 ... \( e5! \)
An alternative is 14 ... \( \text{\#d3}, \text{e.g.} \)
15 \( \text{\#fd1} \) \( e5 \), but the authors feel
that the text is the best option.

15 \textit{Bfd1}

Black is clearly better on 15 de \textit{Bd3!!} 16 \textit{Bfd1} \textit{Bxe5}, while the complications of 15 d5 \textit{Bd4} should turn out well for Black. 15 \textit{Wxc4} ed 16 \textit{Bfd1} \textit{Bxe6} – see our notes to Sigurjonsson-Alburt.

15 ... ed

16 \textit{Bxd4} \textit{Bxd4}

17 \textit{Bxd4} \textit{Bxd4}!

18 \textit{Wxc4} (68)

18 ... \textit{Bxf2}+!

19 \textit{Bxf2} \textit{Wf6}!

Black is slightly better. For further discussion see \textbf{Illustrative Game Sigurjonsson-Alburt} in Chapter 1.

A23

11 \textit{Bf4}

Karpov is fond of this move.

11 ... h6!

12 \textit{Be3}!

On 12 \textit{Bc1} Black should stick with 12 ... e5 13 \textit{Be4} e4! 14 \textit{Cd2} \textit{He8} 15 \textit{Bb3} (15 g4 \textit{Wh4}!) 15 ... d5!, as in Karpov-Vaganian, USSR 1969. After 12 \textit{Wd2}! g5! White can hope for no more than equality by 13 \textit{Bxe3}! d5 14 c5 \textit{Bc4} 15 \textit{Bxc4} dc, Faibisovich-Bagirov, Kiev 1970.

12 ... d5

12 ... e5 is also playable here, since 13 \textit{Bg5} is not possible.

13 b3

13 c5 \textit{Bc4} 15 \textit{Bxc4} dc 15 \textit{Bxa4} and now not Hort’s 15 ... \textit{Ba5}, because of 16 \textit{Wxc4}. This position is similar to one in which the black f-pawn has not advanced, and the best treatment seems to be 15 ... e5, answering 16 dc with 16 ... \textit{Bd3} 17 \textit{Bfd1} (17 \textit{Bfe1} g5) 17 ... \textit{We8} 18 \textit{Bf4} g5 with a slight advantage for Black. On 15 \textit{Wd2} \textit{Bd3} 16 \textit{Bfe1} g5 17 b3-f5! Black has a fine position.

13 ... dc

14 bc \textit{Bc8}!

15 \textit{Bc1} \textit{Ba5}

16 c5 \textit{Bbc4}

17 \textit{Bf4} g5

17 ... e5, Belyavsky-Jansa, Sukhumi 1972, is also quite playable.

18 \textit{Bg3} b6

18 ... \textit{Wd7} 19 \textit{Bxc4} (19 \textit{Be1}!!?) 19 ... \textit{Bxc4} 20 \textit{We2} \textit{We6}! led to equality in Karpov-Vaganian, USSR 1969, but White might try 19 \textit{Bc1}!!?

19 \textit{Bxc4} \textit{Bxc4}

Black has achieved equality. White should now play 20 cb and not 20 \textit{We2} bc! = Karpov-
A. Petrosian, USSR 1971.

5 \( \mathcal{e}c4 \) (69)

Another of Karpov's recommended lines, and one which is extremely popular.

5 ... \( \mathcal{d}b6 \!

After 5 ... c6 6 0-0 (6 ed \( \mathcal{w}xd6 \) is about equal, Short-Vaganian, Lvov 1984) White has some advantage, e.g. 6 ... \( \mathcal{g}7 \) 7 ed \( \mathcal{w}xd6 \) 8 \( \mathcal{e}e1 \) 0-0 9 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{g}4 \) 10 \( \mathcal{b}d2 \) \( \mathcal{e}e8 \) 11 \( \mathcal{b}3 \) h6 12 \( \mathcal{h}4 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 13 c4! \( \mathcal{f}4 \) 14 c5! \( \mathcal{w}xd4 \)!! 15 \( \mathcal{e}e4 \) with a material gain in Tal-Ljubojević, Wijk aan Zee 1973. If 6 ... \( \mathcal{g}4 \), White continues normally and maintains an advantage.

5 ... de 6 de! is very strong for White. P. Cramling-Albert, Reykjavik 1984, saw 6 ... c6 7 \( \mathcal{c}c3 \) \( \mathcal{e}e6 \) 8 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{g}7 \) 9 f4 \( \mathcal{d}d7 \) 10 \( \mathcal{x}d5 \) cd 11 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{b}6 \) 12 \( \mathcal{x}e6 \) fe with a decisive advantage.

6 \( \mathcal{b}3 \) \( \mathcal{g}7 \) (70)

6 ... a5 is not very impressive after 7 a4, e.g. 7 ... \( \mathcal{g}7 \) (7 ... d5 8 0-0 \( \mathcal{g}7 \) transposes to the main line) 8 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) e6 9 f4! de 10 fe c5 11 0-0 0-0 12 c3 cd 13 cd \( \mathcal{c}c6 \) 14 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) f6 15 ef ± Kavalek-Alburt, USA Ch 1981. 15 \( \mathcal{c}c3 \) also comes into consideration. 7 e6!? should not lead to an advantage for White if Black plays correctly, e.g. 7 ... \( \mathcal{x}e6 \) 8 \( \mathcal{x}e6 \) fe 9 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{c}c6 \)!

10 \( \mathcal{x}e6 \) \( \mathcal{w}d7 \) 11 \( \mathcal{w}e2 \) \( \mathcal{f}7 \) (or 11 ... \( \mathcal{d}d8 \) 12 \( \mathcal{x}f8 \) \( \mathcal{f}xf8 \) 13 \( \mathcal{c}c3 \) \( \mathcal{c}c6 \), Gavrić-Chekhov, Banja Luka 1983) 12 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{g}8 \) – Analysis.

A new idea is 6 ... \( \mathcal{c}c6 \), as 7 e6 is not very effective: 7 ... fe 8 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{g}7 \) 9 \( \mathcal{x}e6 \) \( \mathcal{f}f8 \) 10 d5 \( \mathcal{d}d4 \) 11 0-0 \( \mathcal{x}e6 \) 12 de with an unclear position in Gubnitsky-Muravxveri, USSR 1983, but Black can just play 7 ... d5 8 a5 \( \mathcal{c}c4 \).

7 \( \mathcal{g}5 \)

White should probably interpolate 7 a4, since after 7 ... a5 the line is even stronger. Note that Black gets into trouble if he tries 7 ... de 8 a5 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) 9 de c6 10 0-0 0-0 11 \( \mathcal{w}e2 \) \( \mathcal{w}c7 \) 12 \( \mathcal{h}4 \)
with a strong attack, Fichtl-Soupal, Trinec 1972. Others:

a) 7 e6 is inappropriate here. Radoičić-Cafferty, Hammersmith 1971, continued 7 ... dxe 6 8 dxe 6 fe 9 g5 w d 7 10 w f 3 f 6 f 6 ! with an extra pawn.

b) 7 d bd 2 is also ineffective, despite an impressive pedigree: Spassky-Fischer, game 13, Reyjavik 1972, saw Black obtain a meaningful advantage with 7 ... 0-0-0 8 h3? a5 9 a4?! de 10 de d a 6 11 0-0 d c 5 .

c) Should White choose 7 0-0, Black ought to do likewise, instead of 7 ... de 8 d xe 5 0-0-0 9 f 4 d 8 d 7 10 11 w e 3 with advantage to White in Kostro-Pribyl, Czechoslovakia 1973. After 7 ... 0-0-0, Black can look forward to a good game, e.g. 8 e 1 d 9 d xe 5 c 5 ! 10 c 3 ?! cd 11 cd d c 6 ! 12 d xc 6 bc 13 d c 3 e 6 14 d e 3 d d 5 with advantage to Black, Ničevski-Pribyl, Lublin 1974.

d) White can try to resolve the situation in the centre by playing 7 ed cd and now Hort suggests 8 c3!?, which leads to an equal game. White can claim no more than equality after 8 0-0-0-0 9 e 1 g 4 10 h3! x f 3 11 w x f 3 d c 6 , Zinn-Grunberg, Leipzig 1973. Queenside expansion proved costly in Robatsch-Ljubojević, IBM 1972: 8 a 4 0-0-0 a 5 d 6 d 7 10 0-0 d c 6 11 a 6 ba 12 e 1 1 b 8 13 d c 3 d f 6

14 d 5?! d a 5 !

e) 7 w e 2 is more popular than it deserves to be. Of course if Black ignores the danger he gets squashed:

7 ... 0-0-0 8 e 6 d 5 9 ef+ xf 7 10 d g 5 x f 5 11 d e 6 d c 6 12 w x e 6 + , Janošević-Rogulj, Yugoslav Ch 1979. Black should just continue normally with 7 ... d e 6 8 0-0-0-0-9 c 3 d g 4 10 d f 4 w d 7 (10 ... de is an interesting alternative: 11 de w c 8 12 d bd 2 w f 5 13 d g 3 d a d 8 led to an unclear position in Pavlovich-Tarjan, USA 1973) 11 d bd 2 w f 5 ! 12 d g 3 d h 6 ! This is a complicated position in which Black's chances are no worse. Klovan-Alburt, Yerevan 1975, continued 13 e 6 ?

14 x d 2 14 ef+ d g 7 15 w x d 2 d x f 3 16 gf e 6 17 e a e 1 d d 8 18 e e 4 d d 5.

f) Finally, White might consider the new idea 7 d f 4 0-0 8 w e 2 a 5 (8 ... d c 6 is better, in our opinion) 9 a 4 d c 6 10 d bd 2 de 11 d x e 5 with an unclear position in Gurgenidze-Ermolinsky, USSR 1982.

7 ... d 5

This is the standard continuation. Also possible is 7 ... e 6, as in Shamkovich-Alburt, USA Z 1981, which continued 8 w f 3 ?! 0-0 9 w h 3 h 6 10 d f 3 de 11 de d c 6 12 x h 6 d x e 5 13 d x e 5 d x e 5 with an unclear position. 8 f 4 is better.

8 f 4

White should try to build a
perfect pawn structure, following Capablanca’s device of limiting the scope of opposing bishops through staunch pawn formations. Alternatives are:

a) 8 0-0 0-0 9 He1 Qc6 10 c3 f6 is fine for Black, Parma-Gheorghiu, Skopje 1968. No more effective is 9-0 c3 f6 10 ef ef 11 Qf3 Qc6, Korensky-Smejkal, Sochi 1973.

b) 8 Qe3 Qc6 9 Qc3 f6! 10 ef ef 11 Qf3 Oa5! = Zhuravlev-Shmit, USSR 1970.

c) 8 a4 f6 9 ef ef 10 We2+ We7 11 Wxe7 Wxe7 leaves Black with at least an equal endgame, Hasin-Smyslov, USSR Ch 1971.

8 ... f6

If Black takes time out to castle, White will be able to establish a small but lasting advantage: 8 ...

0-0 9 0-0 f6 10 Qf3 Qc6 11 c3 fe 12 fe Qg4 13 Qf2 e6 14 Qbd2, Albury-Kageldyev, Daugavpils 1974.

9 Qf3 Qc6 (71)

9 ... a5 has been tried here. 10 c3 (10 a4!? 10 ... Qa6!? (10 0-0 11 0-0 Qf5 12 Qbd2 ± Lukin-Shusterman, USSR 1974) 11 Wxe2 0-0 12 Qe3 Qg4 13 Qbd2 fe 14 fe c6 with a better position for White, Pospech-Dotlacilom, Czechoslovakia 1983. White is better in all of these variations thanks to his superior pawn structure, which is effective against the fianchetto formation adopted by Black. If Black tries to redepoly his bishop his kingside pawn structure will be weak. Therefore Black must strive for equality through careful defence.

10 c3

ECO prefers 10 Qe3, which is Bagirov’s main line. Bagirov gives only 10 ... Qg4 11 Qbd2 Qd7 12 0-0 0-0-0, which led to interesting complications in Matulovic-Ljubojevic, Yugoslavia 1972. But what about the simple 10 ... Qa5, intending to swing the knight to c4, as suggested by Yudasin? We think that this equalises easily.

10 ... Qf5

10 ... 0-0 11 0-0 Qf5 transposes to positions discussed below, but 11 ... Qg4 allows White to maintain a small advantage: 12 Qbd2 Qd7 13 h3! Qxf3 14 Qxf3 ± Vaisman-Szmetan, Iasi 1978.

11 0-0 (72)

An interesting new alternative is 11 Qh4, e.g. 11 ... Qxb1 (11 ... Qd4? 12 Qd2 Qd3 13 Wf3 Qa6
60 Modern Variation: 4 ... g6

14 f5 with a strong attack - Yudasin) 12 \textit{axb}1 f5 (12 ... 0-0 transposes below) 13 \textit{c}2 e6 14 \textit{d}3 \textit{wd}7 (14 ... 0-0 15 \textit{g}4! \textit{fg}16 \textit{g}5 h6 17 \textit{exe}6 \textit{wh}4 18 \textit{we}2 and 19 \textit{we}1! - Yudasin). This position was reached in the game Yudasin-Kakageldyev, Ivano-Frankovsk 1982. With 15 \textit{d}3 White could have secured an advantage, since 15 ... a5 allows 16 \textit{b}5! and White will in any event be able to continue with a3, b3 and c4.

\textbf{C}

5 \textit{dg}5 (73)

5 ... c6!

By supporting the knight's central post Black takes the sting out of White's bishop deployment.

6 \textit{dc}4

Alternatives:

a) 6 \textit{df}3 is a primitive move which gets nowhere after 6 ... \textit{f}6 7 \textit{ef} (7 c6? \textit{wa}5+! 8 \textit{d}2 \textit{wb}6 gives Black a big edge) 7 ... \textit{ef} 8 \textit{dh}3 \textit{df} 9 \textit{d}3 \textit{xd}3 = Rohrl-Wallner, Austrian Ch 1977.

b) 6 c4 \textit{dc}7! (this exploits a further...
facet of 5 ... c6) 7 \( \text{Wf3} \) f6 8 ef ef 9 \( \text{Qe4} \) \( \text{g7}! \) 10 \( \text{f4} \) 0-0! gives Black good play. 7 \( \text{Qd3} \) led to easy equality in Bogdanović-Knežević, Yugoslav Ch 1965: 7 ... \( \text{Qg5} \) 8 f4 de 9 de \( \text{Qe6} \) 10 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{Qxe6} \).
c) 6 \( \text{We2} \) leads to an advantage for Black after 6 ... h6!, which robs White of the initiative, e.g. 7 \( \text{Qe4} \) \( \text{g7} \) 8 f4 0-0 9 \( \text{Qbc3} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \) 10 \( \text{Qxc3} \) c5 11 d5 e6! 12 \( \text{Qe3} \) ed 13 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{Qc6} \), Bogdanović-Kavalek, Sarajevo 1967.
d) 6 \( \text{h4} \) is more interesting, but the position after 6 ... de 7 fe \( \text{Wc7} \) 8 f4 has not been tested. We think that Black stands well here after 8 ... f6!, and perhaps 7 ... f6 is good too.

6 ... de!

Black is going to play this sooner or later, and by attending to it immediately he secures an equal game.

Hort stops here but Bagirov gives 12 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{Qxf3} \) 13 \( \text{Qxf3} \) e6. Black has nothing to worry about and can look forward to an interesting middlegame where his knights are useful in the semi-closed position. As is so often the case in the Alekhine, the pawn on e5 will require protection.
7 Larsen Variation: 4 ... de

1 e4 \( \square f6 \)
2 e5 \( \square d5 \)
3 d4 d6
4 \( \square f3 \) \( de \) (75)

11 0-0-0+ \( \square c8 \) 12 \( \square b1 \) \( \square c5 \) Black was better in Kostov-Orev, corres 1954.

5 ... g6

It seems that 5 ... \( \square d7 \) is just too risky: 6 \( \square x f7! \) \( \square x f7 \) 7 \( \square h5+ \) \( \square e6 \) 8 c4! \( \square f6 \) 9 d5+ \( \square d6 \) 10 \( \square f7! \)

(10 c5+ also gives White an edge)

10 ... \( \square b6 \) (10 ... \( \square b8 \) 11 c5+! \( \square x c5 \) 12 \( \square e3+ \) \( \square d6 \) 13 \( \square a3 \) a6 14 \( \square c4+ \) \( \square d7 \) 15 d6 wins) 11 c5+ \( \square x c5 \) 12 \( \square e3+ \) \( \square d6 \) 13 \( \square c3 \)

\( \square b x d5 \) 14 \( \square x d5 \) \( \square x d5 \) 15 \( \square x d5 \)

16 0-0-0+ \( \square c6 \) 17 \( \square x d8 \) b6 18 \( \square e2 \)

\( \square b7 \) 19 \( \square f3+ \) c6 20 \( \square h d1 \) ±.

5 ... e6 is not mentioned by Hort, but White only obtains a small advantage after 6 \( \square f 3 \) \( \square f 6 \) 7 \( \square g 3 \) h6 8 \( \square c 3 \) \( \square b 4 \) 9 \( \square b 5+ \) c6 (9 ... \( \square d 7 \) 10 \( \square e 4 \) ) 10 \( \square a 4 \) \( \square d 7 \) (Tal-Larsen, Bled 1965) 11 \( \square d 4 \) — Tal. Still, why shut in the bishop on c8?

6 \( \square c 4 \)

This is the most active move, but there are alternatives to be considered:

a) 6 \( \square d 2 \) led to equality after 6 ...

\( \square g 7 \) 7 \( \square d f 3 \) 0-0 8 \( \square e 2 \) \( \square d 7 \) 9 \( \square x d 7 \) \( \square x d 7 \) 10 0-0 \( \square g 4 \) in

b) 6 g3 67 g7 7 g2 c6 is marked '±'
b) 6 g3 67 g7 7 g2 c6 is marked '±'
by Hort, but the position looks
fine for Black, who can continue
with his deployment in a smooth
fashion, perhaps invading h3 with
a battery of bishop and queen.
c) 6 6e2 6g7 7 6f3? is somewhat
artificial. After 7 0-0 8 0-0 c6 9
e2 6d7 10 6xd7 6xd7, Enklaar-
Sully, Netherlands Ch 1978, Hort
claims an edge for White, but it is
small and not troublesome. 7 ...
0-0 may have been a bit routine.
7 ... 6f5 fails to 8 c4! 6b4 9 6a4+,
but 7 ... c6 8 0-0 6d7 comes into
consideration.
d) 6 c4 should be met by 6 ... 6b6.
Long-recommended, this move
has yet to be played.
e) 6 6f3 6e6 7 6c4 6g7 8 6c3 c6
9 0-0 6d7! 10 6e1 6f6 11 6g5
0-0 12 6b3 6xc3 transposes
below. 13 6xe6?! 6b5!, Adorjan-
McKay, Stockholm 1969 (see
below) or 13 bc 6d5 or 13 6xc3
6d5 14 6d2 6c7, with a good
game for Black in all lines.

6 ... 6e6!

Less impressive is 6 ... c6 7 0-0
6g7 8 6e1 0-0 (8 ... 6d7?!) 9 c3
6e6 10 6d2 6d7 11 6ef3!,

7 6f3

White again has a large selection:
a) 7 6c3 c6 8 6e4 6c7 (8 ... 6d7?!) 9 6b3! (9 6e2 6d7!
equalised in Swic-Knežević, Polanica
Zdroj 1978) 9 ... 6xb3 (9 ...
6d7!?) 10 ab 6g7 11 0-0. White
has a slight edge here, but we feel
that Black could have played
more strongly with 9 ... 6d7.
b) 7 0-0 6g7 and now:
b1) 8 6e2 6d7! 9 6f3 6f6 10
6b3 c6 11 6c4 6c7 12 6c3 0-0 =
Matanović-Knežević, Vrs 1977.
b2) 8 6d2 0-0 9 6e4 c6 10 6e1
6c7 11 6b3 6xb3 (11 ... 6d7?!) 12 ab 6e6 13 c3 6d7 14 6xd7
6xd7, Stein-Honfi, Budapest 1968.
White has a somewhat freer game.
b3) 8 6b3 0-0 9 6c2 (After 9 c4
6b6 10 6e1 c6 11 6c3 6xe5 12
6xe5, Ghinda-Grunberg, Romanian
Ch 1976, Black might go pawn
grabbing with 12 ... 6xc4 13 6e1
e6! 14 6h6 6b8 b7, which is rather
messy, or try 12 ... 6d8 13 6e3
6xc4 14 6e1 e6!, where 14 6h6 is
not playable. If the rook retreats
to e4 (13 6e4), Black also has a
good game.) 9 ... a5! 10 6c3 c6.
Here Jimenez-Larsen, Palma de
Mallorca 1967, saw 11 6xd5? cd
12 a4?! 6c6 13 c3 6b6 14 6a2
6xe5! 15 de d4 with advantage to
Black. White should have played
11 a4 with an equal game.
b4) 8 6e1!? is a new move which
deserves consideration. After 8 ...
0-0 9 6b3 c6 10 6d2 6c7 11
6g4 h5 12 6e3 6b6 13 6c4 6e6
14 c3 White held the initiative in
De Firmian-Alburt, Reykjavik
64 Larsen Variation: 4 ... d6

1984.

