Opening for White according to Anand 1.e4

Alexander Khalifman
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Book IX  1.e4 c5 2.\(\texttt{\texttt{\&}}\texttt{f3}\) \(\texttt{\texttt{\&}}\texttt{c6}\) 3.d4

Miscellaneous
 Löwenthal Variation
 Kalashnikov Variation
 Four Knights’ Variation
 Taimanov Variation
 Paulsen System

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Dear readers,

You are holding in your hands book nine of the series “Opening for White According to Anand – 1.e4”. We continue in it the analysis of the Super Opening, which we know as the Sicilian Defence.

In this book, we begin analyzing variations arising after the moves 2.e3 c6. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that in parts 2 and 3 we deal also with systems arising after 2...e6.

In answer to 2...c6, just like after the majority of the basic lines, I recommend the most principled answer for White – 3.d4. In fact, recently, mostly because of Black’s successes in the Chelyabinsk variation, many strong players prefer to fight for the advantage with White by playing 3.b5, or 3.c3. Still, Black usually equalizes in these sidelines. Anand however, is not afraid at all of the Chelyabinsk variation, so we will follow his example.

The first part of the book is devoted to some rarely played moves for Black after the practically forced line 3...cxd4 4.cxd4. If we take into account the fact that from the point of view of common sense we will analyze the “early Dragon” – 4...g6 in one of our next books together with the “true Dragon” variation – then the only moves for Black, which deserve separate analysis are 4...b6 and 4...e5. The queen-move is quite insidious: experienced Sicilian players use it often with the idea to avoid the comparison of extensive theoretical knowledge. We suggest against it an aggressive plan for White, including castling long and it is not the most popular indeed; nevertheless, it is the most dangerous weapon for him.
The variation 4...e5 5.\(\text{c}b5\) d6 – is “the younger brother” of the Chelyabinsk variation and it has been tested even at the highest level. I see no sensible reasons to call that opening system the Kalashnikov variation, although that name is gaining in popularity and it is universally accepted. It is very important to know well the theory of it, but still White can rely on obtaining the advantage.

In the second part of this book we begin analyzing variations connected with the order of moves: 2.\(\text{c}f3\) \(\text{c}c6\) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{c}xd4\) e6 5.\(\text{c}c3\). As a rule, the move 5...\(\text{c}f6\) is like an invitation to the Chelyabinsk variation and the game transposes to it after 6.\(\text{c}db5\) d6. That will be the subject however of our next book, while here we analyze some not so popular replies for Black on move six. After them, as a rule, there arise much simpler positions and White maintains his advantage against all of them. The correct approach here for White is not to go for more than the position can really provide.

The variation 5...a6 needs a special treatment by White. Black is trying to play the Paulsen system, avoiding the aggressive plan for White connected with castling long. The number of the adherents to that move-order has increased lately. Still, Black’s task in that line is far from easy. There are plenty of new ideas in the principled variation for White – 6.\(\text{c}xc6\) bxc6 7.\(\text{d}d3\) and that enables him to be optimistic for the future. Meanwhile, the pawn-structure in that line is quite specific and that introduces plenty of strategical nuances, so it is essential for White not only to be well acquainted with the theory, but also to understand profoundly the arising positions.

Finally, in the third part of our book, we deal with the basic tabia of the Paulsen system: 2.\(\text{c}f3\) \(\text{c}c6\) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{c}xd4\) e6 5.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{c}c7\). It is amazing that the peak of interest towards that variation at the beginning of the 21st century is due mostly to Anand, who began to play like that regularly with Black and he had excellent results. His opponents, belonging to the world elite, started gradually to find the antidote to that system and Vishy decided quite reasonably that there were some other acceptable systems for Black as well. The system is still quite popular though. I recommend to White an aggressive set-up, which as we will see later, has become nowadays an almost universal plan in numerous lines of the Sicilian Defence. It includes \(\text{e}e3\), followed by \(\text{d}d2\), castling long and a kingside attack. All that is too schematic, since
Black has numerous plans at his disposal, but White can rely on obtaining the advantage thanks to our interesting analyses in many variations. In particular, I believe that the principally new idea (11.\texttt{d}d4!? in the main line might become the subject of lively theoretical discussions in the forthcoming years.

I hope that the new book would help the White players against the Sicilian Defence to create more problems for their opponents and it would help to clarify why the Super Opening is so popular after all. I wish my readers won many beautiful games in the future!

A. Khalifman
14th World Chess Champion
Part 1

1.e4 c5 2.\textit{D}f3 \textit{D}c6 3.d4

rare 3\textsuperscript{rd} moves for Black

3...cxd4 4.\textit{D}xd4

rare 4\textsuperscript{th} moves for Black

\textit{Löwenthal Variation}

4...e5 5.\textit{D}b5 a6

\textit{Kalashnikov Variation}

4...e5 5.\textit{D}b5 d6

3.d4

This is a universally accepted move. White fights for the dominance in the centre in the most natural fashion. The Chelyabinsk variation has become so popular lately that White is often trying to fight for the advantage with the moves 3.\textit{D}c3 and 3.\textit{D}b5. V.Anand has often played them as well. Still, despite the whims of fashion in the openings, the move with the d-pawn remains White's first priority in the diagrammed position.

3...cxd4

White is threatening to advance d4-d5, therefore capturing on d4 seems to be the obvious decision for Black. He has seldom tried some other moves here, though:

About 3...e6 4.d5 – see Book 8, Chapter 10;

It is just terrible for Black to play 3...f5 4.exf5?!, or 3...f6?! 4.d5, or 3...e5? 4.d5;

3...\textit{W}b6?! – Black is trying to exert pressure against White's d4-pawn. The simplest line here is 4.d5?! and after 4...\textit{D}d4 5.\textit{D}fd2!, Black must worry about the possibility for his knight to be
trapped with 6.a4 and 7.c3. After
the practically forced line 5...b5
and 6.d3±, White can develop
his pieces comfortably;

In case of 3...a5?! 4.d2
b6 (or 4...b4? 5.a3 e6 6.dxc5
cxd5 7.dxe4+ Rehder - Krahl,
corr. 2001) 5.d5 a4 6.d3 b5
(or 6...xf3+ 7.wxf3±) 7.xb5
b6 8.a4 a6 (Black is trying to
impede his opponent's castling.)
9.a3 (White's knight is headed
for the b5-square.) 9...xa4
10.0-0 ± - and White has a great
lead in development for the
pawn;

3...f6? 4.d5 b4 (Black has
no compensation for the pawn af­
fter: 4...d4 5.dxd4 exd4 6.wxd4
d6 7.b5+ d7 8.d7+ w xd7
9.c3+ Federman - Finch, corr.
1998; while in case of 4...a5
5.e5, Black cannot play 5...h5,
Caspar - Elchenroth, Germany
1997, because of the obvious reac­
tion - 6.g4++, while after: 5...g4
6.h3 h6 7.a3, Black's position is
strategically hopeless and that
3...g5!?, e5 8.b5+ d7 9.e6 w c8 10.c3
f6 11.0-0 d7 12.f4+) 5.c3
f6 (If 5...g6, then White can opt
for the interesting move 6.b5?!
and here a7-a6 deprives Black of
the only square for the retreat of
his knight on b4, while if Black
does not attack his opponent's
bishop - then the pin of the d7-
pawn helps White's offensive in
the centre: 6...f6 7.e5 g4
8.a3 a6 9.e6 fxe6 10.g5 c7
w xd4+ Egeland - Vea, Oslo
2003.) 6.a3 a6 7.e5 g4 8.h3
h6 9.e6 fxe6 10.dxe6 c7 (10...
dxe6 11.b5+! d7 12.xa6++)
11.xh6 gh6 12.e5+- and
Black has no defence against the
maneuver of White's queen to f3,
or to the h5-square;
3...d6 4.d5 (White can also opt for 4.dxc5 dxc5 5...xd8±) 4...e5?!, but then as a result of: 5...exd5 exd5 6...h5! Black must give up a pawn: 6...d6 7...b5+...d7 8...xd7+...xd7 9...xe5...f6 10...c3...a6 11...e6 12...f4+- A.Berg - Canbolat, corr. 1996; after 4...b4 5...a3...a6 6...b5+...d7 7.c4 e5 8.0-0...f6 9...c3...e7, Benito - Sanchez, Binissalem 2002, 10...h4?!±; or 4...a5 5...b5+...d7 6...c3...f6 7...xd7+...xd7 8.0-0...g6 9.e5 dxe5 10...xe5...f5 11...e2...g7 12...b5+...f8, Hamalainen - Hogan, corr. 1996, 13...e1± White can organize an offensive, exploiting the vulnerability of the light squares in his opponent’s camp.) 5...b5+?!...d7 6...xd7+...xd7 7.c4...g6 8...c3...g6 9.0-0...a6 10...b6, Berch - Wammack, corr. 1999, 11...e5±;

The humble move – 3...g6 does not impede the advance of White’s d-pawn either. After 4.d5...b8 (Black’s position remains very difficult after the other retreats of his knight: 4...a5 5...c3...g7 6...e2± Paglilla – Quinteros, San Isidoro 1993, or 4...b4 5...c3...a6, Doel – Walsh, Belconnen 1994, 6.e5 d6 7...b5+...d7 8...b3±) it looks very attractive for White to continue with 5...c3!?...g7 6.e5± and his advantage is doubtless;

As you have seen in the previous lines, Black is in a big trouble after the advance of White’s d-pawn to d5. Therefore the move 3...d5?! might seem logical enough. 4.exd5...xd5 (or 4...xd4? 5...xd4 cxd4 6...xd4...f5 7...c3 7...b5+...d7 8...xd7+...xd7 9.c4 e6 10.0-0...f6 11...g5+- Angermann – Krah, corr. 2002) 5...c3. There might follow: 5...d8 (or 5...d7?? 6.d5--; 5...h5? 6...b5...b8 7...f4 e5, Trienekens – Reichert, Willingen 2001, 8...xe5...xd1+ 9...xd1...xd4 10...f3--; 5...d6, Wienrich – Truelove, corr. 1997, 6...b5!?...b8 7.d5...d4 8...c3...a6 9...a4++ with the unavoidable threat 10...f4; Black can retreat with his queen with tempo 5...e6+, but then after 6...e3! White is again threatening to advance his d-pawn. The exchange in the centre: 6...cxd4 7...xd4...xd4 8...xd4 only enhances the development of White’s pieces: 8...d7 9.0-0-0...h6 10...e4...g4 11...xh6 and here it is equally bad for Black to try: 11...gxh6 12...xf7+...xf7 13...xh8+- Silveira – Nascimento, Brazil 1998, as well as: 11...xd4 12...xd4...xh6 13...xf7+...xf7 14...xd7–) 6.d5...a5 (or 6...d4 7...xd4...xd4 8...xd4...f6, Rusnak – Marek, Plzen 2001, 9...f4 a6 10.0-0-0--; after 6...b8 7...b5+...d7 8...e2 a6 9...xd7+...xd7 10...f4 e6 11.0-0-0...e7 12...d6...f6 13...d5+- Ligon – Miller, USA 1998; or 6...b4 7...a3...a6 8...c4 e6 9.0-0...f6 10...e1+- Vintouch – Riedler, Austria 1995 and White’s attack in the centre was so powerful that both games
were over in just a few moves.)

7.\textit{b}5+ \textit{d}7 8.\textit{e}2 \textit{a}6 9.\textit{xd}7+ \textit{xd}7 10.0-0+ . White’s position is strategically winning. Black’s kingside is practically stalemated and it is far from clear when and how he can develop it.

4.\textit{xd}4

The position on the last diagram is the key starting point of numerous systems. Now, Black must clarify the subsequent scheme of development of his pieces. If we ignore for a while the great amount of theory connected with the Paulsen system 4...\textit{e}6 5.\textit{c}3 (parts 2 and 3) as well as the line 4...\textit{f}6 5.\textit{c}3, which we will analyze in book 10, then there are three basic defensive systems left for Black: 4...\textit{g}6 (Book 11), 4...\textit{b}6 (Chapter 2) and 4...\textit{e}5 (Chapters 3-4). They have a common idea – Black is attacking immediately his opponent’s knight on d4. The first two moves are not so popular anymore presently, but the move 4...\textit{e}5 still can be encountered in super high-level tournaments, including Wijk aan Zee and Linares.

We have also analyzed in the first chapter of this book numerous lines for Black on move four, which are only very seldom played nowadays.
In this chapter we will pay a thorough attention to the lines: 

a) 4 ... \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \), b) 4 ... a6 and c) 4 ... d5.

Black has also tried here some quite strange moves:

4 ... h6?! - This is just a loss of time. 5.\( \underline{\text{e}3} \) e5 (about 5 ... \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) 6.\( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) - see variation a) 6.\( \underline{\text{db5}} \) a6 7.\( \underline{\text{d6+}} \) \( \underline{\text{exd6}} \) 8.\( \underline{\text{exd6}} \) \( \underline{\text{e7}} \) (or 8 ... \( \underline{\text{ge7}} \) 9.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) 0–0 10.0–0–0 \( \underline{\text{e8}} \) 11.\( \underline{\text{g3}} \) \( \underline{\text{a5}} \) 12.\( \underline{\text{c4}} \) \( \underline{\text{b4}} \) 13.\( \underline{\text{xb4}} \) \( \underline{\text{xb4}} \) 14.\( \underline{\text{b6}} \) \( \underline{\text{bc6}} \) 15.\( \underline{\text{d6+}} \) - Germain – Furger, Sherbrooke 2005) 9.\( \underline{\text{xe7+}} \) \( \underline{\text{exxe7}} \) 10.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \)± – and the dark squares remained completely under White’s domination;

4 ... f6?! 5.\( \underline{\text{c3}} \) g6 (about 5 ... \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) 6.\( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) – see 4 ... \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) 5.\( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) f6, variation a; 5 ... e5?! 6.\( \underline{\text{b3}} \) \( \underline{\text{b4}} \) 7.\( \underline{\text{d2}} \) \( \underline{\text{ge7}} \) 8.\( \underline{\text{c4}} \) a6 9.\( \underline{\text{h5+}} \) g6 10.\( \underline{\text{h6}} \) \( \underline{\text{xc3}} \) 11.\( \underline{\text{bxc3}} \) b5 12.\( \underline{\text{g7}} \) \( \underline{\text{f8}} \) 13.\( \underline{\text{h6+}} \) Zalys – Rabinowitz, corr. 1966; 5 ... e6 6.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) a6 7.\( \underline{\text{e2}} \) \( \underline{\text{b4}} \) 8.0–0 \( \underline{\text{xc3}} \) 9.\( \underline{\text{xc6}} \) \( \underline{\text{bxc6}} \) 10.\( \underline{\text{bxc6}} \) d5 11.\( \underline{\text{exd5}} \) \( \underline{\text{cxd5}} \) 12.\( \underline{\text{c4}} \) \( \underline{\text{e7}} \) 13.\( \underline{\text{h5+}} \) \( \underline{\text{g6}} \) 14.\( \underline{\text{f3}} \) \( \underline{\text{b7}} \), Grierson – Barnes, Nelson 1913, 15.\( \underline{\text{e1}} \) \( \underline{\text{c7}} \) 16.\( \underline{\text{e2}} \)\( \underline{\text{f4}} \) 6.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) \( \underline{\text{g7}} \) 7.\( \underline{\text{d2}} \) \( \underline{\text{xd4}} \) 8.\( \underline{\text{xd4}} \) \( \underline{\text{h6}} \) 9.\( \underline{\text{f3}} \) \( \underline{\text{f7}} \) 10.0–0–0 \( \underline{\text{h6}} \) 11.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) \( \underline{\text{xe3}} \) 12.\( \underline{\text{xe3}} \) a6 13.\( \underline{\text{c4}} \) b5 14.\( \underline{\text{b3}} \) \( \underline{\text{b7}} \) 15.\( \underline{\text{e1}} \)± – and White had a great advantage in development, Kuzder – Polyak, Aggtelek 1998;

4 ... \( \underline{\text{e5}} \)?! - That move only enhances White’s initiative in the centre. 5.f4 \( \underline{\text{g6}} \) (Or 5 ... \( \underline{\text{c6}} \), Laureles – Krahl, corr. 2001 6.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) d6 7.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) \( \underline{\text{f6}} \) 8.\( \underline{\text{e2}} \) e6 9.\( \underline{\text{xd4}} \) \( \underline{\text{e7}} \) 10.0–0–0 0–0 11.\( \underline{\text{g4}} \) ± and here it would not work for Black to play: 11 ... \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) 12.\( \underline{\text{xd4}} \) \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) 13.\( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) e5, due to: 14.\( \underline{\text{xe5}} \) \( \underline{\text{exd4}} \) 15.\( \underline{\text{exd6+}} \) – 6.\( \underline{\text{c3}} \) (or 6.\( \underline{\text{f5}} \) \( \underline{\text{e5}} \) 7.\( \underline{\text{c3}} \) \( \underline{\text{f6}} \) 8.\( \underline{\text{c4}} \) d6 9.\( \underline{\text{b5+}} \) \( \underline{\text{d7}} \) 10.\( \underline{\text{e2}} \) a6 11.\( \underline{\text{xd7+}} \) \( \underline{\text{fxd7}} \) 12.0–0 \( \underline{\text{b6}} \) 13.\( \underline{\text{e3}} \) \( \underline{\text{xb2}} \) 14.\( \underline{\text{d5±}} \) Mannion – Damary, Yerevan 1996) 6 ... \( \underline{\text{a6}} \) 7.\( \underline{\text{f5}} \) \( \underline{\text{e5}} \) 8.\( \underline{\text{f4}} \) d6 9.\( \underline{\text{xd2}} \) \( \underline{\text{f6}} \) 10.0–0–0 \( \underline{\text{c7}} \). White’s lead in development is so great
that he wins by force: 11. \( \text{dx}5 \) 12. \( \text{b}5! \) \( \text{ax}5 \) 13. \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{xb}6 \) 14. \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 15. \( \text{c}7+ \) \( \text{d}8 \) 16. \( \text{xa}8+- \). A. Horvath - Zunic, Neum, 2003;

The move 4...b6 is only very seldom played. The reason is quite evident, in case of: 5. \( \text{xc}6!? \) \( \text{dx}6 \) 6. \( \text{xd}8+ \) \( \text{xd}8 \) 7. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) (Black's bishops have no scope for action in that pawn-structure - 7... \( \text{xf}6 \) 8. \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 9.0-0-0+ \( \text{c}8 \) 10. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{cxd}5 \) 12. \( \text{e}6! \) \( \text{f}xe6 \) 13. \( \text{f}e2 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 14. \( \text{he}1 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 15. \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 16. \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 17. \( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 18. \( \text{xe}6+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 19. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{Simmelink - Scholbach, corr. 1999} \) 8.e5↑ and Black is faced with a difficult fight for a draw;

After 4... \( \text{a}5+ \) 5. \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 6. \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 7. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 8. \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 9. \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 10.0-0↑, White has already completed the development of his pieces, while Black has not even started the mobilization of his forces on the kingside, Battikhi - Babikur, Doha 1993;

It is quite acceptable for Black to play the move - 4... \( \text{c}7 \). Only after 5. \( \text{c}3 \), he must take the d5-square under control. The best move for that is 5... e6 (about 5... \( \text{xd}4?! \) 6. \( \text{xd}4 \) - see variation a; as for 5... \( \text{f}6?! \) 6. \( \text{db}5! \) - see 4... \( \text{f}6 \), Book 10; it is too bad for Black to play 5... e5? in view of: 6. \( \text{db}5 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 7. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 8. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 9. \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 10. \( \text{xd}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 11. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 12. \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 13. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 14. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 15.0-0+- S. Christensen - S. Hansen, Gistrup 1997; it is also bad for Black to try 5... a6?, because of 6. \( \text{d}5! \) and now White wins by force after: 6... \( \text{e}5 \) 7. \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 8. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 9. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{xb}2 \) 10. \( \text{c}7+ \) \( \text{d}8 \) 11. \( \text{xa}8 \) e5 12. \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 13.0-0+- Dzwikowski - Grodzensky, corr. 1999, as well as in case of: 6. \( \text{d}8 \) 7. \( \text{e}3 \), because it is acceptable for Black to play neither: 7... e6 8. \( \text{xc}6 \) and 9. \( \text{b}6+- \), nor: 7... \( \text{b}8 \) 8. \( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{a}5+ \) 9. \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{xb}5 \) 10. \( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{xb}6 \) 11. \( \text{xb}6+- \) C.Dominguez - Letelier Martner, Mar del Plata 1961) about 6. \( \text{e}3 \) - see Part 3.

a) 4... \( \text{xd}4 \) 5. \( \text{xd}4 \)

White's queen is centralized now. Usually, similar early activity is not to be recommended. This is another case, though. Black has nothing to attack White's strongest piece with, if he does not make any concessions in the centre.

5... \( \text{a}5+ \)

In case Black ignores his opponent's queen in the centre, he can hardly complete the development of his pieces.

Objectively speaking, the
check with the queen is by far not the best move for Black. We do not plan however, to elaborate on that subject in this chapter. His other more acceptable alternatives will be analyzed later: about 5...e6 6.\(d_3\) - see 4...e6 5.\(d_3\) \(d_4d_4\) (Chapter 5), as for 5...d6 6.\(d_3\) - see the book with 2...d6 (or 2...d6 3.d4 \(cxd_4\) 4.\(d_4d_4\) \(c_6\) 5.\(d_3\) \(x_4d_4\) 6.\(x_4d_4\)), 5...a6 6.\(d_3\) and here about 6...e6 - see Chapter 5, as for 6...d6 - see the book about 2...d6.

5...f6?! 6.\(d_3\) g6 7.\(d_4\) \(h_6\) (After: 7...e6 8.\(e_3\) b6 9.0-0-0 \(c_5\) 10.\(d_3\) \(cxe_3+\), Gahn – Ruthsatz, Germany 1996, White can continue 11.\(x_4e_3+\) and he creates the unpleasant threats 12.\(x_4e_6\), as well as 12.\(b_5\) and 13.\(d_6\),) 8.e5! (The natural move 8.0-0, after 8...e6?, Em. Lasker – Bird, Newcastle on Tyne (m/5) 1892, should bring swift disaster to Black, in view of: 9.\(b_5\) a6 10.\(x_4h_6\) \(x_4h_6\) 11.d6+ \(f_8\) 12.f4++, but it is more resilient for him to try: 8.\(g_7\) 9.f4++; it is attractive for White to play 8.\(d_5\) and after 8...\(f_7\)? 9.\(c_5!\) \(g_7\) 10.\(c_7+\) \(f_8\) 11.\(x_4a_8+\) – Black's position is completely resolvable, Keres – Raud, Tartu 1932, but it is stronger for Black to defend with 8...d6 9.0-0+) 8...\(f_5\) 9.exf6! exf6 (the idea is – 9...\(x_4d_4??\) 10.f7#; while in case of: 9...\(g_7\) 10.\(x_4h_6\) \(x_4h_6\) 11.exf6 exf6 12.0-0 – White's attack is very powerful.) 10.\(e_4+\) \(e_7\) (or 10...\(e_7\) 11.\(f_4+\)) 11.0-0 \(xe_4\) 12.\(xe_4\) \(e_7\) 13.\(e_1\) \(f_8\) 14.\(f_4\) and White has a powerful attack against his opponent's king, stranded in the centre even in case of the trade of queens.

5...h6?! 6.\(c_3\) e6 6...d6 7.e5!? \(dxe_5\) 8.\(xe_5\) 7.\(f_4\) a6, Georgiou – Megaloudis, Athens 2002 (after 7...d6 8.0-0-0– Black loses his d6-pawn) 8.\(a_4\) and White has the tremendously unpleasant threat 9.\(b_5+\)–

5...\(c_7?!\) 6.\(c_3\) e6 (or 6...e5 7.b5! \(b_8\), M.Smith – Vaughn, Detroit 1990, 8.\(c_3+\); 6...d6, Di Natale – L.Vazquez, Villa Ballestier 2003, 7.d5 \(b_8\) 8.b5+ \(d_7\) 9.\(c_4++\) 7.b5! \(xc_2\), R.Fischer – Tordion, Quebec (simultaneous display) 1964, 8.\(d_3\) \(c_6\) 9.\(f_4\) \(d_6\) 10.\(c_1+\)–

It is too early for Black to develop his knight, just like on the third move, 5...\(f_6?!\). After 6.e5, it must retreat to its initial square 6...\(g_8\) (or 6...\(h_5??\) 7.g4++; 6...a5+ 7.\(c_3\) \(g_8\) 8.\(d_2\) \(d_8\) 9.\(c_4++\) – with the idea to follow with 10.\(b_5\), or 10.\(d_5\)). There might follow: 7.\(c_3\) e6 (or 7...d6 8.\(f_4\) dxe5 9.\(xe_5\) e6 10.\(b_5+\) \(d_7\) 11.0-0-0 \(d_6\) 12.\(e_4\) \(e_7\) 13.\(x_4d_7\) \(x_4d_7\) 14.\(xg_7\) \(f_8\) 15.\(d_6+\) \(x_6d_6\) 16.\(x_6d_6++\) – Gerzina – Tamayo, corr. 2001) 8.\(b_5??\) a6 9.\(d_6+\) \(x_6d_6\) 10.\(x_6d_6\) f6 (or 10...\(e_7\) 11.d4 f6 12.\(f_4++\)) 11.exf6 \(xf_6\) 12.\(f_4\) 13.\(xb_2\) 13.\(e_5\) \(xc_2\) 14.\(d_3\) \(c_6\) 15.\(xc_6\) \(xc_6\) 16.\(xg_7++\) – Noble – Ramunno, corr. 1996.
The exchange of queens: 5...\texttt{b6} 6.\texttt{xb6 axb6}, weakens considerably Black's queenside. After: 7.\texttt{xe3 e6} (or 7.\texttt{a4} 8.\texttt{c3} \texttt{b4} 9.b3 \texttt{f6} 10.f3 e6 11.a3-- G.Schmidt – Neumann, corr. 1997; 7...\texttt{a5} 8.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{e5} 9.\texttt{c3} d6 10.0–0–0 \texttt{f6} 11.f4++ Maltez – Beraglia, corr. 1996; 7...\texttt{f6} 8.\texttt{c3} e5, Balsai – Simon, Fuzesabony 2001, 9.\texttt{b5} \texttt{a4} 10.f3 \texttt{c5} 11.b3 \texttt{xe3} 12.bxa4+) 8.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{f6} 9.\texttt{d3} d5 10.e5 \texttt{d7} 11.\texttt{d4} b6 12.\texttt{c3}± – Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient, Foord – Calton, Flint 1992.

White maintains a powerful initiative after: 5...\texttt{b6} 6.\texttt{c3} \texttt{b7} (or 6...\texttt{f6}?! Vasquez Ramirez – Meira, Cascavel 1996, 7.e5 \texttt{g8} 8.\texttt{f4} \texttt{b7} 9.0–0–0–++) 7.\texttt{e3} e6, O.Hansen – Pranzas, Schleswig Holstein 1989, 8.0–0–0 and he has a great lead in development.

6.\texttt{c3}

\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}

6...\texttt{e5}

Now, the d5-outpost will be chronically weak in Black's camp. After 6...\texttt{e6} 7.\texttt{d2} \texttt{b4} 8.\texttt{d3}±, his position would be even worse, because of his considerable lag in development, Podlesnik – Krnicar, Bled 1992.

7.\texttt{c4}

The other retreats of the queen still lead to a better position for White.

7...\texttt{f6}

Black's position would be quickly in ruins after: 7...\texttt{c5} 8.\texttt{d2} \texttt{b6} 9.\texttt{d5} \texttt{c6} 10.\texttt{c3} \texttt{d6} 11.\texttt{g3} g6 12.\texttt{c3} f6 13.0–0–0 b5 14.h4+- Ashby – C.Sanchez, corr. 2000.

Black's situation is rather suspicious in case of: 7...\texttt{b4} 8.\texttt{d2} d6 (or 8...\texttt{e7} 9.a3 \texttt{c6} 10.\texttt{d1} \texttt{xc3} 11.\texttt{xc3} \texttt{c7} 12.\texttt{d5} 0–0 13.\texttt{c4} a6 14.\texttt{d6} \texttt{xd6} 15.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{e8} 16.\texttt{d2} \texttt{f8} 17.\texttt{e3} \texttt{e7} 18.\texttt{hd1}– Brennecke – Wolf, corr. 2001) 9.a3 \texttt{xc3} 10.\texttt{xc3} \texttt{b6} 11.\texttt{d1} \texttt{e6}, Saint Amour – Wochnik, corr. 1998. White can play: 12.\texttt{a4}!? \texttt{d7} 13.\texttt{b4} \texttt{f6} 14.\texttt{xb6} axb6 15.f3 \texttt{e7} 16.\texttt{b4} \texttt{e8} 17.\texttt{e2}±, creating new pawn-weaknesses in Black's camp.

8.\texttt{d2}

It is obviously weaker for White to play: 8.\texttt{g5} \texttt{b4} 9.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{gxf6} 10.0–0–0 \texttt{xc3} 11.bxc3 d6 12.\texttt{b4} \texttt{xb4} 13.\texttt{xb4} \texttt{e7} 14.\texttt{c4} \texttt{g8} 15.g3 \texttt{g4}– Cavril – Debrus, corr. 1995. According to chess logic, Black should strive to trade queens in the pawn-structure after his move six, because he would then solve his defensive problems with his d6-pawn much easier.
8...\textit{b}6 9.\textit{e}3!?

White has often tried in practice here 9.0-0-0, threatening 10.\textit{b}5.

9...\textit{b}4 10.0-0-0 \textit{xc}4

Black has exchanged queens indeed, but at the price of a considerable lag in development.

11...\textit{g}4 12.\textit{b}5 \textit{xe}3 13. \textit{fxe}3 \textit{d}8

If Black is reluctant to give up his f7-pawn, then after: 13...\textit{e}7 14.\textit{d}6 \textit{f}6 15.\textit{d}2 \textit{g}6 16.\textit{hd}1 \textit{h}6 17.\textit{xc}8+ \textit{xc}8 18.\textit{xd}7+ \textit{f}8 19.\textit{b}3 \textit{xe}3+ 20.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}5 21.\textit{f}7+ \textit{e}8 22.\textit{h}7+ the game might be quickly over, Lategui – F.Martinez, corr. 1999.

14.\textit{xf}7 \textit{c}5

Black's pieces are stranded on the queenside and after: 14...\textit{b}4 15.\textit{hf}1 \textit{f}8 16.\textit{d}5 \textit{a}5 17.\textit{c}3 \textit{xf}1 18.\textit{xf}1 \textit{c}5 19.\textit{f}7 \textit{xe}3+ 20.\textit{c}2+– Jaskula – van Esbroeck, corr. 1999, he failed to offer any resistance.

15.\textit{hf}1± – Black can hardly save that position, because of his catastrophic lag in development.

b) 4...a6

5.\textit{c}3

That is a usual move for the Sicilian Defence. White wishes to complete the development of his queenside according to the scheme \textit{e}3, \textit{d}2, 0–0–0, in case Black does not do anything active in the centre in the nearest future.

5...\textit{e}5

About 5...\textit{e}6 – see 4...\textit{e}6 5.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}6. In case of 5...\textit{d}6 6.\textit{e}3, there arises a position, which we will analyze after the following order of moves – 2...\textit{d}6 3.\textit{d}4 \textit{cxd}4 4.\textit{xd}4 \textit{c}6. About 5...\textit{g}6 6.\textit{e}3 – see Book 11 (The Dragon variation).

6.\textit{f}5

White's knight is just perfectly placed on f5, impeding the development of Black's kingside.

6...\textit{d}6

About 6...\textit{f}6 7.\textit{d}6 \textit{xd}6 8.\textit{xd}6 – see 4...\textit{e}5 5.\textit{b}5 \textit{a}6 6. \textit{d}6 \textit{xd}6 7.\textit{xd}6 \textit{f}6 8.\textit{c}3.

Black cannot free his position with the help of the move – 6...\textit{d}5, He sacrifices a pawn: 7.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xf}5 8.\textit{exf}5 \textit{a}5+ (or 8...\textit{f}6 9.\textit{c}4 \textit{e}7
Chapter 1

10...e3 0–0 11.c3 ♕d6, Geenen – Werner, Belgium 2001, 12.♗b6!? ♕ad8 13.♕xd6 ♕xd6 14.♕d1+–)
9...♗d2 ♘b4 (or 9...b4 10.♗xb4 ♘xb4 11.c3 ♘c6, Gaponenko – Thorhallsson, Reykjavik 2006,
9...d6 10.c3 ♘c6 11.♗d1 ♘d8 12.♗c4 ♘f6 13.0–0 ♕e4 14.♗f4 ♘c5 15.♗b3 0–0 16.♗e3 ♗c6 17.♗ad1 ♘ad8 18.♗d4 ♘d7
19.h3 ♗fd8 20.♗e3+–, but his compensation is insufficient, Rendon – L. Guzman, Columbia 1988.

Black’s position is not any better after: 6...♗b4 7.♗xb4+?? ♘f8 8.♗h5! (In case of 8.♕xf5, Brusco – Miguel, Pan American 1998,
and 8...d5?!, Black would have some counterplay.) 8... ♗h4 9. ♗g3 ♗f6 10.♗d3+–

After 6...h6, Daponta – Spyrou, Greece 2002, White has the choice between the prosaic move 7.♗c4± and the sharper line: 7.♗e3 d6
(The variation: 7...♗f6 8.♕d6+ ♘xd6 9.♕xd6 ♕e7 10.♗c5±, leads to a position, in which the d7-pawn will remain for long on its place.) 8.♕d5 ♗xf5 9.exf5 ♕c8
10.c3 ♗ge7 11.♗b6 ♕c7 12.♕f3 d5 13.0–0–0 d4 14.♗b1±

7.♗c4?!

White’s bishop occupies immediately the strategically important a2–g8 diagonal. Black has three main possibilities: b1) 7...♗xf5,
b2) 7...♗f6 and b3) 7...♕e6.

He has tried sometimes 7...g6. There might follow: 8.♕e3 ♗f6 9.♕e5 (After 10.♕e3, Black’s position becomes rather unpleasant and he should try to release the tension somehow.) 9...♗xd5 9...
♗g4? 10.f3 ♗h6 11.♗e3+– Kutzovic – Kusterle, Nova Gorica 1999) 10.♗xd5!? (White plans to castle queenside, but he can also consider the simple line: 10.♗xd5 ♘e6, Melnikov – Dubinka, St. Petersburg 1999 and here after: 11.♗e3? ♕c8 12.♗b6 ♕h4 13.0–0 ♗g7 14.♖c7+ ♕xc7 15.♗xe6 ♕e7
16.♗d5± White could have remained with a clear advantage.) 10...♖g7 11.♗e3 ♗e7 12.♗d2 ♗xd5 (after 12...0–0 13.0–0–0–0–0 White has problems defending against his opponent’s kingside attack, without the exchange on d5) 13.♕xd5 0–0 14.♕b6 ♕b8 15.
0–0–0 ♕h4 (After 15...♗e6 16.h4 h5 17.♕xd6+– Black has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn.)
16.f3 ♗e6 17.♖g5 ♕h5 18.h4+– and Black’s queen was trapped in the game Milliet – Ragot, France 2003.

b1) 7...♗xf5 8.exf5

The exchange on f5 should not be good for Black. If White manages to complete his development
without losing his f5-pawn, Black’s position will be very difficult from the strategical point of view. The central d5 and e4-squares will be then totally dominated by White.

8...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}6\) 9.0–0

Or 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}5\) – see line b2.

9...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}8\)

In fact, Black has no time for the move – 9...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}7\), Roca Diaz – Navarro Alvarez, Sant Boi 1997, due to 10.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}5\) (planning 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}3\)) 10...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}4\) 11.c3 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}5\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}3\) 0–0 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}7\). Black’s bishop on e7 is like a pawn and his position is very bad.

10.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}5\)!

White’s light-squared bishop needs a safe outpost on the a2-g8 diagonal. The d5-square is just perfect for that, except that the knight on f6 must be exchanged before that.

10...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}4\)

In case of the immediate exchange of the knights – 10...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\text{d5}\), White can play: 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\text{d5}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}7\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}5\) (after 12.c3 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}7\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}5\) Black succeeds in organizing some counterplay) 12...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}4\) 13.c3 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}5\) (or 13...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}5\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}f5\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}7\)+–) 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}3\)? (This is more to the point that: 14.f4 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}6\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}7\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}4\) 14...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}6\) (After: 14...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}e3\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}e3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}6\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}7\) Black loses a couple of pawns on the queenside.) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}5\) 16.a4 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}a4\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}6\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}6\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}8\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}3\)+. Black has two extra pawns, but that should not make you evaluate the position wrongly. His king has lost its castling rights, the knight on h6 is totally helpless and his light squares are quite vulnerable.

11.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}f6\)+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}f6\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}7\)

If 12...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c2\), then the simplest line for White is: 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}3\)! \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}7\) (or 13...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}5\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}b7\)+–) 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d4\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d4\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}4\)+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}8\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}c1\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}7\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d4\)+–

The other possible capture of that pawn – 12...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c2\), after 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}b7\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}7\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}1\) (or 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}4\)! \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}b7\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}4\)+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}7\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c2\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}5\) 14...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}7\) (or 14...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}f5\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}6\)++) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}4\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}4\)+ would not save Black from serious trouble.

13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}7\)

Or 13...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c2\)? 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}6\)+–

Capturing – 13...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}f5\)? is bad for Black due to P.Blatny’s recommendation: 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}6\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}7\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}4\)! \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}7\) (or 15...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}7\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}4\)+–) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d5\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}xd5\)+–

14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}6\)

Black’s knight must retreat, because he loses after 14...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}f5\)?, in view of 15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}4\)+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}8\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}6\)+–

15.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}6\)

Black is trying to exploit somehow the placement of his rook on
h8. The standard move 15...0-0, would enable White to develop his initiative with the help of the move 16.g3!±, with the rather unpleasant threat 17.h4 and 18.\( \texttt{g} \texttt{g}5 \) (recommended by P. Blatny).

16.\( \texttt{fxg6} \texttt{hxg6} \)

Black's move 16...\( \texttt{w} \texttt{xg6} \)!, does not combine well with his previous move, moreover that after: 17.\( \texttt{wh3} \texttt{0-0} \texttt{18.f4} \) Black comes under a dangerous attack.

17.f4!?

In case of 17.g3, White obviously did not like the response – 17...\( \texttt{w} \texttt{f5} \)!

17...\( \texttt{wh4} \texttt{18.wxh4} \texttt{hxh4} \texttt{19.g3} \texttt{f6} \)

If 19...\( \texttt{e7} \), then 20.\( \texttt{f5} \)!

20.\( \texttt{b6} \texttt{d7} \texttt{21.ad1} \texttt{0-0} \)

Black loses immediately after 21...\( \texttt{e7} \)!, because of 22.\( \texttt{xf7} \) + \( \texttt{xf7} \texttt{23.fx} \texttt{e5} \) +

After 21...\( \texttt{d8} \)? 22.\( \texttt{xd8} \texttt{xd8} \) (The other two possible captures are not any better for Black: 22...\( \texttt{xd8} \texttt{23.xc6} \texttt{bxc6} \texttt{24.fxe5} \texttt{dxe5} \texttt{25.xd8+} \texttt{xd8} \texttt{26.fx} \texttt{f7} +; or 22...\( \texttt{x} \texttt{xd8} \texttt{23.xc6} \texttt{bxc6} \texttt{24.fx} \texttt{e5} \) +) 23.\( \texttt{fxe5} \texttt{dxe5} \texttt{24.dx} \texttt{f7} ++ \) and White enters a rook and pawn endgame with an extra pawn for him.

Possibly Black's best chance here is: 21...\( \texttt{exf4} \texttt{22.xf4} \texttt{e} \texttt{e5} \), but after 23.\( \texttt{f2} \) White's advantage is more than obvious.

This position was reached in the game Illescas Cordoba – Bellon Lopez, Seville 1992. After 22.\( \texttt{f5} \) White consolidated his advantage along the light squares even more; meanwhile Black's bishop had no good prospects at all.

b2) 7...\( \texttt{d6} \)

8.\( \texttt{g5} \)!

White wishes to reduce the control of his opponent's pieces over the d5-outpost. He has also tested in practice numerous times the move – 8.\( \texttt{e3} \).
8...\texttt{$\underline{\texttt{xf5}}$}  
After 8...h6 9.\texttt{$\underline{x}$xf6 $\underline{x}$xf6 10.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d5 $\underline{d}$8, Bilgen – Mijatovic, Duesseldorf 2004, White’s strategy triumphs, particularly if he follows with 11.c3±.  

9.\texttt{$\underline{exf5}$} $\underline{e7}$  
Black’s situation is just terrible after: 9...\texttt{$\underline{a}$}a5 10.\texttt{$\underline{xf6}$} gxf6 11.\texttt{$\underline{h}$}h5 d5 12.\texttt{$\underline{xd}$}xd5 0–0–0 13.\texttt{$\underline{x}$}xc6 bxc6, Dietrich – Eichler, Germany 1998, 14.\texttt{$\underline{xf7}$} $\underline{a}$a3? 15.\texttt{$\underline{b}$}b3+-  
In case of 9...\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d4, Elder – Mah Jabeen, Adelaide 1988, White should also exchange on f6. After: 10.\texttt{$\underline{xf6}$} $\underline{xf6}$ 11.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d5 $\underline{xf5}$ 12.\texttt{$\underline{c}$}c7+ $\underline{d}$d8, Black’s counterplay would not work, because of: 13.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d3! e4 14.\texttt{$\underline{xa}$}xa8 exd3 15.cxd3 $\underline{c}$c8 16.0–0 $\underline{xa}$xa8 17.\texttt{$\underline{h}$}h5± and if he does not wish to lose his knight (White is threatening 18.\texttt{$\underline{h}$}h4+.), Black must give up his f7-pawn.  

10.\texttt{$\underline{xf6}$} $\underline{x}$xf6 11.0–0  
White must simply complete his development. The bishops are of opposite colour indeed, but they are not of equal value at all. White has a clear advantage thanks to his control over the light squares. The complications after: 11.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}e4 $\underline{d}$d4 12.c3 d5 13.\texttt{$\underline{xf6}$}+ (or 13.cxd4 $\underline{d}$xc4 14.d5 $\underline{a}$a5∞ Koba – Schupljak, Yaroslavl 1995) 13...\texttt{gxf6} 14.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d3 $\underline{c}$c6∞ Szalanczy – Fodre, Dortmund 1987 are completely unnecessary for White.  

11...\texttt{$\underline{Ec8}$}  
If Black tries to capture his opponent’s f5-pawn with: 11...\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d7?! 12.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d5 $\underline{d}$d8 13.\texttt{$\underline{h}$}h5 $\underline{d}$d4 14.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d3 $\underline{e7}$ 15.c3 $\underline{c}$c6, W.Huebner – Schemmel, Bad Ems 2005, he loses several tempi and White wins after: 16.f6! g6 (or 16...\texttt{$\underline{x}$}xf6 17.\texttt{$\underline{f}$}f5+-) 17.\texttt{$\underline{h}$}h4+-  

12.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d5 0–0 13.\texttt{$\underline{c}$}c3± – Black’s position is very difficult. White has blocked his opponent’s central pawns on the light squares.  

b3) 7...\texttt{$\underline{e6}$}  

8.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d5  
White occupies the d5-outpost at an opportune moment.  

8...\texttt{$\underline{b}$}5  
The exchange – 8...\texttt{$\underline{xf5}$} 9.\texttt{e}xf5, in comparison to variation \texttt{b1}, looks like a loss of time. It is not amazing that after: 9...\texttt{$\underline{b}$}5 10.\texttt{$\underline{d}$}d3 $\underline{g}$e7 11.\texttt{$\underline{e}$}e4 $\underline{c}$c8 12.\texttt{$\underline{g}$}g5 $\underline{d}$d4 13.c3 $\underline{dc}$6 14.f6+- Black re-
signed in the game Milos – Marcelino, Sao Caetano 1999.

In answer to: 8...c8 9.0–0 d4, Rosen – Hunold, Menden 1974, it seemed quite attractive for White to follow with 10.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{fe3}\) and then 11.c3.

9.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{b3}\) c8

After 9...g6 10.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{fe3}\) d4 11.c3 \(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{b3}\) 12.axb3 e7 13.c4 \(\text{\texttt{bxc4}}\), White's exiled knight might come quite handy – 14.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{xc4}\)! (It is also good for White to play 14.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{xc4}\)+, but capturing the knight is even better.) 14...f6 15.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{xd6+1!}\) xd6 (or 15...xd6 16.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{xf6+}\) xf6 17.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{d6+}--\)) 16.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{xf6+}\) d8, Voulidis – Grivas, Athens 1996. Here, after: 17.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f3}\) c7 18.0–0+- it would be practically impossible for Black's king to find a safe haven.

10.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e3}\) g6, Delanoy – Fodre, Paris 1990. White can continue with: 11.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{b6}!\) f7 12.\(\text{\texttt{dfe3}\}g7}\) 13.a4!± and he destroys Black's fortifications on the queenside, using his b5-pawn as a target.

c) 4...d5 5.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{b5}\)

White is trying to exploit his lead in development.

5...dxe4

This capture is practically forced.

After 5...\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d6}\) 6.exd5 \(\text{\texttt{xd5}}\) 7.\(\text{\texttt{xc6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd1+}}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{xd1}}\) a6 9.\(\text{\texttt{xc7+}}\) axb5 10.\(\text{\texttt{xc8}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xc8}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e1+}\) e7 12.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d2}\) h6 13.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c3}+--\), Black loses a pawn and he ends up in a lost position, Jimenez – Hebbelynck, corr. 1999.

5...\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d7}?!\) – This move is also unsatisfactory for Black: 6.exd5 \(\text{\texttt{xd4}}\) (or 6...\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{b4}\)?) 7.\(\text{\texttt{xd7+}}\) xd7 8.c4+– Palininks – Karkus, Hungary 2002) 7.\(\text{\texttt{xd7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd7}}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{xc4}}\) e6 (or 8...f6, Kitov – Shensnovich, Tula 2005, 9.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c3}\) \(\text{\texttt{d8}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f4}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd5}}\) 11.0–0–0 \(\text{\texttt{xc3}}\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{xc3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xc8}}\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{xd8+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd8}}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{a1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{a8}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{c7+}--\}) 9.\(\text{\texttt{c3}}\) f6, Praedel – Tumpkin, Detroit East 1984. White could have returned temporarily his extra pawn with: 10.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e3}!\) \(\text{\texttt{xd5}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{xc5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd5}}\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{xd5}}\) exd5 13.0–0–0± and he could have exploited his lead in development.

6.\(\text{\texttt{xc6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xd1+}}\)

Black is now forced to exchange queens.

In case of: 6...\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{xc6}\)? 7.\(\text{\texttt{xc6+}}\) d7 8.\(\text{\texttt{xa8}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xa8}}\) 9.0–0 g6 (or
9...e5 10.\(d\)c3 f5 11.\(\mathbb{W}\)d5 \(\mathbb{W}\)b8 12.\(\mathbb{W}\)d1 \(\mathbb{W}\)f6 13.\(\mathbb{W}\)b3 \(\mathbb{W}\)c8 14.\(\mathbb{W}\)e3+ – Juergens – Ales Garcia, Germany 1994) 10.\(\mathbb{W}\)c3 \(\mathbb{W}\)g7 11.\(\mathbb{W}\)e3 \(\mathbb{W}\)f6 12.\(\mathbb{W}\)d4+ – Padalkin – Doroginsky, Kiev 2002, his compensation for the exchange is insufficient.

7.\(\mathbb{W}\)xd1

White has temporarily an extra piece, but he cannot keep it.

7...\(\mathbb{a}\)6

Both sides are forced now to play only moves.

It is understandable that Black cannot capture the knight, because after: 7...bxc6?? 8.\(\mathbb{W}\)xc6+ \(\mathbb{W}\)d7 9.\(\mathbb{W}\)xa8+– he loses a rook. It is also lost for him if he tries: 7...\(\mathbb{a}\)d7? 8.\(\mathbb{W}\)d4 e5 9.\(\mathbb{W}\)xd7+ \(\mathbb{W}\)xd7 10.\(\mathbb{W}\)b3+– Brattin – Tumpkin, Detroit East 1984, as well as 7...\(\mathbb{a}\)g4+? 8.\(\mathbb{W}\)f3 \(\mathbb{W}\)d7 9.\(\mathbb{W}\)d4 \(\mathbb{W}\)d8 10.\(\mathbb{W}\)e2 \(\mathbb{W}\)xb5+ 11.\(\mathbb{W}\)xb5+– Bisguier – Mc Cord, Pittsburgh 1946.

8.\(\mathbb{a}\)a4

After the retreat of White's knight: 8.\(\mathbb{W}\)d4+?! axb5 9.\(\mathbb{W}\)xb5 \(\mathbb{a}\)g4+ 10.\(\mathbb{W}\)e1 \(\mathbb{W}\)d8 11.\(\mathbb{W}\)c3 f5\(\mathbb{W}\), Black has the better position, because of his powerful centre and his bishop pair, Terrill – Varas, corr. 2002.

If White captures the e7-pawn, then Black has an easy road to equality: 8.\(\mathbb{W}\)xe7+ \(\mathbb{W}\)xe7 9.\(\mathbb{W}\)e2 (9.\(\mathbb{W}\)c4, Jentzsch – Preiss, Duisburg 2004, 9...\(\mathbb{W}\)e6 10.\(\mathbb{W}\)xe6 \(\mathbb{W}\)xe6=) 9...\(\mathbb{W}\)e6 10.\(\mathbb{W}\)c3 \(\mathbb{W}\)d8+ 11.\(\mathbb{W}\)e1 f5 12.\(\mathbb{W}\)g5+ \(\mathbb{W}\)f6 13.f3 h6 14.\(\mathbb{W}\)e3 \(\mathbb{W}\)d5 15.\(\mathbb{W}\)xd5+ \(\mathbb{W}\)xd5= J.Schneider – Kropp, Wallertheim 1992.

8...\(\mathbb{W}\)d7 9.\(\mathbb{W}\)c3

Now, Black can capture White's knight in two ways: c1) 9...bxc6 and c2) 9...\(\mathbb{W}\)xc6.

\[\text{c1) 9...bxc6}\]

10.\(\mathbb{W}\)xe4

The material equality has been restored. White cannot castle anymore, but Black has pawn-weaknesses in his camp.

10...0–0–0

It is not good for Black to play 10...e6?!, because after: 11.\(\mathbb{W}\)f4! \(\mathbb{W}\)e7 12.\(\mathbb{W}\)d6+ \(\mathbb{W}\)xd6 13.\(\mathbb{W}\)xd6 \(\mathbb{W}\)f6 14.f3 \(\mathbb{W}\)d5 15.\(\mathbb{W}\)e2 \(\mathbb{W}\)b6 16.\(\mathbb{W}\)b3 \(\mathbb{W}\)c8 17.\(\mathbb{W}\)c5 \(\mathbb{W}\)d5 18.\(\mathbb{W}\)ad1 \(\mathbb{W}\)c7 19.\(\mathbb{W}\)d2 f6 20.\(\mathbb{W}\)hd1 \(\mathbb{W}\)b7 21.c4 \(\mathbb{W}\)f4+ 22.\(\mathbb{W}\)f2± White managed to obtain the two-bishop advantage in the

If 10...e5, then it deserves attention for White to try: 11.\(\text{c}e3\)! f5 (or 10...0–0–0 11.\(\text{b}6\)!\(\text{f}\)!) 12.\(\text{c}5\) f4 (after: 12...\(\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}5\), it is very strong for White to continue with 14.\(\text{h}d1\)! and now the line: 14...\(\text{dxe3}\) 15.\(\text{x}d7\) \(\text{xc5}\) 16.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{c}7\)+ \(\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{xc8}\)+ \(\text{xc8}\) 19.\(\text{fxe3}\) leads to a position with an extra pawn for White, while in case of: 14...\(\text{dxe3}\) 15.\(\text{xc5}\) 0–0–0 16.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 17.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{xb6}\)+ \(\text{xb6}\) 19.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{c}7\) 20.\(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{he8}\) 21.\(\text{b}3\) e4 22.f4! exf3 23.\(\text{xf3}\)+ Black’s pieces are tied up with the protection of the pawn on c6 and the bishop on d7, Unzicker – Steiner, Krems 1967) 13.\(\text{xd7}\) \(\text{xd7}\) 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}6\) 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}6\) (after 15...\(\text{e}7\) 16.\(\text{ad1}\) a5 17.\(\text{he1}\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{he8}\), Charlesworth – Truscott, Nottingham 1946, White can use the e4-square as a transfer point: 19.\(\text{e}4\)! \(\text{d}5\) 20.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}7\) 21.\(\text{c}3\)±) 16.\(\text{ad1}\)+ – White maintains his advantage thanks to his bishop pair, Borisek – Barle, Ptuj 2005. Black’s central pawns on e5 and f4 are placed on squares of the same colour as his bishop and that is advantageous for White.

11.\(\text{e}2\) e5 12.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}6\)

Black loses a pawn after: 12...\(\text{c}7\)!! 13.\(\text{ad1}\) f5 14.\(\text{c}5\) f4 15.\(\text{xa6}\)+ \(\text{c}8\) 16.\(\text{c}5\)+ Torrente – Galan, Malaga 2005. In case of: 12...f5 13.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{xe5}\) 14.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{hd1}\)+ White has the two-bish-


13.\(\text{g}6\)\(\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{c}4\) h6 15.\(\text{f}3\) e4 16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{d}6\)\(\text{c}\) Magergut – Fridstein, Moscow 1947.

13...\(\text{gxf6}\) 14.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{e}8\)

15.\(\text{h}d1\)+ – White is clearly better, because of his superior pawn-structure.

c2) 9...\(\text{xc6}\)

10.\(\text{xc6}\)+

Now, just like in variation c1, Black’s queenside pawn-structure will have defects.

10...\(\text{bxc6}\) 11.\(\text{xe4}\)

(diagram)

11...\(\text{e}5\)

Black has tried numerous
moves in practice here. It looks like the worst is – 11...\texttt{xf6}, since after: 12.\texttt{xf6+} \texttt{gx6} Black’s pawn-chain is considerably compromised. There might follow, for example: 13.\texttt{e2 g8} (After: 13...f5 14.d1 d8 15.e3 g7 16.xd8+ xd8 17.d1+ c8 18.d4 g8 19.g3, the bishops were exchanged later and the rook and pawn endgame ended up in favour of White, Tissir – Belkhodja, Cairo 2003.) 14.g3 b8 (Following: 14...e5 15.d1 e7 16.d3 f5 17.b3 g7 18.g5+ e6 19.d1 ab8 20.b3 f4 21.b3 xg3 22.xg3 f8 23.e3 f6 24.d7+ White occupied the d-file, A.Kovacevic – Barle, Ljubjana 2004; as a result of: 14...f5 15.e3 g7 16.ab1 e5 17.hd1 g4 18.b3 h5 19.d3 d6 20.b1 h4 21.f3 hxg3 22.hxg3 e4 23.h1+ White’s rook again managed to occupy the open file, Tatar Kis – Szuk, Hungary 2005.) 15.d1 e5 16.d3 e7 17.b3 d7 18.e3+ – White’s position was better thanks to his pawn-structure in the game, Pfrommer – E.Mueller, Lampertheim 2000.

There might arise a similar situation after 11...e6. In that position Black has tried 12.e3 (White is slightly better too after: 12.e2 d8 13.e3 f6 14.xf6+ gx6 15.hd1 R.Fischer – Vine, New York 1956.) 12...\texttt{f6} 13.xf6+ gxf6 14.e2 0–0–0 (As a result of: 14...b8 15.b3 g8 16.ad1 e5 17.g3 a3 18.d3 e7 19.c3 gc8 20.c4 a8 21.ad1 e6 22.d3 e7 23.dc3 d5 24.h4 h8 25.f4+ Black’s pieces were tied up to protect the pawn-weaknesses, Michel – Ulrich, Bad Elster 1937; after 14...g8 15.g3 0–0–0 16.hd1 e7 17.xd8+ xd8, Szymczak – Sygulski, Warsaw 1983, White had to avoid exchanging the second pair of rooks and to fix Black’s kingside pawns with the move: 18.g4!±) 15.ad1 e7 16.xd8+ xd8 17.g4! (That is a typical idea in similar positions.) 17.d7 18.f4 d8 19.f1 e8 20.f3 f8 21.e2 b7 22.c3 b5 23.d3 d5 24.d4+ – Black had to be very careful protecting his pawn-weaknesses, Tiviakov – Ermenkov, Calcutta 1993.

The pawn-structure was more or less similar after: 11...0–0–0+ 12.e2 e5 13.e3 f6 14.xf6 gxf6 15.ad1 e7 16.g4 c7 17.f3 h5 18.h3 hxg4+ 19.hxg4 xh1 20.xh1 d7 21.e4 e6 22.e4 b8 23.b3 a5 24.f4 a4, in the game Luukkanen – Kosonen, Jarvanpaa 1998. White could have continued with 25.d1!, creating the very unpleasant threat – 26.f5#.

The line: 11.d8+ 12.e2 e5 13.e3 f5 14.d2 e7 15.c4
Chapter 1

e4, Cox – Holanda, corr. 2002, 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)a5!? \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c8 17.f3\(\uparrow\) would have led to a position, in which Black would be very much behind in development and he would have to protect his weak pawns.

After 11...g6 12.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)g7, Sarreens – Del Rio Angelis, Andorra la Vella 2006, White had to continue the fight for an advantage with the line: 13.c3! \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6 14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c5 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d5 15.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e1\(\downarrow\). His superior pawn-structure would have provided him with a slight edge then.

In case of: 11...f5 12.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d2 e5 (After: 12...g6 13.c3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)g7 14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c2 e5 15.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c4 e4 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6 17.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)ad1 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d5 18.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c5 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f8 19.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d4 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)g8 20.f3 exf3 21.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)he1+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e7 22.gxf3 0–0–0 23.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)a5 c5 24.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f2\(\downarrow\) Black’s advanced central pawns only helped White to open new files for his rooks, Pliester – Z. Polgar, Aruba 1992.) 13.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c4 0–0–0+ 14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e2 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6 and there arises the same position, as after 11...e5.

12.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e2

12...f5

Black repels his opponent’s knight from the e4-square.

Following: 12...h6 13.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d1 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d8 14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e3 f5, the knight can remain at its place. The point is that after: 15.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)xd8+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)xd8 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d1+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c7, Betko – Meszaros, Sala 1991, White has a very powerful argument: 17.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d2! \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)b6 (if 17...fxe4, then White regains his piece with: 18.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)a5+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)b7 19.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d7+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c8 20.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d8+–) 18.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)g3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e7 19.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c3\(\downarrow\) and White is clearly better.

After: 12...\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6 13.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)xf6+ gxf6 14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d7 15.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)hd1+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e6 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e7 17.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c3\(\downarrow\) White has a powerful pressure, due to his better pawn-structure, Meszaros – Borgo, Brno 2006.

13.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d2

White’s knight is redeployed to the c4-square in order to attack the e5-pawn.

The consequences of the knight’s maneuver deep into enemy lines do not seem to be so clear to me: 13.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)g5 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6 14.b3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e7 15.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e6 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f7 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)g5+ \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e8\(\infty\), Khashdan – Sandrin, South Fallsburg 1948.

13...\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6

Black has also tried here: 13...\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d6 14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c4 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c7 15.b3 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)f6 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)b2 0–0–0 17.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)he1 e4, A. Sokolov – Szabolcsi, France 2004, but after 18.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)e3!?’’ White could have emphasized the fact that Black’s central pawns were not so reliably protected.

14.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c4 0–0–0

It is instructive that after: 14...\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d7?’’ 15.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)d1 (It is also good for White to follow with: 15.b3 0–0–0 16.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)b2 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c5 17.\(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)ad1 \(\text{\textctt{Q}}\)c7

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1.e4 c5 2.\&f3 \&c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.\&xd4

18.\&c3± Izbinski – Krogulski, Polisha Zdroj 1999.) 15...h6 16.\&d2 \&e7 17.\&c3 \&e6 18.\&xd7 \&xd7 19.\&b6+ \&c7 20.\&xa8+ \&b7 21.\&d1 \&xa8 22.\&d8+ \&b7 23.\&b4+- in the game Hamina – Soovares, corr. 1988, Black resigned.

15.b3

It is weaker for White to play 15.\&xe5, because of: 15...\&e8 16.f4 \&d6 17.\&f3 \&xe5 18.fxe5 \&xe5 19.\&f4 \&e6 20.\&he1 \&e4= Bernard – Brochet, France 2002.

15...\&d6 16.\&b2 \&he8 17.\&hd1 \&d5 18.\&xd6+ \&xd6 19.g3±

White preserves some edge in this position, mostly thanks to his better pawn-structure. It might be also essential that his bishop is stronger than Black's knight.

Conclusion

Black has many possibilities at his disposal on move four, but that should not make you change the correct evaluation of his prospects. His moves can be divided in two not so equal categories: 4...d5 (variation c) and all the rest. The correct appraisal of the second group has been made long ago and that is – Black has serious difficulties. In variation a, he falls behind in development considerably, while in variation b, his pawn-structure presents White with a clear advantage. Meanwhile, it is essential that White's bishop manages to occupy the a2-g8 diagonal and his knight on d4 not only does not retreat from the centre, on the contrary – it is redeployed to a more active position. Our negative evaluation of the rest of Black's possibilities, which have been mentioned in short at the beginning of the chapter, should not put you in any doubt about that too.

Concerning variation c, Black manages to simplify the position indeed, but only at the price of compromising his pawn-structure on the queenside. That type of playing seems not to be so attractive to the adherents to the Sicilian Defence nowadays. In fact, White does not risk anything and the maximum that Black can rely on is a draw, since he has practically no chances of seizing the initiative whatsoever.
Chapter 2

1.e4 c5 2.d3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.cxd4 b6

The main idea of Black's last move is to transpose to the basic positions of the Sicilian Defence with an extra tempo for White, which has been used in fact to retreat his knight away from the centre.

5.d3

In this position, Black plays most often the moves a) 5...e6 and b) 5...b4.

It is easier for White to claim the advantage after Black's other moves:

About 5...b4 6.d3 e6 – see 5...e6 6.d3 b4; as for 5...a6 6.d3 f6 7.e3 – see 5...f6 6.d3 a6 7.e3;

5...b4+? – White obtains a great lead in development after Black plays so many moves with his queen. 6.d3 f6 (It is not better for Black to play: 6...e6 7.d3 d5 8.exd5 exd5 9.0-0 d6 10.b5± and because of the lack of development of his kingside, Black is forced to castle long and that provides White with excellent attacking prospects, Barthel – K.Hofmann, Germany 2000.) 7.d3 d5 8.a3 d6 9.b5 d8 (or 9...b8 10.exd5 Qxd5 11.0-0±) 10.exd5 Qxd5 11.c4± and Black can hardly avoid material losses, because of his great lag in development. 11...e6?! – That is an attempt by Black to save the situation by just giving up a pawn. 12.Qxd5 exd5 13.f4± and Black has no satisfactory defence against the penetration of White's knight to the c7-square, Almagro Llanas – Perez Perez, Madrid 2003;

5...h6?! – That is not the most active placement of Black's knight. 6.d3 e6, D.Sokolov – Kapnisis, Moscow 2005 and here after 7.b5 a6 8.e3 w8d8 9.d6± White has a bishop pair in addition to his lead in development.

5...g6 6.e3 c6 (In answer to 6...d8, Grosar – Pongrac, Bled
1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)f3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)xd4 \(\text{\textl{b}}\)6 5.\(\text{\textl{b}}\)3

1997, White obtains a clear edge by entering a Maroczy type set-up with the line: 7.c4 \text{\textl{g}}7 8.\(\text{\textl{w}}\)d2 \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 9.f3 0–0 10.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3. It seems very strange if Black continues with his queen-maneuvers: 6... \(\text{\textl{b}}\)4+ 7.\(\text{\textl{b}}\)d2 \text{\textl{g}}7 8.c3 \(\text{\textl{a}}\)a4, Rosa – Queirolo, Santiago 1998, 9.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)d3 \(\text{\textl{e}}\)5 – this is forced, because after: 9... \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 10.\(\text{\textl{w}}\)e2+ Black loses his queen – 10.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e2 \(\text{\textl{f}}\)f6 11.f4 \(\text{\textl{c}}\)c6 12.\(\text{\textl{f}}\)f3; it is not any better for him to try 8... \(\text{\textl{d}}\)d6, Lewis – Asbury, Flint 1990, since after 9.f4+, Black’s queen will need to lose even more time in order to find a suitable square.) 7.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3 \text{\textl{g}}7 (In answer to 7...d6, M.Hoffmann – Kovac, Cesky Brod 1996, White has a very unpleasant line for Black: 8.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e3 \text{\textl{g}}7 9.0–0, reaching a position more typical for the Dragon variation.) 8.\(\text{\textl{w}}\)d2 \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 (It is very bad for Black to play 8...e6?! 9.\(\text{\textl{b}}\)b5 \(\text{\textl{w}}\)d8 10.\(\text{\textl{d}}\)d6\(\text{\textl{w}}\) Smeeckert – Asbury, Lansing 1990.) 9.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e2 d6 10.0–0 \text{\textl{h}}5 11.f4 \(\text{\textl{g}}\)4 12.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)d5 \(\text{\textl{w}}\)d7 13.\(\text{\textl{d}}\)d3± Iermito – Cabrera, Buenos Aires 2004;

5...d6 6.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3 e6 (About 6... \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 7.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e3 – see 5... \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 6.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3 d6 7.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e3; after 6...g6, Zelcic – Kiseljak, Tucepi 1996, White can transpose to the Dragon variation with two extra tempi with: 7.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e3 \(\text{\textl{w}}\)d8 8.\(\text{\textl{w}}\)d2 \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 9.f3±) 7.\(\text{\textl{f}}\)f4! \(\text{\textl{e}}\)e5 8.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e3 \(\text{\textl{w}}\)c7 9.f4 \(\text{\textl{c}}\)c6, Z.Medvegy – H.Dobosz, Austria 2004 and now White can transpose to variation \text{\textl{a}} with an extra tempo by playing 10.\(\text{\textl{d}}\)d3 a6 11.0–0 \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 12.a4±;

5...e5 – This move weakens the squares along the d-file, although it is not so easy for White to exploit that, Badura – Zok, Germany 1995, 6.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c4 \(\text{\textl{f}}\)6 (It is hardly advisable for Black to fall even more behind in development with the line: 6... \(\text{\textl{b}}\)4+ 7.\(\text{\textl{b}}\)d2 \(\text{\textl{f}}\)6 8.\(\text{\textl{w}}\)e2±) 7.0–0 \(\text{\textl{e}}\)e7 (After 7... \(\text{\textl{e}}\)xe4 8.\(\text{\textl{xf}}\)f7+ \(\text{\textl{xf}}\)f7 9.\(\text{\textl{wd}}\)d5+ \(\text{\textl{e}}\)e8 10.\(\text{\textl{xe}}\)e4± Black’s king is bound to remain in the centre for a long time.) 8.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3± and White has a slight but stable advantage, because of his lead in development and the weakness of the d5-square.

\textbf{a) 5...e6 6.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3}  

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

6... \(\text{\textl{w}}\)c7

About 6... \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 7.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e2 – see 5... \(\text{\textl{c}}\)f6 6.\(\text{\textl{c}}\)c3 e6 7.\(\text{\textl{e}}\)e2.

Black has tried in practice some other moves too:

6...g6? – That move compromises the dark squares and it does not contribute to Black’s quick development, Vaassen – Klemm, corr. 1990, 7.\(\text{\textl{b}}\)b5±;

6...\(\text{\textl{w}}\)d8?! – This is simply a loss of time, Herges – Thiery, Saarlouis 2004 and here after:
7.\(f4\) d6 8.\(\text{d2}\) e5 9.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{\&f6}\) 10. 0-0-0± there arise positions from the variation: 1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\&f3}\) \(\text{\&c6}\) 3.d4 \(\text{cxd4}\) 4.\(\text{\&xd4}\) \(\text{\&f6}\) 5.\(\text{\&c3}\) d6 6.\(\text{e3}\) e5 7.\(\text{\&b3}\), except that White has played two more moves - \(\text{\&d2}\) and 0-0-0;

6...a6?! - That is also a loss of time. 7.\(f4\) \(\text{\&b4}\) (Black loses after 7...e5? 8.\(\text{\&d5}\) \(\text{\&d8}\) 9.\(\text{\&e3}\) \(\text{\&b8}\) 10.\(\text{\&b6}\) \(\text{\&h4}\) 11.\(\text{\&c7+}\) \(\text{\&e7}\) 12.\(\text{\&d3+} -\) Graham - Zupa, Saint Paul 2000.) 8.\(\text{\&g4}\) \(\text{\&ge7}\), Baramidze - Straub, Bad Wildbad 2002 (It is hardly better for Black to continue with: 8...g6, Schapotschnikov - Roerig, Bayern 2001, after 9.\(\text{\&g3}\), Black is faced with the choice between a difficult endgame: 9...\(\text{\&xc3}\)+ 10.\(\text{\&xc3}\) \(\text{\&b4}\) 11.\(\text{\&xb4}\) \(\text{\&xb4}\) 12.\(\text{\&d4±}\) and a very unpleasant middle game: 9...\(\text{\&d4}\) 10.\(\text{\&c7}\) \(\text{\&a7}\) 11.0-0-0±), now, White can gobble a pawn: 9.\(\text{\&xg7}\) \(\text{\&g6}\) (It is even worse for Black to play 9...\(\text{\&g8}\) 10.\(\text{\&h7±}\) 10.\(\text{\&e3}\) \(\text{\&d8}\) 11.\(\text{\&h6±}\) and Black has no compensation for the pawn);

6...\(\text{\&b4}\) - This development of the bishop is premature. 7.\(\text{\&g4}\) \(\text{\&ge7}\) (After 7...g6 8.\(\text{\&d2}\) \(\text{\&ge7}\), Dennison - Galant, Stillwater 2005, it looks very good for White to continue with: 9.a3 \(\text{\&xc3}\) 10.\(\text{\&xc3}\) e5 11.\(\text{\&f3±}\) and he leads in development and he has a couple of powerful bishops.) 8.\(\text{\&xg7}\) \(\text{\&g6}\) 9.a3 \(\text{\&f8}\) 10.\(\text{\&f6±}\) and Black had no compensation for the pawn in the game Wolski - McCready, Reno 1994.

7.\(f4\)

Now, Black’s knight is not on f6 and the set-up for White, which we have analyzed in variation b (\(\text{\&e2}, \text{\&d2}\) would not be so logical.

7...d6

In answer to 7...\(\text{\&b4}\)!?, Berg - Carton, Oropesa del Mar 1998, White has the aggressive line: 8.\(\text{\&g4}\)!? \(\text{\&ge7}\) (After 8...\(\text{\&xc3}\)+ 9.\(\text{\&xc3}\) g6 10.\(\text{\&a3±}\), or 8...g6 9.\(\text{\&d2}\) \(\text{\&f6}\) 10.\(\text{\&f3±}\) the vulnerability of the dark squares on Black’s kingside is quite obvious, while in the variation: 8...\(\text{\&f8}\) 9.\(\text{\&d2}\) d5 10.e5 \(\text{\&h6}\) 11.\(\text{\&h5±}\) Black has problems with the coordination of his pieces.) 9.\(\text{\&d2}\) 0-0 10.\(\text{\&d3}\) d5 (or 10...f5 11.exf5 \(\text{\&xf5}\) 12.0-0-0 d5 13.\(\text{\&b1}±\) 11.e5 f6 12.exf6 \(\text{\&xf6}\) 13.\(\text{\&h5}±\) and White has excellent attacking chances.

7...a6 8.\(\text{\&e3}\) \(\text{\&f6}?!\) (It is preferable for Black to play here 8...d6 9.g4 - see 7...d6 8.\(\text{\&e3}\) a6 9.g4.) 9.e5 \(\text{\&d5}\) 10.\(\text{\&xd5}\) \(\text{\&xd5}\) 11.c3 b5, Kao – Greene, Los Angeles 1993 and now after: 12.\(\text{\&xd5}\) \(\text{\&b7}\) 13.\(\text{\&c5±}\) White should win with his extra pawn.

8.\(\text{\&e3}\) \(\text{\&f6}\)

In answer to 8...a6, Auer – Blum, Roethenbach 1996, it also deserves attention for White to play in the spirit of the Keres attack, 9.g4 b5 (about 9...\(\text{\&f6}\) 10.g5 - see 8...\(\text{\&f6}\) 9.g4 a6 10.g5) 10.a3 \(\text{\&b7}\) 11.\(\text{\&g2}\) \(\text{\&f6}\) 12.g5 \(\text{\&d7}\) and here after 13.\(\text{\&e2}?!\), followed by castling long, as well as after the
1.e4 c5 2.d4 cxd4 3.cxd4 £c6 4.£c4 £b6 5.£b3

not so sharp line 13.0–0?! White has a powerful initiative.

9.g4

In case of 9...£e7 10.g5 £d7, J.Hoffmann – Knebel, Wiesbaden 2000, it looks very strong for White to play: 11.£h5 a6 12.0–0–0 b5 13.£d3† and Black's dark-squared bishop has already been developed to e7, so it is not good for him to repel White's queen from its aggressive placement.

In answer to 9...d5, Geyler – Seiser, Vienna 2003, it deserves attention for White to play: 10.e5 £d7 11.£b5 £d8 12.£f3† and he has occupied the d4-square, leading in development.

9...£h6 – This move prevents the further advance of White's kingside pawns. 10.£f3 a6 11.£g2 £d7 12.h4† b5 13.0–0–0 £b6 14.£b1 £d7 15.g5 0–0–0 16.£f2± and White has good chances to create threats on both sides of the board, while Black can hardly organize any counterplay, Beliavsky – Cabrilo, Lviv 1981.

10.g5 £d7 11.£f3 b5

12...£b7

This move looks to be quite natural. Black is trying to organize some counterplay on the queenside and he will take care of his king only later.

12...£c5?! – This move enables White to exploit his lead in development. 13.£xc5 £xc5, V.Onischuk – Gasanov, Alushta 2005 and here after 14.£g2 £b7 15.e5 b4 16.£e4± White has a powerful pressure along the h1–a8 diagonal, he has extra space and he dominates on the open file.

12...£b8 13.£b1 £e7 (about 13...£c6 14.£d3 – see 12...£b8 13.£b1 £b6 14.£d3) 14.h4 £a5 15.£c4, Mashian – Temanlis, Tel Aviv 1993 and now after 16.£d4 0–0 17.g6 White's attack looks very dangerous.

12...b4 13.£e2 £b7 14.£b1 0–0–0 15.c3 £xc3? (It looks more resilient for Black to defend with 15...£c5 16.£g2±) 16.£xc3 £b8 17.£f2 £c8 18.£c1± and
White has excellent attacking chances, while Black can hardly organize any counterplay on the kingside, Smirin – L.Kaplan, Oviedo 1993.

12...c6 – Black is trying to seize the initiative on the queenside by occupying the c4-square.

13...b6 – Black is trying to seize the initiative on the queenside by occupying the c4-square.

13.\textcolor{red}{b1} eb814.\textcolor{red}{d3} g615.\textcolor{red}{d4} ! a5 (After 15...\textcolor{red}{g7}?! – it looks very attractive for White to sacrifice a piece: 16.\textcolor{red}{xb5}! axb5 17.\textcolor{red}{xb5} 18.\textcolor{red}{xf8} 19.e5±; Black fails to develop his bishop on g7 after: 15...\textcolor{red}{c4} 16.\textcolor{red}{xc4} xc4 17.\textcolor{red}{d4} \textcolor{red}{d6} 18.\textcolor{red}{d4}±; it is not good for him to opt for: 15...\textcolor{red}{d4} 16.\textcolor{red}{e2} \textcolor{red}{c4} 17.a3 \textcolor{red}{c6} 18.\textcolor{red}{dxc6} \textcolor{red}{dxc6} 19.\textcolor{red}{d4}±; while after: 17...\textcolor{red}{xa3} + 18.\textcolor{red}{bxa3} \textcolor{red}{xc3} 19.\textcolor{red}{f2} – Black remains a piece down.) 16.f5 b4?! (but not 16...\textcolor{red}{g7} 17.\textcolor{red}{xb5}±. It is slightly better for White to play 16...\textcolor{red}{bc4} 17...\textcolor{red}{c1} b4 18.\textcolor{red}{ce2} \textcolor{red}{e5} 19.\textcolor{red}{h3} with a powerful initiative for White.) 17.\textcolor{red}{b5}!! axb5 (Black loses after: 17...\textcolor{red}{e7} 18.e5! dxe5 19.\textcolor{red}{c6}! \textcolor{red}{xc6} 20.\textcolor{red}{xc6}+ \textcolor{red}{d7} 21.\textcolor{red}{c7} \textcolor{red}{d8} 22.\textcolor{red}{xe5} – or 19...axb5 19.\textcolor{red}{xb5}+ \textcolor{red}{d7} 20.exd6 \textcolor{red}{xd6} 21.\textcolor{red}{xe6}+; he would not save the game either after: 17...\textcolor{red}{d7} 18.fxe6 \textcolor{red}{fxe6} 19.\textcolor{red}{xe6}+ – 18.\textcolor{red}{xh5}+ \textcolor{red}{d8} (It is bad for Black to try 18...\textcolor{red}{d7} 19.fxe6 \textcolor{red}{fxe6} 20.\textcolor{red}{xf6}+ –) 19.fxe6 \textcolor{red}{g7} 20.e5! \textcolor{red}{xe5}, Rogers – Bromberger, Augsburg 2004 (It is not any better for Black to defend with 20...d5 21.exf7 \textcolor{red}{xf8} 22.e6±) and here after 21.exf7 \textcolor{red}{xf8} 22.\textcolor{red}{h5±} White has a more than sufficient compensation for the piece. He has two pawns, a better piece-coordination and his opponent’s king is seriously endangered.

13.\textcolor{red}{h4} \textcolor{red}{c8}

13...b4 14.\textcolor{red}{d2} \textcolor{red}{e8} 15.\textcolor{red}{d2} \textcolor{red}{c6}?! (It is slightly better for Black to try: 15...d5 16.\textcolor{red}{g3} a5 17.\textcolor{red}{xa5} \textcolor{red}{xa5} 18.\textcolor{red}{b1}+, but White’s initiative is dangerous even then.) 16.fxe5 \textcolor{red}{xe5} 17.\textcolor{red}{h3} \textcolor{red}{c4} 18.\textcolor{red}{ed4} \textcolor{red}{xd2} 19.\textcolor{red}{xd2} e5 20.\textcolor{red}{c4}! exd4 21.\textcolor{red}{xd4}± White has a lead in development and a safer king as a compensation for the exchange, while after: 21...d5?! 22.exd5 \textcolor{red}{e7}, Bogut – Kurajica, Kastel Stari 1997, White could have played: 23.\textcolor{red}{xg7} \textcolor{red}{g8} 24.\textcolor{red}{f6}± winning a couple of pawns and keeping his opponent’s king in the centre for long.

14.a3 b4 15.axb4 \textcolor{red}{xb4}

16.\textcolor{red}{h2} \textcolor{red}{e7}, Belotti – Dorfman, Cannes 1993 and here it deserves attention for White to continue with the aggressive line: 17.\textcolor{red}{h5}± d5 (After 17...0–0?! 18.g6 h6 19.gxf7+ \textcolor{red}{xf7} 20.\textcolor{red}{h3}± Black fails to create any dangerous threats on the queen-
side.) 18...exd5 0–0 19...g6 20.exd5 gxh7+ (or 20...hx8 21.exd5 exd5 22.exd5!?) 21...exd5 22...exd5 exd5
- White has a pawn for the exchange and good attacking prospects on the kingside.

b) 5...d6 6.c3

6...e6

The other moves for Black look less logical:

6...e5? - This move only facilitates White’s task to occupy the centre quickly, Padioleau – Alaniec, France 1998 and here after 7.f4 c6 (or 7...e4 8.f3) 8.e5 White has an overwhelming lead in development and a huge space advantage;

6...e5?! 7.e3 d8 8.f3 c7, Horsak – Alaverdyan, Czech Republic 2000 and now after 9...d2 d6 10.0–0–0 e6 11.g4 White has three extra tempi in comparison to the variation 1.e4 e5 2.d3 c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.cxd4 g6 5.c3 d6 6.e3 e5 7.b3 c6 8.f3 e7 and that no doubt provides him with clearly better chances;

6...c7 – That move enables White to obtain a considerable space advantage. 7.f4 d6 8...d5 dxd5 9.exd5 b8 10...e3 d7 11.c4 f6 12.exd6 g6 13.0–0 g7, Moradi – Abbasifar, Mashad 2003 and here White can emphasize his advantage with the move 14...d4+;

6...a6 – This move is quite standard for the Sicilian Defence, but here it only weakens the queenside. 7...e3 c7 (In answer to 7...d8, Riggs – Hosking, Australia 1995, it looks logical for White to continue with: 8...d5 cxd5 9.exd5 a5 10.d2 e6 – but not 10...b5? 11.b4 c7 12.a4± and Black’s queenside crumbles. 11...d3+ 8...d5 cxd5 (The “centralization” of Black’s queen leads practically by force to a very difficult position for him: 8...e5 9.d6 b8 10...d3 d5 11.f4 xb2 12.c1 c3+ 13.d2 b2 14...d5 g4 15.e4 xb3 16.axb3 x1d1 17...d6+ and White remains at least with an extra pawn, Hansen – Olesen, Copenhagen 1990.) 9.exd5 e5 10.c4 d6 11.e4 f5 12.exd6 e6 13.0–0± and White has a huge space advantage, meanwhile Black has problems developing his kingside. After the natural line: 13...c8 14.ac1 e7?, Ball – Eickmann, Email 2000, White wins with: 15.f4 d7 16.xg7 f6 17.h6 xb2 18...dxe6+–;

6...d6 – This move enables White to use the d5-square. 7.e3 – now all possible retreats of Black’s queen are of about equal
strength and White has excellent chances of maintaining the advantage:

7...\textit{\textcolor{red}{c7}} 8.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d5}}!? – That is the most energetic line. 8...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{xd5}} (After 8...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d7}} 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{xf6+}} gxf6 10.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{e5}} 11.0–0–0 b6 12.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{f4}}± Black has serious problems to create some counterplay, because of his lag in development, his lack of space and his static pawn-mass in the centre, Swiercz – Bosch, Bethune 2001.) 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{exd5}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{d8}}, Brulic – Biliskov, Kastela 2005, and here after 10.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d3}}± Black does not have a single active piece in action;

7...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d8}} – Black’s queen goes to its initial square losing two tempi in the process. 8.f3 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{g6}} (After 8...e5 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{e6}} 10.0–0–0 – there arises a position from the variation 1.e4 c5 2.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{f3}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{c6}} 3.d4 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{cxd4}} 4.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{xd4}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{d6}} 5.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{c3}} d6 6.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e3}} e5 7.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{b3}}, except that White has played two extra moves – \textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}} and 0–0–0. He follows with his standard plan and he obtains an overwhelming advantage. 10...a6 11.g4 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{e7}} 12.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d5}}± Hoepfl – Reinartz, Passau 1999; Black would not change anything much with 8...a6, Ulrich – Steen, Kappeln 1990, 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}} e6 – it is even worse for Black to play: 9...b5 10.a4 b4 11.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d5}}± and his queenside will crumble at any moment. 10.0–0–0 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{e7}} 11.g4±) 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{g7}} 10.0–0–0 – there arises a standard position from the Dragon variation with two extra tempi for White. 10...0–0 (or 10...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e6}} 11.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{b1}} 0–0 12.h4↑ Ried – Lau­gensen, Tingkaerskolen 1997) 11.g4 a6?! 12.h4 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{f6}} 13.h5→ White can proceed here with his typical kingside attack, Garcia Abrante – Barcelo, Palma de Mallorca 2002;

6...g6 – Black is trying to reach a position of the Dragon type, but he loses important tempi in the process. 7.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e3}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{c7}} (About 7...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d8}} 8.f3 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{g7}} 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}} 0–0 10.0–0–0 d6 11.g4 – see 6...d6 7.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e3}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{d8}} 8.f3 g6 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d2}}) 8.f4 d6 – White has the unpleasant threat 9.e5, Pelerin – Bosch, Bethune 2001 and here after: 9.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d5}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{xd5}} 10.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{exd5}} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{b8}} 11.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{d4}}± White has a clear lead in development, he has extra space and strangely enough he has occupied first the a1-h8 diagonal.

7.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e2}}!?
b1) 7...d6

Black prevents mechanically the advance of his opponent’s e-pawn, but now it looks very promising for White to continue in the spirit of the Keres attack by advancing the g-pawn (1.e4 c5 2.d5 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.cxd4 f6 5.b3)

8.g4 a6

About 8...c7 9.g2 – see 7...c7 8.g4 d6 9.g2.

The alternatives are not better for Black:

8.h6 – Black stops temporarily the advance of White’s kingside pawns, but he weakens the g6-square in the process. 9.e3 c7 10.f4 a6 11.0-0-0 b5 12.h4 b7 13.g2 d7 14.g5 White has a huge space advantage and Black’s king is deprived of a safe shelter. 14...b6 15.g6! c4 (It looks very dangerous for Black to try: 15...fxg6 16.g4→ and he loses his extra pawn, coming under a dangerous attack too.) 16.f5 fxg6 17.fxg6 c3 18.xe3 e5 19.d5 xd5 20.exd5± White has much better prospects thanks to his protected passed pawn in the

7...b4.

Black has also tried in practice:

7...d4?! – This attempt to simplify the position only loses additional tempi. 8.cxd4 b6 9.b5 b6 (It is not good for Black to play: 9...e5 10.f4 b8 11.e5 d5 12.c4± and White has a huge space advantage and better development.) 10.f4 c5 (After the best for Black: 10...d6 11.0-0-0 e5 12.e3 d8 13.c4± White keeps his opponent’s king in the centre and he ensures a huge lead in development for long.) 11.e4 d7 12.c4+ White wins unavoidably plenty of material, which is more than enough to win the game, Siklosi – Zapolskis, Kecskemet 1992;

7...e7 – That move leads to a slight, but stable edge for White. 8.e5 d5 9.cxd5 exd5 10.f4 b4+ 11.d2 e4 12.xe4 dxe4, Zontakh – V.Damjanovic, Belgrade 1993 and now it seems that the most unpleasant line for Black is: 13.f4! 0-0 14.0-0-0± and the backward d7-pawn impedes the development of Black’s queenside; meanwhile he has problems protecting his e4-pawn.

In answer to 7...a6, Korneev – Anastasian, Linares 1996, the simplest line for White is 8.e5 d5 9.cxd5 exd5 10.g5 e7 11.xe7 xe7 12.0-0-0± with a slight, but stable advantage for White, thanks to Black’s weak pawns on the d-file.
centre and his opponent’s endangered king, Siklosi – S. Polgar, Kecskemet 1992;

Black would not change anything much with: 8...\(\mathcal{B}e7\) 9.g5 \(\mathcal{B}d7\) 10.h4 a6 11.\(\mathcal{B}e3\) \(\mathcal{B}c7\) 12.0–0–0 b5 13.a3 \(\mathcal{B}b7\) 14.f4 b4 15.axb4 \(\mathcal{B}xb4\) 16.\(\mathcal{B}h3\) a5 17.\(\mathcal{B}d4\)± and he has failed to organize any counterplay, so his position turned quickly into a hopeless one. 17...\(\mathcal{B}c5\) 18.f5 e5 19.\(\mathcal{B}db5\) \(\mathcal{B}c6\) 20.f6 \(\mathcal{B}xf6\) 21.\(\mathcal{B}xf6\) \(\mathcal{B}f8\) 22.\(\mathcal{B}c4\)– and Black had no defence against White’s numerous threats in the game L’Ami – Erwich, Wijk aan Zee 2003.

9.\(\mathcal{B}e3\) \(\mathcal{B}c7\) 10.g5 \(\mathcal{B}d7\) 11.0–0–0 b5

About 11...\(\mathcal{B}e7\) 12.f4 b5 13.h4 – see 11...b5.

12.f4 \(\mathcal{B}e7\)

In case of 12...\(\mathcal{B}b6\), Martin Gonzalez – Csom, Malaga 1981, it deserves attention for White to follow with his standard kingside offensive: 13.h4 \(\mathcal{B}c4\) 14.\(\mathcal{B}f2\) \(\mathcal{B}b7\) (about 14...\(\mathcal{B}e7\) 15.\(\mathcal{B}g2\) – see 12...\(\mathcal{B}e7\)) 15.\(\mathcal{B}h3\) \(\mathcal{B}c8\) 16.f5± and White’s attack is clearly faster than Black’s counterplay.

13.h4 \(\mathcal{B}b6\)

The move 13...\(\mathcal{B}b7\) – would not save Black from the attack. 14.\(\mathcal{B}h3\) b4 15.\(\mathcal{B}d5\)! \(\mathcal{B}xh5\) 16.\(\mathcal{B}xh5\) \(\mathcal{B}a5\) 17.\(\mathcal{B}xa5\) \(\mathcal{B}xa5\) 18.\(\mathcal{B}he1\) 0–0–0 19.\(\mathcal{B}a7\)– and White soon won, N. Kirov – Th. Paehtz, Bialystok 1979.

(diagram)

14.\(\mathcal{B}g2\)?! – and here after 14...\(\mathcal{B}c4\) 15.\(\mathcal{B}f2\) White had a powerful kingside initiative in the game Patrici – Cella, corr. 1985, while in answer to 14...b4, White had the standard piece-sacrifice – 15.\(\mathcal{B}d5\)! \(\mathcal{B}xh5\) 16.\(\mathcal{B}xh5\) \(\mathcal{B}d8\) 17.\(\mathcal{B}d4\). Black’s king is stranded in the centre, his piece-coordination has been disrupted and that provides White with an excellent compensation, for example after: 17...\(\mathcal{B}f8\) 18.\(\mathcal{B}de1\) \(\mathcal{B}b8\) 19.\(\mathcal{B}h5\) h6 20.\(\mathcal{B}xh6\) \(\mathcal{B}xh6\) 21.\(\mathcal{B}hg1\) f6 22.\(\mathcal{B}e4\)± Black can hardly parry the oncoming attack against his king.

b2) 7...\(\mathcal{B}c7\)

That move also enables White to begin his kingside offensive.

8.g4 d6

Black completes his development, ignoring White’s kingside onslaught.
8...b4 9.d2 0-0 10.g5 e8 11.a3 e7, Baron – Sadvakasov, Ninos Li 1993 and here after 12.0-0-0 a6 13.h4± White's kingside initiative is evidently faster than Black's counterplay.

8...h6 – Black is trying to impede temporarily White's pawn-onslaught on the kingside. 9.g2 a6 10.f4 d6 11.d2 b5 (In case of 11...b8 12.0-0-0 b5, Yagupov – Arzumanian, Tula 2000, it deserves attention for White to sacrifice a pawn with: 13.e5!? dxe5 14.fxe5 Qxe5 15.Qh1 Qd7 – but not 15...b4? 16.Qf4± – 16.Qf4 Qd6 17.Qb1 b4 18.Qe4 Qe7 19.Qh4+ and White's initiative is very powerful due to the unsafe placement of Black's king; 11...b6 12.0-0-0 Qb7 13.h4 0-0-0 14.g5+ and Black's king is safer on the queenside than in the centre, but he has no counterplay at all, Alex.Ivanov – V.Akopian, New York 1994; it is hardly any better for Black to play: 11...Qe7 12.h4 g6 13.0-0-0 Qd7 14.Qf3 0-0-0 15.g5 Qh5, M.Tseitlin – Avshalumov, Balatonbereny 1989 and here after 16.Qf2 Qb8 17.Qe3± White has dangerous threats on the queenside.) 12.0-0-0 Qb7 13.Qf3 Qe7 14.h4 Qd7 15.Qd5 exd5 16.exd5 Qce5 (The greedy move – 16...Qd8, leads to huge material losses for Black after: 17.Qhe1 Qb6 18.Qa5++?, or to a position in which Black is practically stalemated completely after: 17...Qb8 18.Qa5 Qd7 19.Qd4+--) 17.Qxe5 Qxe5, Ye Jiangchuan – Anastasian, Beijing 1991 and now the best line for White seems to be: 18.Qc3 Qc8 (It is not better for Black to follow with 18...Qf6 19.Qe4 Qc4 20.Qg2+) 19.Qb1 b4 (After 19...Qc4 20.Qf2 Qf4 21.Qxe5 dxe5 22.Qa7 Qxf3 23.Qxb7 Qxg4 24. d6± White wins a piece.) 20.Qxe5 dxe5 21.g5 Qd6 22.Qe4+ and White has a space advantage and good chances to organize an attack against Black's king, which is deprived of a reliable shelter.

9.g2 a6 10.f4

10...Qe7

About 10...b5 11.Qe3 Qe7 12.g5 Qd7 13.0-0–0 – see 10...Qe7.

After 10...Qd7 11.Qe3 b5 12. 0-0-0 Qb6 13.Qhe1 Qc4 14.Qf2 Qe7, Siklosi – Peric, Kecskemét 1992, it deserves attention for White to continue with the standard line: 15.g5 0-0 16.h4+ with excellent prospects on the kingside.

11.g5 Qd7 12.Qe3 b5 13. 0-0-0 Qb7

It is worse for Black to try to simplify the position with 13...Qa5?, Rautanen – Rantanen,
Finland 1997, because White can break through in the centre – 14.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{w} \times \text{x}5 \) 15.e5! d5 (It is a disaster for Black to try: 15...\( \text{b}8 \) 16.exd6 \( \text{b}4 \) 17.\( \text{d} \times \text{d}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 18.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}7 \) \( \text{w} \times \text{x}7 \) 19.\( \text{d} \times \text{d}7+ \) and White has good attacking chances, besides his material advantage.) 16.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}5! \) exd5 17.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 18.\( \text{f}5 \) – White’s attack is very dangerous, because Black’s king has no safe shelter and that can be illustrated by the following variations: 18...\( \text{b}7 \) 19.e6 and now Black loses after: 19...\( \text{d} \times \text{d}5 \) 20.exd7+ \( \text{d}8 \) 21.\( \text{e} \times \text{x}1! \), as well as following: 19...\( \text{f}6 \) 20.\( \text{w} \times \text{h}5+ \) \( \text{d}8 \) 21.\( \text{f} \times \text{x}6+ \) and in both cases White reaches easily his opponent’s king, stranded in the centre. Black’s more reliable variation seems to be 19...0–0 20.\( \text{e} \times \text{f}7+ \) \( \text{h}8 \) 21.\( \text{b}1 \) although his defence would be difficult even then, despite the approximate material equality.

14.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{b}4 \)

15.\( \text{d} \times \text{d}5 \)?! – This is a standard piece-sacrifice with the idea to keep Black’s king in the centre. 15...\( \text{e} \times \text{x}5 \) 16.\( \text{e} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 17.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{w} \times \text{x}5 \) 18.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}8 \) (It is not easy for Black to defend the position after: 18...\( \text{b}3 \)?! 19.\( \text{a} \times \text{b}3 \) \( \text{a}1+ \) 20.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{a}5+ \) 21.\( \text{c}3 \). It is quite possible that Black’s more reliable line is to sacrifice back a piece with 18...\( \text{w} \times \text{x}2 \) 19.\( \text{e} \times \text{x}5+ \) \( \text{d}5 \) 20.\( \text{f} \times \text{x}5 \) 0–0 21.\( \text{d}2 \), although White’s pieces remain much more active too.) 19.\( \text{e} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) (Black’s defence is still very difficult after: 19...\( \text{f}8 \) 20.\( \text{e}8+ \) \( \text{c}7 \) 21.\( \text{w} \times \text{x}7 \) \( \text{w} \times \text{x}2 \) 22.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 23.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{a}5 \) – he would not save the game after: 23...\( \text{c}8 \) 24.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 25.\( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 26.\( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 27.\( \text{a} \times \text{x}6+ \) – and Black fails to complete his development. 24.\( \text{e}8 \) and now Black loses after 24...\( \text{w} \times \text{x}5 \) 25.\( \text{b}6+ \) \( \text{b}6 \) 26.\( \text{x} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 27.\( \text{w} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 28.\( \text{d} \times \text{x} \), with a huge material advantage for White, as well as following: 24...\( \text{w} \times \text{x}5 \) 25.\( \text{e} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{w} \times \text{x}7 \) 26.\( \text{x} \times \text{x}7+ \) \( \text{c}6 \) 27.\( \text{x} \times \text{x}7+ \) – and Black cannot defend his king without great material losses.) 20.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{b}5 \) (After 20...\( \text{c}7 \) 21.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{x}5 \) 22.\( \text{h}3 \) White regains his piece, maintaining greater piece-activity.) 21.\( \text{x} \times \text{g}7 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 22.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}2 \) 23.\( \text{x} \times \text{x} \) \( \text{c}8 \) 24.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{g}4 \), U.Andersson - Kuijpers, Wijk aan Zee 1971 and now White’s most energetic line to preserve a huge advantage seems to be: 25.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}5 \) \( \text{x} \times \text{e}2 \) (After 25...\( \text{d} \times \text{c}5 \) 26.d6 \( \text{x} \times \text{e}2 \) 27.\( \text{d} \times \text{x}7+ \) \( \text{x} \times \text{x}7 \) 28.\( \text{e} \times \text{x}7 \) \( \text{x} \times \text{x}7 \) 29.\( \text{x} \times \text{a} \), White must win with his extra pawn.) 26.\( \text{b}6+ \) \( \text{c}8 \) 27.\( \text{x} \times \text{e}2 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 28.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{x} \times \text{g}5 \)!

(In case of: 28...\( \text{f}8 \) 29.\( \text{e}+ \), Black’s bishop remains out of ac-
1.e4 c5 2.dı3 dıc6 3.d4 cxd4 4.dıxd4 ęb6 5.dıb3

29.ęxe8 ęxf4+ 30.ęe3 ęxe8 31.ęxf4± and White’s two bishops must be stronger than Black’s rook.

b3) 7...ęb4

This is the most aggressive move for Black.

8.dıd2 0–0

About 8...e5 9.0–0–0 0–0 10.a3 ęxc3 11.ęxc3 – see 8...0–0.

8...a5 – That move only helps White to redeploy his knight to a more active position. 9.a3 ęxc3 10.ęxc3 a4 11.dıd2 ęc5 12.0–0–0± L.Boer – Boer, Miskolc 1999.

After 8...d6 9.0–0–0 0–0 10.a3 ęxc3 11.ęxc3 ęe8 12.f4± White has the bishop pair and excellent attacking prospects, Yagupov – Karasev, St. Petersburg 2000.

9.a3

Now, Black has two possibilities – b3a) 9...ęxc3 and b3b) 9...ęe7.

b3a) 9...ęxc3

Black is trying to seize the initiative by presenting his opponent with the two-bishop advantage. 10.ęxc3 e5 11.0–0–0

11...ęd8

That is the most logical move. Black wishes to complete his development with d7–d6, while in answer to the careless move 12.g4?! – he has the powerful argument – 12...d5!±

11...ęe8?! – This move enables White to bring his knight into the centre. 12.ęd2 ęc7 13.ęc4 b5 14.ęe3 ęb8 15.ęd5 ęb7 16.f4± K.Szabo – Gara, Hungary 2006.

After 11...ęc7 12.g4 d6 13.g5 ęe8 14.h4± White maintains a powerful kingside initiative and Black’s knight on e8 is not only very passive, but it impedes the coordination of the rest of his pieces, Mrdja – Wohl, Cutro 2006.

11...d6!? – This is an interesting pawn-sacrifice. 12.ęxd6 ęd4 (12...ęe6?! – This move looks like a blunder, because after: 13.ęa5 ęxa5 14.ęxb6 axb6 15.ęxa5 bxa5 16.f3±, Black’s compensation for the queen is evidently insufficient, Rothuis – Souleidis, Hoo-geveen 2005.) 13.ęxd4 (It also deserves attention for White to try: 13.ęxd4!? exd4 14.ęxd4 ęc6 15.f3 with a good compensa-
tion for the exchange.) 13...\&xd6 14.\&c5 \&c7 15.\&xf8 \&xf8 16.f3 (16.\&c4?! \&xc4 17.\&xc4 \&xe4 18.\&e1 \&d6 – 18...\&xf2? 19.\&f1 – 19.\&d3 J.Shaw) \&e6 17.\&b5± and in that position in the game A.Ivanov – Yermolinsky, Seattle 2000, the opponents agreed to a draw, although Black’s compensation for the pawn did not seem to be good enough for equality.

11...\&e8 – This is a rarely played move, but it is interesting and it relies on White’s schematic play. After: 12.g4 d5 13.exd5 \&xg4 14.f3 \&d4 15.\&xd4 exd4 16.\&xd4, it seems dubious for Black to follow with 16...\&d6, because after: 17.\&f2 \&f4+ 18.\&d2 \&xf3 19.\&xf6 \&e4 (The endgame is clearly in favour of White after: 19...\&xf6 20.\&g2 \&xg2 21.\&xf6 gxf6 22.\&xg2±) 20.\&g2 \&e2 21.\&d4 \&e4 (Black loses too after: 21...\&xd4 22.\&xd4 \&xg2 23.\&xg2 \&xg2 24.\&g1 \&xd5 25.\&xg7+ \&h8 26.\&xh7+ –) 22.\&d1! \&e8 (It is very bad for Black to play: 22...\&xd4 23.\&xd4 \&xd4+ 24.\&xd4 \&xg2 25.\&g1–+) 23.\&g1!! – and White won soon, M.Sorokin – Karasev, Blagoveshchensk 1988, but after: 16...\&xe2 17.\&xb6 \&xc2+ 18.\&xc2 \&xf3 19.\&d4, the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Amonatov – Arzumanian, Tula 2004. White’s compensation for the pawn can be sufficient indeed only for a draw. Therefore, instead of the seemingly attractive move – 12.g4?! , it deserves attention for White to continue with the more precise move 12.\&b1!? with the following eventual developments: 12...d6 13.\&xd6 \&d4 14.\&xd4 exd4 15.\&xd4 \&c6 16.f3± and White has two pawns for the exchange and a couple of bishops, so that provides him with superior chances; or 12...\&c7 13.g4 d5!? 14.\&xd5 \&xg4 15.f3 \&d4 16.\&xd4 exd4 17.\&f2! \&f4 18.\&e2± and Black is faced with an unpleasant choice – to play a middle game without a pawn, or to enter an inferior endgame with: 18...\&h5 19.\&xd4 \&e3 20.\&xe3 \&xe3 21.\&d1 \&xf3 22.\&xf3 \&xf3 23.\&e1 \&f8 24.\&a5±, in which White’s queenside pawns seem to be much more dangerous than Black’s kingside pawns.

12.\&d6!

That is an excellent idea. White sacrifices the exchange, he destroys the pawn-shelter of his opponent’s king, and he prevents the activization of his pieces.

It is worse for him to play 12.g4?! d5!±

12...\&c7

The placement of Black’s rook on d8 precludes the line 12...\&d4?? in view of 13.\&xd4 exd4 14.\&a5–+

13.\&xf6 gxf6 14.\&g4+ \&h8

White’s attack is very powerful in case of: 14...\&f8 15.\&h4 d6 16.\&xf6 \&e6 17.\&f4→ Calzetta Ruiz – Milliet, Chisinau 2005.

15.\&h4 \&d6

It is very bad for Black to opt for: 15...\&g7 16.\&d2 \&d6 17.\&h6+
g8 18.g5 f8 19.xf6± and White regains the exchange, remaining with an extra pawn.

Black’s task would not be any easier if he enters the endgame after: 15...d6 16.xf6+ g8 17.g5+ h8 18.f4 e7 19.xe7 ex7 20.fxe5 dxe5 21.xe5+ f8 22.f6±, because White’s two pawns and greater piece-activity is a more than sufficient compensation for the exchange, Nijboer – Piket, Amsterdam 2001.

16.f4

16...e7

Or 16...g8 (Nijboer) 17.g4!? e7 18.b5 d6 19.h3 with an excellent compensation for White, for example: 19...g7 20.f1 a6 21.xc6 bxc6 22.fxe5 dxe5 23.b4 d8 24.a5!+- J.Shaw.

After 16...e8 17.b5± White’s pieces are much more active. 17...e6 18.d1 d6 19.f5 e7 20.b4+- and Black has failed to develop his pieces, so the game was quickly over: 20...f8 21.d3 xb4 22.axb4 d8 23.xf6+ 1–0 Sax – Farkas, Hungary 2004.

17.b5 e8

It would not help Black to try: 17...d6 18.xc6 bxc6 19.fxe5 dxe5, because after 20.b4± his defence would be tremendously difficult, for example: 20...e6 21.c5 d6 22.d7!± and Black cannot avoid being checkmated without huge material losses: 22...xd7 23.xf6+ g8 24.g5+ h8 25.xe5+ f6 26.xf6+ g8 27.g5+ f7 28.f1+ 1–0 Leiviczki – Mihok, Budapest 2007.) 22.d3 e6 23.f1 a6 24.c5 xc6 25.xa6 xa6 26.f3 e8 27.b3+- and Black can hardly defend his ruined kingside without huge material losses.

18.d1 d6 19.a5 d7 20.xb7 d4

21.xd4! xb5 22.xd6+-.

Now, Black loses plenty of material. 22...exd4 (or 22...f5 23.xe7 xe7 24.fxe5 c6 25.f5+-) 23.xd4 xd4 24.xf6+ xf6 25.xf6+ g8 26.g5+ f8 27.xb5 xe4 28.c5+ g8
29.b4+- and White realized soon his material advantage in the game Adams – Knezevic, France 1997.

b3b) 9...e7

Black goes back with his bishop in the hope of exploiting the a3-pawn as a target on the queenside later.

10.0–0–0 d5

Now, there arise positions, which are more typical for the French Defence.

10...d6 – This move enables White to begin a massive pawn-onslaught on the kingside. 11.g4 a6 12.g5 d7 13.h4 c7 14.f4 b5 15.e1 b4 16.axb4 e4 17.f5! b8 (It is not better for Black to opt for 17...e5?!), Muellneritsch – Wegerer, Austria 2001 and now White’s most energetic line to develop his initiative is opening files on the kingside. 18.f6! gxf6 19.gxf6 xf6 20.h6 and Black has problems finding a good move, for example he loses after: 20...d8 21.g1+ h8 22.f2 e7 23.g3 g6 24.h5+–; or 20...e7 21.g2+ h8 22.g1+–. It looks like the most resilient defence for him is to complete his development with 20...b7, but White’s chances are evidently better after that too: 21.g1+ h8 22.f2 c7 23.xf8 xf8 24.a5 a8 25xd6± Black’s king has been reliably protected, he is an exchange down, but White must play precisely, since Black’s dark-squared bishop is very powerful.) 18.f4 exf5 19.exf5 e5 20.h3 e8 (It is hardly better for Black to try 20...b7 21.hf1 f6 22.g2+-) 21.g6 hgx6 (It is bad for Black to play 21...f6 22.e4+, but after 21...fxg6 22.fgx6 h6 23.xc8 ecx8± he would have preserved a somewhat worse, but still defensible position.) 22.xe5 dxe5 23.fxg6 fxg6 24.h5 f5?! (That move loses quickly, but even after the more tenacious line: 24...g5 25.h6 f8 26.hxg7 White’s attack is very dangerous, because Black’s king is deprived of a pawn-shelter.) 25.hxg6!! xh3 (25...xc2+ 26.xc2 xc2 27.e6+ f8 28.xh#) 26.xh3 g5 27.e4 f4 28.bc5, 1–0 Anand – Kramnik, Mainz 2001.

In answer to 10...c7 11.g4 d5, Van Delft – Kurajica, Vienna 2003, it looks logical for White to continue with: 12.g5 xe4 13. xe4 dxe4 14.xe4+ and he has good chances to develop his kingside initiative.

10...a6 – Black does not wish to lose a tempo for the move d6, but White is faster anyway. 11.g4
1.e4 c5 2.\(d\)f3 \(d\)c6 3.d4 exd4 4.\(x\)xd4 \(b\)b6 5.e3

\(c7\) (About 11...d6 12.h4 – see 10...d6 11.g4 a6 12.h4.) 12.g5 \(d\)e8
13.\(g\)1b5 14.\(g\)3 b4 15.axb4 \(d\)xb4,
Neverov - Lazarev, Sautron 2001
and here after 16.\(h\)3 \(b\)7 17.\(g\)2
g6 (It is considerably worse for
Black to play: 17...\(e\)8 18.\(h\)5 h6
19.gxh6 g6 20.h7+ \(h\)8 21.\(a\)5±
and White is better not only
because of his extra pawn, but
also because of his more active
pieces.) 18.f4 \(d\)d6 19.f5↑ Black
can hardly parry White’s numer­
ous threats in the centre and on
the kingside.

11.e5 \(d\)d7
11...\(d\)e8 – This move seems
to be more passive than 11...\(d\)d7,
therefore it is played only rarely.
12.f4 f6, Zufic - Kurajica, Rabac
2003, here it is sensible for White
to take the d4-square under con­
trol with the move 13.\(e\)e3, be­
because no matter where Black’s
queen retreats, White’s prospects
are clearly superior: 13...\(c\)7 (or
13...\(d\)8 14.\(x\)xf6 \(x\)xf6 – it is worse
for Black to play 14...\(x\)xf6 15.g4→
and White has a powerful attack.
15.\(e\)1 \(d\)6 16.g4↑ White’s kings­
side initiative is faster than Black’s
queenside counterplay.) 14.\(x\)xf6
\(x\)xf6 (or 14...\(x\)xf6 15.g4 \(a\)5 16.
\(x\)a5 \(x\)a5 17.g5 and Black’s
compensation for the piece is in­
sufficient after 17...\(x\)a3 18.\(b\)1±,
while in case of: 17...\(e\)8 18.\(e\)1
\(d\)6 19.\(d\)3↑ White’s initiative
on the kingside can turn into a
strong attack. In addition, Black’s
light-squared bishop is very pas­
sive and the dark squares in his
camp are vulnerable.) 15.\(b\)5 \(f\)7
16.\(c\)5 \(e\)7 17.g3± and here White
exchanges unavoidably the dark­
squared bishops, which is quite
advantageous for him. He ends
up with a slight, but stable advan­
tage.

12.f4 a6
Mulyar – Yermolinsky, Seattle
2002.

13.\(e\)3!?&
This is White’s most energetic
line and GM D.Rogozenko has
recommended it.

13...\(c\)7 14.\(h\)5 \(b\)5
It is dubious for Black to try
14...f5, because after 15.g4→
White’s attack is very dangerous.

15.\(d\)3

15...\(g\)6
White’s attack is decisive after
Black’s other possibility too: 15...
h6 16.g4 b4 17.axb4 (The seem­
ingly attaractive knight-sacrifice
– 17.g5?, can be countered by
Black with: 17...\(d\)xe5! 18.\(x\)e5
\(x\)e5 and he regains his piece,
remaining with two extra pawns,
while White’s attack is not con­
vincing at all.) 17...\(x\)b4 18.g5
\( \text{Chapter 2} \)

\( \text{\textit{\textsection 1d}3+ 19.\textit{\textsection 1d}3. \text{Now}, \text{Black's} \text{position is difficult to defend. For example after:} 19...a5 20.\textit{\textsection 4}1 \text{h}8 21.f5 \text{\textsection}xe5 22.f6+- \text{Black loses. He would not save the game either after:} 19...hxg5 20.\textit{\textsection}d4 f6 21.\textit{\textsection}h3 fxe5 22.\textit{\textsection}h7 \text{f}7 23.fxe5+-; \text{or} 19...\text{h}8 20.\textit{\textsection}g1 \text{b}7 21.f5! \text{\textsection}xe5 22.f6+-; 21...exf5 22.g6 \text{g}5 23.\text{\textsection}xg5 fxg6 24.\textit{\textsection}h4- and White has an extra piece and his attack is still running.} \)

\( \text{16.} \textit{\textsection}h6 \text{b}4 \)

\( \text{The other possibilities are worse for Black:} \)

\( \text{16...\textit{\textsection}b6?} \text{!} \text{This is a futile attempt to come in front of White in the development of the attack.} \)

\( 17.\text{h}4 \text{\textit{\textsection}c}4 18.\text{h}5 \text{\textit{\textsection}xa}3 19.\text{\textsection}xc4 bxc4 20.\text{\textsection}c5 \text{\textit{\textsection}b}4 21.\text{\textsection}3e4+- \text{Black's kingside is helpless and the cold-blooded completion of the development would not help} \text{!} \text{16...\textit{\textsection}b7} 17.\text{h}4 \text{\textit{\textsection}fc}8 18.\text{h}5 \text{\textit{\textsection}f}8 19.\textit{\textsection}g5 \text{\textit{\textsection}e}7 20.\textit{\textsection}g3- \text{and here the only way for Black to avoid opening of the h-file is the move} 20...g5? \text{, but after:} 21.\text{\textsection}d4 \text{\textsection}xd4 22.\text{\textsection}xd4 \text{h}6 23.\textit{\textsection}f1 \text{White pushes unavoidably f}4-\text{f}5 \text{and his attack is crushing.} \)

\( \text{17.} \textit{\textsection}xb4 \text{\textsection}xb4 \)

\( \text{Black loses quickly after the other capture} \text{!} \text{17...\textit{\textsection}xb4?} 18.\text{h}4 \text{\textit{\textsection}e}7 19.g4+- \text{and he is helpless against the threats along the h-file.} \)

\( \text{18.} \textit{\textsection}h4 \text{\textsection}xd3+ 19.\textit{\textsection}xd3 \text{\textit{\textsection}e}8 \)

\( \text{It is not better for Black to continue with:} 19...\text{\textit{\textsection}b7} 20.\textit{\textsection}d4 \text{\textit{\textsection}fc}8 \text{(about 20...\textit{\textsection}fe}8 21.h5 g5 22.f5 \text{!} \text{see 19...\textit{\textsection}e}8 20.h5 g5 21.\textit{\textsection}d4! \text{b}7 22.f5) 21.h5 g5 22.f5 \text{\textsection}xe5 23.\textit{\textsection}e3 f6 24.\textit{\textsection}xe5!+- \text{and White's attack is decisive.} \)

\( \text{20.} \text{h}5 \text{g}5 \text{(White's attack is not weaker at all after:} 20...\text{\textit{\textsection}f}8 21.\textit{\textsection}g5 \text{\textit{\textsection}e}7 22.\textit{\textsection}g3 \text{g}5 \text{!} \text{it is very bad for Black to opt for:} 22...a5 23.\textit{\textsection}d4 \text{\textit{\textsection}c}5 24.\textit{\textsection}dd1+- \text{and he has no defence against the threats along the h-file.} 23.\textit{\textsection}b1!? a5 24.\textit{\textsection}c3 \textit{\textsection}b}8 25.\textit{\textsection}d4+-) 21.\textit{\textsection}d}4 \text{\textit{\textsection}b}7 22.f5 \text{\textsection}xe}5 \text{(After 22...\textit{\textsection}h}8 23.fxe6 fxe6 24.\textit{\textsection}xe6 \text{f}6 25.\textit{\textsection}d6-, the game goes into an endgame with an extra pawn for White; meanwhile he exchanges favourably the dark-squared bishops.) 23.\textit{\textsection}g}3! \text{!} \text{That is White's most energetic variation.} 23...\text{f}6 24.fxe6 \text{f}8 25.\textit{\textsection}f1 \textit{\textsection}ae}8 26.\textit{\textsection}f5+- \text{Black cannot hold simultaneously the e}5 \text{and f}6-squares. \)
We have analyzed the move 4...\texttt{b6} in this chapter – Black repels White’s knight from the centre with the idea to transpose to some basic lines of the Scheveningen variation, or the Paulsen system, except that White has won a dubious tempo for the retreat of his knight away from the centre. After the forced move 5.\texttt{b3}, Black plays either a) 5...\texttt{e6}, or b) 5...\texttt{f6}.

In variation a), Black does not exert pressure against the centre and therefore White can begin his actions in the centre and on the kingside after 6.\texttt{c3} \texttt{c7} 7.f4, without being afraid of the move \texttt{b4}. Later, his plan includes occupation of space on the kingside according to the scheme of the Keres Attack – with the help of the pawn-advance \texttt{g2-g4-g5} and he usually castles long. Black’s main problem is that he has no safe place for his king. On the kingside White has everything ready for his attack there. In the centre, Black’s king impeded the coordination of his pieces, while if he castles long he has no counterplay in sight. Meanwhile, White has active possibilities on both sides of the board.

In variation b) Black exerts immediate pressure against the centre and White must play the move 7.\texttt{e2}! in order to proceed with his actions in the centre and on the kingside. He prepares castling long and he fortifies his e4-pawn. After the natural moves 7...\texttt{b4} 8.\texttt{d2} 0–0 9.a3, Black has two possibilities: b3a) 9...\texttt{xc3} and b3b) 9...\texttt{e7}. In variation b3a) Black presents his opponent with the two-bishop advantage, trying to prove that White’s pieces on the kingside are misplaced. Black has problems to develop his queenside however and that becomes quite obvious in the main line. White sacrifices the exchange and he destroys the pawn-shelter of Black’s king having a very powerful initiative. In variation b3b) Black retreats his bishop to the e7-square with the idea to exploit later the move a2-a3 as a target for his queenside attack. After 10.0–0–0, Black’s best move seems to be 10...\texttt{d5}, entering a position of the type of the French Defence. The wonderful idea of GM D.Rogozenko – 13.\texttt{e3} \texttt{c7} 14.\texttt{h5}!? \texttt{b5} 15.\texttt{d3} – puts under doubt the entire defensive concept by Black, since White’s chances are clearly superior in a middle game with actions on both sides of the board, because of his lead in development and our analysis proves that convincingly.
Chapter 3  

1.e4 c5 2.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f}3 \) \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c6} \) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd4} \) e5 5.\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b5} \)

\[ 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Diagram}
\end{array}
\]

5...a6

After the move 5...d6, that is the second most popular line for Black. He weakens the entire complex of dark squares in his camp by giving up his dark-squared bishop and that involves a definite strategical risk. Still, it is not so simple for White to exploit that, because he makes several moves with one and the same piece and he falls behind in development considerably.

The line: 5...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \) 6.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{c3} \), leads to positions, which will be analyzed in our next volume – see 4...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \).

The other variations for Black are less reliable:

5...\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{a5}+ \) 6.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{c3} \) a6 (White can counter 6...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \) with the prosaic reaction – 7.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \).

7.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d6+} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd6} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{xd6} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{ge7} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{h}} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b6} \) (or 9...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d4?} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d3}+-\) 10.0–0–0 \( \text{\textit{w}} \text{xf2} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d5} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd5} \) 12.exd5 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e7} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{xe5}+-\);

5...\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b4+} \) 6.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{c3} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \) (In case of: 6...d6 7.a3 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xc3}+, \) White has the additional possibility: 8.bxc3!? \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd6}+ \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xe7} \), Lischi – Gajate, Email 1998, 10.a4±) 7.a3 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xc3}+ \) 8.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xc3} \) 0–0 (That is the most logical line for Black. After the frequently played move 8...h6, it looks interesting for White to follow with: 9.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{d6}! \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{xe7}+ \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xe7} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{b5} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f8} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e3} \) b6 13.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d6} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e8} \) 14.0–0–0±; while in case of 8...d6, it is good for White to opt for: 9.\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g5} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e6} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{xf6} \) gxf6 11.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{b5} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e7} \) Barr – Bass, Email 1998, 12.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{d2}± \) 9.\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g5} \) h6 10.\( \text{\textit{h}} \text{h4} \) d6 (It seems too risky for Black to try 10...g5 11.\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g3}± \) Santamaria – Gajate, Email 1998, while after 10...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d4} \), Boehm – Pusch, Recklinghausen 1994, the simplest line for White is to continue patiently with: 11.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d3} \) d6 12.0–0±) 11.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d3} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{e6} \) 12.0–0 \( \text{\textit{b}} \text{c8} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{h}} \text{h1}± \) Moura – Thew, Email 2001 – the pin is quite annoying for Black and he has no hopes of equalizing easily.

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5...@c5 6.@@c3 @f6 (After 6...a6, there arises a position from the main line, except with an extra tempo for White - 7.@@d6+ @@xd6 8.@@xd6 @f6, Dombrovsky – Rudkovsky, Nikolaev 2000, 9.@@xf6 @xf6 10.@@g5±) 7.@@d6+ @e7 (It is not logical for Black to play: 7 ... @d6 8.@@d6 @e7 9.@@xe7+ @x7 10.@@g5± Calangi – Nakapunda, Moscow 1994.) 8.@@f5+ @f8 and here it is interesting for White to test a line, which has never been played in practice – 9.@@e3?! – he thus defends against some possible counter strikes for Black like d7-d5 and he simply wishes to complete his development. Meanwhile, Black’s king is stranded in the centre and he can hardly coordinate his pieces. There might follow: 9...@b4 10.@@d3 d5 11.exd5 @xd5 12.@@exd5 @xd5 13.0-0 @xc3 14.bxc3 @e6 15.@@b1 @d8 16.@@xb7 e4 17.@@e2 @xa2 18.@@e1±, or 10...@xc3+ 11.bxc3 d6 12.0-0±;

5...h6 6.@@c3 @f6 (White is threatening 7.@@d5, while in case of 6...a6, the purposefulness of the move h7-h6 is rather questionable: 7.@@d6+ @@xd6 8.@@xd6 and here Black’s position is acceptable neither after: 8...@ge7, Samborska – Sliczna, Wisla 2000, 9.@@e3 0-0 10.0-0-0+-, nor after 8...@f6 9.@@e3 @e7, Davydov – Strozewski, Germany 1995, 10.@@c5±, or 8...@f6, Daniel – Thunold, corr. 1952, 9.@@c7 – Here, I believe that White should strive for more than just an advantage in the endgame – 9...@ge7 10.@@e3 @xd4 11.0-0-0 0-0 12.f4 d6 13.@@b6 @ec6 14.f5±) 7.@@d6+ @xd6 8.@@xd6 @e7 (After 8...@b6, White follows with: 9.@@d2! @d4 10.@@xd4 @xd4 11.0-0-0± Jasnikowski – Zoltek, Zielona Gora 1982, while in case of 8...a6, it is quite unpleasant for Black if White continues with: 9.@@e3 @e7 10.@@c5± Knuth – Dittrich, Mecklenburg 1998.) 9.@@xe7+ @xe7 10.@@e3 d6 11.f3 @e6 12.0-0-0 @hd8 (White’s plan remains practically the same irrelevant of Black’s response – he starts a pawn-offensive on the kingside: 12...@ad8, Hedenstroem – Lucena, Skellefteå 1999, 13.g4 d5 14.@@c5+ @e8 15.exd5 @xd5 16.@@e2±; 12...@ac8, Hamdouchi – Shaw, Caleta 2005, 13.g4±; 12...@hc8 13.g4 @b4 14.a3 @a2+ 15.@@xa2 @xa2 16.h4± Gaprindashvili – Dzindzichashvili, Gori 1968; 12...a6 13.g4 and the game suddenly transposes to the main line – see the move 9...h6 in line b) 13.h4 (That is the precise reaction. The move 13.g4 only creates unnecessary weaknesses, but it looks like White can maintain his advantage with energetic play: 13...d5 14.@@c5+ @e8 15.@@b5, Hutya – Metal, corr. 1994, 15.@@d7 16.h4 @xe4 17.g5 @b5 18.@@d6+ @xd6 19.@@xd6 exf3 20.@@g1±) 13...d5 (After 13...@h5, White can play the patient move 14.@@f2±, restricting the mobility of Black’s knight.) 14.@@c5+ @e8 15.@@b5 b6 16.@@c7+ @d7 17.@@xd5
and White remains with an extra pawn.

6.\(\texttt{Qd6+}\) 7.\(\texttt{xd6}\)

Black has tried numerous moves here, but two of them are the most important: a) 7...\(\texttt{e7}\) and b) 7...\(\texttt{f6}\).

We must also pay some more attention to the line: 7...\(\texttt{f6}\) 8.\(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{e7}\). Now, White can play 9.\(\texttt{d1}\) – see variation a), but after that order of moves, it deserves attention for him to opt for: 9.\(\texttt{xe7+}\) \(\texttt{xe7}\) (It is evidently in favour of White if Black plays: 9...\(\texttt{xe7}\) 10.\(\texttt{g5}\) Hora – Hromada, Prague 1966.)

10.\(\texttt{g5}\) b5 (otherwise Black might get crushed right in the opening) 11.0–0–0 \(\texttt{b7}\) 12.\(\texttt{f3}\) – White is clearly better, because of his bishop pair and Black’s compromised pawn-structure, for example:

12...\(\texttt{c6}\) (Black has played more often here 12...\(\texttt{c8}\), but he has problems castling, since his pawn on d7 is under attack, White can follow simply with 13.a3±) 13.a3 0–0 14.\(\texttt{g3}\)± Sherzer – Strenzwilk, Philadelphia 1992.

The other possibilities for Black hardly deserve any attention:

7...b5, Bryson – Pothin, Manila 1992, 8.\(\texttt{e3}\) \(\texttt{e7}\) 9.\(\texttt{c5}\) \(\texttt{xd6}\) 10.\(\texttt{xd6}\) \(\texttt{b7}\) 11.a4 b4 12.\(\texttt{d2}\) \(\texttt{ge7}\) 13.\(\texttt{c4}\)±;

7...\(\texttt{a5+}\) 8.\(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{ge7}\) 9.\(\texttt{d2}\) \(\texttt{d4}\) 10.\(\texttt{d3}\)–+- Karvinen – Barreira, Internet 2003;

7...\(\texttt{ge7}\) 8.\(\texttt{c3}\) 0–0 9.\(\texttt{e3}\)± Feger – Miller, Manila 1992.

It also seems too risky for him to try something in the spirit of the King’s Gambit: 7...\(\texttt{f5}\) 8.\(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{f6}\) 9.\(\texttt{d1}\) \(\texttt{ge7}\) 10.\(\texttt{exf5}\) 0–0 (It is not better for Black to try: 10...\(\texttt{d5}\) 11.\(\texttt{xd5}\) \(\texttt{xd5}\) 12.\(\texttt{xd5}\) \(\texttt{xf5}\) 13.\(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{d8}\) 14.\(\texttt{c5}\)± Gross – Kondrak, Austria 2003, or 10...\(\texttt{xf5}\), Fragakis – Kekatos, Greece 2002, 11.\(\texttt{d3}\)±) 11.\(\texttt{c4+}\) \(\texttt{h8}\) 12.0–0 \(\texttt{xf5}\) 13.\(\texttt{e3}\) b5 14.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(\texttt{e6}\) 15.\(\texttt{e4}\) \(\texttt{b7}\) 16.\(\texttt{c5}\) \(\texttt{a5}\) 17.\(\texttt{d6}\)± Lanka – Kondrak, Zillertal 1997.

a) 7...\(\texttt{e7}\)

8.\(\texttt{d1}\)

Now, White has numerous possibilities, just like in the line with 7...\(\texttt{f6}\), but I think that the best for him is this modest retreat. If we ignore the tactical nuances, the set-up with \(\texttt{e7}-\texttt{f6}\) seems to
be more harmonious than $\text{f6} - \text{e7}$ and White should play very precisely to maintain his advantage. We will have a look in short at Black's alternatives:

8. $\text{c7}$ d5! (Black exploits the unprotected queen of his opponent and he thus obtains a great lead in development.) 9. $\text{xe7+ gxe7}$ 10. exd5 $\text{xd5}$ 11. c3 $\text{e6}$ and White had to fight for equality in the game Nemec – Maslik, Hlohevec 1996;

8. $\text{d2}$ $\text{f6}$ 9. $\text{c3}$ 0–0 10. $\text{d3}$ (In case of 10.b3, Black can follow with the immediate move 10...b5.) 10...d6 11. $\text{d5}$ (or 11.0–0 $\text{e6}$, followed by b7–b5) 11... $\text{xd5}$ 12. $\text{exd5}$ e4 13. $\text{e2}$ $\text{e5}$ 14.0–0 $\text{g4}$, with a good game for Black, Ploenes – Schulze – corr. 1996;

8. $\text{d3}$ (White’s queen comes under attack on this square.) 8... $\text{f6}$ 9. $\text{c3}$ d5 (It is also possible for Black to continue with 9... $\text{b4}$ 10. $\text{d1}$, Petrov – Karayannis, Ermiion Argolidas 2005 and 10...d5 11.a3 d4 with an excellent game for him.) 10. $\text{xd5}$ (Similarly, in case of: 10. $\text{g5}$ dxe4 11. $\text{xe4}$ $\text{b4+}$ 12. $\text{c3}$ $\text{f5}$.! Black's pieces become tremendously active, van Leeuwen – Klundt, Gent 2000.) 10... $\text{xd5}$ 11. $\text{exd5}$ $\text{d4}$ (Black is threatening – 12...$\text{f5}$.) 12. $\text{d2}$ (or 12. $\text{d1}$ $\text{h4}$ 13. $\text{d3}$ $\text{g4}$! 14. $\text{d2}$ $\text{f3}$) 12... $\text{h3}$ and White is forced to comply with a draw – 13.0–0 $\text{xg2}$ 14. $\text{xg2}$ $\text{g4+}$.

Finally, in the variation: 8. $\text{xe7+ gxe7}$ 9. $\text{c3}$ d5 10. exd5 $\text{b4}$ 11. $\text{d3}$, thanks to the placement of his knight on e7, Black has the resource – 11... $\text{f5}$, equalizing.

8... $\text{f6}$

About 8...h6 9. $\text{c3}$ $\text{f6}$ 10. $\text{e3}$ – see 8... $\text{f6}$.

The other moves for Black are rather dubious:

8... $\text{b4+}$ 9. $\text{c3}$ $\text{ce7}$ (about 9... $\text{f6}$ – see 9...$\text{b4}$ in the notes to the main line) 10.a3 $\text{c5}$ 11. $\text{e3}$ $\text{c7}$ 12. $\text{g4}$ g6 13. $\text{h4}$ $\text{Brustkern – Skorna, Germany 1992}$;

8...b5 9. $\text{c3}$ $\text{b7}$ (about 9... $\text{f6}$ 10. $\text{g5}$ – see 8... $\text{f6}$) 10.a4 b4 (or 10... $\text{d4}$ 11.axb5 axb5 12. $\text{xa8+}$ $\text{xa8}$ 13. $\text{xb5}$ $\text{xb5}$ 14. $\text{xb5}$ $\text{b4+}$ 15. $\text{c3}$ $\text{f6}$ 16.0–0 0–0 17. $\text{e1}$ $\text{c4}$ 18.f3 $\text{Bley – Brennecke, Email 2004}$) 11. $\text{d5}$ $\text{d6}$ 12. $\text{e3}$ $\text{f6}$ 13. $\text{b6}$ $\text{xd1+}$ 14. $\text{xd1}$ $\text{d8}$ 15.f3 $\text{Abreu – Cardenas, Guines 1997}$;

8...d6 9. $\text{c3}$ $\text{e6}$ 10. $\text{d5}$ $\text{xd5}$ 11.exd5 $\text{b8}$ 12. $\text{g4}$ $\text{f6}$ (in case of 12...$\text{f6}$, Laird – Lach, corr. 1982, it would be quite unpleasant for Black if White plays the simple line: 13. $\text{d3}$ g6 14. $\text{c8+}$ $\text{f7}$ 15. $\text{h6+}$) 13. $\text{xg7}$ $\text{g8}$ 14. $\text{h6}$ $\text{bd7}$ 15. $\text{g5}$ $\text{g6}$ 16. $\text{h4}$ 0–0–0 17.0–0 $\text{dg8}$ 18. $\text{xf6}$ $\text{xf6}$ 19. $\text{g3}$ $\text{b8}$ 20. $\text{e2}$ and Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient, van der Wiel – Stripunsky, Wijk aan Zee 1996;

8...f5 9. $\text{c3}$ $\text{f6}$ (It is bad for Black to play: 9... $\text{xe4}$ 10. $\text{d5}$ $\text{d6}$ 11. $\text{c3}$ $\text{f6}$ 12. $\text{b6}$ $\text{xd1+}$ 13. $\text{xh1}$ $\text{g8}$ 14. $\text{c4}$ $\text{van der Wiel – The}
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otokatos, Katerini 1992.) 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}7\) (It is too dangerous for Black to try: 10...0–0, Shabalov – Feller, Torcy 1991, 11.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 12.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{a}5+\) 13.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}xe4\) 14.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 15.\(\text{a}3+\) – and White traps the enemy queen, or 13...\(\text{d}5\) 14.\(\text{xd}5+\) \(\text{xd}5\) 15.\(\text{e}d5\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.\(\text{f}4\)± with a clear edge for White in the endgame.) 11.\(\text{xf}6\) (It is also interesting for White to opt for the sharper line – 11.exf5!?, and then: 11...\(\text{d}4\) 12.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 13.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{h}5\) 14.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{w}e7\) 15.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 16.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}4\) 17.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{exh}5\) 18.\(\text{gxh}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 19.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{e}6\) 20.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{e}8\) 21.\(\text{c}2\)±) 11...\(\text{xf}6\), Sklavounos – Karapanos, Patras 2000, 12.\(\text{c}4\)±

9.\(\text{c}3\)

9...\(\text{h}6\)

The alternatives for Black are:

9...\(\text{b}4\) 10.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{a}5\) (or 10...\(\text{d}4\) 11.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xd}1+\) 12.\(\text{e}d1\) 0–0, Czako – Pota, Fuzesabony 1995, 13.\(\text{b}6\)± and Black is totally squeezed.) 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}7\), Leopold – Daechert, Bad Homburg 2004, 12.\(\text{g}5\)±;

9...\(\text{d}4\) 10.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}5\), Pillhock – J.Peres, corr. 1994, 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}5\) 12.0–0–0 and White maintains a clear advantage in the endgame:

12...\(\text{exe}4\) (or 12...\(\text{dxe}4\) 13.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 14.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 16.\(\text{c}4\) 0–0 17.\(\text{d}5\)±) 13.\(\text{exe}4\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 14.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 15.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 16.\(\text{e}d4\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{f}6\)±;

9...0–0 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}6\) (The other ways for Black to get rid of the pin are less effective – 10...\(\text{h}6\)? 11.\(\text{d}5\)± ; 10...\(\text{d}4\) 11.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 12.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xc}2+\) 13.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}1\) 14.\(\text{g}4\), Thayer – Phillips, Email 1999, 14...\(\text{c}2+\) 15.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}1\)± 16.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 17.\(\text{d}3\)±; 10...\(\text{b}4\) 11.\(\text{xf}6\), J.Garcia – Castano, Giyon 1994, 11...\(\text{xb}2\) 12.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xf}6\) 13.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 14.0–0 \(\text{g}8\) 15.\(\text{ab}1\) \(\text{a}3\) 16.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{g}6\) 17.\(\text{f}4\)±) 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 12.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 13.0–0 \(\text{b}5\), Phytyon – Koloskov, Email 2002, 14.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{exf}4\) 15.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 16.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{c}5\) (but not 16...\(\text{d}6\) 17.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{b}8\) 18.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 19.\(\text{d}5\)±) 17.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 18.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 19.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}5\) (In case of 19...\(\text{e}6\), Black can hardly coordinate his pieces – 20.\(\text{d}6!\) \(\text{c}5+\) 21.\(\text{h}1\)±) 20.\(\text{g}4+\) \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 22.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}3\) 23.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{g}5\) 24.\(\text{xe}3\) \(\text{xe}3\) 25.\(\text{xe}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 26.\(\text{g}3\) (It is also possible for White to play 26.\(\text{f}3\), but he has no reasons to avoid the endgame – he has a stable advantage, due to Black's terrible pawn-structure.) 26...\(\text{h}5\) 27.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{h}4\) 28.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 29.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{h}3\) 30.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 31.\(\text{f}1\)±;

9...\(\text{b}5\) 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}6\), Brent – Bryan, corr. 1978 (But not 10...\(\text{h}6\) 11.\(\text{d}5\)– Lejeune – Lanciers, Ludison 1996. It has also been tested for Black the line: 10...
4. \( \text{exd}4 \) e5 5. \( \text{b}5 \) a6 6. \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 7. \( \text{xd}6 \) 

\( \text{b}4 \) 11. \( \text{xf}6 \) \text{gxf6} 12. \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{d}4 \), Maunrey - Tempelhoff, corr. 1987, 13. \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 14.0-0-0 \( \text{g}8 \) 15. \( \text{h}6 \) - and Black has problems protecting his weak pawns.) 11. \( \text{d}3 \) (White would not achieve anything much after: 11.a4 \text{b}4 12. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 13.exd5 \( \text{g}6 \).) 11... \( \text{b}7 \) 12.0-0 \( \text{e}7 \) 13.a3 0-0 14. \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 15. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 16. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 17.\( \text{f}4 \pm \).

9...\( \text{d}6 \) 10. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 11. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) (It is weaker for Black to play 11... \( \text{d}8 \), Mosi - Koloskov, Email 2002, 12. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 13.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{xf}5 \) 14.\( \text{exf}5 \) \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 16.\( \text{e}4 \)±) 12.exd5 \( \text{b}8 \) (It is worse for Black to try: 12...\( \text{d}4 \) 13.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \), Diaz - Plechaty, Benasque 2000, 14.\( \text{d}3 \)±, or 12...\( \text{a}7 \) 17.\( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 15.0-0 \( \text{b}5 \) 16.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 17.\( \text{a}4 \)± Grazinys - Moore, Email 1997.) 13.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{h}6 \) (The order of moves is not so important. The arising positions are more or less the same after: 13...\( \text{bd}7 \) 14.\( \text{e}2 \) 0-0 15.0-0 a5 16.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 17.\( \text{wc}2 \) \( \text{a}7 \) 18.\( \text{ae}1 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 19.\( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 20.\( \text{d}1 \)±, followed by \( \text{f}2-\text{f}4 \), P.Popovic – Z.Nikolic, Belgrade 1992.) 14.\( \text{xe}3 \) 0-0 15.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{bd}7 \) 16.0-0 \( \text{h}7 \), Tarantino – Monteiro, corr. 1995 (or 16...\( \text{ac}8 \) 17.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 18.\( \text{c}1 \) f5, Mossakowski – Kloninger, Bad Zwesten 1999, 19.f4±) 17.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 18.\( \text{f}4 \). White's position is evidently preferable. He has the bishop pair and good prospects to advance his pawnmass on the queenside. There might follow: 18...\( \text{g}5 \) (or 18...\( \text{exf}4 \) 19.\( \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{g}5 \) 20.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 21.\( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{fxe}4 \) 22.\( \text{ae}1 \)±) 19.\( \text{fxe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 20.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 21.\( \text{ae}1 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 22.\( \text{b}3 \)± – with initiative for White.

10. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \)

It hardly deserves too much attention for Black to try: 10...\( \text{b}4 \) 11.a3 \( \text{e}7 \) (after 11...\( \text{xb}2 \)? 12.\( \text{a}4 \), Black's queen gets trapped, Meshcheriakova – Weingartner, Zalakaros 1995) 12.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}5 \)? 13.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 14.\( \text{d}1 \)± Marcia – Grecescu, Timisoara 1999.

Black can also change the order of moves with the idea to push \( \text{d}7-\text{d}5 \) at once, but if White reacts correctly – that is not going to happen:

10...\( \text{b}5 \) 11.\( \text{wd}2 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 12.0-0-0 \( \text{c}8 \) 13.\( \text{f}3 \) 0-0 14.\( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{d}8 \) – That situation was reached by transposition in the game Volokitin – Klundt, Mainz 2006 and here it deserved attention for White to try: 15.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 16.exd5 \( \text{d}4 \) 17.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 18.\( \text{b}1 \)±;

10...0-0 11.\( \text{wd}2 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 12.0-0-0 (It is also possible for White to opt for: 12.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 13.0-0-0 \( \text{ac}8 \) 14.\( \text{d}6 \) – see 10...\( \text{b}5 \).) 12...\( \text{e}6 \) 13.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 14.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 15.\( \text{wd}6 \) – Svidler – Maze, Noyon 2005.

11.\( \text{wd}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \)

It is bad for Black to play: 11...0-0, Konnyu – Pota, Eger 1998, 12.0-0-0 \( \text{d}8 \) 13.\( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{c}4 \)±

12.0-0-0 \( \text{d}8 \)

Similar positions are reached after 12...0-0-0, but then Black must worry about the unsafe shelter of his king, besides his other problems – 13.\( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{d}7 \)

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14.\text{d}5 \text{xd}5 (or 14...\text{f}8 15.f3 \text{xd}5 16.exd5 \text{e}7 17.\text{a}5 \text{fxd}5? 18.exd5+ - Balinov – Vatter, Dresden 2000) 15.exd5 \text{d}4 16.\text{e}1 \text{f}5?! 17.\text{a}5 \text{e}8 18.\text{b}5+ - Renner – F.Roeder, Vorra 1990.

13.\text{b}6 \text{d}7 14.\text{d}5 \text{xd}5 15.exd5

This move simplifies the position; nevertheless it is quite logical and popular too. In case White retreats his queen, he presents his opponent with additional tempi. Black would then lead in development and he would manage to compensate the defects of his position. See some examples on that subject: 8.\text{d}2 \text{ge}7 9.\text{c}3 \text{d}6 10.b3 0–0 11.\text{b}2 \text{e}6 12.\text{d}5 \text{h}4 13.\text{xe}7+ \text{xe}7 14.\text{d}3 \text{d}5 15.\text{e}3 \text{d}4 16.\text{g}3 \text{xg}3 17.\text{hxg}3 \text{c}6= Leko – Vallejo Pons, Linares 2005, or 8.\text{d}1 \text{g}6 9.\text{c}3 \text{ge}7 10.h4 \text{h}5 11.\text{g}5 \text{d}5 12.exd5 \text{d}4 13.\text{d}3 \text{f}5 14.\text{xf}5 \text{dx}5 15.\text{d}3 \text{f}6 16.\text{e}3 \text{g}4 17.g3 \text{xe}3 18.\text{xe}3 \text{d}8 19.\text{d}1 0–0 20.0–0 \text{f}5 21.\text{e}4 \text{d}4 and White fails to protect his c2-pawn, Efimenko – Vallejo Pons, Khanty-Mansyisk 2005.

White consolidates his advantage with the move in the text and he implies that he is reluctant to complicate the fight. He wishes to exploit his edge in the endgame and the arising positions are rather unpleasant for Black. He has no chances to seize the initiative and he is faced with a long and laborious defence.

8...\text{xf}6 9.\text{c}3

Here, Black’s most principled lines are – b1) 9...\text{d}5 and b2) 9...\text{b}4.

His other possibilities do not create any problems for White – he completes calmly his development maintaining his advantage:

b) 7...\text{f}6

8.\text{xf}6
9...b5 10.\&e3 0-0 11.0-0-0 \&b7 12.f3± Herrmann – Querneheim, Koerbecke 2000;

9...0-0 10.\&g5 (It is also possible to play – 10.\&e3 b5 11.f3 – see 9...b5.) 10...\&d4 (Black has great problems after his other moves too: 10...d6 11.0-0-0 \&d8, Zupanc – Semrl, Slovenia 1996, 12.\&d5± –; 10...b5 11.\&xf6 gxf6 12.\&d5 \&g7, Hartwig – E.Kim, Detroit 1994, 13.0-0-0±; 10...\&e8 11.\&d5± Mariani – Vlaar, Email 2003.) 11.\&d3 b5 (It is possibly more reliable for Black to try: 11...d6 12.\&xf6 gxf6 13.\&d5 \&g7 14.c3 \&c6 15.\&b6 \&b8 16.f4±) 12.\&xf6 gxf6 13.\&d5 \&g7, Ciruzzi – Vande Linde, Buenos Aires 2002, 14.c3 \&e6 15.0-0-0 \&b7 16.\&e3± – and Black has no compensation for the chronic defects of his pawn-structure.