7 ... g7
8 Qc3 c6
9 0-0 0-0

Better is 9 ... d6! 10 e5 c6, Adorjan-McKay, Stockholm 1969, or 13 bc Axc5 or 13 Axe5 Axe5 14 Wd2 c7, with a

good game for Black in all lines.

We suggest that Black investigate this line if he wishes to play the

Larsen Variation.

10 Qe4 (76)

The only move to hold out any

hope for an advantage. Others:

a) 10 Axc6 d5 12 de Qxe5 12 de Qd7 c7 13 Wg3 Axd8 14 Axd5 Axe5

15 f4 Wa5 gave Black equality in

Ostojic-Johansson, Reykjavik 1968.

b) 10 Qe1? is not appropriate in

this position, as can be seen in

the game Calvo-Hartston, Menorca 1974: 10 ... Qc7! 11 Axe6 Axe6 12
d5 cd 13 Axe5 Axe5 14 Axd5
d8! with a decisive advantage

for Black.

This position was reached in

Hindle-Williams, British Ch 1974.

Hort evaluates it as better

for White, but judge for yourself.

If you think that this position

is acceptable, then the lines

given in this chapter might be

right for you. The lines with 9 ...

Axc5 are particularly promising.

On the other hand, De Firmian-

Alburt (7 0-0 g7 8 Qe1) may be

an important new resource for

White.
8 4  \( \text{\underline{f3}} \): Other replies for Black

\begin{align*}
1 & \text{e4} \quad \text{\underline{f6}} \\
2 & \text{e5} \quad \text{\underline{d5}} \\
3 & \text{d4} \quad \text{d6} \\
4 & \text{\underline{f3}} (78)
\end{align*}

\( \text{$g_7$ 8 \text{\underline{e2}} 0-0 9 0-0 \) White is better, Matulović-Kovačević, Krk 1976. White can also capture on d6, transposing to Chapter 6, variation B, note to Black's 5th move.

\( 4 \ldots \text{\underline{f5}} \) allows White to try to increase his control of the centre with 5 \text{\underline{h4}}, e.g. 5 ... \text{\underline{c8}} 6 \text{\underline{f4}}! \text{e6} 7 \text{\underline{f3}} \text{\underline{e7}} \) (Steiner-Grünfeld, Budapest 1926) 8 c4! and Black will slowly suffocate. 5 \text{\underline{e2}} also gives White an edge.

\begin{align*}
78 & \\
B & \\
\text{A} & \\
4 & \ldots \quad \text{\underline{b6}}
\end{align*}

We have already considered two fully playable moves for Black in this position (4 ... \text{\underline{g4}}, 4 ... \text{\underline{g6}}) and one interesting alternative (4 ... \text{\underline{de}}). We do not feel that any of the moves in this chapter give Black any real hope of equality, and therefore concentrate on the lines which guarantee White a good game.

\begin{align*}
\text{A} & \quad 4 \ldots \quad \text{\underline{b6}} \\
\text{B} & \quad 4 \ldots \quad \text{\underline{c6}} \\
4 & \ldots \text{\underline{c6}} 5 \text{\underline{e2}} \text{\underline{g4}} \text{transposes to Chapter 4, but White can also play} \\
& \quad 5 \text{h3}. \text{After 5 ... \underline{d6} \underline{de} g6 7 \underline{c4}}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
5 & \quad \text{\underline{c3}}! \\
5 & \quad \text{a4 is another good choice.} \\
5 & \quad \ldots \quad \text{\underline{g6}} \\
5 & \quad \text{... \underline{g4} 6 \text{h3} \underline{h5} (6 ... \underline{xf3} 7 \underline{xf3} \underline{c6} 8 \underline{b5})} 7 \text{g4!} \underline{g6} 8 \text{e6! with a strong attack.}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
6 & \quad \text{\underline{f4}} \quad \text{\underline{g7}}
\end{align*}
66 4 \( \text{Qf3: Other replies for Black} \)

7 \( \text{Qd2} \) 0-0
8 \( \text{h3!} \)

8 \( \text{h4} \) h5! still keeps Black in the game, e.g. 9 \( \text{Qh6} \) de 10 \( \text{Qxg7} \)
\( \text{Qxg7} \) 11 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 12 \( \text{Qg5} \)
\( \text{Qxe5} \) 13 \( \text{Qxe5} \) f6, Ambroz-Neckar, Prague 1983.

After 8 \( \text{h3} \) White has the advantage.

B

4 ... \( \text{Qc6} \)

This move is often played by the German IM Klaus Bischoff.

As we have seen in previous chapters, it is generally better to keep this move in reserve, as the two knights are ready targets for White's pieces.

5 c4 \( \text{Qb6} \) (79)

6 e6?!

This is the most common reply. White sacrifices a pawn to gain time for his attack. But 6 ed will secure a solid advantage without all the worry. We examined that reply in Illustrative Game Sigurjonsson-Bischoff, Reykjavik 1982 in Chapter 1. We choose 6 e6 as our main line only because it is still played frequently and is of considerable interest.

The Czech correspondence player Podgorny has shown that 7 \( \text{Qg5} \) is not sufficient: 7 ... e5! 8 \( \text{Qd3} \)
\( \text{Qxd4} \) 9 \( \text{Qxh7} \) \( \text{Qxh7} \) 10 \( \text{Qxh7} \) \( \text{Qf5} \)

11 \( \text{Qa3} \) \( \text{Qxc4!!} \) 12 \( \text{Qxc4} \) (12 0-0 \( \text{Qxa5} \) 13 ba \( \text{Qc2} \) 14 \( \text{Qh5} + \) g6 15 \( \text{Qh4} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 16 \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) 17 \( \text{Qh7} \)
\( \text{Qd7} \) 18 \( \text{Qh3} + \) \( \text{Qf5} \) 19 g4 \( \text{Qc2} \) 20 f3 \( \text{Qd3} \) and Black is winning,

Boscher-Podgorny, 2nd European Team Correspondence-Ch 12 ... \( \text{Qc2} + \) 13 \( \text{Qf1} \) \( \text{Qxa1} \) 14 \( \text{Qxf8} \) \( \text{Qxf8} \)

15 \( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 16 \( \text{Qf3} \) g6 17 g4 \( \text{Qc6} \)!
18 \( \text{Qg2} \) \( \text{Qxf3} + \) 19 \( \text{Qxf3} \) \( \text{Qe6} \)

20 \( \text{Qd2} \) (Kuijpers-Böhm, Amsterdam 1982, tried to improve with 20 \( \text{Qe4} \) but after 20 ... \( \text{Qxa2} \) 21 b4 \( \text{Qb3} \) 22 \( \text{Qb2} \) a5 23 \( \text{Qc2} \) ab 24 \( \text{Qxb4} \) \( \text{Qa4} \) White resigned) 20 ... \( \text{Qc2} ! \), Volfl-Podgorny, Czechoslovak Corres Ch 1974. The recently introduced 8 \( \text{Qf3} \) is interesting, e.g. 8 ... \( \text{Qxd4} \) 9 \( \text{Qxf7+} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 10 \( \text{Qe3} \) h6! \( \infty \)

7 \( \text{Qc3} \) leads to less complicated play, but it is harder to justify the investment of the pawn, though Black must play with care: 7 ... \( \text{Qd7} \) 8 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) 9 \( \text{Qe3} \) (9-0 g6 10 d5 \( \text{Qe5} \) 11 \( \text{Qxe5} \) de is less dangerous, Shamkovich-Hansen,
4 \( \text{f}3 \): Other replies for Black 67

Esbjerg 1982) 9 ... g6 10 h4 \( \text{g}7 \) 11 \( \text{g}5 \), Vogt-Cibulka, Trenčianske-
Teplice 1974, is very dangerous for Black. 7 ... e5 is probably best,
e.g. 8 d5 \( \text{d}4 \) 9 \( \text{xd}4 \) ed 10 \( \text{xd}4 \) e5, Honfi-Csom, Hungary 1965,
but even here White is better (compare below – White has a
knight developed at c3 as opposed to a pawn at h4).

7 \( \text{d}3 \) is met by 7 ... e5! with equal chances. White stands better:

7 ... e5

This is the only move to slow the advance of the white h-pawn.

8 d5 \( \text{d}4 \)

9 \( \text{xd}4 \) ed

10 \( \text{xd}4 \) (80)

White stands better:

a) 10 ... e5 11 \( \text{d}1 \) ±.

b) 10 ... \( \text{d}7 \) 11 \( \text{e}2 \) e5 12 de \( \text{xe}6 \)

13 \( \text{h}3 \) ± Nei-Honfi, Zalaegerszeg 1969.

Nevertheless, we prefer the plan adopted in Sigurjónsson-Bischoff
– see Chapter 1.
9 Four Pawns Attack: Introduction

1 e4 \(d\text{f}6\)
2 e5 \(d\text{d}5\)
3 d4 \(d\text{d}6\)
4 c4 \(d\text{b}6\)
5 f4 (81)

Players of the white side should learn the line against 5 ... g5, for it is not easy to find at the board (which is the only thing the variation has going for it!). Variation D is quite new and bears watching.

A 5 ... \(d\text{f}5\)
B 5 ... g5?!
C 5 ... g6?!
D 5 ... de! 6 fe g6?!

5 ... de 6 fe c5 is Chapter 10.
5 ... de 6 fe \(d\text{f}5\) is Chapter 11.
5 ... de 6 fe \(d\text{c}6\) is covered in Chapters 12 and 13.

A
5 ... \(d\text{f}5\)
6 \(d\text{c}3\) e6
7 \(d\text{e}3\) \(d\text{e}7\)
7 ... de returns to the main line and is treated in Chapters 11, 12 and 13.
8 \(d\text{f}3\) 0-0
9 \(d\text{d}3\)
9 ed cd 10 b3 d5! 11 c5 \(d\text{d}6\) 7 12 \(d\text{d}3\) \(d\text{x}d3\) 13 \(d\text{x}d3\) e6 14 cb \(d\text{x}b6\) = Uitumen-Fischer, Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970.
9 ... \(d\text{xd}3\)

The Four Pawns Attack is the most direct attempt at an outright refutation of the Alekhine Defence. White is willing to weaken his 'forecourt' (the area surrounding his king) in order to establish a big pawn centre. Black can get crushed like a bug if he is not careful, but with good play he will eventually obtain a comfortable game. In this chapter we take a look at a few lines which are rather off the beaten track, saving the
Four Pawns Attack: Introduction 69

10 \( \text{wxd3} \) \( \text{d5} \) (82) saw 6 d5?! e6! 7 f5 ef 8 e6 \( \text{wf6} \) with advantage to Black.

Eales and Williams suggest 6 \( \text{Qf3} \) (although 6 ... g4 looks like a good reply) and 6 \( \text{wh5} \) (and then how to answer 6 ... de?).

6 .... \( \text{gf} \)

Black is committed to bold play. After 6 .... \( \text{wxd6} \) 7 c5 is recommended by Hort, followed by 7 .... \( \text{we6} \) +8 \( \text{we2} \).

7 .... \( \text{dc}! \)

Here it is White who must play carefully! After 7 \( \text{Axf4} \) cd 8 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 9 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) Black has a good game:

a) 10 \( \text{Qe2} \) \( \text{Qc6} \) 11 \( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qxf3!} \) 12 \( \text{gf} \) \( = \) Krstev-Planinc, Skopje 1967.

b) 10 \( \text{Qe1} \) \( \text{Qc6} \) 11 d5 \( \text{Qd4} \) 12 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qxf3} \) 13 \( \text{gf} \) \( \text{Qh5} \) with a good game for Black, Levchenko-Grigorian, USSR 1971.

5 .... \( \text{g5?!} \) (83)

A bold and brazen attempt to undermine the white centre.

6 \( \text{ed} \)

Not 6 \( \text{fg} \) \( \text{de} \)! when Black is already much better.


7 .... \( \text{Qxc7} \)

8 \( \text{Qc3!} \) \( \text{e5} \)

What else? Black cannot take on c4 because of \( \text{Qa4+} \), while on the prosaic 7 .... e6, 8 c5! is very strong.

9 \( \text{de} \) \( \text{Qc6} \)

If Black simply captures on e5, then his shattered pawn structure will prove his undoing. His best hope is to throw all of his pieces into the game.

10 \( \text{Qxf4} \) \( \text{Qe6} \)

11 \( \text{Qe4} \) (84)

The weakness of the d6 square is critical.
White has a clear advantage, Matanović-Darga, Bordeaux 1964.

**D**

5 ... de
6 fe g6 (85)

**C**

13 Qe4! Qxb3
14 ab

Black is busted, Tringov-Planinc, Varna 1970.

5 ... g6
Better is 5 ... de 6 fe g6 (see below).

6 Qc3! Qg7
7 Qe3 0-0
8 Qf3 de

8 ... Qe6 leaves White with a better game after 9 b3.

9 de!

It is because of this possibility that we prefer to fianchetto the bishop after capturing at e5 on move 5.

9 ... c6!

After 9 ... Qxd1 10 Qxd1 White stands better, while 9 ... Qc6 is met by 10 c5!

10 Qb3 Qg4
11 Qe2 Qxf3
12 Qxf3 Qd3

On 7 Qf3 Black can play 7 ... Qg4, or 7 ... Qg7 8 Qe2 0-0 9 0-0 Qg4, as in Jurjevich-Schiller, Atlanta 1983, which continued 10 c5!? Qd5 11 Qc3 b6 12 cb ab 13 Qb3 Qe6 14 Qc4 c6 15 Qg5 b5! 16 Qxd5 Qxd5 17 Qxd5 Qxd5 18 Qxd5 cd with a slight edge for Black.

7 ... Qg7
8 Qe3

Other moves allow Black to obtain an equal game without much difficulty:

a) 8 c5 Qd5 9 Qb3 Qxc3 10 bc 0-0 11 Qf3 Qc6! 12 Qe6 b6! 13 cb ab 14 0-0 Qe6 = (Hort), or 9 Qc4 Qxc3 10 bc 0-0 = Lazarević-Alexandria, Bladel 1971.
b) 8 øf3 øg4! 9 c5! ød5 10 øc4
e6 11 0-0 øxc3 12 bc 0-0 = Parma-

8 ... 0-0

9 øf3

9 øe2 looks reasonable, but
Black can strike quickly at the
centre with 9 ... c5!, and after 10 dc
ød7 White should try 11 e6,
instead of 11 øf3 øxe5 12 øxd8
øxd8 13 ød5 øbc6 14 øxe5
øxe5 where Black was much
better in Veroci-Levitina, Medelin
1974.

9 h4 can be handled by 9 ... h5.

9 ... c5 also deserves consideration.

9 ... øe5!

10 dc

Black is better after 10 d5 øg4
11 øxc5 ød8d7.

10 ... ød6d7 (86)

11 e6 fe

12 øc2

Not 12 øg5? øa5 and White is
in deep trouble.

12 ... øa5

13 øe2

Not 13 h4?, which allows Black
to counter in the centre with 13 ...
øxc5 14 h5 e5! 15 hg øf5!

13 ... øc6 comes into con-
sideration.

14 0-0 øc6

Black is ready to meet 15 a3
with 15 ... øxc3. The position
after 14 ... øc6 is unclear and has
not had sufficient practical tests.

We suggest that you study this
system and, if you feel comfortable
with it, add it to your repertoire.
## 10 Four Pawns Attack: 6 ... c5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>e4</th>
<th>6 c5 (87)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>e5</td>
<td>e5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>d4</td>
<td>d6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>c4</td>
<td>b6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>f4</td>
<td>de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>fe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Black strikes at the white centre immediately. This move has a poor reputation. It leads to massive complications.

7  d5

Black gets a good game on 7 dc?  
\[ \text{\textbf{x}d1+ 8 } \text{x}d1 \text{ } \textbf{a}4!, \text{ e.g. } 9 \text{ b}4 \text{ a}5  
10 \text{ a}3 \text{ ab } 11 \text{ ab } \textbf{c}3+!  
7  ...  \text{ e}6  
8  \textbf{c}3  

White must not get carried away. After 8 d6?!  \[ \text{h}4+ 9 \text{ g}3

This might seem a bit odd but Black cuts down the scope of the bishop on f1 and opens a path for his bishop on f8. White cannot play 10  \textbf{x}c4, hoping for 10 ...  
\[ \textbf{x}c4? 11 \text{ a}4+, \text{ because } 10 ...  
\[ \text{h}4+ \text{ wins a piece.}  
10  \textbf{f}3!  

Other moves achieve nothing:  
a) 10  a3 keeps the bishop from reaching b4, but leaves White underdeveloped. After 10 ...  
\[ \textbf{c}5  
Black has a good game.
b) **10 \text{wd}4** covers c5, but not for long: 10 ... \text{dc}6! 11 \text{we}4 \text{db}4 12 a3 (12 \text{d6?} \text{g6!} 13 \text{db}5 \text{df}5 \mp Belova-Ramane, USSR 1981) 12 ... \text{cd}xd5 13 \text{db}5 \text{wd}5 14 \text{wd}5 \text{xc}d5-15 \text{xc}c4 \text{dc}7-16 \text{db}3 \text{ae}6 = Ciocaltea-Ljubojević, Malaga 1971.

10 d6 has been suggested, intending to play \text{db}5 or \text{df}3 and then \text{g}5. After 10 ... \text{dc}6 11 \text{db}5 (11 \text{df}3 \text{eg}4 or 11 \text{sf}4 \text{g}5) 11 ... \text{wh}4+ 12 \text{g}3 \text{we}4+ 13 \text{w}e2 \text{wx}e5?! 14-\text{dc}7+ \text{sd}8 15 \text{wx}e5 \text{xe}5 16 \text{dx}a8 \text{dx}a8 17 \text{ff}4 \text{xd}6 18 0-0-0

After 13 \text{g}4?! White could find himself in trouble, e.g. 13 ... \text{dx}d5 14 \text{wx}g7 \text{ff}8, Hecht-Dressen, Solingen 1970.

10 ... \text{gg}1 14 \text{wh}6!? has been suggested by Murei.

White does not have a significant edge. 10 ... \text{sd}7 can be met by 11 \text{df}3 and Black has no useful move. 10 ... \text{se}6 is interesting. After 11 \text{sb}5 \text{sd}5 12 \text{xe}4??, 12 ... \text{wh}4+ wins. Meanwhile, 12 ... \text{wa}5+ is threatened, as well as 12 ... \text{wh}4+. On 11 \text{df}3, 11 ... \text{sa}6 leads to an unclear position with chances for both sides.

d) **10 \text{sf}4?!** \text{sb}4! 11 \text{xc}c4 \text{xc}c4 12 \text{wa}4+ \text{cc}6 13 \text{dc} \text{xb}2 14 \text{cb}+ \text{sd}7 15 \text{wb}4 \text{dd}3+ leaves Black ahead.

10 ... \text{gg}4

11 \text{wd}4

Black has nothing to fear from other moves:
a) **11 \text{se}2** is too slow, and Black can reply 11 ... \text{sc}5! with a good game.

b) **11 \text{xc}4 \text{xc}4 12 \text{wa}4+ \text{dd}7 13 \text{xc}c4 \text{xf}3 14 \text{gf} \text{xe}5 15 \text{we}2** (Browne-Ničevsky, Rovinj-Zagreb 1970) 15 ... \text{wh}4+! or 15 \text{we}4 \text{wh}4+, as in Cursoux-Letzelter, Le Touquet 1977.

11 ... \text{xf}3

12 \text{gf} \text{b}4

13 \text{xc}4

Now the fun begins. After 15 \text{gh}6? \text{cc}6 16 \text{we}4 \text{xe}5 17 \text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 18 \text{sb}5 \text{wc}5 Black was winning in Gibbs-Stewart, corres 1972.

15 ... \text{wc}7

16 \text{sb}3 \text{ec}5

17 \text{wf}4 (90)

This is the crucial position.
17 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} d8d7 \)

This is a relatively new idea.

17 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} xg1 \) is too dangerous, as demonstrated in Bronstein-Ljubojević, Petropolis 1Z 1973.