9...d6 10.\&e3 \&e6 11.0-0-0 \&d8 (In case of 11...0-0-0, the fight might continue in the following fashion: 12.\&b6 \&d7 13.f3 d5 14.exd5 \&xd5 15.\&xd5 \&xd5 16.\&xd5 \&xd5 17.\&d3 \&e6 – Black protects against the check from the f5-square, which would have taken his king even farther away from the centre – 18.a3 h5 19.h4±) 12.\&e2 (White can also play the calm move – 12.f3±) 12...b5, Kacmarcik – Cerveny, Plzen 1995, 13.a4!? b4 14.\&d5 \&xe4 (or 14...\&xd5 15.exd5 \&xe7 16.\&xa6 \&exd5 17.\&g5 h6 18.\&xf6 \&xf6 19.f4 \&e7 20.\&he1 \&e8 21.\&b5 \&e6 22.\&d4+) 15.\&xa6 \&d7 16.b5±;

9...\&d4 10.\&d3 b5 11.\&e3 (It is not so clear after: 11.\&g5 \&b7 12.\&xf6 gxf6 13.\&d5 \&xd5 14.\&xd5 b4 and White cannot exploit the precarious situation of Black’s knight on d4.) 11...\&b7 (or 11...0-0, Vos van Zalingen – Bakkes, Haarlem 1999, 12. f3±) 12.f3 \&e6 13.0-0-0 0-0 14.\&he1±;

9...h6 10.\&e3 d6 (White should continue in a similar fashion against Black’s other moves as well. That is – “central strategy”, combined with gradual advance of his kingside pawns, for example: 10...b5, Riek – Czekalski, Germany 1999, 11.0-0-0 \&b7 12.\&d3 11.0-0-0 \&e7 (11...\&g4 12.\&b6 \&d4 13.\&d2 \&e4 14.\&h3±) 12.\&e6 (or 12...b5 13.\&h4 \&e6 14.g4 b4 15.\&a4 h5 16.g5 \&d7 17.\&h2±) 13.g4 b5 14.h4 \&a5, Mednis – Lombardy, New York 1969, 15.\&h2 \&c4 16.\&xc4 \&xc4 17.\&hd2±

b1) 9...d5 10.\&exd5 \&b4 11.\&d3

11...\&xd3+

It is clearly worse for Black to play: 11...h6 12.0-0 0-0 13.\&e1 \&e8 14.f4 \&xd3 15.\&xd3 exf4
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16...\texttt{\textbackslash xe8}+ \texttt{\textbackslash xe8} 17...\texttt{\textbackslash xf4} \texttt{\textbackslash f5} 18. \texttt{\textbackslash xe1} \texttt{\textbackslash xd3} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash e7} b5 20.\texttt{d6} \texttt{\textbackslash ed8} 21.\texttt{d7} \texttt{\textbackslash f6} 22.\texttt{\textbackslash d5} \texttt{\textbackslash xd7} 23.\texttt{\textbackslash c7}+- Mohrlok – Ditt, Beverwijk 1963, or 11...0–0 12.\texttt{\textbackslash g5} e4 13.a3 \texttt{\textbackslash exd3} 14.axb4 \texttt{\textbackslash dxc2} 15.\texttt{\textbackslash xf6} \texttt{\textbackslash gxf6} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash f5} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash g4} \texttt{\textbackslash g6} 18.f4 f5 19.g5 \texttt{\textbackslash ac8} 20.\texttt{\textbackslash xc2} \texttt{\textbackslash c4} 21.\texttt{\textbackslash hf1}+- Mohrlok - Ditt, Beverwijk 1963.

Black’s most reasonable alternative here is: 11...0–0 12.\texttt{\textbackslash g5} \texttt{\textbackslash fxg5} 13.\texttt{\textbackslash d2}, but White maintains a stable advantage with his couple of powerful bishops:

13...f514.0–0 0–0 0–0, R.Rodriguez – A.Fernandez, Oviedo 2003, 15.\texttt{\textbackslash c4} \texttt{\textbackslash e6} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c3}±;

13...\texttt{\textbackslash d7}14.0–0 0–0 0–015.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} \texttt{\textbackslash he8} 16.c4!? (This move preserves the two bishops for White. His edge is not so great after: 16.\texttt{\textbackslash e4} \texttt{\textbackslash xc6} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash g5} \texttt{\textbackslash b4} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash xc6} \texttt{\textbackslash xc6} 19.\texttt{d7} f6 20.\texttt{\textbackslash e3} b5 21.\texttt{\textbackslash ed1} \texttt{\textbackslash ed8} 22.\texttt{\textbackslash b6} \texttt{\textbackslash xd7} 23.\texttt{\textbackslash xd7} \texttt{\textbackslash c8} 24.a3± Kauzky – Jumabekov, Goa 2006.)

16...\texttt{\textbackslash ac8} 17.b3 b5 18.\texttt{\textbackslash g2} \texttt{\textbackslash f6} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash c3} e4 20.\texttt{\textbackslash e2}±;

13...0–0 14.0–0 0–0 \texttt{\textbackslash e6} (about 14...\texttt{\textbackslash e8} 15.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} \texttt{\textbackslash d7} 16.c4 – see 13...\texttt{\textbackslash d7}; 14...\texttt{\textbackslash e7} 15.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} \texttt{\textbackslash c6} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c3} \texttt{\textbackslash e8} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash e4} f6, O.Schmidt – Feller, Trier 2002, 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d6} \texttt{\textbackslash f8} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash ed1}±) 15.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} \texttt{\textbackslash f4}, Levene – Freeman, Brighton 1984 (but not 15...f6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash f4}± Imperor – Pierrard, Email 2000) 16.\texttt{\textbackslash e4}! \texttt{\textbackslash fb8} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash f3} \texttt{\textbackslash g6} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash b4}± – White’s bishops are free for action now and they will break Black’s defence apart;

13...\texttt{\textbackslash e6} – That is obviously the most reliable plan for Black, but still it remains difficult for him to obtain an acceptable position: 14.0–0 0–0 0–0 0 (about 14...0–0 15.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} – see 13...0–0 0 14.0–0 0 \texttt{\textbackslash e6}; 14...f6 15.\texttt{a5} \texttt{\textbackslash e7} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash e4} \texttt{\textbackslash c6} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash b6} \texttt{\textbackslash c8}, Coelho – Oliveira, Brazil 2003, 18.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} \texttt{\textbackslash f7} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash d6} \texttt{\textbackslash he8} 20.b3±; in case of 15...\texttt{\textbackslash b8}, Black loses a pawn: 16.\texttt{\textbackslash e4} \texttt{\textbackslash e7} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash xb7}± Short – Tomczak, Germany 1990) 15.\texttt{\textbackslash he1} \texttt{\textbackslash f4} (It is worse for Black to try: 15...f6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c4} \texttt{\textbackslash e7} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash a5} \texttt{\textbackslash d4} 18.b3 \texttt{\textbackslash f5} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash f1} \texttt{\textbackslash xd1}+ 20.\texttt{\textbackslash xd1}±) 16.\texttt{\textbackslash f1} (It is advisable for White to preserve the two-bishop advantage. He has only a slight edge in case of: 16.\texttt{\textbackslash xf4} \texttt{\textbackslash exf4}, R.Byrne – Sosonko, Reykjavik 1980, 17.\texttt{\textbackslash e5}±) 16...\texttt{\textbackslash g6} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash a4} \texttt{\textbackslash d4} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash a5} \texttt{\textbackslash hd8} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash c3} \texttt{\textbackslash xd1}+ 20.\texttt{\textbackslash xd1}± 12.\texttt{\textbackslash xd3}

12...\texttt{\textbackslash f5}

White’s advantage is considerable after Black’s other moves too:

12...b5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash g5} b4 (That attempt to chase White’s knight ends badly for Black. It is even less logical for him to opt for: 13...0–0, Harasimovic – Travnicek, Czech Re-
public 1997, 14.\texttt{xf}6 gxf6 15.f4\$)
14.\texttt{xf}6 gxf6 15.\texttt{e}4 f5, Socha – Skrochocka, Wisla 2000, 16.\texttt{d}6+\texttt{e}7 17.\texttt{c}4 f6 18.f4+$;

12...h6 – Black manages to preserve the flexibility of his pawn-structure, but he pays a too dear price for that. He fails to regain his pawn and to obtain a sufficient compensation for it: 13.0–0 0f5 14.\texttt{e}1 0–0–0 15.\texttt{xe}5\texttt{xd}3 16.\texttt{f}4+$ Kotronias – Mourouitis, Corinthos 1997.

\textbf{13.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{xd}3}

In case of 13...0–0, White keeps his extra pawn – 14.\texttt{xf}6 gxf6 15.d2+$ Furlan – Markun, Slovenia 2002.

\textbf{14.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{b}5}

14...\texttt{f}5 (It is about the same after: 14...\texttt{g}6 15.\texttt{xf}6 gxf6 16.f4$)
15.\texttt{xf}6 gxf6 16.f4 0–0–0 17.0–0 e4, Bellini – Bressi, Lombardia 1991, 18.\texttt{f}2$. Black’s defence remains very difficult, because of his passive pieces and compromised pawn-structure.

\textbf{15.\texttt{xf}6 gxf6 16.\texttt{e}4$ De Firmian – Hreinsson, Gausdal 1999 – Black loses at least a pawn here.}

\textbf{b2) 9...\texttt{b}4}

Black exploits the possibility to introduce disharmony in his opponent’s set-up, since it is not good for White to play 10.\texttt{d}1, due to 10...\texttt{g}4.

\textbf{10.\texttt{d}2}

It seems attractive for White to play 10.d3, with the idea to transpose to the lines, which we have analyzed in variation – \textbf{b1}, but in that case Black obtains a relatively comfortable game after: 10...b5! 11.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{b}7 – with the idea to force White to lose time on the move a2-a3.

\textbf{10...d6}

Black wishes to complete his development and to prepare later – d6-d5.

It seems too slow for him to try 10...h6, Agayeva – Kashlinskaya, Spain 2002, 11.b3 d5 (The attempt to preserve the knight on the b4-square with: 11...d6 12.a3 a5, leads to the weakening of the b5-square and White can exploit that immediately with: 13.f3 0–0 14.b5 \texttt{d}8 15.c3 \texttt{c}6 16.\texttt{e}3 d5 17.\texttt{c}7 \texttt{b}8 18.\text{\texttt{xd}5} \texttt{xd}5+ 19.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{xd}5 20.\texttt{d}3$) 12.a3 d4
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13.\( \text{fxg4} \) dxc3 + 14.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 15.\( \text{f3} \)±

Following: 10...0-0 11.f3 d6, White again obtains a superior position with: 12.a3 \( \text{c6} \) 13.\( \text{e1} \) h6 14.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 15.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{f8} \), Trapl – Vokac, Trnava 1980 (15...\( \text{ad8} \) 16.\( \text{b6} \) \( \text{d7} \), Pieri – Cecconi, Montecatini Terme 1994, 17.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 18.\( \text{c4} \)±) 16.\( \text{b6} \) \( \text{d7} \) 17.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 18.\( \text{c4} \)±. The point is that if Black does not change the structure of the position, it will be tremendously difficult for him to equalize, since White would remain with a bishop pair and a better pawn-structure.

Tournament practice has shown that Black can hardly equalize after the standard pawn-break for that system: 10...d5 11.a3 d4 12.axb4 dxc3 + 13.\( \text{e3} \)!

Now, White obtains the advantage easily after: 13...0-0 14.f3 \( \text{e6} \) 15.\( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{ac8} \), Lukinov – Maslik, Pardubice 1999, 16.b5 axb5 17.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{xc3} \)+ 18.\( \text{d3} \)+, or 13...\( \text{e6} \) 14.f3 \( \text{c8} \), G.Kuzmin – Lindberg, Chalkidiki 2002, 15.b5± – Black is in trouble, because of his vulnerable b7-pawn and White’s powerful bishops.

White’s task is much easier after: 13...\( \text{xb2} \) 14.\( \text{xb2} \).

There has been tried here:

14...\( \text{g4} \) + 15.\( \text{f3} \) f5 (After 15...0-0? Black remains a pawn down – 16.h3+- Kodric – Stubljar, Skofja Loka 1997.) 16.exf5 \( \text{xf5} \) 17.\( \text{h3} \) e4+ 18.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{f6} \) 19.\( \text{c4} \)± – White thus deprives his opponent’s knight of the d5-square, emphasizing the displacement of Black’s pieces, which are hampered by his own e4-pawn;

14...\( \text{d7} \), Mrochen – Gaviria, Internet 2004 – Black remains hopelessly behind in development after that. 15.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{bd1} \) b6 17.b5 a5 18.\( \text{a3} \)+ 19.\( \text{d6} \)+;

14...0-0 – This move also enables White to reach his optimal set-up: 15.f3 \( \text{d7} \) (or 15...\( \text{e8} \), Letelier – Ader, Chili 1961, 16.\( \text{e2} \) and Black has difficulties completing his development – White can counter 16...\( \text{d7} \) with 17.\( \text{a5} \) b5 18.\( \text{ha1} \)+) 16.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e8} \) 17.\( \text{bd1} \) \( \text{f8} \) 18.\( \text{b5} \)± Dominguez – Gillani, Calvia 2004;

14...\( \text{e6} \) 15.\( \text{a5} \) (White plans to push b4-b5; while in case of: 15.f3 \( \text{d7} \), followed by \( \text{c7} \) and \( \text{h8} \), Black manages to coordinate his pieces.) 15...0-0, Pribeanu – M.Mueller, Mondariz 2003 (Black cannot change anything much with: 15...\( \text{g4} \) + 16.\( \text{f3} \) f6 17.b5 \( \text{c8} \) 18.\( \text{d3} \) axb5 19.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{c7} \) 20.h3 \( \text{h6} \) 21.\( \text{b1} \)+ Van Beek – Slaa, Hengelo 1996, or 15...\( \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 17.b5 axb5 18.\( \text{xb5} \)+) 16.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 17.\( \text{ha1} \)+;

It looks like Black’s most tenacious defence here is: 13...\( \text{g4} \)+
14...f5?! – Practice has shown that Black is not better prepared for such type of action than his opponent: 15.bxc3 fxe4 (In case of 15...c6, White remains with a solid extra pawn – 16.e5 cxe5 17.f3 0-0-0 18.e1+ f7 19.f2± Velimirovic – Ristic, Skender Vakuf 1980, while after 15...0-0–0, he maintains a clear advantage with the paradoxical variation: 16.e1! fxe4 17.h3 d6 18.c4+ h8, van Kerkhof – Bloemhard, Dieren 2006, 19.a5 d7 20.e5 ac8 21.b3 xc3 22.b2±) 16.h3 d6 17.e5 b5 18.e4 d7, Balaban – Savic, Jahorina 2000, 19.e3 f7 20.b2 h8 21.e5 bxc4 22.e2 b5 23.d1± – Black's position is abundant with numerous weaknesses;

14...e6 15.bxc3 c4+ 16.e1 xf1 17.xf1 c8, Hauchard – Lehericey, Chanak 1989, 18.f3 d6 19.d2 e7 20.e2±, followed by b4-b5;

14...cxb2 15.axb2 e6 (In case of: 15...f6 16.f3 d6 17.e3 e6 18.c4 c8, Martin – van Wranken, corr. 1988, it deserves attention for White to continue with: 19.c5 d7 20.b5! d5 21.bxa6 bxa6 22.e6 and despite the simplifications, Black has problems completing his development.) 16.h3 c8 17.c1 d6 18.e3 d7 19.c4 f6, Medvegy – Ledger, Gibraltar 2003, 20.e2± – White plans to penetrate with his rook to the d-square and Black has difficulties countering that – his king would be rather unsafe on the a3-f8 diagonal.

11.e3 c6 12.e1!? e6

Black only loses time after: 12.d4 13.d3 e6, E.Yilmaz – Bukovec, Herceg Novi 2006, 14.e3 and he should better come back – 14...c6 15.d1 d8 16.g5 (White can also play the simple move 16.f3±) 16...h6 17.xf6 gxf6 18.f4 exf4 19.f1 g8 20.d2 e5 21.xf4 e7 22.d2±

13.f3

It seems to me – that move is more flexible than 13.e3. The point is that Black can free his position with the move d6-d5 either immediately, or after the preliminary – d6-e7. In the latter case, White might not need at all to occupy the e3-square with his bishop – see the notes to Black's next move.

13...d5

Black's alternative here is: 13...e7 14.f2 0–0–0 15.d3 d5 16.exd5 fxd5 17.xd5 dxc5 18.e1 f4 19.f1 g6 20.e3 c7 (In case of: 20...f5, White seizes the control over an important diagonal – 21.c4! f6 22.g4 h7 23.a1±) 21.ad1 he8 22.g3±

14.exd5 dxd5 15.cxd5 e3 0–0–0 17.f2 e6

Black thus prevents the unpleasant move b6, since now he would counter it with 18...xd2+. In case of 17...he8, White has the possibility to occupy the d-file: 18.b6 d7 19.d1±
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18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}3} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}4}

That move restricts the scope of the bishop on e3, but now Black’s e5-pawn is too vulnerable.

19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}e1} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}e8}, Korneev – Tomczak, Tegel 2006, 20.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}ad1} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}6}. Black will have to solve the problem with his h7-pawn sooner or later. 21.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}4}. White’s urgent task here is to realize the power of his pieces by exploiting the vulnerability of the dark squares on Black’s queenside. He must try to create new objects for attack and to break thus his opponent’s defence. He activates his bishop, creating the unpleasant threat 22.f4 in the process. Meanwhile, he has the possibility to create an isolated pawn for his opponent at an opportune moment with the move \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}3xd4}. It is rather difficult for Black to parry White’s threats. His attempt to do that with the move 21...f5, can only worsen his situation – after 22.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}3} Black will be paralyzed to protect his central pawns, while in case of 22...f4, he simply loses a pawn – 23.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{xd}}4 exd4} 24.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}6 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}7} 25.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}4±

Conclusion

The variation 4...e5 5.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}5} a6 – is not such a frequent guest in the contemporary tournament practice. Still, it remains interesting, because of its strategical complexity. Black weakens his pawn-structure at an early stage of the game and in addition he presents his opponent with the two-bishop advantage. His hopes are based on his lead in development in order to manage to either create some counterplay in the middle game, or to repair the defects of his position. That plan has a certain drawback – White can enter an endgame (That decision is usually quite unpleasant for Black, from the psychological point of view.). The point is that Black’s chances of equalizing are connected with the possibility to push d6-d5, but the game is opened after that, usually in favour of White, because of his powerful bishops. The pawn-structure remains asymmetrical and that is in favour of White too, particularly if he maneuvers skilfully. Black is faced with a difficult defence. White’s advantage is due to long-term strategical factors and he only needs to watch for some forced lines and tricks, while he follows his plan. He must also be careful not to change the pawn-structure – especially on the kingside.
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1.e4 c5 2.\textit{\&f3} \textit{\&c6} 3.d4 cxd4 4.\textit{\&xd4} e5 5.\textit{\&b5} d6

This order of moves became fashionable at the end of the 80ies of the last century and it was quite interesting for the theory of the Sicilian Defence. The position resembles a lot the Chelyabinsk variation. It arises sometimes via a transposition of moves, but meanwhile I would like to point out the important difference: Black delays the development of his king's knight, preventing thus White's move \textit{\&g5} and he preserves the possibility to continue at some moment with the maneuver \textit{\&f8-e7-g5}, as well as with the pawn-advance – f7-f5. This system, just like the Chelyabinsk variation, became modern mostly thanks to the profound analyses and the vast experience of GM Evgenij Sveshnikov.

6.\textit{\&c3}

White can make use of the fact that his knight is still not on c3 and he can play 6.c4. This move used to be considered as the best, but subsequently, Black found his way and White began to have problems maintaining his advantage. The main drawback of the move with the c-pawn is that the d4-square is weakened irrevocably.

6...\textit{\&a6}

Black repels his opponent's knight to the edge of the board and that looks quite logical.

After 6...\textit{\&f6}, there arises the basic position of the Chelyabinsk variation – see 4...\textit{\&f6} (Book 10).

Black has also tried 6...\textit{\&e6}, but then White plays 7.\textit{\&d5}. In case of 7...\textit{\&c8}, White follows with 8.c4 a6 (If 8...\textit{\&f6}, then 9.\textit{\&xf6+ \&xf6} 10.\textit{\&e3} and it is sufficient for Black to play neither 10...\textit{\&d8} 11.\textit{\&d2} a6 12.\textit{\&c3}± Ivanovic – Gostisa, Belgrade 1988, nor 10...\textit{\&g6} 11.f3± and White has a stable advantage thanks to the vulnerability of Black's d6-pawn.) 9.\textit{\&bc3} (Notice that the knight was not
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forced to retreat to the edge of the board.) 9...\(\text{c}f6\) (It is too dubious for Black to opt for: 9...\(\text{a}ge7\)?! 10.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{xd}5\), Halasz – Rybajlak, Bratislava 1996, 11.\(\text{c}xd5\) \(\text{b}8\) 12.\(\text{w}b3\)±, while in case of: 9...\(\text{e}e7\) 10.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{g}5\), there would follow: 11.\(\text{b}b6\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{e}e2\) \(\text{h}6\) 13.0–0 0–0 14.\(\text{w}d3\)± Walek – Chytilek, Czech Republic 1995.) 10.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{e}7\) (or 10...\(\text{xd}5\) 11.\(\text{c}xd5\) \(\text{b}8\) 12.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{e}7\) 13.0–0 0–0 14.\(\text{f}3\)± Sarkar – Legaspi, Philadelphia 1996) 11.\(\text{e}e2\) 0–0 12.0–0± and White remains with slightly better prospects. It is also possible for Black to try 7...\(\text{xd}5\) 8...\(\text{e}d5\). He has retreated to different squares with his knight, but he never managed to solve his opening problems:

8...\(\text{c}c7\) 9.\(\text{c}4\) a6 (White counters the careless move 9...\(\text{f}6\)? with 10.\(\text{a}a4!++\)) 10.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{f}6\), R.Horvath – Nemeth, Tapolca 1998, 11.\(\text{d}d3\) \(g6\) (11...\(\text{g}6\) 12.0–0 \(\text{e}7\) 13.\(\text{e}3\)±) 12.0–0 \(\text{g}7\) 13.\(\text{e}3\) 0–0 14.\(\text{w}b3\)±? \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{a}a4\)± and White has powerful pressure on the queenside.

After 8...\(\text{b}8\) 9.\(\text{c}4\) a6 (or 9...\(\text{d}7\) 10.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 11.0–0 a6 12.\(\text{c}3\) f5 13.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{b}6\) 14.\(\text{h}1\) e4 15.\(\text{a}a4\) \(\text{c}7\) 16.\(\text{e}3\)± Ghinda – Seliger, Decin 1976) 10.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}6\) (10...10 \(\text{g}6\)?! 11.\(\text{d}3\) f5 12.0–0± Makka – Fakhiridou, Ermioni 2006) 11.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 12.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{bd}7\) 13.0–0 0–0 14.\(\text{c}1\)± Pfaffel – Huber, Graz 1995 and White has a slight advantage, because of his bishop pair.

7.\(\text{a}3\)

Now, Black has an important choice to make. He has numerous possibilities and we must analyze in details: a) 7...\(\text{e}7\), b) 7...\(\text{e}6\) and c) 7...\(\text{b}5\). I will point out immediately that the last move is most attractive for him, since it restricts the mobility of the knight on a3. At first, we will mention his other options:

As before, there arise no original positions after: 7...\(\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{g}5\) – see 4...\(\text{f}6\); meanwhile White can choose: 8.\(\text{c}4\)! b5 (After 8...\(\text{e}7\) 9.\(\text{g}5\), Black reaches an unfavourable for him line of the Chechylabinsk variation – see 4...\(\text{f}6\)) 9.\(\text{e}3\), White should not be afraid of the move 9...\(\text{b}4\) (It is possibly more prudent for Black to try 9...\(\text{e}7\) – see 7...\(\text{e}7\), or 9...\(\text{e}6\) – see 7...\(\text{e}6\)) 10.\(\text{c}d5\) \(\text{xe}4\), because after: 11.a3 \(\text{bxa}3\) (or 11...b3 12.\(\text{cxb}3\)±) 12.\(\text{xa}3\)\(\text{xe}3\), as the game Anand – Ponomariov, Wijk aan Zee 2003 showed, White’s compensation for the pawn was more than sufficient;

It is not so good for Black to play 7...\(\text{g}7\) 8.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}4\), Lahaye

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In the game Aronin – Kuzminykh, Leningrad 1947, Black opted for 7...h6, but following:
8.\(\text{\texttt{C}}\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) b5 (about 8...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) – see 7...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{6}}\)) 9.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) \(\underline{\text{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{5}}\) \(\underline{\text{e}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) 0-0 12.a4 b4 13.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}\text{\texttt{6}}\+) \(\text{\texttt{xf}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)± he had great problems. It was possibly better for him to continue with 8...\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\), but even then the move – 9.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\)± would have emphasized the weakness of the b6-square;

The too optimistic decision 7...f5 can be countered by White with 8.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)!? Now, it is too risky for Black to try: 8...\(\text{\texttt{fxe}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{\texttt{8}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) (or 10...\(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{5}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{4}}\)±) 11.g3! \(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{5}}\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{4}}\)± \(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) (In case of 12...\(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{6}}\), White plays 13.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{7}}\)±) 13.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{7}}\+) \(\underline{\text{e}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)±. In the game Sinkevich – Averjanov, St. Petersburg 2003, Black played 8...\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\), but it can be recommended to White to continue with 9.\(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{a}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)± (Black loses after: 9...\(\text{\texttt{fxe}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{gx}}\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{5}}\+) \(\underline{\text{d}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{7}}\+) \(\underline{\text{e}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{c}4}\)±, while if 9...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{6}}\), then 10.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{gxf}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)± \(\underline{\text{d}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) (The too original line: 10...\(\text{\texttt{fxe}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) \(\underline{\text{e}}\text{\texttt{6}}\), is insufficient for Black in view of 12.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{c}4}\)±) 11.exd5 \(\underline{\text{e}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) \(\underline{\text{w}}\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{\texttt{4}}\)±? \(\underline{\text{g}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) 14.a5 \(\underline{\text{e}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{\texttt{a}4}\)±! \(\underline{\text{d}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) (15...\(\text{\texttt{fff}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{4}}\)±) 16.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) \(\underline{\text{d}}\text{\texttt{8}}\) (16...\(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)? 17.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{x}6}++\)) 17.\(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{\texttt{4}}\)± and White is better.

\textbf{a) 7...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{7}}\)}

This line began to be played regularly in practice only lately and there are plenty of rather unclear moments. Black does not mind the centralization of White's knight and he plans meanwhile to complete the development of his kingside.

\textbf{8.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{\texttt{4}}\)}

\textbf{8...\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)}

Otherwise, Black must consider the invasion of White's knight to the b6-square after the development of the bishop to e3.

There are only transpositions after the move 8...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{6}}\), or 8...\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{5}}\) – see 4...\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\).

It is premature for Black to play 8...\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{5}}?)!, which was tested in the game Horbing – Jahjajev, Hallstahammar 2003, because after: 9.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{\texttt{5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{4}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) b5 11.\(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{\texttt{6}}\) \(\underline{\text{d}}\text{\texttt{7}}\) 12.\(\underline{\text{c}}\text{\texttt{c}7}\+) \(\underline{\text{f}}\text{\texttt{8}}\) 13.\(\underline{\text{xa}}\text{\texttt{8}}\) \(\underline{\text{b}}\text{\texttt{c}4}\) 14.\(\underline{\text{c}7}\)± – White succeeded in evacuating his knight away from the corner of the board.

\textbf{9.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{\texttt{6}}\)}

If 9...\(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{\texttt{5}}\), then 10.a4 b4 (or 10...\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{\texttt{e}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{xe}}\text{\texttt{3}}\) b4 12.\(\underline{\text{d}}\text{\texttt{5}}\)± Vlassis – Kouvatsou, Aegina 1996)
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11.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{cf6} \) 12.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 13.\( \text{xe3} \)\( \pm \) — Black got rid of his “bad” bishop indeed, but he was left without the key-defender of his dark squares and the d6-pawn.

10.\( \text{g3} \)?

That is a key-decision for White. He is trying to deploy his forces in the most harmonious fashion and the development of his bishop on \( g2 \) is quite purposeful. You should not forget though — his central e4-pawn remains insufficiently protected for a moment.

10...\( b4 \)?

This is Black’s most principled line and strangely enough, it has never been played in practice yet. The evaluation of White’s previous move depends on the outcome of the arising complications.

It also deserves attention for Black to try 10...\( h5 \)?, In that case White should better ignore Black’s flank operation – after 11.\( \text{hg2} \) \( h4 \) (about 11...\( \text{d}4 \) 12.0–0 \( h4 \) – see 11...\( h4 \)) 12.0–0 \( \text{d}4 \) (If 12...g6, then 13.a4 b4 14.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 15.c3! \( \text{bx}c3 \) 16.\( \text{bx}c3 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 17.\( \text{a}3 \)\( \pm \) van Den Doel – Moiseenko, Plovdiv 2003, while in case of 12...hxg3, it looks very good for White to continue with: 13.fxg3?! \( \text{e}6 \) 14.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 15.c3\( \pm \) with initiative for him, T.Kosintseva – Johansson, Feugen 2006.) 13.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 14.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 15.c3 \( \text{xd}5 \) (or 15...\( \text{c}6 \) 16.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 17.\( \text{d}2 \)\( \pm \) 16.\( \text{exd}5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 17.\( \text{d}3 \) \( g6 \) (or 17...\( \text{h}6 \) 18.a4\( \pm \) 18.a4 hxg3 (That exchange is necessary, because Black’s position is very difficult after: 18...\( \text{b}8 \)?! 19.axb5 axb5 20.\( \text{g} \) 7 21.\( f4 \) exf4 22.\( \text{xf}4 \)\( \pm \) Cheparinov – Spraggett, Metz 2005.) 19.hxg3 \( \text{b}8 \) 20.axb5 \( \text{b}4 \)\( \pm \) and White ended up with a stable positional advantage in the game, Potkin – Eljanov, Moscow 2004.

After the calm line: 10...0–0 11.\( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) (In case of: 11...\( b4 \) 12.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 13.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{g}5 \) 14.\( \text{gx}5 \) \( \text{wg}5 \), White creates great problems for his opponent with the undermining move: 15.a3! — there might follow: 15...bx\( a3 \) 16.\( \text{bxa}3\) 15...b3 16.\( c3 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 17.0–0, or 15...\( \text{b}8 \) 16.axb5 \( \text{xb}4 \) 17.\( \text{e}3 \)\( \pm \) Karjakin – Bator, Saint-Vincent 2005.) 12.0–0 \( \text{c}8 \) (It is not logical for Black to play: 12...\( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{b}6 \)?! 14.c3\( \pm \) Pikula – Carron, Biel 2006, while if 12...\( b4 \), then 13.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 14.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 15.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \), Melekhina – Golubenko, Oropeza 2000, 17.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 18.\( \text{h}3 \)\( \pm \) and White maintains the two-bishop advantage. Black has also tried here: 12...\( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{cd}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 14.c3\( \pm \) Slizhevsky – V.Sherbakov,
Omsk 2007; while in case of 12... \\
D a5, White has a choice between
13. D c d 5 D x d 5 14. D x d 5 D c 4 15.
D h 4 ! D b 6 16. D e 3 D c 8 17. D f 3 D d 7
18. D d 1 D f d 8 19. b 3 ± Smikovski — Vinichenko, Omsk 2007 and
13. b 3 !?; after 12... D d 4 13. D c d 5
D x d 5 , Testor — Tober, Austria
2004, White can play 14. D x d 5 ±,
followed by c 2 -c 3 .) 13. D c d 5 D a 5
(That move is more precise than:
13... D d 7 14. c 3 D g 5 15. D f 4 D x f 4
16. D x f 4 D h 6 17. a 4 D e 8 18. D x b 5
a x b 5 19. D g 4 ± and Black's posi­
tion was terrible in the game Bo­
logan — Maidla, Riga 1995.) 14. c 3
D c 4 . Here, White can develop
his initiative with the line: 15. a 4
D x d 5 (or 15... D x e 3 16. D x f 6 + D x f 6
17. D x e 3 D c 4 18. D e 1 D d 7 19. a x b 5
a x b 5 20. D a 6 ± Swinkels — Vander­
hallen, Bethune 2006) 16. D x d 5
D x d 5 17. e x d 5 f 5 18. a x b 5 a x b 5
19. D e 2 ± — and despite the simpli­
fications, Black's defence remains
difficult.

11. D c d 5 D x e 4 12. D g 2 f 5
Black loses material after his
other moves, because of the de­
fenselessness of his knight on c 6.

13. g 4 !
White needs that super-import­
ant resource in every position.

13... D h 4
Black should try to find coun­
ter chances by attacking the f 2-
square. Naturally, he cannot
play 13... g 6 ? due to 14. g x f 5 g x f 5
15. D h 5 + −

14. 0-0 0-0
It is insufficient for Black to
continue with 14... D x f 2 15. D x f 2
D x f 2 + 16. D x f 2 0-0 (or 16... D x g 4
17. D x b 4 ±) 17. D g 1 D x g 4 (or 17... D 4
18. D x f 4 ±) 18. D x b 4 ± — and Black's
pieces are hanging on the long di­
agonal in all the variations.

15. D x f 5 D x f 2 +
Black does not have much of a
choice. If 15... D g 5 , then White
should play not: 16. D x b 4 ?! D x b 4
17. D x a 8 D h 3 + 18. D g 2 D f 4 + 19.
D h 1 D x f 5 , but: 16. f 4 ! D f 7 (or 16...
D x f 4 17. D x f 4 ±) 17. D x b 4 ±

16. D x f 2 D x f 2 17. D x f 2 D x f 5
In general, a rook and two
pawns are good material equiva­
lent of two light pieces, but in this
case White's forces are perfectly
coordinated and that provides
him with an advantage.

18. D x f 5 D d 4
The intermediate check 18...
D h 4 + ?! is useless here, because
after 19. D g 1 D x f 5 , White has a
very powerful maneuver at his
disposal: 20. D e 3 ! D g 5 21. D f 1 ±,
winning material.

19. D g 1 D x f 5

20. D g 4 !? D c 8
Black loses after 20... D c 8 ?
It is evidently in favour of White if Black plays: 20...a5 21.e4 g6 22.a3!±, or 20...a7 21.g5 w8c 22.xb4 xc2 23.f1±

21.xb4 c5+ 22.h1 e8 23.e4 g6 24.d2±

Tournament practice can of course correct this analysis at some moments, but it would hardly be able to change the basic evaluation – Black’s attempt to go after his opponent’s central e4-pawn is extremely risky for him.

b) 7...e6

This variation is in principle similar to the previous one, but there are some basic differences too. On one hand, the move 7...e6 is more flexible and purposeful, but on the other hand, because of some tactical nuances, which you will understand later, after 7...e6, White cannot follow with the abovementioned comfortable scheme with the development of his bishop to the g2-square.

8.c4 b5

About 8...f6 9.g5 – see 4...f6.

It is too dubious for Black to play: 8...h6?! 9.e3 b5 10.b6 b8 11.bd5 f6 12.xf6+ gxf6 13.d5± Fishbein – Legaspi, Philadelphia 1996, or 8.d4?! 9.d5 xd5 10.exd5 f6 11.c3 f5, Bauer – Gabriel, Germany 1995, 12.d3! e7 13.g5! and if 13...exd5, then 14.e4±

In case of 8...b8, as it was played in the game Rakitskij – Glicenstein, Budva 2003, White could have followed with: 9.d5!? b5 10.ce3 f6 11.d3±, with the same ideas as in the main line.

After 8...e7, White can occupy the b6-square with the move – 9.e3. There might follow:

9...f6 10.b6 b8 11.e2 0–0 (or 11...e4 12.xe4 d5 13.c5 d4 14.xe6 fxe6 15.c4± Armas – Kouatly, France 1993) 12.0–0 e4!? (In case of 12...d7, White can continue with 13.cd5 and Black cannot answer with 13...g5?, because of: 14.xd7 xd7 15.b6 e8 16.c7+– Smikovski – Bogachkov, Omsk 2007 and he loses material. It is too passive for Black to opt for 12...e8 13.d2 h6 14.cd5± Tolnai – Fauland, Velden 1993.)

13.xe4 f5 (White obtains a stable advantage, thanks to his superior pawn-structure, after: 13...d5 14.c5 d4 15.xe6 fxe6 16.c4 dxe3 17.xe3 b6 18.c4 c5 19.c3± Radulov – Liberzon, Nice 1974.)

14.c4 xc4 15.xc4 fxe4 16.xd5+ h8, Folkova – Medunova, Stare Mesto 2005, 17.ad1± and White
enjoys a blockade on the light squares of his opponent's game.

Instead of 9...\(\textit{f}6\), Black has also tried in practice: 9...b5 10.\(\textit{b}6\) b8 11.\(\textit{bd}5\). Here, in case of: 11...\(\textit{f}6\) 12.a4 bxa4 (12...0-0?! 13.axb5 axb5 14.\(\textit{AXB}5\) Lalic – Dunnington, London 1997; 12...b4 13.\(\textit{xf}6\) + \(\textit{xf}6\) 14.\(\textit{d}5\) Jakubiec – Zeberski, Krakow 1999) 13.\(\textit{xa}6\) 0-0 (or 13...\(\textit{xb}2\) 14.\(\textit{bd}5\) \(\textit{d}7\) 15.\(\textit{xa}4\) \(\textit{xd}5\) 16.\(\textit{xd}5\)), as it was played in the game Am.Rodriguez – G.Hernandez, Havana 1997, White obtained the advantage after: 14.0-0?! \(\textit{xb}2\) 15.\(\textit{xa}4\), while after 11...b4?, he is not forced to play: 12.\(\textit{a}4\) \(\textit{f}6\) 13.\(\textit{b}6\) \(\textit{d}7\) 14.\(\textit{c}7\) + \(\textit{f}8\) 15.\(\textit{xa}6\) \(\textit{xb}6\)! 16.\(\textit{xb}6\) \(\textit{a}7\) – it is more precise for White to continue with: 12.\(\textit{e}2\)! \(\textit{f}6\) 13.\(\textit{g}3\) a5 14.\(\textit{c}4\) 0-0 15.0-0 \(\textit{g}4\) 16.\(\textit{f}5\) \(\textit{xe}3\) (The following line is in favour of White: 16...\(\textit{xf}5\)!! 17.\(\textit{exf}5\) \(\textit{xe}3\) 18.\(\textit{fxe}3\) ±) 17.\(\textit{fxe}3\) ± with a powerful initiative for him.

We must also analyze 8...\(\textit{xc}8\). After 9.\(\textit{e}3\) \(\textit{d}4\) (It is evident that Black should not lose a tempo in variations like: 9...b5 10.\(\textit{b}6\) b8 11.\(\textit{cd}5\) ± Marcsingo – Tivolt, Kaposvar 2000, or 9...\(\textit{f}6\) 10.\(\textit{b}6\) b8 11.\(\textit{e}2\) e7 12.0-0 0-0 13.a4, followed by: 13...d7 14.\(\textit{cd}5\) \(\textit{xb}6\) 15.\(\textit{xb}6\) \(\textit{d}7\) 16.\(\textit{c}3\) ± de Firmian – Rocha, Lisbon 2000, or 13...b4 14.\(\textit{bd}5\) \(\textit{fxd}5\) 15.\(\textit{xd}5\) \(\textit{xd}5\) 16.\(\textit{exd}5\) \(\textit{d}7\) 17.\(\textit{a}5\) ± de Vreught – Perez Garcia, Haarlem 1994.) 10.\(\textit{xd}4\) \(\textit{xc}4\) 11.\(\textit{xc}4\) \(\textit{xc}4\) 12.\(\textit{xe}3\) \(\textit{f}6\) (about 12...\(\textit{e}7\) 13.0-0 \(\textit{f}6\) 14.\(\textit{cd}3\) \(\textit{c}7\) 15.\(\textit{g}5\) – see 12...\(\textit{f}6\) ) 13.\(\textit{d}3\) – The powerful outpost in the centre provides White with a long-lasting advantage. In the game Vuckovic – Dinev, Beograd 2006, there followed: 13...\(\textit{c}7\) (or 13...\(\textit{c}8\) 14.\(\textit{g}5\) \(\textit{d}4\) 15.\(\textit{e}2\) ± Seres – Jakobsen, Budapest 2003; 13...\(\textit{c}6\) 14.\(\textit{g}5\) Zimina – Smokina, Vladimir 2006) 14.0-0 \(\textit{e}7\) 15.\(\textit{g}5\) \(\textit{d}4\) 16.\(\textit{f}3\) \(\textit{c}6\) 17.\(\textit{xf}6\) \(\textit{xf}6\) 18.\(\textit{d}5\) \(\textit{d}8\) 19.\(\textit{c}3\) \(\textit{d}2\) 20.\(\textit{b}3\) \(\textit{c}5\) 21.\(\textit{fd}1\) ± – White had a powerful knight against a “bad” bishop.

9.\(\textit{e}3\) \(\textit{f}6\)

It is only a transposition after: 9...\(\textit{e}7\) 10.a4!? b4 11.\(\textit{cd}5\) \(\textit{f}6\) 12.\(\textit{d}3\) – see 9...\(\textit{f}6\).

10.\(\textit{d}3\)

That is White's most reliable move, which provides him with a slight but stable advantage.

It is time to explain why the move 10.g3 is not so good when Black's bishop is on the e6-square. The point is that in that case it is very good for Black to continue with: 10...b4?! 11.\(\textit{cd}5\) \(\textit{xe}4\) 12.\(\textit{g}2\) f5 and he should not be afraid
of the line: 13.g4 g6 14.gxf5 gxf5 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}}_5+ \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_7\infty\) – that is the essential difference between the moves 7...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_7\) and 7...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_6\). In the game Carlsen – Grigore, Budapest 2003, White tried to seize the initiative with: 13.0–0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_7\) (Black has not tested in practice the move – 13...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_8\)!? yet, but still it deserves serious attention.) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xf}}}_5! \text{\textit{\textbf{xf}}}_5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_3\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_6\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_8\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}}_7\infty\), but that only led to a very complicated situation with mutual chances.

**10...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_7\)**

Black can try some other possibilities too:

It is not in the spirit of the position for him to opt for: 10...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_6\) 11.0–0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_7\) 12.a4 b4 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{cd}}}_5\) 0–0, Korneev – Cheparinov, Seville 2003 (or 13...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{exd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_7\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_2\)! \(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_5\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_3\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{wc}}}_7\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{db}}}_6\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{bb}}}_8\) 19.a5 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{exd}}}_5\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xa}}}_6\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{wc}}}_6\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{wd}}}_3\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_7\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{wc}}}_4\)+ Moliboga – Vedmediuc, Kiev 2006), 14.a5!? \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) (or 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xa}}}_5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}}_4\)+; 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{wb}}}_8\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{db}}}_6\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{ea}}}_7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{ed}}}_5\)+) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{exd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_4\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{ad}}}_2\) – Black’s a6 and b4-pawns seem to be quite vulnerable.

In the game Krotofil – Grunwald, Pinneberg 1993, Black chose 10...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{bc}}}_8\) and White had to continue with the standard plan 11.a4 b4 12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{cd}}}_5\)+ with a slight edge.

It is somewhat premature for Black to try 10...b4, Mirabile – Niculescu, Nassau 1997, 11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{cd}}}_5\)+.

Black’s most interesting alternative to the main line is the principled move – 10...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{b}}}_4\)?, although it would not equalize either, if White plays correctly. After the schematic move 11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_2\), Black would solve all his problems with the help of the freeing pawn-advance 11...d5=+, but it is stronger for White to play 11.a4!, after which it is not good for Black to try: 11...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{bx}}}_a4\)! 12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xa}}}_4\) d5 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{exd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{fxd}}}_5\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{cd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) (In case of 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\), White has the tactical resource: 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}}_4\)! \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xb}}}_4\)+ 16.c3 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_7\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_4\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}}_8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{wd}}}_8\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xa}}}_8\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xa}}}_8\) 21.0–0± with a great advantage for him.) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) 16.0–0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_5\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_1\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_1\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_7\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_5\)+ – and the endgame would be very difficult for Black, while if: 11...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_5\) 12.0–0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_3\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_3\) b4 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{cd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) (or 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{exd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{wc}}}_7\) 17.f4\(+\)\)), then 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{exd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe}}}_7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{bd}}}_1\) 0–0 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}}_5\)+ with powerful pressure for White. After the natural and relatively best line for Black: 11...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_3\)+ 12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_3\) b4 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{cd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) (or 14...\(\textit{\textbf{a}}_5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_3\)+) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{ec}}}_8\) (In case of 15...\(\textit{\textbf{e}}_7\) 16.\(\textit{\textbf{d}}_2\) a5 17.\(\textit{\textbf{xc}}_3\) bxc3, White has as a powerful resource the intermediate move 18.\(\textit{\textbf{wc}}_6\)+! \(\textit{\textbf{f}}_8\) 19.\(\textit{\textbf{xc}}_3\) \(\textit{\textbf{g}}_6\) 20.f4\(+\); Black still has a lot of problems after: 15...\(\textit{\textbf{ac}}_1\) and now White can play the interesting move – 16.\(\textit{\textbf{d}}_2\)\(\textit{\textbf{a}}_2\)? The arising position should still be tested in practice, but the analysis shows that White’s queenside initiative is
quite powerful despite the simplifications and Black will have great problems neutralizing it. There might follow: 16...a5?! 17.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b5±; 16...\textit{\textsuperscript{x}}xc2 17.0-0 \textit{\textsuperscript{xb}}2 (or 17...a5 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{f}}c1±) 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{d}}d3! (White emphasizes the awkward placement of his opponent’s rook.) 18...b3 (If 18...\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c8, then White occupies reliably the open c-file and Black is in a lot of trouble after that: 19.\textit{\textsuperscript{f}}c1 \textit{\textsuperscript{d}}d7 20.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c4 b3 21.\textit{\textsuperscript{a}}a1±) 19.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c3! \textit{\textsuperscript{a}}a2 20.\textit{\textsuperscript{a}}xa6±; 16...\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b6 17.0-0 \textit{\textsuperscript{e}}e7 (The exchange of queens: 17...\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c6 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}xb4 \textit{\textsuperscript{xd}}5 19.\textit{\textsuperscript{ex}}d5 \textit{\textsuperscript{xc}}2 20.\textit{\textsuperscript{ac}}1 \textit{\textsuperscript{xb}}2, would not help Black, because of 21.\textit{\textsuperscript{xa}}6!±; while after 17...\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c5, it is good for White to play: 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b7 a5 19.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c6 20.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b5!± with an obvious advantage for him.) 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{fd}}1 0-0 (It is too risky for Black to try: 18...\textit{\textsuperscript{xc}}2 19.\textit{\textsuperscript{dc}}1 \textit{\textsuperscript{xc}}1+ 20.\textit{\textsuperscript{xc}}1 0-0 21.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c6 \textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b7 22.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c4±) 19.a5±. White maintains better prospects in all the variations; nevertheless, Black's defensive opportunities should not be underestimated.

11.a4!? White plays more often here 11.0-0, but I believe that the move 11.a4 is more precise, since it prevents the possibilities for Black connected with the move \textit{\textsuperscript{d}}b4.

11...b4 12.\textit{\textsuperscript{cd}}5 0-0 13.0-0 \textit{\textsuperscript{d}}d7
In the game Andreikin – Lenic, Kirishi 2003, Black chose the immediate move – 13...a5, but White demonstrated quite energetically and convincingly the advantages of his position. There followed: 14.c3! bxc3 15.\textit{\textsuperscript{xc}}3 \textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b8 16.\textit{\textsuperscript{a}}a3 \textit{\textsuperscript{xd}}5 17.\textit{\textsuperscript{ex}}d5 \textit{\textsuperscript{ac}}8 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b1 \textit{\textsuperscript{wc}}7 19.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b3± and Black's position became very difficult.

14.\textit{\textsuperscript{d}}d2 a5
In case of 14...\textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b8?! White follows with: 15.\textit{\textsuperscript{xb}}4 \textit{\textsuperscript{xb}}4 16.\textit{\textsuperscript{xe}}7+ \textit{\textsuperscript{h}}8 17.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c4± Erneste – Stepovaia, Podolsk 1990.

\begin{center}
\textbf{15.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c3! bxc3 16.\textit{\textsuperscript{xc}}3 \textit{\textsuperscript{dc}}5 17.\textit{\textsuperscript{c}}c2 \textit{\textsuperscript{b}}b8 18.\textit{\textsuperscript{f}}4\uparrow}
\end{center} Socko – Zozulia, Cappelle la Grande 2005. White controls reliably the d5-square and he has deployed favourably his dark-squared bishop. His kingside initiative is running smoothly after he has accomplished the pawn-advance – f2-f4.
c) 7...b5

That is the most popular and concrete move. Black takes the c4-square under control and he creates the threat 8...b4, forcing White's next move.

8.\(\text{\&}d5\)

Now, Black has numerous possibilities. White’s knight on d5 is very powerful, so Black is usually trying to neutralize it immediately. Here, we will not analyze the natural move – 8...\(\text{\&}f6\), because after 9.\(\text{\&}g5\) there arises the Chelyabinsk variation by a transposition of moves – see 4...\(\text{\&}f6\). Sometimes Black tries the move c1) 8...\(\text{\&}e7\), with the idea to avoid the pin along the h4-d8 diagonal, but still he most often chooses the lines: c2) 8...\(\text{\&}ge7\), or c3) 8...\(\text{\&}ce7\).

Before we start dealing with the main lines, we should pay some attention to some of the rarely played sidelines:

It leads only to transpositions of moves after: 8...\(\text{\&}b8\) 9.c4 b4 10.\(\text{\&}c2\) \(\text{\&}f6\) (about 10...\(\text{\&}e7\) – see 8...\(\text{\&}e7\); 10...a5 11.\(\text{\&}d3\) \(\text{\&}e7\) 12.0–0 \(\text{\&}f6\) – see 8...\(\text{\&}e7\)) 11.\(\text{\&}d3\) \(\text{\&}e7\) – see 8...\(\text{\&}e7\);

The move 8...\(\text{\&}b7\)?! enables White to occupy the b6-square with: 9.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}c8\) 10.\(\text{\&}b6\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 11.\(\text{\&}e2\)± Kornilovich – Pervushov, St. Petersburg 1997;

It is not in the spirit of the position for Black to fianchetto his dark-squared bishop: 8...g6?! 9.c4 b4 10.\(\text{\&}c2\) a5, Nordenbaek – Asgeirsson, Copenhagen 2005, 11.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}b8\) 12.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 13.0–0±;

It is rather dubious for Black to play: 8...h6?! 9.c4 b4 (If 9...bxc4, then the simplest line for White is 10.\(\text{\&}xc4\)± Guffart – W.Steiner, Germany 1994.) 10.\(\text{\&}c2\) a5 11.\(\text{\&}d3\)± Hladik – Machacek, Brno 1987;

Black would not solve his problems with the active line: 8...f5 9.\(\text{\&}d3\) \(\text{\&}e6\), as it was played in the game El Khymam – Lahmiti, Morocco 1995 (or 9...f4, Novak – Micanek, Brno 1998, 10.c4 b4 11.\(\text{\&}c2\) a5 12.g3±). Here, White could have obtained a clear advantage with the variation: 10.c4 bxc4 (or 10...b4 11.\(\text{\&}c2\)±) 11.\(\text{\&}xc4\) \(\text{\&}d4\) 12.0–0±;

It looks relatively acceptable for Black to try 8...\(\text{\&}e6\). After 9.c4 b4 (It is weaker for Black to continue with 9...\(\text{\&}xd5\) 10.exd5 \(\text{\&}b8\) 11.cxb5± Romsdal – Hoejgaard, Tromsøe 1996, or 9...bxc4 10.\(\text{\&}xc4\) \(\text{\&}d4\) 11.\(\text{\&}e3\)± Kilpela – Kiviaho, Finland 2002, while in case of 9...\(\text{\&}d4\) 10.cxb5, Black solves his problems neither with: 10...\(\text{\&}xd5\) 11.exd5 axb5 12.\(\text{\&}xb5\)± Tsiamis
- Fragiadakis, Athens 2005, nor with the line: 10...f5 11.bxa6!? fxe4 12.\(\text{b}5+\) \(\text{f}7\) 13.\(\text{f}4!\)± Chura – Tovarek, Valtice 1991.) 10.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{xb}8\) (or 10...a5, Rafiee – Fink, Bad Zwesten 2001, 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 12.0–0 \(\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{b}3\) 0–0 14.a3\(\pm\) 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}7\) (or 11...g6 12.0–0 \(\text{g}7\) 13.\(\text{d}2\) a5, Wallner – Eckhoff, Graz 2004, 14.b3\(\pm\) followed by 15.a3) 12.\(\text{d}2\)!? a5 13.0–0 \(\text{f}6\) 14.a3 b3 15.\(\text{ce}3\) 0–0 16.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 18.exf5 \(\text{c}5\) 19.\(\text{e}1\)± and White had the initiative in the game Shirov – Gatland, Bergen 2001.

c1) 8...\(\text{e}7\)

This move is reliable, but it is somewhat passive. Black intends to complete the development of his kingside, preventing the possibility – \(\text{g}5\) in the process.

9.c4

\[\text{9...b4}\]

It is in favour of White if Black plays: 9...bxc4?! 10.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}8\) 11.\(\text{xc}4\)± Shyndin – Chernushevich, Leningrad 1990.

He can try the gambit line 9...\(\text{f}6\)!?, but then after: 10.cxb5 \(\text{d}4\) 11.d3 \(\text{xd}5\) 12.exd5, there arises a position, which we will analyze later – see 8...\(\text{e}7\).

10.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}8\)

Black’s b4-pawn needs protection now.

The careless move 10...\(\text{f}6\)! can be countered by White with the line: 11.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{xf}6\) 12.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 13.\(\text{a}4\)± Murariu – Vior-eanu, Las Palmas 2003.

Black has also tried in practice here 10...a5, but that enables White to exploit the weakening of the b5-square in many variations. There might follow: 11.d3 \(\text{f}6\) 12.0–0 0–0 13.b3 \(\text{d}7\) (In case of 13...\(\text{b}8\), Backlund – Wismayer, Dortmund 1995, it would be interesting for White to try: 14.a3! bxa3 15.\(\text{xa}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{xe}7+\) \(\text{xe}7\) 17.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 18.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{d}4\) 19.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{b}7\) 20.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xc}2\) 21.\(\text{xc}2\)\(\pm\) 14. a3. Now, it is in favour of White if Black continues with: 14...\(\text{b}8\)! 15.axb4 axb4 16.\(\text{d}2\)± Djukic – Cvicic, Budva 2004. It is better for him to opt for 14...bxa3, as it was played in the game Hoffmann – Schmittdiel, Germany 1998, but then White could have played: 15.\(\text{xa}3\)!? \(\text{c}5\) (or 15...\(\text{g}5\) 16.\(\text{b}2\)!?\(\pm\), followed by 17.\(\text{b}5\)\(\pm\) 16.\(\text{b}5\), with a clear advantage in all the variations: 16...\(\text{b}7\) 17.\(\text{b}1\)!

(This is more precise than 17.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}4\)\(\pm\) 17.\(\text{c}4\)\(\pm\) 17.\(\text{e}3\)\(\pm\) 17.\(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{c}7\) 21.\(\text{g}4\)\(\pm\) 16...\(\text{e}6\) 17.\(\text{c}2\)\(\pm\) 18.\(\text{c}4\) 18.\(\text{xb}4\) axb4 19.\(\text{d}2\)\(\pm\) 18...\(\text{xd}5\) 19.\(\text{b}4\) 19.\(\text{d}1\)±
Chapter 4

11.\textit{xd}3 \textit{df}6

About 11...\textit{e}6 12.\textit{d}2 – see 8...\textit{e}6.

In principle, it is desirable for Black to trade the dark-squared bishops, but in case of: 11...\textit{g}5 12.\textit{xg}5 \textit{gg}5, Sinowjew – Petschar, Hartberg 1992, 13.\textit{ce}3 \textit{ge}7 14.\textit{c}7+ \textit{f}8 15.\textit{h}4 \textit{h}6 16.\textit{wa}4\textpm, he loses his castling rights and that makes his position tremendously difficult.

12. 0–0 0–0

About 12...a5 13.b3 0–0 – see 10...a5.

13.b3!

White must prevent the further advance of his opponent’s b4-pawn.

13...\textit{d}7

This is the most logical move for Black. He deploys his knight to the c5-square opening the diagonal of his bishop on e7 in the process.

About 13...a5 14.a3 – see 10...a5.

In case of 13...\textit{e}6, Asquith – Baker, corr. 1999, White can exploit the well-familiar motive – 14.\textit{d}2, provoking 14...a5 and lat-
er: 15.a3 bxa3 16.\textit{xa}3\textpm, having in mind that in answer to 16...\textit{d}4? – he has the resource 17.\textit{xa}5!\textpm

If 13...\textit{b}7, then 14.\textit{d}2 a5 15.\textit{a}3 bxa3 16.\textit{xa}3?!\textpm Salmensuu – Bibik, Helsinki 1999.

14.a3!

That is a typical undermining move, with which White liquidates Black’s space-advantage on the queenside and he creates additional weaknesses for him.

14...\textit{b}xa3

Black’s attempt to counter attack the b3-pawn with the line: 14...\textit{c}5 15.\textit{cxb}4 \textit{d}4, would not be sufficient due to: 16.\textit{e}3! \textit{cxb}3?! 17.\textit{b}1 and Black has serious problems, for example: 17...a5 18.\textit{xb}3\textpm, 17...\textit{a}5 18.\textit{x}d4 exd4 19.\textit{e}2\textpm, or 17...\textit{d}7 18.\textit{xa}6\textpm Nikolenko – Sluka, Pardubice 1993. It is more solid for him to try 16...\textit{b}7, but even then after 17.\textit{x}d4 exd4 18.\textit{b}1 \textit{e}8 19.\textit{c}2\textpm White remains with a stable edge.

15.b4!

This is an important intermediate move, without which the pawn-advance a2-a3 would not have been so effective.
15...\textit{\textbf{g5}}

If 15...\textit{\textbf{f6}}, then 16.\textit{\textbf{d2}}, while in case of 15...\textit{\textbf{b6}}, Moberg – Svensson, Gothenburg 1996, White can play: 16.\textit{\textbf{xe7+}}?! \textit{\textbf{x e7}} 17.\textit{\textbf{e xa3}}

16.\textit{\textbf{b5}} axb5 17.\textit{\textbf{cxb5}}

Now, White’s initiative is quite real. He controls the d5-outpost and he has a passed pawn. In the game Janetschek – Petschar, Austria 1991, after: 17...\textit{\textbf{a5}} 18.\textit{\textbf{cb4}} \textit{\textbf{x c1}} 19.\textit{\textbf{xc1}} \textit{\textbf{b7}}, Moberg – Svensson, Gothenburg 1996, White can play: 16.\textit{\textbf{xe7+}}?! \textit{\textbf{xe7}} 17.\textit{\textbf{xa3}}

9.\textit{\textbf{c4!}}

That is the only way for White to fight for the advantage. Black is practically forced now to act in a gambit style.

9...\textit{\textbf{d4}}

He sacrifices a pawn, relying on his quick development and his future pawn-majority on the kingside in order to obtain sufficient compensation. We will see however, that after a precise play by White, Black’s hopes would be in vain.

About 9...\textit{\textbf{xd5}} 10.\textit{\textbf{exd5}} \textit{\textbf{d4}} 11.\textit{\textbf{xb5}} – see 9...\textit{\textbf{d4}}.

The line: 9...\textit{\textbf{b8}} 10.\textit{\textbf{cb5}} \textit{\textbf{xd5}} (or 10...\textit{\textbf{d4}} 11.\textit{\textbf{c3+>>) 11.\textit{\textbf{exd5}} \textit{\textbf{d4}}, will be analyzed later as well – see 9...\textit{\textbf{d4}}.

White is better after: 9...\textit{\textbf{xe6}} 10.\textit{\textbf{cb5}} \textit{\textbf{d4}}, Cuijpers – Fabiano, Mendrisio 1989, 11.\textit{\textbf{e3!}} \textit{\textbf{xd5}} (or 11...\textit{\textbf{xd5}} 12.\textit{\textbf{exd5}} \textit{\textbf{ef5}} 13.\textit{\textbf{xa6+>>) 12.\textit{\textbf{exd5}} \textit{\textbf{xd5}} 13.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{exd4}} 14. \textit{\textbf{wb4}} \textit{\textbf{a5+}} 15.\textit{\textbf{d1}}

In case of: 9...\textit{\textbf{b4}} 10.\textit{\textbf{cc2}} \textit{\textbf{b8}}, Maus – Schmittdiel, Bad Wörishofen 1991, (or 10...\textit{\textbf{a5}}, Sosa – Mossong, Manila 1992, 11.\textit{\textbf{d3!}} \textit{\textbf{xd5}} 12.\textit{\textbf{exd5}} \textit{\textbf{e7}} 13.0–0\textbf{\textit{+}), the best for White is 11.\textit{\textbf{d3!}} – and
Black would hardly manage to continue without capturing on d5, which would lead to a very difficult position for him from a strategic point of view: 11...\( \text{cxd5} \) 12.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{c_e7} \) 13.0-0 \( \text{g_g6} \) (or 13...f5 14.f4+) 14.\( \text{d_d2} \) a5 15.\( \text{g_g3} \! \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{e_e3} \! \pm 

Black plays very seldom 9...bxc4. After 10.\( \text{xc4} \), it is insufficient for Black to try 10...\( \text{xe6} \), Saravia – Rossel, Montevideo 2004, 11.0-0 \( \text{xd5} \) 12.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{b_b8} \) (or 12...\( \text{d_d4} \! \pm \) 13.\( \text{f_f3} \) \( \text{f_f5} \) 14.g4+) 13.\( \text{f_f2} \! \pm \) \( \text{d_d7} \) 14.\( \text{d_d2} \! \pm 

Black plays very seldom 9...bxc4. After 10.\( \text{xc4} \), it is insufficient for Black to try 10...\( \text{xe6} \), Saravia – Rossel, Montevideo 2004, 11.0-0 \( \text{xd5} \) 12.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{b_b8} \) (or 12...\( \text{d_d4} \! \pm \) 13.\( \text{f_f3} \) \( \text{f_f5} \) 14.g4+) 13.\( \text{f_f2} \! \pm \) \( \text{d_d7} \) 14.\( \text{d_d2} \! \pm 

Black has numerous possibilities now. The most interesting are c2a 11...\( \text{d_d7} \) and c2b 11...\( \text{e_e7} \). It is much easier for White to maintain his advantage after Black’s other possibilities:

It is insufficient for him to try: 11...\( \text{b_b7} \! \pm \) 12.\( \text{e_e3} \) \( \text{g_g6} \) \( \text{f_f6} \) – Susnik – Kolar, Vrhnika 1995;

If 11...\( \text{g_g6} \), then 12.\( \text{f_f3} \) 13.\( \text{f_f5} \) 13.\( \text{b_b6} \) \( \text{d_d7} \) (In case of 13...\( \text{xe3} \), White has the intermediate move 14.\( \text{b_b5} \! \pm \) and then it is too risky for Black to play: 14...\( \text{d_d7} \) 15.\( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{x_d7} \) 16.\( \text{x_f6} \) \( \text{h_h6} \) 17.\( \text{e_e4} \! \pm 

After 11...\( \text{g_g4} \) (This move used to be quite popular once and it had its adherents.) White can play directly: 12.\( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{e_e7} \) (Following 12...\( \text{xa6} \), White should better refrain from the seemingly attractive line: 13.\( \text{x_a4} \! \pm \) \( \text{e_e7} \! \pm 

10.cxb5!? This is the principled way for White. He captures the sacrificed pawn. His alternative is the calmer line: 10.\( \text{f_f3} \) \( \text{c_c6} \) 11.\( \text{cxd5} \).

10...\( \text{cxd5} \)

About 10...\( \text{f_f6} \) 11.\( \text{f_f3} \) – see 9...\( \text{f_f6} \).

11.exd5

![Diagram]

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If 11...\( \text{g_g6} \), then 12.\( \text{f_f3} \) 13.\( \text{f_f5} \) 13.\( \text{b_b6} \) \( \text{d_d7} \) (In case of 13...\( \text{xe3} \), White has the intermediate move 14.\( \text{b_b5} \! \pm \) and then it is too risky for Black to play: 14...\( \text{d_d7} \) 15.\( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{x_d7} \) 16.\( \text{x_f6} \) \( \text{h_h6} \) 17.\( \text{e_e4} \! \pm 

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10...\( \text{cxd5} \)

About 10...\( \text{f_f6} \) 11.\( \text{f_f3} \) – see 9...\( \text{f_f6} \).

11.exd5

![Diagram]
16. ♕b5+ Rodina – Goldenberg, Quebec 2000) 14. ♕xd4 exd4 15. ♕d3 ♕xa6 16.0–0 ♕f8 17. ♕xa6 ♕xa6 18.g3 ♕g5 (18...♕f6 19.♕c4±) 19.♕xd4 ♕f6 20.♕d3± and Black’s temporary activity was gradually neutralized in the game Kovchan – Moiseenko, Alushta 1999.

It deserves some attention for Black to try the rarely played move – 11...♕b8. After: 12.bxa6!? ♕a5+ 13.♕d2 ♕xd5, as it was played in the game Hennemann – Edouard, France 2004, White had to continue with: 14.a7! ♕a8 15.♕b5+ and later: 15...♕e7 16.0–0 ♕b7 17.f4 ♕xb5 (or 17...f6 18.♕f2! ♕xa7 19.♕c4 ♕c6 20.♕d3 ♕e4 21.♕c3±) 18.♕xd5 ♕xd5 19.♕xb5 ♕c4 20.♕a4 ♕xf1 21.♕xf1±, or 15...♕d7 16.♕xd7+ ♕xd7 17.0–0 ♕xa7 (or 17...♕e7 18.b3! ♕xa7 19.♕c4 ♕b8 20.♕b2+) 18.♕c2 ♕e7 19.♕xd4 exd4 (or 19...♕xd4 20.♕e2±) 20.♕d3 ♕f6 21.♕d2± with a superior position for White.

c2a) 11...♕d7

The idea of that move is that Black is threatening the b5-pawn and he provokes White to play 12.bxa6 and after 12...♕a5+ 13.♕d2 ♕xd5∞, tournament practice has shown that Black obtains a good position.

12.♕e3!

White should not be too greedy. His main task here is to repel his opponent’s knight away from the central d4-square.

12...axb5

About 12...♕e7 13.♕xd4 exd4 14.♕d3 axb5 – see 12...axb5.

If 12...♕f5 13.♕d2 axb5, as it was played in the game Prasanna – Svoysky, Batumi 2006, then White should play: 14.♕xb5 ♕e7 15.♕d3±

Black can regain his pawn with 12...♕xb5, but that would not solve his problems, because of 13.♕c4. This position has been tested numerous times in practice and White’s chances are better: 13...♕f5 14.a4 ♕a7 (or 14...♕c7 15.♕c1+) 15.♕c1 f4 16.♕d2 ♕c8 17.♕b3± Smirin – Shirov, Klaipeda 1988, or 13...♕e7, Gallagher – Kovalevskaya, Stockholm 2003, 14.♕e2!? 0–0 15.0–0 ♕f5 16.a4, with the idea to counter 16...♕c7 with the line: 17.♕xe5! dxe5 18.d6 ♕e6 19.♕c5±

13.♕xd4 exd4 14.♕d3

The d4-pawn is poisoned: 14.♕xd4? ♕e7†

14...♕a5+

Black is trying to prevent the calm completion of White’s development.

Otherwise, Black will be faced with a long and laborious defence,
Chapter 4

for example after: 14...e7 15.0-0 b8 16.c2 0-0 17.xd4 wb6 18.f5 e8 (or 18...xf5 19.xf5 f6 20.c1 fc8, Fages – Frijling, corr. 2002, 21.e1±; 18.f6 19.xd7 xd4 20.d2±) 19.c1± Skovgaard – Nilssen, Skovlunde 2006.


15...e7 16.e2 b8 17. c2!±

Following the hasty move 17.e1?, Black can play 17...0-0! The position after 17.c2, arose in the game Motylev – Shariyazdanzov, Tomsk 2004. Black could not castle short and that caused his subsequent difficulties. There followed: 17...f8 18.xd4 (It is also good for White to play 18.a3!? f6 19.b4± Motylev) 18...b6 19.c6! xc6 20.dxc6 xc6 21.h4!± and White’s king’s rook is activated.

c2b) 11...e7

This is the most popular line for Black. He is after quickest possible development, ignoring his queenside. White must play very precisely in that variation.

12.d3!? I recommend this move, although White usually prefers – 12.c4, having excellent statistical results too. In fact, after 12...0-0 (or even 12...axb5!? 13.xb5 a6 14.a3 0-0 – see 12...0-0) 13.bxa6 (or 13.0-0 f5 14.bxa6 f4) xa6 14.0-0 wb6! (It is weaker for Black to play: 14...f6 15.e3 f5 16.xa6 xa6 17.d3± Klovans – Kiselev, Frunze 1988.) 15.b3 c5 16.b2 b8 17.d3 xc4 18.xc4 xd5± Areshchenko – Maze, Aarhus 2005 and there arises an original and not so well-analyzed position, in which Black has good counter chances.

12...0-0 Black has serious problems after: 12...wb6 13.0-0 axb5 14. e3 b4 15.c2± Tseshkovsky – Bangiev, Simferopol 1989, or 12...d7 13.0-0 f5 14.f4 wb6 15.e3± Mansson – Barron, Hastings 2006, while in case of: 12...g5
13.0–0 \texttt{$\text{dx}c1$} 14.\texttt{$\text{dx}c1$} 0–0 15.\texttt{$\text{c}c2$} \texttt{$\text{dx}b5$} 16.a4 \texttt{$\text{c}c7$} 17.\texttt{$\text{b}b4$}± Bauer – Tregubov, Clichy 2001, White has a considerable positional advantage.

Black has played only very seldom: 12...\texttt{axb5} 13.\texttt{$\text{dx}b5$} \texttt{$\text{dx}b5$} (It is important that White's bishop on d3 is protected and Black cannot play 13...\texttt{a}a6; if 13...\texttt{a}a5+, then 14.\texttt{$\text{d}d2$} \texttt{$\text{b}b6$} 15.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 16.\texttt{$\text{b}b3$} 0–0 17.\texttt{$\text{e}e3$} \texttt{g}g4 18.0–0± Kuzmin – Bessmoly, corr. 1988.) 14.\texttt{$\text{bx}b5$}+ \texttt{$\text{d}d7$} 15.\texttt{$\text{c}c4$}!? – and Black's compensation for the sacrificed pawn is insufficient.

13.0–0 f5

In the game Lanka – Christiansen, Germany 1995, Black chose: 13...\texttt{d}d7 14.\texttt{$\text{e}e3$} \texttt{$\text{f}f5$} (or 14...\texttt{$\text{dx}b5$} 15.\texttt{$\text{c}c4$}±), but White had better counter that with 15.b6! \texttt{$\text{xe}3$} 16.\texttt{fxe3}+, followed by \texttt{$\text{c}c4$}.

If Black attacks his opponent's central pawn with the move 13...\texttt{b}b7, then White can protect it indirectly with 14.\texttt{$\text{e}e3$}! – there might follow 14...\texttt{g}6 (It is too risky for Black to play: 14...\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 15.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{$\text{h}h5$} f5 17.\texttt{$\text{xf}x$}f5±; he would not solve his problems after his other possibilities either: 14...\texttt{$\text{xb}x$}b5 15.\texttt{$\text{xb}x$}b5 \texttt{axb5} 16.\texttt{$\text{xb}x$}b5 f5 17.f3± Pastor – Rodriguez Costa, Gran Canarian 2002; 14...\texttt{f}f6 15.\texttt{$\text{e}e1$}!?±) 15.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{exd4} 16.\texttt{$\text{c}c4$± Smikovsky – Bogachkov, Omsk 2006 and White is clearly better.

14.\texttt{bxa6 $\text{b}b6$}

That move creates greatest problems for White.

The straightforward line: 14..\texttt{f}4 15.\texttt{$\text{c}c2$} \texttt{$\text{b}b6$} (or 15...\texttt{$\text{f}f5$} 16.\texttt{$\text{b}b4$}± Kurlenda – Czerwonski, Slupsk 1989) 16.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4, was tested for the first time in the game Hardarson – Arnason, Island 1988, but it would not be sufficient for Black due to White's precise response: 17.a4! \texttt{$\text{d}d8$} (In case of 17...\texttt{e}e4?! , White has prepared: 18.\texttt{$\text{xe}4$}! \texttt{$\text{xe}4$} 19.\texttt{$\text{e}e1$±) 18.\texttt{$\text{e}2$} f3 19.\texttt{gxf3} \texttt{$\text{h}h3$} 20.\texttt{$\text{d}d1$}. Black is clearly worse too after: 14...\texttt{xa}a6 15.\texttt{$\text{xa}a6$} \texttt{$\text{xa}a6$} 16.\texttt{$\text{e}e3$±

15.\texttt{$\text{e}e3$}!

The b2-pawn is immaterial here. White must mobilize his forces quickly and try to protect his a6-pawn.

15...\texttt{$\text{xa}a6$}

In case of 15...\texttt{$\text{xb}2$}, White will of course continue with 16.\texttt{$\text{c}c4$} \texttt{$\text{b}4$} 17.\texttt{$\text{b}b1$} \texttt{$\text{c}5$} 18.\texttt{$\text{b}b6$}±, while if 15...\texttt{f}4, then 16.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 17.\texttt{$\text{b}b5$} \texttt{$\text{xb}2$} (or 17...\texttt{$\text{b}6$} 18.\texttt{$\text{c}c1$} \texttt{$\text{xa}6$} 19.\texttt{$\text{e}e6$} \texttt{$\text{b}8$} 20.\texttt{a}a4±) 18.a7 \texttt{f}3 19.\texttt{gxf3} \texttt{$\text{h}h3$} 20.\texttt{$\text{e}e1$±

16.\texttt{$\text{xa}a6$} \texttt{$\text{xa}a6$}

Or 16...\texttt{$\text{xa}a6$} 17.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 18.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{exd4} 19.\texttt{$\text{c}c2$}±

17.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 \texttt{exd4} 18.\texttt{$\text{c}c2$}±

\texttt{4.\texttt{$\text{xd}x$}d4 e5 5.\texttt{$\text{b}5$} d6 6.\texttt{$\text{c}c3$}}
This situation is quite typical for that system. Black has some compensation for the pawn indeed, but it is only enough to contain his opponent’s initiative a bit. White cannot develop easily his forces and he has problems starting the realization of his extra material, but still he has made the first step towards accomplishing that goal. Meanwhile, it is essential that Black’s e6-square has been compromised.

c3) 8...\(\text{\$ce7}\)

This is an original line and it has numerous adherents. It owes its popularity to some chess players from the city of Omsk in Russia (Vladimir Shcherbakov and Marat Makarov, who played it regularly at the beginning of the 80ies of the last century. The idea of the retreat of the queen’s knight to e7 for Black is not to lose a tempo after the trade on d5. His other knight will be developed later to f6 and it will exert pressure from there against White’s central pawn.

9.c4

That is the best move for White. He plays sometimes 9.g5, but in that case, the pin along the h4-d8 diagonal is not so annoying for Black as in the Chelyabinsk variation.

9...\(\text{\$xd5}\)

It is useless for Black to play: 9...\(b7\)! 10.cxb5 \(\text{\$xd5}\) 11.bxa6± Simacek – Sluka, Valtice 1992, or 9...bxc4?! 10.xc4± Skrochocka – Siwek, Krakow 1999.

10.exd5 bxc4

Black has tried sometimes gambit lines:

10...h4?! 11.cxb5 \(\text{e4}+\) 12.e3 f6, Dukaczewski – Rosikhin, Spain 2000, 13.c4! axb5 (13...\(\text{\$xd5}\) 14.b6+--; 13...\(\text{\$xd5}\) 14.a4+) 14.f3 \(\text{\$xd5}\) 15.b6 \(\text{\$xd1}\) 16.a8 17.xc8 xxc8 18.xb5±;

10...g6?! 11.cxb5 e7, Black – Nielsen, Moscow 1994, 12.bxa6 \(\text{a5}+\) 13.d2 \(\text{\$xd5}\) 14.b5 \(\text{d7}\) 15.c3±;

10...f5?! (This move is more logical, but still insufficient, in case White plays precisely.) 11.cxb5 f6 12.bxa6 a6 (If 12...a5+, then 13.d2 \(\text{\$xd5}\) 14.a4+ \(\text{d7}\) 15.b5 \(\text{c8}\) 16.c1±; Black has no compensation for the pawn af-
4. \( \text{exd4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 5. \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 6. \( \text{c3} \)

ter: 12...\( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) + \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 14.0-0 0-0 15.\( \text{\texttt{f2e2}} \) \( \text{f4} \) 16.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) + 18.\( \text{\texttt{h1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) \( \text{+ Slekhys} \) – Burstein, Vilnius 1996.) 13.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \) + \( \text{\texttt{f7}} \) (Black has nothing else: 13...\( \text{\texttt{d7}} \)?) 14.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xb5}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{xa8}} \) + \( \text{\texttt{f7}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{g5}} \) +; or 13...\( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) +) 14.\( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) 15.0-0 \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) (or 15...\( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{c2}} \) \( \text{+ Ni Hua} \) – Mikhailovsky, Qingdao 2002) 16.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b7}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{d1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{a5}} \) (or 17...\( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{c8}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f8}} \) 20.\( \text{\texttt{g5}} \) \( \text{+ Ni Hua} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{b4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{a4}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 20.\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) + with an overwhelming advantage for White.

10...\( \text{b4} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \) + \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 12.\( \text{\texttt{xb4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f5}} \), Grebeshchikov – Lubashov, corr. 1993, 13.\( \text{\texttt{c5}} \)? \( \text{\texttt{dx5}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{c7}} \) (or 14...\( \text{\texttt{d6}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \); 14...\( \text{\texttt{e4}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{f4}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \); 10...\( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) (It is only a transposition of moves after 10...\( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{cxb5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) – see 10...\( \text{\texttt{f6}} \).) 11.\( \text{\texttt{cxb5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) (In case of: 11...\( \text{\texttt{c5}} \) + 12.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \), Janturin – Shkadiousk, Decin 1998, White can follow with: 13.\( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \), or 13...\( \text{\texttt{xd5}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) +) 12.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \) 0-0 13.0-0. This position has been tested in several games, which showed that Black’s compensation for the pawn was insufficient: 13...\( \text{\texttt{e4}} \) (It is not logical for Black to continue with: 13...\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b8}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \) \( \text{+ Shirov} \) – Annageldyev, Istanbul 2000; after 13...\( \text{\texttt{axb5}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{xb5}} \), White is better following: 14...\( \text{\texttt{d7}} \), Zude – Schmittdiek, Gladenbach 1997, 15.\( \text{\texttt{e3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{a6}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \), and 14...\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \), Masserey – Gerber, Geneva 1994, 15.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{e3}} \) ; if 13...\( \text{\texttt{d7}} \), Kotsur – Lputian, Abu Dhabi 2003, 14.\( \text{\texttt{e3}} \) \( \text{f5} \), then simply 15.\( \text{\texttt{f3}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{e2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f5}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{a5}} \) (In the game Arzumanian – Zubov, Alushta 2001, Black chose 15...\( \text{\texttt{g5}} \) and White had to counter that with 16.\( \text{\texttt{exg5}} \), obtaining an advantage after every possible capture: 16...\( \text{\texttt{exg5}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{b4}} \), or 16...\( \text{\texttt{f4}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{exg5}} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{f1}} \) \( \text{f4} \) + in case of 15...\( \text{\texttt{c5}} \), Masserey – Ceteras, Mamaia 1991, it can be recommended to White to try: 16.\( \text{\texttt{b4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) e4 18.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{c1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f4}} \) + with a better game for White.) 16.\( \text{\texttt{f3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{c5}} \) (It is less reliable for Black to play: 16...\( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) – and here he has problems in every variation: 17...\( \text{\texttt{xb6}} \) + 18.\( \text{\texttt{a3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{a5}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{a7}} \) \( \text{+ D.Kayumov} \) – Kiselev, Chelyabinsk 1993, or 17...\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{fc1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) +) 17.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{b4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa6}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{f2}} \) – and as we are going to see, Black has difficulties developing his initiative, while White’s material advantage becomes a telling factor.

11.\( \text{\texttt{xc4}} \)

11...\( \text{\texttt{f6}} \)
About 11...\(\text{b8}\) 12.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{f6}\) – see 11...\(\text{f6}\).

Black must complete his development, but he must watch carefully about his weak squares on the queenside in the process. For example, it is slightly premature for him to play 11...f5, in view of 12.\(\text{d2}\). Now, White would counter 12...\(\text{b8}\) with 13.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{e7}\), Alves – Balabaev, corr. 2000, 14.\(\text{a4+!}\) 15.\(\text{a3}\), while in case of 12...a5, Toth – Kaman, Hungary 1995, it is very strong for White to continue with: 13.\(\text{b3!}\) 14.\(\text{f6}\) 15.\(\text{b6}\) – and the exchange of queens is definitely in favour of White in similar situations.

Black plays much more often 11...\(\text{e7}\) (That move is more flexible in comparison to 11...f5.) and White should better react to that with 12.\(\text{d2}\). Black has numerous possibilities here, but White maintains his advantage in all the variations:

Black loses his castling rights after: 12...\(\text{f5?!} 13.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{b8}\) 14.\(\text{b6}\) 15.\(\text{a4+!}\) 16.\(\text{e2}\) Daniliuk – Amurskij, Armavir 1995.

The game Mohrlock – Schlachetka, corr. 1994, continued with 12...\(\text{d7}\) 13.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{b8}\) 14.\(\text{d2}\) 15.\(\text{f6}\) \(\text{a7}\) (or 14...\(\text{f6}\) 15.\(\text{b6}\)) and here White can follow with 15.\(\text{c1}\) 16.\(\text{b6}\) maintaining a powerful pressure.

In case of 12...\(\text{b8}\), Nolte – Salvador, Genova 2004, White should simply proceed with his usual plan: 13.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 14.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{b7}\) 15.\(\text{c1}\)

Finally, after the prophylactic move – 12...a5 (This is the most popular answer for Black.) White can resort to the already familiar idea to enter a favourable endgame with: 13.\(\text{b3!}\) 14.\(\text{d7}\) (If 13...\(\text{f6}\) 14.\(\text{b6}\) a4, Karjakin – Kosteniuk, Brissago 2003, then 15.\(\text{b4!}\) \(\text{b8}\) 16.\(\text{b5+}\) 17.\(\text{xc8}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 18.\(\text{xa4}\) 19.\(\text{b6}\) (or 14...\(\text{f6}\) 15.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{d6}\) 16.\(\text{xd6}\) \(\text{e7}\) 17.\(\text{xe7}\) 18.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{d6}\) 19.\(\text{b3}\)) 15.\(\text{a6}\) \(\text{b8}\) 16.\(\text{d7}\) \(\text{d7}\) 17.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{d6}\) 18.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{d5}\) (It is too risky for Black to play: 18...\(\text{xb2?!}\) 19.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{c8}\) 20.\(\text{b5}\) 21.\(\text{xc1}\) \(\text{b8}\) 22.\(\text{ab1}\) \(\text{xb1}\) 23.\(\text{xc1}\) \(\text{a7}\) 24.\(\text{c6}\)) 19.\(\text{b5+}\) \(\text{e6}\) 20.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 21.\(\text{b3}\)) Karjakin – Kosteniuk, Lausanne 2003 – White has a considerable advantage in that endgame thanks to his bishop pair and his dangerous passed pawns.

12.\(\text{e3}\)

The d5-pawn needs protection, so the line – 12.\(\text{d2}\) a5∞ is not so effective anymore.

12...\(\text{b8}\)

Black usually takes immediately the b6-square under control, although it is quite possible for him to opt for 12...\(\text{e7}\). In that case, White should better not enter the complications after 13.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{b8}\) 14.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 15.\(\text{xa6}\) 0–0 16.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{c8}\), instead it is simpler for him to choose: 13.\(\text{e2}\) 0–0 14.\(\text{b8}\) 15.a4 and thus to transpose to the main line – see 12...\(\text{b8}\).
13.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e2}}}}

That is the correct move order. After 13.a4?! Black has the rather unpleasant resource – 13...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{g4}}}}!

\textbf{13...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e7}}}}}

Black has never tried in practice yet the move 13...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b5}}}} and that is hardly surprising. After 14.a4 \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xd5}}}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c2}}}}± his rook is in a serious trouble and he will lose the exchange.

\textbf{14.a4}

White’s aim is to occupy the b6-square.

\textbf{14...0–0}

About 14...a5 15.0–0 0–0 – see 14...0–0.

It would be in favour of White if Black chooses the rather artificial line: 14...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d7}}}} 15.0–0 \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b7}}}}?!

(About the more reliable move 15...0–0 – see 14...0–0.) 16.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{a7}}}}\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d8}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{f5}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c1}}}} e4 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c7}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xd5}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xa6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e6}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c2}}}}± Shirov – Fedorov, Istanbul 2000.

Black would not change anything much with 14...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b7}}}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d7}}}} 16.a5± Naumann – Boensch, Germany 2005.

\textbf{15.0–0}

Black’s other possibilities are not played so often, but still they are interesting and we will deal with them in details:

His attempt to attack his opponent’s central pawn with 15...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{f5}}}} – after 16.a5 \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b5}}}} (if 16...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d7}}}}, as it was played in the game Kotsur – Fedorov, Istanbul 2000, then 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b7}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c1}}}}±; it is insufficient for Black to opt for: 16...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e4}}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xb6}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xb6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{a8}}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{f3}}}}± Sherzer – Gostisa, Budapest 1990.) 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xb2}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xa6}}}} – Now, Black’s rook is isolated from the rest of his forces and it comes under attack. There might follow: 18...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{g4}}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c1}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xb6}}}} (or 19...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b4}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e1}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e4}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c3}}}}±; 19...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c2}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d3}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xd3}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xd3}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c7}}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d2}}}}±) 20.axb6 \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xb6}}}} Lavecic – Popchev, Podgorica 1991, 21.h3 \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{f6}}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e3}}}}±;

After 15...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d7}}}} 16.a5, there arise original variations only after: 16...f5 (about 16...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b7}}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b6}}}} – see 15...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{b7}}}}), as it was played in the game Doggers – Kuijpers, Vlissingen 2003. Here, White had to continue with 17.f4! – and it was far from safe for Black to try: 17...g5?! 18.fxg5 f4 (or 18...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xfg5}}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{a5}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xg5}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xd6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xb2}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{a3}}}}±) 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{f2}}}} e4 (or 19...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{a5}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xd6}}}}±; 19...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xc7}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c1}}}}±) 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{d4}}}}±, while in case of: 17...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{exf4}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{xf4}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{c5}}}} then 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textsc{e1}}}}± and White would end up with a stable advantage;

Black obtained good counter chances with the aggressive
move – 15...\(\text{b}4\) in the game Motylev – Shabalov, Bermuda 2003 and there followed: 16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xd}5\) 17.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\)\(=\). It was however, much stronger for White to play: 16.a5! \(\text{b}7\) (About 16...\(\text{b}5\) 17.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{xb}2\) 18.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 19.\(\text{c}4\) – see 16...\(\text{b}7\)). 17.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{xb}2\) 18.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}8\) 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{c}5\)\(=\) Vokarev – Shabalov, Moscow 2003 – and Black would be forced to give up the exchange in rather unfavourable circumstances.

The not so well-analyzed move 15...\(\text{c}4\)! looks purposeful, but after 16.\(\text{c}2\)! (White achieves nothing much with 16.f3 \(\text{c}5\)=) 16...f5 (or 16...\(\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{fd}1\)\(=\) Zawadzka – Pokojska, Ostrow 2002) 17.\(\text{d}3\)\(=\) White’s prospects are superior.

After 15...a5, Black’s rook pawn becomes a real weakness: 16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{a}8\) 17.\(\text{e}1\)! \(\text{xd}5\) (or 17...\(\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 19.\(\text{xa}6\) \(\text{xa}6\) 20.b4 \(\text{g}5\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 22.b5 \(\text{a}8\) 23.\(\text{c}6\)\(=\) Palac – Brumen, Pula 2000; 17...\(\text{b}7\) 18.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{b}8\), Nowak – Pokojska, Jarnoltowek 2003, 19.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{e}7\) 20.b4 \(\text{xd}5\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 22.\(\text{b}5\)\(=\) 18.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{e}6\) (or 18...\(\text{b}7\) 19.\(\text{xa}5\)\(=\)) 19.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}8\) (The other retreats of the queen are not any better: 19...\(\text{b}8\) 20.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 21.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}7\) 22.\(\text{a}8\) \(\text{xa}8\) 23.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{d}2\) 24.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{xb}7\) 25.\(\text{f}1\)\(=\); or 19...\(\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 21.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{c}6\) 22.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{b}7\) 23.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{xa}8\) 24.f3\(=\) Bokros – Forgacs, Budapest 2001.) 20.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 21.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{e}6\) (about 21...\(\text{b}7\) – see 19...\(\text{b}8\)) 22.\(\text{a}8\) \(\text{xd}5\) 23.f3 \(\text{c}4\) 24.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{d}5\) 25.\(\text{b}4\)\(=\) – and Black’s compensation for the exchange is insufficient.

The move 15...\(\text{e}8\) reduces the tension around the \(\text{d}5\)-outpost and it enables White to prepare the following route for his knight: 16.\(\text{d}5\)! \(\text{f}5\), Antal – P.Horvath, Budapest 2003, 17.\(\text{a}5\) f4 18.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{a}8\) 19.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{b}5\)\(=\)

In case of 15...\(\text{d}7\), White annihilates his opponent’s lightsquared bishop with the help of the line: 16.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{f}8\) \(\text{xc}8\) \(\text{xc}8\) and after 18.\(\text{c}1\), he maintains the edge. In the game Bologan – Milov, New York 1997 there followed: 18...\(\text{f}5\) 19.\(\text{b}3\)! a5 (or 19...\(\text{e}4\) 20.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 21.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{xe}3\) 22.fxe3 \(\text{e}5\) 23.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 24.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 25.a5 \(\text{a}7\) 26.b4 \(\text{g}5\) 27.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 28.b5 \(\text{c}5\) 29.\(\text{b}1\) f4 30.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 31.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{xf}4\) 32.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 33.\(\text{c}4\)\(=\) 20.h3 \(\text{e}4\) 21.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}7\) (21...\(\text{d}8\) 22.\(\text{d}2\)\(=\); 21...\(\text{e}5\) 22.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}8\) 23.\(\text{d}4\)\(=\)) 22.\(\text{g}4\)\(=\) and Black’s position became quite difficult. It would be slightly better for Black to try 18...\(\text{b}7\), but White could counter that with 19.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{xb}2\) 20.\(\text{xa}6\)\(=\) (Bologan). 16.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{d}7\)

Black can hardly comply with White’s knight on \(\text{b}6\) for long and that can be best illustrated in the variation: 16...\(\text{e}4\) 17.a5 \(\text{f}5\) 18.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{f}6\) (It is not less problematic for Black to play: 18...\(\text{f}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}3\) 20.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{g}5\) 21.\(\text{xf}8\)\(=\) \(\text{xf}8\) 22.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 23.\(\text{g}4\)\(=\) Grosar – Svesh-

It is an interesting alternative for Black to opt for 16..\textit{We8}!!, with the idea to free the d8-square for the bishop and to capture on b6 later. After 17.a5 \textit{Ad8} 18.c4 \textit{Ax}xb6 19.\textit{Axb}6 (In case of 19.axb6 \textit{Ad}7, Bogachkov – V.Sherbakov, Russia 2001, 20.\textit{Axa}6?!), Black has the tactical resource – 20...
\textit{Ax}xb6\textit{A}7 19...\textit{A}d7 (or 19...\textit{Ec}8 20.b3 \textit{Ad}7 21.\textit{A}e3 f5 22.f4?!± Papp – Kosztolanczi, Goed 2004; 19...\textit{We}7 20.f3 \textit{Ad}7 21.\textit{Af}² Smikovski – V.Sherbakov, Omsk 1998) 20.\textit{A}a7?! (White thus discoordinates his opponent’s pieces.) 20...
\textit{A}a8 (20...\textit{Ec}8? 21.\textit{Ab}3±) 21.\textit{A}e3 f5 22.\textit{A}b3 \textit{Ac}8 23.f4± Smikovski – V.Sherbakov, Omsk 1998 and White preserved a slight edge.

17.a5 f5

Black is trying to exploit his pawn-majority on the kingside, but as we are going to see, White’s initiative develops much faster.

Black has also tested in practice the immediate exchange: 17...
\textit{Ax}xb6 18.\textit{Ax}xb6 \textit{Ad}7. Now, White should better play: 19.b4 \textit{F}c8 (If 19...f5, then 20.b5! axb5 21.\textit{Ab}3!, planning to counter 21...\textit{A}a6 with 22.\textit{F}c1 \textit{F}c8 23.\textit{F}c6++; while after 19...\textit{B}c8, as it was played in the game Naumann – Boensch, Solingen 2005, it was again good for White to play 20.b5! and later 20...axb5 21.a6 \textit{A}a8 22.\textit{B}b1++; Black will hardly solve his problems with the passive line 19...
\textit{A}a8 20.\textit{Ab}3±) 20.\textit{Ab}3± with the idea to follow with b4-b5.

18.\textit{Ac}1!?

White usually prefers here 18.f3, but it turns out – that standard move is hardly necessary if we take into account the tactical nuances of the position. The advance of the f-pawn is not dangerous for White.

18...f4

Now, it is not so good for Black to continue with: 18...
\textit{Ax}xb6?! 19.\textit{Ax}xb6 \textit{We}8 20.\textit{Ac}7 \textit{A}a8 21.\textit{Ab}3 \textit{Ac}8 22.\textit{Fc}6 – because White easily exploits Black’s weaknesses.

It is more prudent for Black to defend with 18...
\textit{F}c6, as it was played in the game Nielsen – Palo, Denmark 2003. Here, instead of the double-edged move – 19.f4, White had better continue with 19.f3! f4 20.\textit{Af}2 \textit{We}8 (or 20...e4 21.\textit{Fxe}4 \textit{Fxe}4 22.\textit{F}d4±) 21.\textit{Ed}3 \textit{Ff}7 22.\textit{We}2 \textit{Ad}8 23.\textit{F}d1± with powerful pressure.

19.\textit{Ag}4!

This intermediate move en-
ables White to deploy his bishop to an active position and to restrict his opponent’s pieces.

19...\(\text{\textit{\textdollar}}\text{f6} 20.\text{\textit{\textdollar}}\text{e6+ \textit{\texth8} 21. \textit{\textdollar}}\text{d2}}\)

White has an obvious space advantage. In the game D. Kayumov – Turov, Abu Dhabi 2002, Black tried to create some counterplay with 21...f3 22.g3 (It is even simpler for White to play 22.gxf3!!) 22...\(\text{\textit{\textdollar}}\text{e4}}!?! (It is more reliable, but still not enough for Black to equalize with 22...\(\text{\textit{\textw8}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textw3}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textw5}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{\textw4}}}\), but that idea can be put to the test by White with the precise reaction: 23.\(\text{\textit{\textd7}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textd2}}\) (if 23...\(\text{\textit{\textc5}}\), then 24.\(\text{\textit{\textxc5}}\)! dxc5 25.\(\text{\textit{\textc3}}}\) with an overwhelming advantage for White) 24.\(\text{\textit{\textw2x}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textg5}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{\textw3}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textxc1}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{\textxf8}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textxf8}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{\textxc1}}}\)

In case of 21...\(\text{\textit{\textw8}}\), as it was played in the game Haslinger – Ansell, England 2002, White could follow with 22.\(\text{\textit{\textw3b3}}}!? \text{\textit{\textd4} (22...f3 23.\textit{\textgxf3}}}; 22...\textit{\textw6} 23.\textit{\textf3}}) 23.\textit{\textb4} f3 (It is essential that White can counter 23...\(\text{\textit{\textwb5}}\) with 24.\(\text{\textit{\textd7}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textxd5}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{\textxd5}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textxb4}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{\textc4}}}-- winning.) 24.g3!! with an edge for White.

Conclusion

The system with the early pawn-advance e7-e5 is often played in the contemporary tournament practice and it is one of the most principled in the theory of the Sicilian Defence. Black gives up the central d5-outpost indeed, but he tries to compensate that with rapid mobilization of forces and occupation of space on the queenside.

In the main line (7...b5), Black has problems lately, therefore the adherents to that variation have started playing more often the other lines (7...\(\text{\textit{\texte7}}\) and 7...\(\text{\textit{\texte6}}\)), which can be considered as not so well analyzed. As we have seen in this chapter – White obtains the opening advantage with a precise play.

The arising positions are rather sharp and quite various strategically. It is too dangerous to play only common sense moves for both sides, so we advise our readers to study thoroughly the variations in this chapter.

We will mention that the pawn-structure, which is typical for this system, can be encountered in some other schemes in the Sicilian Defence – that is for example the Chelyabinsk variation and some lines of the Najdorf variation. We will study these variations in our next volumes.

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Part 2

1.e4 c5 2.\f3 3.c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.\xd4 e6 5.\c3

rare 5\textsuperscript{th} moves for Black

Four Knights' Variation
5...\f6

Taimanov Variation
5...a6

Black often uses different orders of moves in the Sicilian Defence and that enables him to avoid certain systems, which do not make him too enthusiastic (the reasons for that are usually just subjective). Still, there come moments in which Black must make key decisions and that is the case now.

In Chapter 5, we have analyzed predominantly some sidelines after which White has no problems to maintain his advantage.

In Chapter 6, we are dealing with some rare lines, which Black resorts to after 5...\f6 6.\db5; while to his main line – 6...\b4 (If we do not count the move 6...d6, which after: 7.\f4 e5 8.\g5 leads to the Chelyabink variation – it will be dealt with in the next book of our series) we devote our Chapter 7. That is a reliable variation, but it has a serious drawback – Black is trying to solve his opening problems in a too simple fashion. He manages to obtain a free game indeed, but instead White has some long-lasting pluses like the two-bishop advantage and a superior pawn-structure. As a rule, it is too difficult for Black to neutralize completely these two factors.

The next chapter marks the beginning of the analysis of the Paulsen system – which is one of the most reliable in the Sicilian Defence. It is in particular a basic opening weapon in the “Black” opening repertoire of Vishvanathan Anand and Sergey Rublevsky. In Chapters 8 and 9, we analyze
the Taimanov variation: 5...a6 6.\texttt{xc6 bxc6 7.\texttt{d3}.}

That relatively old system of development is presently very fashionable again and Black must consider it after some other orders of moves too (for example in the variation 2...e6 3.d4 cxd4 4.\texttt{xd4 a6 5.\texttt{c3 \texttt{c7 6.\texttt{d3 \texttt{c6 7.\texttt{xc6}}}}}). Black has a good pawn centre indeed; nevertheless, White has the initiative, because he controls more space.
Chapter 5  

1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c6}}\) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd4}}\) e6 5.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c3}}\)

We will analyze in this chapter all the moves for Black, which have been tested in practice, except the most popular: (5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d6}}\), 5...a6 and 5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c7}}\)): 

a) 5...d5?! 

b) 5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c5?!}}\) 

c) 5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b6?!}}\) 

d) 5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b4?!}}\) 

e) 5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd4?!}}\) 

f) 5...d6 (without the transposition to the Najdorf and the Scheveningen variations).

There are some other moves too, which have been played only very seldom:

5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e7?!}}\) – This passive move enables White to obtain a stable advantage with energetic play. 6.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d5+}}\) d6? (about 6...a6 7.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d6+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd6}}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd6}}\) – see 5...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c5}}\) 6.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash db5}}\) a6 7.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d6+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd6}}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd6}}\); Black fares only slightly better after a move, which has not been experimented in practice: 6...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f6}}\) 7.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d6+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd6}}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xd6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e7}}\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f4?!}}\), although White’s couple of bishops and superior development provide him with a great advantage too.) 7.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f4}}\) e5 8.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d5?!}}\)

Now, Black either loses his castling rights, or he loses material: 8...exf4 (After 8...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d8}}\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f6}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xf6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash gxf6}}\), Fleuch – Bilitza, Bad Wildungen 2000, White can improve his position with: 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash h5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e6}}\) 12.0–0–0\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f6}}\) – Black’s defence is difficult due to his unsafe king and compromised pawn-structure. He can maintain the material equality with the line: 8...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b8}}\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f6}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xe7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xe7}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f3}}\) a6 12.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b6!}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d7}}\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c3?!}}\) – but his king remains stranded in the centre and his queenside is blocked, so he has no chances of equalizing, Heemsoth – Duenhaupt, corr. 1951) 9.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash bc7+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f8}}\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xa8}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a5+}}\) (White has no problems after: 10...\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e5}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash ac7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f6}}\), Paakkonen – Kyrola, Jyvaskyla 1999, following: 12.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xf6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash xf6}}\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g5}}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e2++;}}\) White should win with an extra exchange.) 11. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d2++;}}\) Wagner Michel – Beltz, Halle 1978;
Chapter 5

5...\(\text{d}7\)ge7?! – That move allows White to obtain the two-bishop advantage and a powerful initiative. 6.\(\text{d} \text{db} 5\) d5 (White’s task is even simpler after the more natural line: 6...\(\text{d} \text{g} 6\) 7.h4! – White develops his initiative taking advantage of the fact that his h-pawn is untouchable: 7...\(\text{d} \text{xh} 4\)? 8.\(\text{f} 4\) e5 9.\(\text{g} 3\) \(\text{g} 6\) 10.\(\text{d} 5+-\); 7...c5 8.h5 \(\text{d} \text{ge} 7\), Milosevic – Fotiadis, Ikaros 2003 and here after: 9.h6 g6 10.\(\text{d} 3 \text{xe} 3\) 11.\(\text{d} 6+ \text{d} f 8\) 12.\(\text{f} 3+\)– Black has no chances at all, because of his terribly vulnerable king; 7.a6 8.h5 \(\text{d} \text{ge} 5\) 9.\(\text{d} 6+ \text{d} \text{x} d 6\) 10.\(\text{d} \text{xd} 6\) \(\text{e} 7\) 11.\(\text{d} 7\) e7 12.\(\text{c} 5\) b5 13.0–0–0 d6 14.f4± – Black can hardly protect his d-pawn without his dark-squared bishop, Muller – Henke, Internet 2004.) 7.\(\text{f} 4\) e5 8.\(\text{xd} 5\) \(\text{xf} 4\) 9.d6 \(\text{d} f 5\) 10.\(\text{c} 7+ \text{d} 7\), D.MacDonald – Ortiz, Email 1999 and here White’s most natural move is the best too: 11.\(\text{d} \text{xa} 8\) \(\text{xd} 6\) 12.\(\text{d} 3\) \(\text{d} 7\) (It is not better for Black to try: 12...\(\text{d} 8+\) 13.\(\text{e} 4\) \(\text{d} 7\) 14.\(\text{h} 5\) \(\text{f} 8\) 15.0–0–0±. White’s pieces are more active and his knight at the edge of the board is still alive.) 13.\(\text{d} 2\) \(\text{d} 6\) 14.0–0–0 \(\text{d} 5\) 15.\(\text{d} \text{he} 1\)–White’s initiative is quite powerful due to the vulnerable placement of his opponent’s king. The following variations illustrate Black’s difficulties: 15...\(\text{f} 6\) 16.\(\text{axe} 5\) \(\text{xe} 5\) (or 16...\(\text{x} e 5\) 17.\(\text{xe} 2+ \text{f} 6\) 18.\(\text{xf} 5\) \(\text{xa} 8\) 19.\(\text{xe} 6+\)– and Black’s king will be easily checkmated, as it is deprived of any defenders.) 17.\(\text{xf} 4\) – One of Black’s centralized pieces is lost after that and White remains with an extra pawn, preserving his threats against the enemy king; 15...\(\text{d} 6\) 16.g3! \(\text{xa} 8\) (or 16...\(\text{x} g 3\) 17.f4 \(\text{xc} 3\) 18.\(\text{xc} 3\) \(\text{g} x 2\) 19.f5+-) 17.\(\text{xf} 4\) \(\text{xc} 3\) 18.\(\text{xc} 3\) \(\text{d} 7\) 19.f5+- White remains with an extra exchange; 15...\(\text{xa} 8\) (that is the most natural move) 16.\(\text{xe} 5\) \(\text{xe} 5\) 17.\(\text{xf} 5\) \(\text{d} 8\) 18.\(\text{xf} 4\)± White has a solid extra pawn in that endgame; 15...f6 16.\(\text{xf} 5\) \(\text{xd} 2\) 17.\(\text{xd} 2\) \(\text{xf} 5\) 18.\(\text{d} 7\)± Black’s powerful bishop pair is still not enough to compensate the exchange; 15...g6 – That seems to be the most tenacious defence for Black. 16.\(\text{xe} 5\) \(\text{xe} 5\) 17.\(\text{xf} 4\) \(\text{d} 6\) (It is just terrible for Black to play: 17...\(\text{xd} 3\) 18.\(\text{xd} 3\) \(\text{xa} 8\) 19.\(\text{c} 7+ \text{e} 8\) 20.\(\text{e} 4+-\), 19...\(\text{f} 6\) 20.\(\text{e} 4+ \text{g} 7\) 21.\(\text{e} 5+ \text{g} 8\) 22.\(\text{f} 6+-\), or 17...\(\text{b} 8\) 20.\(\text{b} 4+ \text{f} 6\) 21.\(\text{xf} 5! \text{xf} 5\) 22.\(\text{c} 7+-\), 21...\(\text{gx} f 5\) 22.\(\text{d} 6\) \(\text{xa} 8\) 23.\(\text{d} 5+ \text{g} 6\) 24.\(\text{d} 4+-\)) 18.\(\text{e} 4\) \(\text{d} 8\) 19.\(\text{f} 1\) \(\text{b} 8\) 20.\(\text{xd} 8\) \(\text{xd} 8\) 21.\(\text{b} 5\) \(\text{c} 6\) 22.\(\text{bc} 7\)± White’s knights are placed a bit strangely indeed, but he has an extra pawn, a more active queen and a safer king.

a) 5...d5?! (diagram)

The main drawback of that move is not so much that he remains with an isolated pawn, but that he opens files in the centre, being behind in development.
6...exd5 exd5 7...b5 g67
That is the most natural move, but Black lags in the development of his kingside.

He has tried some other moves too:

7...a6? 8.exd5 wb6, Martin - Valauskas, Dos Hermanas 2003 (Black's position is lost too after: 8...d6 9.e2+ e6 10.d4+ axb5 11.cx b5 d7 12.f4 c8 13.e5+--) 9.d5+--;

7...c7? 8.xd5 e5+ 9.e2++ and White should materialize his extra pawn in the endgame, Halasnik - Subrt, Most 1999;

7...c5? - This move presents White with an overwhelming material advantage. 8.xc6 bxc6 9.xc6+ d7 10.xa8 xa8 11.xd5+-- Smolen - Repcek, Bratislava 2002;

7...d7?! - White wins a pawn after that move. 8.xd5 xd4 (It looks much worse for Black to play: 8...xf6 9.e2+ e710.xf6+ gxf6 11.xc6 bxc6 12.d3+ and all his pawns are a sorry sight; meanwhile he is a pawn down too, Veriguine - G.Velazquez, Dos Hermanas 2004.) 9.xd7+ w xd7 10.wd4 e7 11.c4 xd5, Heistermann - Buechner, Willingen 2001, here it is favourable for White to keep the queens on the board: 12.cxd5 d6 (after 12...0-0-0 13.0-0 Black's king will come under a dangerous attack and he will hardly regain his pawn. He loses too after: 12...e7 13.xg7 0-0-0 14.0-0 h8 15.xf7++, it is not any better for him to opt for: 14...xd5 15.f4 h8 16.c3+ c5 17.g3++) 13.xg7 0-0-0 14.e3 h8 15.d4+ Black's activity cannot compensate his being two pawns down.

8.0-0 a6

8...d6 - This is with the idea to evacuate promptly the king to the queenside, but that would not save Black from his great difficulties. 9.e1 d7 10.g5 0-0-0 11.xc6 xc6 12.wd4+-- A.Rotstein - Platzgummer, Wattens 1997.

8...d7 - Black wishes to simplify the position: 9.e1 xd4 10.xd7+ xd7 11.wd7 g8 12.f4+- Pommerel - Gravgaard, Email 1992.

9.xc6+ bxc6
10.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}1 \textit{\texttt{d}7?!}}} (White maintains a great lead in development after: 10...\textit{\texttt{f}6 11.\textit{\texttt{f}3+}) 11.\textit{\texttt{g}5 \textit{f}6?!} (It is better for Black to play: 11.\textit{\texttt{a}4 \textit{a}5 13.b3 c5 14.\textit{e}2±, but even then he has problems completing his development.) 12.\textit{\texttt{xf}6+ \texttt{gxf}6? 13.\textit{\texttt{h}5#}} Pichelin – Bastion, Besancon 2004.

b) 5...\textit{c}5?!}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

Black develops prematurely his dark-squared bishop; therefore he has great problems along the d-file.

6.\textit{\texttt{db}5 \textit{d}6

About 6...\textit{\texttt{f}6 7.\textit{\texttt{f}4 – see 4...\textit{\texttt{f}6 5.\textit{\texttt{c}3 e}6 6.\textit{\texttt{db}5 \texttt{c}5 7.\textit{\texttt{f}4;}}\textit{\texttt{a}6}\textit{\texttt{db}5 \texttt{c}5 7.\textit{\texttt{f}4;}} for 6...\textit{\texttt{b}6 7.\textit{\texttt{d}2 – see 5...\textit{\texttt{b}6 6.\textit{\texttt{db}5 \texttt{c}5 7.\textit{\texttt{d}2.}}}}

The move 6...\textit{a}6?! – leads to a difficult position for Black. 7.\textit{\texttt{d}6+ \texttt{e}7 (About 7...\textit{\texttt{xd}6 – see 5...\textit{\texttt{b}4 6.\textit{\texttt{db}5 a}6 7.\textit{\texttt{d}6+ \texttt{xd}6.) 8.\textit{\texttt{f}4 e}5 9.\textit{\texttt{f}5+ \texttt{f}8 10.\texttt{e}3 \textit{d}6 (It is too dangerous for Black to open the f-file with: 10...\texttt{xe}3?! 11.\textit{\texttt{d}6+ \texttt{ge}7 12.\texttt{fxe}3 \texttt{a}5? 13.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{xe}7 14.\texttt{c}4+– Odisharia – I.Ioseliani, Tbilisi 2001, it is more tenacious for Black to defend with: 12...\texttt{g}8 13.0–0–0 \texttt{f}8 14.\texttt{a}4±, but even then it is unclear how he can develop his queenside.) 11.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{dx}5 12.\texttt{xd}8+ \texttt{xd}8 13.\texttt{d}6 \texttt{d}7 14.0–0–0 \texttt{c}6 15.\texttt{c}4 f6 16.\texttt{b}6 \texttt{b}8 17.\texttt{c}4± White has occupied the queenside with a purposeful play, Zubov – Mastrovasilis, Oropesa del Mar 1999.

7.\textit{\texttt{f}4 e}5 8.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{b}4

It is bad for Black to capture – 8...\texttt{xe}3?, because after 9.\texttt{fxe}3±, he has no satisfactory way of defending of his d6-pawn.

It is better for Black to play: 8...\texttt{f}6 9.\texttt{xc}5 – see 4...\texttt{f}6 5.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{e}6 6.\texttt{db}5 \texttt{c}5 7.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}5 8.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{d}6 9.\texttt{xc}5.

He has not tried yet the seemingly logical move 8...\texttt{e}6?!, in view of: 9.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{dx}5 10.\texttt{w}6! Now, Black is forced to enter an endgame without a pawn. 10...\texttt{xd}6 11.\texttt{xd}6+ \texttt{e}7 12.\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{d}4 13.0–0–0 \texttt{c}8 14.\texttt{d}5+ \texttt{xd}5 15.\texttt{ex}d5±

9.\textit{\texttt{a}3 \texttt{xc}3+

But not 9...\texttt{a}6?? 10.\texttt{axb}4+- van der Raadt – Bergsma, Hengelo 2004.
10.\texttt{bxc3!} $\texttt{\&e7}$ 11.\texttt{\&d3} $\texttt{\&f6}$ (It is not better for Black to try 11... $\texttt{a6}$, because of 12.\texttt{\&b6!} and now he loses after: 12...\texttt{\&xb6} 13.\texttt{\&xd6+} $\texttt{\&e8}$ 14.\texttt{\&c7++}, while following: 12...\texttt{\&d7} 13.\texttt{\&c7} $\texttt{\&b8}$ 14.\texttt{\&d1} $\texttt{\&f6}$ 15.\texttt{\&e3} White's pawns are weak indeed, but Black's pieces are terribly misplaced.) 12.\texttt{\&d1} $\texttt{\&e8}$ 13.\texttt{c4} $\texttt{a6}$ 14.\texttt{\&c3?} Wehbrink – Brunner, Internet 2001.

c) 5...\texttt{\&b6}?! 

After that move the vulnerability of the $d6$-square is very important.

6.\texttt{\&db5} $\texttt{\&c5}$

Black's other moves are not any better:

About 6...\texttt{\&f6} 7.\texttt{\&f4} $\texttt{e5}$ 8.\texttt{\&e3} – see Book 10 (2...\texttt{\&c6} 3.\texttt{d4} $\texttt{exd4}$ 4.\texttt{\&xd4} $\texttt{\&f6}$ 5.\texttt{\&c3} $\texttt{e5}$ 6.\texttt{\&db5} $\texttt{\&b6}?!$ 7.\texttt{\&e3});

The move 6...\texttt{\&e5}? – loses outright. 7.\texttt{\&e3} $\texttt{\&d8}$ 8.\texttt{\&d6+} $\texttt{\&xd6}$ 9.\texttt{\&xd6+-} and Black has no defence against the threat 10.\texttt{\&b5}, Gerhards – Krah, Bad Bertrich 1997;

6...\texttt{\&b4}? – This move loses time and White wins material.

7.\texttt{\&e3} $\texttt{\&c6}$, Giachino – Sapone, Ivrea 2001, 8.\texttt{a3} $\texttt{\&a6}$ 9.\texttt{\&xa7+–};

6...\texttt{\&b4}?! – Now, White obtains the two-bishop advantage and he leads in development: 7.\texttt{\&f4} $\texttt{e5}$ 8.\texttt{\&e3} $\texttt{\&a5}$ 9.a3 $\texttt{\&xc3+}$ 10.\texttt{\&xc3} $\texttt{\&ge7}$ 11.\texttt{\&d6±} Zezulkin – Vokoun, Czech Republic 2006;

6...\texttt{a6}?! 7.\texttt{\&e3} – White has a couple of bishops after that move and he has the possibility to develop his initiative in the centre as well as on both sides of the board: 7...\texttt{\&a5} 8.\texttt{\&d6+} $\texttt{\&xd6}$ 9.\texttt{\&xd6} $\texttt{\&ge7}$ 10.\texttt{\&d3} 0–0 11.\texttt{\&d2} $\texttt{\&d8}$ 12.0–0± Horbach – Degigis, Email 2000, 7...\texttt{\&d8} 8.\texttt{\&d6+} $\texttt{\&xd6}$ 9.\texttt{\&xd6} $\texttt{\&e7}$, Benjes – Lehmann, Germany 1996, 10.\texttt{\&g3} $\texttt{f6}$ 11.0–0–0±

7.\texttt{\&d2}!

White's queen is a bit misplaced indeed, but that is only temporary, since Black must lose a tempo defending against – 8.\texttt{\&a4}.

7...\texttt{\&d8}

That move looks strange, but Black has no satisfactory defence anyway:

7...\texttt{\&f6}? – That is a blunder.
Chapter 5

8.\( \text{d}4 \text{a}4 \text{d}8 \) 9.\( \text{xc}5 \text{f}1-0 \) Bennett – Marcus, corr. 2003;

7...\( \text{d}4? \) – This move loses a piece. 8.b4! \( \text{xc}2 \) + (or 8...\( \text{xb}4 \) 9.\( \text{xd}4 \text{f}6 \) 10.f3 0-0 11.a3+-) 9.\( \text{xc}2 \text{xb}4 \), Shivdasani – Da Silva, Email 2001, 10.\( \text{b}1\)-+;

7...\( \text{e}5? \) – This move seems to be active, but it loses by force. 8.\( \text{a}4 \text{c}6 \) 9.\( \text{xc}5 \text{xc}5 \), Do Nascimento – Nogueira, corr. 1981 and here after 10.b3!+-, Black has no defence against 11.\( \text{a}3 \);

7...\( \text{a}6 \) 8.\( \text{a}4 \text{xf}2? \) (It is better for Black to opt for 8...\( \text{d}8 \), but even then after: 9.\( \text{xc}5 \text{axb}5 \) 10.\( \text{d}3\)±, his defence remains quite problematic.) 9.\( \text{d}1! \text{a}5 \) 10.\( \text{d}6\)± \( \text{e}7 \) 11.\( \text{xf}2 \text{xd}6 \) 12.\( \text{b}6 \) 1-0 Hamdouchi – Dimitrov, Montpellier 2004;

7...\( \text{b}4? \) – Black thus loses another tempo. 8.a3 \( \text{e}7 \) (8...\( \text{xc}3? \) – This move looks purposeful, but it loses. 9.\( \text{xc}3 \text{e}5 \) 10.\( \text{e}3 \text{d}8 \) 11.\( \text{c}5 \text{ge}7 \) 12.\( \text{d}6\)± \( \text{f}8 \) 13.\( \text{f}3 \) 1-0 Casser – Lielmezs, corr. 2004.) 9.\( \text{f}4 \text{f}8 \) 10.\( \text{e}3 \text{e}5 \), Ibanez Aullana – Buenafe Moya, Valencia 2003, Black’s king is misplaced; meanwhile White has a great advantage in development, therefore he needs the queens on the board. 11.\( \text{g}3 \text{d}8 \) 12.0-0-0±;

7...\( \text{e}7? \) – That move leads to a position, in which Black will soon have problems to find a useful move. 8.\( \text{f}4 \text{f}8 \) 9.\( \text{e}3 \text{a}5 \) 10.0-0-0 \( \text{f}6 \) 11.\( \text{d}6\)± A.Galkin – Koster, Hoogeveen 2001.

\[ \text{8.\( \text{d}6\)± \( \text{xd}6 \) 9.\( \text{xd}6 \) a6 10.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 11.\( \text{g}3 \text{f}6 \) 12.0-0-0±} \]

White leads in development and he has a powerful bishop pair. 12...\( \text{b}5 \) 13.\( \text{h}4! \text{f}8 \) 14.\( \text{h}5 \text{e}5 \) 15.\( \text{f}4 \text{f}7 \) 16.\( \text{f}2\)-+ – Black will hardly manage to coordinate his pieces, Lastin – Pushkarev, Tula 2001.

\[ \text{d) 5...\( \text{b}4?!} \]

Black fails to obtain anything out of that pin.

6.\( \text{db}5 \) a6

About 6...\( \text{f}6 \) – see 4...\( \text{f}6 \) 5.\( \text{c}3 \) e6 6.\( \text{db}5 \) \( \text{b}4 \); as for 6...\( \text{b}6 \) – see 5...\( \text{b}6 \) 6.\( \text{db}5 \) \( \text{b}4 \).

Black has seldom played other moves:

6...\( \text{h}4?7.\( \text{c}7+\text{d}8 \) 8.\( \text{xa}8\)-
Schoenbach – Rowe, corr. 2002;
...d6?! – This attempt loses a pawn. 7.a3 âxc3+ (It is not better for Black to opt for 7...âc5 8.b4 and now he loses quickly after: 8...a6? 9.bxc5 axb5 10.cxd6 b4 11.âb5 âxa5 12.âe3 bxa3 13.âc7+ âf8 14.âb6+– Krotofil – C.Petersen, Pinneberg 1994, while after: 8...âb6 9.âxd6+ âe7 10.âxc8+ âxc8 11.âxd8+ âxd8 12.âb2±, Black's slight lead in development is not sufficient to compensate the sacrificed pawn, Lukas – Kolbe, Em­scher Lippe 1996.) 8.bxc3 âe7 9.a4 âf6 (The move 9...a6? – is just terrible for Black – 10.âxd6 âxa5 11.âd2 âh6? – after 11...âf8 12.âa3 âge7 13.âc4++ he falls behind catastrophically in development – 12.âa3 âf6 13.h4 1–0 – Black has no satisfactory defence against 14.âc4, Zdeb­skaja – L.Hansen, Chalkidiki 2001; 9...h6? – That is a loss of time in a difficult position. 10.âa3 âf8 11.âxd6 âge7, Abel Quin­teros – Alfonso Quinteros, San­tander, 2003, 12.âh5 g6 13.âf3++) 10.âxd6 âe8 11.âxc8+ âxc8 12.âa3+ âf6 (or 12...âd6 13.âd2 âc7 14.âg5++ Sotron – Sepchat, Fontenay le Fleury 2003) 13.âf3+ âg6 14.e5!± Black cannot capture the pawn on e5, because he loses a knight, therefore he has no compensation for the pawn in view of the precarious situation of his king, Lugo Sanchez – Lenhart, Bratislava 1994; 6...d5?! – Black opens the pos­ ition, falling behind in develop­
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fensive move with a3; 7...ge7 8.d6+ ef8 10.e3+- and White has an overwhelming advantage in development, while Black’s king is unsafe. 10...a6? 11.f3 f6 12.fx6+ 1–0 Lobo – Ventimiglia, corr. 1994) 8.d6+ ef8 9.a3 ge7 10.h5+- Now, Black is forced to weaken his dark squares even more. 10...g6 11.h6+ gh8 12.0–0–0 a5, Riegler – Jug, Slovenia 1992 and here the quickest way for White to win is the move – 13.e8+–;

The move 6...ge7 – enables White to establish a total control over the centre. 7.d6+ xd6 8.xd6 0–0 (or 8...a6 9.e3 – see 6...a6 7.d6+ xd6 8.xd6 ge7 9.e3) 9.e3 b6 10.0–0–0 h6?! – This move only creates a target for White, Hakkarainen – Koivusalo, Finland 1997, 11.g4 g6 12.h4–;

6...a5 – After that, White obtains at least the two-bishop advantage. 7.a3 a6?! (It was necessary for Black to defend with: 7...xc3+ 8.xc3 f6 9.d3± 8.axb4 xa1 9.c7+ f8 10.xa8+– Demirci – Yildiz, Kusadasi 2004.

7.d6+

7...e7

In answer to 7...f8, Wood – Lapham, Seattle 1983, the simplest line for White is: 8.a3 a5 (In the variation 8...xc3+ 9.bxc3 f6 10.f4±, White’s powerful knight on d6 more than compensates his compromised pawn-structure on the queenside.) 9.d3 e5 (or 9...f6 10.f4±) 10.d2 c5 11.f4 g4 (That move is easily refuted, but Black has hardly anything better.) 12.b4! xb4 13.axb4 xa1 14.e2 f6 15.0–0 and Black loses unavoidably his queen, for example: 15...e7 16.c4 b5 17.a5+–, or 16...d5 17.a3–

After 7...xd6 8.xd6, Black has nothing to counter the power of White’s bishops with,

for example:
About 8...h6 9.e3 ge7 – see 8...ge7;
8...h4 – Black’s queen is only seemingly active here, Boros – Szirti, Budapest 1995, 9.e3 ge7 10.0–0–0±;
8...e7 9.g3 f6 (9...g6?
– This move only loses time and it weakens the position. 10.f4
1.e4 c5 2.d4 cxd4 3.d4 cxd4 4.cxd4 e6 5.\( \square_c3 \) 6.\( \square_c6 \) 7.e5 f6 11.\( \square_d6 \) \( \varfrown_7 \) 12.\( \square_a4+ \) – Albano Rivares – Grey, Email 1991; 9...\( \varfrown_6 \) 10.\( \varfrown_f4 \) \( \varfrown_g5 11.0-0-0-0 \) – Denoyelle – Gouy, France 1998) 10.\( \square_e3 \) b5 (Black has problems defending his queenside after: 10...\( \varfrown_7 \), Creyghton – Keller, Bar- men 1905, 11.\( \square_a4 \) b5 12.\( \square_b6 \) \( \varfrown_b8 \) 13.a4±) 11.0-0-0 \( \varfrown_7 \), Bleykmans – Mannheimer, Haarlem 1901, 12.h4 \( \varfrown_e7 \) 13.h5±;
8...\( \varfrown_g7 \) 9.\( \varfrown_e3 \) 0-0 (9...h6?! – This move leads to a lag in development and it compromises Black’s position. 10.\( \varfrown_g3 \) \( \varfrown_g6 \), Sanchez Martin – Jargaldaihan, Oropesa del Mar 2000, 11.h4 \( \varfrown_f6 \) 12.0-0-0-0; after 9...\( \varfrown_a5 \) 10.\( \varfrown_e2 \) \( \varfrown_e5 \), Fuster Garcia – Neila Castillo, Zaragoza 1998, White should not avoid the favourable endgame – 11.\( \varfrown_xe5 \) \( \varfrown_xe5 \) 12.\( \square_a4± \); in an- swer to 9...b5, Nguyen Van Hai – Dang Thanh Long, Vietnam 2004, White should not present his op- ponent with counter chances, by castling on opposite sides. After 10.\( \varfrown_e2 \), followed by 0-0, Black can hardly create any counter- play.) 10.\( \varfrown_e2 \) b5 11.0-0± Tirado – Benitez Diaz, Mexico 1999.

9.\( \varfrown_d4 \) \( \varfrown_c3 \)

After: 9...\( \varfrown_e5 \) 10.\( \varfrown_c4 \) \( \varfrown_d8 \) 11.\( \varfrown_d6± \), Black fails to repel White’s piece from the d6-square, Hillen- brand – von Reth, Neuwied 1993.

10.\( \varfrown_bxc3 \) \( \varfrown_f6 \)

In answer to 10...f6, Koulitchenko – Dudognon, Paris 2004, it seems logical for White to block Black’s queenside with: 11.a4 \( \varfrown_e5 \) (White’s idea is best illustrated in the variation: 11...\( \varfrown_f8 \) 12.\( \varfrown_c4 \) \( \varfrown_d8 \) 13.\( \varfrown_d6+ \) \( \varfrown_g6 \) 14.a5 \( \varfrown_f7 \) 15.\( \varfrown_b6 \) \( \varfrown_a7 \) 16.c4+-; Black’s defence is not any easier after 11...b5 and 12.\( \varfrown_e2 \) bx a4 13.0-0 \( \varfrown_e5 \) 14.\( \varfrown_d4 \) a3 15.c4 \( \varfrown_f8 \) 16.c5± and White has an overwhelming lead in de-velopment.) 12.\( \varfrown_e2 \) \( \varfrown_f8 \) (Black loses after: 12...b5? 13.\( \varfrown_xe5 \) fxe5 14.0-0+- and his attempt to repel his opponent’s knight with: 12...\( \varfrown_c5 \) 13.\( \varfrown_d1 \) \( \varfrown_f7 \), would not work, because of 14.\( \varfrown_xb7+ \)–) 13.0-0 \( \varfrown_e7 \) 14.\( \varfrown_fd1± \) and Black has problems completing his de-velopment.

11.\( \varfrown_e2 \) b5
12. 0-0 \( \text{d8} \), W.Hartston – Roth, Bath 1963 and here White wins with 13.a4! \text{bxa4} (or 13...b4 14.\text{c4} \text{exe4} 15.\text{d6+} \text{e8} 16. \text{e3+-} and Black loses his knight) 14.\text{c4} \text{b5} (or 14...\text{exe4} 15. \text{d6+ f6} 16.\text{e3+-}) 15.\text{d6+ e8} 16.\text{a3+–}

\( e) \) 5...\text{xd4}?!  

The main drawback of that move is that it contributes to White's development.

6.\text{xd4 d6}

That seems to be the most natural move.

6...\text{c7?} – After that reply, Black's queen comes under attack and he loses quickly. 7.\text{b5 xc2}, R.Fischer – Tordion, Quebec (simultan) 1964 (or 7...\text{c6} 8.\text{f4 d8} 9.\text{c7+–} Jelen – Haase, Email 1998) and here White must develop his pieces with tempo and that would provide him with a material advantage. 8.\text{d3 c6} 9...\text{f4+-}

6...\text{f6?} – Black loses time and he surrenders space to his opponent. 7.e5 \text{g6} (Black's queen comes under attack here. It is better for him to try: 7...\text{d8} 8.\text{b5 – see 6...f6 7.e5 g8 8.b5.}) 8.\text{e3 b6} 9.\text{d3 f5} 10.exf6 \text{xf6} 11.e4 \text{b8} 12.d5+- and White has an overwhelming lead in development. 12...\text{d8} 13.g6+ 1-0 Gross – Veizaj, corr 2000.

6...\text{d6?} 7.e5 \text{g8} (Black can hardly obtain any compensation for the pawn after: 7...\text{d5?} 8.\text{xd5 exd5} 9.\text{xd5} and now White's position is winning after: 9...\text{e7} 10.\text{c4 f6} 11.\text{f4+-} Mercado – Meira, Cascavel 1996, as well as following: 9...\text{e7} 10.\text{e3 0–0} 11.0–0–0+- Powell – Cieslak, corr 1998 – and in both cases White not only remains with an extra pawn, but he has a superior development too.) 8.\text{b5 a6} 9.\text{d6+ xd6} 10.\text{xd6 e7} 11.\text{d3±} White has extra space and a couple of powerful bishops.

6...b6? – This move is too slow and now Black fails to develop his kingside. 7.\text{f4 b7} (The other possibilities are not any better for him: 7...\text{h6?} 8.\text{b5+–; 7...c5?} 8.\text{xe7+– N.Gusev – Gupta, Kapuskasing 2004; 7...d6?} 8. 0–0–0 e5 9.\text{xe5 f6} – He loses even quicker after: 9...\text{g5}+)
10...fxe5 11...b5+ 1–0 Gozzi – Elakany, Copenhagen 1999 – 10...b5+ 17d7 11...xf6+ and Black has no chances of saving the game with a compromised structure, being a pawn down, Taminsyah – Soh Huei Ming, Brunei 2003; in answer to 7...f6, White’s most energetic reaction seems to be 8...b5 and here it is just terrible for Black to try: 8...e5? 9...d5 17b8 10...xe5+–, but even after: 8...c5 9...c3 e5 10...e3±, his lag in development should cause him his demise; 7...xf6 8...b5 d6? Bui Trung Hieu – Dang Anh Tuan, Vung Tau 2004, Black had better try: 8...c5 9...d6+ 17f8 10...d2±, but even then White has a superior development and powerful pressure along the d-file. Now, after: 9...xd6+ 17xd6 10...xd6+– White remains with an extra pawn and two bishops; 7...e7 8...b5 17c6 9...d2 e5 10...g5 f6 11...e3 17a6 12.0–0–0 17xb5 13...xb5± and White has better development, two powerful bishops and pressure along the d-file, A.Grant – K.Malkin, Clarkston 2000.) 8...b5 17c8 9...xa7 17xc2 10...d3 17c5 11.b4 17h5 12...b5 17f6 13.e5 17d8 14...c1+– Black’s kingside is not developed and his rook is stranded there, so his chances of successful defence are minimal, Henoch – Haase, Email 1998.

6...a6?! – This move enables White to develop his dark-squared bishop to the most active position. 7...f4! 17a5 (About 8...e7 8.0–0–0 – see 6...e7 7...f4 a6 8.0–0–0; White preserves a solid extra pawn after: 7...e7? 8...xg7 17f6 9...g3+- Usbeck – Kressmann, corr. 1997; it is bad for Black to opt for: 7...f6 8.e5 17h5 9...e3 g6 10.g4 17g7 11...e4 17e7 12...f6+ 17f8 13...h6+–, since he would hardly develop his kingside pieces, Berglitz – Klinge, Gluecksburg 1977.) 8...d6 17xd6 9...xd6 17f6, Seyb – Dorsch, Schloss Schney 1995 (After: 9...b6 10.0–0–0 17e7 11.f4 f5 12...d3± Black falls behind in development considerably, S.Nilssen – Pettersen, Hammerfest 1995) and here White poses greatest problems for his opponent with the logical line: 10.0–0–0 b6 (Black loses after the seemingly active line: 10...g4? 11...g3 17g5+ 12...b1 17g6 13...a4 17f6 14...c7+– and he has no defence against the threat 15...b6.) 11.e5 17g4 12...e2! 17xf2 13...f3 17xh1 (or 13...a7 14...d4! 17xh1 15...c4 17d8 16.b4! 17a3+ 17...d2+–, Black is temporarily with an extra rook, but White will soon gain an overwhelmind material advantage.) 14...xa8 17f2 15...d4+– and Black’s knight on f2 is doomed.

6...e7 7...f4! 17c6 (or 7...a6 8.0–0–0 17c6 9...d2 – see 7...c6 8...d2 a6 9.0–0–0, while after: 8...b5 9...b1 17b7, Zielinski – Kabachev, corr. 2003, it is quite unpleasant for Black if White follows with: 10...e2 17c8 11.h4 17c6 12...d3 17c5 13...g3±
with dangerous threats along the d-file and on the kingside.)
8.\( \text{d2} \) a6 (The other possibilities are not better for Black: 8...\( \text{b4?!} \) 9.a3 \( \text{xc3} \) 10.\( \text{xc3} \) 0-0 11.\( \text{d6} \) White’s powerful dark-squared bishop paralyzes Black’s pieces, Demaria – D.Hansen, Dos Hermanas 2004; 8...\( \text{b6?!} \) – That move also enables White to obtain the two-bishop advantage. 9.\( \text{b5} \) e5 10.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d8} \), Silva – J.Svensson, Email 2001 and here after: 11.\( \text{c4} \) a6 12.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{b4} \)+ 13.\( \text{c3} \) 0-0 14.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 15.\( \text{xd6} \)± Black can hardly complete his development without material losses; 8...\( \text{e7} \)! – Now, White establishes firm control over the central squares. 9.\( \text{b5} \) e5 10.\( \text{e3} \) a6, Durban Piera – Arnedo, Lograno 2002, 11.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 12.\( \text{xc3} \) e5 \( \text{d8} \) 13.0-0-0+, it is more or less the same after: 10...0-0 11.0-0-0 a6 12.\( \text{d6} \) b5 13.\( \text{f5} \) Braakhuis – Rovan, Email 1999) 9.0-0-0 b5 (It is bad for Black to play: 9...\( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{d6} \) 0-0 11.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{e8} \) 12.e5 b5, Serpi – Rosa, Asiag 1991, after 13.\( \text{e4} \)± Black is completely squeezed.) 10.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 11.e5 g5?! (It is better for Black to continue with the calmer line: 11...0-0 12.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{b7} \) 13.\( \text{d6} \), or 12...\( \text{c7} \) 13.\( \text{f6} \) \( \text{h8} \) 14.\( \text{d3} \), although even then White’s advantage is doubtless.) 12.\( \text{g3} \) f5 13.exf6 \( \text{xf6} \) 14.\( \text{e4} \)± Black’s position looks lost due to his unsafe king and his lag in development, Rosich Valles – Vieguer Passe, Barcelona 2002.

7.\( \text{e3} \)

7...\( \text{a6} \)

Black’s attempts to refrain from playing that move lead to difficult positions:
7...\( \text{f6} \) 8.0-0-0 \( \text{d7} \), Frohman – Patterson, Detroit East 1983 and here Black can hardly maintain the material balance after the energetic line: 9.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{c6} \) (It is not better for Black to opt for: 9...\( \text{xb5} \) 10.\( \text{xb5} \)+ \( \text{d7} \) 11.\( \text{f4} \)± and he would lose his d6-pawn.) 10.f3 d5 (10...\( \text{xb5} \) 11.\( \text{xb5} \)+ \( \text{d7} \) 12.\( \text{f4} \)±) 11.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{c8} \) 12.\( \text{a7} \) \( \text{d7} \) (or 12...\( \text{a8} \) 13.exd5 \( \text{xd5} \) 14.\( \text{c4} \)++ 13.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{a8} \) 14.exd5 \( \text{xd5} \) 15.\( \text{b5} \)– and Black has problems completing his development without material losses;)
7...e5 – That move does not solve the problems with Black’s development and it weakens the d5-square. 8.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 9.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{e7} \), Gott – Carlson, corr. 1968 (After: 9...\( \text{f6} \) 10.\( \text{c7} \)+ \( \text{e7} \) 11.\( \text{xe6} \) fxe6 12.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 13.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f7} \) 14.0-0± White will soon push f2-f4 with excellent attacking prospects; 9...\( \text{a5} \)+ 10.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 11.exd5 \( \text{c5} \) 12.\( \text{a4} \)+ \( \text{d8} \) 13.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 14.\( \text{d1} \)
1.e4 c5 2.d3 d6 3.d4 cxd4 4.exd4 e6 5.c3

\[ \text{Black plays: } 5...d6 \]

This move leads to original positions only very seldom.

6.e3 a6

About 6...\texttt{f6} 7.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation.

6...e7 7.d2 d6 (about 7...a6 – see 6...a6 7.d2 d7) 8.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation.

6.e7 7.d2 d4 (about 7...f6 – see the Scheveningen variation; 7...a6 8.0-0-0 \texttt{f6} 9.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation)

8.d4 e5 (about 8...\texttt{f6} 9.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation)

9.e3 a6, K.Müller – Huth, Rowy 2003 (after 9...\texttt{f6} 10.b5+ d7 11.xd7+ \texttt{xd7} 12.g5+ White’s knight reaches the d5-square and it cannot be repelled from there.), 10.d5 \texttt{f8} 11.b6 \texttt{d7} 12.0-0-0

\[ \text{White plays: } 5...e7, \text{Teubert – F.Rohde, Internet 2004, now Black has problems with the protection of his d6-pawn: } 8.0-0-0 \texttt{c6} 9.\texttt{d2} \texttt{a5} 10.f4 \texttt{e5} (The other possibilities are clearly worse for Black: 10...\texttt{e5} 11.b5! \texttt{xa2} 12.c7+ \texttt{d8} 13.c3--; and he loses at least a piece; 10.d7 11.xd6 0-0-0 12.xf8 \texttt{xf8} 13.e3+ White remains with a solid extra pawn.) 11.e3 \texttt{e6} 12.b1 \texttt{c8} 13.d5+ White has a stable edge thanks to his powerful centralized knight.

8.0-0-0 e5

It is just terrible for Black to play 8...\texttt{e7}?, Durna – Kabakcili, Izmir 2003, because after 9.xg7 \texttt{f6} 10.g3++ he has no compensation for the pawn. His better option is the move 8...\texttt{d7}, which has not been tried in practice yet, but after 9.a4+ Black will have to comply at some moment with the exchange of his bishop for White’s active knight.

(diagram)

9.d2 \texttt{f6}, Huba – Stetz, Karvina 2005 and here White can emphasize the vulnerability of the d5-outpost with the line: 10.c4 \texttt{c7} 11.b3 \texttt{e6} 12.g5+
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6...\textSwc7?! – This move enables White to provoke weakening of the d5-square. 7.\textSdb5 \textSwb8, Murshed – Abdul, Dhaka 2006, 8.\textSf4 e5 (Black loses after: 8...\textSde5 9.\textSwd4 a6 10.0–0–0–0+) 9.\textSac3 \textSdf6 (It is worse for Black to play: 9...a6 10.\textSac3 b5 11.\textSd5± 10.\textSd5 \textSxd5 11.exd5 \textSe7 12.c4± There arose a line from the Chelyabinsk variation (1.e4 c5 2.\textSf3 \textSc6 3.d4 exd4 4.\textSxd4 \textSf6 5.\textSc3 e5 6.\textSdb5 d6 7.\textSd5 \textSxd5 8.exd5 \textSe7 9.c4), except that White has already developed his bishop, while Black’s queen is misplaced on the b8-square.

6...\textSge7 7.\textSb3 – Naturally, White should not allow the exchange of knights in that situation. Black has tested in practice here:

7...\textSg6 – with the idea to complete the development of the kingside. 8.f4 \textSe7 (After 8...a6 9.\textSf3 \textSe7 10.0–0–0 \textSc7, Ulitin – A.Frollov, Sochi 1990, it deserves attention for White to play 11.\textSwf2!?, for example: 11...b5 12.h4†; 11...\textSf6 12.\textSwd2 \textSe7 13.h4† and he develops a powerful initiative, exploiting Black’s misplaced knight on g6. It is too dangerous for Black to accept the pawn-sacrifice – 13...\textSxh4 14.f5 \textSxe5 15.\textSwe1 g5 16.\textSd4 b5 17.\textSf2\textDb 9.\textSf3 0–0 10.0–0–0 a6 (After: 10...\textSc7 11.h4 \textEe8 12.h5 \textSf8, Mikliaev – Vl.Popov, Riga 1968, White should better try: 13.\textSb5 \textSwb8 14.g4 a6 15.\textSd5d4±) 11.h4 \textEe8 (Accepting the sacrifice is tremendously risky – 11...\textSxh4 12.\textSwh5 h6 13.g4 e5 14.\textSd5±) 12.h5 \textSf8, Vl.Popov – Kirpichnikov, Riga 1968 and now after 13.g4± White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative.

7...a6 – That is a useful move, not clarifying the future of the knight on e7 yet. 8.f4 b5 (about 8...\textSg6 9.\textSf3 – see 7...\textSg6 8.f4 a6 9.\textSf3; after 8...\textSwc7, Putzbach – Rathje, Bargteheide 2005, it seems logical for White to try to make use of the vulnerability of the d6-pawn with the move 9.\textSwd2 and here the most reliable line for Black seems to be: 9...\textSc7 10.0–0–0 \textSc8 11.\textSb1 – see 6...a6 7.\textSwd2 \textSd7 8.0–0–0 \textSge7 9.\textSb3 \textSc8 10.f4 \textSc7 11.\textSb1) 9.\textSf3 \textSa5 (It is not better for Black to try: 9...\textSb7 10.0–0–0 \textSwc7? – this is a blunder, but even after: 10...\textSg6 11.\textSc5± White’s prospects are clearly superior – 11.\textSxb5 \textSg6 12.\textSxa4 0–0–0 13.\textSf2 \textEe8 14.\textSb6 1–0 Lau – Gruenfeld, New York 1985.) 10.\textSxa5 \textSxa5 11.\textSd3 \textSc6 12.0–0 \textSe7 13.\textSwg3 g6, A.Sokolov – Moor, Switzerland 2002 (In answer to 13...0–0, it seems strong for White to continue with: 14.f5!? \textSwd8 15.\textSh6±, or 14...\textSh8 15.\textSfxe6 \textSfxe6?! 16.\textSxf8+ \textSxf8 17.e5±, 15...\textSxe6 16.\textSd5±), and now, Black is in trouble after: 14.a3 \textSd7 (or 14...\textSwc7 15.f5 \textSde5 16.\textSd4±) 15.f5 \textSc7 16.a4 b4 17.\textSe2 \textSe5 18.\textSd4± Black’s king has no reliable shel-
ter and he has no active play in sight.

7. \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d7} \)

About 7...\( \text{e7} \) 8.0-0-0 \( \text{f6} \) 9.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation; or 7...\( \text{e6} \) 8.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation.

7...\( \text{c7} \) 8.0-0-0 b5 (about 8...\( \text{f6} \) 9.f3 – see the Najdorf variation; 8...\( \text{d7} \) 9.f3 \( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{f6} \) – see the Najdorf variation.) 9.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \), Stockfleth – Saltaev, Hamburg 1991, now White can obtain a favourable pawn-structure resembling the French Defence: 10.e5 \( \text{d5} \) 11.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c7} \) 12.f4 \( \text{h6} \) 13.\( \text{d4} \) Black is behind in development and his light-squared bishop is passive.

8.0-0-0 \( \text{e8} \)

About 8...\( \text{f6} \) 9.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation.

8...\( \text{ge7} \) 9.\( \text{b3} \)?? \( \text{c8} \) 10.f4 \( \text{c7} \) 11.\( \text{b1} \) b5, Fercec – Cabrilo, Jahorina 2003, after 12.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 13.\( \text{g3} \) 0-0 14.e5!? White’s position looks very promising.

8...b5 9.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 10.f3 \( \text{f6} \).

9.\( \text{b1} \) b5 10.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 11.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f6} \)

This is a standard transfer of the knight to a more active placement.

12.\( \text{e2} \)

About 12...\( \text{e7} \) 13.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{b7} \) 14.g4 – see 12...\( \text{b7} \).

13.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 14.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 15.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{e5} \)

In answer to 15...d5, White has no advantage after the attractive line: 16.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 17.\( \text{f5} \), Sammalvuo – Paronen, Jyväskylä 2006, in view of: 17...0-0! 18.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \)?? and Black has better development to compensate White’s two-bishop advantage. Black might be in a serious trouble however, after the move – 16.\( \text{h3} \)! – White completes his development and he attacks the vulnerable e6-square. 16...\( \text{c5} \)

(The other moves do not seem to be reliable for Black either: 16...dxe4 17.\( \text{xe6} \) exf3 18.\( \text{h3} \) 0-0 19.\( \text{f5} \)±; 16...\( \text{b6} \) 17.\( \text{xe6} \) and White has an excellent compensation for the piece – three pawns, moreover that Black’s king is stranded in the centre. 17...\( \text{c4} \) 18.\( \text{f2} \) fxe6 19.\( \text{xe6} \rightarrow \text{a5} \) 20.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{h7} \) 21.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g8} \) 22.\( \text{h4} \)??; 16...\( \text{d6} \) 17.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 18.e5 \( \text{b8} \) 19.\( \text{f5} \)?) 17.exd5 \( \text{xd5} \)

(After 17...\( \text{xd5} \) 18.\( \text{xe1} \)?? Black can hardly complete his development without positional concessions and his most logical line leads to a transposition of moves: 18...0-0 19.\( \text{f5} \) exf5 20.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 21.\( \text{xd5} \) – see 17.\( \text{xd5} \)).