The most recent example is 18 d6
\( \text{\text{ế}} c5 19 \text{\text{ế}} e4 \text{\text{ế}} d4 20 \text{\text{ế}} d1 \text{\text{ế}} xxb2 \)
21 \( \text{\text{ế}} f6+! \text{\text{ế}} h8 22 \text{\text{ế}} d2! \pm \)

Moura-Rinaldi, corr 1983.

Hort quotes Bonaventure-Renaud, Le Havre 1977: 17 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} e8 18 \text{\text{ế}} f6 \)
\( \text{\text{ế}} d8d7 19 \text{\text{ế}} e4! \text{\text{ế}} xxe5! 20 \text{\text{ế}} xg5 \)
\( \text{\text{ế}} xe5 21 \text{\text{ế}} e2! (\infty - \text{Hort}) 21 ... \text{\text{ế}} d6! 22 \text{\text{ế}} h6? \text{\text{ế}} bd7 23 \text{\text{ế}} g3 \text{\text{ế}} f8 \)

is still unclear, according to Hort.

By completing his development Black retains good chances.

18 d6 \( \text{\text{ế}} c6 \)

19 0-0-0

White can also play 19 \( \text{\text{ế}} e4 \).

Timman, Ree and Marović are responsible for the following line:
19 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} xg1 20 \text{\text{ế}} f6! \text{\text{ế}} xxf6 21 ef \)
(21 \( \text{\text{ế}} xf6!? \)) 21 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} e8 22 \text{\text{ế}} h6 \text{\text{ế}} xxe4+ 23 \text{\text{ế}} f1 \text{\text{ế}} e1+ 24 \text{\text{ế}} g2 \text{\text{ế}} e2+ 25 \text{\text{ế}} xg1 \text{\text{ế}} c5+ 26 \text{\text{ế}} h1 \text{\text{ế}} xh2+! 27 \text{\text{ế}} xh2 \text{\text{ế}} f5 28 \text{\text{ế}} g3 \)
(28 \( \text{\text{ế}} xf7+?! \text{\text{ế}} h8) 28 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} xf6 \)
29 \( \text{\text{ế}} e1 \). Here Barry Spiro ‘discovered’ 29 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} c8! \), but refuted it himself with 30 \( \text{\text{ế}} e7 \)
\( \text{\text{ế}} e1+ 31 \text{\text{ế}} g2 \text{\text{ế}} xxb2+ 32 \text{\text{ế}} f2 \text{\text{ế}} xf6! \)
33 \( \text{\text{ế}} d2! \text{\text{ế}} e8 34 \text{\text{ế}} xxb7 \text{\text{ế}} d8 35 \text{\text{ế}} xxf7 \text{\text{ế}} xf7 36 \text{\text{ế}} xxf7+ \text{\text{ế}} xf7 37 \text{\text{ế}} h6. So it goes. As an afterthought he suggested 29 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} d8 30 \text{\text{ế}} e7 \)
\( \text{\text{ế}} d7 31 \text{\text{ế}} xxf7+ \text{\text{ế}} f8 32 \text{\text{ế}} xd7 \text{\text{ế}} xd7 33 \text{\text{ế}} d5 \text{\text{ế}} e5 with a complicated position favouring Black. White has excellent compensation for the pawn after 29 \( \text{\text{ế}} e1 \).

(Timman).

19 ... \( \text{\text{ế}} xg1 \)

20 \( \text{\text{ế}} xg1 \text{\text{ế}} c5 \)
21 \( \text{\text{ế}} e1 \text{\text{ế}} e8 \)
22 \( \text{\text{ế}} e7 \text{\text{ế}} xe7 \)

23 de \( \text{\text{ế}} xe7 \)
24 e6 \( \text{\text{ế}} h8! \)

This is Spiro’s suggested improvement of 24 ... \( fe 25 \text{\text{ế}} xe6 \), given by Zaitsev, Shashin and Marović. He claims: “After 25 \( \text{\text{ế}} d4+ f6 26 \text{\text{ế}} e4 \text{\text{ế}} e5 27 \text{\text{ế}} d6 \text{\text{ế}} c8! \), it is difficult to judge whether White’s e-pawn will win the game or prove vulnerable, but 28 \( \text{\text{ế}} xe7 \text{\text{ế}} xe7 29 \text{\text{ế}} d1 g5! =\infty.”

6 ... \( c5 \), as we have seen, leads to enormous complications. One must be quite familiar with the theory, and also possess a gambling spirit if one wishes to play this line.
11 Four Pawns Attack: 6 ... \( \mathcal{f}5 \)

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & e4 \, \mathcal{f}6 \\
2 & e5 \, \mathcal{d}5 \\
3 & d4 \, d6 \\
4 & c4 \, \mathcal{b}6 \\
5 & f4 \, \mathcal{d}e \\
6 & fe \, \mathcal{f}5 (91)
\end{array}
\]

\( \mathcal{h}4+ \) \( \text{†} \), Marco-Kostić, 1921.

7 ... \( e6 \)

8 \( \mathcal{d}f3 \)

Solid and strong. 8 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{c}6 \) transposes to the next chapters.

Now:

A 8 ... \( \mathcal{e}7 \)

B 8 ... \( \mathcal{b}4?! \)

A

8 ... \( \mathcal{e}7 \)

This is an attempt to avoid some of the nastier variations of 6... \( \mathcal{c}6 \), but it does not succeed.

9 \( \mathcal{e}3 \)

Now Black has nothing better than to transpose to the normal lines with 9 ... \( \mathcal{c}6 \) (Chapter 13).

White can also demonstrate his independence by playing 9 \( \mathcal{d}d3 \) \( \mathcal{g}4 \) (9 ... \( \mathcal{xd}3 \) 10 \( \mathcal{xd}3 \) \( \mathcal{c}6 \) 11 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) 0-0 12 \( \mathcal{d}f1 \) \( f6 \) 13 ef \( \mathcal{xf6} \) 14 0-0 \( \mathcal{e}8 \) 15 b3 \( \mathcal{d}8 \) 16 \( \mathcal{e}4 \) gave White a clear positional edge in Velimirović-Hlousek, Kapfenburg 1970) 10 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) (Bagirov’s idea 10 \( \mathcal{e}4 \) is also worthy of investigation, but we don’t think that Black has anything to worry about) 10 ... \( \mathcal{c}6 \) 11 0-0.

9 ... \( 0-0?! \)
9 ...  c6 is the only realistic plan for Black.

10  d3  g4

As in similar positions, Black cannot afford to exchange on d3 as White's spatial advantage and control of the centre guarantee him an almost decisive edge.

Naturally the pawn structure reached after 10 ... c6 11 xf5 ef will not give Black sufficient play.

11  0-0  e6
12  h3  xf3

Unfortunately, Black cannot retreat the bishop to h5 because of the tactical trick 13 xh7+!, as in Mikhalevishin-Mikadze, USSR 1974.

13  xf3 (92)

Already there is no escape for Black.

13 ...  xe5

Neither 13 ... f6 14 ef xf6 15 e4 nor 13 ... xd4 14 e4 xf5 15 g4! allow Black to survive for very many moves.

14  xh7+!  xh7

15  de  d3
16  ad1  g6
There is no salvation in 16 ...

xc4? 17 d4 c6 18 h5+ g8 19 f6.

Now we have two very convincing examples of why Black's position is such a mess:

a) 17 d4 ad8 18 g4 d3 19 e4 xc4 20 xg7+!, Velimirović-Marović, Yugoslavia 1972.

b) 17 b3! c6!? 18 a4 ad8?! 19 xd8 xd8 20 xf7! xf7 21 xf7, Mikadze-Beradze, Sukhumi 1974.

B 8 ...  b4 (93)

9  d3!

This is the most effective answer.

9 ...  c5

The alternatives fail to provide relief for Black:

a) 9 ... xd3 10 xd3 c5 11 0-0 cd left Black in a bad position after 12 e4! d6 13 fg5 xe5 14 g3 bd7 15 f4, Ivkov-Timman,
Amsterdam 1974.
b) 9 ... \(\text{g6}\) 10 0-0 \(\text{xc3}\) 11 bc \\
\(\text{d7}\) 12 \(\text{xg6!}\) fractures Black's kingside and lets the knight wreak havoc: 12 ... hg 13 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f8}\) 14 \(\text{h7}\) ± Messing-Popov, Yugoslavia 1972.

and now Black has a playable game after either 14 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 15 \(\text{ad1}\) c4! 16 \(\text{d4}\) \(\text{a6}\), Westerinen-Esléon, Eksjé 1976 or 14 d6 \(\text{xc3}\) 15 bc \(\text{d7}\), Padovsky-Spirodonov, Varna 1973.

Bagirov suggests 10 d5 \(\text{xd5}\) 11 \\
\(\text{d3}\) ed 12 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{c6}\) 13 \(\text{xf7!!}\) with a very strong attack for White.

c) 9 ... \(\text{g4}\) 10 0-0 c5 (10 ... \(\text{xf3}\) 11 \(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{xd4+}\) leaves Black dangerously exposed: 12 \(\text{e3}\) \(\text{d7}\) 13 \(\text{ad1}\) ±. Even the sensible 10 ... c6 gets Black into trouble after 11 c5! \(\text{xc3}\) 12 bc \(\text{d5}\) 13 \(\text{e1}\), Velimirović-Martínez, Vrinjaca Banja 1973) 11 \(\text{e4!}\) cd 12 c5 with a big edge for White, Tal-NN, simul, England 1974.

10 ... cd \(\text{d3}\) 10 ... 0-0 11 \(\text{e4}\) leads to the same position.

After 11 \(\text{e4!}\) cd 12 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{c7}\) 13 a3, White stands better. The black bishop is too far from the kingside and can find itself in trouble. Therefore the bishop should not prematurely abandon e7 for b4, and Black should establish a knight on c6 early in the game. 10 0-0!
12 Four Pawns Attack: 6 ... c6

Introduction

1 e4 d6
2 e5 d5
3 d4 d6
4 c4 c6
5 f4 e6
6 e4 d6 (94)

8 ... f6 (9) c2 (9 c5 d5! 10 b5 d7! 11 0-0 g6 12 a4 xf3! 13 xf3 and Black was much better in Kalantar-Bagirov, Batumi 1961) 9 ... d7! 10 c5 d5

The American IM Michael Rohde has proposed 7 ... h5 here, intending 8 ... g4. This idea deserves practical tests.

7 e3

7 e3 allows Black to play 7 ... g4 and now 8 e3 would fail to 8 ... xf3 (8 ... e6 is also good and may transpose below) 9 g6 e6 10 c3 (10 e2 gives Black a choice between 10 ... h4+ and 10 ... e7 11 c3!? h4+ 12 f1 g5 13 xg5 xg5 with an unclear position) 10 ... h4+ 11 f2 f4 =. 8 e6 is tempting, but after

a) 8 a3 e6 9 f3 (9 b4 e7 10 f3 f6! =) A. Steiner-Tartakower, Ujpest 1934) 9 ... e7 10 c3 f6 =.

b) 8 d3 xd3 9 xd3 cxe5 \(\pm\).

c) 8 e6 fe 9 c3 e5 10 d5 b4 11 ecx1 e6 12 a3 ed \(\pm\).

d) 8 f3?! is best met by 8 ... b4! This line is one of the few cases where the early knight foray is appropriate, since after 9 a3 the knight is misplaced and Black can obtain a good game with the simple 9 ... e6.

8 ... e6
8 ... ²b4 does not seem quite good enough for equality: 9 ²c1

c5 10 d5 e6 11 a3! ed 12 ab d4 13 bc
dc 14 b4! ³xd1+ 15 ³xd1 ²d7 16
²f3 c2 17 ²c1 a5 18 ³a1± (Hort).

9 ³f3 (95)

A 9 ... ²b4

95

B 9 ... ³g4

C 9 ... ³e4

D 9 ... ²d7

9 ³e2 (9 ²d2 ²b4 10 0-0-0
²a4 11 c5 led to an unclear position in Kaminsky-Ivanov, Sochi 1969, but instead of 9 ... ²b4
Black can play 9 ... ³e7 and 10 ...
³f6) 9 a3 ²d7 10 ³f3 transposes below to variation D) 9 ... ²b4! 10
³c1 c5 and now:
a) 11 a3 cd 12 ³xd4 ³c6 ±.
b) 11 dc ²xd1+ ±.
c) 11 d5 cd 12 cd ³c4! 13 ³xc4
³h4+ 14 ²f1 ²xc4+ ± Torre-Rodriguez, Manila 1968, or 13
³f4 ³xb4 14 ³b5+ ³d7 15 ²e2
³xb5 16 ³xb5+ ²d7 ± Georgadze-Kopylov, USSR 1948.

Now 9 ... ³e7 is Chapter 13, but there are four other plans for Black which are not considered adequate by present theory. Still,

variation C bears watching, since the deployment of the bishop at g4 is quite logical.

A 9 ... ²b4

B 9 ... ³g4

C 9 ... ³e4

D 9 ... ²d7

10 ²c1

After 10 ³g5 ²e7 11 ³xe7
³xe7 Black's king is in no real danger. Marjanovic-Agazamov, Belgrade 1982, continued 12 ²c1 c5
12 a3 cd 14 ³xd4 ³d3+ 15 ³xd3
³xd4 16 ³f5 ³e3+ an interesting game in which Black's chances are no worse.

10 ... c5

11 ³e2

White can also play for a small advantage with 11 a3 cd 12 ³xd4
³c6 13 ³xc6 (13 ³xf5 ³xd1+! =)
13 ... ³xd1+! (13 ... bc 14 ³f3 ± Neiderwitz-Brauer, corres) 14 ³xd1
bc 15 ³e2 ³e7 16 0-0 ³d7!
17 g4+ ± Tringov-Hecht, Teesside 1972.

It should be clear that White will have to fight for equality after 11 dc ³xd1+ 12 ³xd1 ³d8+ 13
³e1 ³d7! Soesan-Curtis, British Ch 1959.

11 ... cd

According to Hort, this is the least effective reply, but we find the alternative lines to be less satisfactory for Black:
a) 11 ...  \( \text{c} \text{c7} \) 12 0-0 0-0 13 dc!  \( \text{d} \text{d7} \)  
14 a3  \( \text{c} \text{c6} \) 15 b4  \( \text{d} \text{xe5} \) (15 ...  
\( \text{d} \text{xe5} \)!!) 16 \( \text{d} \text{b5} \)  \( \text{d} \text{e4} \) 17 \( \text{d} \text{d6} \)  
\( \text{d} \text{xf3} \) 18 \( \text{g} \text{f} \) ± Veroci-Stadler,  
Subotica 1974) 16  \( \text{d} \text{xe5} \)  \( \text{d} \text{xe5} \) 17  
\( \text{d} \text{b5} \)  \( \text{d} \text{d3} \) (17 ...  \( \text{g} \text{g5} \) 18 \( \text{c} \text{c3} \)!!  
Hort-Knežević, Slančev Briag  
1974) 18  \( \text{d} \text{f4} \)  \( \text{d} \text{xe2} \) 19  \( \text{d} \text{xe2} \)  \( \text{d} \text{d3} \)  
20  \text{He}1  \( \text{xf}4 \) 21  \( \text{xf}4 \) ± Mikhalchishin-Karsha, Kotov Memorial, Lvov 1983.  
b) 11 ...  \( \text{g} \text{g4} \) 12  \( \text{g} \text{g5} \)!! (12 0-0-0?  
\( \text{d} \text{x}3 \) 13  \( \text{d} \text{x}3 \)  \( \text{d} \text{xc}4 \) 14  \( \text{f} \text{f2} \) with  
a sharp position in which White's chances must be preferred) 12  
\( \text{c} \text{e}7 \)!! 13  \( \text{d} \text{xe7} \)  \( \text{d} \text{xe7} \) 14  \( \text{d} \text{c}4 \) 0-0 15  
dc  \( \text{d} \text{d}7 \) 16 a3  \( \text{c} \text{c6} \) 17  \( \text{d} \text{d}6 \)  \( \text{d} \text{xf3} \)  
18  \( \text{d} \text{xf3} \)  \( \text{c} \text{c5} \)  \( \text{d} \text{dxe5} \). We feel that in  
this complicated position White's chances are only very slightly  
better.  

12  \( \text{d} \text{xd4} \)  \( \text{g} \text{g}6 \) (96)  

13  \( \text{c} \text{c5} \)!!  
There are three alternatives, but the text is the most effective move  
for White:  

a) 13  \( \text{d} \text{db5} \)  \( \text{w} \text{xd1}+ \) (13 ...  \( \text{d} \text{d}3+ \)  
14  \( \text{d} \text{xd3} \)  \( \text{d} \text{xd3} \) 15 b3 ±) 14  \( \text{d} \text{xd1} \)  
\( \text{d} \text{c}2+ \) 15  \( \text{f} \text{f2} \)  \( \text{d} \text{xe3} \) 16  \( \text{d} \text{c}7+ \)  \( \text{d} \text{e}7 \)  
17  \( \text{d} \text{xe3} \). After 17 ...  \( \text{d} \text{c8} \) the  
position holds chances for both  
sides.  
b) 13 a3  \( \text{d} \text{c6} \) 14  \( \text{d} \text{xc6} \)  \( \text{b} \text{c} \) 15  
\( \text{w} \text{xd8}+ \)  \( \text{d} \text{xd8} \)!! 16  \( \text{d} \text{xb6} \)  \( \text{a} \text{b} \) 17  \( \text{f} \text{f}3 \)  
\( \text{e} \text{a}5 \)!! 18  \( \text{d} \text{c6} \)  \( \text{d} \text{xe5}+ \) 19  \( \text{d} \text{d}2 \)  
\( \text{d} \text{c}5 \) 20  \( \text{h} \text{h} \text{e}1 \)  \( \text{d} \text{xe1} \) 21  \( \text{d} \text{xe1} \)  \( \text{d} \text{e}7 \)  
gives Black a fully equal game.  
c) A more recent attempt is 13 0-0-0  
\( \text{d} \text{c}5 \) 14  \( \text{d} \text{c}5 \) 0-0 15 a3  \( \text{d} \text{c}6 \) 15 b4  
\( \text{d} \text{xd4} \)!! 16  \( \text{d} \text{xd4} \)  \( \text{w} \text{g}5 \) led to a  
roughly even game in Westerinen-Hansen, Esbjerg 1982.  

White stands clearly better.  

B  

9  ...  \( \text{d} \text{b4} \) (97)  

10  \( \text{d} \text{e}2 \) 0-0  
After 10 ...  \( \text{d} \text{a}5 \) 11 c5  \( \text{d} \text{d}5 \)
\( \text{d2 c6 13 0-0 0-0 14 g5 White had a slight edge in Rohde-Shamkovich, New York 1978.} \)

11 0-0

White can also try 11 \( \text{xc1 a5} \)

12 \( g5 w7?? \) 13 \( c5 \) \( a4 \) 14 \( w2 \) \( b6 \) i5 0-0 ± Bohak-Preo, corres 1983.

11 ... \( xe3 \)

11 ... \( \text{a5} \), originally suggested by Boleslavsky, usually leads to similar positions. It may actually be better than the text, as there does not seem to be an immediate need to capture on \( c3 \).

12 \( bc \) \( a5 \)

13 \( d2 \) \( w7 \)

14 \( f4 \)

14 \( f3 a4! \) 15 \( f1 \) (Lebedev-Bleichstein, USSR 1965) 15 ... \( \text{g6} \) intends ... \( c5 \), but White can maintain an advantage with 16 \( c5 \). Black might investigate 14 ... \( f6!? \), attacking the centre. Plans with ... \( f6 \) should be considered more often in positions of this nature.

14 ... \( g6 \)

15 \( f1 \) \( c5 \)

Zuidema-Hort, IBM II 1971.

White should now play 16 \( h4! ? \).

9 ... \( g4 \)

This is an alternative to the well-analysed paths of 9 ... \( e7 \) which adventurous players of the black side might well wish to add to their repertoire.

10 \( w2!? \) (98)
d) The best reply to 14 \textcolor{red}{Wd3} is 14 ... f6!, striking immediately at the fragile white centre.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
10 c5 & d5 & \textcolor{red}{Wd3} & x5 \textcolor{red}{Wx5} \\
11 & & e2 & 0-0-0 \\
12 & & e4 & with advantage to Black and 10 \textcolor{red}{Ad3} can be met by 10 ... b4 or 10 ... e7. \\
10 & & b4!? \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

This is the move which gives the variation its bite. Black has established two powerful pins and these will give him sufficient time to complete his development in comfort.

11 \textcolor{red}{Cf}2

11 0-0-0 is not good because of 11 ... \textcolor{red}{Da4}. If White harrasses the bishop with 11 a3 Black can simply retreat 11 ... \textcolor{red}{Cf}7, having achieved a significant weakening of the b3 square. Messing-Ghizdavu, Varna 1973, continued 12 \textcolor{red}{De4} a5 13 \textcolor{red}{Cf}2 \textcolor{red}{Xf3} 14 gf \textcolor{red}{Kh4+} with a better game for Black.

11 ... \textcolor{red}{Xf3}

12 gf \textcolor{red}{Da5}

Contrary to popular belief this is not a dubious move. Nevertheless, Black might wish to investigate the alternatives 12 ... \textcolor{red}{Wh4+} and 12 ... \textcolor{red}{Da4}.

13 b3 c5
14 dc \textcolor{red}{Dd7}
15 0-0-0 \textcolor{red}{We7}
16 \textcolor{red}{Fb2} \textcolor{red}{Xc5}
17 \textcolor{red}{Gg5} \textcolor{red}{Wc7}
18 \textcolor{red}{We3} a6 (99)

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
19 & d6 & & \\
19 ... \textcolor{red}{Dd7} \\
19 ... h6 is worth investigating, i.e. 20 \textcolor{red}{Ah4} \textcolor{red}{C8} 21 \textcolor{red}{Hd1} g5! 22 \textcolor{red}{Ag3} b5! and now if White plays 23 cb?, he runs into 23 ... \textcolor{red}{Xc3}+, winning for Black.
20 \textcolor{red}{Hd1} \textcolor{red}{Xd6}
21 ed \textcolor{red}{Wb6} (100)
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
In this double-edged position Black’s chances are no worse.

**D1**

10  \( \text{\textit{e}2} \)

White relies on his spatial advantage and continues to develop normally.

10  ...  0-0-0

There is a very sharp alternative in 10  ...  \( \text{\textit{d}8} \), and the player who wishes to play 9  ...  \( \text{\textit{d}7} \) as Black might well wish to pursue it: 11 0-0 \( \text{\textit{g}4} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{g}5} \) (Hort claims a large advantage for White after 12 \( \text{c5} \), but we disagree. Bagirov gives 12  ...  \( \text{\textit{d}5} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{x}d}5 \) \( \text{\textit{w}xd}5 \) 14 \( \text{\textit{g}5} \) \( \text{\textit{e}2} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{w}xe}2 \) \( \text{\textit{zd}7} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{f}2} \) \( \text{\textit{d}8} \)) 12  ...  \( \text{\textit{xe}2} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{xe}2} \) \( \text{\textit{xc}4} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{xf}7}!! \) 15 \( \text{\textit{xe}3} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{d}3} \) \( \text{\textit{e}7} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{w}xe}3 \) \( \text{\textit{xe}5} \) is given by Bagirov.

On 15 \( \text{\textit{x}d}7 \) \( \text{\textit{xd}1} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{xd}8} \) + Black can play 16  ...  \( \text{\textit{xd}8} \) (16  ...  \( \text{\textit{xd}8} \) also comes into consideration) 17 \( \text{\textit{xe}6} \) + \( \text{\textit{e}7} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{e}3} \) \( \text{\textit{xf}8} \), 15 \( \text{\textit{b}3} \) \( \text{\textit{e}7} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{xe}6} \) (threatening 17 \( \text{\textit{xg}7} \) mate!) 16  ...  \( \text{\textit{xf}7} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{xd}8} ++ \) \( \text{\textit{e}8} \), 18 \( \text{\textit{f}7} \) \( \text{\textit{xd}4} \) is good for Black. This line deserves practical tests.

11  0-0 (102)
11 ... \text{\texttt{Ag4}}
This is the most recent try, replacing 11 ... f6 12 d5! \texttt{Axe5} 13 \texttt{Axe5} fe 14 a4! a5 15 \texttt{Ab5} \texttt{Ab4}
h5! leaves White with only a small advantage – Hort. We think that
16 d6 c5 and now Bagirov's Black can hold the ending, and
17 \texttt{Wc1}!? intending 18 \texttt{Ad2} is good for White, as is 17 \texttt{Ag5} and
later 18 \texttt{Ad2}.

22 \texttt{Eafl}
22 \texttt{Eg7} \texttt{Ec4} 23 \texttt{Ec1} c6 24 \texttt{Efl}

12 e5 \texttt{Ed5}
13 \texttt{Exd5} \texttt{Wxd5} Gipslis-Kengis, Jurmala 1983,

14 \texttt{Gg5} now faded to a draw after
14 \texttt{Af2} can be met with 14 ... f6
and Black has no significant \texttt{Gg1} \texttt{Ed7}.
problems.

Hort gives 14 b4 \texttt{We4} 15 \texttt{Wb3} \texttt{D2}
10 d5!?

\texttt{Exd4} 16 \texttt{Exd4} \texttt{Axe2} 17 \texttt{Af4}! This is the more aggressive
\texttt{We5} 18 \texttt{Ee1} g5 19 \texttt{Af2} ±, but after 19 ... \texttt{Ah5} 20 \texttt{Ad2} \texttt{Ag7} 21
\texttt{Wa4} (Platonov-Kupreichik, USSR
\texttt{Ch} 1969) Black can play 21 ...
\texttt{Exd4}! 22 \texttt{Exd4} \texttt{Wxe3}+ 23 \texttt{Exe3}
12 \texttt{Dd4} (103)
\texttt{Exd4}.

14 ... \texttt{Axe2}
15 \texttt{We2} \texttt{Exd4}
16 \texttt{Axd4} \texttt{Wxd4}+
17 \texttt{Ah1} \texttt{wd2}
18 \texttt{Wxd2} \texttt{Exd2}
19 \texttt{Exf7}

On 19 c6!? Black equalises with
19 ... h6! 20 \texttt{Exf7} \texttt{Eg8}, according to Watson.

19 ... \texttt{Axe5}
20 \texttt{Axe6} \texttt{Ae4}!
20 ... \texttt{Ab6}! allows White to
play 21 \texttt{Ee1}! ± Instead, Grünfeld-D.Cramling, Gausdal 1980, saw
21 \texttt{Eg7} \texttt{Ag4}! =.

21 \texttt{Exd4} \texttt{Exd4}

12 ... \texttt{a6}!
After 12 ... \texttt{E6xd5} 13 \texttt{Dxd5}
Black can play 13 ... \texttt{Axd5} 14
\texttt{Exf5} \texttt{Ab4}+ 15 \texttt{Ad2} \texttt{Wxf5} 16
\texttt{Wa4}+ c6 17 \texttt{Abx4} \texttt{Wxe4}! is good
for Black. Myers, in *Myers’ Opening Bulletin*, gives 15 $\text{c6}$ unclear.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Move</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-0-0</td>
<td>16 $\text{d6+}$ cd 17 $\text{xd5}$ and</td>
<td>13 $\text{e2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wrote: “White is a bishop ahead and Black does not have any significant attack.”</td>
<td>15 $\text{xf5}$</td>
<td>$\text{b4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This position has already been reached, however, and after 17 ... $\text{f5}$ 18 $\text{c4}$, Tomić-Gipslis, 1978, we agree Black has a fully equal game, with Hort that the position is Fontana-Bed, 1950.</td>
<td>17 $\text{a4}$</td>
<td>$\text{d7}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 $\text{xd7+}$</td>
<td>$\text{xb4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 $\text{xb4}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13 Four Pawns Attack: Main Line

1  e4  \&f6
2  e5  \&d5
3  d4  d6
4  c4  \&b6
5  f4  de
6  fe  \&c6
7  \&e3  \&f5
8  \&c3  e6
9  \&f3  \&e7 (104)

10 ...  0-0
11 0-0  f6!
12  ef

There are a few unconvincing alternatives:
a) 12 a3 fe 13 d5 (13 \&xe5 \&xe5 14 de \&e8 15 \&b5 \&d8 16 \&b3 \&g6! gave Black an excellent game in Selesniyev-Panov, Moscow 1929)
  13 ... e4! 14 dc ef 15 \&xf3 bc 16 \&xc6 \&xc4! 17 \&xa8 \&xe3 \&
b) 12 d5? ed 13 cd \&xe5 \&,
  Bagirov.
c) 12 \&e1 fe 13 de (13 \&xe5? \&xd4!) 13 ... \&d7 14 \&d1 \&e8
gives Black an equal game, but if he tries for more with 12 ...
\&b4
  based on 13 \&d1 \&c2 14 \&f2
\( \text{Qxe3} \) (L. Steiner-Takacs, Vienna 1927) then he should be prepared to meet the new move 13 \( \text{Wg3}. \)

d) 12 \( \text{Wb3} \) \( \text{Qb4} \) 13 \( \text{Rac1} \) a5! 14 a3 (Mitura-Malek, Poland 1975)

14 ... \( \text{Qc2} \), to answer 15 \( \text{Qxc2} \) with 15 ... a4! is interesting, but White should play 15 \( \text{Qf2} \) with slightly better chances in a very unclear position. Another line which deserves consideration is 14 ...

\( \text{Qxc2} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe2} \) a4 16 \( \text{Qxa4} \) \( \text{Qxc2} \)

17 \( \text{Qxb6} \) \( \text{Qxe3} \) 18 \( \text{Qxa8} \) \( \text{Qxf1} \) 19

\( \text{Qxb7} \) (19 c5!? 19 ... \( \text{Qd2} \)! with advantage to Black – Analysis.

e) 12 \( \text{Qh4} \) fc 13 \( \text{Qxf5} \) ef 14 d5

\( \text{Qd4} \) 15 \( \text{Qxd4} \) ed 16 \( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qd7} \)

allows White to play 17 \( \text{Qd3} \)!

g6 + and Black is also OK after

17 ... \( \text{Qc5} \) + 18 \( \text{Qh1} \) \( \text{Qe5} \) -

Analysis.

12 ...

\( \text{Qxf6} \)

13 \( \text{Qd2} \)

13 h3 leads to an inferior position after 13 ...

\( \text{Qe8} \)! 14 g4 \( \text{Qg6} \) 15 \( \text{Qh1} \) \( \text{Qe4} \) 16 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \), e.g. 17 \( \text{Qd2} \) (or 17 \( \text{Qg1} \) ) 17 ...

\( \text{Qxd4} \) 18 \( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qxd4} \) 19 \( \text{Qxd4} \)

(19 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qc6} \) ) 19 ... \( \text{Qxe2} \) -

Analysis.

13 ...

\( \text{Qe7} \)! (106)

14 \( \text{Qad1} \)

14 c5 is a reasonable alternative, e.g. 14 ...

\( \text{Qd5} \) 15 \( \text{Qxd5} \) ed 16

\( \text{Qae1} \) (not 16 \( \text{Qb5} \) \( \text{Qd8} \) ! 17 \( \text{Qf4} \)

\( \text{Qe6} \) 18 \( \text{Qae1} \) \( \text{Qe4} \) ! 19 \( \text{Qe5} \) ! \( \text{Qxe5} \)

20 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) ! 21 b4 \( \text{Qe6} \) +

Denker-Eson, Netanya 1974)

16 ...

\( \text{Qe4} \) 17 \( \text{b4} \) a6 18 a4, Dvoiris-

Bratchenko, USSR 1974, and now

18 ... \( \text{Qae8} \) with an equal game.

14 \( \text{Qae1} \) \( \text{Qh8} \) 15 \( \text{Qh1} \) \( \text{Qad8} \)

16 \( \text{Qg1} \) should be met by 16 ...

\( \text{Wb4} \) and Black stands well in the complex position – Analysis.

14 ...

\( \text{Qad8} \)

15 \( \text{Qe1} \)

15 \( \text{Qe1} \) \( \text{Qb4} \) 16 a3 \( \text{Qc2} \) 17 \( \text{Qf2} \)

\( \text{Qxe3} \) 18 \( \text{Qxe3} \), Rauzer-Fine, Leningrad 1937, yields equality after 18 ...

\( \text{c6} \)!

15 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{Qd5} \) 16 \( \text{Qxd5} \) (16 a3 \( \text{Qh8} \) ! 16 ... \( \text{ed} \) favours Black.

15 ...

\( \text{b6} \)

Black has an interesting alternative in 15 ...

\( \text{e5} \) !? 16 d5 (16 de ...

\( \text{Qxe5} \) 17 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qxd1} \) 18 \( \text{Qxd1} \)

\( \text{Qxe5} \) is good for Black, Gipsis-Mikenas, USSR Ch 1970) 16 ...

\( \text{Qxd4} \) !? 17 \( \text{Qxd5} \) ed 18 \( \text{Qxd4} \)

(18 \( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{g5} \) 19 \( \text{Qa1 c5} \) ! 20 \( \text{f2} \)

\( \text{Qc2} \) and Black is at the very least now worse) 18 ...

\( \text{Qxd4} \) 19 \( \text{Qxd4} \)

(Lanc-Schmidt, Brno 1975) 19 ...

\( \text{c6} \) ! and Black has no problems.
On 17 \( \text{\textit{Ax}} d4 \text{ ed} 18 \text{ \textit{O}}xd4 \) Black can play 18 ... \( \text{\textit{Ag}} 5 19 \text{ \textit{W}}a1 \text{ \textit{Ad}}7 \) with a powerful pair of bishops.

16 \( \text{\textit{Oh}} 1 \)

This is White's best try.

Alternatives:
a) 16 d5 ed 17 cd \( \text{\textit{Ax}} c3 18 \text{ bc \textit{O}}xd5 19 \text{ \textit{Ac}}4 \text{ \textit{Ee6} +.} \)
b) 16 \text{ \textit{Afe1} \textit{Gh8} 17 \text{ b3 \textit{Ag4} + Luginbuhl-Cafferty, Birmingham 1977.} \)

16 ... \( \text{\textit{Oh8}} \)

17 \( \text{ h3} \text{ \textit{Ah7!}} \)

18 \( \text{\textit{Afe1} \textit{Wf7}} \)

19 \( \text{ b3} \)

Black also has a good game after 19 \( \text{\textit{Ef1 \textit{Wg8}!} 20 \text{ b3 \textit{Afe8}} 21 \text{ c5 \textit{Od5}, Jovčić-Kovačević, Titovo Uzice 1978.} \)

19 ... \( \text{\textit{Afe8} (107)} \)

107 \( \text{W} \)

107

Black has a good game, e.g. 20 \( \text{\textit{Ag1 \textit{Ec7}}! 21 \text{\textit{Ef1} \textit{We8} 22 \textit{Wf4 \textit{e5} \textit{+ Filipowicz-Jansa, Budapest 1970.}}}} \)

B 10 d5 (108)

B1 10 ... ed!

B2 10 ... \( \text{\textit{Ob4}} \)

10 ... \( \text{\textit{Ob8}} \) lacks point and is immediately refuted by 11 \( \text{\textit{Ad3}}! \text{\textit{Ax}} d3 12 \text{\textit{Wxd3} \textit{Od6} 13 0-0-0. In Hecht-Thorvaldsson, Helsinki 1972, Black played 13 ... \textit{Wd7, to which White should have responded 14 \textit{d6! with a crushing position.}} \)

B1

10 ... ed

Now White can simply recapture or interpolate a capture on b6.

B11 11 cd

B12 11 \( \text{\textit{Ax}} b6! ? \)

11 cd \( \text{\textit{Ob4}} \)

12 \( \text{\textit{Od4} (109)} \)

12 \( \text{\textit{Od4} (109)} \)
109

12 ... c6

The alternatives have been refuted. We recapitulate the main lines below:

a) 12 ... d7 13 b5 c6 14 0-0!

b) 12 c8 13 b5+ c6 14 dc 0-0

15 0-0 a6 16 cb xxb7 17 e2 ± Ghizdavu-Suba, Romania 1970.

c) 12 g6 13 b5+ f8 (13 ...

c6 14 dc 0-0 15 cb b8 16 0-0!

x b7 17 f3 c7 18 a3 d4 d5

19 c6! x c6 20 x c6 x e 3 21 x e 3 ± Marasescu-Chitu, Romania 1974) 14 0-0 (intending x e 6)

14 ... g8 15 f5 x f 5 16 x f 5 x d 5 17 b3 and White is better, Lev-Birnboim, Israel 1976.

13 e6

If White wants to avoid the heavily analysed lines he can play 13 f3!? (16 b3 c5!) 13 ... c5 14 dc bc?! (14 ... x c 6 15 e 6 !, Liggerink-Bohm, IBM II 1974, also looks better for White) 15 e6! fe (15 ... x e 6 16 a3 d4 d5 17 x c 6 c 7 18 x e 7 x e 7 19 b5 ±) 16

0-0-0 d6 d 5 17 a3 ± Velimirović-Kovačević, Yugoslav Ch 1978.

Perhaps Black can play 14 ... xc6 15 x c 6 x c 6 , where he is only very slightly worse. In any event, he has a sharper alternative in 13 ...

0-0 14 a3 c5 15 ab cd 16 x d 4 x b 4 ,

e.g. 17 f2 e 7 or 17 e 2

w h 4 + Analysis.

13 ... fe

Not 13 c8? 14 b5+ f8 15

0-0 f6 16 h5 e 7 17 x f 6 ±

Rellstab-Berdin, W. Germany 1975.

Black cannot escape by casting:

15 ... 0-0-0 16 0-0-0 e 8 17 f 5 ±

Yudovich-Germanović, USSR 1952.

16 g3 x h 1

16 ... d 5 allows 17 h 6 !, while 16 ... f 6 is refuted by

17 0-0-0!

17 0-0-0

17 b5+ cb 18 0-0-0 0-0 19 gh h 5 !

Velimirović-Kovačević, Yugoslav Ch 1984.

17 ... f 6

Black is forced to part with the bishop since 17 ... f 6 loses to

18 f 5 d6 d 5 19 x g 7 + ! x g 7

20 h 5 + e 7 21 c 5 + x e 6

22 h 3 + 1-0, Williams-Cafferty, British Ch 1971.

18 gh 0-0 (110)

19 b5!

The alternatives are manageable:

a) 19 h3 f3! 20 x f 3 x f 3 21

x f 3 x f 3 22 x b 6 ab 23 e 7 f 7 !
90 Four Pawns Attack: Main Line

24 $d8$  $xc7$ 25 $xa8$ $xh3$ $\square$

b) 19 $g5$ $xf1$ 20 $xf1$ (20 e7 $xa2$+ 21 $xa2$ $c4+$ 22 $c3$

$xf1$ $\supset$ Kupreichik-Alburt, USSR Ch 1974) 20 ... $xf1+$ 21 $d1$

$c3+$ 22 $cl$ $e1+$ $\uparrow$.

c) 19 $e2$ $d5$! 20 $g5$ $e5$ 21 e7

$f7$ (21 ... $fe8$ is also good:
22 $xd5$ $xd5$ 23 $f5$ $e5+$ $\uparrow$
22 $f3$ $xa2$ 23 $xa2$?? $we2$ $\uparrow$

Bol-Diepstratten, corres 1979.
Palaty-Hlouskovi, CSSR Ch 1983,
saw 20 a3 $da2$+ 21 $xa2$ $xa2$ 22 $g1$ $d5$ 23 $g5$ $g6$ threatening...

$wb1+$.

19 ... $c5$!

Although Black has the material advantage, he must worry about the advanced e-pawn and the inactivity of his pieces. Other moves are unconvincing.

a) Hort gives 19 ... $c6$!? unclear, but this is refuted by Wall: 20 $g5$

$we5$ 21 e7 $f7$ (21 ... $fe8$ 22 $f5$

$h5$ 23 $xb4$ is not as bad as Wall implies, but it is still not very good for Black) 22 $f5$! $d5$ (22 ... $xf5$

$xf5$ 23 $d8$+ $f7$ 24 $xf5+$ $xf5$ 25 e8$w$ mate, or 22 ... $xf5$

23 $d8$+ $xd8$ 24 e8$w$+ $\pm$

23 $h6+$ $h8$ (23 ... $gh$ 24

$f6+$ $\pm$) 24 $xf7+$ $xf7$

25 $d8+$ $\pm$. 19 ... $c6$ is just bad.

b) 19 ... $f3$ 20 $xf3$ $xf3$ 21

$xf3$ $xf3$ 22 $xb6$ ab 23 $e7$ $\pm$

c) 19 ... $e6$ 20 $g5$ $e5$ 21 e7

$fe8$ 22 $f5$!! $h8$ (22 ... $h5$

$xb4$ $xf5$ 24 $d3$ $\pm$ Marjanovic-Rogulj, Yugoslavia 1975) 23 $e3$

$e6$ 24 $d4$ $f4+$ 25 $xf4$

$xf4$ 26 $xg7+$ $g8$ 27 $c5$ $\pm$

(McCambridge and Wall).

d) 19 ... $we5$ 20 $eh6$ (20 $g5$

transposes to the text after 20 ...

c5, and into the above variations

after 20 ... $c6$ or 20 ... $e6$. The

transposition may be White’s best

plan) 20 ... $c5$ (20 ... $h8$ 21

$xg7$+!! $xg7$ 22 $xg7+$ $g7$

23 $e7$ $c6$ 24 $f7+$ $xf8$ 25 $e6+$

$f7$ 26 $xc7$ $\pm$ – McCambridge

and Wall) 21 $g1$ cd (21 ... $g6$

leaves Black with a playable position – Analysis) 22 $xg7+$

$xg7$ 23 $xg7$ $f2$ 24 $d4+$ $g2$

25 $xh1$ $c6$! with a complicated

e ndgame.