18.\( \text{f5} \) 0-0 19.\( \text{d4} \) exf5 20.\( \text{xd5} \)
\[ \text{Chapter 5} \]

\[ \text{\( \text{\#.xd5 \, 21.\text{\#.xd5}\)} \] and White has the two-bishop advantage and a superior pawn-structure.

16.\text{\#.g2} \text{\#.c4} 17.\text{\#.xc4} \text{\#.xc4} 18.\text{\#.h4}\]

White has a powerful kingside initiative, while Black has no time to organize any counterplay on the queenside.

(diagram)

18...\text{\#.g6} 19.\text{\#.h5} \text{\#.f8} 20.\text{\#.hxg6} \text{\#.hxg6} \]

Baramidze – Bischoff, Bad Zwesten 2004 and here after

21.\text{\#.b3} \text{\#.c7} 22.\text{\#.f2}\]

Black has problems finding satisfactory defence against 23.\text{\#.b6}, followed by 24.\text{\#.a5}.

\[ \text{Conclusion} \]

We have analyzed some not so popular lines in this chapter. In variation a), Black opens the centre, but he remains behind in development. White occupies the e-file and he impedes the mobilization of his opponent’s forces. In variations b), c) and d), Black has great problems in connection with the vulnerability of his pawn on d6. In variation e), Black enhances his opponent’s development and then he is forced to create weaknesses in his position. The move 5...d6 has only seldom any separate importance and we have analyzed it in variation f). The game usually transposes to the Scheveningen variation; otherwise White exploits the delay of the development of Black’s knight on f6, or its deployment to the e7-square and he seizes the initiative on the kingside.
Contrary to the Paulsen-Kan Variation (2...e6 3.d4 cxd4 4.Qxd4 a6) Black has played the active move Qc6, instead of a6, and it is fruitless for White to continue with his calm development. For example after 6.Qe2, Black obtains a very good game by playing simply 6...Qb4, attacking his opponent’s e4-pawn.

White must fight for the advantage by exploiting the temporary weakness of the d6-square and he can do that in two possible ways: 6.Qxc6 bxc6 7.e5 Qd5 8.Qe4, establishing firm control over the d6-square, but falling behind in development, or by playing the move that I recommend to you – 6.Qdb5

With the idea to follow with Qf4, threatening checks from the d6 and c7-squares.

In this chapter we will analyze a) 6...a6?! – that move forces White to check from the d6-square, which he intended to do anyway and b) 6...Qc5 – this move is played with the idea – in answer to the check on d6 to continue with Qe7 and to obtain a lead in development with a purposefully deployed dark-squared bishop. The next chapter will be devoted to the more popular (and obviously better) move – 6...Qb4.

The most often played move in that position is – 6...d6 – and it is used mainly to eliminate the lines for White, in which he develops his bishop to b5 (1.e4 c5 2.Qf3 Qc6 3.Qb5, or 3.Qc3 Qf6 4.Qb5), transposing after 7.Qf4 e5 (It is too bad for Black to play 7...Qe5, because White follows with 8.Wd4, winning a pawn: 8...a6 9.Qxd6 Qxd6 10.Wd1 or 9...Wxd6 10.Qxe5) 8.Qg5 a6 9.Qa3 b5, to the “starting” thematic position of the Chelyabinsk variation of the Sicilian Defence. It will be analyzed thoroughly in our Book 10.

Black cannot play 6...d5?, because of the simple tactical operation: 7.exd5 exd5 8.Qxd5 Qxd5
9. \( \texttt{x}d5 \) – and White wins a pawn, for which Black has no compensation whatsoever. For example after: 9...\( \texttt{b}4 \) 10.\( \texttt{c}4 \), White is threatening a double attack on the c7-square.

Black reaches a much worse version of the starting position of the Chelyabinsk variation after: 6...b6? 7.\( \texttt{f}4 \) e5 8.\( \texttt{g}5 \), or 6...\( \texttt{e}7 \)? 7.\( \texttt{f}4 \) e5 (or 7...0-0 8.\( \texttt{c}7 \) \( \texttt{e}8 \) 9.\( \texttt{d}6 \) \( \texttt{x}d6 \) 10.\( \texttt{x}d6 \) \( \texttt{e}7 \) 11.\( \texttt{b}5 \)++) 8.\( \texttt{g}5 \) – and he cannot even repel White's knight from b5, because he has not played the move d6 yet.

Black has tried several times the not so purposeful move here – 6...\( \texttt{b}6 \) (His queen is attacking nothing from that square and it only comes under attack.) 7.\( \texttt{e}3 \) \( \texttt{a}5 \) 8.\( \texttt{d}2 \) \( \texttt{d}8 \)? 9.\( \texttt{f}4 \) e5 10.\( \texttt{g}5 \) \( \texttt{b}4 \), Svidler – Karasev, St. Petersburg 1999, 11.\( \texttt{d}6+ \) \( \texttt{x}d6 \) (11...\( \texttt{f}8 \) 12.\( \texttt{c}4 \), 13.0-0 \( \texttt{x}c3 \) 14.\( \texttt{xc}3 \) \( \texttt{xc}3 \) 15.\( \texttt{xf}6 \) \( \texttt{gx}f6 \) 16.\( \texttt{h}5 \)++; 11...\( \texttt{e}7 \) 12.\( \texttt{xf}6+ \) \( \texttt{gx}f6 \) 13.\( \texttt{f}5 \)) 12.\( \texttt{xd}6 \) with the threats \( \texttt{b}5 \), or \( \texttt{d}5 \). It is better for Black to opt for: 8...\( \texttt{b}6 \) 9.\( \texttt{f}4 \) e5 10.\( \texttt{e}3 \) (It is not so convincing for White to continue with: 10.\( \texttt{g}5 \) a6 11.\( \texttt{xf}6 \) \( \texttt{ax}b5 \) 12.\( \texttt{g}5 \) \( \texttt{b}4 \) 13.\( \texttt{d}3 \)). 10...\( \texttt{a}5 \) 11.\( \texttt{f}3 \) and White has the edge, because Black's d6-square is quite vulnerable, while the pawn-sacrifice 11...d5 is not quite correct, because of White's simple reaction: 12.\( \texttt{ex}d5 \) \( \texttt{b}4 \) 13.\( \texttt{f}2 \) \( \texttt{f}5 \) 14.d6, or 13...a6 14.a3 \( \texttt{ax}b5 \) (14...\( \texttt{xc}2 \) 15.\( \texttt{xc}2 \) \( \texttt{ax}b5 \) 16.\( \texttt{xb}5 \)++) 15.\( \texttt{xb}5 \)

\( \textbf{a) 6...a6?!} \)

This is not a good move for Black – he simply forces White to play \( \texttt{d}6 \) and that leads to the disappearance of the important dark-squared bishop for Black.

7.\( \texttt{d}6+ \) \( \texttt{xd}6 \) 8.\( \texttt{xd}6 \)

Now, Black must either repel or exchange White's queen on the d6-square. His basic moves are – \( \textbf{a1) 8...\texttt{a}5} \) and \( \textbf{a2) 8...\texttt{e}7} \).

Black has also tried in Practice:

8...\( \texttt{b}5 \) – This move seems to be useful (Black must develop his queenside somehow...), but on the other hand he weakens his queenside and later White can exploit that with the move a4. 9.a3 (White is threatening b4.) 9...\( \texttt{e}7 \) 10.\( \texttt{f}4 \) \( \texttt{h}5 \) 11.\( \texttt{xe}7+ \) \( \texttt{xe}7 \) 12.\( \texttt{d}6 \) \( \texttt{f}6 \), Tian – Onufreichuk, Sydney 1996 and here White’s simplest line would be: 13.a4 \( \texttt{xa}4 \) 14.f3 with the idea to follow with \( \texttt{xa}4 \) and then depending on circumstances \( \texttt{b}6 \), or \( \texttt{c}5 \);

It is useless for Black to play 8...\( \texttt{h}6 \), because White does not intend to develop his bishop to g5 anyway. 9.\( \texttt{f}4 \) \( \texttt{e}7 \) 10.0-0-0
\[ \text{\(\text{\#}d6\)} \text{\(11.\text{\#}d6\)} \text{\(\text{\#}g4\)} \text{\(12.\text{\#}d2\)} \text{\(\pm\) and the endgame is tremendously difficult for Black, Davydov – Bister, Germany 1996.}

8...\text{\(\text{\#}b6\)} 9.\text{\(\text{\#}d3\)} \text{\(\text{\#}d4\)}, Uwira – Lauer, Marburg 2000, 10.\text{\(\text{\#}f4\)} \text{\(\pm\) and it is rather unclear why Black has deployed his queen to the d4-square – he will have to exchange it for White’s queen anyway except that he has lost a tempo in comparison to the line with 8...\text{\(\text{\#}e7\);} 8...\text{\(\text{\#}e7\)} – That move is played with the idea to castle short, but here that would not solve Black’s problems. 9.\text{\(\text{\#}e3\)} 0–0 10.\text{\(\text{\#}b6\)} \text{\(\text{\#}e8\)}, Nuesken – Karcher, Langenhagen 2000, 11.\text{\(\text{\#}d3\)} \text{\(\pm\) – and it would be rather difficult for Black to develop his squeezed queenside.

\text{\(a1\)} 8...\text{\(\text{\#}a5\)}

Black creates the threat \text{\(\text{\#}xe4\)}, but White can easily defend against that.

9.\text{\(\text{\#}d2\)}

9...\text{\(\text{\#}b4\)}

Black reaches a very difficult endgame with a weakness on d6 after: 9...\text{\(\text{\#}e5\)} 10.\text{\(\text{\#}xe5\)} \text{\(\text{\#}xe5\)} 11.f4 and here his position is bad after: 11...\text{\(\text{\#}g6\)} 12.e5 \text{\(\text{\#}h5\)} (That move loses a piece, but even after: 12...\text{\(\text{\#}g8\)} 13.\text{\(\text{\#}e4\)}, Black’s position is nearly hopeless.) 13.g3 \text{\(\text{\#}e7\)} 14.g4 1–0 Nazzari – Tierra, Uruguay 1971, as well as following: 11...\text{\(\text{\#}c6\)} 12.e5 \text{\(\text{\#}g8\)} (or 12...\text{\(\text{\#}g4\)} 13.\text{\(\text{\#}e4\)} f5 14.\text{\(\text{\#}d6\)}+ \text{\(\text{\#}e7\)} 15.a4 \text{\(\text{\#}h6\)}, Plane – Dancourt, Plancourt 2001, 16.\text{\(\text{\#}e3\)} \text{\(\text{\#}f7\)} 17.\text{\(\text{\#}c5\)} \text{\(\pm\) and it would just be a matter of simple technique for White to press his advantage home in that position.) 13.\text{\(\text{\#}e4\)} f6 (Or 13...\text{\(\text{\#}g7\)} 14.\text{\(\text{\#}d6\)}+ \text{\(\text{\#}f8\)} 15.\text{\(\text{\#}d3\)} g6, Kung – Rosebrook, USA 1992, Black weakens considerably his dark squares, 16.0–0–0–0\(\pm\) – and his position is quite difficult strategically. Black would not fare any better after: 15...f6 16.0–0–0 – since he would not be able to capture on e5 anyway and he lacks any reasonable moves.) 14.\text{\(\text{\#}d6\)}+ \text{\(\text{\#}e7\)} 15.\text{\(\text{\#}c3\)} \text{\(\text{\#}h6\)} 16.0–0–0 fxe5 17.fxe5 \text{\(\text{\#}g4\)} 18.\text{\(\text{\#}e1\)} b5 19.b3 (or 19.h3 b4 20.\text{\(\text{\#}xb4\)} \text{\(\text{\#}xb4\)} 21.hxg4 \text{\(\text{\#}xa2\)}+ 22.\text{\(\text{\#}d2\)} \text{\(\text{\#}b4\)} 23.c3 \text{\(\text{\#}c6\)} 24.\text{\(\text{\#}d3\)}\(\pm\) 19...b4 20.\text{\(\text{\#}b2\)} a5, Frisch – Woelbl, Dresden 2001 and here White maintains a clear advantage after 21.h3\(\pm\), repelling his opponent’s knight, since Black cannot capture on e5: 21...\text{\(\text{\#}gxe5\)} 22.\text{\(\text{\#}xe5\)} \text{\(\text{\#}xe5\)} 23.\text{\(\text{\#}xc8\)}++

10.\text{\(\text{\#}xb4\)} \text{\(\text{\#}xb4\)} 11.0–0–0

Now, Black’s knight must retreat from the b4-square and White maintains a clear advantage because of his bishop-pair and Black’s weakness on d6.
11...\(\text{g4}\)

Or 11...0-0 12.f3 d5 13.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{a4}\) \(\text{b6}\) \(\text{a7}\) (The move 14...\(\text{b8}\) loses a pawn: 15.exd5 \(\text{xd5}\) 16.\(\text{xd5}\) exd5 17.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{a8}\) 18.\(\text{xd5}\)--) 15.\(\text{e3}\) dxe4, Johnen – Heick, Lemgo Matorf 1993 and here White must choose the right moment to capture the exchange, for example: 16.fx e4 \(\text{xe4}\) 17.g4 \(\text{g2}\)++, opening additional files for White's pieces.

11...\(\text{c6}\) 12.f3 \(\text{b5}\), Johann – Francis, Bad Zwesten 1998 and now White should better play 13.\(\text{f4}\)±, taking the d6-square under control.

12.\(\text{e1}\) 0-0 13.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{e5}\) 14.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{g6}\) 15.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 16.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{b8}\), Sergo – Plato, Sweden 1964, 17.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{d8}\) 18.\(\text{d6}\)± – Black's knights have been repelled, his queenside is squeezed and his position remains very difficult.

\(\text{a2)}\) 8...\(\text{e7}\) 9.\(\text{f4}\)  
(diagram)

9...\(\text{xd6}\)

After 9...b5 10.f3 \(\text{b7}\) (or 10...0-0 11.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{x7}\) 12.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{e8}\) 13.a4+- and Black will lose a pawn on the queenside for sure, Krause – Golmayo, London 1927) 11.0-0-0 e5 12.\(\text{e3}\) (or 12.\(\text{xe7}\)+ \(\text{xe7}\) 13.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{d4}\)±) 12...\(\text{e8}\). Black is not losing by force yet, but his chronic weaknesses make his position very difficult. 13.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{e6}\) 14.\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{d8}\) 15.\(\text{a3}\) \(\text{c6}\) 16.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{b7}\) 17.\(\text{d2}\) d6 18.\(\text{h4}\)± – Black has no counterplay and his pieces are misplaced, Michiels – Kubacsny, Bad Wildbad 2003.

9...\(\text{h5}\) 10.\(\text{xe7}\)+ \(\text{xe7}\) (Or 10...\(\text{xe7}\) 11.\(\text{d6}\) b5 12.a4 \(\text{xa4}\) 13.\(\text{xa4}\) \(\text{f6}\) 14.f3 – and Black's a6-pawn is doomed – 14...\(\text{d8}\) 15.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{a7}\) 16.\(\text{xb5}\) \(\text{c6}\) 17.\(\text{xc8}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 18.\(\text{xc8}\) 19.\(\text{xa6}\)+ – Zavodny – Bobovsky, corr. 1977.) 11.\(\text{c7}\)± (Black has failed to repel White's bishop from the h2-b8 diagonal.) 11...\(\text{f6}\) 12.0-0-0 \(\text{e8}\) (or 12...b5 13.\(\text{d6}\)+ \(\text{d8}\) 14.f3± – Black's king has remained in the centre, his queenside is vulnerable and his pieces are not developed yet, Malisauskas – Heimberger, Eger 1987.) 13.\(\text{b6}\) d6 (or 13...f6 14.\(\text{e2}\) d6 15.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{d7}\) 16.f4 \(\text{e8}\), Postler – Hinkel, corr. 1982 17.\(\text{d1}\)± and it is unclear how Black can parry the threat \(\text{c5}\).) 14.f4 f6 (or 14...
\( \text{\&d7 15.\&e2 \&c8 16.\&d2=} \) 15.\&e2 \&b8 (About 15...\&d7 16.\&d2 – see 13...f6) 16.e5 fxe5 (It would be just fatal for Black to open the position completely. He should better opt for: 16...dxe5 17.fxe5 \&d7 18.exf6+ gxf6 19.\&a5+) 17. fxe5 dxe5 18.\&c5+ \&f7 19.\&d8 \&c6 20.\&f1+ \&g6 21.\&d3 \&d4 (or 21...\&f6 22.\&g3+ \&f7 23.\&h5+ g6 24.\&e4+-) 22.\&g3+ \&h6 23.\&h3+ and Black resigned, Klein – Mueller, Halle 2004.

9...0–0 10.\&xe7 \&xe7 11.\&d6 \&e8 12.\&e2+ and it looks like the only way for Black to repel his opponent’s bishop from d6 would be 12...b5 (weakening the queenside!) 13.a4 \&b7 14.f3 \&c8 15.\&a3 bxa4 16.\&xa4 \&c6 17.\&c5+, but now Black must worry about the protection of his a-pawn on top of his other problems, Wojcieszyn – Konstantinou, Poland 2000.

9...e5 – This move is logical (Black must fight for the dark squares.), but after: 10.\&xe7+ \&xe7 11.\&g5,

White has another threat – the check from the d5-square and that would be rather unpleasant for Black. He has no good prospects in that position:

11...\&e8? 12.\&xf6 gxf6 13.\&d5 \&b8 14.\&xf6+ and White remains with a solid extra pawn in that endgame, Ftacnik – Simik, Znojmo 1999;

11...\&b4 12.0–0–0 h6 13.\&xf6+ \&xf6 14.a3 \&c6 15.\&d5+ \&g6, Khovrina – Samoilova, Penza 2006 and after 16.\&b6 \&b8, White has the pleasant choice between capturing the pawn and the move – 17.\&d6+- with a winning position for him;

11...\&f8 12.0–0–0 b5 13.f3 (or 13.\&xf6 gxh6 14.\&d5 \&g7 15.\&d3) 13...\&e8 14.a4 f6 15.\&e3 bxa4 16.\&xa4 \&e7 17.\&b6 \&b8 18.\&xc8+ \&xc8 19.\&xa6++, winning a pawn for White, Slobodjan – Byhan, Leutersdorf 2001;

11...h6 12.\&d5+ \&d8 13.\&xf6+ gxf6 14.\&xf6+- Dovzaltz – Manev, Dos Hermanas 2004; 11...\&d4 12.0–0–0 \&f8 (or 12...d6 13.\&d5+ 1–0 Erashchenkov – Pirk, Internet 2004) 13.\&xf6 gxf6 14.\&d5 \&g7, Heemskerk – Dimer, Amsterdam 1899 and here White’s simplest line would be: 15.c3 \&e6 16.\&b6++, with a material advantage once again.

10.\&xd6 \&d8

It might be better for Black to try: 10...b5 11.f3 \&b7 12.e5 \&g8 13.a4 b4 14.\&e4 f5 (or 14...\&ge7 15.\&c5 \&c8 16.\&d3+) 15.\&c5 \&c8 16.0–0–0 and White has a clear advantage, because Black’s queenside is completely squeezed: 16...


Chapter 6

\[ D6 17.f4 Df7 18.De2 Da7 19.Df3 Dfd8 20.g4, opening the game on the queenside, Wessendorf – Degenhardt, Germany 1989. \]

11.0–0–0 c6 12.Dg3 De7 13.e5 (It is even better for White to continue with 13.Da4 ...Db6±) 13...f6 14.f4 f5? 15.Dh4+ Dn 16.Dla4+- and White wins the d7-pawn, Steinitz – Heral, Vienna 1873.

The fact that the move 6...a6 is almost never played nowadays, at the master level and above, is quite indicative about its quality.

b) 6...Dc5

Black develops his bishop and White’s check – 7.Dd6 becomes senseless, since Black would simply counter that with 7...De7, ob-
taining a lead in development with the idea to attack soon White’s pawn on f2 with the move Db6.

7.\textbf{Df4}

White is threatening to check on c7. Black has a choice here between \textbf{b1)} 7...e5 and \textbf{b2)} 7...0–0.

\textbf{b1)} 7...e5

8.De3! d6

Or 8...Db4 9.a3 Dxc3+ 10.Dxc3 d6, Orsini – Dolezal, Buenos Aires 2006 (Black manages to develop his bishop on c8 in that fashion; otherwise after 10...0–0, Clarac – Bortot, Rosny sous Bois 2002, 11.Db2 b6 12.0–0–0 Db7 13.f3\textup{f4} Ag4, or 10...b6 11.Db6 Db7 12.f3 Dd7 13.Db5± and White establishes his knight on the d6-outpost.) 11.De2 0–0 12.Db2 Dd6 13.0–0–0 De8 14.f4+- and White’s position is preferable because of his bishop pair and Black’s passive knight on e8.

After the exchange of the bishops: 8...Dxe3? 9.Dd6+ Dh8 10. fxe3, there arises a position in which White’s powerful knight on d6 more than compensates the
weakness of White's doubled e-pawns. Meanwhile, Black must be careful not to come under attack along the open f-file.

It is tremendously dangerous for Black to try to win a pawn with: 10...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)b6 11.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xb2 12.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)b1 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)a3 13.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)c4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)a5 (It is still better for him to opt for: 13...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e7 14.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xf7 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)f8 15.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d3±, but White is threatening a discovered check – \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d5 and that forces Black's queen to abandon the a3-square, so White's knight goes back to d6.) 14.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xf7 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e7 (Black loses after: 14...g6 15.0–0 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)g7 16.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)c5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)c5 17.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xf6 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xf6 18.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f1+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)g7 19.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f2 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)f8 20.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f6+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)h6 21.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f5+ and White checkmates, Pantaleoni – Vancin, Lugo 1985.) 15.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe8 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)c5, Roeberg – Loidl, Aschach 2000 and here White could have simply grabbed a piece with: 16.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xa5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe3+ (or 16...a6 17.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f5+–; 16...b6 17.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)a4; 16...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe4 17.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe3+ 18.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d1 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe4 19.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f1+-) 17.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d1+-- and Black is incapable of creating any threats.

It is more prudent and better for Black to continue with 10...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e8 11.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe8 (It is even simpler for White to play: 11.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)c4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd6 12.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd6+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e7 13.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d3±) 11...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe8 12.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)c4± – and Black can hardly evacuate his king away from the centre and his d5, d6 and f7-squares are very weak. Later in the game Groszpeter – Orso, Berlin 1996, there followed: 12...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)h4+ 13.g3 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)h6 14.0–0 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d8 15.d5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe3+ 16.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f2 and Black lost so many tempi with his queen, while the rest of his pieces were not developed that after: 16...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e5 17.b4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xb4 18.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e6 19.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d6+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)f8 20.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xf7+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)g8 21.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)af1, he resigned.

9.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xc5 dxc5 10.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd8+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd8 11.0–0–0+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e7

But not 11...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d7, because of 12.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d6±.

It is too dangerous for Black to play: 11...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d4 12.f4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)g4 13.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d2 exf4 14.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd4 cxd4 15.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d4± – and he will have to lose his f4-pawn, Hameister – Sanchez Carol, Email 2000.

12.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)c7 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)b8 13.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d5+ \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd5 14.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xd5±

White has a slight, but stable edge in that endgame because of the vulnerability of the d5-outpost. In the game Dochev – Lindgren, Umel 1997, Black defended rather unsuccessfully: 14...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)f8 15.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e6 16.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)c4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xc4? (Black should not have exchanged the last defender of the d5-square. He should have tried instead the move – 16...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e7± immediately.) 17.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xc4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e7 18.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d8 19.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xc5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e6 20.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d4 21.\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e1±
b2) 7...0–0

8.\(\text{c7}\)

White mains his opponent's queen to the e7-square with the idea to trade it and to transfer to a favourable endgame.

8...\(\text{c7}\) 9.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 10.\(\text{xd6}\)

The specific feature of Black's set-up is that he presents his opponent with the control over the d6-square. At first, he hopes that he will manage to develop his queenside pieces despite the presence of his pawn on d7 (with b7-b6 and \(\text{c8-b7}\)). Secondly, White's pieces on d6 can be exchanged (\(\text{f6-e8}\)) and later Black can obtain some counterplay with f7-f5.

Black's basic possibilities in this position are b2a) 10...\(\text{d8}\) and b2b) 10...\(\text{e8}\).

It is not so good for him to try: 10...a6 11.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{xe7}\) 12.\(\text{d6}\) – and the move a7-a6 only compromises here Black's queenside. 12...\(\text{e8}\) (Or at first 12...b5, van Blitterswijk – Janssen, Arnhem 1996, 13.0–0–0 \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 15.\(\text{xd6}\) – see 12...\(\text{e8}\)) 13.0–0–0 \(\text{xd6}\) 14.\(\text{xd6}\) f5 (Or 14...b5 15.\(\text{e2}\) – and as it often happens in similar Sicilian Defence endgames – the advance of Black's pawns only makes his queenside more vulnerable. White has superior chances in comparison to the variation with 10...\(\text{e8}\). 15.\(\text{a7}\) 16.f4 f6 17.\(\text{hd1}\) \(\text{c6}\) 18.\(\text{g4}\). White is threatening \(\text{xe6}\). 18...\(\text{a5}\) 19.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{c7}\) 20.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{f7}\) 21.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{c6}\) 22.\(\text{b8}\) \(\text{e8}\) 23.e5± with an overwhelming positional advantage for White, Valvo – Rasmussen, Winnipeg 2001.) 15.\(\text{d3}\) fxe4 16.\(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{a7}\) 17.f3 b5 – the placement of Black's pawns on a6 and b5 only compromises his queenside. In the game Jenni – Raetsky, Lenk 2003, there followed: 18.b4 \(\text{f5}\) 19.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 20.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{f8}\) 21.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 22.\(\text{hd1}\) \(\text{c7}\) 23.\(\text{c5}\) a5 24.a3± – and White's pieces occupied powerful outposts, exploiting the weakening of the dark squares. 24...g5 25.\(\text{b6}\) h5 26.\(\text{d4}\) axb4 27.axb4 \(\text{e5}\) 28.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{f5}\) 29.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{e5}\) 30.\(\text{b8}\) \(\text{f5}\) 31.\(\text{e4}\) d5 32.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{f4}\) 33.\(\text{xb5}\) h4 34.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{fc4}\) 35.\(\text{c1}\)±

The variation: 10...\(\text{xd6}\) 11.\(\text{xd6}\) \(\text{e8}\) 12.\(\text{xe8}\) \(\text{xe8}\), in comparison to 10...\(\text{e8}\), has the drawback that Black does not have the counterplay connected with the pawn-advance f7-f5. His position is therefore clearly worse: 13.0–0–0 (White can also continue with: 13.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{d8}\) 14.0–0–0± M.Rytshagov – van den Doel, Netherlands 1996.) 13.\(\text{a7}\) 14.\(\text{b5}\) b6 15.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{b8}\)
16.\( \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{f}}8 \texttt{, Aagaard – Bellon López, Malmo 2004} \text{ and here for example after} \texttt{17.f4± – White would have maintained a slight but stable advantage in that endgame.} \\

\textbf{b2a) 10...\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{8} \texttt{.}} \\

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram}
\end{center}

Black wishes to repel White’s queen from the d6-square with the move \( \texttt{\text{e}} \texttt{8} \texttt{, preserving the strongest pieces on the board.} \\

\textbf{11.\( \texttt{\text{c}} \texttt{7} \texttt{.}} \\

The idea of that move is to counter Black’s idea – \( \texttt{\text{f}} \texttt{6}-\texttt{e8} \texttt{and to exchange that knight in order to maintain the queen on the d6-outpost.} \\

\textbf{11...\( \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{8} \texttt{.}} \\

Or 11...\( \texttt{\text{e}} \texttt{8} \texttt{12.\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{xe8} \texttt{\text{xe8}} \texttt{13.} \texttt{0–0–0} \texttt{a6 14.\( \texttt{\text{f}} \texttt{4} \texttt{b5 15.\( \texttt{\text{h}} \texttt{4} \texttt{\text{.}} \texttt{It is not so clear after:} \texttt{15.e5 \texttt{\text{e}} \texttt{7} \texttt{16.\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{7} \texttt{17.\( \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{1} \texttt{\text{c}} \texttt{8} \texttt{– because Black manages to deploy his pieces quite well.})} \texttt{15...\( \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{4} \texttt{16.e4 \texttt{\text{a}} \texttt{5} \texttt{17.b3 \texttt{\text{h}} \texttt{5} \texttt{(or} \texttt{17.\( \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{7} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{\text{b}} \texttt{1±} \texttt{))} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{c} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{g}} \texttt{4} \texttt{19.h5 e5} \texttt{20.fxe5 \texttt{\text{g}} \texttt{5}±} \texttt{21.\( \texttt{b} \texttt{1} \texttt{\text{e}} \texttt{5} \texttt{22.\( \texttt{c} \texttt{4}±.)} \texttt{White maintains the advantage thanks to his dominance over the d6-outpost and Black’s undeveloped bishop on c8.}} \texttt{Later, in the game Torres – De Oliveira, corr. 2001, there followed:} \texttt{22...\( \texttt{\text{xd6} \texttt{23.\( \texttt{\text{xd6} \texttt{a} \texttt{5 24.h6} \texttt{\text{e}} \texttt{5} \texttt{25.\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{a}7} \texttt{26.\( \texttt{h} \texttt{xg7} \texttt{\text{c}} \texttt{7} \texttt{27.\( \texttt{d} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{xd3} \texttt{28.cxd3± – and Black was left with too many pawn-weaknesses.} \texttt{12.\( \texttt{e2} \texttt{b6}} \texttt{.}} \\

It deserves attention for Black to try 12...\( \texttt{b} \texttt{5} \texttt{13.e5 (It is not so good for White to capture the pawn:} \texttt{13.\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{7} \texttt{xb5} \texttt{\text{a}5} \texttt{14.\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{2} \texttt{d5 15.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{d} \texttt{5} \texttt{16.0–0} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{8} \texttt{17.\( \texttt{\text{d}} \texttt{4} \texttt{\text{xd} \texttt{d} \texttt{4} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{4} \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{4} \texttt{19.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{xb} \texttt{2} \texttt{\text{h} \texttt{2} \texttt{Berthelot – Raetsky, Sautron 2005, or} \texttt{13.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{7} \texttt{14.e5} \texttt{\text{xe} \texttt{5}±) \texttt{13...\( \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{8} \texttt{(or} \texttt{13...\( \texttt{b} \texttt{4} \texttt{14.exf6} \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{3} \texttt{15.fg7} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{g} \texttt{7} \texttt{16.\( \texttt{\text{g} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{h} \texttt{8} \texttt{17.\( \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{x} \texttt{3} \texttt{± and White remains with an extra pawn)14.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{e} \texttt{8} \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{8} \texttt{15.f4 (It is again fruitless for White to capture on} \texttt{b} \texttt{5:} \texttt{15.\( \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{b} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{a}5} \texttt{16.\( \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{x} \texttt{c} \texttt{6} \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{2} \texttt{17.0–0} \texttt{d} \texttt{c} \texttt{6} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{6} \texttt{\text{f} \texttt{8}±.}} \texttt{Black has an excellent counter-play after:} \texttt{15.0–0} \texttt{b4 16.e4 \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{7} \texttt{17.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{1} \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{7} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{5} \texttt{19.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{8} \texttt{, or} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{\text{f} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{5}.)} \texttt{15...\( \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{6} \texttt{16.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{2} \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{4} and White maintains a slight advantage.} \texttt{13.e5 \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{8} \texttt{.}} \\

Black has an interesting possibility to disrupt White’s plans by playing 13...\( \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{7} \texttt{, in order to force the knight to retreat from the c7-square and to continue then with} \texttt{\text{e} \texttt{8}.}} \texttt{After the principled line:} \texttt{14.exf6} \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{7} \texttt{(or} \texttt{14...\( \texttt{\text{c} \texttt{7} \texttt{15.fg7} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{g} \texttt{7} \texttt{16.\( \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{7} \texttt{17.\( \texttt{\text{g} \texttt{3} \texttt{\text{h} \texttt{8} \texttt{18.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{6}±.}} \texttt{15.\( \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{5} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{6} \texttt{16.\( \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{6} \texttt{\text{b} \texttt{8} \texttt{17.fg7} \texttt{\text{d} \texttt{g} \texttt{7} \texttt{18.0–0} \texttt{0–0±.}} \texttt{White maintains some advantage in the endgame thanks to his pow-} \texttt{109}
erful knight.

14. \( \text{dxe8} \) \( \text{exe8} \) 15.\( \text{f4} \)

Black wanted to develop his queen to g5.

15...\( \text{b7} \)

It is not good for Black to continue with 15...\( \text{f6} \) 16.\( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{b7} \) 17.\( 0-0-0 \) f6 18.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 20.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 21.\( \text{fxe5} \) \( \text{bd7} \) 22.\( \text{he1} \) (V. Golod) and White remains with a solid extra pawn.

This position was reached in the game Galkin – Kabanov, Kazan 2005 and White played here: 16.\( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 17.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 18.\( 0-0-0 \) \( \text{b5} \) 19.\( \text{e5} \) 20.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{b4} \) 21.\( \text{a3} \) (or 21.\( \text{c5} \) \( \text{c7} \) 22.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 23.\( \text{xb6} \) axb6 24.\( \text{d4} \) 21...\( \text{d5} \) – but despite Black's weakness on d6, the position was rather unclear, because of his powerful knight on d5.

It is evidently stronger for White to play:

16.\( 0-0-0 \)

attacking on d7 and developing pieces.

After 16...\( \text{f6} \) 17.\( \text{xd5} \) fxe5 18.\( \text{xf3} \) White still maintains some edge thanks to the vulnerability of the e6-pawn and the presence of some tactical threats, for example: 18...\( \text{xd5} \) 19.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{a8} \) 20.\( \text{c7} \) \( \text{ec8} \) 21.\( \text{xc8} \) 22.\( \text{exe5} \) \( \text{exe5} \) 23.\( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{xa8} \) 24.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{g6} \) 25.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{f4} \) 26.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{gxg}2 \) 27.\( \text{d5} \). If Black defends his pawn with 16...\( \text{e7} \), then it is quite unclear how he plans to repel his opponent's queen from the d6-outpost and so White has a clear advantage.

Black has nothing else to try but:

16...\( \text{e7} \) 17.\( \text{xd5} \)

Now, White must capture that pawn.

17...\( \text{gxg2} \)

After 17...\( \text{f5} \) 18.\( \text{h5} \) \( \text{g6} \) 19.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 20.\( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{bxd8} \) 21.\( \text{gxf3} \), Black must still try to recapture his pawn: 21...\( \text{e3} \) 22.\( \text{de1} \) \( \text{g2} \) 23.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{h4} \) 24.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 25.\( \text{d6} \) with a positional advantage for White.

18.\( \text{xa7} \) (or 18.\( \text{hgl} \) \( \text{d5} \) ) \( \text{and the complications end up in} \)

favour of White: 18...\( \text{d5} \) (18...\( \text{d5} \) 19.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{a8} \) 20.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{c7} \) 21.\( \text{hgl} \) \( \text{xa2} \) 22.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{ec8} \) 23.\( \text{f3} \) 18...\( \text{c8} \) 19.\( \text{hgl1} \) ) 19.\( \text{hgl} \) \( \text{a8} \) 20.\( \text{b7} \) \( \text{xc3} \) (or 20...\( \text{e7} \)
21.\textbf{wc6} \textbf{ec7} 22.\textbf{wb5±}) 21.\textbf{wg2} \textbf{exe2}+ 22.\textbf{we2} and in order
to avoid losing a pawn for nothing, Black must enter the varia-
tion: 22...\textbf{xa2} 23.\textbf{xe7+} \textbf{xe7} 24.\textbf{xd8} \textbf{xd8} 25.\textbf{c3} – but
his king remains vulnerable and White preserves the advantage in
that position with approximate
material equality.

\textbf{b2b}) 10...\textbf{e8}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chess-board.png}
\caption{Diagram showing the position after 10...\textbf{e8}}
\end{figure}

11.\textbf{xe7} \textbf{xe7} 12.0-0-0 \textbf{f5}
That move is quite logical, because \textbf{f7-f5} is Black's only real
counterplay in that position.

About 12...\textbf{a6} 13.\textbf{d6} \textbf{xd6}
14.\textbf{xd6} – see 10...\textbf{a6} 11.\textbf{xe7}
\textbf{xe7} 12.\textbf{d6} \textbf{e8} 13.0-0-0
\textbf{xd6} 14.\textbf{xd6}.

13.\textbf{d6}

Things are not so clear after:
13.\textbf{e5} \textbf{g6} 14.\textbf{e1} \textbf{a6} 15.\textbf{d4} \textbf{b5}
16.\textbf{h4} \textbf{b7} 17.\textbf{h5} \textbf{e7} 18.\textbf{a3} \textbf{c8}
19.\textbf{h3} \textbf{c7} 20.\textbf{f4} \textbf{cd5}± Barua –

13...\textbf{xd6} 14.\textbf{xd6} \textbf{fxe4} 15.
\textbf{exe4} \textbf{f5} 16.\textbf{d2} \textbf{d5}

16...\textbf{b6}, Minchev – Thurlow,
Internet 2005, this is a clever
move – Black does not wish to
restrict the scope of action of his
bishop with the move \textbf{d7-d5} just
yet. 17.\textbf{g5} (White plays this in
anticipation of the attack – \textbf{b7})
17...\textbf{h6} (about 17...\textbf{d5} 18.\textbf{f3} – see
16...\textbf{d5}) 18.\textbf{f3} and if Black wants
to avoid playing \textbf{d5}, he will need
to complete his development with
the line: 18...\textbf{d6} 19.\textbf{c4} \textbf{f6} (or 19...
\textbf{g5} 20.\textbf{h3}±) 20.\textbf{e1}± – and Black's
central pawns are rather weak.

17.\textbf{g5}±

There arose a position of the
"French Defence" type. Black has
a backward \textbf{e6}-pawn in the centre
and a "bad" light-squared bishop.

17...\textbf{b6}

Or 17...\textbf{d7} 18.\textbf{d3} \textbf{e5} 19.\textbf{e4}
\textbf{dxe4} 20.\textbf{xd7} \textbf{e3} 21.\textbf{xe3} \textbf{xe3} 22.
\textbf{xe1} \textbf{xe2} 23.\textbf{xe5} \textbf{ad8} 24.\textbf{xd8}
\textbf{xd8} 25.\textbf{e7} \textbf{f6} 26.\textbf{b4}± Hall.

17...\textbf{h6} (This move only helps
White to do what he would have
done anyway.) 18.\textbf{f3} \textbf{d6}
19.\textbf{d3} \textbf{d7} 20.\textbf{e1} \textbf{f6} (Black
should not deploy his pawns on
the light squares: 20...\textbf{b5} 21.\textbf{de2}
\textbf{f4} 22.\textbf{e5} \textbf{c8} – it is better for
him to try 22...\textbf{e8} 23.\textbf{g3±} Black
is worse, but he is not losing
material yet – 23.\textbf{f3} \textbf{a6} 24.\textbf{c6}
Chapter 6

$\text{Bf6}$ (or $24... \text{Bd7} 25.\text{Be7+} \text{Kf7} 26.\text{Bxd5+-}) 25.\text{Bd8+-}$ and Black loses his e6-pawn, Conquest – Duquesnoy, Montpellier 2006)

21.\text{Be5} \text{Bb5} and here instead of

22.\text{Bxb5} \text{Bxb5} 23.\text{Bd7} \text{Bg6} 24.g3 \text{b6} 25.\text{Bb1+} Schnabel – Schaefer, Gausdal 2005, White could have simply captured the pawn:

22.\text{Bxg4} \text{Bxf4} 23.\text{Bxe6} \text{Bxd3} 24.cxd3 \text{Bc8}+ 25.\text{Bd1} \text{Bxg4} 26.f3+.

17...\text{Bd7} – This move is passive, but it is quite solid. 18.\text{Bd3} (White does not need to retreat with his knight yet: 18.\text{Bf3} \text{Bd6} 19.\text{Bd3} \text{Bae8} 20.\text{Bxe1} \text{Bf7} 21.\text{Bde2}, Berg – Raetsky, Internet 2004, 21...e5 22.\text{Bxe5} \text{Bxe5} 23.\text{Bxe5} \text{Bxe5} 24.\text{Bxe5} \text{Bxf2} and White still has some symbolic edge.) 18...g6 19.\text{Bf3} \text{Bd6}, Tissir – Bellon Lopez, Malaga 2003, 20.\text{Bxe1} \text{Bae8} 21.\text{Bde2} \text{Bf7} 22.c3±

GM Bellon Lopez has played several times the simplifying line:

17...\text{Bh4} 18.g3 \text{Bf3} 19.\text{Bxf3} \text{Bxf3} 20.\text{Bxg2} (After 20.\text{c4} \text{Bf7} 21.b3 b6 22.cxd5 \text{Bb7} 23.\text{Bg2} \text{Bd8} 24.\text{Bhd1} \text{Bxd5} 25.\text{Bb2} \text{Bfd7} 26.\text{Bxd5} \text{Bxd5} 27.\text{Bxd5} exd5 28.\text{Bc1} \text{Be8} 29.\text{Bc3} \text{Bc8}+ 30.\text{Bd2} \text{Bxc1} 31.\text{Bxc1}, the king and pawn endgame turned out to be a draw: 31...\text{Bf7} 32.\text{Bd2} \text{Bie6} 33.\text{Bf3} \text{Bf5} 34.f3 \text{g5} 35.\text{Bd4} \text{Bie6} 36.b4 \text{h5} 37.\text{b5} \text{h4} 38.a4 \text{h3} 39.f4 \text{gx4} 40.gxf4 \text{Bf5} 41.\text{Bxd5} \text{Bxf4} 42.\text{Bc6} \text{Bf3} 43.\text{Bb7} \text{Bg2} 44.\text{Bxa7} \text{Bxh2} 45.a5 \text{bxa5} 46.b6 \text{Bg2} 47.b7 \text{h2} 48.\text{b8w} \text{h1w} 49.\text{Bb7}+ \text{Bh2} 50.\text{Bc7+} and a draw Ganguly – Bellon Lopez, Gibraltar 2006.) 20...\text{Bf7} (That is an improvement in comparison to the variation: 20...\text{Bf6} 21.c4 b6 22.cxd5 \text{Bb7} 23.f4 \text{Bc8}+ 24.\text{Bb1} \text{h5} 25.\text{Be1} \text{exd5} 26.\text{Bc6} 27.\text{Bxd5+} \text{Bf8} 28.\text{Be5} \text{Bd8} 29.\text{Bc1}+ and White ends up with a material advantage, E.Berg – Bellon Lopez, Gothenburg 2004; while after 21...\text{dxc4} 22.\text{Bxd1} \text{Bb8} 23.f4, Black will have problems getting rid of the pin along the eighth rank.) 21.f4 (or 21.c4 \text{Bc7} 22.b3 \text{Bd7} 21...\text{g6} 22.h4 \text{h5} 23.\text{Be1} \text{Bd7} 24.\text{Bh3} \text{Bf6} 25.\text{Bde2} \text{Bf7} – White has a stable advantage thanks to his better bishop, but Black has good chances to save the game after an accurate defence, Coleman – Bellon Lopez, England 2006.

18.\text{Bf3}

Black’s centre should be blocked. It does not seem convincing for White to play 18.\text{Bd3} in view of 18...e5 19.\text{Be1} \text{e4} 20.\text{b5} \text{Be7} 21.\text{Be3} \text{h6} 22.\text{Bh3} \text{Be6} 23.\text{Ba4} \text{f5} 24.\text{Bc3} \text{Bh4} – in the game Czebe – Chernov, Interlaken 2003 Black organized a powerful counterplay by an active play in the centre, forcing White
to place his knight on a bad po-

sition. 25.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{b3}}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{ad8}}} 26.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{ec6}}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{g4}}}
27.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{xd5}}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h7}}} 28.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{f4}}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xd5}}} 29.
\texttt{\textit{\texttt{xd5}}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxg2}}} 30.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{c3}}} e3 31.\texttt{\texttt{fxe3}}
\texttt{\texttt{xf1+}} 32.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{d2}}} \texttt{\texttt{fx2+}} 33.\texttt{\texttt{d3}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e1+}}}
34.\texttt{\texttt{c4}} \texttt{\texttt{exh2}}

18...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{d6}}} 19.\texttt{\texttt{d3}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d7}}}

It is hardly advisable for Black
to redeploy his knight: 19...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{b7}}}
20.\texttt{\texttt{c3}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c5}}} 21.\texttt{\texttt{c2}} a5 22.\texttt{\texttt{e1}} a4
23.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{e5}}}+. White has a stable po-
sitional advantage, while Black's
premature attempt to create
some counterplay with the move
23...a3 – led only to the forma-
tion of additional weaknesses in
his camp: 24.\texttt{\texttt{b3}} \texttt{\texttt{a7}} 25.\texttt{\texttt{b4}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a6}}}
26.\texttt{\texttt{f3}} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c7}}} 27.\texttt{\texttt{e3}} \texttt{\texttt{a7}} 28.\texttt{\texttt{d4}}
\texttt{\textit{\texttt{b8}}} 29.\texttt{\texttt{d2}} \texttt{\texttt{a6}} 30.\texttt{\texttt{c4}} \texttt{\texttt{dxc4}}
31.\texttt{\texttt{xa3}} \texttt{\texttt{b5}} 32.\texttt{\texttt{c3}} \texttt{\texttt{a7}} 33.\texttt{\texttt{a3}} \texttt{\texttt{e8}}
34.\texttt{\texttt{xc4}} \texttt{\texttt{ac7}} 35.\texttt{\texttt{b3}} \texttt{\texttt{f8}} 36.\texttt{\texttt{c2}}
\texttt{\textit{\texttt{d7}}} 37.\texttt{\texttt{d6}} and White won in
the game M.Carlsen – Vidoniak,
Gausdal 2005.

20.\texttt{\texttt{e1}} \texttt{\texttt{f7}} 21.\texttt{\texttt{c4}}

It is also possible for White to
try 21.\texttt{\textit{\texttt{e5}}} \texttt{\texttt{xe5}} 22.\texttt{\texttt{exe5}}
21...\texttt{\texttt{ac8}} 22.\texttt{\texttt{b1}} \texttt{\texttt{fe8}}

It is preferable for White not
to force the issue yet: 23.\texttt{\texttt{c2}}!±
(Or 23.\texttt{\texttt{cxd5}} exd5 24.\texttt{\texttt{exe8+}} \texttt{\texttt{xe8}}
25.\texttt{\texttt{c2}} \texttt{\texttt{g4}} 26.\texttt{\texttt{b3}} \texttt{\texttt{xf3}} 27.\texttt{\texttt{xf3}}
\texttt{\texttt{e1+}} 28.\texttt{\texttt{c2}} \texttt{\texttt{f8}} 29.\texttt{\texttt{xd5}} \texttt{\texttt{e7}}
– White will hardly manage to
realize his edge with his com-
promised pawn-structure on the
kingside, Berg – Hall, Germany
2002.) 23...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{c6}}} 24.\texttt{\texttt{d4}} \texttt{\texttt{b7}}
25.\texttt{\texttt{cxd5}} \texttt{\texttt{xd5}} 26.\texttt{\texttt{f3}}± and Black
is still slightly worse.
Chapter 7 1.e4 c5 2.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{c6}} \) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) e6 5.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 6.\( \text{\textit{db5}} \) \( \text{\textit{b4}} \)

This is the strongest move for Black in this position, similar to 6...d6. He develops a piece and he attacks White’s e4-pawn.

7.\( \text{\textit{a3}} \)

White forces his opponent to exchange on c3 and thus he obtains the two-bishop advantage.

He achieves nothing with the check on d6 – after 7.\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) Black plays simply 7...\( \text{\textit{e7}} \), attacking the knight on d6. The forced variations arising after: 7.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{c7}} \) +\( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) (or 9.\( \text{\textit{xa8}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc3}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \) \( \text{\textit{d4}} \), Reggio – Tarrasch, Monte Carlo 1902) 9...d5 10.0–0–0 \( \text{\textit{xc3}} \) 11.bxc3 e5 are rather unclear.

7...\( \text{\textit{xc3}} \)+

This exchange is forced, since it is too dangerous for Black to play 7...\( \text{\textit{a5}} \)? and to lose the control over the d6-square completely. 8.b4 \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) (Or 8...\( \text{\textit{c7}} \), Axelson – Lindgren, Sweden 1992, 9.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \)?\( \pm \). White is threatening 10.e5 and Black cannot play: 9...d6 10.\( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) +\( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{b5}} \)+\( \pm \) with a terrible position for him.) 9.\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) +\( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{c4}} \)!\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) (After 10...d5 11.\( \text{\textit{xb6}} \) axb6 12.b5 \( \text{\textit{a5}} \) 13.a4\pm Black’s position is very bad, his king is in the centre and his dark squares are vulnerable.) 11.\( \text{\textit{b5}} \)! d5 (Naturally, Black loses after: 11...\( \text{\textit{xa1}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) +\( \text{\textit{e8}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{c7}} \) +\( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{xc7}} \)+\( \pm \) ) 12.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc4}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{xc6}} \) +\( \text{\textit{bxc6}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{g5}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{c5}} \)+\( \text{\textit{e8}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) \( \text{\textit{gxf6}} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{xc4}} \)+ and White ends up with a solid extra pawn, English – L.Paulsen, Leipzig 1879.

8.\( \text{\textit{xc3}} \) d5

Black has exchanged his dark-squared bishop and now he must compensate its absence fighting for the centre with the move – 8...d5.

He has tried some other moves though:

8...a6 9.\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) and White obtains with a useful extra tempo (the move a2-a3) a position from
the variation 6...a6 7.\textit{d}d6+\textit{xd}6 8.\textit{xd}6 (see Chapter 6);

8...d6. We have on the board a typical pawn-structure for the Sicilian Defence, but Black's dark-squared bishop is absent and his problems are like a snow avalanche. 9.\textit{g}5 0–0, Faulks - Trott, Bermuda 2002 (In case of 9...h6, White's initiative develops effortlessly: 10.\textit{xf}6 gxf6, Powell – R.Marshall, Email 1997, 11.\textit{d}2 a6 12.0–0–0 13.\textit{fe}4±) 10.\textit{e}2± – Black is completely paralyzed, because of his weak d6-pawn and the annoying pin;

8...\textit{a}5 9.\textit{d}3 d5 (or 9...0–0 10.0–0 a6. Black's last several moves do not combine well together. 11.\textit{xf}6 h6 12.\textit{d}6 \textit{e}d8 13.\textit{e}5 \textit{fe}8 (13...\textit{ex}e5 14.\textit{b}4+-) 14.\textit{b}4 \textit{wb}6 15.\textit{a}4 \textit{wd}4 16.\textit{e}7 and White won the exchange in the game Yudasina – Madivani, Ramat Aviv 1998.) 10.\textit{ex}d5 \textit{xd}5 11.\textit{d}d2 \textit{xc}3 12.\textit{xc}3 \textit{wg}5 13.0–0 0–0 14.\textit{e}e1 \textit{ed}8 15.\textit{f}3 \textit{we}7, Bjoeloglav – Stavila, Budva 2003. Black lost so many tempi for queen moves and after 16.\textit{we}4+- he was forced to compromise decisively his kingside;

8...\textit{wb}6. Black prevents the development of his opponent's bishop on c1, but White can develop his kingside instead. 9.\textit{d}3 and here Black should better castle, because after: 9...\textit{fe}5 10.\textit{e}2 0–0, Rosenberger – von Reth, Neuwied 1993, 11.\textit{f}4 \textit{g}6 12.\textit{wd}3 \textit{de}3, e5, h2-h4-h5, he could have come under a dangerous attack, while the move 12...e5 is bad in view of: 13.f5 \textit{xf}4 14.\textit{xf}4 \textit{ex}f4 15.e5 \textit{fe}8 16.0–0–0+-;

8...h6. The only idea behind that move is to prevent \textit{g}5 after \textit{xf}4 and e5. Still, after 9.f4 d6 10.\textit{e}3 a6 11.\textit{f}3 \textit{wc}7 12.0–0–0± it turns out that Black has seriously compromised his kingside – it is too risky for him to castle there, while it would be just terrible for him to play 12...b5, because of: 13.\textit{xb}5 \textit{ax}b5 14.\textit{xb}5 \textit{wb}8 15.\textit{xd}6→ – and White has a strong attack in a position with approximate material equality, van den Berg – van Soom, Sinaia 1965;

8...0–0 9.\textit{wd}6 – White prevents d7-d5. Here, Black has tried in practice:

9...a6 – Similar neutral passive moves are hardly advisable in situations like that, because the power of White's pieces increases with every move. 10.\textit{e}3 (White would have countered 9...h6 with the same move.) 10...\textit{fe}8, Maeder – Muhana, corr. 1978, 11.\textit{g}3±;

9...\textit{wb}6, Sgaravatti – Sommerbauer, Latschach 2005 and here the best for White would be to play like before (see 8...\textit{wb}6) – 10.\textit{d}3±;

9...\textit{e}7 10.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xe}7 11.\textit{g}5 h6 12.\textit{h}4 \textit{g}6 13.\textit{g}3 b6 14.\textit{d}6 \textit{ed}8 15.0–0–0 \textit{b}7 16.f3 \textit{ac}8 17.\textit{b}5± – White's dark-squared bishop and the weak d6-square provide him with a serious advan-
tage in the endgame, O’Donnell – South, Canada 1992;

9...\texttt{a5} 10.\texttt{d3} a6 (After 10...\texttt{e8} 11.\texttt{d2} \texttt{e5} 12.\texttt{b5} \texttt{xd6} 13.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{d8} 14.\texttt{g5} h6 15.\texttt{xf6} gxf6 16.0–0–0\pm – Black’s kingside pawns are weak, as well as his d6-square and it is far from clear how he can complete his development, Paethz – Giannopoulos, Kallithea Chalkidiki 2003.)
11.0–0 \texttt{e5} 12.\texttt{f4} \texttt{xd6} 13.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{e8}, Kelemen – P. Szabo, Hungary 2000, 14.f4\pm – Black’s position is very difficult strategically;

9...\texttt{e8} 10.\texttt{g3} d5 11.\texttt{d3} d4 12.\texttt{c2} e5 13.f4 f6 14.0–0 \texttt{e6} 15.f5 \texttt{f7} 16.\texttt{h4} \texttt{d6} 17.\texttt{f3} \texttt{h8} 18.g4\# \texttt{g5} – and White has good attacking prospects on the kingside, Purdy – Charmatz, Sydney 1944.

9.\texttt{exd5}

Now, we will analyze both captures – a) 9...\texttt{exd5} and the main line b) 9...exd5.

a) 9...\texttt{exd5}

Black avoids the appearance of an isolated pawn on d5 with that move, but now the centre is opened and that is in favour of White, because of his two bishops.

10.\texttt{d2}?

White prepares the evacuation of his king to the queenside and the occupation of the d-file with this useful move. Black has countered that most often with:
a1) 10...0–0 and a2) 10...\texttt{h4}.

His other moves seem to be less logical:

10...a6 – This looks like a loss of time, Krabbe – Fritsch, DDR 1975, 11.\texttt{h5} \texttt{f6} 12.\texttt{g5} 0–0 13.\texttt{d3}+;

10...\texttt{d7} – That is not the most active position for that bishop, Wiesinger – Perndl, corr. 1994, 11.\texttt{h5} \texttt{f6} 12.\texttt{h4} \texttt{e7} 13.0–0–0\pm;

10...\texttt{b6} – Black prepares the fianchettoing of his bishop, but that seems to be too slow, Zakirova – Ertel, Kazan 2001, 11.\texttt{h5} \texttt{f6} 12.\texttt{h4} \texttt{d4} (12...0–0 13.0–0–0 \texttt{e7} 14.\texttt{d3}+\pm) 13.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 14.0–0–0 0–0 15.\texttt{f4}\pm;

10...\texttt{ce7} – Black’s knight retreats from the centre, but that is hardly in his favour. 11.\texttt{h5} \texttt{d7},
4.\(\text{\#}xd4\) e6 5.\(\text{\#}c3\) \(\text{\#}f6\) 6.\(\text{\#}db5\)\(\text{\#}b4\) 7.a3 \(\text{\#}xc3\) 8.\(\text{\#}xc3\)

Zuckerman – Steinmeyer, Manhattan 1963, 12.\(\text{\#}d3\)±;

10...\text{\#}b6 – That move enables White to obtain a lead in development and to occupy the central squares. 11.\(\text{\#}d4\) 0–0 (It is not better for Black to try: 11...\(\text{\#}d4\) 12.\(\text{\#}xd4\) \(\text{\#}xd4\) 13.\(\text{\#}b5\)± \(\text{\#}d7\)
14.\(\text{\#}xd7\)± \(\text{\#}xd7\) 15.0–0± and his king remains stranded in the centre and that would be very troublesome for him, J.Kaplan – Siaperras, Siegen 1970.) 12.c4 \(\text{\#}de7\)
13.\(\text{\#}e3\) \(\text{\#}d8\) 14.\(\text{\#}e2\) e5 15.0–0 \(\text{\#}f5\) 16.\(\text{\#}c5\) \(\text{\#}e8\) 17.\(\text{\#}f3\)± Adler – Rogozhnikov, USSR 1967;

10...\text{\#}f6 – This move leads to an unpleasant endgame for Black. 11.\(\text{\#}h5\) \(\text{\#}g6\) (About 11...0–0 12.\(\text{\#}d3\) – see 10...0–0 11.\(\text{\#}h5\) \(\text{\#}f6\)
12.\(\text{\#}d3\); it is even worse for Black to weaken his dark squares with: 11...g6 12.\(\text{\#}g5\) \(\text{\#}xg5\) 13.\(\text{\#}xg5\) \(\text{\#}xc3\)
14.\(\text{\#}f6\) 0–0 15.\(\text{\#}xc3\) \(\text{\#}d8\) 16.\(\text{\#}f6\) \(\text{\#}d5\) 17.c4± and Black has failed to compromise his opponent’s pawn-structure and White’s dark-squared bishop is tremendously strong now, Walther – Schiffer, corr. 1977.) 12.\(\text{\#}xg6\) \(\text{\#}xg6\) 13.
0–0–0 0–0 14.g3 \(\text{\#}d8\) 15.\(\text{\#}g2\)
\(\text{\#}xc3\) 16.\(\text{\#}xc3\)± White has occupied the only open file and his bishops are very active on the long diagonals, Seres – Dibusz, Hungary 2002;

10...e5 – That move enables Black to develop his bishop to a more active position, but now he weakens important squares on the d-file. 11.\(\text{\#}h5\) \(\text{\#}e6\) (about 11...0–0 12.0–0–0 – see 10...0–0
11.\(\text{\#}h5\) e5 12.0–0–0) 12.0–0–0 \(\text{\#}c7\) 13.\(\text{\#}xd5\) \(\text{\#}xd5\), Sanz – Mendoza, Aragon 1991 and here after 14.\(\text{\#}h6\) 0–0–0 (It is too bad for Black to play: 14...\(\text{\#}d4\) 15.\(\text{\#}xd4!\)
exd4 16.\(\text{\#}xg7\)± and White’s bishops are tremendously active.) 15.\(\text{\#}xg7\) \(\text{\#}he8\) 16.\(\text{\#}d3\)± and White remains with a solid extra pawn;

10...\(\text{\#}xc3\) – That move only enhances White’s development. 11.\(\text{\#}xc3\) \(\text{\#}xd1\)± (About 11...0–0
12.\(\text{\#}h5\) – see 10...0–0) 12.\(\text{\#}xd1\)
f6 (The other moves are not any better for Black: 12...0–0 13.f4 \(\text{\#}d8\) 14.\(\text{\#}xd8\) 15.\(\text{\#}e2\) \(\text{\#}d7\)
16.\(\text{\#}f2\) \(\text{\#}c6\) 17.\(\text{\#}d1\) \(\text{\#}e8\) 18.\(\text{\#}f3\) \(\text{\#}c8\)
19.g4± White’s two-bishop advantage enables him to start an offensive on both sides of the board, Salimaki – Latvio, Espoo 2002; or 12...e5 13.\(\text{\#}d3\) \(\text{\#}e6\) 14.0–0 0–0 15.\(\text{\#}e1\)± and Black will lose his e5-pawn, Arul – Soumya, Salem 2000.) 13.f4 \(\text{\#}d7\) (Black has no active play at all after: 13...\(\text{\#}e7\)
14.\(\text{\#}d3\) \(\text{\#}d7\) 15.0–0 \(\text{\#}ad8\) 16.\(\text{\#}e1\)± Fucak – Meulders, Groningen 1968; 13...e5 – Black creates deliberately a weak pawn for him in the centre with that move. 14.fxe5
fxe5 15.\(\text{\#}b5\) \(\text{\#}g4\), Bringer 1.5 – Insomniac 0.55, Boissel 1999 and here the most unpleasant line for Black seems to be: 16.\(\text{\#}d2\) 0–0
17.\(\text{\#}c4\)± \(\text{\#}h8\) 18.h3 \(\text{\#}h5\) 19.\(\text{\#}f1\)±)
14.\(\text{\#}c4\) 0–0–0 15.0–0 \(\text{\#}he8\) (It is hardly any better for Black to defend with: 15...\(\text{\#}c7\) 16.\(\text{\#}d1\)! ?\(\text{\#}he8\)
17.\(\text{\#}f3\) \(\text{\#}c8\)± – or 17...e5 18.fxe5

a1) 10... 0–0

This natural move enables White to develop his queen to the most active position.

11. Axe5 Axe6

The alternatives are not better for Black:


11... Axe3 – This move only improves White's development. 12. Axe3 e5 (It is not preferable for Black to try: 12... Axe5 13. Axe4 e5 14. d3 h6, Haapala – Vornanen, Kirjeshakki 1974, because after: 15. 0–0–0 Axe8 16. Axe4 Axe4 17. Axe4± White has the two-bishop advantage and he is dominant on the only open file.) 13. Axe3 g6 (After 13... h6 14. 0–0–0 Axe5+ 15. Axe5 Axe5 16. Axe4± Black will need to defend for long a very unpleasant endgame, Maeder – Naranja, Bad Pyrmont 1970.) 14. Axe6 Axe6 15. 0–0–0 Axe7 16. Axe3± and White has excellent attacking chances thanks to the weak dark squares on Black's kingside, Tal – V. Liberzon, Kislovodsk 1964;

In answer to 11... Axe6, Erler – Calmbach, corr. 1986, it looks very promising for White to sacrifice a pawn with: 12. Axe5 exd5 13. 0–0–0 Axe5 2 (Black must defend a very unpleasant position with material equality if he does not accept the pawn-sacrifice.) 14. Axe3 f5 15. Axe1 Axe5 16. Axe1± White’s pieces are very active and his king is safe, so he has excellent
attacking chances, for example: 16...d4 (It seems that Black’s defensive task is even more difficult after: 16...g6 17.\textit{Wh}h6 \textit{\&}d7 18.h4+)\n17.\textit{W}f4 \textit{\&}f7 18.\textit{E}e1 \textit{\&}d7 19.b4!? \textit{\&}d5 (That is Black’s only move. After: 19...\textit{\&}d6 20.\textit{\&}c4+- White wins the exchange, preserving very dangerous threats.) 20.\textit{\&}h4 g6 (It is hardly better for Black to try: 20...g5!? 21.\textit{\&}xg5+ \textit{\&}g7 22.\textit{\&}c4 \textit{\&}xg2 – Black loses immediately after: 22...\textit{\&}xc3? 23.\textit{\&}c4+- 23.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}e8 24.\textit{\&}xe8+ \textit{\&}xe8 25.b5 \textit{\&}e7 26.\textit{\&}b8 \textit{\&}f8 27.\textit{\&}c1+ and despite the fact that White has had to advance the pawns in front of his king, his prospects are clearly superior, because he would regain unavoidably his pawn, while his opponent’s king has no reliable shelter. If Black manages to avoid coming under attack, by trading the queens, the endgame would be clearly in favour of White, because of his powerful bishop pair.) 21.\textit{\&}f3! \textit{\&}e6 (After 21...\textit{\&}xf3 22.gxf3\textit{\&}, White either wins the exchange, or he captures the d4-pawn, which cramps his bishops.) 22.\textit{\&}xd5 \textit{\&}xd5 23.b5 \textit{\&}e7 24.\textit{\&}xd4\textit{\&} and the centre has been opened, which makes White’s bishops even stronger;

11...e5 – This move weakens the d5-square, but it enables Black to develop his bishop to a good position. 12.0–0–0 \textit{\&}e6, Hansson – Helmertz, Bolinnas 1973 (After 12...\textit{\&}xc3 13.\textit{\&}xc3 \textit{\&}c7 14.\textit{\&}d3\textit{\&} White exerts powerful pressure in the centre and he maintains good attacking chances. 14...e4? 15.\textit{\&}g5 f6 16.\textit{\&}d5+ \textit{\&}h8 17.\textit{\&}xe4+- Da- betic – Rodic, Kladovo 1992; 12...\textit{\&}f6 13.\textit{\&}h4 \textit{\&}d4 14.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}g4, Safar Zadeh – Oskooei, Iran 1993 and now after: 15.f3 \textit{\&}xg3 16.\textit{\&}xg3 \textit{\&}f5 17.g4 \textit{\&}g6 18.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}fd8 19.\textit{\&}c4\textit{\&} White has a stable advantage in that endgame. 12...\textit{\&}c7 – This move looks too slow, Preibsch – Wolf, corr. 1969 and after 13.f4! White is ready to push that pawn even further, without letting Black’s knight to the e6-square. White is preparing a kingside attack and the following variations illustrate the fact that Black’s defence is rather difficult: 13...exf4 14.\textit{\&}xf4 \textit{\&}d7 15.\textit{\&}d3\textit{\&}; 13...g6 14.\textit{\&}h6\textit{\&}; 13...\textit{\&}d4 14.f5 \textit{\&}e8 15.\textit{\&}g5\textit{\&}; 13...\textit{\&}e8 14.f5 f6 15.\textit{\&}xe8 \textit{\&}xe8 16.g4±) and here after: 13.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}a5 14.\textit{\&}xd5 \textit{\&}xd5 15.f3 \textit{\&}fd8 16.\textit{\&}d3\textit{\&} White has a slight, but stable edge thanks to his two-bishop advantage.

12.\textit{\&}h4

![Diagram](image)

12...\textit{\&}d4

Entering an endgame would not solve the defensive problems
for Black, but the alternatives are not better for him at all:

12...\textit{\=Dd}4 – That knight-maneuver looks strange. 13.0–0–0 \textit{\=Df}5 14.\textit{\=Dh}3 \textit{\=Db}6 15.\textit{\=Dd}3± and White is perfectly prepared for a kingside attack, Wegener – Kind, Germany 2003;

12...\textit{\=Db}6!? – That is an attempt by Black to create some threats against White’s king faster that his opponent. 13.0–0–0 \textit{\=Dd}8, Kaspersen – Buktas, corr. 1991, 14.\textit{\=Dd}3 \textit{\=Dx}d3!? (The other possibilities for Black enable White to begin his offensive outright: 14...e5 15.\textit{\=Dg}5 \textit{\=Dd}4 16.f4±; or 14...\textit{\=Dd}4 15.\textit{\=Dg}3 \textit{\=Dg}4 16.\textit{\=Dh}3 \textit{\=De}5 17.\textit{\=De}3 \textit{\=Da}5 18.\textit{\=De}2±) 15.\textit{\=Dx}d3 \textit{\=Dd}4 (It is not preferable for Black to try here: 15...e5 16.\textit{\=De}3 \textit{\=Da}5 17.d4±) 16.\textit{\=De}3 e5 17.\textit{\=Dx}d4 \textit{\=Dx}d4 18.\textit{\=De}2 \textit{\=De}6 19.\textit{\=Dx}d4± and Black can hardly prove that his compensation for the exchange is sufficient, for example: 19...\textit{\=Dg}4 (After 19...\textit{\=De}8+ 20.\textit{\=Dd}1 \textit{\=Dg}4 21.\textit{\=De}1! \textit{\=De}8 22.h3+– White consolidates his position. It is not advisable for Black to opt for: 19...\textit{\=Da}2!? 20.\textit{\=Dd}2! \textit{\=De}8 21.\textit{\=Dc}2! h6 22.\textit{\=Df}5 \textit{\=Dx}d3 23.\textit{\=Db}4± and it is inconceivable how Black can improve his position later.) 20.f3 \textit{\=Dx}d4 21.\textit{\=Fx}g4 b5 22.\textit{\=Dd}2! b4 23.\textit{\=Df}2± White has parried his opponent’s threats and he has simplified the position considerably.

13.\textit{\=Dx}d4 \textit{\=Dx}d4 14.0–0–0 e5 15.\textit{\=De}3 \textit{\=Dg}4

Now, there follows a practically forced variation, which leads to a clear advantage for White, because of his very active pieces.

16.\textit{\=Dx}d4 \textit{\=Dx}d4 17.\textit{\=Dx}d4 \textit{\=Df}2
18.\textit{\=Dg}1 \textit{\=Dg}4 19.\textit{\=Dd}5 \textit{\=De}5 20.\textit{\=Db}5 \textit{\=Dg}6 21.\textit{\=De}1± Suetin – Roizman, USSR 1961.

\textit{\textbf{a2}) 10...\textit{\=Dh}4}

Black prevents the development of his opponent’s queen to the h5-square.

11.\textit{\=Df}3
Still, White plans to castle long.

11...\textit{\=Dd}4
That is the most aggressive line for Black. His other possibilities enable White to obtain a stable advantage with quite natural moves:

11...0–0 12.\textit{\=Dg}3 \textit{\=Dx}g3 13.hxg3

\textit{\textit{\textbf{z}}d8 14. \textit{\textbf{z}}d3 \textit{h6 15.0-0-0± and White has the two-bishop advantage, while after: 15...b6 16. \textbf{\textit{x}}d5 exd5 17. \textit{\textbf{h}}e1 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 18.f3± Black must also worry about his weak d5-pawn, Matanovic – Gerusel, Bad Pyrmont 1970;}}}

11... \textit{\textbf{z}}e5 12. \textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}g3 \textit{\textit{\textbf{w}}}xg3 13.hxg3 \textit{\textbf{z}}d7 14. \textit{\textbf{z}}d5 exd5 15.0-0-0± and White has excellent chances to exert powerful pressure on the kingside, while Black must take care about the protection of his vulnerable d5-pawn, which makes his defence even harder. 15...f6 16. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}c3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}c6 17. \textit{\textit{\textbf{z}}}e1 0-0 18.f4 \textit{\textbf{z}}d7 19. \textit{\textbf{z}}d3 g6? (Black had better try: 19...h6 20. \textbf{\textbf{z}}g6 \textit{\textbf{z}}c5 21. \textit{\textbf{z}}d4 \textit{\textbf{z}}e4 22.g4±) 20. \textbf{\textbf{z}}e7+- Scholz – Elsner, corr. 1972.

12. \textit{\textbf{w}}d3

12... \textit{\textbf{z}}f4

12...e5?! – This piece-sacrifice is very dubious. 13. \textit{\textbf{z}}xd5 \textit{\textbf{z}}f5 14. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}c3 0-0 (Black loses quickly after: 14...\textit{\textbf{w}}e4+? 15. \textit{\textbf{z}}e3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}c8 16. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}d3 \textit{\textbf{z}}xc3 17. \textit{\textbf{z}}xe4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}xe3+ 18.\textit{\textbf{w}}xe3 \textit{\textbf{z}}xe4 19.\textit{\textbf{w}}xd4 1-0 Hardicsay – Regan, Budapest 1978.) 15.\textit{\textbf{z}}e3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}fc8 16.\textit{\textbf{w}}b4! \textit{\textbf{z}}xc2, Kolar – Demian, Slovakia 2001, corr. 2002 and here White neutralizes his opponent’s activity with: 17.\textit{\textbf{z}}c1 \textit{\textbf{w}}e4 18.\textit{\textbf{h}}h4! – White prepares the development of his rook with that move, but also he deprives his opponent’s queen of the h4-square. 18...a5 (It is not better for Black to continue with 18...\textit{\textbf{z}}b3, because after: 19.f3 \textit{\textbf{z}}xc1+ 20.\textit{\textbf{z}}xc1 \textit{\textbf{w}}c6 21.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}d2+– he has nothing else to attack.) 19.\textit{\textbf{w}}b6 \textit{\textbf{z}}b3 20.\textit{\textbf{f}}3 \textit{\textbf{z}}xc1+ 21.\textit{\textbf{z}}xc1 \textit{\textbf{w}}b1 22.\textit{\textbf{z}}d2 \textit{\textbf{z}}e6 (or 22...\textit{\textit{\textbf{z}}}c8 23.\textit{\textbf{z}}d3+–) 23.\textit{\textbf{z}}d3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}a1 24. \textit{\textbf{z}}c2+– White has managed to simplify the position and to parry Black’s seemingly dangerous threats.