20 $g5$ $we5$

20 ... $f3$ fails to 21 $xf3$ $xf3$

22 $xf3$ $xf3$ 23 $e7$.

21 $e7$ $cd$!

This is the best move. The knight is one of White’s most dangerous pieces, and must be eliminated immediately.
22 e5f1+ cxf8
23 cxdh1 (111)
sation for the piece – Analysis.

B12

11 cxb6 (112)

23 ... a5

After 23 ... dc White captures on b4 with advantage, according to McCambridge and Wall, but after 24 ... h6 Murei-Albur, Beersheva 1980, headed quickly towards the draw, although Black was always a bit better. Wall and McCambridge suggest 23 ...

\(\text{cc}8\) but completely ignore the text!

24 cwe4

This is better than 24 cwe2? cc7

25 cwe6+ ch8 26 cxd2 dc 27 cxc3 cd6 d or 25 cwe7 cxe7 26 cxe7 cc8+.

24 ... \(\text{dxa2}\)+

25 cde2 c1f2+

26 cdb3 cxb2+

27 cda3 cxb5

28 cxe5 cxe5

29 cxa2 cc4+

30 cbc3 b5

31 cec1 h6

Black has at least full compen-

Often mistakenly attributed to Velimirović, this move is not entirely harmless and has been rising in popularity.

11 ... ab

12 cd cb4

13 cdc4 cg6!

14 d6

14 cb5+ c6! 15 dc 0-0 16 cb cc5 + Kupper-Klundt, Kaufbeuren 1971.

14 ... cxd6!

Black should not get too greedy here: 14 ... ch4+ 15 g3 0-0 16 a3 c5 17 cf3 cc2+ 18 cf2 cg5 19 cd3 cxal 20 cxe6 c6 21 cxa1 led to a very sharp position in Murei-Kovačević, Hastings 1982-3.

Black can castle immediately, but the consequences are less clear: 14 ... 0-0 15 a3 cd 16 ab cxal 17 ca1 de 18 cf3 cb4 19 cd3, Chandler-Kengis, Jurmala 1983.

Black has the bishop pair and
three pawns for the piece.

15 ed 0-0!

16 dc Wc7

16 ... Wxd4 comes strongly into consideration.

17 a5 b5 Had8

Black has a good position,

Majeric-Rogulj, Yugoslavia 1981.

B2

10 ...

©b4 (113)

11 ©c1!

A great deal of theory has grown around 10 ©d4, but in our opinion 11 ©c1 is sufficient to secure an advantage for White and therefore dissuade Black from adopting the plan with 10 ... ©b4.

A summary of the theory is presented here:

11 ©d4 ©g6! 12 a3 c5 13 ©xe6!? (13 ab cd 14 Wxd4 §xb4
15 §e2 0-0 16 §f3 ©c8 is unclear)
13 ... fe 14 ab cb! 15 ©a4!? (15 ©b5
0-0 16 §xa7 §xa7 17 ©xa7 ed 18
cd ©xd5 19 ©c4 ©f7 20 ©f2 Wc7
21 Wd4 ©f4 =) 15 ... 0-0! (15 ...
©d7 16 Wd4! ©a5 17 d6 ©d8 18
c5 b5! 19 b3! 0-0! 20 ©b6 Wxa1+
21 Wxa1 ab 22 Wb2! ©xe5 23
Wxe5 ©f6 24 Wxe6+! ©h8 25 c6
©ae8 26 Wxe8! ©xe8 27 ©f2 ++ –
Weinstein) 16 ©xb6 ab 17 ©xa8
Wxa8 18 d6 ©d8 19 ©e2 b3! 20
©f1+! ©a5+ 21 ©d2 Wxe5 22
Wxf8 ©xf8 23 ©f4 ©a5 24 d7 ©c4
25 ©d6+! ©f7 26 ©b4! ©e5 27
©e3 ©f5 28 ©xb3 ©xg2. This
unclear position is "state of the art". In any event, White should
stick to 11 ©c1, and Black should
avoid the whole mess by playing
10 ... ed.

11 ...

ed

11 ... f6 is not really playable:
see Illustrative Game De Witt-
Nijboer in Chapter 1.

12 a3

Not 12 ©xb6 ab 13 cd ©xa2 14
©xa2 ©xa2 15 Wb3 ©a5 with a
winning game for Black in Chandler-
Jordan, Tjentiste 1975.

12 ...

©c5

An interesting alternative is
12 ... ©xc4. Kostro-Hlousek,
Luhacovics 1971, saw Black
equalise after 13 ©xc4 dc 14 ab
Wxdl+ 15 ©xd1 ©xb4 16-0 ©d3
17 ©f1 0-0 18 ©f2 ©fe8 19 ©d4
c6, but 17 ©f2 might be better –
Analysis.

13 ab d4

14 ©xd4

Not 14 bc dc! 15 cb cb with a
winning game for Black.

14 ...

dc
to win quickly in Konikowski-Schultz, Poland 1972: 21 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}e2 g6}
22 0-0 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}g7} 23 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xf7++! \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xf7 24
\textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}e6+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}h6 25 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}d7 ++

15 ... \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xb4
16 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}e5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}d5
17 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}b5+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}d7
18 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xd7+!

After 18 0-0 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xc3 19 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xd7+
\textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xd7 20 bc 0-0-0 21 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}g5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}h8 22
\textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xh7 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}h8 23 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}g5 we transpose
below.

18 ... \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xd7
19 0-0 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xc3
20 bc \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}h8 0-0-0
21 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}g5

Another good move is 15 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xd4
\textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}b8 16 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}e2 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}g6 (16 ... \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}e6!?!) 17
c5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}d7 18 e6 (18 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}d5!? \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}g5 19

White has clear advantage, e.g.
21 ... \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}h8 22 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}f7!
20 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}f8 20 ef \textit{\textbf{\texttt{Q}}}xf7? allowed Black
14 Exchange Variation: 5 ed ed

1 e4 \textcopyright{f6} \textcopyright{g4} 14 \textcopyright{b5} a4 = Kubbel-Model, 1928.
2 e5 \textcopyright{d5}
3 d4 d6 b) 6 \textcopyright{d3} \textcopyright{c6} 7 \textcopyright{ge2} \textcopyright{g4} is perfectly playable for Black.
4 e4 \textcopyright{b6} c) 6 \textcopyright{e2} c6! or 6 ... \textcopyright{c6} 7 \textcopyright{f3} \textcopyright{g4} give Black a good game.
5 ed ed (115)

This is a less ambitious system than 5 ... cd (Chapter 15). Black accepts a cramped and passive position, and allows White to maintain his spatial advantage. Nevertheless, it is a safe line.
A 6 \textcopyright{c3}
B 6 \textcopyright{e3}
C 6 d5
D 6 \textcopyright{f3}

a) 6 b3 \textcopyright{e7} 7 b2 0-0 8 \textcopyright{e2} \textcopyright{f6} 9 \textcopyright{f3} \textcopyright{c6} 10 0-0 \textcopyright{f5} (10 ... \textcopyright{g4} is worth considering) 11 \textcopyright{d2} \textcopyright{e8} 12 \textcopyright{c3} a5 13 a3?! (13 d5!) 13 ...

A1 6 ... \textcopyright{c3}
6 ... \textcopyright{e7}
A2 6 ... g6 A1 7 h3

This prevents ... \textcopyright{g4} and thereby limits the mobility of Black's pieces. It is strange that this move is not even mentioned by some authors. Since this variation is often reached by other move orders such as 4 \textcopyright{f3} \textcopyright{g4} 5 \textcopyright{e2} \textcopyright{c6} 6 c4 \textcopyright{b6} 7 ed ed, Black should be aware of the alternative lines:
a) 7 \textcopyright{f3} 0-0 (7 ... \textcopyright{g4}!?) 8 \textcopyright{e2} \textcopyright{g4} 9 b3 \textcopyright{c6} 10 \textcopyright{e3} \textcopyright{f6} 11 0-0 d5! =.
b) 7 \textcopyright{d3} \textcopyright{c6} 8 \textcopyright{e3} (8 \textcopyright{ge2} 0-0 9 h3 \textcopyright{f6} 10 \textcopyright{b1} g6 11 b3, Znosko-Borovsky-Ratner, 1925,
11 ... d5 12 c5 GLuint7 13 GLuintxd5 GLuintxc5 and Black is fine; another good line is 8 ... 8f6! 9 8ge2 0-0 10 0-0 (10 a3 d5! 11 cd 8xd5 12 8xd5 8xd5 13 0-0 8g4 = Zinn-Kupreichik, Minsk 1968) 10 ... 8g4 11 f3 8h5 12 b3 8e8 13 8d2 8g6 14 8ael d5 15 c5 8c8 16 8f4, Ilyin Zhenevsky-Rabinovich, USSR Ch 1937.

Black has almost equalised, e.g.
16 ... 8xd3 17 8xd3 8b4 18 8d2 8xe3 19 8we3 8c2.

c) 7 8e2 0-0 8 8f3 8c6 9 0-0 (9 b3 can be met by 9 ... 8e8 10 0-0 8f6 11 8e3 8f5 and now 12 8d2 h6 13 h3 d5 or 12 a3 a5!? 13 8c1 a4) 9 ... 8f6 10 h3 8e8 11 b3 8f5 12 8e3 h6 with an equal game, e.g.
13 8d2 8h7! 14 8h2 8g5 15 8f4 8h4 16 8f3 8e7!, Bouljovic-Vukić, Yugoslav Ch 1975. A more consistent approach for Black is 8 ... 8g4, e.g. 9 0-0 (9 b3 c5 10 8c3 8c6 11 8c1 f5 12 dc dc = Minc-Smyslov, Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970) 9 8c6 10 b3 8f6 11 8e3 d5 12 c5 8c8 13 h3! 8e6 14 8d2 and now 14 ... g6 is probably best, since 14 ... h6 ran into a strong new plan in Walter-Niedermeyer, corre 1983: 15 b4! a6 16 b5 ab 17 8xb5 with some advantage to White.

d) 7 8e3 0-0 8 8ge2 8c6 9 8f4 8f6 10 8e2 8e7 11 g4!? 8g6 12 8xg6 hg = Vatnikov-Gik, USSR 1968.

The game is rather fluid in these lines, and many transpositions can take place in the early part of the game.

7 ... 0-0

8 8f3 (116)

8 ... 8f6

Black can also play 8 ... 8c6

9 8e2 8f5 10 0-0 h6 11 b3 8f6 12 8e3, Matanović-Buljovic, Yugoslavia 1969. We prefer 10 ...

8f6! 11 8f4 8e8 12 b3 8e4!, Ostojić-Schmid, Monte Carlo 1969.

9 8e2 8e8

10 0-0 8c6

11 8f4 8f5

The chances are equal, Matanović-Hort, Palma de Mallorca 1969.

A2

6 ... g6

This line looks safe for Black.

7 8f3! 8g4

On the immediate 7 ... 8g7 White gets a clear advantage with 8 8g5 f6 9 8e3 0-0 10 c5!, e.g.

10 ... dc 11 dc 8d7 12 8d5+ 8h8 13 0-0-0 8c6 14 h4! ± Rauzer-Masel, Leningrad 1936.
96 Exchange Variation: 5 ed ed

8  h3
  Black has no problems after
  8  a4 e2 a4 g7 9  c3 (9  g5 w8 d7 =)
  9  0-0 10 0-0  a6 11  b3  a7 12

8  h3  a4xf3 13  a4xf3 c6!, intending
  a6f5. On 14 g4 Black plays 14 ...
  f5!, while 14  a4 g4 is met by 14  h5!

15  ...
  f4
  Black seems to be rolling along,
  but White can play 17 h5!  a4xf4 18

  16  a4xf4  dc

11  0-0-0  0-0
  Otherwise White will have a

16  ...
  f4
  much better game.

10  a4 e3  a4 g7

12  h4  f5 (117)

13  c5!
  On 13 g4?? White gets into
  trouble: 13  f4! 14  g5  a4f6
  intending  a4 h6.

13  ...
  a4d7
  Black must avoid both 13 ...
  dc 14 dc  a4d7 15  a4d5+  a4f7 16  a4c4
  and 13  f4 14  a4xf4  a4xd4 15
  a4xd4 intending 16 cb.

14  a4c4+  a4h8

15  a4d5
  15 h5! comes into consideration,
  and it is not clear that Black has an
  adequate defence.

6  a4 e3  a4 e7

7  a4d3
  Black equalises easily against
  7  a4 e2: 7  a4f5 8  a4c3  a4d7 9  a4f3
  0-0 10  b3  a4f6 11 0-0  a4e8,
  Maroczy-Tartakower, 1924.

  7  ...
  a4d7?!
  Black should simply castle, and
  answer 8  a4ge2 with 8  a4c6.

7  a4e2
  Unfortunately, we have no practical
  examples of this approach. There
  aren't any significant differences
  between this line and the lines with
  6  a4c3, unless White chooses to
  develop his knight on b1 at d2, but
  that hardly seems an improvement
  over the usual deployment at c3.
  Black can just continue with his
  normal plan of  a4g4-h5-g6, a4e8,
  and so on, equalising without
difficulty.

8  a4ge2

8  a4c3 is an interesting alternative,
  e.g. 8 0-0-0  a4c2?!  a4f6 10  a4ge2
  a4e8 11 0-0-0  a4bd7 12 h3 a4f3
  (Levenfish-Réti, Moscow 1925)
13 d5! ±.
8 ...  $\mathcal{Q}$f6
9 h3 0-0
10 $\mathcal{Q}$d2

10 $\mathcal{Q}$c3 transposes to lines with 10 $\mathcal{Q}$c3.
10 ... $\mathcal{Q}$e8
11 $\mathcal{Q}$c2

11 g4 is an interesting alternative.
11 ... $\mathcal{Q}$bd7

12 g4

White could obtain a small advantage after 12 0-0.

By avoiding the natural developing schemes (7 ... 0-0!) Black has got himself into considerable difficulty. After 12 ... $\mathcal{Q}$f8 (Wolf-Gründfeld, 1922) 13 d5! gives White an overwhelming position.

6 d5!? (118)

6 ... $\mathcal{Q}$f5

This is considered to be the surest method of obtaining equality.
Black might also consider 6 ...
$\mathcal{Q}$d7 intending $\mathcal{Q}$d7-e5. We prefer the simple kingside-developing move 6 ... $\mathcal{Q}$e7, followed by castling.

7 $\mathcal{Q}$f3 $\mathcal{Q}$bd7
8 $\mathcal{Q}$c3 $\mathcal{Q}$g4

Black has no problems: Tarrasch-Vukovich, Teplice 1922. Black might also wish to try the more natural 8 ... $\mathcal{Q}$e7.

D

6 $\mathcal{Q}$f3 $\mathcal{Q}$g4

Contrary to some authorities, Black can play 6 ... $\mathcal{Q}$c6 since 7 $\mathcal{Q}$g5 can be met by 7 ...

7 ... $\mathcal{Q}$e7

7 ... $\mathcal{Q}$e7+ is not quite as good.

8 $\mathcal{Q}$b2 $\mathcal{Q}$f6

Black has a comfortable position.
15 Exchange Variation: 5 ed cd

1 e4 e5 2 d4 c6 3 c4 d6 4 f6 d5 would be inappropriate here, as Black can play 6 ... e5 or 6 ... e6 with a good game, e.g. 7 de xe6 8 b3 d5!

6 g5 g6 7 d2 h6! 8 c3 g7 9 c3 f5 10 h3 g5! gives Black a very good game, Buljovčić-Ivkov, Yugoslavia 1965.

After 6 d3, Black can choose between 6 ... c6 7 c2 g6 8 d2 g7 9 c3 0-0 10 0-0 e5! = Werner-Schmid, Germany 1956 and 6 ... e5!? 7 c2 c6 8 d5 b4 9 bc3 f5 10 b1 a5 11 0-0 e7 12 f4 0-0 with an unclear position in Sigurjonsson-Hort, Hastings 1974-5.

A 6 e3 f5! (120)

The positions which arise in this variation hold more tension than those of the previous chapter. The unbalanced pawn structure gives White chances to develop a queenside initiative involving c4-c5, after Black plays ... d5. After 6 f3 g6 the game transposes to the Modern Variation (Chapter 6), but there are a number of alternatives which must be considered:

A 6 e3
B 6 c3
6 ... g6 is also playable. Don’t be fooled by all of those references to 7 d5?! because Black can get a good game by playing 7 ... g7 8 d4 xd4 9 wxd4 0-0 10 c3 e5!, Suttles-Fischer, Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970. A better move is 7 wd2! and now Black can play 7 ... g7 8 h6 f6!? 9 c3 c6 10 d5 c5 11 e4 xc4 12 xc4 xc4 13 we2 wa5+ 14 f1 xb2 15 b1 xa2 with a decent game for Black. Black might also play for straightforward development with 8 ... 0-0, e.g. 9 xg7 xg7 10 f3 e5.

7 c3

Black has no problems after 7 e2 d5!, e.g. 8 b3 dc 9 bc e5! or 8 g3 xb1! 9 xb1 dc 10 xc4 xc4 11 wa4+ d7 12 xc4 b6, Walter-Schmid, Germany 1959. On 7 d5, 7 ... e6 is a good answer.

7 ... e6
8 f3 e7
9 e2 0-0
10 0-0 a6

Black has a good game. Hartston-Schmid, 1974, continued 11 wb3 wb8 12 f4 c7 13 ac1 d8 14 h3 h6! =.
10 ... d5 is also playable.

B

6 c3 g6

Black’s Dragon-type pawn structure is very appropriate here. He can develop comfortably and put considerable pressure on the white centre.

B1 7 h4?!
B2 7 e3

7 h3 g7 8 f3 0-0 9 e2 c6 10 0-0 e5 transposes to the Modern Variation, Chapter 6.

B1 7 h4?!

This is a forcing variation which must be handled carefully.

7 ... h5!

8 e3

After 8 d3 g7 9 ge2 c6 10 e3 0-0 many sources quote Polak-Pribyl, Hradec Kralove 1973, which continued 11 a3 d5! =. 11 wd2! is a much stronger move, according to Hort, but Black can equalise with 11 ... b4, exchanging one of White’s bishops.

8 g5 g7 9 c1 c6 10 d5 ec5 11 b3 0-0 leaves Black with a very comfortable game, Bellon-Palatnik, Teesside 1974.

A recent innovation is 8 wb3, but it doesn’t seem to be dangerous:
Exchange Variation: 5 ed cd

8 ... Ag7 9 Qf3 (Waddingham-Hennigan, Lloyds Bank 1983) and now 9 ... 0-0 intending ... a6 and ... Ag4.

8 ... Ag7
9  c5!? 
After 9 wb3 Qc6 10 Ad1 0-0 11 Ae2 e5 12 Af3 ed 13 Qxd4 We7 White had nothing in Kurajica-Hecht, Wijk aan Zee II 1973.

Black can try to exploit the lack of protection of the pawn on c4 by bringing the rook to c8 and his knight to a5: Since White has already played h4 the thrust d5 is not dangerous. After ... Ae5 the g4 square will be available against any attempts by White to chase the knight with the f-pawn.

9 ... dc
10 dc Qxc3+?!

9 Qf3 transposes to the Modern Variation. The point behind 9 Ag2 is that now White can meet ... Ag4 with f3.

9 ... Qc6
10 0-0
10 b3 d5! 11 c5 Qd7 12 Qb5 (12 Qxd5 is not on because of Qxc5!) 12 ... e5! 13 0-0 Qxc5 14 de d4! gave Black a better than equal game in Minić-Fischer, Palma de Mallorca 1970.

10 ... e6
10 ... Ag4!? is a reasonable alternative. After 11 h3 Ag2 12 Qxe2 Black can claim full
equality, so White must try 12 
\( \text{Qxe2} \). In Dur-Tomaszewski, Graz 
(World Junior) 1978, Black played 
12 ... \( \text{Qb4} \) 13 b3 \( \text{Qxd3} \) 14 \( \text{Qxd3 a5} \) 
and stood worse after 15 \( \text{Qc3 d5} \) 
16 c5. He could have limited the 
damage with 14 ... \( \text{Qd7} \), but 
12 ...d5 13 c5 \( \text{Qc4} \) seems a better 
approach, as Black will have 
possible plans involving ... e5, ... 
b6, or ... \( \text{Qxe3} \). White will have to 
spend time preparing b4. Another 
approach is 11 f3 \( \text{f5!} \) (exploiting 
the unprotected \( \text{Qe3} \) 12 b3 \( \text{Qxd3} \) 
13 \( \text{Qxd3 e6!} \), Minić-Gipslis, Erevan 
1971. Black can also safely play 
13 ... d5 14 c5 \( \text{Qc8} \) 15 \( \text{Qab1 e6} \) 16 
\( \text{b4 Qe7} \) 17 \( \text{Qf2 Qf5} \), as in Ivell-
Raynes, British Ch 1983. 
Black can also go after the 
bishop pair with 10 ... \( \text{Qb4} \). 
11 b3 \( \text{d7} \) 
In Minić-Planinc, Yugoslavia 
1970, Black outplayed his opponent 
in a complex middlegame after 
15 \( \text{Qad1 b6!} \). White should play 
15 b4, which gives him a small 
advantage, largely due to the 
misplaced bishop on d7. Therefore 
we prefer 10 ... \( \text{Qg4} \).
16 Hunt Variation: 5 \( \text{c}4 \)

1 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \)  
2 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \)  
3 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \)  
4 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \)  
5 \( \text{c}4 \) (125)

In the Hunt Variation White chooses to avoid setting up a broad pawn centre, but prefers to chase the wayward knight all over the board, simultaneously developing his pieces on good squares. The chief drawback of the system lies in the weakness of the advanced pawn structure.

5 ... \( \text{e}6 \)

5 ... \( \text{c}6 \) is not as bad as its reputation. White achieves nothing after 6 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \)! so 6 \( \text{f}2 \) seems best. Now it's dangerous for Black to go pawn-grabbing with 6 ... \( \text{b}6 \) 7 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{x}c3 \) 8 \( \text{d}c \) \( \text{b}c \) 9 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 10 \( \text{g}5 \) f5 as Illustrative Game Shirazi-Alburt, Lone Pine 1981 (see Chapter 1). Also dangerous is 6 ... \( \text{a}5 \) 7 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 8 \( \text{d}4 \)! , a line employed by Makarychev. We recommend 6 ... \( \text{e}6 \) 7 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) as Black's best option.

Here White has three choices:

A 6 \( \text{c}3 \)
B 6 \( \text{g}4 \)
C 6 \( \text{d}4 \)

A 6 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{x}c3 \)

6 ... \( \text{c}6 \) has been criticised because of 7 \( \text{e}4 ! \) but Szabolcsi-Knežević, Elekes Memorial 1982, saw 7 ... \( \text{b}6 \) 8 \( \text{d}6+ \text{x}d6 \) 9 \( \text{c}d0-0 \) 10 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) and White stands only slightly better.

Another plausible line is 6 ... \( \text{d}6 \) 7 \( \text{x}d5 \) (7 \( \text{cd} \) \( \text{cd} \) 8 \( \text{ed} \) \( \text{xc}3 \) 9 \( \text{dc} \) \( \text{xd}6 \) is fine for Black) 7 ... \( \text{ed} \) 8 \( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 9 \( \text{xf}7+ \) \( \text{xf}7 \) 10 \( \text{cd} \) \( \text{e}8 \) (10 ... \( \text{a}5 \) 11 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 12 0-0 \( \text{d}5 \) 13 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \pm \) Paust-Willner, 1981. Also inadequate for equality is 10 ... \( \text{g}6 ? ! \) 11 \( \text{b}3+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 12 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \pm \) Skepladze-Hanmuradova, Ash-
khabad 1983) 11 \( \text{f3}^+ \text{g8} \) 12 \( \text{e3 e6} \) 13 \( \text{e2 d7} \) 14 0-0 with roughly level chances in Vasyukov-Spassky, USSR Ch 1959 or 11 \( \text{e2 c5} \) 12 \( \text{f3 e6} \)? with an unclear position.

7 \( \text{dc} \)

The open file is more important than the pawn centre. After 7 \( \text{bc} \) \( \text{d6} \)! Black had no problems in Sergeant-Tartakower, Hastings 1945-6.

7 \( \text{... c6} \) (126)

If Black recaptures on c5, then White will pressure the kingside with \( \text{g4} \). There are, however, a couple of interesting alternatives which are not much worse than the text:

a) 7 \( \text{... b6} \) 8 \( \text{cb} \) \( \text{ab} \) 9 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{a6} \) 10 \( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{xa6} \) 11 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c5} \) 12 0-0 \( \text{w8} \) (12 ... \( \text{a4} \)? might be worth a try) 13 \( \text{e3 w6} \) 14 \( \text{xc5} \)! bc 15 b3 \( \text{d5} \) 16 \( \text{ed} \) \( \text{cd} \) 17 \( \text{fe1} \pm \) Paoli-Martz, Norristown 1973.

b) 7 \( \text{... w4} \) is not as bad as Hort suggests it is: 8 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 9 g3 (9 \( \text{h3} \)? f6 10 b4 \( \text{b6} \) 11 a4 a6 12 a5 \( \text{a7} \) 13 b5 f5 14 b6 cb 15 \( \text{g5} \) h6 16 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e4} \) and Black stands better, Ivanov-Alburt, Lone Pine 1981. Hort suggests 9 \( \text{f3} \)? intending \( \text{f4} \) and 0-0-0 \( \pm \) 9 ... \( \text{we7} \) 10 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{f8} \) 11 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 12 b4 (Povah-Eales, England 1978) 12 ... \( \text{e7} \)? Still, White has more than enough compensation for his pawn.

c) 7 ... \( \text{d6} \) 8 \( \text{cd} \) \( \text{cd} \) 9 \( \text{f3} \) (9 ed allows Black to obtain a satisfactory game with 9 ... \( \text{xd6} \) but 9 \( \text{f4} \)? deserves attention) 9 ... \( \text{c7} \) 10 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c6} \) 11 \( \text{f4} \) gives White a clear advantage. Chavez-Wheeler, Caracas 1976, saw instead 11 ed \( \text{xd6} \) 12 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{d7} \) 13 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e5} \) 14 \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) with equality.

8 \( \text{f4} \)

8 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xc5} \)! and 8 \( \text{f4} \)? \( \text{xe5} \) are both unpleasant for White.

8 \( \text{... xc5}! \)

This line is the one which holds the most promise for Black. Great complications ensue and a single innovation can change the evaluation of the variation overnight. The positions are very sharp and the player of the black side who has studied the theory and is experienced in its play will be able to marshalling great resources.

9 \( \text{g4}! \)

9 \( \text{h5} \) g6 only aids Black in his defence: 10 \( \text{f3} \) (10 \( \text{g4} \) h5; 10 \( \text{h3} \) g5 11 \( \text{g3} \) h5!; 10 \( \text{h6} \)
Hunt Variation: 5 \textit{\&c4}

\[ \text{\&f8 11 \&h3 g5!} 10 \ldots g5! 11 \textit{\&g3} \]

\[ \text{h5 12 h4 gh 13 \&xh4 \&xe5!} 14 \]

\[ \text{\&e4} \]

with a decisive edge for Black, or 13 \&xh4? \&xe5!

9 \ldots \textit{\&g5}

Also worthy of consideration is 9 \ldots \textit{\&f8} 10 \&f3 \&e7 11 0-0 \textit{\&b6} 12 \textit{\&b4} \&b7 13 \&fe1 \textit{\&h6} with an unclear position in Jankov-Popov, Sofia 1971.

10 \&xe5!

White should not capture with the queen: 10 \&xg5?! (10 \textit{\&g3} \textit{\&h5} intending to advance to h4) 10 ... \textit{\&xg5} 11 \textit{\&xg5 and with the queens safely off the board Black can play 11 ... \&xe5! 12 \textit{\&f6} \&xf2+! 13 \textit{\&e2} (13 \textit{\&xf2} is met by \textit{\&g4+}, winning) 13 ... \textit{\&xc4} 14 \textit{\&xh8} \textit{\&xg1} 15 \textit{\&hxg1} \textit{\&xb2}, Domino-Delander, Berlin 1952.

No better is 12 \textit{\&e2} \textit{\&g8} 13 \textit{\&f4} d6 14 \textit{\&xe5} de 15 \textit{\&d5} \textit{\&d7} 16 \textit{\&f3} 0-0-0 with a much better game for Black, Hewson-Cafferty, England 1965.

10 \ldots \textit{\&g8}

10 ... \&xe5 loses to 11 \&h5.

11 \&h3

The exchange of queens allows Black to equalise, but only if he plays very carefully: 11 \&xd8 \textit{\&xg4} 12 \textit{\&e2} \textit{\&xg2} 13 \textit{\&xc7} \textit{\&b6!} 14 \&h3 (14 \&b4 \&xf2 15 \&f1 \&xg1+ 16 \&xf2 \&g6 leads to an unclear position with chances for both sides, Trapl-Neckar, Hradec Kralove 1972) 14 ... \&b7 15 \&f3

\[ \text{\&g8} 16 0-0-0 \textit{\&c8} 17 \textit{\&d6} \textit{\&xd6} 18 \textit{\&a5} \textit{\&h6} 19 \textit{\&xg1} \textit{\&xg1} \]

12 \textit{\&f8! 21 \&g5 \&g7!} 22 \textit{\&b4} \&xf3 23 \textit{\&b1} \&f6!, Lees-Ripley, British Ch 1971.

On 12 \textit{\&xe7} \textit{\&xg4} 13 \textit{\&xd8} Black can obtain a satisfactory game with 13 ... \textit{\&xc4} 14 \textit{\&xc7} \textit{\&xe5}.

12 \ldots \&xe5

13 \&f6 \&xg5

14 \&h5 \&g7

Black might try interpolating 14 ... \textit{\&h6}. 14 ... \&b5 is playing on the wrong side of the board, however, and is punished by 15 \textit{\&xh7} \&f8 16 \&d3! \&b7 17 0-0 when White will be able to get his bishop to the e4 square.

15 0-0 (127)

This is the critical position.

After 15 ... \textit{\&h6} 16 \&d3! \&e7 17
\[ \text{\textit{Hunt Variation: 5 } \textit{c4} \textit{105}} \]

\[ \text{\textit{df3}! White had the better chances in Sokolov-Kuuksmaa, USSR 1977.} \]

We recommend a different plan for Black:

\begin{align*}
15 & \text{... } \text{we7!}^+ \\
16 & \text{\textit{df3}} \\
\end{align*}

Black also obtains a good game on 16 \textit{d3} b6 17 \textit{e4} c6 18 \textit{dxh7} \textit{a6} 19 \textit{f6e1} 0-0-0 20 \textit{e4} f5! 16 \text{... } b6 17 \text{\textit{gg3}} h6

Black can be pleased with his game. Analysis by Hort continues Black stands better, Radojevic-Hlousek, Hradec Kralove 1973-4.

\begin{align*}
18 & \text{\textit{gf2}} \textit{wc5} 19 \textit{we2} d6 20 \textit{ed cd} \\
21 & \textit{d1} \textit{b7}^+ \\
\end{align*}

With this move White puts immediate pressure on the black kingside. Nevertheless, given White's lack of development he cannot expect any advantage from this rash action.

\begin{align*}
6 & \text{... } d6 \\
\text{Also good is } 6 \text{... } f5 7 \textit{g3} a4 8 \textit{a3} b6 9 d4 \textit{a6}, Johansson-Pettersson, corres 1943. \\
\end{align*}

This is the most the most common move. Now 6 ... d6 7 cd cd transposes to the Alapin-Sveshnikov Variation of the Sicilian Defence. Black can, however, keep to the Alekhine path with a different attack on the centre:

\begin{align*}
6 & \text{... } b6 \\
7 & \textit{cb} \\
\end{align*}

7 \textit{xd5} parts with a valuable bishop for no apparent reason,
106 Hunt Variation: 5  

and after 7 ... ed 8 cb ab 9  

Black can be satisfied with his game.

7 ... ab

7 ... cb has also been tried in conjunction with an interesting pawn sacrifice: 8  

With a complicated middle-game, White has some threats on the kingside and more space but Black's pawn structure is much better, Pedersen-Hansen, Esbjerg 1981.

8  

position, Nun-Hausner, Czechoslovak Ch 1980. In return for just one pawn Black has comfortable development, a healthy pawn structure and a useful c-file.

White, on the other hand, has a wretched pawn structure and must find a safe haven for his king.


8 ... a6

8 ... e7 9 0-0 0-0 (9 ... a6 10  

Black has a fully equal game, Gonzales Mesters-Marović, Spain 1977.

9  

On b3 Black obviously avoids strengthening White's centre with 9 ... xc4?, but plays 9 ... b4+!

10  


9 ... b4+

Also adequate is 9 ... a6

10 0-0 e7 = Machulsky-Gurgenidze, USSR 1973.

10  

11 bxd2 a6

11  

Chekhov-
17 Hunt Variation: 5 \( \text{c3} \)

White can also play 5 d4, but Black has nothing to fear after 5 ... b6 or 5 ... d6 6 cd ed 7 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 8 \( \text{c3} \) (Sveshnikov-Shamkovich, Hastings 1977-8) 8 ... de 9 \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{e6} \) 10 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{d7} \) =, or 7 ... de 8 \( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{b4+} \) 9 \( \text{d2} \) 0-0 = Szeles-Knežević, Kesztely 1981.

5 ... \( \text{c6} \)

In the opinion of the authors, this is Black's best reply. Black should not part with his outpost so early in the game: 5 ... \( \text{xc3} \) 6 dc! d6 7 cd ed 8 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 9 \( \text{f4} \! 

puts Black under considerable pressure, Krogius-A. Zaitsev, USSR 1971, continued 9 ... de 10 \( \text{xe5} \) 0-0 11 \( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 12 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 13 0-0-0 \( \text{d7} \) 14 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 15 \( \text{b3} \), and now Black could have limited the damage with 15 ... \( \text{c8} \), but White is still clearly better after 16 \( \text{h6} \).

A great deal of theory has been built up around 5 ... e6, and this is Black's playable alternative. 6 \( \text{c4} \) transposes to material considered under the move order 5 \( \text{c4} \). Other tries:

a) 6 d4 d6 7 cd cd 8 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) leads to a solid variation of the Sicilian Defence.

b) 6 \( \text{g4} \) h5! 7 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{xc3} \) brings Black equality after 8 ... d6 no matter how White recaptures.

c) 6 \( \text{xd5} \) ed 7 d4 d6 8 cd cd 9 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 10 \( \text{e2} \) (best here, to avoid the pin with 10 ... \( \text{g4} \) 10 ... de! 11 de (11 \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{b4+} \) 12 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{b6} \) = Voskanin-Schmit, USSR 1975) 11 ... \( \text{b4+} \) 12 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{a5} \) = Siaperas-Flatov, Lugano Ol 1968.

6 \( \text{c4} \)

White can continue his develop-
ment with 6  \( \Box f3 \), but after 6 ... d6 matters come to a head in the centre: 7  \( \Box x d5 \) cd 8 cd ed and now Black has a good game, e.g. 9  \( W b3 \) \( \Box c6! \) 10  \( \Box b5 \)  \( \Box e7 \) 11  \( W x d5 \) 0-0, Sikora-Alburt, Decin 1977, or 9 d4  \( \Box c6 \) 10  \( \Box e2 \) with equality, Sikora-Ghinda, Warsaw Z 1979.

6 ... d6 12 b3 d5 13  \( \Box e2 \)  \( \Box d7 \) 14 f4, although Black is no worse. This is better than 8 cd  \( \Box x e5 \) 9  \( \Box x d5 \) cd 10  \( \Box x d5 \) e6 with a better game for Black. Bagirov's 10 ...  \( W d6 \) is also good.

7 ... ed 8  \( \Box f3 \) 8  \( W b3 \) led to an equal game in Platonov-Knežević, Kiev 1978:

7 cd 8 ...  \( \Box e7 \) 8 de 9  \( \Box x d5 \) cd 10  \( \Box x d5 \)  \( W c7 \), Not 8 ...  \( \Box g4?! \) 9  \( \Box x d5 \)! cd 10  \( \Box x d5 \) and the pawn on b7 is loose.

7  \( W b3 \) leads to complicated positions, but Black's chances are no worse after either 7 ... de 8  \( \Box x d5 \) cd 9  \( \Box x d5 \) e6 10  \( \Box x b7 \)  \( \Box x b7 \)  \( W x b7 \)  \( W d5 \)!, Sveshnikov-Palatnik, USSR 1974, or 7 ...  \( \Box d7?! \) 8  \( \Box x d5 \)  \( \Box x c5 \) 9  \( \Box c7+ \)  \( \Box d7 \) 10  \( W e3 \)  \( \Box x c7 \) 11 d4  \( \Box e6 \)!, which led to unclear positions in Kislova-Levitina, Italy 1972:

7 ...  \( \Box f3 \) 8  \( \Box b3 \) 0-0 11 d4  \( \Box a6 \) 12  \( \Box f4 \).

If White tries to build a strong pawn centre with 10 bc and later d4, Black will be able to strike quickly with ... c5 and queenside expansion.

10 ... 0-0

The game is level.
18 Miscellaneous 4th moves for White

1 e4 d6
2 e5 d5
3 d4 d6 (131)

Kuznetsov, USSR 1968.

a) 3 ... d6 shunts in the bishop on c8, and after 4 c4 d6 5 f4 White has a favourable version of the Four Pawns Attack.

White has a number of alternatives after 3 ... d6, only the first two of which are seen these days:

A 4 c4
B 4 f4
C 4 ed
D 4 g5
E 4 e2

A

4 c4

This straightforward developing and attacking move makes some sense, in that it places pressure on the f7 square. But unless White is able to get the attack rolling, c4 will prove a waste of time, as the bishop will be threatened by d6 and will have to retreat. Thus far Black seems to be able to hold his own without too much difficulty, but Black should be well versed in the theory as this is becoming a popular way of avoiding the main
lines.

4 ...  

Simplest and best.

5  

Back in 1975, Leonard Pickett enthusiastically recommended 5 e6, devoting 5 pages to its analysis. Unfortunately, Ray Keene provided an effective refutation. After 5 ...  

What's wrong with Black's game? Nothing, as far as we can tell. The pawn on d4 is a sitting duck and White will have to develop his king's knight on an awkward square. Meanwhile Black can develop comfortably. Praxis has borne out the promising nature of Black's plan, as in the two known examples Black has obtained an equal game without much effort:

a) 7  

Arnason-Alburt, Lone Pine 1980. On 10  Black can play 10 ...  

b) 7  


5  

The most natural and correct move, and it was first suggested by Lev Alburt. Why enter into the messy complications following 5 ... de?  

5  

This is the move which must have inhibited players of the black side. White attacks both the bishop on f5 and the pawn on b7, forcing Black's reply. Other moves lead to the French Defence.

6  

What's wrong with Black's game? Nothing, as far as we can tell. The pawn on d4 is a sitting duck and White will have to develop his king's knight on an awkward square. Meanwhile Black can develop comfortably. Praxis has borne out the promising nature of Black's plan, as in the two known examples Black has obtained an equal game without much effort:

a) 7  

Arnason-Alburt, Lone Pine 1980. On 10  Black can play 10 ...  

b) 7  


B  

White hopes to bamboozle Black into an inferior line of the Four Pawns Attack by holding back c4. But Black has resources, too!  

4 ...  

de
4 ... \( \text{\textDelta} f5 \) also gives Black equal chances.

5 \( \text{\textDelta} e \)

5 de \( \text{\textDelta} f5! \) 6 c4 \( \text{\textDelta} b4 \) 7 \( \text{\textOmega} x d8+ \) \( \text{\textOmega} x d8 \) 8 \( \text{\textDelta} a3 \) e6 gives Black a definite advantage in development and complete control of the initiative.

5 ... e5! (134)

Bagirov recommends 5 ... \( \text{\textDelta} c6 \)

6 c3 \( \text{\textDelta} f5 \) here. Later Black will castle long and play ... f6 with a good game.

This is good enough to earn Black instant equality.

6 \( \text{\textDelta} f3 \)

6 c4 \( \text{\textDelta} b4 \) 7 d5 (7 a3 \( \text{\textDelta} c6 \)) 7 ... \( \text{\textDelta} f5 \) puts great pressure on the c2 square.