12...0-0 13.0-0-0 \textit{\textbf{z}}d8 (After 13...\textit{\textbf{z}}xc3 14.\textit{\textbf{z}}xc3 \textit{\textbf{z}}c6 15.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}g3±, the activity of White’s pieces provides him with a stable advantage.) 14.\textit{\textbf{w}}g4? (Black had better defend with: 14...\textit{\textbf{w}}f6 15.\textit{\textbf{z}}e4 \textit{\textbf{w}}f3 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}xf3 \textit{\textbf{z}}xf3 17.\textit{\textbf{z}}g2 \textit{\textbf{z}}xd2 18.\textit{\textbf{z}}xd2±, although even then his lag in development would make his task very difficult.) 15.\textit{\textbf{z}}h3 \textit{\textbf{w}}f3 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{z}}}xf3 \textit{\textbf{z}}xf3 17.\textit{\textbf{z}}g2 \textit{\textbf{z}}xd2 18.\textit{\textbf{z}}xd2+– Mecking – van Riemsdijk, Sao Paulo 1972.

13. \textit{\textbf{w}}e4

This is White’s most energetic line. He could have obtained a slight but stable advantage, thanks to his domination over the d-file and his more active pieces, in the variation: 13.\textit{\textbf{z}}xf4 \textit{\textbf{w}}xf4 14.\textit{\textbf{z}}d1 \textit{\textbf{z}}c6 15.\textit{\textbf{z}}e2± Maxion – Laven, Germany 1985.

13...f5

It is quite evident that follow-
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14. \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{c1xc2} + \)
15. \( \text{d1 xf4} \)
16. \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xa1} \)
17. \( \text{c4} \)
18. \( \text{d7} \)

After 17 ... \( \text{et7} \) 18. \( \text{etcl} \) \( \text{el8} \) 19. \( \text{ea2} \)
\( \text{el4} \) (or 19 ... \( \text{ef6} \) 20. \( \text{el1} \pm \) 20. \( \text{e5} \pm \) Black unavoidably loses his knight on a1 and White obtains a slight material advantage, moreover that his pieces are more active as well.

18. \( \text{e2!} \)
19. \( \text{ea2} \)
18. \( \text{c2} \)

It is worse for Black to give back the exchange: 19 ... \( \text{exc3} \) 20. \( \text{bxc3} \)
\( \text{c2} \) 21. \( \text{ebl} \) (The move 21. \( \text{c1} \) seems to be stronger at first sight, for example: 21 ... \( \text{a4} \) 22. \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 23. \( \text{c1} \) \( \text{d8} \) 24. \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{xb5} \) 25. \( \text{f3} \), but after 25 ... \( \text{c6} \), Black creates powerful threats.) and here Black must give back his extra pawn in order to save his knight and his defence becomes too difficult: 21 ... \( \text{b6?} \) 22. \( \text{c1}! \) \( \text{f7} \) 23. \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{a4} \) 24. \( \text{b3} \) and Black loses his knight; 21 ... \( \text{xa3} \) 22. \( \text{xb7} \); 21 ... \( \text{c6} \) 22. \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xa3} \) 23. \( \text{ea1} \) \( \text{b5} \) 24. \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 25. \( \text{xf5} \pm \) White has a stable advantage, thanks to his powerful bishop pair in an open position.

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20. \( \text{d3} \)
21. \( \text{bxa3} \)
22. \( \text{ehd8} \) (or 22 ... \( \text{eh8} \) 23. \( \text{f3} \pm \) 23. \( \text{c2} \pm \) – and White’s pieces are much more active in a position with approximate material equality.

b) 9 ... \( \text{exd5} \) 10. \( \text{d3} \)

This is the main line of the 6... \( \text{b4} \) system.

The position should be better for White from the point of view of common sense. At first, he has a couple of powerful bishops and he has good diagonals for them. His dark-squared bishop is particularly strong and it has no opponent. The bishop on d3 is active and well deployed too. Secondly, Black has an isolated pawn in the centre. Why does Black enter a position like that and sometimes at the highest level?

As a compensation for the abovementioned drawbacks of his position, Black obtains a free piece-development (\( \text{e8} \), \( \text{g4} \)) and sometimes (after d5-d4) even a slight space advantage, which does not happen so often when you play with Black.
As for the two-bishop advantage – Black has good chances to exchange one of the bishops (the one on the d3-square) either for a bishop (\(\triangle c8-f5\)), or for a knight (\(\triangle c6-e5\)). He will contain the action of the other bishop with his pawns somehow (d4, h6).

Finally, the weakness of Black’s isolated d5-pawn (or d4) is not so great, since knights are much more effective, in the fight against an isolated pawn, than bishops are.

Still, the evaluation of the position as better for White stands; he must take care of his opponent’s ideas and counter them adequately, for example, he must keep his bishops from being exchanged.

The most natural move for Black in that position is – b2) 10...0-0, while the only way in which he can hope to exploit advantageously the fact that neither side has castled is – b1) 10...d4.

About 10...h6 11.0-0 0-0 12.h3 – see 10...0-0 11.0-0 h6 12.h3; as for 10...\(\text{\&e6}\) 11.0-0 0-0 – see 10...0-0 11.0-0 \(\text{\&e6}\).

We must also see some other moves, which require separate analysis:

10...\(\text{\&e7+}\) 11.\(\text{\&e2}\) 0-0 (about 11...\(\text{\&e5}\) 12.0-0 \(\text{\&xd3}\) 13.\(\text{\&xd3}\) 0-0 14...\(\text{\&g5}\) – see 11...0-0) 12.0-0 \(\text{\&e5}\) (or 12...\(\text{\&g4}\), Florian – Byrtek, Katowice 1949, 13.f3 \(\text{\&e6}\) 14.g5 \(\text{\&c5+}\) – otherwise Black will have to unpin with the help of h6 and g5 – 15.h1 \(\text{\&d7}\) 16.\(\text{\&d2+}\) \(\text{\&e3}\) and \(\text{\&d4}\) 13...\(\text{\&g5}\) \(\text{\&xd3}\) (or 13...\(\text{\&g4}\) 14.f3 \(\text{\&d7}\) 15.\(\text{\&d4}\) h6, Krivokapic – Steinhagen, France 2007, 16...h4. White should better not exchange on f6, before the trade on d3. 16...\(\text{\&fe8}\) 17.\(\text{\&e1±}\) – White’s knight on d4 is very powerful and he has a stable advantage.) 14.\(\text{\&xd3}\) 0-0 (It is more or less the same after 14...h6, Saitaj – Santacruz, Thessaloniki 1984 15.\(\text{\&xf6}\) \(\text{\&xf6}\) 16.\(\text{\&d4±}\) 15.\(\text{\&xf6}\) 0-0, Arnason – Rufenacht, Zug 1983, 16...\(\text{\&d4±}\) and White has the standard edge in this variation – a powerful knight against a “bad” bishop and Black must also worry about his isolated pawn;

10...\(\text{\&g4}\) 11.f3 \(\text{\&e6}\) (about 11...\(\text{\&e7}\) 11.\(\text{\&e2}\) 0-0 12.0-0 – see 10...\(\text{\&e7+}\) 11.\(\text{\&e2}\) 0-0 12.0-0; as for 11...h5 12.0-0 0-0 – see 10...0-0 11.0-0 \(\text{\&g4}\) 12.f3 \(\text{\&h5}\)) 12.0-0 h6 (This move prevents the pin of the knight on f6; 12...\(\text{\&b6+}\) 13.\(\text{\&h1}\) d4 14.\(\text{\&e2}\) 0-0 15.b4 and here: 15...a6 16.\(\text{\&h2}\) \(\text{\&ad8}\) 17.\(\text{\&d2+}\), or 15...\(\text{\&h8}\), Sandin – Butenschoen, corr 1961, 16.\(\text{\&b2}\) \(\text{\&d5}\) 17.\(\text{\&d2±}\) – the weakness of the e3-square now is almost immaterial, because in case Black’s knight occupies it, White would retreat with his rook and he will attack the weak d4-pawn, for example: 17...\(\text{\&fe8}\) 18.b5 \(\text{\&e3}\) 19.\(\text{\&fb1}\) \(\text{\&c4}\) 20.\(\text{\&xc4}\) \(\text{\&xc4}\) 21.bxc6 \(\text{\&xe2}\) 22.cxb7; about 12...0-0 13.\(\text{\&g5}\) – see 10...0-0 11.0-0 \(\text{\&g4}\) 12.f3 \(\text{\&e6}\) 13.\(\text{\&g5}\) 13.\(\text{\&f4}\) 0-0 14.\(\text{\&d2}\) \(\text{\&e7}\) (Black fails to exchange the bishop: 14...
15...\texttt{b5} \texttt{f5} 16.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d3} 17.\texttt{xd3} \texttt{c6} 18.\texttt{ad1±}. Black is clearly worse – his d5-pawn is weak and his dark squares are vulnerable. In the game Palac – Pinkus, Geneve 1996 there followed: 18... \texttt{b6}+ 19.\texttt{e3} d4? 20.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xb2} 21.\texttt{b1} a2 22.\texttt{xb7}+-

\begin{center}
\textbf{b1)} 10...d4 11.\texttt{e2}
\end{center}

11...\texttt{f5}

This is the move, which makes the line with 10...d4, before castling, have separate importance. The exchange of the bishops is in principle favourable for Black, but the point is that he loses two tempi for it and as a result of that, his d4-pawn becomes endangered.

About 11...0–0 12.0–0 – see 10...0–0; as for 11...\texttt{d5} 12.0–0 0–0 – see 10...0–0 11.0–0 d4 12.\texttt{e2} \texttt{d5}.

Black has also tried in practice:
11...\texttt{d7} 12.0–0 0–0, Govedarica – Novoselski, Arandjelovac 1990, 13.h3 \texttt{e8} 14.\texttt{f4±} – and Black must remove his queen from the d7-square in order to develop his bishop on c8, since it is usually bad for him to fianchetto his bishop in that system;

11...\texttt{a5}+ 12.\texttt{d2} \texttt{b6} (Or 12... \texttt{xd2}+ 13.\texttt{xd2} 0–0 14.0–0 \texttt{e8} 15.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d7} 16.\texttt{ad1} \texttt{g4}, Leino – Kivisto, Finland 1993, but after: 17.\texttt{f4} \texttt{g5} 18.\texttt{b5} \texttt{ad8} 19.c3 \texttt{xc3} 20.\texttt{xc3±} the endgame is very favourable for White, because of his bishop pair in a position with an open centre.) 13.0–0 0–0 14.\texttt{g5} \texttt{g4} (Or 14...\texttt{e8}, Kauppinen – Fastberg, Finland 1989, 15.\texttt{h4}; 14...h6 15.\texttt{g3} \texttt{h8} 16.\texttt{h4} and White attacks simultaneously the d4 and h6-pawns, Kytoniemi – Fastberg, Jyvaskyla 1994.) 15.\texttt{g3} \texttt{e8} 16.\texttt{h3} \texttt{d7} 17.\texttt{f4} h6 18.\texttt{b5} \texttt{xb5} 19.\texttt{xb5±} – and in that endgame, even if Black exchanges one of White's bishops, his d4-pawn will remain vulnerable: 19...\texttt{a8} (or 19...a6 20.\texttt{d3} \texttt{e5} 21.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{xe5} 22.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d5}) 20.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d5} 21.\texttt{d6} \texttt{ed8} 22.\texttt{e4} \texttt{a5} 23.\texttt{d3} \texttt{c4} 24.b3 \texttt{xd6} 25.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{c7}, Kujala – Kivisto, Finland 1991, 26.\texttt{e4} and White wins his opponent's d4-pawn;

11...\texttt{g4} 12.0–0 \texttt{d7} (About 12...0–0 – see 10...0–0 11.0–0 d4 12.\texttt{e2} \texttt{g4}.) 13.f3 \texttt{e6}, Virostko – Chrz, Plzen 2001, 14.\texttt{f4} 0–0 15.\texttt{xe6} fxe6 16.\texttt{e2±} and the pawn-structure is advantageous for White;

11...\texttt{e6} 12.0–0 \texttt{d5}?! (This is simply a loss of time in that
4. \( \text{dxd4} \) e6 5. \( \text{dc3} \) \( \text{df6} \) 6. \( \text{db5} \) \( \text{b4} \) 7. \( \text{a3} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 8. \( \text{xc3} \)

Black must lose an additional tempo to defend against the threat – \( \text{axf6} \), therefore White’s couple of powerful bishops provides him with a stable advantage.) 16. \( \text{ad1} \) \( \text{e6} \) (In case of 16...\( \text{g4} \), Larusson – Mertens, Oerebro 1966, White should better not trade queens with the move \( \text{f4} \), but he should continue simply with 17. \( \text{g3} \) – because the temporary removal of his knight from \( \text{e2} \) does not facilitate Black’s task to protect his d4-pawn at all. Now, for example White is threatening 18. \( \text{f5} \), followed by either \( \text{fxe6} \), or c4, Baczynskyj – Marchand, Albany 1989.

12. \( \text{0–0} \)

White can try to refute Black’s idea in the forced variations after: 12. \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{a5+} \) 13. \( \text{c3} \), for example: 13...\( \text{dxc3} \) 14.\( \text{0–0} \) \( \text{f5} \) 15. \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16. \( \text{e1+} \) \( \text{e7} \) 17. \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{xd1} \) 18. \( \text{axd1} \) \( \text{d8} \) 19. \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{xd1} \) 20. \( \text{xd1} \) \( \text{c6} \) 21. \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 22. \( \text{h5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 23. \( \text{e1+} \) \( \text{d6} \) 24. \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{c5} \) and Black managed to draw that endgame thanks to his active king in the game Yemelin – Kornev, St. Petersburg 1993.
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12...\textgt{d}xd3

12...\textgt{g}g6 13.b4 and here:

13.a6 - defending against b4-b5. 14.\textgt{b}b2 \textgt{h}h5 15.\textgt{d}d2 \textgt{e}e5
16.\textgt{xd}xd4 \textgt{xd}xd3 17.\textgt{e}e3+ \textgt{e}e7 18.\textgt{xd}xd3\textpm and Black has no
compensation whatsoever, Mokry – Witkowski, Prague 1978;

13.\textgt{c}7 14.\textgt{f}4 \textgt{b}6, Kaminski – Protaziuk, Poland 1994, 15.b5
\textgt{e}e7 16.\textgt{e}e5 \textgt{d}d8 17.\textgt{e}e1\textpm and Black cannot castle 17...0-0, because of
18.\textgt{xd}xd4+-;

13.\textgt{b}6, Shilov – Protaziuk, Poland 1998, 14.b5 \textgt{e}e5 15.\textgt{x}xg6
hxg6 16.\textgt{xd}xd4\textpm, Black must enter an endgame without a pawn,
since he cannot continue with:
16...\textgt{xb}xb5 17.\textgt{c}c3 \textgt{a}a5 18.\textgt{e}e1+-;

13.\textgt{d}6, Migala – Byrka, Wysowa 2003, 14.\textgt{e}e1 0-0 (or
14...0-0-0 15.\textgt{f}4 \textgt{d}d5 16.b5
\textgt{xd}xd3 17.\textgt{xd}xd3 \textgt{e}e5 18.\textgt{h}h3+ \textgt{ed}d7
19.\textgt{g}g3\textrightarrow and Black's king remains stranded on the c8-square,
while White’s attack is just crushing.) 15.b5 \textgt{e}e5 16.\textgt{x}xg6 hxg6 17.\textgt{xd}xd4\textpm;

13...0-0 14.\textgt{b}b2 \textgt{c}c8 15.\textgt{x}xg6
hxg6 16.\textgt{xd}xd4\textpm – The weakness of the c4-square cannot fully

13.\textgt{xd}3

Now, Black’s task is to protect his weak d4-pawn.

13...0-0

After 13...\textgt{d}d5 14.\textgt{f}4 \textgt{e}e5 15.\textgt{b}b3 0-0 16.\textgt{xb}xb7 \textgt{fc}8 17.\textgt{d}d2,
Black has some positional compensation for the pawn indeed
(He exerts pressure on the open b and c-files.), but he can hardly
equalize: 17...\textgt{c}c5 18.\textgt{b}b3 \textgt{e}e5
19.\textgt{d}d1 \textgt{ab}8 20.\textgt{a}a4 \textgt{e}e4 and here instead of 21.b4, Gufeld –
Bukhman, Tallinn 1965, which allowed Black’s spectacular tactical
strike: 21...\textgt{f}f3\textpms! 22.gxf3 \textgt{g}g5\textpm, White had better play 21.\textgt{b}b4\textpm

13.\textgt{b}6, Pavlovic – Milosavljevic, Golubac 2003, 14.d1
0-0-0 15.\textgt{f}4\textpm – and Black’s king
is not so well placed on c8. It is in fact worse there than on the g8-
square.

14.\textgt{g}5

14...h6

This is a useful move, which creates a leeway for the king and
it repels White’s bishop to the h4-square.

14.\textgt{d}6 – That move enables
White to pin Black on the d-file: 15.d1 \textgt{d}d8 (It is the same after
15...\textgt{fd}8, Slabek – Szewczak,
Mikolajki 1991, 16.c3.) 16.c3 h6
(It is too bad for Black to play
16...\textgt{g}g4 17.\textgt{h}h3 and White frees
the file for his rook with tempo:
17...f6 18.\textgt{x}xg4 fxg5 19.\textgt{xd}4
\textgt{f}f4 20.\textgt{e}e6\textpms, remaining with
a solid extra pawn, Schnaebele – Braun, Germany 1986.) 17.\(\texttt{\texttt{xf6 xf6 18.\texttt{\texttt{xd4 xd4 19.cxd4 d7 20.e2 fd8 21.f4d4 ± – Black has good chances for a draw indeed, but White can still fight for a win, Padevsky – Bilek, Harrachov 1966.}}}

14.\(\texttt{e8 15.ad1 c8 16.f1 e6, Pritchett – Byway, Torquay 1982 (about 16...h6 17.h4 – see 14...h6), 17.f1, analogously to the main line – 14...h6.}

14...c8 15.ad1 b6? (about 15...e8 16.f1 – see 14...e8; as for 15...h6 16.h4 – see 14...h6) 16.xf6 xf6 17.f4± – Black does not need to leave his kingside completely in ruins, Kummerow – Khorras, Moscow 1991.

15.h4 e8

About 15...c8 16.ad1 e8 17.f1 – see 15...e8.

After 15...g5 16.g3 d5 17.\(\texttt{ad1 ad8 18.f3 d7 19.f2 fd8, Thorhallsson – Vidarsson, Iceland 1994, 20.f1± \Delta \texttt{g3-f5(e4)} – The weakening of Black’s kingside might turn out to be very important.}

15...d6 16.c3 \(\texttt{ad8 17.ad1 fe8, Toloza Soto – Munoz Sanchez, Bled 2002, 18.xd4 xd4 19.cxd4± – It might not be so easy for White to win this position with heavy pieces and an isolated d4-pawn, but the maximum that Black can rely on is a draw.}

16.ad1 c8

That is the only way for Black to protect his d4-pawn, by attacking his opponent’s c2-pawn.

17.f1 e6

Black frees his queen and he is threatening \(\texttt{e7 in the process.}

Or 17...e7 18.f3 e3+ 19.\(\texttt{exe3 dxex3 20.xf6 xf6 21.f4 d7, Kountz – Steiger, Ladenburg 1992, 22.e2± – and the endgame is very unpleasant for Black, because of his weak e3-pawn.}

After 17...g5 18.g3 e6 19.f1 d7, Ciuksys – Milasute, Vilkauskis 1994, 20.b4± – Black has compromised the shelter of his king at a moment in which he could have avoided the pin of his knight in another fashion.

18.f1!

White defends against the pin along the e-file.

18...c7

18...a6 19.g1!? (That is another plus for the move – 18.f1.) 19...e1+ 20.e1 d6 21.f3 d7, Haensel – Neyman, Neumuenster 1999, 22.c3 c5 23.d5 e6 24.d1± – and Black has problems defending his d4-pawn.

19.g3

White’s h2-pawn was under attack and he could not play:
19.\texttt{dx}d4 \texttt{exe}1+ 20.\texttt{exe}1 \texttt{d}xd4 21.\texttt{exe}d4 \texttt{exe}8+ 22.\texttt{f}f1 \texttt{x}xh2± 

19...\texttt{b}b6 20.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{a}6 21.\texttt{f}f4 

Once again, the straightforward capturing of the pawn was not good for White: 21.\texttt{d}xd4 \texttt{d}xd4 22.\texttt{w}xd4 \texttt{w}xd4 23.\texttt{exe}4+ 24.\texttt{exe}1 \texttt{exe}2= Skrzypnik – Flasinski, Laczna 2002.

It is too early for White to clarify the situation and he should better maintain the tension.

21...\texttt{e}e8

Or 21...\texttt{exe}+ 22.\texttt{exe}1 \texttt{exe}8 23.\texttt{x}xe8+ (if 23.\texttt{d}d1 then \texttt{e}e4=) 23...\texttt{exe}8 24.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{w}d8 25.\texttt{f}f5±

22.\texttt{exe}8+ \texttt{exe}8 23.\texttt{e}e2±

Black’s d4-pawn is weak, moreover that White has at his disposal numerous piece-maneuvers (\texttt{w}f5, \texttt{h}4, \texttt{d}6), so he has the initiative. Later, in the game Karpov - G.Kuzmin, Leningrad 1977, there followed: 23...\texttt{d}d8 (Black would not have equalized completely either after: 23...\texttt{c}c8 24.\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{d}d7 25.\texttt{f}f5 \texttt{e}e8 26.\texttt{d}d3 – 26.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{b}5=; 26.a4!? – 26...\texttt{f}f8 27.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{f}6 28.\texttt{x}xf6 \texttt{x}xf6 29.\texttt{d}d3) 24.\texttt{h}h4± \texttt{e}e5 (24...\texttt{d}d6 25.\texttt{xf}6; 24...\texttt{g}5 25.\texttt{g}3±) 25.\texttt{f}f5 \texttt{d}d3 (After 25...\texttt{c}c4!? 26.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{w}xf6 27.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{g}xf6 28.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{w}xd4 29.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{d}xa3 30.\texttt{e}e2± – the king and knight endgame is bad for Black, because of his passive king and his pawn-weaknesses.) 26.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{d}d3 27.\texttt{c}c3! \texttt{d}xa3 28.\texttt{e}e4± and Black's kingside will be soon in ruins.

b2) 10...0–0 11.0–0

11...\texttt{d}d4

This is the main line for Black, but he has many other possibilities as well.

I will start with some relatively rarely played and I would like to mention immediately that if Black allows his knight to be pinned, without obtaining anything in return, then he has no chances of reaching an acceptable position:

11...\texttt{a}6 12.\texttt{f}f4 (It is also good for White to play 12.\texttt{g}g5±) 12...\texttt{d}d4 13.\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{d}d5 14.\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{e}e8 15.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{f}5?! 16.\texttt{d}d6± Vukcevich – Ervin, USA 1976;

11...\texttt{w}d6 12.h3 (That is a useful prophylactic move and its idea is to deprive Black’s pieces of the g4-square.) 12...\texttt{a}6 13.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{d}d7 14.
The drawback of that move is that not only Black loses a pawn, but White's pieces become suddenly quite active. 15.\(\text{a}xe6\) \(\text{xf6}\) 16.\(\text{d}xe5\) \(\text{xb2}\) 17.\(\text{e}b1\) \(\text{d}d4\) 18.\(\text{xb7}\) \(\text{f}d8\) 19.\(\text{c}b6+\) Mach – Worsfold, Aarhus 1990;

11...\(\text{e}e8\) 12.\(\text{c}g5\) \(\text{e}e6\) 13.\(\text{e}e1\) \(h6\) 14.\(\text{c}d4\) a6, Franco Gomez – F.Martinez, Mondariz 1996 and here White has a very promising set-up at his disposal – 15.h3, followed by \(\text{d}f3\); 

11...\(\text{d}e6\) 12.\(\text{c}g5\) \(h6\) (About 12...\(\text{d}e5\) – see 11...\(\text{d}e5\); 12...\(\text{c}c8\), Rizouk – Esteve Lopez, Balaguer 2003, 13.\(\text{e}e1\)? – depriving Black of the possibility \(\text{c}6-e5\) – 13...\(\text{c}c8\) 14.\(\text{c}c4\) \(\text{b}2\), Middelburg – Hamers, Arnhem 1996, White can follow the already mentioned plan – 15.h3, followed by \(\text{d}f3, \text{c}d1\); 14.\(\text{e}e1\) \(\text{c}4\), Reyes Barragan – Witwer, Dos Hermanas 2003 (About 14.\(\text{d}xe6\) 15.\(\text{w}x\)d6 – see 11...\(\text{d}e5\) 12.\(\text{c}g5\) \(\text{e}e6\) 13.\(\text{e}e1\) \(\text{d}xe5\) 14.\(\text{w}x\)d6 \(\text{h}6\) 15.\(\text{c}d4\); it is too passive for Black to play: 14...\(\text{d}e7\) 15.\(\text{c}b5\) \(\text{b}6\) 16.\(\text{w}d4\) Santor-Roman – Kivisto, Mendoza 1985) 15.\(\text{e}b1\) (White should avoid unnecessary simplification. In case of 15.b3 \(\text{b}2\), Black’s defence would be slightly easier.) 15...\(\text{c}c8\) 16.\(\text{c}c2\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{d}d4\); 

11...\(\text{d}e5\). That move is more active than the ones we have already analyzed, but even here, as tournament practice has shown, the pin is quite effective for White.

\(\text{d}g5\) \(h6?!\). Black has difficulties to do anything active, while the advantages of White's position would gradu-
ally become more and more noticeable. Black has tried here:

About 12...d4 13.\textit{Q}e2 – see 11...d4 12.\textit{Q}e2 h6 13.h3;

12...\textit{Q}e5 13.\textit{Q}f4 \textit{Q}xd3 (This exchange does not bring any solace to Black. It is hardly attractive for him to opt for: 13...\textit{Q}g6 14.\textit{Q}g3 a6 15.\textit{Q}e1 \textit{Q}e7?! 16.\textit{Q}f3± Madl – Shapira, Tel Aviv 2001.) 14.\textit{Q}xd3 \textit{Q}e6 15.\textit{Q}e1 \textit{Q}d7 16.\textit{Q}e5. Now, Black loses a pawn almost by force – 16...\textit{Q}h7 17.\textit{Q}ad1 \textit{Q}ad8 18.\textit{Q}g3 f6 19.\textit{Q}c7 \textit{Q}e8 20.\textit{Q}f4 \textit{Q}h8 21.\textit{Q}e3 \textit{Q}fe8 22.\textit{Q}xa7± Kutuzovic – Plescko, Pecs 1996;

12...\textit{Q}e6 13.\textit{Q}f4 d4, Klerides – Burgos Figueroa, Turin 2006 (13...\textit{Q}d7 14.\textit{Q}d2 \textit{Q}e7 15.\textit{Q}ad1 a6 Ekdyshman – Kachkina, St. Petersburg 2002, 16.\textit{Q}e5 \textit{Q}h7 17.\textit{Q}fe1±) 14.\textit{Q}b5 \textit{Q}d5 15.\textit{Q}g3±;

12...a6, Fercec – Lerch, Cannes 1996, 13.\textit{Q}e1 d4 14.\textit{Q}a4± – It seems to me – that is more promising for White than 14.\textit{Q}e2 – see 11...d4 12.\textit{Q}e2 h6 13.h3 a6 14.\textit{Q}e1;

12...\textit{Q}e8 13.\textit{Q}f4 a6 14.\textit{Q}e1 \textit{Q}xe1+ (Black would not change much with: 14...\textit{Q}e6 15.\textit{Q}d2 \textit{Q}c8 16.\textit{Q}ad1 \textit{Q}a5 17.b3 \textit{Q}c6 18.\textit{Q}a4 d4 19.\textit{Q}c5± Slepanova – M.Petrovic, Czech Republic 1997.) 15.\textit{Q}xe1 d4, Marinkovic – Govedarica, Belgrade 2004, 16.\textit{Q}a4±;

11...\textit{Q}g4. Black is trying to create some disharmony in his opponent's set-up with that move, or to provoke weakening of the g1-a7 diagonal. He manages to realize the latter task indeed, but his pieces are not active at all and he fails to acquire anything real out of that. 12.f3

and here Black must make an important decision:

12...\textit{Q}h5 13.\textit{Q}g5 \textit{Q}b6+ (That is the most principled line for Black, since after his other lines his position is not to be envied at all: 13...\textit{Q}e7 14.\textit{Q}h1 \textit{Q}d6, Keres – Stoliar, Moscow 1957, 15.\textit{Q}b5 \textit{Q}c6 16.\textit{Q}e1 \textit{Q}f8 17.\textit{Q}xf6 gxf6 18.\textit{Q}d2±; 13...\textit{Q}e8 14.\textit{Q}g6 hxg6 15.\textit{Q}xf6 \textit{Q}xf6 16.\textit{Q}xd5 \textit{Q}fd8 17.\textit{Q}c5 \textit{Q}d4, Black obtains some compensation for the lost pawn, Kruger – Olland, Haarlem 1901. It is simpler for White to play 14.\textit{Q}b1±, depriving Black of counterplay against the b2-pawn.) 14.\textit{Q}h1 \textit{Q}e4 (In case of: 14...\textit{Q}e5, White remains with a solid extra pawn after: 15.\textit{Q}xf6 \textit{Q}xf6 16.\textit{Q}xd5 \textit{Q}d6 17.\textit{Q}f4 \textit{Q}xd3 18.\textit{Q}xh5± Cochet – Huilmot,
4. \( \text{exd4} \) e6 5. \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{c6} \) 6. \( \text{db5} \) \( \text{b4} \) 7. a3 \( \text{xc3} \) 8. \( \text{xe3} \)

France 2000. It is also bad for Black to continue with: 14...\( \text{xe7} \) 15.\( \text{xe7} \) and he is in a big trouble: 15...\( \text{f6} \), Cubas – F. Fernandez, Sao Paulo 2002, 16.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) 17.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 18.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 19. \( \text{xe7} \)+ \( \text{xe7} \) 20.\( \text{e1} \); 15...\( \text{c5} \) 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{e8} \) 17.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 18.\( \text{e2} \)+

Marco – Mieses, Monte Carlo 1903; 15...\( \text{d6} \) 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{g6} \) 17.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d7} \), Chigorin – Mieses, Monte Carlo 1901, 18.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 19.\( \text{c3} \)

15.\( \text{xe4} \) dxe4 16.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 17.\( \text{b1} \). The arising endgame is rather unpleasant for Black. 17...\( \text{xb1} \) 18.\( \text{axb1} \) f5 19.\( \text{d3} \) b6 20.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{g6} \) 21.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{ac8} \), Magem Badals – Romero Holmes, Torrevieja 1997, 22.\( \text{f4} \)? White fixes the weak f5-pawn and he prevents radically the possibility for Black to play f5-f4, exchanging the light-squared bishops. 22...\( \text{e8} \) 23.\( \text{d7} \)+ and White has the initiative in that endgame and additionally he can easily improve his position;

12...\( \text{e6} \) – This move is more solid and probably because of that, it is more popular. 13.\( \text{g5} \)

and here the game might develop in the following fashion:

13...\( \text{e8} \) 14.\( \text{d2} \) d4 15.\( \text{e2} \) and Black has hardly any counterplay: 15...\( \text{a6} \), Planinec – Andersson, Sombor 1970, 16.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{e5} \) 17.\( \text{h5} \) \( \text{ed7} \) 18.\( \text{ae1} \); 15...\( \text{h6} \) 16.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{c8} \), Kobese – Encinas, Navalmoral 1999, 17.\( \text{ad1} \); 15...\( \text{c8} \), Sziva – Klusek, Brno 1989, 16.\( \text{ad1} \);

13...\( \text{e5} \) 14.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{xd3} \) (or 14...\( \text{b6} \)+ 15.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{fd7} \) 16.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 17.\( \text{b5} \) a6 18.\( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 19.\( \text{xd5} \)+

Krzyszton – Heigl, corr. 1963) 14...\( \text{xd3} \) 15.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{c8} \) 16.\( \text{b5} \) a6 17.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 18.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 19.\( \text{b3} \)+ – Black has managed to simplify the game indeed, but he has paid a too dear price for that, Denker – Bolbochan, La Plata 1947;

13...\( \text{h6} \) 14.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e8} \) (about 14...\( \text{b6} \)+ 15.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16.\( \text{f4} \) – see 13...\( \text{b6} \)+ 14.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 15.\( \text{f4} \) h6 16.\( \text{h4} \); 14...\( \text{e5} \), Plewe – Dietzsch, Heimbach 1987, 15.\( \text{e1} \); 14...\( \text{c8} \), Rosas – Brioa, corr. 2002, 15.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{b6} \)+ 16.\( \text{f2} \) d4 17.b4±; 14...\( \text{g5} \) – That move solves radically the problem with the pin, but Black’s king shelter is weakened considerably. – 15.\( \text{f2} \) and White has a clear advantage after 15...\( \text{c8} \), Janowski – Blackburne, Monte Carlo 1901, 16.\( \text{b5} \)+, as well as following: 15...\( \text{a6} \) 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{h5} \) 17.\( \text{f6} \) b5 18.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 19.\( \text{ad1} \) Cabello Rodriguez – Martinez Torho, Benidorm 2004.) 15.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{b6} \)+ 16.\( \text{f2} \) d4 17.b4! a6 18.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{d5} \) 19.c3 \( \text{e3} \) 20.\( \text{b1} \)+ and Black’s seemingly active set-up crumbles, Sidenko – Barks, Email 1998;
Chapter 7

13...\(\text{\textbf{b}}6+\) 14.\(\text{\textbf{h}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{d}}7\) (Capturing for Black - 14...\(\text{\textbf{xb}}2\), ended up with his queen being trapped - 15.\(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\) \(\text{\textbf{gxf}}6\) 16.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}5\)? 17.\(\text{\textbf{a}}4++\) N.Mueller - J.Szekely, Gyor 1906. Naturally, Black's move 16 was a blunder, but even after the correct decision - 16...\(\text{\textbf{b}}6\), his position would be hopeless: 17.\(\text{\textbf{h}}6\) f5 18.\(\text{\textbf{xd}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{xd}}5\) 19.\(\text{\textbf{xf}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{fd}}8\) 20.\(\text{\textbf{xe}}h7+\) \(\text{\textbf{h}}8\) 21.\(\text{\textbf{e}}4+\) \(\text{\textbf{g}}8\) 22.\(\text{\textbf{g}}5+\) \(\text{\textbf{xf}}8\) 23.\(\text{\textbf{xd}}5+-\) 15.f4 f5 (It is only a transposition after: 15...f6 16.\(\text{\textbf{h}}5\) f5 17.\(\text{\textbf{f}}3\) - see 15...f5 16.\(\text{\textbf{f}}3\). Black can try the plan with the advance of his d-pawn, but he has great difficulties even then - 15...h6 16.\(\text{\textbf{h}}4\) d4 17.\(\text{\textbf{a}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) 18.c4± Matulovic - Lombardy, Zuerich 1961, or immediately 15...d4, McDonald - Saint Amour, Email 1999, 16.\(\text{\textbf{a}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) 17.f5 \(\text{\textbf{d}}5\) 18.\(\text{\textbf{c}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{dxc}}3\) 19.\(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}5\) 20.\(\text{\textbf{h}}4+\) - and White is threatening to advance his f-pawn.) 16.\(\text{\textbf{f}}3\) \(\text{\textbf{ac}}8\) (In case of 16...\(\text{\textbf{c}}5\), White has the resource 17.b4! and now it is bad for Black to play: 17...\(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) 18.\(\text{\textbf{xf}}5\)+, as well as: 17...\(\text{\textbf{d}}4\) 18.\(\text{\textbf{b}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{b}}6\) 19.\(\text{\textbf{ae}}1++\) Donner - Orbaan, Wageningen 1957. It is slightly better for Black to try 16...\(\text{\textbf{c}}5\), but he has great problems then too: 17.\(\text{\textbf{xd}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{xb}}2\) 18.\(\text{\textbf{e}}7+\) \(\text{\textbf{xe}}7\) 19.\(\text{\textbf{xe}}7\) \(\text{\textbf{fc}}8\) 20.\(\text{\textbf{e}}3\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}4\) 21.\(\text{\textbf{ab}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}3\) 22.\(\text{\textbf{xb}}7\)± Jones - Maffeo, San Francisco 1977.) 16...\(\text{\textbf{ac}}8\), Ehlvest - A.Guseinov, Volgodonsk 1983, White's position is doubtlessly superior and he could have emphasized that with the move 17.\(\text{\textbf{ab}}1\), depriving his opponent of any tactical chances. White has so many strategical pluses that he should manage to settle gradually the issue in his favour after careful play.

12.\(\text{\textbf{e}}2\)

The position is simplified too much after: 12.\(\text{\textbf{e}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{f}}5\) 13.\(\text{\textbf{g}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{xe}}4\) 14.\(\text{\textbf{xe}}4\) h6 15.\(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\) \(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\) 16.\(\text{\textbf{e}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{ad}}8\), Leko - Timman, Wijk aan Zee 2001 - as usual in the opening, the exchanges of several light pieces are not favourable for White. He should try to redeploy his knight on e2, after castling, to g3 and later - to h5, f5 or e4 (if there is no black knight on the f6-square).

![Diagram](image.png)

Black has tried numerous moves here, but his best are - b2a) 12...\(\text{\textbf{e}}8\), b2b) 12...\(\text{\textbf{d}}5\) and b2c) 12...\(\text{\textbf{g}}4\).

The move 12...\(\text{\textbf{e}}6\) - covers the sixth rank and it does not allow Black after 13.\(\text{\textbf{g}}5\) to play \(\text{\textbf{d}}6\) and to get rid of the pin of the knight on f6, which is rather annoying for him. 13...h6 (Or 13...\(\text{\textbf{d}}5\) 14.\(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\) \(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\), Szarvas - Markhot, Savaria

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4. \( \text{a}d4 \) e6 5. \( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 6. \( \text{d}b5 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 7. \( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{xc}3 \) 8. \( \text{xc}3 \)

2002, 15. \( \text{g}3\pm \). And Black has no compensation for his kingside weaknesses.) 14. \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 15. \( \text{c}4 \) dxc3 16. \( \text{xc}3 \). Black has problems, because of the pin of the knight on f6. He loses after: 16...

19. \( \text{f5} \) and Black was checkmated in the game Li Shilong – Witwer, Dos Hermanas 2004.

12... \( \text{d}5 \) – Black defends against the pin \( \text{g}5 \) and he frees the way for his queen to the h4-square. 13. \( \text{g}3 \) (Black can counter 13. \( \text{e}4 \) with 13... \( \text{d}e7 \) \( \text{f}5 \).) 13... \( \text{h}4 \) 14. \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}e7 \) (14... \( \text{e}6 \) 15. \( \text{f}5\pm \)) 15. \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{g}6 \), Kunze – Renner, Wildflecken 1988 (or 15... \( \text{e}6 \) 16. \( \text{e}4\pm \) and Black will have to comply with the weakening of his kingside pawn-structure), 16. \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 17. \( \text{h}5\upaarrow \) and White’s threats on the kingside will force Black to exchange on f5, after which White will have a stable advantage – two bishops, while Black will have no real counterplay at all.

12... \( \text{b}6 \) – This move is only seldom played. Black prepares an additional protection of his d4-pawn (\( \text{d}8 \)) and he attacks the b2-pawn. 13. \( \text{b}4 \) (After 13. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{g}4 \), the placement of White’s bishop is not so purposeful; if 13. \( \text{g}3 \), reducing the pressure against the d4-pawn, Black plays 13... \( \text{e}5 \); finally, Black can counter 13. \( \text{h}3 \) with the line: 13... \( \text{e}8 \) 14. \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 15. \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 15. \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 16. \( \text{f}1 \) a6 – and here in the game Hagara – Hasangatin, Presov 2000, the opponents agreed to a draw. I believe – that decision was a bit premature for White. He had some more resources to improve his position, for example: 17. \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 18. \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 19. \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 20. \( \text{h}5\pm \)

12...h6 – That move is played with the obvious idea to prevent the pin \( \text{g}5 \) and in general to restrict White’s dark-squared bishop. 13.h3.

This is also prophylactic against \( \text{g}4 \) or \( \text{g}4\text{-e}5 \). In this position, Black has tried:

13... \( \text{e}5 \) – That move is not to be recommended. Black’s d4-pawn is weak and he is hardly threatening to capture on d3. 14. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 15. \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 16. \( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 17. \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{e}6 \), Hanison – Grobler, Email 2003. In fact, Black has lost a couple of tempi and here White could have organized a decisive attack with the line: 18. \( \text{xh}6 \) gxh6 19. \( \text{xh}6 \). There might follow for example: 19... \( \text{d}7 \) 20. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 21. \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 22. \( \text{h}5 \) \( \text{xh}5 \) 23. \( \text{h}7\upaarrow \) \( \text{f}8 \) 24. \( \text{h}8\upaarrow \) \( \text{e}7 \) 25. \( \text{xe}5\upaarrow \) \( \text{e}6 \) 26. \( \text{xh}5\upaarrow ; \)

13... \( \text{a}6 \) – Black defends against
the potential threat $\text{b}5xc6$, winning the $d4$-pawn. 14.$\text{xe}1$ (or 14.$\text{xf}4$ $\text{d}5$) 14...$\text{d}5$ (In case of 14...$\text{e}8$, Lutzenberger – Duriez, Email 2002, it looks very good for White to continue with: 15.$\text{g}3$ $\text{exe}1+$ 16.$\text{exe}1$ $\text{e}6$ 17.$\text{f}4$ $\text{d}5$ 18.$\text{e}4$ $\text{xf}4$ 19.$\text{xf}4$, followed by $\text{e}1+$) 15.$\text{f}4$ $\text{xf}4$ 16.$\text{xf}4$ $\text{e}6$ 17.$\text{wh}5+$ White has a very comfortable position and he can easily improve it, for example by doubling of his rooks along the e-file: 17...$\text{wd}7$ 18.$\text{we}2$ f5 19.$\text{eae}1$ $\text{f}7$ 20.$\text{f}3$ $\text{eae}8$ 21.$\text{exe}8$ $\text{exe}8$ 22. $\text{exe}8+$ $\text{exe}8$ 23.$\text{g}3+$ with a better endgame for White, Lobron – Gobet, Biel 1984;

13...$\text{wd}5$ 14.$\text{f}4$ $\text{d}6$ 15.$\text{f}4$ $\text{d}5$ $\text{e}5$ 16.$\text{wh}5$ $\text{eh}5$ 16.$\text{wh}5$. There arose a position from the variation: 12...$\text{wd}5$ 13.$\text{f}4$ $\text{d}6$ 14.$\text{h}5$ $\text{d}xh5$ 15.$\text{wh}5$ h6, except that White has played an extra move – 16.h3. That move might not be the most useful indeed, but it does not influence the evaluation of the position as better for White. 16.$\text{e}8$ 17.$\text{d}2$ $\text{d}7$, Severiukhina – Atnilov, Herceg Novi, 2005, 18.$\text{eae}1$ $\text{e}5$ (It is not good for Black to play 18...$\text{e}5$ 19.$\text{f}4+$) 19.$\text{f}3+$ and White follows with $\text{f}4$ (White achieves nothing after: 19.$\text{exe}5$ $\text{exe}5$ 20. $\text{f}4$ $\text{e}8$ 21.$\text{h}1$ $\text{f}6$; Black succeeds in exchanging the light-squared bishops in the variation: 19.$\text{f}4$ $\text{exe}5$ 20.$\text{x}d6$ $\text{g}5$=). After 19.$\text{f}3$, it is bad for Black to opt for: 19...$\text{eae}8$ 20.$\text{f}4$ $\text{f}6$ 21.$\text{exe}5$ $\text{xf}3$ 22.$\text{gx}f3$ $\text{exe}5$ 23.$\text{g}2+$–;

13...$\text{wb}6$ 14.$\text{b}4$ $\text{d}8$ (It is the same after 14...$\text{a}6$, Llanes Hurtado – Roche Simon, Zaragoza 1995, 15.$\text{b}2+$) 15.$\text{b}2$ $\text{a}6$ (Black would not change much with: 15...$\text{e}6$ 16.$\text{wd}2$ $\text{eac}8$ 17.$\text{f}e1$ $\text{a}6$ 18.$\text{f}4+$ Boettcher – Prestage, Email 2002.) 16.$\text{wd}2$ $\text{e}6$ 17.$\text{ad}1$ $\text{d}6$ 18.$\text{f}4$ $\text{ad}8$ 19.$\text{d}2$ $\text{a}7$ 20.$\text{fd}1+$ – and White has a stable advantage, because of Black’s weak $d4$-pawn, Pavlovic – Skembris, Bor 1983;

13...$\text{e}8$ 14.$\text{f}4$ $\text{e}6$ (In case of 14...$\text{wd}5$, Augustaitis – Rogozenko, Piarnu 1987, it is interesting for White to try: 15.$\text{c}4$ $\text{dxc}3$ 16.$\text{xc}3$ $\text{wd}4$ 17.$\text{wd}2$ $\text{d}8$ 18.$\text{fd}1$ and he has a powerful initiative, for example: 18...$\text{e}6$ 19.$\text{b}5$ $\text{d}5$ 20.$\text{eac}1$ $\text{e}7$ 21.$\text{d}6$ $\text{wd}7$ 22.$\text{we}3$. Black has also tried here: 14...$\text{wd}5$ 15.$\text{g}3$ $\text{f}6$ 16.$\text{f}2$ $\text{e}6$ 17.$\text{ad}1$ $\text{ad}8$ 18.$\text{f}e1$ $\text{de}7$, Berczes – Hidegh, Spata 1998, but now White had better avoid the exchange of the light-squared bishops with: 19.$\text{f}4$ $\text{f}5$ 20.$\text{c}4+$ 15.$\text{wd}2$ $\text{e}8$ (In case of 15...$\text{d}5$, White should not be afraid of the capturing on $f4$ – 16.$\text{f}e1$ $\text{xf}4$ 17. $\text{xf}4$ $\text{g}5$ 18.$\text{xg}5$ $\text{hxg}5$, Somod – Kokkonen, corr. 1991, 19.$\text{f}4$ $\text{xf}4$ 20.$\text{f}4+$ and White has a slight, but stable edge in that endgame.) 16.$\text{ad}1$ $\text{d}5$ 17.$\text{f}e1$ $\text{f}6$ 18.$\text{g}3$ (It is better for White to play 18.$\text{h}2+$, so that the bishop does not come under attack from the knight on $f5$.) 18...$\text{b}6$ (or 18...$\text{de}7$?) 19.$\text{xf}4$ $\text{d}8$ 20.$\text{e}4$ $\text{d}5$
21. $\text{W}f3$± and Black has great problems to protect his d4-pawn, Dolgener – Zimmer, Germany 1990; 13... $\text{xe}6$ 14. $\text{f}4$ $\text{d}5$, Nikolaev – Schiffers, Kiev 1903, 15. $\text{xe}6$ $\text{xe}6$ 16. $\text{W}e2$, and White's two bishops and the weaknesses on Black's kingside are more important than Black's pawn-majority in the centre.

12... $\text{d}6$. The idea of that move is that after the natural line: 13. $\text{f}4$ $\text{d}5$, White has developed his bishop indeed, but he has deprived his knight of the f4-square. Still, it does not seem advisable for White to waste tempi for such dubious ideas. 14. $\text{g}3$ (White prevents $\text{f}5$.) 14... $\text{e}8$. (Black has also tried here: 14... $\text{g}4$ 15. $\text{f}3$ $\text{e}6$ 16. $\text{W}d2$ $\text{d}7$ 17. $\text{W}f2$ $\text{d}5$. He fails to exploit the weakness of the e3-square, while his problems with the protection of the d4-pawn are considerable. 18. $\text{d}2$ $\text{f}5$ 19. $\text{e}2$ $\text{f}6$ 20. $\text{b}5$± Hamarat – V. Ivanov, corr. 1985. After 14... $\text{e}5$, White maintains his advantage by exchanging the dark-squared bishops: 15. $\text{xe}5$ $\text{xe}5$ 16. $\text{e}1$ $\text{d}5$ 17. $\text{e}4$ $\text{g}4$ – or 17... $\text{xe}4$ 18. $\text{xe}4$± – 18. $\text{f}3$ $\text{e}6$ 19. $\text{g}3$ $\text{h}8$ 20. $\text{d}2$? White transfers his knight to f3 and it attacks Black's d4-pawn from there. 20... $\text{d}7$ 21. $\text{f}3$ $\text{h}6$ 22. $\text{e}4$ $\text{f}5$ 23. $\text{e}5$ $\text{ad}8$ 24. $\text{f}4$ $\text{f}6$ 25. $\text{e}2$± – Black's d4-pawn is doomed, Koch – Cerisier, Rouen 1987.) 15. $\text{e}1$ $\text{e}1$+ 16. $\text{xe}1$ $\text{e}6$ 17. $\text{d}1$ $\text{g}4$ 18. $\text{f}3$ $\text{e}6$ 19. $\text{f}2$. White has completed his development and he has a slight edge, thanks to his bishop pair. Later, he can choose between several possibilities, for example c2-c4, or $\text{g}3$-$\text{e}4$. The game followed later with: 19... $\text{a}2$ 20. $\text{c}1$ $\text{d}8$? 21. $\text{g}5$ $\text{e}5$ (or 21... $\text{xb}2$ 22. $\text{xf}6$ $\text{xf}6$ 23. $\text{h}5$ $\text{e}7$ 24. $\text{d}2$– and White's attack is decisive) 22. $\text{h}5$ $\text{xh}5$ 23. $\text{xd}8$ with a material advantage for White, Zhu Chen – Balmazi, Germany 2006.

12... $\text{g}4$. This is an interesting idea: it is advantageous for Black to exchange the bishop on d3, but if he plays $\text{c}6$-$\text{e}5$, then his d4-pawn remains defenseless. Therefore, he places the other knight on the e5-square and that often forces White to part with one of the bishops. The drawback of that plan is that it contradicts the basic principles of playing in the opening, since Black plays several moves in a row with the same piece. 13. $\text{f}4$ and here Black has tried in practice:

Naturally, it is bad for Black to play 13... $\text{g}5$? 14. $\text{d}2$ $\text{e}7$ 15. $\text{g}3$→,
because he would not survive for long with that gaping weakness on g5, Servat – Roman, La Plata 1992;

13...f6 14.d2 h6 15.ad1 d8 16.f1 e5 17.dxe5 xe5 (or 17...dxe5 18.f4, attacking the d4-pawn) 18.g3 c7, Grabics – Abolina, Szeged 1994, 19.e2! e6 20.e4 g6 21.h4 g7 22.f4 and Black is forced to allow White’s queen to come to the d6-square; otherwise he must enter the variation: 22...
e7 23.xe7 xe7 24.c5 c6 25.xb7 b6 26.c5;

13...e8 14.d2 e5 15.dxe5 c5 (or 15...dxe5 16 xd4+) 16.g3 e8 (Black must first remove his rook from e8 in order to develop his bishop to the e6-square.) 17.f4 e6 18.ad1. White has the initiative on the kingside. Later, in the game Kotronias – Bousois, Greece 1993 there followed: 18..c8 19.f1 c7 20.h4 (White provokes weakening of Black’s kingside.) 20...h6 21.e4 g6 22.h4 g7 23.
e4 d8 24.g3+ f5 25.d6 xe1+ 26.xe1 xd3 27.cxd3 b8 28.b4 a6 29.e8 w7 30.xb8 xb8 31.e5+ g8 32.d4+ and White won some material and the game as well.

12...a6. That move is a loss of time – Black would hardly need to defend against b5, or to play b7-b5. 13.g5 h6 (Or 13...d6 14.e1 h8. Black defends against the tactical motive – c3 and after the capturing – xh7+; but that move does not contribute to his development. 15.f2 d5 16.f4 – c4! dx3 17.xc3 xc3 18.xc3 xad1 – f5 17.f3 h6 18.xd5 xd5 19.e3+ and Black lost a pawn in the game Leyva – Reynaldo Hernandez, Guines 1994.) 14.h4 e8 (or 14...d6, Erashchenkov – Moskalenko, Smolensk 2001, 15.e1 and depending on Black reaction either c2-c3, or d2) 15.e1 b5 (After 15...g5 16.g3 e4? 17.xd4 xd4 18.c3+ – Black remains a pawn down, Alekseev – Ianochcin, Oropesa del Mar 2001; 15...d7 16.d2 c8 17.ad1 b5 18.f3 e6 19.f4+ d7 20.h5 xe1+ 21.xe1+ and White wins, Seirawan – Comp Maestro, Zuerich 1988; 15...d6 16.c3! and Black cannot capture on c3, so White captures on d4 under favourable circumstances. After: 16.xf6 xf6 17.dxd4, De la Riva – Del Moral del Caz, Gijon 2002, 17...d7, Black obtains some compensation for the pawn.) 16.d2 (White failed to obtain any advantage in the game Klimov – Sarakauskas, St. Petersburg 2005, 16.xf6 xf6 17.xd4 b7 18.xc6 xc6 19.xe8+ xe8 20.c1 e5 and Black had a sufficient compensation for the pawn.). Now, Black has problems defending against the threat g3-h5 (e4), meanwhile his d4-pawn is hanging as before: 16...d6 (or 16...b7 17.g3±; 16...e5
4. \( \text{cxd4} \) e6 5. \( \text{dc3} \) \( \text{df6} \) 6. \( \text{db5} \) \( \text{b4} \) 7. a3 \( \text{xc3} \) 8. \( \text{xc3} \)

17.f4 \( \text{e6} \) 18.\( \text{g3} \pm \) 17.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \)

18.\( \text{xd4} \pm \)

\textbf{b2a) 12...\( \text{e8} \)}

This is a natural and good move for Black.

\textbf{13.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{e5} !? \)}

He attacks White’s bishop on g5 and he intends to trade the bishops with the move \( \text{xf5} \).

The move 13...\( \text{g4} \) does not have any separate importance, because after 14.\( \text{xe1} \) the game transposes to well familiar schemes.

About 13...\( \text{d6} \) 14.\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{g4} \) 15.\( \text{d2} \) – see 12...\( \text{g4} \) 13.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 14.\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 15.\( \text{d2} \).

13...h6. White’s bishop on g5 is not so well placed from the point of view of tactics, since it comes under attack after \( \text{e4} \), or \( \text{e5} \) and so its forced retreat to h4 is much rather in favour of White. 14.\( \text{h4} \) and here:

About 14...a6 15.\( \text{e1} \) – see 12...a6;

14...\( \text{d7} \) 15.f3 (In case of 15.\( \text{d2} \), Brandl – Anreiter, corr. 1991, White must consider the promising pawn-sacrifice for Black: 15...\( \text{e4} \) 16.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 17.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 18.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{ad8} \) – and Black’s compensation for the pawn is quite sufficient.) 15...g5 16.\( \text{xf2} \pm \)

14...\( \text{e6} \), Tzolas – Theofilopoulou, Hania 1998, 15.\( \text{d2} \) – and now the move 15...\( \text{e4} \) is not so good anymore, because the knight is not protected, therefore White can play simply 16.\( \text{d4} \pm ; \)

14...\( \text{g4} \) 15.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{e5} \), Breyther – Schleicher, Hamburg 2000 (about 15...g5 – see 12...\( \text{g4} \) 13.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{e8} \) 14.\( \text{e1} \) h6 15.\( \text{h4} \) g5), 16.\( \text{b5} \pm \) and if Black does not wish to exchange on e2 immediately; he would need to go back with his knight to c6 – because his d4-pawn is hanging;

14...g5. That move compromises considerably Black’s king shelter, but it is played with the idea to activate his pieces. 15.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e4} \) (About 15...\( \text{g4} \) 16.f3 – see 12...\( \text{g4} \) 13.\( \text{g5} \) h6 14.\( \text{h4} \) g5 15.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e8} \) 16.f3; 15...\( \text{b6} \) !?, Moshina – Doibani, Kishinev 2001, 16.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e4} \) 17.\( \text{e1} \) – and it cannot be good for Black to attack the b2-pawn, while his kingside is so vulnerable.) 16.f3 (It is weaker for White to play: 16.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{f5} \); or 16.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{g4} \) 17.f3 \( \text{b6} \).)

16...\( \text{c5} \) 17.\( \text{f2} \) (The position is rather unclear after: 17.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{b6} \) 18.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) 19.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{a6} \) 20.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{ad8} \); or 18.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 19.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{ed8} \) 20.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 21.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xd4} \).) 17...\( \text{xf6} \) 18.\( \text{b5} \) d3, Mista – Andres Gonzalez, Aviles 2001 and here White plays simply 19.\( \text{c3} \pm \).
Chapter 7

Black's tactical threats have been parried, his king is vulnerable and his position is in ruins.

14...\textbf{f}4 \textbf{d}5

This is a logical move. It is not worth for Black to retreat losing a tempo: 14...\textbf{e}8, Mastrovasilis – Pavlidou, Kavala 2005, 15...\textbf{f}e1±. It is also possible for Black to play: 14...\textbf{a}5 15...\textbf{g}3 \textbf{e}5 16...\textbf{x}e5, with a transposition to the main line, Zhao Jun – Stellwagen, Oropesa del Mar 2000.

15...\textbf{g}3

White prevents the exchange –\textbf{f}5.

15...\textbf{e}5

Black still forces the trade of one of his opponent's bishops. After 15...\textbf{b}6, Kountz – Roth, Baden 1999, White can prevent that exchange with the move 16...\textbf{e}4±. If 15...\textbf{g}4, Guerra – Khenkin, Coruna 1992, then White should not repel Black's bishop to g6. It is much more promising for him to opt for: 16...\textbf{d}2 \textbf{e}5 17...\textbf{x}e5 \textbf{x}e5 18...\textbf{f}e1 \textbf{xe}1+ 19...\textbf{xe}1 \textbf{b}6 20...\textbf{b}4±

16...\textbf{xe}5 \textbf{xe}5

Black has managed to simplify the position somehow, but he has made several moves with his rook left and right. He has remained with an isolated pawn and White's position continues to be slightly better.

17...\textbf{e}1

Now, after the exchange on e1, White transfers his queen to b4 and he attacks Black's queenside pawns from there. His other possibility is 17...\textbf{d}2 and ...\textbf{ad}1.

17...\textbf{xe}1+ 18...\textbf{xe}1 \textbf{e}6

Or 18...\textbf{b}6 19...\textbf{b}4± and after the exchange of queens, every variation leads to a better end-game for White.

19...\textbf{d}b4 \textbf{d}7

Anisimov – Michiels, Oropesa del Mar 2000 and here after: 20...\textbf{d}1± Black has difficulties protecting his d4-pawn. For example, after the natural line 20...\textbf{d}8 21...\textbf{c}3, he loses it altogether.

b2b) 12...\textbf{d}5

The idea of that move is to play \textbf{f}5 on the next move and to exchange the light-squared bishops, which is of course favourable for Black.
13. $\text{g}f4$

White wins a tempo by attacking Black's queen, but his knight is not so well placed on that square, since it covers the diagonal of the bishop on c1. Later he would need to redeploy his knight on f4 at some moment.

13... $\text{w}d6$

It is not so logical for Black to play immediately: 13... $\text{w}d8$
14. $\text{h}5$ (14. $\text{e}1!$?; 14. $\text{h}3!$?) 14... $\text{g}4$
15. $\text{h}3$ $\text{h}4??$ (15... $\text{g}e5$) 16. $\text{hxg}4$
$\text{hxg}4$

The move 13... $\text{c}5$, Ernst – Novoselski, Bolzano 1990, exposes Black’s queen to an attack after: 14. $\text{b}4$
$\text{w}6$
15. $\text{b}2$
$\text{e}8$
16. $\text{b}5$
$\text{e}5$
17. $\text{xd}4+-$ – and his d4-pawn is endangered too and after its exchange (c2-c3), White maintains the advantage thanks to his active bishops.

14. $\text{h}5$

Now, we will analyze in details the moves: b2b1) 14... $\text{g}4$, b2b2) 14... $\text{d}5$ and b2b3) 14... $\text{xh}5$.

The alternatives for Black are:

14... $\text{e}5$ – This is with the idea to force White to exchange on f6.
15. $\text{xf}6+$ $\text{xf}6$
16. $\text{h}5$
$\text{h}6$
Tjut-junnikov – Hasangatin, Orel 1996
(or 16... $\text{g}6$
17. $\text{g}5$
$\text{e}6$
18. $\text{h}6$
$\text{f}6$
19. $\text{ae}1$
$\text{f}7$
20. $\text{f}4+-$ – and Black’s kingside is so vulnerable that he is clearly worse in the middle game as well as in the endgame, Flores Rios – Jorczik, Batumi 2006),
17. $\text{f}4+-$ – White plans to counter 17... $\text{e}6$ with 18. $\text{f}5$. He has a powerful bishop-pair and a stable advantage. He can begin an attack against his opponent’s king with his g and f-pawns.

14... $\text{d}7$
15. $\text{f}4$
$\text{e}5$
(The endgame seems to be just terrible for Black after:
15... $\text{e}6$
16. $\text{e}1$
$\text{g}4$
17. $\text{xf}6+$ $\text{gx}f6$
18. $\text{xg}4$
$\text{xe}4$
19. $\text{h}5$
$\text{h}6$
$\text{fe}8$
21. $\text{f}4+$
16. $\text{e}1$
$\text{fe}8$
17. $\text{e}2$
$\text{g}4$
18. $\text{xe}5$
$\text{xe}2$
19. $\text{xd}6$
$\text{hx}5$
20. $\text{xe}8+$
$\text{xe}8$
21. $\text{c}5+-$ and Black loses a pawn without any compensation whatsoever;

14... $\text{e}8$
15. $\text{f}4$
$\text{e}6$. (Black remains much worse, but still it is possible that his best defensive line here is: 15... $\text{e}5$
16. $\text{e}1+$
and the pin is quite annoying for Black: 16... $\text{h}6$
17. $\text{h}3+$ $\text{e}2$; 16... $\text{g}4$?
17. $\text{xe}5$
$\text{xd}1$
18. $\text{xe}8+$
$\text{xe}8$
19. $\text{xd}6$
$\text{e}1+$
20. $\text{f}1$
$\text{hx}5$
21. $\text{b}4+$
16. $\text{e}1$
$\text{xe}1+$
17. $\text{xe}1$
$\text{xe}1+$
18. $\text{xe}1$
$\text{e}6$
19. $\text{xf}6+$
$\text{gx}f6+$ – and Black's pawn-structure is simply terrible in that endgame, Plachetka – Pons, Moscow 1994.)
b2b1) 14...\(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{f4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{d5}}\)

It is bad for Black to play:
15...\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{g3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{ge5}}\) 17.b4 \(\text{\texttt{b6}}\)
(17...\(\text{\texttt{e7}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{e1}}\)?) 18.\(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\)
19.\(\text{\texttt{xh7+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xh7}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{h5+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g8}}\)
21.\(\text{\texttt{xe5+}}\) and he has no compensation for the pawn, Livshits – Llaneza Vega, Olomouc 2001.

15...\(\text{\texttt{d8}}\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{g3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h4}}\) (In case of 16...\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{d2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{ge5}}\), White can afford giving up one of his bishops: 18.\(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe5}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e6}}\)
20.\(\text{\texttt{fe1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h6}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{wh4}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{f4+}}\) Teubert – Litz, Email 2001; if
16...\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{e1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e6}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{h3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e8}}\), Gutenev – Temirbaev, Salekhard 2006, then after the developing move – 19.\(\text{\texttt{d2}}!?\)? White is better.)
17.\(\text{\texttt{f5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf5}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{xf5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h6}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{g3}}\)
(White’s prospects are superior too after: 19.g3!? \(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{e4}})?)
19...\(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\) f5 21.f4 (That move is forced.) 21...\(\text{\texttt{g6}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{f3}}\)
\(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{d3}}\). The e3-square in White’s camp is weak indeed, but that does not provide Black with a sufficient counterplay. His knight cannot remain there for long, because of the undermining move – c3. On the other hand, the placement of White’s bishop on f3 on the long diagonal spells trouble for Black. In the game Karpov – Alburt, Daugavpils 1971, there followed: 23...\(\text{\texttt{ad8}}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{fe1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{h8}}\)
25.\(\text{\texttt{e2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{fe8}}\) 26.\(\text{\texttt{ae1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e3}}\) 27.\(\text{\texttt{b5}}\)
\(\text{\texttt{xe2}}\) 28.\(\text{\texttt{exe2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e3}}\) 29.\(\text{\texttt{d3}}\) h6
30.\(\text{\texttt{f3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e8}}\) 31.b4 a6 32.c3 \(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) 33.\(\text{\texttt{exe8+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{exe8}}\) 34.\(\text{\texttt{cxd4+}}\) – and White remained with a solid extra pawn.

16.\(\text{\texttt{g3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e6}}\)

The other possible set-up is not better for Black at all: 16...\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{d2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{e8}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{fe1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{d7}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) – and his knight has no good square to retreat to. He will need to go back with it: 19...\(\text{\texttt{g4}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{c4}}\)
\(\text{\texttt{d6}}\), van den Doel – Matikozian, Duisburg 1992, 21.b4 b6 (After
21...\(\text{\texttt{ge5}}\) 22.c5 \(\text{\texttt{f8}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\)
– the difference in the activity of the pieces is more than obvious.)
22.\(\text{\texttt{f4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{ac1}}\) – Black’s pieces are pinned, while White’s pawn-majority on the queenside is more important than Black’s passed d-pawn.

16...\(\text{\texttt{f5}}\) – That move looks logical, but it is too risky. Black’s attempt to stop White’s pawn-offensive on the kingside is in vain. 17.\(\text{\texttt{e1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{ge5}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{f1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g6}}\), Gruenberg – Vidonyak, Germany 2000 and here White maintains his advantage with the line: 19.\(\text{\texttt{c4}}\)
\(\text{\texttt{d8}}\) (It is not good for Black to let his opponent’s bishop to the d6-square – 19...\(\text{\texttt{f7}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{d6}}\))
20.\(\text{\texttt{f3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf4}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{xf4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 22.b4 and White is better, because of his superior pawn-structure. After the natural line: 22...\(\text{\texttt{e6}}\) (or 22...\(\text{\texttt{d7}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\)) Black ends up in trouble after: 23.b5 \(\text{\texttt{a5}}\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{h5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f7}}\) (or
24...\(\text{\texttt{g6}}\) 25.\(\text{\texttt{xg7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xg7}}\) 26.\(\text{\texttt{c7}}\))
25.\(\text{\texttt{xg7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xg7}}\) 26.\(\text{\texttt{e5}}\)
17.\(\text{\texttt{e1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f6}}\)

It is more or less the same after: 17...\(\text{\texttt{ad8}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{h3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{d2}}\)
\(\text{\texttt{c8}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{g5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{d6}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\) (White could have played even sim-
pler, for example with 21...\texttt{Qad1±})

21...\texttt{Qxe4} 22.\texttt{Qxe4} \texttt{Qb5} 23.\texttt{Qf4±}

Schlemmer Meyer – B. Stein, Germany 1993 and White’s position improves with every move, for example after: 23...\texttt{Qdd8} 24.\texttt{Qd3±}

18.\texttt{h3} \texttt{Qfe8} 19.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qac8} 20.\texttt{Qad1} \texttt{Qd7} 21.\texttt{Qe2} \texttt{Qd5}

Naturally, it is too risky for Black to leave White’s knight on h5 so close in the vicinity of his king, but he plans to defend somehow with moves like f5 or f6. It is far from easy for White though, to attack the g7-square with other pieces.

15.\texttt{Qf3} \texttt{Qe8}

About 15...\texttt{Qe6} 16.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qfe8} 17.\texttt{Qae1} – see 15...\texttt{Qe8}.

After 15...\texttt{Qd8} 16.\texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Qd7}, Ernst – Faldt, Malmo 1992, 17.\texttt{Qd2} – Black must retreat his rook to the e8-square losing a tempo, because it is useless on d8 anyway.

It is not good for Black to play:

15...\texttt{Qe5} 16.\texttt{Qg3} \texttt{Qg4} (He weakens the shelter of his king considerably with: 16...\texttt{Qg6} 17.\texttt{Qh6} \texttt{Qe8} 18.\texttt{Qae1±} Ramo – M. Rodriguez, Aragon 1991.) 17.\texttt{Qxg7} (Or 17.\texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Qfe8} 18.\texttt{Qxe5} and in the game Isupov – A. Platonov, Orel 1996, the position became suddenly very dangerous for White after: 18...\texttt{Qxe5} 19.\texttt{Qxg4} \texttt{Qe1+} 20.\texttt{Qf1} \texttt{Qg6} – since he could not repel his opponent’s rook away from his first rank.) 17...\texttt{Qxg7} 18.h3 \texttt{Qf3+} (otherwise Black simply remains with his pawn-structure in ruins) 19.\texttt{gxf3} \texttt{Qxg3+} 20.\texttt{fxg3} \texttt{Qxh3} 21.\texttt{Qf2} \texttt{Qe6} 22.\texttt{Qh2}±

16.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qe6} 17.\texttt{Qae1} \texttt{Qad8}

(diagram)

This position was reached in two games.

In the encounter Szalanczy – Khenkin, Budapest 1991, there
followed: 18...\texttt{e}e4 f5 19...\texttt{e}e2 g6 (After
19...\texttt{e}e5 20...\texttt{g}g3\texttt{f}, strangely
enough, White failed to exploit the
weakening of the dark squares.)
20...\texttt{f}fe1\texttt{f} g0 h5 21...\texttt{x}h5 (It de-
serves attention for White to try
here: 21...\texttt{g}g5\texttt{f} \texttt{e}a8 22...\texttt{x}xf5.) 21...
\texttt{e}7 22.h4 \texttt{h}8 23...\texttt{g}g5 \texttt{f}7 24...\texttt{f}f3
\texttt{x}xe2 25...\texttt{x}xe2 \texttt{f}f8 – Black parried
White’s threats and he preserved
his material advantage.

In the game Morozevich
– Khenkin, Cappelle la Grande
1992, after 18...\texttt{g}g5 \texttt{e}e5 19...\texttt{g}g3
\texttt{d}xd3, White did not obtain any
advantage with the combination:
20...\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{x}f8 21...\texttt{h}6 (or 21...\texttt{c}xd3
\texttt{f}6), because of: 21...\texttt{h}3f4\texttt{f}! 22...\texttt{x}xf4
\texttt{x}xf4 23...\texttt{x}f4 \texttt{f}6 with an approxi-
mately equal position.

It deserved attention for White
to opt for: 18...\texttt{e}e2\texttt{f} f?, with the
idea to follow with \texttt{f}fe1, avoiding
attack against his rooks and sim-
ply doubling them. He could thus
postpone for a while the creation
of concrete threats on the king-
side.

\texttt{b}b3\texttt{b}3] 14...\texttt{x}h5 15...\texttt{x}h5
(diagram)
15...\texttt{h}6

Or 15...f5 16...\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{e}e6 17...\texttt{e}e1
\texttt{d}d5 18...\texttt{c}c4 dxc3 19...\texttt{xc}c3 \texttt{g}g6 20.
\texttt{w}h3 (\texttt{f}e3) 20...\texttt{g}g4 21...\texttt{x}g4
fxg4 22...\texttt{e}e3\texttt{f} – and after the ex-
change of several pawns, White
obtains a long-lasting advantage
with his powerful bishop pair,
Golubev – Todorovic, Bela Crkva
1990.

16...\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{d}d7

Black must develop some-
how and his possibilities are not
so great. Either he must go with
his bishop to \texttt{d}7, or he must de-
defend against \texttt{x}h6 with the move
\texttt{e}e6.