6 ... cd

7 \( \text{\textOmega} x d4 \) \( \text{\textDelta} c6! \)

Larics-Letelier saw instead 7 ... e6? 8 \( \text{\textDelta} c3 \) \( \text{\textDelta} b4 \) 9 \( \text{\textDelta} d2 \) \( \text{\textDelta} x c3? \) 10 bc 0-0 11 \( \text{\textDelta} d3 \) with a big edge for White.

8 \( \text{\textOmega} e4 \)

8 \( \text{\textDelta} b5? \) \( \text{\textOmega} a5+! \) 9 \( \text{\textDelta} c3 \) \( \text{\textDelta} x c3 \) \( \text{\textOmega} x f4. \)

8 ... e6

Black is effectively a tempo up on the above mentioned game, and 9 \( \text{\textDelta} c3 \) is not on. \( \text{\textDelta} c5 \) is a powerful threat, as if White cannot castle kingside his pressure along the open f-file will not be developed, and he will be saddled with the weakness at e5 in any event.

C

4 \( \text{\textOmega} d \)

This can easily transpose into Exchange Variation or Modern Variation. We present an interesting alternative:

4 ... \( \text{\textOmega} x d6 \)

5 \( \text{\textDelta} f3 \)

5 c4!? might lead to an interesting middlegame after 5 ...

\( \text{\textDelta} b4 \) a3 (6 \( \text{\textDelta} f3 \) \( \text{\textDelta} f5! \)) 6 ... \( \text{\textOmega} c6 \).

5 ... \( \text{\textDelta} f6 \) would leave White with a small advantage.

5 ... \( \text{\textOmega} g4 \)

6 \( \text{\textOmega} e2 \)

On 6 c4 the books give 6 ... \( \text{\textDelta} f6 \)

7 \( \text{\textOmega} e2 \) \( \text{\textOmega} c6 \) and now 8 d5!, but why not 6 ... \( \text{\textDelta} f4 \), or even 6 ... \( \text{\textDelta} b6 \)

7 c5 \( \text{\textOmega} e6+ \), or 6 ... \( \text{\textOmega} e6+ \) 7 \( \text{\textOmega} e2 \)

\( \text{\textDelta} x f3 \) 8 gf \( \text{\textDelta} f6! \)

6 ... \( \text{\textDelta} c6 \)

7 0-0

On 7 c3 the knight leaps in with 7 ... \( \text{\textDelta} f4 \), and White probably has nothing better than 8 \( \text{\textDelta} x f4 \) \( \text{\textOmega} x f4 \), where Black has no complaints.

7 \( \text{\textDelta} c3 \), on the other hand, gives Black a superior position after castling queenside: 7 ... 0-0-0!
8 \( \text{\textit{Q}xd5} \) \( \text{\textit{Q}xd5} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{B}e3} \) e5! struck at the centre effectively in Ilyin Zhenevsky-Réti, Moscow 1925.

7 ... 0-0-0
8 c3 \( \text{\textit{Q}f4} \)
9 \( \text{\textit{Q}xf4} \) \( \text{\textit{Q}xf4} \)
10 b4 e6

Not 10 ... e5?! , which is far too optimistic. Yates-Knoch, Budapest 1926, saw 11 g3! \( \text{\textit{Q}h6} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{Q}xe5} \) \( \text{\textit{Q}xe5} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{Q}xg4+} \) with a decisive advantage for White.

11 ... de

One can also interpolate 4 ... h6 5 h4, as in Sholman-Mikenas, USSR 1965.

11 b5

Suggested by Hort, who gives the plan \( \text{\textit{Q}a4} \) and g3 for White.

11 ... \( \text{\textit{Q}b8}?! \) (135)

6 ... \( \text{\textit{Q}c6} \)
7 \( \text{\textit{Q}b5} \)

6 \( \text{\textit{Q}f3} \) \( \text{\textit{Q}g4} \) gives Black a comfortable game, e.g. 7 \( \text{\textit{Q}b5} \) h6 8 \( \text{\textit{Q}d2} \) e6 9 0-0 \( \text{\textit{Q}e7} \), Lutikov-Kopylov, USSR 1968.

12 g3

12 \( \text{\textit{Q}a4} \) fails to 12 ... \( \text{\textit{Q}xf3} \)
13 \( \text{\textit{Q}xf3} \) \( \text{\textit{Q}d6} \).

12 ... \( \text{\textit{Q}f5} \)
13 \( \text{\textit{Q}bd2} \) h5!

Black has sufficient counterplay.

D

4 \( \text{\textit{Q}g5} \) (136)

A real oldie! As a matter of fact, this is the first game of the modern period using the Alekhine Defence!
winning game for Black.

11 ... bc

12  kc1 de4

13  d4 g2

14  g1 0-0-0

Black has the better ending – Analysis.

Modern Variation: 5 c4 d6 6 ed cd 7 e3 g7 8 c3 c6, Lebreto-S.Garcia, Bayamo 1984.

E

5  de  c6

4  e2

This is an attempt to avoid the pin of the knight on f3, but it allows black to equalise because it does nothing to support White’s fragile centre.

6 ... g4

7  0-0 e6

8  e1 e7

Black has a fine game, Matanovič.

4 ... c6 is an acceptable Teschner, Hamburg 1955.
19 3 \( \Box c3 \) and Others

1  e4 \( \Box f6 \)  

White offers to exchange Black’s only developed piece.

2  e5 \( \Box d5 \) (137)  

3  ...  

\( \Box x c3 \)  

This is Black’s best move. Now White must define his objectives.

He can either try to build a strong pawn centre (A1) or exploit an open d-file (A2).

A1  4 bc
A2  4 dc
A1

4  bc  

\( d5! \)  

White has left the light squares of the centre undefended, so Black stakes his claim.

5  d4

The most logical reply. Others:

a) 5 f4 allows Black to expand in the centre with 5 ... d4!? 6 \( \Box b2 \) dc 7 \( \Box x c3 \) \( \Box f5! \) and White has no advantage to speak of. 5 ... c5! is another good move, as Black will be able to develop comfortably with \( \Box c6 \), \( \Box f5 \), e6 etc.

b) 5 \( \Box a3 \) is best met by 5 ... b6 6 d4 (6 f4 c5! 7 d4 e6 gives Black a decent game, Haik-Torre, Athens 1971) 6 ... c5! 7 \( \Box b5+ \) \( \Box d7 \) 8 \( \Box d3 \) \( \Box c6 \) 9 \( \Box f3 \) c4 and Black has good play, Vorotnikov-Agзамов, USSR
1974.

5 ... c5
6  \( \Delta f3 \) \( \Delta c6 \)
7  \( \Delta e2 \)

7 \( \Delta d3 \) allows the effective pin
7 ... \( \Delta g4 \), and on 8 h3 \( \Delta xf3 \) 9 \( \Xi xf3 \) e6 Black had solved his opening problems in Mecking-Bobotsov, Palma de Mallorca 1969. A more recent try is 8 \( \Xi b1 \) c4! 9 \( \Delta e2 \) \( \Xi d7 \)
10 h3 \( \Delta xf3 \) 11 \( \Delta xf3 \) e6 12 0-0 0-0
13 g4?! f6! 14 ef gf 15 \( \Delta g2 \) h5!

Zaitsev-Bagirov, Minsk 1983. Better is 13 g3 f6 14 ef gf 15 \( \Delta g2 \) with equal chances.

The prophylactic 7 h3 wastes too much time. In I. Zaitsev-Vasyukov, USSR Ch 1969, Black obtained a good game with 7 ... e6
8 \( \Delta d3 \) cd 9 cd \( \Xi b4 \)! 10 \( \Xi b1 \) \( \Xi c7 \).

7 ... \( \Delta g4 \)

An interesting alternative is 7 \( \Delta f5 \) 8 \( \Xi b1 \) \( \Xi b8 \) 9 e6 \( \Delta xe6 \) 10 \( \Delta f4 \)
\( \Xi c8 \) 11 \( \Xi xb7 \) c4 12 0-0 \( \Xi a5 \) with complications, Borngasser-Hazai, Pula 1957.

8 0-0 e6
9 \( \Xi b1 \) \( \Delta e7 \)!

In Vaisman-Alburt, Bucharest 1978, after 9 ... \( \Xi b8 \) 10 h3 \( \Delta h5 \), 11 \( \Delta e3 \)! Still, Black is fine after both 11 ... c4 and 11 ... \( \Delta e7 \), in either case intending to play on the queenside.

10 c4?!

This move leads to complicated play.

10 ... dc

11 d5

This position was reached in Nikolić-Schmidt, Smederevska Palanka 1978. Hort evaluates it as unclear but we fail to see what White has after either 11 ... \( \Xi xd5 \) or 11 ... ed.

12 A2

4 dc d5

Best, despite published opinions to the contrary!

5 c4

5 \( \Delta e3 \) should be met by 5 ... \( \Delta f5 \)

6 \( \Delta d3 \) \( \Delta xd3 \) 7 \( \Xi xd3 \) e6 and then Black can expand with ... c5.

A reasonable alternative is 5 f4

56 \( \Delta e3 \) e6 7 \( \Delta f3 \) \( \Xi c6 \) 8 \( \Delta d3 \) \( \Delta e7 \)
9 0-0 \( \pm \) Knaak-Espig, East Germany 1972. 5 ... \( \Delta f5 \) is better.

5 ... c6

5 \( \Delta f3 \)

6 f4 should be answered with 6 ... \( \Delta f5 \), as in the previous note.

6 ... \( \Delta g4 \)
7 h3 \( \Delta xf3 \)
8 \( \Xi xf3 \) e6 (139)

\[ \text{Diagram:} \]

139

W

9 cd \( \Xi xd5 \)
This is Keres’ idea. Naturally White can return to the normal lines with 4 d4.

4 ... \( \text{c6} \)

4 ... c6 is another option.

5 \( \text{b3} \)

5 \( \text{f5} \) (141)

We feel that this is clearly the strongest reply to Welling’s 3 b3. Those readers interested in the analysis of 3 ... d6 are referred to *Myers Opening Bulletin*, volume 1, nos. 6 and 7.

4 \( \text{b2} \)

5 \( \text{g7} \)

6 \( \text{b6} \)

6 \( \text{f3} \)!

This threatens c5. 6 e6 is premature.

6 ...

7 \( \text{d4} \)

7 \( \text{c6} \)

7 ... d6 is also playable.

8 \( \text{d2} \)

8 \( \text{d6} \)

Black has a good position, Welling-Diepstratten, corres.

C

3 \( \text{f3} \)

4 \( \text{c4} \)!

After 5 ... de?! 6 \( \text{xe5} \) e6 White would have an advantage, as the bishop on c8 would be locked in.

In the diagrammed position Black’s chances are not worse. Practical tests are awaited.

D

3 \( \text{f3} \)

This looks rather silly, but Black must be prepared to respond in an appropriate manner.

3 ...

4 \( \text{e6} \)

Now 4 d4 is met by 4 ... \( \text{c6} \) and the initiative is already in Black’s hands, as 5 c3 d6 strikes at the weak e5 square.

4 c3 is an insipid move. 4 ... c5 5 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c6} \)! 6 \( \text{x5} \) ed was good for Black in Rajković-Ljubojević, Yugo-
slav Ch 1975. 4 ... d6 should also be adequate, since the queen occupies the best target square for the knight on g1. After 5 d4 de 6 de
Oc6 Black is sufficiently ahead in development to answer 7 g3 with 7 ... de7, threatening ... w d5 and retaining the options of f5 or g6 for his knight.

Worthy of consideration is 4 ...
Oc6 5 x d5 ed 6 x d5 w g5.
5 b3 Oc6
6 w g3 Od4
6 ... Oc7??! is also possible, but 6 ... d6! is more natural and certainly best.

7 f3 xb3 Wedberg-Niklasson, Lund 1974,
saw instead 7 ... f5?! 8 f4 d6 9 d4 de 10 d3 with a better game for White.

8 ab
Black has obtained the bishop pair but has wasted time and yielded the a-file, also giving White the better pawn structure. Therefore we suggest that Black try the untested 6 ... d6 which we feel will bring him at least equality.
20 The Hypermodern 2 ... $\text{g}8$

1 e4 $\text{f}6$

2 e5 $\text{g}8 (142)$

repertoire for international competition. The illustrative games in
Chapter 1 have shown how much
excitement can be generated.

Before getting to the main line,
however, let us deal with 2 ... $\text{e}4$,
which allows White to establish an
overwhelming position with 3 d3
$c5 4 d4$. It takes a great deal of
hypermodern masochism to dare
to defend that position.

3 $d4$

3 f4 d6 4 d4 transposes below,
while 4 $\text{f}3$ c5! prevents d4, e.g.
5 d4 ed 6 $\text{xd}4$ de 7 fe $\text{wa}5+$ or
6 $\text{xd}4$ $\text{c}6$ 7 $\text{b}5$ $\text{d}7$ 8 $\text{xc}6$
$\text{xc}6$ 9 ed $\text{xf}3$! 10 gf $\text{xd}6$.

Black can play these lines without
fear.

3 ...

d6

This is the usual move, although
there is the interesting alternative
3 ... d5, which has been played by
Anatoly Lein: 4 $\text{d}3$ c5 5 c3 $\text{c}6$
$\text{e}2$ $\text{g}4$ 7 f3 $\text{d}7$ (Damsky-
Lein, USSR 1958) and now
Schwarz gives 8 0-0 $\text{b}6$ 9 $\text{c}2$
$c8$ 10 f4 cd with approximate
equality. 4 ed would transpose
below.

A strange sight indeed. White
has a pawn at e5 and there is no
evidence of Black's having moved.
This must truly be one of the most
hypermodern openings ever essayed
in serious tournament praxis. It is
not entirely without merit, however,
as the pawn on e5 is a nice target.
Unfortunately, recorded examples
are few and far between. Petrosian
has played it, as has the young
American IM Joel Benjamin.
Against a much weaker opponent
the line can be played with
confidence, although it is not
recommended as part of a healthy
Now White has:

A 4  \( \mathcal{D}f3 \)

B 4  ed

A

4  \( \mathcal{D}f3 \)  \( \mathcal{D}g4 \)

4 ... de 5  \( \mathcal{D}x e5 \)  \( \mathcal{D}d7 \) is clearly

defective: 6  \( \mathcal{W}f3 \)  \( \mathcal{D}g f6 \) 7  \( \mathcal{D}c3 \) e6

8  \( \mathcal{D}g5 \) ± Spielman-Flohr, Prague

1930.

4 ... c6!? comes into consideration,

intending to answer 5 ed with 5 ...

\( \mathcal{W}x d6 \), transposing to B2.

4 ... g6 leads to the best known

game in the ‘retreat’ variation,

with a World Champion defending

the black side: 5  \( \mathcal{D}c3 \)  \( \mathcal{D}g7 \) 6  \( \mathcal{D}c4 \)

c6 7 h3 d5 8  \( \mathcal{D}b3 \) b6 9 0-0 e6 10

\( \mathcal{A}e1 \)  \( \mathcal{A}a6 \) 11  \( \mathcal{D}e2 \)  \( \mathcal{D}e7 \) 12  \( \mathcal{D}f4 \) and

Black had problems finding a

smooth pattern of development,

Boleslavsky-Petrosian, USSR 1966.

4 ... c5 is an untested double-
pawn sacrifice: 5 dc  \( \mathcal{D}c6! ? \) 6 ed

\( \mathcal{D}g4 \). Also possible is 6 ...

\( \mathcal{W}a5+7 \)

c3  \( \mathcal{W}x c5 \) 8  \( \mathcal{A}e3! \)  \( \mathcal{W}x d6 \) 9  \( \mathcal{W}x d6 \) ed

10  \( \mathcal{D}d4 \) leaves White comfortably

ahead in development and in

possession of a much superior

pawn structure.

5  h3!

5  \( \mathcal{A}e2 \) also favours White after

5 ... c6  \( \mathcal{D}b d2 \) e6 7 0-0  \( \mathcal{D}d7 \) 8 ed!

\( \mathcal{A}x d6 \) 9  \( \mathcal{D}e4 \), Smejkal-Alster,

Czechoslovak Ch 1974. 5 ... e6

strikes us as a more promising try.

Since it seems strange that Black

would want to ‘provoke’ h3,

perhaps he should be prepared to

face the consequences after 5 ...

\( \mathcal{A}h5 \) 6 e6, or perhaps play 4 ...

\( \mathcal{A}f5 \). The following example is

hardly encouraging.

5 ...  \( \mathcal{A}f5 \)

6  \( \mathcal{A}d3 \)  \( \mathcal{W}d7 \)

7 ed  ed

8  \( \mathcal{A}x f5 \)  \( \mathcal{W}x f5 \)

9 0-0

White has a comfortable lead

in development, Smejkal-Vesely,

Czechoslovakia 1968.

B

4  ed (143)

This line will appeal to those

players who like to adopt the

Exchange Variation in the main

lines.

Black has three possible recaptu-

res, but 4 ... cd seems to be

inadequate in view of 5  \( \mathcal{D}f3 \) g6 6

h3  \( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 7  \( \mathcal{A}d3 \)  \( \mathcal{D}f 6 \) 8 0-0-0 9  \( \mathcal{A}g5 \)

with a clear edge for White,

Valenti-Taruffi, Italian Ch 1977.

5 ...  \( \mathcal{A}g4 \) comes into consideration.

B1 4 ... ed

B2 4 ...  \( \mathcal{W}x d6! ? \)
This is the logical continuation, as if Black eventually plays ... d5 line of the Scandinavian (1 e4 d5 2 ed \textit{W}xd5 3 \textit{C}c3 \textit{W}d6!? 4 d4). There has not been sufficient scrutiny of this line, as most authors simply cite the game Karpov-Lutikov, USSR 1979 (see below) and leave it at that. The fact that Black played badly in the opening seems to have gone unnoticed.

5 ... \textit{G}c6

5 ... g6 will erect a kingside pawn structure which is likely to crumble in the face of a kingside pawn storm, since Black has no counterplay in the centre or on the queenside.

6 c3 \textit{G}f6

6 \textit{G}f6 \textit{G}f3 a6?! (6 ... c6)! 7 \textit{G}e3 ±.

7 \textit{G}e2 \textit{G}g4

Instead, Karpov-Lutikov, USSR 1979, saw (by transposition) 5 ...

White tried to avoid the pin, but Black does not oblige.

8 0-0 (144)

1949, saw (by transposition) 5 ...

Grefe and Silman, in their book on the Centre Counter, do not even consider this logical reply, which steers the game into Caro-Kann channels.

8 \textit{G}c4

6 \textit{G}f3 \textit{G}g4!? and 6 \textit{G}e4 \textit{W}c7 await practical tests.

6 ... \textit{G}f6

7 \textit{G}e2 \textit{G}g4! (145)

The position is double-edged and holds chances for both sides. See \textit{Illustrative Game Forster-
8 f3

This position was reached (by transposition from a Centre Counter) in Mengarini-Schiller, New York 1980. Black should have played 8 ... ∆f5, but played the inferior 8 ... ∆h5. The complete game is presented in Chapter 1.

The lines with 2 ... ∆g8 may not be good enough to provide equality, but they do lead to unbalanced positions. 4 ∆f3 is White’s best option.
21 2 \( \Delta c3 \)

1 e4 \( \Delta f6 \) 3 ... de.
2 \( \Delta c3 \) (146) A

3 ed \( \Delta xd5 \)

Here there are no less than five paths to choose from, none of which is dangerous for Black:
A1 4 \( \Delta c4 \)
A2 4 \( \Delta f3 \)
A3 4 \( \Delta ge2 \)
A4 4 \( \Delta xd5 \)
A5 4 g3

4 \( \Delta f3 \) won't even get dignified with a column. After 4 ... \( \Delta b6 \) 5 \( \Delta h3 \) e5 6 \( \Delta b5+ \) c6 7 \( \Delta d3 \) g6 8 b3 \( \Delta e6 \) 9 \( \Delta e4 \) \( \Delta e7 \) Black had full equality in George-J. Brooks, USA 1983.

A1

4 \( \Delta c4 \)

White tries to develop with tempo, but does not succeed.

4 ... \( \Delta b6! \)
5 \( \Delta b3 \) \( \Delta c6! \)
6 \( \Delta f3 \)

There are three alternatives, only the last of which presents any real difficulties:
a) 6 f4 \( \Delta d4! \) 7 \( \Delta f3 \) \( \Delta xb3 \) 8 ab g6 = Dowden-Tomaszewiski, Graz 1978.
b) 6 \( \text{bge}2 \text{e5!} \) 7 0-0 \( \text{bge}7 \) 8 d3 0-0 = W. Schmid-Ruhrig, Germany 1977. 
\( \text{xd5} \) \text{ed} 12 \( \text{bfe}1 \) \( \text{b3} = \) Barle-Hazai, Pula 1975.