Black loses after: 16...\texttt{e}e6
17...\texttt{x}h6 \texttt{g}xh6 (17...\texttt{g}g4 18...\texttt{f}f4+-)
18...\texttt{x}h6+-

In case of 16...\texttt{f}f6, Harlamov
– E.Platonov, Krasnodar 1999,
White has the interesting reply
17...\texttt{d}d5\texttt{f}?, threatening 18...\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{g}6
19...\texttt{x}h6. Black can hardly find
any satisfactory defence: 17...\texttt{h}4
(or 17...\texttt{e}e7 18...\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{g}g6 19...\texttt{d}d2↑
and White dominates all over the
board; 17...\texttt{e}e6 18...\texttt{e}e4+-) 18...\texttt{d}d2
and it is not good for Black to con-
tinue with: 18...\texttt{e}e6 (After 18...
\texttt{d}d8 19...\texttt{g}g3 – White can base his
plan on the weakness of Black's
eighth rank – 19...exf6 20.exe4 g6 21.exh6+ 19.exe6 exe6 20.wxe6+ h8 21.ge6 xf2+ (or 21...g8 22.wh7+ 23.e1+) 22.h1 g8 23.exh6 f7 24.wh7+ f8 25.whh8+ e7 26.g5+, or 20...f7 21.f3+ – and White regains the exchange and he remains with a solid extra pawn.

17.wh4 efe8

After 17...f5 18.cf4 ef6 19.xf6 xf6 20.h4+ f3, cf2 White has the edge in the endgame, Belyaev – Lots, Ordzhonikidze 2004.

17...eae8 18.cf4 ed5 19.g3 e6 (It is possibly better for Black to play 19...h8, with the idea to follow with f5. White maintains his advantage too after: 20.d6 exe1+ 21.exe1 e8 22.exe8+ exe8 23.h3+ – since the exchange of the two pairs of rooks has led to a very favourable endgame for him, Kozlitin – Tomilin, Russia 2000. In case of 20...eg8, Haen-sel – Neymann, Greifswald 2002, White should follow with 21.cf4+, preventing f5.) 20.exe6 exe6 21.d2 we5 (After 21...e8 22.e1 exe1+ 23.exe1 exe1+ 24.cf1, White gradually consolidates his position and then his material advantage should be decisive, for example: 24...f5 25.cf4 e6 26.d2+, or 24...e1 25.d3) 22.e1 xg3 23 hxg3+. White is clearly better in that endgame. Later, in the game Tiviakov – Sorokin, St. Petersburg 1993, there followed: 23...e8 24.xe8+ xxe8 25.f4 d7 26.cf2 xf8 27.e4 e7 28.e2 d6 29.d3 b6 30.b4+- e6 (or 30...xb4+ 31.axb4 d4--) 31.f3 f5 32.cf4 a5 33.d5+! xf6 34.d6 d5 35.c7 and Black resigned, because White's king penetrates into his camp.

18.cf2

Contrary to the variation 17...eae8, after 18.cf4 ed5 19.g3, White does not have the threat d6 and following: 19...h8 20.b4 a6 21.c7, Payen – Rosandic, Cannes 1995, 21...f5= Black equalizes gradually.

18...e5


The endgame is worse for Black after the exchanges: 18...e6 19.exe6 exe6 20.e1 g4 21.xg4 xg4 22.f4 g6 23.b4±. White has a bishop pair and a clear advantage and Black’s attempt to obtain some counterplay after: 23...a6 24.a4 a5 25.b5 d4, Vehi Bach – San Segundo, San Sebastian 1995, should end rather badly for him in view of the line: 26.e4 b8 27.h3 f5 (27...d7 28.axb4 axb4 29.d1+) 28.xf5 gxf5 29.xb4 axb4 30.b1+, or 26...e8 27.xb4 axb4 28.xb7 xc2 29.e4+- db6.

In the game Korneev – Mellado Trivino, Malaga 2000, in answer to 18...a6, White entered an endgame, but not under most favourable circumstances for him:
19.\( \text{xf}4 \) (He had better make a useful waiting move like for example 19.\( \text{ad}1! ? \)). 19...\( \text{xf}4 \) 20.\( \text{xf}4 \) g5 21.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 22.\( \text{xf}1 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}5 \) 23.\( \text{ed}1 \) \( \text{ac}8 \) 24.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \)=

It also deserves attention for White to counter 18...a5, Darr – Juozapenas, Dos Hermanas 2004, with the move 19.\( \text{ad}1 \). 19.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \)

Black is trying to force some simplification at the price of a pawn. His other options would not solve his problems, for example: 19...\( \text{g}6 \), Raeuchle – Kaus, Email 1999, 20.\( \text{xd}6 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 21.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 22.\( \text{f}1 \).

It is quite possible that the least of evils for Black is – 19...\( \text{e}7 \) 20.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{ae}8 \) 21.\( \text{ae}1 \) f6 22.\( \text{g}3 \), although his position remains clearly worse even then. For example, White is threatening the rather unpleasant transfer of his bishop to the b4-square.

20.\( \text{g}3 \)\( \pm \) \( \text{g}6 \) (20...\( \text{xd}3 \) 21.\( \text{hx}6 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 22.\( \text{cd}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 23.\( \text{f}4 \); 20...\( \text{g}4 \) 21.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 22.\( \text{hx}6 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 23.\( \text{g}5 \)\( \pm \)) 21.\( \text{gx}6 \) \( \text{fg}6 \) 22.\( \text{gx}6 \) \( \text{gx}1 \)\( \pm \) 23.\( \text{xe}1 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 24.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{xc}2 \) 25.\( \text{hx}6 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 26.\( \text{e}5 \)\( \pm \) – and White not only has an extra pawn, but his attack seems to be decisive, Tiviakov – Maljutin, Montecatini Terme 1994.

b2c) 12...\( \text{g}4 \)

This is the main line for Black and the entire system with the move 6...\( \text{b}4 \) owes its resurrection to it during the years 2001-2003, when it was tested even at the highest level.

The pin of the knight on e2 looks a bit strange, but it is connected with a concrete idea. Black provokes the move f2-f3, which weakens the e3-square and later he can exploit that with the maneuver \( \text{f}6 \)-d5-e3. If White does not play f2-f3, in some variations he must consider the possibility for Black to exchange on e2 and after the capture \( \text{xe}2 \) – to follow with the move \( \text{e}4 \).

13.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{d}6 \)

That logical move is the best for Black – he unpins immediately his knight on f6.

His other possibilities are:

13...\( \text{h}5 \) – with the idea to
trade the light-squared bishops on g6. 14.\textit{\textbackslash bd}2 \textit{\textbackslash bd}g6, Morawietz – Abdul Rahim, Oberwart 1994, 15.\textit{\textbackslash e}ad1 (The d4-pawn would come under attack after the exchange of the bishops.) 15...\textit{\textbackslash e}c8 16.\textit{\textbackslash bd}b5 h6 (Or 16...\textit{\textbackslash dd}e4 17.\textit{\textbackslash dx}d8 \textit{\textbackslash dx}d2 18.\textit{\textbackslash dx}d2 \textit{\textbackslash dx}d8 19.\textit{\textbackslash fd}d4 – and White wins a pawn.) 17.\textit{\textbackslash dx}f6 \textit{\textbackslash dx}f6 18.\textit{\textbackslash dx}c6 bxc6 19.\textit{\textbackslash dx}d4 \textit{\textbackslash dx}d4 20.\textit{\textbackslash dx}d4 \textit{\textbackslash dx}c2 21.\textit{\textbackslash ec}1± – and Black has a weakness on the c6-square; After 13...\textit{\textbackslash de}5, Talla – Hangatgin, Czech Republic 1997, Black exchanges the bishop on d3, but he weakens his d4-pawn. 14.f3!? (In this position White is not afraid of the transfer of Black's knight to the e3-square, while it would be useful for him to preserve the knight on e2 in order to attack his opponent's d4-pawn.) 14...\textit{\textbackslash de}6 (or 14...\textit{\textbackslash dh}5 15.\textit{\textbackslash df}4 \textit{\textbackslash dg}6 16.\textit{\textbackslash dx}g6±) 15.\textit{\textbackslash ec}1± and White is better – Black has serious problems with the protection of his d4-pawn, since it is not good for him to follow with: 15...\textit{\textbackslash bd}6 16.\textit{\textbackslash xf}6 gxf6 17.\textit{\textbackslash wd}d2±;

13...\textit{\textbackslash de}8 14.\textit{\textbackslash de}1 \textit{\textbackslash dh}5 (About 14...\textit{\textbackslash wd}6 15.\textit{\textbackslash wd}d2 – see 13...\textit{\textbackslash wd}6; Black weakens his kingside without any compensation after: 14...h6 15.\textit{\textbackslash dh}4 g5 16.\textit{\textbackslash dg}3 \textit{\textbackslash dh}5 17.f3 \textit{\textbackslash dx}g3 18.\textit{\textbackslash dx}g3 \textit{\textbackslash de}6 19.\textit{\textbackslash wd}d2± L.Fernandez – Cheype, Aix-les-Bains 2006. The move 14...\textit{\textbackslash de}5, Escalante – Jimenez Lopez, Gran Canaria 2002, also weakens the d4-pawn and White's simplest line against that is: 15.\textit{\textbackslash bd}5 \textit{\textbackslash dc}6 16.f3, while in answer to 16...\textit{\textbackslash wb}6, it would be enough for White to continue with 17.\textit{\textbackslash ad}3±, exchanging on f6, compromising Black's pawn-structure on the kingside.) 15.\textit{\textbackslash bd}2 \textit{\textbackslash dg}6 16.\textit{\textbackslash df}4 \textit{\textbackslash dd}6 17.\textit{\textbackslash dx}g6 hxg6 18.\textit{\textbackslash fd}4± – White has preserved his two bishops and that provides him with a slight but stable advantage, Small – Watson, New Zealand 1982; 13...h6.

One of the main ideas for Black in this variation is to exchange on e2 and after White's capturing with the bishop to follow with \textit{\textbackslash dc}6-e4, attacking the bishop on g5, so that move, which forces the bishop to retreat from the g5-square, only restricts Black's possibilities. 14.\textit{\textbackslash dh}4 g5 (Or 14...\textit{\textbackslash wd}6, Kirillov – A.Zaitsev, Minsk 1962, 15.\textit{\textbackslash ec}1 and later White plays analogously to the main line 13...\textit{\textbackslash wd}6, except that, as we have already pointed out, the difference is in favour of White – the bishop on g5 is more vulnerable than on h4. 14...\textit{\textbackslash dx}e2 15.\textit{\textbackslash xe}2 \textit{\textbackslash de}8 (In case of 15...\textit{\textbackslash wd}6, Zozulia – C.Fois, Marseille 2006, it looks very good for...
White to follow with: 16.\textit{fxf6 e8} 17.f3 f6 18.fxf6 gxf6 19.f4\pm, or 16...f6 17.f1+ and White occupies the e-file. If we add to that the vulnerability of Black’s d4-pawn and the total dominance of White’s pieces all over the board, we can assume that Black’s defence would be very difficult.)

16.f3 d5 17.xd5 xd5 18.f1 f4 19.f1 g5 20.g3 xe1 21.xe1 e6 22.c4\pm and the endgame is evidently favourable for White, because his bishops are clearly stronger than Black’s knights, Aleksandrov - Karapchanski, Varna 1995.)

16.g3\pm - The weaknesses on Black’s kingside will surely affect the outcome of the fight. 15.d5 (Or 15.h5 16.f3 xg3 17.xg3 d7 18.f4+- and White has decisive threats against Black’s king, Alamany - Masdeu, St Cugat 1994; 15.e8 16.f3 h5 17.f2 d5 18.d2 ad8 19.ad1 g7 20.g3 g6, Dworakowska – Jensen, Istanbul 2000, 21.f4 xe4 22.xe4 xe4 23.c4 c5 24.b4\rightarrow, White captures then on g5 with a powerful attack; 15.d5 16.f3 h5 17.c4! dxc3 18.xc3 d4+ 19.f2 d7 20.e4 e6 21.c5\pm - and Black’s queen is misplaced, his kingside has been compromised and he would hardly survive for long, Shmuter – Khmelnitsky, Lviv 1990.)

16.d2 b6 17.b4 e8 18.f1 a6 19.h4\pm - Black’s king is seriously endangered, Gobet – Kivisto, Groningen 1981.

**14.e1**

The other possibility for White here is – 14.d2 xe2 15.f4 d5 16.xe2 e8 17.f1 ad8 18.d3 e5 19.xe5 xe5 20.xe5 xe5 21.e1\pm – but after the exchange of one of the bishops, Black practically equalizes, Leko – Grischuk, Linares 2001.

14...f8

This is the most logical and strongest line for Black.

14.a5 – It is far from clear why Black plays that move now, because White was not planning to follow with b4 anyway. 15.d2 d5, Mainka – B.Stein, Dortmund 1987 and here White had the tactical possibility 16.c4\pm and Black could not play 16...dxc3? 17.xc3 – because he would be incapable of protecting his knight on d5, while the move 17...xc3, naturally would lose, because of 18.xh7+.

In case of 14...h6, White should better play 15.h4 – and as we have already explained, Black loses the important tactical motive e4, when he repels White’s bishop from the g5-square. (It is worse for White to play 15.f4,
Schlosser – B. Stein, Budapest 1987, 15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xf4 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xf4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd1 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}fe8 and the endgame is quite acceptable for Black.

14...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}ad8 – That move deserves attention for Black. He protects his d4-pawn and he plans to follow that with \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e5. 15.f3. Now, Black has his knight on f6 pinned and so he will need to remove his rook from d8 in order to follow with \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d5, so White can weaken the e3-square. (Black's chances of equalizing are greater after: 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e5 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g3, V.Gurevich – Mashinskaya, Koszalin 1999, 16...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd3?? 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd3 h6 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xf6 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8=) 15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}de8 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2± \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f4, with a slight advantage for White.

14...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h5 – That move is played with the idea to trade the bishops, but Black loses too many tempi in doing that. 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g6 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}ad1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}ad8, Klundt – Heining, Stuttgart 2001, 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}fe8 (The line 17...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd3 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}f5 is evidently unfavourable for Black.) 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xf5 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xf5± – and after the exchange of the bishop with which Black has lost so many tempi, he has no counterplay in sight at all.

15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2

(diagram)

15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}xe2

That is the idea behind the development of the bishop to g4. In case White manages to put his knight on g3 – then the placement of Black’s bishop on g4 becomes senseless.

15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e4? 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}xe4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}e4 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}3+-

15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h6 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}d5 (or 16...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}d7 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}g3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}d5 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}h6± Meikhitarian – Di Berardino, Buenos Aires 2007; after 18...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}xh6, White follows with 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}h6 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e6 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h3, regaining his piece, after which Black's position is nearly hopeless.) 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c4 dxc3 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}xc3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h5 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}b5± and White transfers his knight to the d6-outpost.

After 15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}ad8 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h6 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f8 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e4 (or 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d5± Hoffmann – Haener, Basel 2006) 18...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}xe4 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}xe4± White ends up with a slight edge.

15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h5 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f4. This move practically forces the exchange of queens (It is not good for Black to allow doubling of his f-pawns.) in a favourable situation for White.

16...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}ad8 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xd6 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xd6 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g6 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xe8+ \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}e8 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f6 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}g6 hxg6 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f1± Dunis – Rosin, Nice 2005.

15...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}ac8 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g3 (16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f4?) 16...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}5 (It is not good for Black to try: 16...a6 17.h3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d7, Hartman – Finnlaugsson, Sweden 1992, in view of: 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xf6 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}6
Chapter 7

20...c5 d5 21...xf5 xf5 22...xb7 d5 23...d4±) 17...4h5 18.e4 dxe3 19.dxe3 f5 20...x5, Mikhalkishin – Guseinov, Baku 1983 and here after: 20...e5 21.h3 22...xf5± White ends up with a solid extra pawn. After the correct line – 17...c5, White maintains his advantage after the exchange: 18...xe5 xe5 19...xe5 xe5 20...e1 d5 (It is not advisable for Black to continue with: 20...d6 21...f5 d8 22...xg4 dxe4 23...g5± 17...f5) 21...f4 e6 22...e5± and e4 with an initiative for White on the kingside.

16...f4!

That is an important intermediate move. In the forced variations after: 16...xe2 xe2 17...xe2 xe8, White fails to maintain any advantage: 18...f3 (or 18...d2 e5= Kineva – N.Nikolaev, Smolensk 2005) 18...e5 19...f4 (Or 19...xb7 xd3 20.cxd3 xe5 21...d2 g4 22.f4 e2 and only White risks losing that position.) 19...b6 20...xf6 xd3 21.g3 (or 21...xd4 xf6 22...xf6 gxf6 23.cxd3 e2 24...b1 d2= Dworakowska – Ptacnikova, Istanbul 2000) 21...xf6 22...xd3 b6= Kudrin – Rogers, London 1988.

16...d7

It is hardly any better for Black to opt for: 16...d5 17...xe2 e4 18...d3 c5 19...c4 f5 20.g3 h6 21.b4 e6 22...d3 f6 23...d4±. As usual in that variation, if White manages to prevent the exchange of the bishops, he maintains a clear advantage. Later, in the game Tiviakov – Halkias, Amsterdam 2006, here followed: 23...g5 24.f4 e7 25.h4 e5 26.wxd4 xd8 27...xa7 e6 28.f5 xd3 29.cxd3 d4 30.e5 and Black failed to regain his pawn: 30...w7 31.e8+ e8 32.h2 g5 33.b6 gxf4 34...xf4 f5 35.f4 xg3 36.fxg3 e6 37.f2 xd3 38.c1±

17...xe2?!

In the famous game Kasparov – Grischuk, Cannes 2001, White followed with: 17...xe2 xe2 18...xe2 (18...xe2!?) 18...e8 19...f1 e6 20.h3. White’s position would have been better if he had managed to occupy the e-file. He failed to do that in the game though...and after: 20...h6 21.d1 d5 22.g3 f6 23.f4 d5 24.d2, Black had the tactical strike: 24...e3! 25.fxe3 dxe3 26...e2 (or 26...e1 exd2 27...e6 e6 28...e2 d4 29...f2...xe2+ 30...xe2...xe2 31...xe2 f8 32...xd2 e7=) 26...exd2 27...xe6...xe6 28...xd2 – and White’s edge was only symbolic.

17...e4
In case Black follows the recommendation of GM V. Golod: 17...\texttt{W}f5 18.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{g}e4, it deserves attention for White to force the exchange of queens with: 19.f3 \texttt{e}xd2 20.\texttt{x}xf5 \texttt{e}c4 21.\texttt{g}e4 h6 (or 21...\texttt{x}xb2 22.\texttt{e}eb1 \texttt{e}c4 23.\texttt{x}xb7\texttt{x}) 22.b3\texttt{+} with a slight but stable advantage for him.

17...\texttt{e}e7 18.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{a}e8 19.\texttt{e}xe7 \texttt{exe}7 20.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{exe}1\texttt{+} (After 20...\texttt{e}6, White can avoid the trade of the rooks and he can play 21.\texttt{b}d1\texttt{+}, threatening Black's d4-pawn.) 21.\texttt{w}xe1 h6 22.\texttt{we}2\texttt{+} – and in that position White has a long lasting advantage with his bishop pair, while Black has no easy counterplay, Kupreichik – Palatnik, Rostov 1980.

18.\texttt{wd}3 \texttt{f}5

This move turns out to be a loss of time, but Black equalizes neither after: 18...\texttt{ac}8 19.\texttt{ad}1\texttt{+}, nor following 18...\texttt{c}5 19.\texttt{wc}4 \texttt{f}5 20.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{ad}8 (20...\texttt{e}6 21.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{e}4 22.\texttt{d}d3\texttt{+}) 21.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{e}6 22.\texttt{f}3\texttt{+} – and White manages to repel his opponent's active pieces and his bishops are stronger than Black's knights.

19.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{wd}7

That retreat does not look good, but Black is worse anyway after: 19...\texttt{f}6 20.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{c}c5 21.\texttt{b}5 g5(21...\texttt{e}6? 22.\texttt{xb}7+-) 22.\texttt{xc}6 \texttt{bx}c6 23.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{gx}f4 24.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{f}3 25.\texttt{xe}8\texttt{+} \texttt{exe}8 26.\texttt{h}4\texttt{+} (V. Golod).

In case of 19...\texttt{a}5, Korneev – Lenic, Nova Gorica 2006, it looks very good for White to play 20.b4! – since the weakening of the c3-square seems to be immaterial, for example: 20...\texttt{b}6 21.\texttt{f}3, followed by \texttt{d}d3\texttt{+} 20.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{c}5 21.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{e}6 22.\texttt{d}2\texttt{+}

White has neutralized his opponent's activity in the centre. Black's pieces have been forced to retreat to passive positions and White's stable positional advantage is obvious. The game Sadvakasov – Al Modiahki, Doha 2003 continued with: 22...\texttt{ac}8 23.\texttt{d}5 \texttt{c}7 (23...\texttt{xd}5 24.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{cd}8 25.\texttt{g}2\texttt{+}) 24.\texttt{ac}1 \texttt{cd}8 25.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{e}7 26.\texttt{wh}4 \texttt{de}8 27.\texttt{g}2 \texttt{h}6 28.\texttt{wh}5 \texttt{g}5 29.\texttt{exe}7 \texttt{xe}7 30.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{e}6 31.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{w}d7 32.\texttt{g}4\texttt{!} \texttt{f}8 33.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xe}1\texttt{+} 34.\texttt{xe}1 \texttt{xd}7 35.b4\texttt{+} \texttt{f}8 (or 35...\texttt{de}5?!\texttt{+}) 36.f4! a6 37.\texttt{f}2\texttt{+} – and White simply approached with his king Black's d4-pawn and gobbled it.
Conclusion

The order of moves, which we have analyzed in the last two chapters – 1.e4 c5 2.d3 c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.cxd4 f6 5.c3 e6 – enables White, contrary for example to the Paulsen variation, to play 6.db5, exploiting the weakness of the d6-square.

As you have seen in our chapter 6, these lines, in which Black allows his opponent to deploy a piece (a knight and after its exchange – the queen and sometimes the bishop) on the d6-square, they all lead to a worse position for Black. That is not surprising, because whenever Black’s pawn is on d7, he has great problems to develop his queenside; meanwhile White also has the two-bishop advantage.

It is a little better for Black (naturally with the exception of the moves 6...d6 and 6...b4) to play 6...c5, after which it is pointless for White to check on d6. In the main line – 7.f4 0–0 8.c7 e7 9.d6 xd6 10.xd6 c8 11.xe7 xe7 12.0–0 f5 13.d6 xd6 14.xd6 fx e4 15.xe4 – Black ends up in a slightly worse endgame with a bad light-squared bishop.

The evaluation of the system 6...b4 7.a3 xc3+ 8.xc3 d5 9.exd5 exd5 is more complex. Black presents his opponent with the two-bishop advantage and he complies with the isolation of his central pawn. Still, Black has a free development and a powerful counterplay. In the main lines after: 10...d4 11.e2 f5, as well as: 10...0–0 11.0–0 d4 12.e2 g4, or 12...e5, White can maintain his advantage only by a very precise play. His chances are to either attack Black’s d4-pawn (d2, ad1, often – b4 and b2), or to play on the kingside (g5, g3, doubling rooks along the e-file). White should better try to keep both his bishops on the board, since that would provide him with a better endgame.

Black had good results at the beginning of the 21st century in the variation – 12.g4 and that on the highest possible level. Presently however, White has found a correct order of moves and that enables him to maintain his advantage.
Chapter 8  

1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) \(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) e6 5.\(\text{\textit{c3}}\) a6

This move gained popularity thanks to the efforts of GM M.Taimanov. It has been often used by V.Jansa, An.Karpov and U.Andersson etc. It is also a part of the opening repertoire of some contemporary players like V.Anand, P.Svidler, V.Ivanchuk, S.Rublevskhy, A.Volokitin and many others.

6.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) bxc6

Capturing with the other pawn leads to a difficult endgame for Black after: 6...dxc6? 7.\(\text{\textit{xd8+}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd8}}\) 8.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) b5 (8...\(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 9.0–0–0+ \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 10.e5 \(\text{\textit{b4}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{e4}}\)± Ghadimi – Scepanik, Kiel 2006) 9.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\) f6 10.0–0–0+ \(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{e5}}\)± and White has a space advantage, superior development and he dominates on the d-file, Keres – Gerusel, Dortmund 1973.

7.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\)

Now, we will analyze: a) 7...\(\text{\textit{e5}}\), b) 7...\(\text{\textit{d6}}\), c) 7...\(\text{\textit{c7}}\), while the most popular move – 7...d5 will be dealt with in the next chapter.

7...\(\text{\textit{e7}}\)?! – Black’s knight is too passive here. 8.0–0 \(\text{\textit{g6}}\) 9.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{h5}}\) 0–0 11.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\)± Borg – Pepe, corr. 1997.

7...\(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 8.0–0 \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 9.e5 \(\text{\textit{d5}}\), Balka – Cesek, Brno 2004, 10. \(\text{\textit{g4}}\)±

7...\(\text{\textit{g6}}\) – That move weakens the dark squares on the kingside. 8.e5 \(\text{\textit{g7}}\) 9.f4 f6, Dunlop – Pickett, Auckland 1922 (In answer to 9...d6, White obtains a powerful initiative with: 10.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{e4}}\)± and now it is too risky for Black to win a pawn, because after: 11...dxe5 12.fxe5 \(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{f6}}\)\(+\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 0–0 15.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\)\(\underline{\text{\textit{e7}}\})\) (It is worse for Black to try: 11...\(\text{\textit{f8}}\) 12.0–0\(\rightarrow\) 12.\(\text{\textit{c4}}\) e4 (It is harder to better for Black to opt for: 12...\(\text{\textit{exf4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) d5 14.\(\text{\textit{e5}}\) \(\text{\textit{b6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\)\(\underline{\text{\textit{e4}}\})\) 13.\(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) d5 14.\(\text{\textit{e5}}\) \(\text{\textit{c7}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\)\(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) 16.fxe5 \(\text{\textit{xe5}}\)±...
17.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{e2}\) 18.0-0± White has an excellent compensation for the pawn, because of the vulnerability of the dark squares in Black's camp.

7...\(\text{c5}\) – This move compromises Black's kingside. 8.0-0 \(\text{e7}\) (about 8...d5 9.\(\text{g4}\) – see 7...d5 8.0-0 \(\text{c5}\) 9.\(\text{g4}\), Chapter 5) 9.\(\text{h5}\) \(\text{d4}\), Tran – Stadler, Bayern 1995 and here White obtains an overwhelming advantage opening the f-file with: 10.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{xe3}\) 11.\(\text{fxe3}\) 0-0 12.e5\(±\). White's central pawns are doubled indeed, but Black can hardly exploit that, while White has good attacking prospects and the endgame might be excellent for him due to his dominance over the dark squares.

7...\(\text{b4}\) – That move weakens the kingside as well. 8.0-0 \(\text{e7}\) (about 8...d5 9.e5 – see 7...d5 8.0-0 \(\text{b4}\) 9.e5; after 8...d6, A.Anderssen – De Vere, Baden-Baden 1870, White can emphasize the unfavourable placement of his opponent's dark-squared bishop with: 9.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{f6}\) 10.\(\text{g5±}\) 9.a3 \(\text{xc3}\) 10.\(\text{xc3}\) 0-0, Selby – Taylor, Churchill 2000 and now it seems very good for White to occupy additional space with: 11.e5 \(\text{a5}\) 12.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{g6}\) (or 12...\(\text{xc3}\) 13.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{d4}\) 14.\(\text{b4}\) c5 15.c3 \(\text{d5}\) 16.\(\text{c4}+\)-) 13.\(\text{e2}±\) – White has a superior position thanks to his two bishops and extra space. It is too dangerous for Black to gobble a pawn with: 13...\(\text{xc3}\) 14.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{d4}\) 15.\(\text{b4}\) \(\text{e8}\) 16.\(\text{ad1}\) and White leads in development and he has an excellent compensation for the pawn. Black loses rather quickly if he tries to simplify with: 16...\(\text{f4}\) 17.\(\text{h7}\)\(±\) 18.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{c4}\) 19.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xc2}\) 20.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{g8}\) 21.\(\text{d6}+\).

7...\(\text{b7}\) 8.0-0 d6 (about 8...d5 9.e1 – see 7...d5 8.0-0 \(\text{b7}\) 9.e1, Chapter 5; in answer to 8...c5, Marra – Lebredo, Brazil 2005, it is good for White to gain some space: 9.e5 \(\text{c7}\) 10.e1 \(\text{e7}\) 11.\(\text{h5±}\) 9.e3 d5, Ascenzo – Dass, Internet 2004 and here after: 10.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{f6}\) 11.e5 \(\text{d7}\) 12.f4 c5 13.c4\(±\) White enjoys a typical position with chances for initiative.

7...\(\text{f6}\) – That move is less logical than the main line. White occupies the centre and Black is doomed to create additional pawn-weaknesses. 8.e5 \(\text{d5}\) 9.e4 \(\text{c7}\) (In answer to: 9...d6, Korneev – T.Sanz, Manresa 2004, the simplest line for White is: 10.\(\text{b4}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 11.\(\text{exd6}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 12.0-0\(±\) and he has a stable edge due to his powerful bishop-pair. If Black tries to simplify the position with 12...\(\text{b4}\), then after: 13.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xd1}\) 14.\(\text{xd1}\) f5 15.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f7}\) 16.\(\text{f3}\)\(±\) he remains with weak pawns and vulnerable dark squares; after: 9...f5 10.\(\text{exf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\), Groszpeter – Kosoric, Rethymnon 2003, it seems very good for White to follow with 11.\(\text{g5}\) and after: 11...\(\text{g7}\) 12.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 13.\(\text{h5}\)\(±\) \(\text{f8}\) 14.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 15.0-0\(±\) Black has
problems defending his king as well as his central pawns, which are much rather a liability than strength. It looks slightly better for him to try: 11...$\text{a}5+ 12.$\text{d}2
$\text{b}4 13.$\text{c}3 $\text{e}7 14.$\text{c}4+, but even then Black can hardly activate his light-squared bishop without creating weak pawns.) 10.$\text{f}4$ $\text{c}5
(After: 10... $\text{e}7 11.$\text{c}4 $\text{b}4 12.$\text{b}1
$c5 13.0-0 $\text{b}7 14.$\text{e}3± Black has no active prospects in sight, he lacks space and his $c5$ and $d7$-pawns remain vulnerable, Spasov – Makridis, Kavala 2001. The following variation was tested in a game between computers: 10...
$\text{b}6 11.$\text{a}3 $\text{e}7 12.$\text{c}4 $\text{e}3$, Fritz 5.32 – Junior 5.0, 2000 and here after: 13.$\text{e}2 $\text{f}5 14.$b4± White had plenty of extra space without any counterplay for Black. White has a stable advantage too after:
10...d6 11.exd6 $\text{xd}6 12.$\text{xd}6+ $\text{xd}6 13.0-0± Guillen Ramirez – Montecinos, Managua 2001.) 11.$\text{c}4 $\text{b}4 (The other retreat is not any better: 11... $\text{b}6 12.0-0 $\text{b}7 13.$\text{e}2± – Black’s knight on $b6$ has no active prospects whatsoever, Priborsky – Routner, Havelkuv Brod 2005.) 12.$\text{b}1 $\text{b}7 13.0-0
$\text{xe}4 (In answer to 13... $\text{d}8$, Beckemeier – Roese, Germany 1991, White can capture his opponent’s other bishop after: 14.$\text{d}6+$ $\text{xd}6
15.exd6 $\text{b}6 16.$f5→ and Black has problems parrying White’s threats on the kingside and in the centre.) 14.$\text{xe}4 $\text{c}6 15.$\text{e}3 $\text{b}8 16.$\text{f}2 $\text{b}4 17.$\text{d}3± White’s space advantage is quite visible and he can proceed with active operations on both sides of the board, Goerke – C.Prokop, Niederrhein 1995.

\textbf{a) 7...e5}

Black prevents his opponent from acquiring extra space and he is ready to deploy his bishop to the g1-a7 diagonal, from where it would be quite useful for his future counterplay.

\textbf{8.0–0 $\text{f}6}$

That is the most logical line for Black, but he has tried in practice some other moves too:

8...$\text{h}4?! – That is not the best square for the queen. 9.$\text{a}4 $\text{b}8, Stojanovic – Markovic, Dimitrovgrad 2003, 10.$\text{f}4$ $\text{d}6 11.$\text{e}2±

8...$\text{e}7?! 9.$\text{f}4$ exf4, Bartolomaeus – Roehl, Mecklenburg 2003 and here after: 10.$\text{xf}4 $\text{g}6 11.$\text{g}3 $\text{c}5+ 12.$\text{h}1 0-0 13.$\text{e}5
$\text{h}7 14.$\text{h}5± Black can parry White’s kingside attack only by creating additional pawn-weaknesses on the queenside.

8...$\text{b}4?! – Black either presents his opponent with the two-
bishop advantage with that move, or he isolates his dark-squared bishop from the actions, Vetter – Lopez Martin, corr. 2002, after 9.f4 d6 (or 9...\(\text{Nxc3}\) 10.bxc3 d6 11.f4±) 10.a4 \(\text{Nf6}\) 11.c3 a5 12.fx e5 dxe5 13.g5± Black's dark-squared bishop is away from the protection of his kingside.

8...c5 9.a4 d4 (or 9...a7 10.c4 d4 11.c5) 10.c3 a7, Guez – Matschek, Metz 2006, now it seems logical for White to advance his c-pawn with the idea to cramp Black's bishop, or to provoke weaknesses on his queenside: 11.c4 d4 (White maintains a stable advantage after Black's other possibilities: 11...\(\text{Nf6}\) 12.c5 d6 13...d1±; 11...d6 12.c5 \(\text{Nf6}\) 13...d1± 14...d1±) 12.c5 \(\text{Nf6}\) 13...e3 \(\text{Nxe3}\) 14.fxe3 0–0 (After: 14...d6 15.b6 \(\text{Nxb8}\) 16.xc8 \(\text{Nxc8}\) 17.cxd6± Black has no compensation for the pawn at all.) 15.c4 dxe4 16.d3\(\text{Nxe4}\) 16.d3\(\text{Nxe4}\) – Black's queenside is not developed yet and White has an excellent compensation for the pawn. Black's attempt to bring his forces into action with: 16...d5 17.cxd6 \(\text{Nxd6}\) 18.a1 \(\text{Nxa7}\), leads after 19.b3!± to a slight material advantage for White.

9.e2

The standard move – 9.f4 is worse here due to: 9...c5!±
10.e1 \(\text{Nc4}\).

(diagram)

9...c5

Following 9...d6, it deserves attention for White to try the plan with the advance of his c-pawn: 10.a4 e7 11.c4 \(\text{Nc6}\) (about 11...0–0 12.b3 – see 9...e7) 12.c5 dxc5 13.d1 0–0 14.e3 \(\text{Nxa5}\) 15.b3 c4 16.xc4 xc4 17.c4± – White has a slight but stable edge thanks to Black's weak queenside pawns, Rohde – Goregli, Mineola 1994.

9...e7 – This move is more reliable than 9...c5, but it has been seldom played, because it seems to be too passive. 10.a4 0–0 11.c4 d6 12.b3 \(\text{Nc7}\) (or 12...e6 13.c5 dxc5 14.e3 \(\text{Nc5}\), Trin-gov – Osnos, Leningrad 1967, 15.a1\(\text{Nc5}\)+) 13.b2 \(\text{Nc7}\), Kutuzovic – Rezan, Pula 2001 and here it deserves attention for White to play: 14.b3\(\text{Nc5}\) d5 (White has a good compensation for the pawn after: 14...dxc5 15.c4\(\text{Nc4}\), as well as after: 14...xc5 15.xc5 dxc5 16.b5\(\text{Nc5}\) and in both cases Black remains with passive pieces and weak queenside pawns.) 15.b6 \(\text{Nxb6}\) 16.cxb6 \(\text{Nxb6}\) 17.cxe5\(\text{Nc5}\) ±

10.a4 a4

Or 10...a7 11.c4.

11.c3 a7 12.c4 d4

After 12...e7 13.e3 c5 14.
4. \texttt{d4} \texttt{e6} 5. \texttt{d3} \texttt{a6} 6. \texttt{xc6} bc 7. \texttt{d3}

\texttt{ad1} d6, Dembo – Ambrosi, Leon 2001, it is good for White to play 15.\texttt{c3}± and Black’s dark-squared bishop is cramped, his d5-square is weak and he has no active prospects.

13.\texttt{xe3} \texttt{xe3} 14.\texttt{xe3} 0–0

15.\texttt{fd1} \texttt{c7}

It is not any better for Black to try: 15...d6 16.c5 \texttt{a5} 17.b3 dxc5 18.\texttt{xc5} \texttt{xc5} 19.dxc5± and White maintains powerful pressure against Black’s vulnerable queenside pawns.

16.c5± – Black has problems developing his queenside pieces, Dembo – Pg Mohd, Budapest 2003.

b) 7...d6

\begin{center}
\text{\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c c}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
	exttt{K} & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
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\begin{center}
\text{\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c c}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
	exttt{K} & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
\end{tabular}}
\end{center}

Black postpones the active actions in the centre and he can opt for e6-e5 or d6-d5, but the latter move loses tempi.

8.0–0 \texttt{f6}

Black plays seldom some other moves too:

8...\texttt{e7} 9.f4 d5 (about 9...\texttt{f6} 10.\texttt{h1} – see 8...\texttt{f6} 9.f4 \texttt{e7} 10.\texttt{h1}) 10.e5 f5, Eriksson – Lehmusvaara, Turku 1999 and here after: 11.\texttt{a4} \texttt{h6} 12.\texttt{e3}± White maintains a stable advantage due to the vulnerable dark squares on Black’s queenside;

8...g6 – This move weakens the dark squares. 9.f4 \texttt{g7} 10.\texttt{e1} \texttt{f6} 11.\texttt{h1}± – Black’s bishop on g7 covers the weaknesses on the kingside, but he has no active prospects, Valiente – Izquierdo, Santiago 1996;

8...d5?! Methi – Johnsen, Lakselv 1993, that move is a loss of time in comparison to the line with 7...d5. 9.\texttt{e1} \texttt{f6} (or 9...d4 10.\texttt{a4} e5 11.c3±) 10.\texttt{g5}! – This seems to be the most aggressive move for White. 10...d4 11.\texttt{a4} e5 (Black cannot win a pawn with the attractive line: 11.\texttt{a5} 12.e5 \texttt{d7} 13.c3 \texttt{exd5} 14.\texttt{e4} \texttt{dxc3}?! 15.\texttt{f4}±, because he would have problems with the protection of his c6-pawn.) 12.c3 dxc3 13.\texttt{xc3}±;

8...e5 – That move helps White to open the f-file. 9.f4 exf4 (about 9...\texttt{f6} 10.\texttt{h1} – see 8...\texttt{f6}; 9...\texttt{c7} 10.\texttt{fexd5} \texttt{dxe5} 11.\texttt{c4} \texttt{f6} 12.\texttt{e1} \texttt{c5}?! – It is more reliable for Black to keep the bishop at its place: 12...\texttt{e7} 13.\texttt{g3} 0–0
14.\(\text{h1} \text{b8} 15.\text{b3}\), although he has problems creating counterplay even then – 13.\(\text{h1} 0-0?\) 14.\(\text{xf6} \text{gxf6} 15.\text{h6} \text{h8} 16.\text{g8} \text{e7} 17.\text{xf8} \text{xf8} 18.\text{xf6+} \text{g8} 19.\text{f1+} –\) Stross – Bjornsson, Liberec 2004. Black had to go back with the bishop – 13...\(\text{e7}\), in order to protect his kingside. After: 14.\(\text{g5} 0-0 15.\text{h4}\), Black has lost two tempi and he must watch carefully about the possible sacrifice on f6 – for example after: 15...\(\text{e6}\) 16.\(\text{xf6} \text{xf6} 17.\text{xf6} \text{gxf6} 18.\text{h6} \text{e6} 19.\text{f1+} –\) White’s attack is decisive.) 10.\(\text{xf4} \text{e6}\) 11.\(\text{e5}\), Boudre – Anka, France 1995 (Capturing of the b2-pawn seems to be too risky for Black: 11...\(\text{b6}+\) 12.\(\text{h1} \text{xb2}\) 13.\(\text{a4}\) and no matter where Black’s queen retreats to – his defence is extremely difficult, for example: 13...\(\text{b8}\) 14.\(\text{exd6} \text{xd6}\) 15.\(\text{e4}\) and Black lags considerably in development. He loses after: 15...\(\text{d5}\) 16.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{cx}d5\) 17.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xf4}\) 18.\(\text{xf4+}–\); it is somewhat better for him to try: 15...\(\text{xf4}\) 16.\(\text{xc6+} \text{e7}\) 17.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{a7}\) 18.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{xe6}\) 19.\(\text{d4}\) – but White’s attack against his opponent’s king, stranded in the centre, is overwhelming. Black must concede too much in order to complete his development – 19...\(\text{f6}\) 20.\(\text{ab1!} \text{c7}\) 21.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{e5}\) 22.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{d8}\) 23.\(\text{xe5+} \text{f8}\) 24.\(\text{d5+}–\). It is also too dangerous for him to play: 13...\(\text{a3}\) 14.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{d8}\) 15.\(\text{c4} \text{xc4}\) 16.\(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{d5}\) 17.\(\text{e6}\) and White’s compensation for the pawn is excellent. It is bad for Black to play: 17...\(\text{f6}\) 18.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 19.\(\text{g4}\), since he can hardly complete his development in that case. It is not better for him to follow with: 17...\(\text{xf6}\) 18.\(\text{c7}\) \(\text{e8}\?\) 19.\(\text{xf7+} \text{xf7}\) 20.\(\text{xd5}\) –, while after: 18...\(\text{f6}\) 19.\(\text{xd8} \text{xd8}\) 20.\(\text{d3}\) Black’s two pawns do not compensate the exchange, because of his lag in development and his insecure king.). Now, White’s most aggressive line seems to be: 12.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 13.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{d4}\) (After 13...\(\text{g6}\) 14.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{b6}\) 15.\(\text{b4}\), it is bad for Black to play: 15...\(\text{xb4}\)!) 16.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{f6}\) 17.\(\text{h5}\) and White regains his pawn, maintaining the advantage. It is also dangerous for Black to try 15...\(\text{xe5}\), since after 16.\(\text{e1}\) he cannot find a safe haven for his king, for example: 16...\(\text{xd3}\) 17.\(\text{cx3}\) \(\text{c7}\) 18.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 19.\(\text{xc5}\) 0–0 20.\(\text{a4}\) – and the queenside shelter is not reliable for Black’s king.) 14.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{a5}\) 15.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{dxc3}\) 16.\(\text{xe3}\) \(\text{xe5}\) (After 16...\(\text{d8}\) 17.\(\text{f3}\), the material is equal and Black’s position remains clearly inferior.) 17.\(\text{c2}\) White has an excellent compensation for the pawn, because of Black’s lag in development and his vulnerable queenside pawns.

9.\(\text{f4}\)

(diagram)

9...\(\text{e7}\)

9...\(\text{b6}\) – This is a loss of time, since Black’s queen is misplaced here. 10.\(\text{h1} \text{e7}\), Abdulssalam – Hind, Istanbul 2000, White's
most aggressive line seems to be:
11.e5 \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\) (After: 11...\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}5\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{e}5\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{e}5\) 0–0 14.\(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{h}5\)+- Black will not manage to protect his king without material losses.) 12.exd6 \(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{x}d6\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{e}7\) 14.b3± – White has a superior pawn-structure, he leads in development and his pieces are more active.

9...\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\) – White saves a tempo after that move. 10.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}3\) (After the retreat of Black’s knight, White should not worry anymore about the possibility – 10...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}5\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{xe}5\) \(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{g}4\), so he can develop immediately his bishop to an active position.) 10...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\), Klovans – Soffer, Biel 1991. Now, it deserves attention for White to play the aggressive line: 11.e5!? \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{xe}5\) (White obtains the habitual advantage after: 11...d5 12.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{a}4\) c5 13.c4\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{e}5\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{xe}5\) \(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{h}5\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}6\) (Strangely enough, after: 13...\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{xd}3\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{d}1\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}5\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}3+\)– Black’s position is undefensible, it is bad for him to follow with: 13...\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{e}7\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{f}6\)! gxf6 16.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}4\)± and his extra exchange would not compensate his lag in development, the vulnerability of his dark squares and his “bad” king.) 14.\(\text{\texttt{ad}}\text{d}1\) – White’s compensation for the pawn is obvious: Black’s king is stranded in the centre. His attempt to prepare castling short with 14...g6 can be countered by White with the tactical strike: 15.\(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{x}g6\)! f\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{g}6\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}2\) \(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{b}8\)!? (In answer to the other retreats of the queen, White regains his piece with the move – 17.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}4\)±) 17. \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\texttt{g}}\text{g}4\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{x}g4\) e5. It becomes clear now that White did not regain his piece, but his attack is just crushing: 19.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}3\) exd4 (It is even worse for Black to play: 19...\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}5\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c}6+\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{f}5\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{f}5\)! gxf5 23.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c}6+\)– and White at least regains the exchange, remaining with extra pawns.) 20.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}7+\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{d}4+\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{d}7\)+! \(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}1+\) \(\text{\texttt{w}}\text{d}6\) 24.\(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{d}6+\) \(\text{\texttt{x}}\text{d}6\) 25.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}4+\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\) 26.\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c}5+\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}8\) (or 26...\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}6\) 27.b4--) 27.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}6+\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\) 28.\(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}4+-

After 9...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c}5+\) 11. \(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{h}1\) 0–0 12.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}5\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}\text{d}7\), V.Orlov – Vakin, Alma-Ata 1991, it deserves attention for White to continue with: 13.\(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{a}4!\) \(\text{\texttt{a}}\text{a}7\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}3± – with the idea to proceed with active actions on both sides of the board.

9...\(\text{\texttt{c}}\text{c}7\) (Black usually follows that move with \(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\) and we have analyzed that in the line with – 9...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{h}}\text{h}1\) \(\text{\texttt{b}}\text{b}8\)?! Kaehler – Neese, Bad Bevensen 2002, (It is better for Black to play 10...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}1\) – see 9...\(\text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7\).) and here White should exploit his opponent’s lag in development by
opening the centre with: 11.e5!? and then: 11...dxe5 12.fxe5 \(d7\) (Black would not fare any better after: 12...\(d5\) 13.\(e4\) \(xe5\) 14.\(c4=\)) 13.\(h5\) g6 14.\(f3\) \(xe5\) 15.\(f6\) \(g4\) 16.\(f4\) \(xf6\) 17.\(xc7\) and White wins the exchange, 11...
\(d5\) 12.\(e4\) a5 (about 12...dxe5 13.\(e4\) – see 11...dxe5 12.fxe5 \(d5\); 12...\(b4\) 13.\(e2=\)) 13.\(f3=\) and Black has problems completing his development; 11...\(d7\) 12.\(exd6\) \(xd6\) 13.\(e4\) \(e7\) 14.b3± Black's queenside pawns are weak, his pieces are passive and his king is vulnerable.

9...e5 10.\(h1\) \(g4=\)?! (It is better for Black to play 10...\(e7\) 11.\(f5\) – see 9...\(e7.\)) 11.\(e1\) exf4, Retter – Bernhoeft, Ellwangen 1996 and here White opens the centre with an excellent game: 12.e5 dxe5 13.\(xf4\) \(d7\) (or 13...\(e6\) 14.\(xe5\) \(g4\) 15.\(f5=\)) 14.\(xe5\) \(xe5\) 15.\(xe5+\) \(e7\) 16.\(f4\) \(e6\) 17.\(ae1=\) – Black's king is weak and he lags in development. His queenside pawns are vulnerable too.

10.\(h1\)

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{chessboard}
\end{center}

10...\(c7\) That is the most reliable line for Black.

10...e5 11.\(xe5\) dxe5 12.\(e3\) 0–0 (It is more or less the same after 12...\(a5\), Whitehead – Saba, Lone Pine 1977, 13.\(e1\) \(b8\) 14.b3 \(c7\) 15.\(a4=\); Black should refrain from: 14...0–0 15.\(d5\) \(d8\) 16.\(xe7+\) \(xe7\) 17.\(g5=\), since his king's shelter ends up in ruins.) 13.\(a4\) \(b8\) 14.\(e1\) \(c7\) 15.b3± White's prospects are slightly superior because of Black's weak queenside pawns and his passive pieces, moreover that White can organize powerful pressure along the f-file. Black's attempt to activate his light-squared bishop leads only to weakening of the light squares: 15...c5=?! (It is somewhat better for Black to try: 15...a5 16.\(c4=\), but his position remains difficult anyway, because he has no counterplay, Matanovic – Bertok, Bled 1961.) 16.\(g5\) \(b7\) 17.\(w4\) \(c6\) 18.\(c3\) h6 19.\(xf6\) \(xf6\), van der Wiel – Zapata, Palma de Mallorca 1989 and now Black has problems to counter his opponent’s pressure along the f-file after: 20.\(h5\) \(g5\) 21.\(c4\) \(c7\) 22.\(f3\) \(bd8\) 23.\(af1=\)

10...d5 11.e5 \(d7\) 12.\(a4\) \(b7\), Short – Andersson, Skelleftea 1989, it looks sensible for White to begin queenside actions here: 13.c4 0–0=?! – That is a loss of time (It is slightly better for Black to play: 13...c5 14.cxd5 exd5 15.b3±, but even then his hanging pawns are a liability in his posi-

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... White has a solid extra pawn, after: 16... \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 3± Black’s pieces are passive and his queenside pawns are weak.) 16.cxd5 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 5 (or 16... exd5 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 5±) 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}\) 3±

10... \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}\) 7 11.e5 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 5 (After 11... dxe5 – opening of the f-file presents White with additional possibilities. 12.fxe5 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 7 13. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) 4 6, Burns – Underwood, Ireland 1999 and here after 14. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) 3 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}\) 7 it deserves attention for White to sacrifice a pawn with 15. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 4! and if Black does not accept it, then after 15...0–0 16. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) 4± his dark squares are very weak; 15... \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 5?!

– That move loses material. 16. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) 4 f6 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) h3 0–0 18. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 5± Black cannot capture that knight, so he loses the exchange; 15... \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) 5 16. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) 4 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 5 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}\) d1 c5 18. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}\) 6+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\) d6 19. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\) d6± – Black’s king remains stranded in the centre and that provides White with more than sufficient compensation for the pawn.) 12. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) 4 c5 13.exd6 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\) d6 14.f5 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) 6 (It is even worse for Black to play: 14...exf5 15. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\) d6+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) xd6 16. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\) xf5 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) c7 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}\) e1+ \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}\) 7 18. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) 4±, since he would hardly manage to castle.) 15. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}\) 5 e5 16. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}\) f6 gxf6, Adams – J.Polgar, Frankfurt 1999. The basic defect of Black’s position is his passive dark-squared bishop, moreover that his king has no reliable shelter. Now, the most aggressive line for White seems to be: 17. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}\) h5 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}\) 7 18. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}\) d1 \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}\) 8 19. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}\) e1 0–0–0 20. \(\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}\) 2±
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and now:

11...dxe5?! – That is obviously the worst – Black opens the f-file for his opponent’s rooks. 12.fxe5 \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 13.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 14.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{e8}?! \) – That move loses by force, but Black’s position was bad anyway. 14...\( \text{h8} \) – Black’s king runs away from the dangerous juxta-position. 15.\( \text{ad1} \), now Black’s queen has no good square: 15...\( \text{c7}?! \) – The queen is not well placed here, since Black cannot play f7-f5. 16.\( \text{xh7}! \) \( \text{xh7} \) 17.\( \text{h5+} \) \( \text{g8} \) 18.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 19.\( \text{h6+-} \), 15...\( \text{b6} \) – The combination would not work now, but White wins with the simple move 16.h5, for example: 16...\( \text{g6} \) 17.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{g8} \) 18.\( \text{e3+-} \), or 16...\( \text{xd3} \) 17.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 18.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 19.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{g8} \) 20.\( \text{hxh7+} \) \( \text{xh7} \) 21.\( \text{h3+-} \), Black loses too after: 15...\( \text{e8} \) 16.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 17.\( \text{xd3} \) f5 18.exf6 \( \text{xf6} \) 19.\( \text{g3}+-- \), or 18...\( \text{xf6} \) 19.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e5} \) 20.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f7} \) 21.\( \text{df3}+- \). His most resilient defence seems to be: 14...\( \text{xd3} \) 15.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{g5!} \) 16.\( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 17.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 19.\( \text{xe5}+ \) Black avoids being checkmated, but his weak pawns make his defence quite difficult in that endgame.) 15.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{f8} \) 16.\( \text{hxh7+}! \) \( \text{xh7} \) 17.\( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) 18.\( \text{xf7} \) 1–0 Khavsky – Klimov, St. Petersburg 1994;

11...\( \text{d5} \) – Strangely enough, Black’s knight is not so well placed here. 12.\( \text{e4} \) \( f5 \) (Or 12...\( \text{dxe5} \) 13.\( \text{fxe5} \) \( \text{f6} \) and opening of the f-file is again in favour of White:

14.exf6 \( \text{xf6} \) 15.\( \text{xf6}+\) \( \text{xf6} \), Hartung – Gasbarrini, Luxembourg 1996, after 16.\( \text{e2} \pm \) Black has problems creating active actions compensating the vulnerability of his pawns.) 13.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) (That is a blunder.) 14.c4 \( \text{e7} \) 15.\( \text{xd6}+ \) Novik – Sikora Lerch, Czechoslovakia 1992. It would have been more precise for him to try: 13...\( \text{xf6} \) 14.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{d5} \) 15.a3?! , but his central pawns would be weak even then. Black’s passive play led to a complete destruction of his centre after: 15...\( \text{b8} \) 16.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 17.\( \text{g5} \) \( e5 \) (or 17...\( \text{d7} \) 18.\( \text{c5}+ \)) 18.\( \text{c5}+ \). It seems slightly better for him to opt for: 15...\( \text{e5} \) 16.\( \text{fxe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 17.\( \text{xf8+} \) \( \text{xf8} \) 18.\( \text{g3}+ \), but he would still have preoblems to protect his weak pawns;

11...\( \text{e8} \) 12.\( \text{e4} \) \( g6 \) (After 12...\( \text{d5}? \) 13.\( \text{g5} \) \( g6 \) 14.\( \text{xg4} \pm \) White’s pieces on the kingside look quite threatening. 14...\( \text{h6}?! \) 15.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xf7} \), Kojovic – Boskovic, Petrovac 2004 and here there is no satisfactory defence for Black in sight after: 16.\( \text{xg6} \) \( \text{g7} \) 17.\( \text{h5+-} \), or 16...\( \text{g7} \) 17.\( \text{f3}+-- \) 13.\( \text{f3} \) \( a5 \) 14.\( \text{e3} \) \( d5 \) 15.\( \text{g5} \) \( c5 \), Cordovil – Santos, Caldas de Felgueira 1999 (Black’s attempt to repel his opponent’s knight from its active position fails after: 15...\( \text{h6} \) 16.\( \text{xe6!} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) – it is not better for Black to try: 16...\( \text{xe6} \) 17.f5 \( \text{xf5} \) 18.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 19.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{d7} \) 20.\( \text{h5} \) and he has no defence against the transfer of White’s rook to the g3-square – 17.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{f7} \) 18.\( \text{xe6}+ \)
4. d4 e6 5. d3 a6 6. dxc6 bxc6 7. d3

... g7 19. w x h6+ White has three pawns for the piece, while Black's king has no pawn-shelter and that is more than sufficient compensation. The following variations confirm that evaluation: 19... d4 20. d2 b8 21. f3 d5 22. g3+-, or 20... d5 21. b3 b4 22. c3 dxc3 23. bxc3 c5 24. c4 d4 25. d1+-) 16. c4↑ Black's position is solid, but it is too passive.

11. w e1

The other possibilities are not better for Black:

11... d7

The other possibilities are not better for Black:

11... e5 12. fxe5 dxe5 13. a4 0–0 14. e3 b8 15. b3 a5 16. c4 h8 17. a3± Black's position seems to be defensible, but he has problems creating counterplay. In the game Matanovic – Bertok, Bled 1961, Black sacrificed the exchange, but his compensation was insufficient: 17. dxe4 18. b6 x b6 19. x b6 w x b6 20. w x e 4±; 11... a5 12. e5 d7 13. e6 14. d4 e7 15. f5 d6 16. f6 x e 6 17. d g5± and White obtains the two-bishop advantage, West – Reeves, Melbourne 1998; 11... d5 12. g3 g6 13. b3 b8 14. w f2±. Now, it is not good for Black to capture on e4, so White should not be in a hurry to advance – e4-e5, preserving the possibility to exchange on d5. 14... c5?! (That move enables White to create powerful pressure on the kingside.) 15. edx5 edx5 16. f5 b6 17. g5 b7 18. e1 0–0 19. h4± Adams – MacKay, Arnhem 1988;

11... 0–0 – That move is as risky as 10... 0–0. 12. e5 d7 (Retreating the knight to the centre exposes it to attacks: 12. d5 13. edx6 edx6 14. e4 7, Stolec – Bakhtadze, Holon 1995 and here White's most energetic line is: 15. c4!? d4 16. b1 and Black has problems with his misplaced knight and his queenside pawns: 16... c5 17. e3 f5 18. a3±, or 16... a5 17. d2! a6 18. b3±; in the line: 15. d6 16. a4 x e 4 17. x e 4 a5 18. c3± White's bishops are evidently much more active.) 13. edx6 x d6 (Black would not change the evaluation of the position with the line: 13. w x d 6 14. e4 w d 5 15. d2 f6 16. c3± – Black's "active" queen only enhances White's initiative, Sharif – Darakorn, Haifa 1976.) 14. e4 e7 15. d2 c5, Pelesev – Kelstrup, corr. 1991 and here after: 16. c4 b7 17. c3± Black's kingside is endangered and even if White fails to organize an attack, he will have a superior endgame due to Black's weak queenside pawns.

12. g3
12...0-0, Goetz – Simon, Moscow 1990 (It is worse for Black to play: 12...\texttt{xf6} 13.\texttt{e3} \texttt{b8} 14.e5! dxe5 15.\texttt{e4}±, because White regains his pawn and he remains with the two-bishop advantage, Nguyen Van Huy – Tran Xuan Tu, Vietnam 2000.). Now, it deserves attention for White to play the calm line: 13.\texttt{e3} e5 (The move 13...\texttt{f6}?! – enables White to activate his forces with the help of a pawn-sacrifice: 14.e5 dxe5 15.\texttt{e4} \texttt{e7} 16.f5 \texttt{xf5} 17.\texttt{xf5}± Black will hardly manage to withstand the pressure of White's forces. Black has no active possibilities after: 13...\texttt{b8} 14.b3 \texttt{a5} 15.\texttt{a4} \texttt{f6} 16.\texttt{ad1}±) 14.\texttt{c4} \texttt{f6} 15.f5?!± – Black's only counterplay is connected with the pawn-break – d6-d5, but that is quite difficult to accomplish. Meanwhile, White can easily prepare a pawn-offensive on the kingside.

c) 7...\texttt{c7}

(diagram)

Black makes a seemingly useful move without being in a hurry to attack the centre.

8.0-0 \texttt{f6}

He has tried some other moves too:

About 8...d5 9.\texttt{e1} – see 7...d5;

8...e5 9.f4 d6! (It is bad for Black to play: 9...\texttt{f6}?! 10.fx\texttt{e5} \texttt{xe5} 11.\texttt{f4} \texttt{c5}+ 12.\texttt{h1} d6, Padeschah – LukasLok, Internet 1999, since White can open the centre with: 13.e5 dxe5 14.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{g4} 15.\texttt{g3} \texttt{e7} 16.\texttt{f3}±, with a considerable lead in development. It is not advisable for Black to weaken his kingside with: 9...\texttt{c5}?! 10.\texttt{h1} d6 11.\texttt{a4}! \texttt{a5} 12.c3 \texttt{a7} 13.\texttt{xe5} dxe5 14.\texttt{c4}±, because he has problems completing his development, Viana da Costa – De Lima, Sao Paulo 2006; after: 11...\texttt{a7} 12.\texttt{xe5} dxe5 13.\texttt{c4} \texttt{f6} 14.\texttt{g5}±, it is quite obvious that Black's dark-squared bishop is misplaced.) about 10.fx\texttt{e5} – see 7...d6 8.0-0 e5 9.f4 \texttt{c7} 10.\texttt{xe5};

8...d6 9.f4 \texttt{f6} (In answer to 9...d5, R.Kovacevic – Bocina, Pula 1992, it is good for White to follow with: 10.\texttt{e3} \texttt{f6} 11.e5 \texttt{d7} 12.\texttt{a4} c5 13.c4±) about 10.\texttt{h1} – see 7...d6 8.0-0 \texttt{f6} 9.f4 \texttt{c7} 10.\texttt{h1};

8...\texttt{b4}?! – This move weakens
the kingside. 9...g4 d8 10...d2
e6 11...e2 d6 12.f4± Black can
hardly coordinate his pieces, Fer-
nandez Martin – Marino Bravo,
Asturias 1987;
8...e7?! – It is too early for
Black to develop his bishop here.
9...g4 f6 10.f4 e5, Camilleri
– Kereinnis, corr. 1998 and now
after: 11...f3 d6 12...c4± in con-
nection with White’s pressure
along the f-file, Black cannot com-
plete his development: 12...e7?! 13.fxe5
dxe5 14.g5!+-;
8...c5?! – This move enables
White to provoke weakening of
Black’s kingside. 9...g4 g6, Ste-
jskal – Pasternak, Hamburg 1997
(It is not better for Black to play
9...f8, Horak – Schmitzer, Email
2000, since his king is stranded
on the f8-square and White can
begin active actions in the cen-
tre: 10...a4 f6 11...e2 d6 12.f4
e5 13.c4! ef4 14.c5 e5 15.b6
b8 16.c4=. Black’s queenside
has been blocked and White en-
joy a n excellent compensation
for the pawn. The following vari-
ations illustrate Black’s difficul-
ties: 16...g5 17.h1! b5 18.g3!,
or 16...d4+ 17.h1 g5 18.e5 d5
19...h5+) and White can play ag-
grcssively exploiting Black’s vul-
nerable dark squares: 10.a4 e7
(It is hardly better for Black to try
10...a7 11.c4!, or 10...d4 11.c3
g7 12...e3+) 11.e5?! – That is the
most aggressive line for White.
11...xe5 12.b6 b8 13.f4
d4 14.g3! xb6 (After 14...
d6 15...xc8 xc8 16.c3±, White
regains his pawn, preserving
his lead in development.) 15.e5 h4
16.e3! f6 17...xb6 fxe5 18.c7±
White remains with an extra ex-
change;
8...b7 9...e3 d8 (In an-
swer to 9...f6, Avram – Gruber,
Wangs Pizol 1996, it looks very
good for White to opt for: 10.f4
d6 11...f3 c5 c5 f5±) 10...e2 a8?
(Naturally, it is better for Black
to play: 10...f6 11.f4 d5 12.e5
c7 13...a4 a5 14.b3±) 11.f4=
Vazquez – Guerra, Oviedo 2005;
Following: 8...d6, Shishov
– Gipslis, Moscow 1959, it looks
attractive for White to continue
with 9.f4 c5+ (but not 9...e5
10...g4±) 10...h1 d5 11...g4
g6 12...xd5 exd5 (or 12...exd5 13.f5±)
f5! – White opens the f-file, ex-
ploiting the fact that it is bad for
Black to capture the pawn. 13...
e7 14...x e6 fxe6 15...f3±;
8...g6 – That move compro-
mises the dark squares on Black’s
kingside, Campos – Araujo,
Casavel 1996, 9.f4 d6 (or 9...
d5 10.a3 g7 11...c5±) 10.e5? d5
(10...dxe5 – This move only
opens the f-file for White and it
does not win a pawn at all. 11...x e5
a7 12...f4 xe5 13...xe5 a5 14...f3±) 11...a4±;
8...c5 – Black transfers his
knight to the d4-outpost indeed,
but he cannot play anymore e5 or
d5. 9...e2 e7, Abedinov – Oster-
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9. \( \text{e}2 \)

It is less logical for White to try 9.f4, because after 9...d5, that advance turns out to be slightly premature.

Black has three principled answers in the diagrammed position: c1) 9...d6, c2) 9...e5 and c3) 9...d5.

He has also tried in practice:

9...\( \text{d}6 \) 10.f4 \( \text{c}5 \) (about 10...e5 11.\( \text{h}1 \) – see 9...e5 10.f4 \( \text{d}6 \) 11.\( \text{h}1 \) 11.\( \text{h}1 \) h5, Klokow – Gibson, Winnipeg 1999 (It is too dangerous for Black to open the central files: 11...e5?! 12.fxe5 \( \text{x}e5 \) 13.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \), after 14.\( \text{ae}1 \) 0–0 15.e5 \( \text{d}5 \) 16.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{cxd}5 \) 17.\( \text{h}5 \) h6 18.\( \text{g}5! \)± he has no satisfactory defence, for example he loses after: 18...\( \text{e}8 \) 19.\( \text{f}6! \) \( \text{f}8 \) 20.\( \text{e}3+ \)–; it is not better for him to try: 11...\( \text{d}4 \), after 12.e5 \( \text{d}5 \) 13.\( \text{e}4 \) 0–0 14.c3± White is dominant in the centre.) and here the most logical line for White seems to be to occupy the centre with: 12.e5 \( \text{g}4 \) (Black would not fare any better after: 12...\( \text{d}5 \) 13.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 14.a3±) 13.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \)

14.h3 \( \text{f}5 \) 15.\( \text{d}6+ \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 16.\( \text{exd}6 \)± and White’s couple of powerful bishops and his lead in development provide him with a clear advantage. The piece-sacrifice is not dangerous for White: 16...\( \text{xd}6 \) 17.\( \text{h}xg4 \) \( \text{h}xg4+ \) 18.\( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 19.\( \text{f}2+ \)–;

9...h5 – That move is too risky and it does not help Black’s development, Verkasalo – Georgiou, Patras 2001, 10.e5 \( \text{g}4 \) (After: 10...\( \text{d}5 \) 11.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{cxd}5 \) 12.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 13.c4±, the basic drawback of the move 9...h5 becomes obvious – Black’s kingside has been compromised and it becomes risky for him to castle short.) 11.f4 d5 12.\( \text{xd}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 13.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 14.h3± Black has an only active piece and his king is vulnerable, so he can hardly hope to equalize;

9...\( \text{e}7?! \) – This move is too passive. 10.e5 \( \text{d}5 \) 11.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{cxd}5 \) 12.\( \text{e}1 \) d6 13.\( \text{g}4 \) g6 14.\( \text{h}6+ \) Black’s defence is too difficult, because of his weak dark squares on the kingside and the lack of reliable shelter for his king, Vorobiov – Ozolin, Kazan 2006;

9...\( \text{b}7?! \) Attard – Tatai, Budva 1981, that move enables White to occupy some additional space and after 10.e5 \( \text{d}5 \) 11.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{cxd}5 \) 12.\( \text{f}4+ \) White’s e5-pawn cramps his opponent’s position considerably and Black’s attempt to get rid of it only worsens his situation: 12...d6 13.\( \text{h}5 \) g6 14.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 15.\( \text{g}3 \) 0–0–0 16.\( \text{fe}1±\)
c1) 9...d6

That move is reliable but passive and it leads to a calm play with a slight but stable advantage for White who has plenty of extra space.

10.f4

That is the most principled answer for White, although it seems quite good for him to try the calmer line 10.\(a4\), for example: 10...\(\text{e7}\) (After 10...\(e5\)! 11.c4 c5, the weakness of the d5-square is evident. 12.a3 \(\text{d7}\) 13.\(c3\) h6 14.f4 \(\text{c6}\) 15.\(\text{d5}\)\(±\) Dimitrov – Heeren, Portugal 2005; Black obtains a standard position after: 10...d5 11.e5 \(\text{d7}\) 12.f4 \(\text{b6}\) 13.\(\text{xb6}\) \(\text{xb6}\)+ 14.\(h1\) c5, Nickel – Hadraba, corr. 1996 and here following: 15.c4 d4 16.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{e7}\) 17.\(\text{ab1}\)\(±\) White can choose which side to act on.) 11.c4\(±\) – White has a slight but stable edge thanks to his space advantage. 11...\(\text{d7}\) (about 11...c5 12.b3 \(\text{d7}\) 13.\(\text{b2}\) – see 11...\(\text{d7}\) 12.b3 \(\text{f6}\) 13.\(\text{b2}\); after 11...0–0 12.f4 \(\text{b7}\), Girard – Pneumonidis, Quebec 1997, White can increase his space advantage with 13.e5, for example: 13...\(\text{dxe5}\) 14.\(\text{fxe5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 15.\(\text{e4}\) g6 16.\(\text{f4}\)\(±\), or 13...\(\text{d7}\) 14.\(\text{exd6}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 15.\(\text{c2}\) g6 16.c5 \(\text{e7}\) 17.\(\text{e3}\)\(±\) and in both cases Black's vulnerable dark squares present White with additional possibilities.) 12.b3 \(\text{f6}\) (Black would not change much with: 12...c5 13.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{f6}\) 14.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 15.\(\text{f4}\)\(±\) Reichmann – Kwatschewsky, Austria 1999.) 13.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{xb2}\) 14.\(\text{xb2}\) 0–0 15.\(\text{d1}\) c5 16.f4 \(\text{b7}\) 17.\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{d8}\) 18.\(\text{f2}\)\(±\) and Black has problems organizing an active counterplay, because of his lack of space and his weak d6-pawn, L.Milov – Brodsky, Berlin 1993.

10...\(\text{e7}\)

That is the most popular move for Black.

About 10...\(e5\) 11.\(\text{h1}\) – see 9...\(e5\) 10.f4 d6 11.\(\text{h1}\), variation c2.

10...\(\text{b7}\)! – Black’s delay of the development of his kingside enables White to develop a powerful initiative, Roux – Vivian, France 2000, 11.e5 dxe5 12.\(\text{fxe5}\) \(\text{d7}\) (It is not better for Black to defend with: 12...\(\text{d5}\) 13.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xe5}\) – because after: 13...\(\text{e7}\) 14.\(\text{g5}\)\(±\) – White attacks on the...
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kingside in a position with material equality. 14...\textit{xf7}! \textit{e7} 15. \textit{d2}!±. White’s pieces are well coordinated and Black can hardly parry the mounting threats. For example, he loses by force after: 15...\textit{xf7}? 16.\textit{g5}+ \textit{gxg5} 17.\textit{xdg5} \textit{xdg5} 18.\textit{h5}+ \textit{xf6} 19.\textit{xf1+} \textit{f4} 20.\textit{h4+}–, White’s attack is quite strong too after: 15...\textit{xb2} 16.\textit{xf1} 0–0–0 17.\textit{c3}–, it is evidently best for Black to continue with: 15...\textit{d4}+16.\textit{f2} 0–0–0 17.\textit{xa6}±, but even then he remains a pawn down, because he can hardly capture White’s b2-pawn.) 13.\textit{h1}! (This is useful prophylactic.) 13... \textit{e7} (White obtains an excellent compensation if Black captures the pawn: 13...\textit{xe5}?! 14.\textit{f4} \textit{f6} 15.\textit{ad1} \textit{b4} 16.\textit{e4}± and Black must permanently worry about the possibility \textit{g5}; 13...\textit{exe5}?! 14.\textit{e4} \textit{c5} 15.\textit{f4} \textit{d5} 16.\textit{g5} \textit{xf6} 17.\textit{ad1} \textit{c6} 18.\textit{e5} Black’s king will probably have to remain in the centre; after 14...\textit{e7} 15.\textit{f4} \textit{wa5} 16.\textit{ad1}! 0–0 17.\textit{d6}± White’s dangerous threats on both flanks more than compensate his pawn-sacrifice. It is premature for Black to chase his opponent’s light-squared bishop: 13...\textit{c5}?! 14.\textit{g5}! – White does not need to protect his central pawn. 14... \textit{xd3} 15.\textit{xd3} \textit{c5} 16.\textit{e4}† Black’s king is stranded in the centre and that provides White with a long-term initiative. It is too risky for Black to win a pawn, because after: 16...\textit{xe5} 17.\textit{ad1} \textit{d5} 18.\textit{fe1}!±

he has no defence against White’s numerous threats and in the line: 17...\textit{c7} 18.\textit{h4}! \textit{c8} 19.\textit{g5} \textit{c6} 20.\textit{h3}± White regains his pawn maintaining the pressure.) 14.\textit{f4} \textit{c5} 15.\textit{e4}† White is dominant in the centre and he has better prospects.