9 ... \( \text{b4} \)

10 ... \( \text{b4} \)

Hort suggests 10 a3?!?, to which Black should reply 10 ... \( \text{b8} \) intending ... \( \text{d5} \).

10 ... \( \text{d5} \)

11 ... \( \text{a5} \)

11 ... \( \text{b3} \) 7

Black's two bishops could become useful as the game progresses, Estrin-Hazai, Agaard 1976.

4 12 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g4} \)

Also reliable is 4 ... \( \text{c6} \) 5 d4

A2

7 d4 e6

5 ... \( \text{b5} \) 6 a3 g6 7 d4 c4 \( \text{b6} = \) Yates-Nimzowitsch, 1925.

8 d5 \( \text{e6} \)

Or 6 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 7 0-0-0 = Yates-Colle, Baden Baden 1925.

8 ... \( \text{c4} \)


A3

4 \( \text{ge2} \) \text{e5!} 

There are alternatives, but this move is, in our opinion, a sufficient guarantor of equality.

5 g3 \( \text{xc3} \)

6 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{d7} \)

Black prevents White from taking control of the h1-a8 diagonal, thereby defeating \( \text{ge2} \), g3, \( \text{g2} \) plan.

7 \( \text{c4} \) \text{e5}
8 0-0  
9 Bb4! =


This is similar to a Scandinavian Defence, except that a pair of knights has been removed from the board. This is entirely to Black's advantage, since the queen on d5 is more secure.

5 Bf3

5 d4 Ac6 6 Ae3 e5!, Adam-Ciocalteu, Romanian Ch 1977, gave nothing to White, and 5 Af3 c6 6 Ae2 Af5 led to a quick edge for Black after 7 Bxd5? cd 8 d3 Ac6 9 Ff3 e5 in Clemenčič-Knežević, Sarajevo 1974.

Perhaps simply 5 ... Ag4 6 Ae2 e5! as suggested by Hort.

6 d4 Ag4

6 ... e5 can be met by 7 Ae3 (Peresipkin-Alburt, Kiev 1978) and now Black has to choose between 7 ... ed 8 Bxd4 Ac5 and 7 ... Ag4.

7 Ae2 0-0-0
8 c3

Borg-Atalik, World Junior 1980, continued 8 Ae3 e5 9 0-0 ed 10 Bxd4 Axe2 11 Axe2 Bxd1 12 Bfxd1 Ad6 where a draw was agreed.

8 ... e5 (148)

8 ... e6 is also interesting, for example 9 Ae3 Ae7 10 0-0 h5 11 h3 Af5, as in Pomar-Seideman, East German Ch 1976.

9 0-0 ed

10 cd Bd6

10 ... Bxf3!? 11 Bxf3 Bxd4 and now 12 Bb3 holds the balance.

11 Ae3 Bb8 +

Alburt-Vasyukov, USSR 1967.

4 g3 b6

Black contests the long diagonal immediately. Still, 4 ... Af5 5 Ag2 c6 (Ignatiev-Knežević, Kislovodsk 1968) and 4 ... Bxc3 5 bc Bd5! (Benko-Martz, USA 1972) also equalise.

5 Ag2 Ab7

6 Bf3 e6

7 0-0 Bxc3

Or 7 ... Ae7 8 Ae1 0-0 9 Ae4 Bd7 = Westerinen-Timman, Tallinn 1973.

8 bc Ae7

9 a4 a5 =

Darcy-Hjorth, World Junior Ch 1980.
with 5 ... ef! 6 bc Qd6 =, according to Hort.

5 ... cd+
6 Qxd2
6 Qxd2 Qxg7 is also seen.

White can then try:
a) 7 c3. B. Spiro claims a big advantage for White here, but Hort’s 7 ... Qd5 gives Black the edge, as the white kingside is not easy to organise.

b) 7 Qh5 Qd4! (preventing White from queenside castling) 8 c3
Qe4+ 9 Qe3 Qc6 (Honfi-Larsen, Copenhagen 1965) and now not 10 Qe2? Qg4! but 10 Qf3 Qg6 with a level position.

c) 7 Qf3 Qxb2 (7 ... Qd4?! – Hort) 8 Qd1 Qd4 9 Qe2 Qg4 10 Qb3 was played in Balashov-Alburt, USSR Ch 1974. Here Black committed his pawn to d5 (compare 2 e5 Qg8, Chapter 20).

B1

3 ... d4
4 ef dc
5 fg

Other captures are less impressive:
a) 5 fe cd+ 6 Qxd2 Qxd2+ 7 Qxd2
Qxe7 = Skold-Asmundsson, Lugano 1968.
b) 5 bc ef 6 Qf3 Qd6 7 d4 0-0 was played in Corden-Williams, Cambridge 1970. Now White should probably play 8 Qe2, avoiding the check on the e-file, but even then he cannot lay claim to any advantage.
c) 5 d4?! (Casper-Heckert, East Germany 1975) should be answered
9 \( \mathcal{b}5 \)

White must play carefully in order to preserve the advantage he owns thanks to his better pawn structure. After 9 \( \mathcal{e}e2 \) Black equalises with 9 ... \( \mathcal{d}d7 \) 10 \( \mathcal{c}3 \) \( \mathcal{x}c3 \) 11 \( \mathcal{x}c3 \) 0-0-0, Ball-Cafferty, Birmingham 1975.

9 ...

9 ... \( \mathcal{e}6?! \) 10 \( \mathcal{e}e2 \) 0-0-0 11 \( \mathcal{x}c6 \)
gave White a clear advantage in Bronstein-Albur, Yerevan 1975.

10 \( \mathcal{f}3 \)

10 \( \mathcal{e}e2 \) also gives White a small edge after 10 ... \( \mathcal{a}6 \) 11 \( \mathcal{a}4 \) 0-0-0 12

\( \mathcal{c}3 \) \( \mathcal{x}c3 \) 13 \( \mathcal{d}c3 \).

10 ...

0-0-0

11 \( \mathcal{a}1 \)

White has a slight advantage thanks to his better pawn structure.

Timoshenko-Knežević, Polanica Zdroj 1976, was agreed drawn after 11 ...

\( \mathcal{d}e8 \) 12 \( \mathcal{g}5 \) \( \mathcal{h}6 \), but surely White stands better after 13 \( \mathcal{d}e4 \), as recommended by Hort. No better is 11 ...

\( \mathcal{e}6 \) 12 \( \mathcal{g}5 \), Chekhov-Barlow, Tjentiste 1975.

Bagirov's evaluation of chances for both sides is a bit generous to Black, as White stands better.

B2

3 ...

\( \mathcal{f}d7 \) (151)

The main problem with this move is that Black must be prepared to defend the French Defence after 4 \( \mathcal{d}4 \)! Other moves give Black no significant problems:

4 \( \mathcal{e}6?! \)

Spielmann's aggressive thrust has insufficient positional grounding but it does lead to some sharp complications.

Others:

a) 4 \( \mathcal{x}d5?! \) is one of Nimzowitsch's less successful ideas: 4 ...

\( \mathcal{e}5 \) 5 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{c}5 \) 6 \( \mathcal{f}4 \) (6 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) \( \mathcal{x}f3 \) 7 \( \mathcal{w}x3 \) \( \mathcal{d}6 \) 8 \( \mathcal{b}5 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \)

and Black had a wonderful game in Yates-Réti, Bad Kissingen 1928. 6 \( \mathcal{b}4 \) is pointless: 6 ...

\( \mathcal{e}6 \) 7 \( \mathcal{b}2 \) \( \mathcal{e}5 \), Groszpfater-

Suba, Kecskemet 1979) 6 ...

\( \mathcal{e}6 \) 7 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) (7 \( \mathcal{c}4 \) \( \mathcal{e}6 \)) 7 ...

\( \mathcal{c}7 \) 8 \( \mathcal{g}3 \) \( \mathcal{e}6 \) 9 \( \mathcal{b}2 \) \( \mathcal{e}7 \) 10 11 \( \mathcal{g}2 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \)

120-0 \( \mathcal{f}6 = \) Tartakower-Landau, Rotterdam 1930.

b) 4 \( \mathcal{f}4 \) \( \mathcal{e}6 \) 5 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) (5 \( \mathcal{d}4 \)! leads back to the French) 5 ...

\( \mathcal{c}5 \) 6 \( \mathcal{g}3 \) (6 \( \mathcal{b}5 \)

\( \mathcal{a}6 \) 7 \( \mathcal{x}d7 \)+ \( \mathcal{d}x7 \) 8-0-0 \( \mathcal{c}6 \) 9 \( \mathcal{d}3 \)

\( \mathcal{g}6 \)!, Vidmar-Rubinstein, Semmering 1926. Black has excellent prospects against the weak white centre,
especially the now defenceless light squares. 6 d4 transposes to a
French, as in Lukin-Bagirov, Telavi 1982) 6 ... Qc6 7 Qg2 Qe7
8 0-0 0-0 (8 ... a6 9 a4 Wa5 10 d3 b5
11 f5! gave White the better chances in Balashov-Schmidt, Riga
1975, but Black might consider
9 ... f6, or 9 ... 0-0 and then ... f6)
9 d3 f6 10 ef Qxf6 (10 ... Qxf6)
11 We2 We8 12 Qd2 (Balashov-
Schmidt, Halle 1976) and now
Hort gives 12 ... Qb8 13 a4a6±. We
propose 12 ... Qb4!? intending
13 ... d4, 14 ... Qbd5, 15 ... Qg4
eventually sinking a knight into
e3.

4 ... fe
5 d4 g6!
5 ... e5 is also playable.
6 h4 Qg7
7 h5 Qf8 (152)

\[152\]

W

This retreat not only defends
the pawns on the light squares, but
also eases the congestion about
the black king.

8 h6

8 Qd3 Qc6! 9 hg hg 10 Qxh8
Qxh8 11 Qe3 e5! t Bobkov-
Sokolov, corr. 1960.

8 Qf3 is suggested by Bagirov.

8 ... c5 seems the most direct
answer. Also worth considering is
8 ... Qc6 intending ... e5.

8 ... Qf6
9 g4 Qg8
10 g5 Qh8

What can be said about this
position? Black's pieces are
undeveloped and have little chance
of seeing action unless ... e5 can be
played. But Black is a pawn
ahead, and can achieve this break
even at the cost of a pawn. Thus
on 11 Qf3 Black might consider
11 ... e5 12 de (12 Qxe5 Qxe5 13 de
e6!?) 12 ... e6 intending ... Qg4!?
Black can also strike at the centre
with ... c5, ... Qc6 etc. We feel that
Black's chances are certainly no
worse.

B3

3 ... Qd4 (153)

\[153\]

W

This is the most interesting
continuation. The handling of the black side has changed dramatically since Bagirov's 1979 analytical work.

4 \( \text{Qxce2} \)

White has several options here: but White can play 5 c3! with a good game, e.g. 5 ... \( \text{Qc6} \) 6 cd \( \text{Qg5} \)

a) 4 \( \text{Qxe4} \) de leaves White with a sickly pawn on e5. The future World Champion equalised in Rytov-Karpov, USSR 1969: 5 d4

7 d3! \( \text{Qe6} \) 8 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qxd4} \) 9 \( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qxd4} \) 10 \( \text{Qa4+} \), Bellon-Schmidt, Pula Z 1975. A curious line is 5 ...

ed 6 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qc6} \) 7 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qg4}! \) and now instead of 8 h3? \( \text{Qxf3} \) 9 \( \text{Qxf3} \) \( \text{Qd4!} \) White should have tried simply 6 bc embarrasses the knight at e4.

b) 4 d4 \( \text{Qxc3} \) 5 bc e6!? is a French Defence, usually reached via 1 e4

\( \text{Qh5} \), but here White can obtain a superior position with 5 d4 \( \text{Qe6} \)

Heidenfeld-Hecht, Nice Ol 1974. Black can also play 5 ... \( \text{Qf5!} \) 6 \( \text{Qf3} \) e6, Charenkov-Aravin, corres 1965.

c) 4 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \) 5 dc g6 followed by \( \text{Qf3-g7} \) gives Black a good game, e.g. 6 \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 7 0-0-0 c6 8 \( \text{Qe3} \)

\( \text{Qb6} \) 9 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{Qe6} \), Schalk-Schiller, New York Open 1984.

d) 4 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \) 5 dc c5 6 f4 \( \text{Qc6} \) 7 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) 8 0-0 e6 9 h3 \( \text{Qxf3} \) 10 \( \text{Qxf3} \) c4 = Kosten-Brameld, British Ch 1983. 4 ... \( \text{Qc5} \) (see variation e below) is also good.

e) 4 \( \text{Qb5?} \) c6 5 \( \text{Qd3} \) is even worse than the line above. After 5 ... \( \text{Qc5} \) White is practically lost due to the threatened advance of the d-pawn. Geller-Schiller, New York Open 1984, continued 6 \( \text{Qe2} \) g6 7

b4 \( \text{Qxd3} \) 8 cd (8 \( \text{Qxd3} \) \( \text{Qf5} \) 8 ...

\( \text{Qg7} \) and Black was on his way to an easy win.

4 ... \( \text{Qf6!} \)

4 ... \( \text{d4} \) was Bagirov's main line, but White can play 5 c3! with a good game, e.g. 5 ... \( \text{Qc6} \) 6 cd \( \text{Qg5} \)

6 \( \text{Qe3}! \), Chikoviani-Mikadze, USSR 1976. 6 f4 g6 can also be inserted, e.g. 7 \( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 8 \( \text{Qd2} \) b6 9 h3 e6

10 \( \text{Qf3} \) c5 11 g4! ± Gaprindashvili-Alexandria, match (7), USSR 1975.

5 d3

5 \( \text{Qf3} \) should be countered by 5 ... \( \text{f6!} \) 6 d3 \( \text{d6} \) 7 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qd7} \)

8 \( \text{Qxd7} \) \( \text{Qxd7} \) = Smyslov-Alburt, USSR Ch 1977. Hort's evaluation of ± is not justifiable.

5 ... \( \text{Qg5} \)

6 \( \text{Qf4} \)

6 \( \text{Qxg5} \) fg 7 \( \text{Qg3} \) is inferior because the disruption of the black pawn structure does not justify White's parting with the bishop pair. Paoli-Alburt, Odessa 1976, continued 7 ... e6 8 \( \text{Qg4} \) g6 9
h4 \( \text{\textsc{c}c}6 \)! 10 \( \text{\textsc{d}}f3 \) gh 11 \( \text{xh4 e}7 \) 12 0-0-0 \( \text{x}d7 \) 13 d4 0-0-0 with a good game for Black. 7 h4 g4 leads to sharp, but balanced, positions. Instead, 7 ... gh leads to very complicated play, a taste of which was presented in Vorotnikov-Kengis, USSR 1983 (Chapter 1). After 6 f4 the black knight finds a comfortable resting place on f7.

6 ... g6!

Hort does not mention this move, giving only Van Geet-Bisguier, 1961, which continued 6 ... fe 7 \( \text{x}d5 \) xd5 8 \( \text{x}g5 \) \( \text{\textsc{c}c}6 \) 9 \( \text{\textsc{e}e}2! \) ±.

Both sides have chances in this balanced position. Terentiev-Kengis, USSR 1983, continued 8 h5 \( \text{xf4} \) 9 \( \text{x}f4 \) g5 10 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{\textsc{c}c}6 \) 11 d4 \( \text{x}h6 \) with a better game for Black.
22 2 d3 and 2 \( \text{c4} \)

A few sensible alternatives are:

a) 2 ... e5 (a reversed Philidor). On

3 f4 Black should play 3 ... \( \text{c6} \) 4
\( \text{f3} \) (4 fe \( \text{cxe5} \) =) 4 ... d5! 5 ed

(5 fe de! 6 ef ef 7 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{d4} \) and

Black is rolling along) 5 ... \( \text{xd5} \)

6 fe \( \text{g4} \) and Black regains the

pawn with a good game: 7 \( \text{e2} \)

\( \text{xf3} \) 8 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{h4} \) + 9 g3 \( \text{d4} \)

10 \( \text{we2} \) 0-0-0 11 c3 \( \text{we5} \) 12 0-0

\( \text{wxe2} \) 13 \( \text{exe2} \) \( \text{c7} \). Now

Bagirov considers the capture of

the f-pawn too dangerous, so

Black will be able to play ... \( \text{f6} \)

with (at least) equality.

b) 2 ... c5 3 c4!? (A radical idea

from Nimzowitsch. Most other

moves transpose into the Closed

Sicilian which Black must be

willing to defend if he chooses 2...

c5. Another possibility for White

is 3 f4, which leads to the 'Big

Clamp' Variation of the Closed

Sicilian which has seen a lot of

action in Canada and Great

Britain) 3 ... \( \text{c6} \) 4 f4 d6 5 \( \text{c3} \) g6

6 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{g7} \) 7 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d4} \) =

Nimzowitsch-Vuković, Kecskemét

1928.

c) 2 ... d6 (how good is 2 d3 against

moves considered in this chapter.

Black has no trouble meeting

either of them.

A 2 d3

B 2 \( \text{c4} \) ?!

A

2 d3

Objectively, there is not much
to be said in favour of this move.

White locks in his bishop on f1

and abandons any thought of

occupying the centre with his

pawns. Black can now choose

almost any legal move with

impunity, but most in keeping

with the Alekhine spirit is ...

2 ... d5
the Pirc?) 3 \( \text{g5}\)! ? \( \text{bd7} \) 4 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{g6} \), or 4 \( \text{w}d2 \) \( \text{c6}\)!? with a sharp game ahead.

d) \( \text{2} \) \( \text{c6}\)!? 3 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 4 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{g4}\)!? or 4 ... \( \text{d7}\)!?

e) \( \text{2} \) ... \( \text{c6}\)!?, \( \text{2} \) ... \( \text{a6} \), \( \text{2} \) ... \( \text{b5} \) and \( \text{2} \) ... \( \text{g6} \) all come into consideration.

Have fun!

3 \( \text{e5} \)

3 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{e6} \) is a French Defence, King’s Indian Attack, but more interesting is 3 ... \( \text{e5} \) with a reversed Philidor, e.g. 4 \( \text{gf3} \) \( \text{c6} \)

5 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 6 0-0-0 0-7 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 8 \( \text{b4} \) \( \text{a6} \) 9 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{e6} \) 10 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{d7} \) = Kallai-Paulsen, Graz 1981.

3 ... \( \text{f6} \)

3 ... \( \text{g8}\)!? is intriguing, if only because Black is a full tempo up on the ‘retreat’ variation (Chapter 20) if White ever plays \( \text{d4} \). If White refrains from the advance of the d-pawn, Black will play ... \( \text{c5} \), ... \( \text{f5} \), ... \( \text{e6} \) etc.

4 \( \text{f4} \)

4 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 5 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c6} \) leaves Black a full tempo up on the French Defence.

4 ... \( \text{c5} \)

5 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e6} \)

6 \( \text{g3}\)!? \( \text{c6} \)

7 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{e7} \)

8 \( \text{0-0} \) \( \text{b5} \)

Black has equalised – Bagirov.

Conclusion: 2 \( \text{d3} \) is an insipid move which fails to present Black with any problems. White has no guarantee that he will even be able to set up a King’s Indian Attack, and Black can experiment freely without fear of catastrophe.

B

2 \( \text{c4}\)!!

Deployment of the bishop without defending the e-pawn is just plain reckless, but deployment of the bishop while simultaneously defending the pawn on \( \text{e4} \) is no good either: 2 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e5} \)! 3 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d5} \) 4 \( \text{ed} \) \( \text{ed} \) 5 \( \text{w}x\text{d5} \) \( \text{f6} \) Poupel-Arnold, France 1978.

2 ... \( \text{dxe4}\)!

The faint of heart can cop out with 2 ... \( \text{e6} \) 3 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d5} \) 4 \( \text{ed} \) \( \text{ed} \) 5 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{d4} \) = Schover-Muller, corres.

3 \( \text{x}\text{f7}+ \)

4 \( \text{w}h\text{5}+ \) (156)

Or 4 ... \( \text{g6} \) 5 \( \text{w}d\text{5}+ \) \( \text{e6} \) 6 \( \text{w}x\text{e4} \) (Gaffney-Arnold, England 1979) 6 ... \( \text{g7} \) 7 \( \text{w}f\text{4} \) \( \text{e8}\)! – Hort.

Black has nothing to worry about.
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