10...\textit{d7} – This is a reliable defensive line and it prevents White’s immediate breakthrough in the centre. 11.b3 \textit{e7} 12.\textit{b2} \textit{f6}, Balashov – Yap, Jurmala 1985 (It is not better for Black to opt for: 12...\textit{b7} 13.\textit{a4} 0–0, Ashton – Conquest, Douglas 2005, after 14.e5 \textit{d5} 15.c4† there arise standard positions with a stable initiative for White.) and here White should try the resolute line: 13.e5!? \textit{exe5} 14.\textit{f4} \textit{exf4} (After: 14...\textit{b7} 15.\textit{xf6}+ \textit{gxf6} 16.\textit{xe5} \textit{fxe5} 17.\textit{ad1}± Black can hardly preserve his extra pawn without coming under attack.) 15.\textit{xf6}+ \textit{gxf6} (Black would not change much with: 15...\textit{xf6} 16.\textit{h1} \textit{b7} 17.\textit{e5} \textit{e7} 18.c4±, since White regains his f4-pawn, preserving his kingside pressure.) 16.\textit{g4} \textit{b7} 17.\textit{xf4} 0–0–0 18.\textit{wh4}±. Now, Black can keep his slight material advantage only at the price of considerable positional concessions.

10...\textit{d5}. That move is seldom played but it is quite logical. In comparison to 7...\textit{d5}, Black has lost a tempo, but White cannot develop his bishop to \textit{g5}. 11.e5 \textit{d7} 12.\textit{a4} \textit{c5} (or 12...\textit{c5}
4. 4xd4 e6 5. c3 a6 6. xc6 bc 7. d3

13. xc5 xc5+ 14. h1± 13.b3 b6 14. xbx6 xb6, H. Pettersen – Kolberg, corr. 1970 and here after 15.c4 e7 (Reduction of the tension in the centre is in favour of White after: 15...d4 16. d2±) 16. d2± – White has a space advantage and excellent possibilities to develop his initiative on both sides of the board.

11.e5 d5

Opening of the f-file is favourable for White: 11...dxe5 12. fxe5 d5, Zhang Pengxiang – Wu Wenjin, Yongchuan 2003, but now he must repel Black’s active knight. 13. a4! 0–0 (After 13...f5 14. exf6 xf6 15. f4± Black remains with too many weak pawns, while in case of: 13...b4 14. h5± he must compromise his kingside.) 14.c4 b6 (but not 14...b4 15. b1±) 15. xb6 xb6+ 16. e3± – White has a superior pawn-structure and more active pieces.

12. exd6 xd6

13.e4!

White sacrifices a pawn and he maintains powerful pressure in the centre and on the kingside.

13...xf4

It is not better for Black to refrain from capturing the pawn: 13...0–0 14. xxd6 xxd6, Jovanovic – Vernacki, Osijek 2005, White has the two-bishop advantage and after: 15.c4 f6 16.b3 b7 (It is a disaster for Black to opt for: 16...d8 17. b2! xxd3? 18. ad1+-) 17. b2± they are dangerously pointed at Black’s kingside.

14. xf4 xf4 15. g4 g6 16. h1 e5

After 16...f5 17. h5 0–0 (The attempt to win material – 17...fxe? 18. xe4+– leads to a situation in which White regains his piece, while Black cannot evacuate his king away from the centre without material losses.) 18. g5 h6 19. xg6 hxg5 20. xg5 b8 21. b3± Black’s king shelter is vulnerable and he has numerous weak pawns.

17. g3 e7, Iordachescu – Smetankin, Condom 2002 (After 17...b8 18. g5 f4 19. e1 e6 20. xh7!± the material is equal and therefore Black has no compensation for his king stranded in the centre.) 18. g5!? (That
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seems to be White's most energetic line.) \textbf{18...f6} (It is too bad for Black to play: 18...0–0? 19.\texttt{gxg6! fg6} 20.\texttt{wb3\pm} and White obtains a material advantage. It is also not advisable for Black to try: 18... \texttt{e6?! 19.g4 \texttt{dd8} 20.xc6+ \texttt{xf8} 21.xe6+ \texttt{xe6} 22.wf3\pm, because his king remains in the centre in a position with an equal number of pawns, while White's queenside pawns are ready to advance to promotion.) \textbf{19.e4!?\pm} – Black can hardly complete his development without material losses and his king has no safe haven.

c2) 9...e5

\textbf{10.f4 \texttt{d6}}

Black has also tried 10...d6 (It is worse for him to play 10... \texttt{c5+ 11.h1}, because his dark-squared bishop does not contribute to the defence of his kingside and it might come under attack in some lines, for example: 11...0–0 12.fxe5 \texttt{xe5} 13.e5 \texttt{d4} 14.g5 \texttt{e8}, Cronin – Justo, Thessaloniki 1984 and here White obtains a great advantage after: 15.d1 d5 16.c4!\pm with an unavoidable transition into an endgame with compromised pawn-structure on Black's queenside, or 11... \texttt{d6} 12.a4 \texttt{g4?! 13.b4}, Roth – Koller, Vienna 1996 – Black should better play: 12...\texttt{a7 13.c4\pm} – Now, after 13.wd2\pm White obtains the two-bishop advantage, since it is bad for Black to play: 13...\texttt{a7? 14.fxe5 dxe5 15.wg5+- and he loses a piece.) 11.h1 \texttt{e7} (Black would not change much with: 11... a5 12.fxe5 dxe5 13.c4 \texttt{e7} 14.g5 a4, Albero – Aguina gable, Spain 1998, after 15.wf2 0–0 16.wxh4\pm Black has no active possibilities in sight.) 12.fxe5 dxe5 13.g5 0–0 (13...\texttt{g4} – That is an attempt by Black to solidify his future castling position with the help of the transfer of the bishop to the g6-square. Still, after 14.wf2 \texttt{h5} 15.wxh4 \texttt{g6} 16.e2 \texttt{g8} 17.g3 \texttt{xe5} 18.wxg5 \texttt{xe7} 19.wxh3\pm the weaknesses on his queenside are more obvious, Seipel – Kakoschke, Ostfildern 1996) 14.h3 \texttt{d6} (After 14...\texttt{e8}, End – Kinnmark, Sundsvall 1969, it looks logical for White to continue with: 15.e3 \texttt{eb8} 16.b3 \texttt{d6} 17.a4\pm) 15.c4 a5 16.ad1 \texttt{b4} 17.ef3! a4 (In case of: 17...\texttt{xb2} 18.e1 \texttt{a3} 19.d5 \texttt{dd6} 20.xe7+ \texttt{xe7} 21.bf1→ White's piece-activity should turn into a decisive attack.) 18.b3 axb3 19.cxb3\pm Black got rid of his weak a-pawn indeed, but White obtained an outside passed pawn. His kingide pressure seems to be quite strong too; nevertheless
Black’s position is still solid, Lambert – Guridov, corr. 1985.

**11. ♗h1**

It is worse for Black to play: 11... ♗b7?! , Dobrovolsky – Jurkovic, Hartberg 1991, because his bishop must come back after: 12.fxe5 ♗xe5 13. ♗g5 d6 14. ♘d1+ ♗c8 (It is too risky for Black to castle - 14...0-0?! 15. ♗xf6 ♗xf6 16. ♗xf6 gxf6 17. ♘e3±, because his extra exchange is almost immaterial, while his king is too vulnerable.) 15. ♘e3 ♗xb2 16. ♗ab1 ♗e5 (It is hardly any better for Black to try 16... ♗c3 17. ♗c4 ♗d7, in view of 18.e5! and his defence is quite problematic, no matter how he captures the pawn: 18...dxe5? 19. ♘h5! ♗f8 20. ♗xh7 ♘d4 21. ♗g6+-; it is even worse for him to opt for: 19...g6 20. ♗xf7+ - or 19... ♗f6 20. ♗xf6 gxf6 21. ♗xf6+- and White has a crushing attack in both cases; 18...dxe5? 19. ♗xf7! ♗xf7 20. ♗f1+ ♗e8 21. ♘xe5 dxe5 22. ♘h5+ ♘d7 23. ♗f7+ ♘d6 24. ♗xe7 ♗xe7 25. ♗f7+ ♘d7 26. ♗f5+- White has a crushing attack in both cases; 18...dxe5? 19. ♗xf7! ♗xf7 20. ♗f1+ ♗e8 21. ♘xe5 dxe5 22. ♘h5+ ♘d7 23. ♗f7+ ♘d6 24. ♗xe7 ♗xe7 25. ♗f7+ ♘d7 26. ♗f5+- Black loses even faster after: 20... ♘g8 21. ♘xe5 ♘xe5 22. ♘xe5!+- and he has no adequate defence against the checkmate. 18... ♘xe5 19. ♗f5 h6 – After 19...0-0 20. ♗e7, White wins the exchange, maintaining dangerous threats, since it is bad for Black to try 20... ♗e8 21. ♗xh7!+- and he will be soon checkmated - 20. ♗xd7 ♗xd7 21. ♗b7!+- and Black loses his queen. 20... ♗xd7 21. ♘xe5 ♗e6 22. ♗d3! hxg5 23. ♗xf7 0-0 24. ♗xg5± and Black loses unavoidably his d6-pawn, because of the dangerous threats against his d6-pawn.) 17. ♗c4 h6 18. ♗h4 ♗d7 19. ♘h5## - White maintains an excellent compensation for the pawn, since Black fails to take his king to safety: 19...0-0 20. ♗e7 ♗f6 21. ♗xf6 ♗xf6 22. ♗xf6 gxf6 23. ♘h6 ♗b8 24. ♗f1+-

11...exf4?! – Strangely enough, that move does not lose immediately, but it leads to a very unpleasant endgame for Black: 12.e5 ♗xe5 13. ♗xf4 d6 14. ♘xe5 dxe5 15. ♘ae1 0-0 16. ♗xe5± ♗b6?, Heymann – Hackbusch, Germany 1995 (Naturally, it would have been better for Black to fight in an endgame with weak queenside pawns and passive pieces than to lose the game outright.) and here after: 17. ♗xf6 gxf6 18. ♗xf6+- Black can save his king only at the price of huge material losses.

11...h5?! – After that move Black’s king is bound to remain in the centre: 12.f5 ♗c5 13. ♗a4 ♗a7,

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V.Onoprienko – Voloshin, Pardubice 1997, 14...g5±

11...0-0 12.f5 b4 13.g5 e7, Eickhoff – Mai, Germany 2000, 14.c4 b7 15.ad1↑ – Black’s chances to accomplish the pawn-break in the centre are minimal, so White has good attacking prospects on the kingside.

12.d2 0–0

It is too dangerous for Black to continue with: 12...exf4 13.e5 xe5 14.xf4 d6 15.xe5 dxe5 16.e1 0–0 and here, instead of the line analyzed by GM S. Movsesian – 17.xe5 xe5 18.xe5± White’s attack is decisive after: 17.xf6! gxf6 18.e3→ and it looks like Black is beyond salvation, for example: 18.e4 19.xh6 exd3 20.e4+-, or 18..g7 19.g3+ h8 20.h4 g7 21.e3 d8 22.e4+-

13.f5 e8 14.c4 a5?

That is a loss of time. No doubt, it is preferable for Black to play the line recommended by GM S. Movsesian: 14...b8 15.f3 a7, but even then White’s kingside initiative is very dangerous after 16.g4↑

15.f3!→ Now, White is perfectly prepared for a direct kingside attack. 15...b4 16.g3 f8 17.e3! g8 (Black loses after his other possibilities too: 17...e7 18.xg7 xe3 19.xf7--; 17...d5 – that is supposed to be the standard “counter strike in the centre against an attack on the flank”. After: 18.xg7 xg7 19.xh6+ g8 20.g5+ h7 21.xf6 xc4 22.f1+- Black’s pieces fail to take part in the protection of his king. His defence is quite difficult after the alternatives as well: 18...dxc4 19.xh6 e7 20.g5 d6 21.d1++; or 18.xc3 19.bxc3 dxc4 20.xh6 e7 21.g5 d6 22.h5! f8 23.d1+-, Black would not save the day either with: 19.xg7 20.xh6+ g8 21.g5+ h7 22.xf6 xc4 23.h6+ g8 24.f6++) 18.f6 gxf6 19.f1+– Kasparov – Movsesian, Prague 2001.

c3) 9...d5 10.g5

Now, it deserves attention for Black to try: c3a) 10.e7 and c3b) 10...b7.

White obtains the edge easily after Black’s other moves:

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10...c5? – That is a blunder of a pawn. 11.exd5 \( \texttt{xd} \) 6 12.f4 \( \texttt{f} \) b8, Barber – Ginsburg, Dos Hermanas 2004, 13.\( \texttt{xa} \) e6+.–

10...d4 – Black thus blocks the centre and he cannot obtain any counterplay. 11.\( \texttt{b} \) e1 e5, Schneider – Bischof, Pinneberg 1996 (It is hardly better for Black to try: 11...\( \texttt{d} \) 7, Illescas Cordoba – Valcarcel, Benidorm 1986, since after: 12.c3\( \texttt{xc} \) d4 13.\( \texttt{xd} \) cxd4 14.\( \texttt{d} \) d2± White has a huge lead in development.) and here it is quite sensible for White to open the c-file: 12.c3 c5 (It is much worse for Black to play 12...\( \texttt{e} \) 7?!, because after: 13.\( \texttt{xc} \) d4 exd4 14.e5 \( \texttt{d} \) 5 15.\( \texttt{xe} \) e7 \( \texttt{xe} \) e7 16.\( \texttt{d} \) d2± he has problems protecting his weak pawns.) 13.\( \texttt{xc} \) d4 cxd4 14.\( \texttt{d} \) d2± – and White's further plan includes the occupation of the c-file and the preparation of f2-f4;

10...\( \texttt{b} \) b4 – That move either loses a tempo, or it presents White with the two-bishop advantage. 11.exd5 \( \texttt{xc} \) 3 (After 11...\( \texttt{xd} \) 5 12.\( \texttt{xd} \) d5 cxd5 13.\( \texttt{ac} \) 1 \( \texttt{d} \) 6 14.\( \texttt{h} \) 5 \( \texttt{b} \) 8 15.c4↑ Black has problems castling.) 12.bxc3 cxd5 (The other capture is worse for Black: 12...\( \texttt{xd} \) 5 13.c4 \( \texttt{f} \) 4 14.\( \texttt{xf} \) 4 \( \texttt{xf} \) 4 15.\( \texttt{h} \) 5↑, because his queen remains stranded in the centre and it impedes the coordination of his pieces, for example: 15...\( \texttt{d} \) 7 – the other logical line is: 15...h6 16.\( \texttt{c} \) 5 \( \texttt{d} \) 7 17.\( \texttt{ab} \) 1, and it leads to a transposition of moves – 16.\( \texttt{ab} \) 1 h6 17.\( \texttt{c} \) 5 \( \texttt{g} \) 5 18.\( \texttt{d} \) 6 \( \texttt{e} \) 7 19.\( \texttt{b} \) 8+ \( \texttt{xb} \) 8 20.\( \texttt{xb} \) 8+ \( \texttt{d} \) 8 21.\( \texttt{a} \) 7 \( \texttt{c} \) 8 22.\( \texttt{c} \) 5 \( \texttt{c} \) 7 23.\( \texttt{e} \) 4 \( \texttt{d} \) 7 24.\( \texttt{f} \) 3↑ That long and practically forced variation has led to a difficult position for Black and he can hardly complete his development without material losses.) 13.c4 dxc4 14.\( \texttt{xc} \) 4 \( \texttt{b} \) 7 15.\( \texttt{d} \) 3± White's powerful bishop pair provides him with a slight advantage. Black's attempt to simplify the position with: 15...\( \texttt{d} \) 7 16.\( \texttt{ab} \) 1 \( \texttt{c} \) 5 17.\( \texttt{g} \) 4 \( \texttt{xd} \) 3 18.\( \texttt{xd} \) 3 h5 19.\( \texttt{b} \) 4±, leads to his king remaining in the centre and the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board only enhances White's attacking chances. 19...\( \texttt{c} \) 6 20.\( \texttt{fc} \) 1 f6 21.\( \texttt{c} \) 4 \( \texttt{d} \) 7 22.\( \texttt{f} \) 4 e5 23.d4+- Prandstetter – Stoeckmann, Dortmund 1989.

\section*{c3a) 10...\( \texttt{e} \) 7 11.e5}

11...\( \texttt{h} \) 6

The other possibilities for Black seem to be worse:

After 11...\( \texttt{e} \) 4 12.\( \texttt{xe} \) 7 \( \texttt{xc} \) 3 13.\( \texttt{g} \) 4 \( \texttt{xe} \) 5 14.\( \texttt{ae} \) 1 \( \texttt{e} \) 4 15.\( \texttt{a} \) 3\( \texttt{ab} \) 1 his weak dark squares compensate amply White's sacrificed pawn
and in case of: 15...f5 16.\( \text{h} \)h4 \( \text{c} \)c7 18.f3 \( \text{d} \)d6 19.\( \text{f} \)f6 \( \text{f} \)f7
20.\( \text{x} \)xe6+ \( \text{x} \)xe6 21.\( \text{e} \)e1+ -- White's position was winning in the game
Deretic -- Ivanovic, corr. 1980;

11...\( \text{g} \)g8 -- This move is too passive. 12.\( \text{d} \)d2 \( \text{c} \)c5 (or 12...\( \text{g} \)g6 13.\( \text{a} \)a4
\( \text{c} \)c5 14.\( \text{c} \)c4± Sanden -- Engstrom, Sweden 1998) 13.b3 \( \text{b} \)b7, Shmirina
-- Nill, Nuremberg 2004 and here it looks logical for White to play: 14.\( \text{a} \)a4 \( \text{h} \)h6 (Black's lag in development is considerable after: 14...
\( \text{c} \)c4 15.bxc4 dxc4 16.\( \text{e} \)e4±) 15.\( \text{e} \)eh6
\( \text{g} \)hxh6 16.f4 \( \text{g} \)g8 (or 16...\( \text{c} \)c6 17.\( \text{c} \)c4
dxc4 18.\( \text{e} \)e4=) 17.c4 dxec (It is not better for Black to opt for: 17...\( \text{d} \)d4
18.\( \text{e} \)e4 0--0 0 19.\( \text{b} \)b2±) 18.\( \text{e} \)e4
cxb3 19.axb3± White's prospects are better due to his opponent's weak pawns and his passive dark-squared bishop;

11...\( \text{d} \)d7 12.\( \text{x} \)xe7 \( \text{x} \)xe7 13.\( \text{a} \)ae1
\( \text{b} \)b7 (It is worse for Black to try: 13...\( \text{c} \)c5 14.b3 \( \text{f} \)f5? 15.\( \text{a} \)xf5 \( \text{d} \)d4 16.\( \text{g} \)g4
1--0 Fernandes -- Guerra, Lisbon 1999; or 13...\( \text{g} \)g6, Mitlashevsky
-- Dragomarjezki, Moscow 2002, after 14.\( \text{a} \)a4 \( \text{f} \)f8 15.\( \text{c} \)c4 \( \text{g} \)g7 16.\( \text{c} \)5± Black's pieces are passive and his dark squares are vulnerable.)
14.b3 \( \text{c} \)c5 15.f4 \( \text{e} \)6, Lanka -- Fog
mann, corr. 1986; now it looks very strong for White to follow with 16.\( \text{d} \)d1! with the idea 16...
\( \text{f} \)f8 17.f5 →

12.\( \text{h} \)h4 \( \text{g} \)g8

That move seems to be too passive, but is evidently not worse than the attractive line -- 12...\( \text{d} \)d7, since after the practically forced
variation: 13.\( \text{e} \)xe7 \( \text{e} \)xe7 14.\( \text{a} \)ae1
\( \text{c} \)5 15.b3 \( \text{b} \)b7, Hracek -- Volokitin, Germany 2005, it is very good for
White to play the line recommended by GM A.Volokitin: 16.f4! \( \text{g} \)g6
17.\( \text{d} \)d1! \( \text{f} \)f8 18.f5!?, The following variations illustrate White's dangerous attacking prospects: 18...\( \text{g} \)xf5 19.\( \text{a} \)xf5 \( \text{e} \)e5
(White's game is even simpler after the other lines for Black: 20...
\( \text{e} \)e8 21.e6 \( \text{e} \)e7 22.\( \text{h} \)h5 f6 23.\( \text{e} \)e3+ --
and Black must concede material in order to avoid being checkmated, or 20...\( \text{h} \)h5 21.e6 \( \text{g} \)g8 22.\( \text{x} \)xf7!
\( \text{x} \)xf7 23.exf7+ \( \text{h} \)h7 24.\( \text{d} \)d3+ \( \text{g} \)g7
25.\( \text{e} \)e7 \( \text{f} \)f8 26.\( \text{f} \)f5--; 25...\( \text{f} \)f8
26.\( \text{e} \)e3--; 23...\( \text{h} \)h8 24.\( \text{g} \)g4 \( \text{e} \)e5
25.\( \text{f} \)f4--; 24...\( \text{f} \)f6 25.\( \text{g} \)g6 \( \text{f} \)f4
26.g3 \( \text{g} \)g5 27.\( \text{x} \)xg5 hxg5 28.\( \text{e} \)e7
\( \text{c} \)c6 29.\( \text{e} \)e6+ -- and White should easily press the advantage of his extra pawns home.) 21.\( \text{a} \)xf7! \( \text{f} \)f8
22.e6+ \( \text{f} \)f8 (or 22...\( \text{e} \)e7 23.exd7+ \( \text{d} \)d7 24.\( \text{g} \)g6+ \( \text{d} \)d8 25.\( \text{g} \)g6+; 22...\( \text{g} \)g7 23.\( \text{g} \)g4+ \( \text{f} \)f8 24.\( \text{f} \)f1+
\( \text{e} \)e7 25.\( \text{f} \)f7+ \( \text{e} \)e6 26.\( \text{f} \)f6! 27.\( \text{f} \)f4+
\( \text{e} \)e6 28.\( \text{f} \)f6+ \( \text{x} \)xd7 29.
\( \text{f} \)f6+ \( \text{f} \)f8 30.\( \text{g} \)g8 31.\( \text{g} \)g2+)
23.\( \text{f} \)f3+ \( \text{e} \)e7 (or 23...
\( \text{d} \)d6 24.\( \text{x} \)xf6+ \( \text{g} \)g8 25.e7 \( \text{c} \)c6
26.\( \text{e} \)e6 \( \text{e} \)e8 27.\( \text{e} \)e3! \( \text{f} \)f7 28.\( \text{e} \)e5
\( \text{c} \)c6 29.\( \text{f} \)f5++, 27...\( \text{h} \)h7 28.\( \text{f} \)f5
\( \text{h} \)h5 29.\( \text{e} \)e3! \( \text{d} \)d1+ 30.\( \text{f} \)f2 \( \text{d} \)d2+
31.\( \text{g} \)g3++; 24.exd7+ \( \text{e} \)e7 25.
\( \text{f} \)f5+ \( \text{c} \)c6 (25...\( \text{d} \)d8 26.\( \text{f} \)f6+--)
26.\( \text{e} \)e6+ \( \text{e} \)e7 27.\( \text{e} \)e3+-
13.\( \text{g} \)g3 \( \text{h} \)h5 14.\( \text{f} \)f4 \( \text{c} \)c5 15.b3
\( \text{b} \)b7

Sedlak -- Volokitin, Turin
2006.
4. \( \textit{d}4 \) e6 5. \( \textit{c}3 \) a6 6. \( \textit{d}xe6 \) bc 7. \( \textit{d}3 \)

16. \( \textit{d}d1?! \) (That is a standard transfer of the knight to d3 or e4.) 16... \( \textit{h}6 \) (Black exploits the fact that it is too risky for White to capture the h5-pawn, since his opponent activates his pieces promptly and he does not lose time to protect his h5-pawn: 16...g6 17.c4 d4 18.\( \textit{b}2 \) \( \textit{h}6 \) 19.\( \textit{e}4 \) \( \textit{f}5 \) 20.\( \textit{d}3\). It is also in favour of White if Black tries the line: 16...\( \textit{c}6 \) 17.f3 \( \textit{h}6 \) 18.c4 d4 19.\( \textit{f}2 \) \( \textit{f}5 \) 20.\( \textit{d}2\); after 17...0-0-0 18.c4± it is much easier for White to organize an offensive on the queenside than it is for Black to create counterplay on the kingside.) 17.c4 \( \textit{dxc4} \) (White's position is better after Black's other moves: 17...d4 18.f3 \( \textit{f}5 \) 19.\( \textit{f}2 \); 17...\( \textit{f}5?! \) 18.\( \textit{x}f5 \) \( \textit{xf5} \) 19.cxd5 \( \textit{xd5} \) 20.\( \textit{e}3 \) \( \textit{e}6 \) 21.\( \textit{c}4\) Black's king is obviously unsafe; 17...g5?! – That move is too risky, since Black cannot organize anything real on the kingside. 18.\( \textit{d}2 \) d4 19.f3 \( \textit{f}5 \) 20.\( \textit{f}2 \) \( \textit{h}4 \) 21.\( \textit{e}4\); 19...g4 20.\( \textit{e}4 \) 0-0-0 21.\( \textit{b}2\) 18.\( \textit{bxc4} \) \( \textit{d}8 \) (After 18...\( \textit{f}5 \) 19.\( \textit{x}f5 \) \( \textit{xf5} \) 20.\( \textit{c}3\) White's knight obtains the excellent outpost on d5.) 19.\( \textit{b}1 \) h4 20.\( \textit{h}3 \) \( \textit{d}4 \)

21.\( \textit{d}2 \) \( \textit{d}7 \) 22.\( \textit{b}3\)± Now, the main drawback of Black's position is the lack of a reliable shelter for his king.

\[ \text{c3b} \] 10...\( \textit{b}7 \) 11.f4

11...\( \textit{c}7 \)

11...\( \textit{b}6+?! \) – This computer move is too ambitious. 12.\( \textit{h}1 \) h6, episcopal – slowman, Internet 1999 (12...\( \textit{xb}2 \)? – That is the most principled move indeed, but White obtains a winning position in the fastest possible way with: 13.\( \textit{xd}5 \)! cxd5 14.\( \textit{ab}1 \) \( \textit{d}4 \) 15.\( \textit{xb}7 \) dxe4 16.\( \textit{xa}6 \) \( \textit{d}6 \) 17.\( \textit{b}5+ \) \( \textit{f}8 \) 18.\( \textit{d}1+-; \) Black would hardly save the game either after: 14...\( \textit{xa}2 \) 15.\( \textit{xb}7 \) \( \textit{c}5 \) 16.\( \textit{xf}6 \) \( \textit{xf}6 \) 17.exd5 \( \textit{xd}5 \) 18.\( \textit{e}4\) and White's attack is decisive. It seems too strange for Black to try: 12...\( \textit{xb}4 \)?! 13.exd5 exd5 14.f5± White's threats in the centre are quite dangerous and Black decided to have something to suffer for and so he played: 14...\( \textit{xb}2 \) 15.\( \textit{ab}1 \) \( \textit{c}3 \), Diepeveen – crafty, Internet 1999, but after: 16.\( \textit{xb}7 \) \( \textit{c}6 \) 17.\( \textit{fb}1 \) \( \textit{e}7 \) 18.\( \textit{b}6+-; \) he had no satisfactory defence in sight.) 13.\( \textit{h}4 \) d4 (Af-
ter 13...\textit{\textnumero}xb2 14.\textit{\textnumero}xd5+- there arise variations, which we have analyzed in our notes to Black's move 12 and the placement of the pawn on h6 and not on h7 is immaterial for the evaluation of the position.) 14.\textit{\textnumero}a4 \textit{\textnumero}a5 15.b3 \textit{\textnumero}a3 (or 15...\textit{\textnumero}h5 16.\textit{\textnumero}e1±) 16.\textit{\textnumero}e1 \textit{\textnumero}c7 (It is not better for Black to try: 16...\textit{\textnumero}b4 17.c3 dxc3 18.a3±) 17.b4 \textit{\textnumero}d7 18.f5 e5 19.\textit{\textnumero}g4 \textit{\textnumero}f8 20.\textit{\textnumero}b1± and the difference in coordination of pieces is evident to the naked eye too.

11...\textit{\textnumero}h6 12.\textit{\textnumero}h4 \textit{\textnumero}e7 13.e5 \textit{\textnumero}d7 14.\textit{\textnumero}xe7 \textit{\textnumero}xe7, S.German – Panno, Buenos Aires 1995 and here it is very good for White to follow with: 15.\textit{\textnumero}ae1 c5 16.b3 g6 17.\textit{\textnumero}d1± and once again the placement of the pawn on h6 and not on h7 changes nothing.

11...\textit{\textnumero}c5+ – Black worsens the position of his bishop...with tempo. 12.\textit{\textnumero}h1 \textit{\textnumero}d4 13.e5 \textit{\textnumero}d7, Perez Ramos – Collazo, Cuba 2000 and here it deserves attention for White to continue with: 14.\textit{\textnumero}a4 h6 15.\textit{\textnumero}h4 \textit{\textnumero}a5 16.c3 \textit{\textnumero}a7 (It is a disaster for Black to play: 16...\textit{\textnumero}xa4? 17.b3 \textit{\textnumero}a3 18.cxd4+-) 17.b3± – Black's king would not find a safe haven on the queenside, while it would come under attack in the centre and on the kingside.

11...dxe4 – That is an attempt by Black to seize the initiative. 12.\textit{\textnumero}xe4 \textit{\textnumero}xe4 13.\textit{\textnumero}xe4 h6 14.\textit{\textnumero}h4 g5!?, Lipcak – Lakatos, Slovakia 2002 and it is worth for White to try the pawn sacrifice: 15.\textit{\textnumero}e1!? gxf4 16.\textit{\textnumero}c3 \textit{\textnumero}g8 17.\textit{\textnumero}f6\textbf{=} Black's king is stranded in the centre, his pieces are passive and his pawns are weak.

11...\textit{\textnumero}d7 12.\textit{\textnumero}a4 \textit{\textnumero}c5 13.\textit{\textnumero}xc5 \textit{\textnumero}xc5+ 14.\textit{\textnumero}h1 \textit{\textnumero}e7, Ljubisavljevic – Ivkov, Imperia 1967 and now White should open files in the centre with: 15.exd5 cxd5 (It is worse for Black to play: 15...\textit{\textnumero}xg5 16.dxc6 \textit{\textnumero}xc6 17.fxg5±) 16.\textit{\textnumero}xe7 \textit{\textnumero}xe7 17.\textit{\textnumero}ae1 g6 (After 17...0–0? 18.f5± White has excellent attacking chances.) 18.\textit{\textnumero}e5 0–0–0 (It is too dangerous for Black to play: 18...0–0! 19.f5±) 19.\textit{\textnumero}d4± – Black's king has no pawn-shelter and his centre only restricts his pieces.

12.e5 \textit{\textnumero}d7

In answer to 12...\textit{\textnumero}g8, German – Giardelli, Buenos Aires 1993, it is worth for White to opt for 13.\textit{\textnumero}g4±, forcing Black to compromise his kingside.

13.\textit{\textnumero}xe7 \textit{\textnumero}xe7, Spassky – T.Petrosian, Palma de Mallorca 1969 and here, analogously to the game Hracek – Volokitin, Germany 2005, White should better follow with: 14.\textit{\textnumero}ae1 c5 15.b3 g6
16. \( \text{d}1 \pm \) with the idea to organize my notes to Black's move 12 in the an attack after 16...\( \text{f}8 \) 17.\( \text{f}5 \rightarrow \) (see variation \( \text{c3a} \)).

**Conclusion**

We have started analyzing in this chapter the variation with 5...a6, introduced in the tournament practice during the 60ies of the last century, by the grandmaster from Saint Petersburg M.Taimanov. At first, Black's main idea used to be the piece set-up – \( \text{ge7} \), followed by \( \text{xd4} \), after which his king's knight was usually perfectly placed on c6 and that was instructively demonstrated by Mark Evgenievich in numerous games. Later, White managed to counter that scheme quite convincingly and Black began to use that order of moves in order to avoid the development of White’s pieces according to the following active set-up: \( \text{e3} \), \( \text{d2} \) and \( 0-0-0 \). In that case, Black is prepared to meet 6.\( \text{e3} \) with the simple reaction 6...\( \text{f6} \) and White cannot play 7.\( \text{d2} \), because of the active move 7...\( \text{b4} \) and then he will be faced with a difficult fight to equalize.

White exchanges knights on c6 and he not only prevents thus Taimanov's set-up, but he has a quite effective scheme of development in mind. Naturally, that exchange has some advantages and some drawbacks for White. He acquires a lead in development and he has good prospects of occupying additional space on the kingside and in the centre. Meanwhile, the main drawback of that exchange is that Black obtains an elastic pawn-chain and he can handle it in the centre any way he pleases. Black's queen rook also gains an immediate access to the semi-open b-file.

In variation a, Black continues with the move 7...e5 and he simultaneously follows the opening principles and he ignores them. On one hand, he prevents his opponent from occupying space in the centre, but on the other hand he makes a sixth move out of seven with a pawn in the opening and that is naturally harmful to his development. White obtains an advantage without too much of an effort. He completes his development with the moves \( 0-0 \) and \( \text{e2} \) and then as a rule he follows a plan connected with \( \text{c3-a4} \) and the advance of his c-pawn. As a result of that, Black's pawn-chain on the queenside is destroyed and White can create additional targets there with the move c4-c5. In case Black counters White's move c4-c5, by advancing c6-c5 himself – then he weakens the important central d5-square.
In variation b), Black’s seventh move 7...d6, seems to be quite flexible, but somewhat passive. He is trying to postpone the final decision about his future plans and depending on White’s scheme of development, Black can continue with e6-e5, or d6-d5. White’s pieces set-up is simple then – he castles, he plays f2-f4 and he places his queen on e1. (Black can force, with a precise order of moves, his opponent to play $h1$, but that move is favourable for White anyway.) Later, White creates the threat e4-e5 and that compels Black to clarify the situation in the centre. White’s pieces are so harmoniously deployed that he has no problems to start active actions irrelevant of the possible pawn-structure in the centre.

It seems more precise for Black to play 7...c7, which we have analyzed in variation c). He thus prevents White’s occupation of the centre and he develops a piece. Meanwhile, just like in variation b, Black preserves the possibility to choose the eventual pawn-structure in the centre. In variation c1), he allows his opponent to accomplish the important central break e4-e5, which is connected with a pawn-sacrifice, but White’s pieces become tremendously active after that. Black places his pawn on the e5-square in variation c2), but White then has active prospects on the kingside. In variation c3), White obtains a space advantage on the kingside and in the centre. Instead, Black has the pawn-tandem c5 and d5, but White counters that with the move b2-b3, preventing his opponent from occupying additional space on the queenside. The future of White’s knight becomes quite important then. Strangely enough, the ideal square for it seems to be d1, since it can be transferred from there to f5 (after White pushes f4-f5 and he sacrifices his bishop on that square), as well as to the e4, or d3-squares (after White pushes c2-c4).

In general, we have to mention that Black’s different and rather complicated possibilities in that variation do not help him obtain a satisfactory game and his objectively best line is the move 7...d5, which we deal with in our next chapter.
Black fights immediately for the centre.

8. 0–0

We will analyze now: a) 8...\texttt{d}d6, b) 8...\texttt{c}7 and c) 8...\texttt{f}6.

About 8...\texttt{b}7 9.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{f}6 10.\texttt{f}4 – see 8...\texttt{f}6 9.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{b}7 10.\texttt{f}4.

Black plays only seldom other moves here:

8...d4 – The reduction of the tension in the centre is favourable for White. 9.\texttt{e}e2 c5, Held – Roeber, Bad Bevensen 1994 and here after 10.c3 dxc3 (or 10...e5 11.cxd4 cxd4 12.f4±) 11.\texttt{xc}3 \texttt{e}7 12.\texttt{g}5 h6 13.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{b}6 14.\texttt{c}1± White leads in development and he has an easy game against Black’s vulnerable queenside;

8...\texttt{c}5 – That move weakens the g7-pawn and White can exploit that outright. 9.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{f}8, N.McDonald – Gillen, Dundee 1993 (It is disaster for Black to play: 9...\texttt{f}6? 10.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{g}6 11.e5+– Vybornov – De Lillo, Dos Hermanas 2004; 9...g6 – Black weakens the dark squares on his kingside. 10.e5 \texttt{c}7 11.\texttt{e}1 h5 12.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{b}7 13.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{a}7, Bucher – Kohler, Lausanne 2000 and now after 14.b4± the dark squares on his queenside are also weak.) and in that position White can fight for the dominance over the dark squares with: 10.e5 \texttt{b}8 (or 10...\texttt{c}7 11.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{e}7 12.\texttt{e}1±) 11.a3 \texttt{c}7 12.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{e}7 13.b4±;

In answer to 8...\texttt{e}7, Dembo – Cmilyte, Turin 2006, it seems logical for White to play: 9.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{f}6 (after 9...\texttt{f}6 10.\texttt{g}3±, the threat 11.e5 is quite unpleasant) 10.\texttt{x}g7 \texttt{g}8 11.\texttt{h}6 \texttt{g}6 12.\texttt{d}2±, since Black falls behind in development and he can hardly prove a sufficient compensation for the pawn;

8...\texttt{b}4 – After that move, Black will have either to present his opponent with the two-bishop advantage, or he will have to lose tempi to retreat with that bishop. 9.e5 \texttt{c}7, Pereira – Romao, Por-
tugal 2001, 10.\texttt{\textit{Be}}1 \texttt{\textit{b}}8 (It is not better for Black to try: 10...\texttt{\textit{De}}7 11.\texttt{\textit{B}}g4 \texttt{\textit{Bxc}}3 12.\texttt{\textit{Bxc}}3 \texttt{\textit{d}}0–0 13.\texttt{\textit{Bh}}5+, because he will hardly prove that his opponent’s doubled pawns are weak, while Black risks coming under attack on the kingside, moreover that he will have problems activating his light-squared bishop.) 11.\texttt{\textit{D}}d2 \texttt{\textit{De}}7 12.\texttt{\textit{B}}g4 \texttt{\textit{Bg}}6 13.\texttt{\textit{Bb}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bxb}}5 14.\texttt{\textit{Bxb}}4± White’s powerful dark-squared bishop provides him with a strong positional pressure;

8...g6 – This move compromises the dark squares on the kingside. 9.\texttt{\textit{B}}e2 \texttt{\textit{Bf}}6 (After: 9...\texttt{\textit{B}}g7 10.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{cxd}}5 11.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bb}}7 12.\texttt{\textit{Bb}}4 \texttt{\textit{Bd}}6 13.c3± White remains with a solid extra pawn, van den Brande – Verellen, Westerlo 2004.) 10.\texttt{\textit{B}}g5 \texttt{\textit{Be}}7 11.\texttt{\textit{Bh}}6± Martinovic – Rogers, Bor 1984;

8...\texttt{\textit{De}}7, Boriss – Kaza, Ikaros 2002, that try does not contribute to the fight for the centre and it enables White to maintain his queen at a maximally active position. 9.\texttt{\textit{Bh}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bg}}6 10.\texttt{\textit{Bg}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bd}}5 (or 10...\texttt{\textit{Bc}}7 11.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{cxd}}5 12.\texttt{\textit{Ba}}1 \texttt{\textit{Bb}}7 13.\texttt{\textit{Bxg}}6 \texttt{\textit{fxg}}6 14.\texttt{\textit{Bf}}3±. Black is behind in development and his pawns in the centre need additional protection. That cannot be compensated by his bishop pair and his attempt to parry the threat against the d5-pawn with the move 14...\texttt{\textit{Bb}}4 exposes him to an attack on the weak dark squares in a position with approximate material equality: 15.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bxe}}1 16.\texttt{\textit{Bxe}}1 \texttt{\textit{Ba}}7 17.\texttt{\textit{c}}4 \texttt{\textit{Bf}}7 18.\texttt{\textit{B}}a3–;

Black loses after: 12...\texttt{\textit{Bxe}}7 13.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{exd}}5 14.\texttt{\textit{Bxg}}6++, while following: 12...\texttt{\textit{Bd}}7 13.\texttt{\textit{Be}}2± White deploys his knight in the centre and his lead in development becomes threatening.) 11.\texttt{\textit{D}}d2 \texttt{\textit{Cc}}7 12.\texttt{\textit{Bae}}1 \texttt{\textit{d}}4 13.\texttt{\textit{Be}}2 \texttt{\textit{Bb}}8 14.\texttt{\textit{B}}b3 \texttt{\textit{e}}5 15.\texttt{\textit{Bf}}4± Black has problems neutralizing White’s kingside initiative, due to his lag in development;

8...\texttt{\textit{Bh}}4, Marolt – Zorko, Slovenia 1999 – This move looks aggressive, but it is slightly premature. 9.\texttt{\textit{B}}e1 – White does not need to weaken the position of his king with the move g3. 9...\texttt{\textit{Bc}}5 (Black’s queen is evidently misplaced after: 9...\texttt{\textit{d}}4? ! 10.\texttt{\textit{Bb}}4 \texttt{\textit{Bb}}7 11.\texttt{\textit{Bxe}}3± and he has problems defending his queenside. It is also bad for him to try: 9...\texttt{\textit{Bf}}6?! 10.\texttt{\textit{g}}3 \texttt{\textit{Bg}}4 11.\texttt{\textit{Bc}}2 \texttt{\textit{Bg}}6 – after 11...\texttt{\textit{Bh}}3? 12.\texttt{\textit{e}}5+- Black loses at least a knight – 12.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 and here he is lost after: 12...\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 13.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{cxd}}5 14.\texttt{\textit{Bh}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bf}}5 15.\texttt{\textit{g}}4 \texttt{\textit{Bf}}6 16.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5++, while in case of: 12...\texttt{\textit{cxd}}5 13.\texttt{\textit{Bd}}3± he loses his d5-pawn.) 10.\texttt{\textit{g}}3 \texttt{\textit{Bf}}6 (Black loses a pawn after: 10...\texttt{\textit{Bd}}8 11.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{cxd}}5 12.\texttt{\textit{Bxd}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bb}}7 13.\texttt{\textit{Be}}4±, or 12...\texttt{\textit{Bf}}6 13.\texttt{\textit{c}}4 0–0 14.\texttt{\textit{Bxf}}6+ \texttt{\textit{Bxf}}6 15.\texttt{\textit{Bf}}4±) 11.\texttt{\textit{Bf}}4 \texttt{\textit{Bxf}}2+!? (It looks like this temporary piece-sacrifice is Black’s best chance. White would be clearly better in a calm position after 11...\texttt{\textit{Bb}}7 12.\texttt{\textit{e}}5 \texttt{\textit{Bc}}7 13.\texttt{\textit{Bc}}4 \texttt{\textit{Bd}}7 14.\texttt{\textit{c}}4+, as well as following: 11...\texttt{\textit{g}}5 12.\texttt{\textit{Bh}}6 13.\texttt{\textit{Bxe}}3 \texttt{\textit{Bxe}}3 14.\texttt{\textit{Bxe}}3 \texttt{\textit{Bc}}7 – it is a disaster for Black to try: 14...
4.\( \texttt{xd} 4\texttt{e} 6 \) 5.\( \texttt{c} 3\texttt{a} 6 \) 6.\( \texttt{x} \texttt{c} 6\texttt{bc} 7.\( \texttt{d} 3\texttt{d} 5\texttt{8} - 0 - 0\)

\( 4.\texttt{tx} \texttt{d} 4 \texttt{e} 6 5.\texttt{c} 3 \texttt{a} 6 6.\texttt{x} \texttt{c} 6 \texttt{bc} 7.\texttt{d} 3 \texttt{d} 5 8.\texttt{0} - 0 \)

\( \texttt{d} 4? 15.\texttt{e} 4+ -, \text{while in case of: } 14.\texttt{f} 5 15.\texttt{a} 4= \text{he remains clearly behind in development and his dark squares are vulnerable.} 15.\texttt{a} 4 \texttt{b} 8 16.\texttt{g} 4= \text{Black’s pieces are discoordinated and he has weak pawns on both sides of the board.} 12.\texttt{x} \texttt{xf} 2 \texttt{g} 5 13.\texttt{e} 5 \texttt{w} \texttt{h} 6 14.\texttt{e} 3 \texttt{w} \texttt{xh} 2+ 15.\texttt{f} 1! \text{(Black’s idea can be best seen in the variation: } 15.\texttt{f} 3= ?! \texttt{g} 4+ 16.\texttt{w} \texttt{xg} 4 \texttt{d} 6+ ! 17.\texttt{d} 3 \texttt{g} 8= and he has dangerous threats.) 15...\texttt{h} 3+ 16.\texttt{e} 2 \texttt{w} \texttt{xg} 3 17.\texttt{d} 2 \texttt{w} \texttt{e} 5 18.\texttt{g} 4= - \text{Black’s attack has backfired and now his dark squares are very weak, moreover that his catastrophic lag in development makes his position completely hopeless.} \\

\textbf{a) } 8...\texttt{d} 6 \\

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{image}
\end{center}

This is not the best line for Black; nevertheless it is often played in practice.

9.\texttt{e} 1 \texttt{e} 7

In answer to 9...\texttt{d} 4, Nissen – Kempen, Box Hill 2000, White’s most aggressive line seems to be 10.e5, with the following possibilities: 10...\texttt{e} 7 11.\texttt{e} 4± and Black can hardly complete his development: 10...\texttt{d} 3 11.\texttt{e} 6 \texttt{w} \texttt{x} \texttt{d} 6 12.\texttt{g} 4 \texttt{f} 8 13.\texttt{b} 3± and White has the two-bishop advantage, while Black’s king is stranded in the centre; 10...\texttt{b} 4 11.\texttt{g} 4 \texttt{d} 7 12.a3 \texttt{a} 5 13.b4± Black has numerous weaknesses to worry about; 10...\texttt{e} 5 11.\texttt{xe} 5 \texttt{d} 3 12.\texttt{e} 1 \texttt{cxb} 2 13.\texttt{xb} 2 \texttt{e} 7 14.\texttt{d} 1± White has two powerful bishops and a lead in development, so his compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient.

After 9...\texttt{c} 7, Tang – Melamedoff, Winnipeg 2003, it is advantageous for White to trade his flank h2-pawn for Black’s central d5-pawn. 10.\texttt{e} 5 \texttt{f} 6 (In case of: 10...\texttt{e} 4 11.\texttt{h} 1 \texttt{d} 6 12.\texttt{e} 6 \texttt{e} 6 13.\texttt{h} 5 \texttt{f} 8 14.\texttt{e} 4± Black lags behind in development considerably.) 11.\texttt{d} 6 \texttt{e} 2 12.\texttt{h} 1 \texttt{h} 5 13.\texttt{f} 3 \texttt{h} 4 14.\texttt{e} 4 \texttt{e} 4 15.\texttt{x} \texttt{e} 4± White remains with an extra pawn and it would be too difficult for Black to exploit his opponent’s somewhat shaky king’s shelter, because of the passivity of his queenside pieces.

10.\texttt{w} 5 \texttt{d} 4

This move leads to a sharp fight, which is more favourable for White, since he leads in development.

10...\texttt{g} 6? – This is obviously a blunder. 11.\texttt{e} 5 0–0 (Black could have kept his extra pawn with the line: 11...\texttt{a} 5 12.\texttt{d} 2 \texttt{cxd} 5 13.\texttt{b} 5 \texttt{w} \texttt{d} 8 14.\texttt{d} 6+ \texttt{w} \texttt{d} 6 15.\texttt{a} 3±, but in that case White’s couple of
Chapter 9

bishops provide him with a clear advantage in that open position.)

12.dxc6 b8, A.Berg – Moscoso, Email 1997 and here White's simplest decision seems to be 13.e4+

10...e5 – This move enables Whitetobegin a kingside offensive.

11.f4 d4 (After: 11...e6 12.exd5 cxd5 13.fxe5 c5+ 14.h1+ White remains with a solid extra pawn, Brendel – Hess, Germany 1996.)

12.fxe5 a5 13.f1 g6 14.b5! – That is a spectacular introduction to an attack. 14...b8 15.e6! axb5 16.exf7+ f8 17.e5! – and despite his extra piece, Black is incapable of neutralizing the numerous threats: 17...exf5 18.h6! c7 19.xg7+ xg7 20.xh7+ 1-0 S.Klimov – Lindberg, Stockholm 1999.

10...b4?! – This is a loss of time, because in the variations, which we will analyze later, Black develops his bishop to the c5-square immediately. 11.a3 xc3 (It is possibly better for Black to preserve the bishop: 11...c5!? 12.a4 d4 13.c3 a7 14.b4, although after that his queenside pawns are blocked and he has no active prospects. After: 12.a5 13.b4, it is very bad for Black to play: 13.xf2+? 14.xf2 xa4 15.b2+, because his dark squares are very weak and his queen remains out of play. It is slightly better for him to try: 13...xa4 14.bxc5+, but even then he has problems defending his dark squares.) 12.bxc3 g6, Brendel – Berset, Bern 1998. White can open files in the centre in order to exploit his lead in development and his powerful bishops: 13.g5 a5 14.exd5 cxd5 15.c4 dxc4 (Black loses immediately after: 15...b7? 16.xg6+–, while in case of: 15...d4 16.f3 a7 17.c6+ d7 18.d6± Black loses either a pawn, or the exchange.) 16.xg6!? fxg6 17.f3 a7 18.h4 f8 19.g4 f7 20.g3+ and White has excellent chances of organizing an attack on the weakened dark squares in his opponent’s camp. The presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board even enhances his offensive.

10...b7 11.e5 c7 12.d5 c5, Menghi – Surroca Collazo, corr. 2001, and here it is logical for White to continue with: 13.a4 a5 14.b4 xa4 15.bxc5 a5 16.e3+ White's powerful bishop-pair provides him with a clear advantage and after 16...f5 17.f4, it is dangerous for Black to play: 17.xc5? 18.xf5 g6 19.h4 gxh4 20.e3+, because his bishop cannot take part in the defence. It is only slightly better for him to try: 17.e7 18.g5 g6 19.d2 xc5 20.b4+

10...b7 11.e5 c5 12.d2 g6 13.a4 c7, Gullaksen – Romsdal, Norway 1997 and here after 14.b4± Black has no active prospects in sight.

10...c7 11.e5 c5 12.g4 g6, Langrock – Lindberg, Hamburg 1999, 13.d2 b8 (or 13...b6
14...g3±) 14.âa4 âe7 15.b4 0–0 16.âc3± and Black has no counterplay in a position with material equality.

11.e5 âa5 12.âg5

It is bad for Black to play: 12...h6 13.âe4 âxe5, because of: 14.âf4 (14.âf6!? ) and he is incapable of protecting his bishop: 14...g5 (or 14...âg6 15.âd6+) 15.b4 âd5 16.âc4+-

12...dxc3 13.exd6 cxb2 14.âxb1

14...h6

Black is trying to make use of the pin, preparing to castle in the process (14...âf5 15.âe7!!). 15.h4 âf5 (In answer to 15...âd5, White must redeploy his bishop to the long diagonal: 16.âf4±, exploiting the fact that he is clearly better after: 16...0–0 17.âxh6 f5 18.c4 – and here in case of; 18...âb6? 19.âxg7+- he has a checkmating attack, while after: 18...âf6 19.âg5 âa7 20.âd2± the pawns are equal, but White has the two-bishop advantage and excellent play on the dark squares.) 16.âe7± Black’s king was stranded in the centre and he lost quickly: 16...g6 (or 16...âg8 17.âe4±) 17.âf3 âb8 18.âxf5 gxf5 19.âg3 1–0 Petrovic – Leoni, Email 1999.

b) 8...âc7 9.âe1

9...âb7

There arise no original lines after: 9...âf6 10.âg5 – see 8...âf6 9.âe1 âc7 10.âg5, variation c, or 9...âd6 10.exd5 – see 8...âd6 9.âe1 âc7 10.exd5, variation a.

9...d4 – Black blocks the centre falling behind in development. 10.âe2 e5 (It is not better for Black to try: 10...c5 11.c3 dxc3 12.âxc3 âb7, Gilbert – Pearce, England 1998 and here it looks very unpleasant for him if White follows with 13.âa4+, because after: 13...âc6 14.âd5± the centralized knight is very powerful, while the line: 13...âc6 14.âc2 âe7 15.âa5 âd8 16.âa3±, leads to a position with a considerable lead in development for White and a weakness for Black on c5.) 11.c3 12.âxc3 âb7, Alford – Torres Contreras, Merida 2002, (Black’s vulnerable queenside pawns present White with a stable edge after: 11...dxc3 12.âxc3± âb4?! – Black obtains a
protected passed pawn in the centre indeed, but White has occupied the c-file and he has the two-bishop advantage. 13.\(\text{d}5!\) cxd5 14.\(\text{g}4+\) d7 15.\(\text{xb}4\pm\) Black's a6 and e5-pawn need additional protection, moreover that his king is still in the centre. 15...\(\text{b}8\) 16.\(\text{a}3\) d4 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{a}8\) 20.\(\text{a}5+-\) Black loses his central pawns, Soby – Moller, Vejle 1974) and here White manages to develop his pieces faster than his opponent after: 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}6\) (It is worse for Black to play 13...\(\text{d}6?!\), because in answer to 14.cxd4, he loses a pawn after: 14...cxd4 15.\(\text{a}4\pm\), while the line: 14...\(\text{a}4\) 15.\(\text{f}4\) presents White with a full control over the centre.) 14.cxd4 cxd4 (but not 14...cxd4?! 15.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}7\) 16.e5\pm and White breaks through in the centre) 15.\(\text{a}5!\) \(\text{c}5\) (The other retreats of the queen are not any better: 15...\(\text{e}6\) 16.\(\text{ac}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 17.\(\text{c}7\pm\) 15...\(\text{b}7\) 16.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.f4\pm) 16.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 17.\(\text{ac}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.\(\text{b}4\pm\) White's position is superior thanks to his domination over the c-file and the weakness of Black's a6-pawn.

10.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}6\)

10...\(\text{f}6?!\) – Now, Black must lose tempi on queen-moves. 11.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 12.a3 \(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 14.\(\text{ad}1\uparrow\) and Black has no active prospects. His attempt to create some counterplay on the queenside led to a difficult position for him after: 10...a5 15.exd5 cxd5 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{c}8\) 17.\(\text{a}7\pm\) P.Smirnov – Bryzgalin, Kazan 2005.

White obtained a slight, but stable advantage after: 10...d4 11.\(\text{e}2\) c5 12.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{d}6\) 13.cxd4 cxd4, in the game Jansa – Velikov, Vrnjacka Banja 1982. Now, after the prophylactic move 14.\(\text{h}1\), Black can hardly protect his d4-pawn, for example: 14...\(\text{e}5\) 15.\(\text{g}3\) \(g6\) (or 15...\(f6?!\) 16.\(\text{d}2\pm\) 16.\(\text{d}2\pm\) and Black's king remains stranded in the centre, moreover that White is dominant on the c-file, so he has a stable advantage. It is more or less the same after: 14...\(\text{b}6\) 15.\(\text{d}1\) e5 16.\(\text{g}3\) \(g6\) 17.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.\(\text{b}3\pm\); Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient after: 14...\(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 16.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{a}5\) 17.\(\text{e}2\pm\); White maintains superior prospects after: 14...\(\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) h5 (It is worse for Black to play: 16...0–0 17.\(\text{g}5!\) \(\text{xb}2\) 18.\(\text{ab}1\) \(\text{e}5\) 19.\(\text{ec}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 20.\(\text{a}5\pm\) and White has powerful queenside pressure.) 17.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 18.\(\text{ac}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 19.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{xb}2\) 20.\(\text{h}3\pm\) Black's king is stranded in the centre and opening of the b-file is in favour of White.


11.e5!?

That move is necessary; otherwise Black will have no problems, because of his control over the e5-square.

11...\textit{f8}

White has excellent attacking chances if Black accepts the pawn-sacrifice: 11...\textit{xe5} 12.\textit{h5} \textit{xc3} (It is hardly better for Black to try 12...\textit{d6} 13.\textit{xe6} \textit{e7} 14.\textit{e2} – because no matter where he shelters his king, he will have great problems. After 14...0–0–0 15.b4! White’s queenside initiative will soon turn into a decisive attack. It seems also too risky for Black to opt for: 14...h6 15.\textit{g5} 0–0 16.\textit{ae1}+ and White is threatening the standard destructive sacrifice – 17.\textit{xh6--+}) 13.bxc3\textit{.}

Let us see now Black’s most natural replies:

13.\textit{e7} 14.\textit{b1} \textit{g6} (It is dangerous for Black to try: 14...\textit{f8} 15.\textit{b4}! c5 16.\textit{f4} g6 17.\textit{h4} \textit{g8} 18.\textit{f3}, since his chances of a successful defence are minimal due to the vulnerability of his dark squares.) 15.\textit{gx6} \textit{fxg6} 16.\textit{xe6+} \textit{f7} 17.\textit{f3+!} \textit{xe6} 18.\textit{f4} \textit{c8} 19.\textit{g5}! and despite the extra rook, Black has no satisfactory defence, for example: 19...\textit{f8} 20.\textit{e1}+ \textit{d7} (White checkmates too after: 20...\textit{d6} 21.\textit{g3+} \textit{c5} 22.\textit{e3+} \textit{b5} 23.a4+) 21.\textit{e7+} \textit{d6} 22.\textit{g3+} \textit{c5} 23.\textit{e3+} \textit{b5} 24.a4+ with an unavoidable checkmate.

13.\textit{f6} 14.\textit{xe6+} \textit{d8} 15.\textit{xf6!} \textit{gxf6} 16.\textit{b1} \textit{e8} 17.\textit{e3} c5 18.\textit{h7±} White has a pawn for the exchange and his pieces are very active. In addition, Black’s king is dangerously stranded in the centre.

13...\textit{e7} 14.\textit{b1} \textit{f6} 15.\textit{g5} 0–0 (It is terrible for Black to play: 15...\textit{g6}? 16.\textit{xb7+}; after 15...\textit{g8} 16.\textit{e3±} his pieces are passive and his king has no reliable shelter.) 16.\textit{h4--+} Black has managed to castle indeed, but he cannot avoid coming under attack: 16...h6 (or 16...\textit{d7} 17.\textit{e3} \textit{e4} 18.\textit{h3} h6 19.\textit{h6+-}) 17.\textit{hxh6} \textit{fb8} (or 17...\textit{gxh6} 18.\textit{e3+}) 18.\textit{e3+--}

12.\textit{e2} \textit{e7}

After 12...\textit{xe5} 13.\textit{f4} \textit{f6} 14.\textit{g3}, White has an excellent compensation for the pawn, because of his lead in development. Black’s defence is very difficult, for example after: 14...\textit{d8} 15.\textit{h5} c5 16.\textit{ad1} \textit{b6} 17.\textit{e5±} White regains his pawn and he has a dangerous attack.

In answer to 12...c5, it is good for White to follow with the standard move 13.c4, for example: 13...\textit{e7} 14.\textit{g3} dxc4 15.\textit{e4} \textit{d5} 16.\textit{d2}. Black will lose his c4-
pawn at some moment, while White’s space advantage is long-lasting and Black cannot capture on e5 - 16...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}\text{\textit{e}}}_5\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_5\)! 0–0–0 (It is not better for Black to opt for: 17...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_2+\)–) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_5\)! \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_5\) (or 18...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_5\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_5\)–) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_3\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_3\); 13...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_4\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{k}}}_8\) (It is worse for Black to play: 14...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_4\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_8\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_4\)±) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_3\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_2\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_6\) (or 16...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_6\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_2\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_4\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_4\)±) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\)± Black is doomed to a long and difficult defence, because of his lack of space and his weak queenside pawns.

13.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_4\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_6\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_3\) !

Following 13...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_6\), it deserves attention for White to continue with the aggressive line: 14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\)! ? \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_6\) (It is possible that Black should better play the not so greedy move 15... \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_6\), although after 16.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_7\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{h}}}_5\) White has a powerful initiative and Black’s attempt to seize it back fails after: 17...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_7\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_6\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_8\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_8\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_3\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_6\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{h}}}_2\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_1\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_1\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_2\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_2\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}}_1\)±). Now, White obtains a very dangerous attack by sacrificing a piece: 16.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_6\)+! \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_6\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_6\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_7\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_6\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_8\) (After: 18...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_7\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_7\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_7\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_4\), White remains with an extra pawn in an endgame.) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_3\)– and Black has no satisfactory defence against the threat – 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\), for example: 19...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_7\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_8\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_8\)+! \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_8\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_8\); or

19...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_8\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_3\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_7\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_8\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_7\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_6\) 24.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_6\)+–; 19...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_3\)+! \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_7\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_1\)+–; 19...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_7\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_5\)!! \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) (It is not any better for him to try: 20...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_3\)+ 21.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_3\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}_5\)+ \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_8\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}_7\)+–, since White regains his piece and he remains with a couple of extra pawns, while his attack is running unsupported.) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}_5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_7\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}_1\)– Black’s bare king is defenseless in the centre and he will lose plenty of material, while protecting it.

In answer to 13...c5, White can continue with 14.c3!, preventing the advance of Black’s queenside pawns and not letting his knight come to the d4-outpost. 14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}_6\) (about 14...g6 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_6\) – see 13...g6 14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}_6\) c5 15.c3) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{h}}}_5\) Now, Black has problems developing his kingside without creating additional weaknesses, moreover that he can hardly find a safe haven for his king. He might lose immediately after: 15...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}_5\)? 16.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_5\)+–

14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}}_3\)!
That is an excellent idea, demonstrated by Anand in a blitz game – White prevents the development of Black's bishop to the g7-square, because of the reply – \( \text{Qh5!} \)

14...c5 15.c3!

Black's c5 and d5-pawns look beautiful, but they are static. His king has no reliable shelter – his dark squares on the kingside are vulnerable and on the queenside his king might come under attack after b2-b4.

15...h5

But not 15...g7, due to 16. \( \text{Qh5!} \)

16.h4 g7 17.Qh3! Qg8 18. Qf4 Qf5

After 18...0-0-0 19.Qg5\pm Black has no possible counterplay in sight.

19.Qxf5 gxf5

That position was reached in the game Anand – Svidler, Rishon Le Zion 2006 and here White's most energetic line seemed to be: 20.Qh6!? Qf8 21.Qg5\pm. Black's king remains in the centre and after the unavoidable move – \( \text{Qf4} \) he loses his h5-pawn.

c) 8...Qf6 9.Qe1

Black's most popular moves in this position are c1) 9...Qb7 and c2) 9...Qe7.

He has tried some other possibilities too:

About 9...Qb4 10.e5 Qd7 11. Qg4 Qf8 – see 9...Qe7 10.e5 Qd7 11.Qg4 Qf8;

9...h6?! – Black loses an important tempo with that move. 10.Qf4 Qc5 11.e5 Qd7 12.Qa4\pm Sudakova – Aseeva, St. Petersburg 1999;

9...Qb8?! – This move enables White to deploy his pieces on good positions with tempo. 10.e2 Qb4 11.Qf4 Qb6 12.Qed1 0-0 13.Qa4 Qb7, Watson – C.Hansen, Esbjerg 1988 and White can capture a pawn after: 14.e5 Qd7 15.Qxa6 Qa7 16.Qxc8 Qxc8 17.b3 Qa3 18. c4\pm and Black has no compensation at all;

9...d4 – White obtains a long-lasting initiative after that move. 10.Qa4 e5 11.c3 c5 12.b4?! – This is his most energetic answer – White destroys his opponent's centre with the help of a temporary pawn-sacrifice and also he
obtains a space advantage. 12... cxb4 13.cxd4 exd4 (The other possibilities are worse for Black: 13... g4 14.h3 xd4 15.hxg4 xa1 16.b6++ and he suffers great material losses, or 13... xd4 14.e3 d6 15.b6 b8 16.a4+ d7 17.xa6 xa6 18.ed1 d3 19.c4+ and Black fails to complete his development.) 14.b2 e7 15.e5 d5 16.xd4 0-0 17. e4 e6 18.c5 c8 19.xe6 fxe6, Gallagher – Kaenel, Samnaun 2004 and here after: 20.b3 f4 21.ad1± White has superior chances thanks to his bishop-pair;

9...c7 – This move seems to be quite reliable and after 10.g5, Black has tested the following responses:

10...e7 – This move leads to the trade of the dark-squared bishops, which is favourable for White. 11.e5 d7 (It is worse for Black to play: 11...g8 12.g4 h5 13.g3 – it is more precise for White to follow with 13.h4, preventing the advance of Black’s rook-pawn. 13.xg5 14.xg5 g6 15.a4 b8, Costantini – Djingarova, Reggio Emilia 2002 and here after 16.e3± White is totally dominant on the dark squares.) 12.xe7 xe7 13.h5 f5, Perez Cruz – Caridi, Email 2001 and now, after 14.b4, Black has problems creating counterplay, because of the vulnerability of his dark squares. For example, he loses immediately after: 14...c5? 15.xf5+-, or 14...ex5 15.h4+ f7 16.f4 f6 17.d4++; his position is very difficult too in case of: 14...a5 15.b5 f8 (but not 15...cxb5 16.xb5 b6 17.d6++) 16.bxc6±, Black only has some chances to defend with the line: 14...f8 15.h4±;

10...d4 – This move leads to the opening of the central files and that is very dangerous for Black, because of his lag in development. 11.e5 dxc3 12.exf6 cxb2 (It is not better for Black to try: 12...h6 13.c1!? gxf6 14.f3 e7 15.bxc3±) 13.b1 g6 (After: 13...b8 14.f3 g6 15.e4 d7 16.f4 d6 17.xd6 xd6 18.ed1 c7 19.e3± Black’s king remains in the centre, while he is incapable of protecting his b2-pawn.) 14.xb2 d6 15.f3 xh2+ 16.f1 d6 17.h6± Black’s extra pawn is immaterial and his pieces are discoordinated. White will soon regain his sacrifice with an interest, Nowak – Thurlow, Internet 2004;

10...b7 – That is the most solid move for Black. 11.f3 e7 12.e5 d7 13.xe7 xe7 14.g3
c5, Motylev – Rublevsky, Ajaccio 2004, (It is worse for him to play: 14...\texttt{ag8} 15.\texttt{da4} \texttt{wa5} 16.b3 c5 17.c4 d4 18.\texttt{e}4±, because Black fails to advance his kingside pawns anyway, Kuijff – van Voorthuijsen, Eindhoven 1983.) and here after: 15.b3 \texttt{f}8 16.f4± White maintains his space advantage. Black must be very careful about the possible pawn-break – f4-f5.

\textbf{c1) 9...\texttt{ab7} 10.\texttt{f4}}

10...\texttt{ae7}

10...\texttt{c}5 – That is just a loss of time – that bishop belong to the e7-square. 11.\texttt{a}3 0–0, Fritz 7.0 – Genius 6.5, Stuttgart 2002 and here White’s most energetic line seems to be: 12.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}7 (After: 12...h6 13.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{e}7 14.\texttt{ad}1± Black has no counterplay in sight.) 13.\texttt{wh}3 h6 (After: 13...g6 14.\texttt{h}4± the vulnerability of the dark squares in Black’s camp is quite evident.) 14.e5 \texttt{h}7 15.\texttt{xh}6 gxh6 16.\texttt{wh}6 \texttt{g}5 17.h4±

It is too dangerous for Black to try: 10...d4 11.e5 dxc3 12.exf6 cxb2 (After: 12...\texttt{xf}6 13.\texttt{e}5 \texttt{g}5 14.\texttt{f}3 cxb2 15.\texttt{ab}1\texttt{a}, Black’s lag in development is not compensated by his extra pawns. His best line here seems to be: 15...\texttt{b}4 16.\texttt{xb}2! \texttt{xe}1 17.\texttt{xb}7 0–0 18.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{xf}2+ 19.\texttt{xf}2 \texttt{d}2+ 20.\texttt{e}2±, but White’s bishop-pair is obviously stronger than rook and pawns.) 13.\texttt{b}1 \texttt{xf}6 14.\texttt{e}5± Black’s extra pawns are hardly any consolation for him after: 14...\texttt{e}7 15.\texttt{xb}2 c5 (White’s attack is very powerful too in case of: 15...\texttt{d}8 16.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{a}8 17.\texttt{eb}1\texttt{a} 16.\texttt{b}1 1–0 Burger – Taffijn, Internet 2005.

Following: 10...\texttt{a}5 11.a3 \texttt{e}7 12.b4 \texttt{d}8 13.e5 \texttt{d}7 14.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{f}8 15.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{c}7 16.c4± White has an overwhelming lead in development. 16...d4 17.c5 g6 18.\texttt{b}2 \texttt{g}7 19.\texttt{c}4+– Black’s d6-pawn is lost and White’s knight goes to the d6-outpost, while Black has no counterplay whatsoever, E.Mortensen – Hellsten, Copenhagen 1995;

11.\texttt{f}3

Anand played like that, although White has excellent prospects too after the not so often tested line: 11.e5!? \texttt{d}7 12.\texttt{a}4 c5 13.c4 d4 (After: 13...\texttt{xc}4 14.\texttt{xc}4 \texttt{c}7 15.\texttt{c}1 \texttt{d}8 16.\texttt{f}1 \texttt{c}6 17.\texttt{c}2 0–0 18.b3 \texttt{e}8 19.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{h}8 20.\texttt{g}3± White has evidently much more space, while Black’s c5-pawn is weak and he has no counterplay, Morozevich – Ivanchuk, Monaco 2003.) 14.b3 \texttt{g}5 15.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{xf}4 (It is not any better for Black to try: 15...h6 16.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{xe}4 17.\texttt{gx}5 hxg5 18.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{e}8 19.\texttt{b}2 \texttt{c}7 20.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{h}4 21.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{e}7 22.\texttt{g}3
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\[ \text{h5 23.e4} \text{ Taistra - Boschek, Internet 2003.) 16.xf4} \text{ h6 17.} \text{xe4 xe4 18.xe4 a5 19.ad1 g6 20.db3 df8 21.eg3 dg7 22.h4±}
\]

Black can hardly counter White’s powerful kingside pressure, Nijboer – Rublevsky, Bled 2002.

11...0–0

That move looks the most natural.

11...\text{a7!?} - That try is too strange. 12.ad1 c5 13.exd5 exd5 14.e5 0–0 15.g3 c6 16.e4± - White was dominant in the centre in the game, Wibe – Niklasson, Skien 1980.

11...g6 - This move weakens the dark squares, Kovel – Damljanovic, Spain 2005, 12.db6±

11...a5 - Now, the b5-square has been weakened. 12.exd5 cxd5 13.db5+ df8, Fedorowicz – Pablaza, San Francisco 1997, White has prevented his opponent from castling and now he can deploy his knight on b5. 14.ad3 db6 (or 14...dc8 15.db5±) 15.db5 dc8 16.a4±

11...\text{a5} - That is an attempt by Black at solving the problems in a tactical fashion. 12.a3! d4 (It is evidently more reliable for Black to play: 12...0–0 13.bh3 g6 14.b4 \text{d8 15.ab1±}) 13.e5 dxc3 14.exf6 cxb2 (Black’s position is too worrisome after: 14...xf6 15.b4 gb6 16.e3 gc7 17.e5∞ - his king has no safe shelter and his light-squared bishop is passive, while his extra pawn is presently immaterial. It is not better for him to try: 16...d4 17.g4 0–0 0 18.xd4 \text{xd4 19.e4 \text{d5 20.xg7, since the pawns are equal, while Black has too many weaknesses.})} 15.fxe7!? bxa1b 16.xa1∞ Black’s king is stranded in the centre, his rooks are discoordilated and his dark squares are vulnerable. 16...\text{xe7} (Black’s desire to capture that annoying pawn is understandable. White’s attack is quite dangerous too even after the more prudent line: 16...g5 17.g3 \text{xe7 18.xg7 f8 19.b1∞} 17.b1→ White begins a direct attack. 17...c8 (or 17...a7 18.g3+–) 18.g3 df8 (Black would not save the game either after: 18...c5 19.xg7 f8 20.e3 \text{xa3} 21.g5+ f6 22.c5+ \text{d8 23.h5+–; 20...d5 21.c4! \text{d6 22.e2!+–;} 21...xc4 22.g5+ \text{e8 23.f6–) 19.d6+ \text{g8 20.}} \text{e5+– Anand – Morovic Fernandez, Sao Paulo 2004.}}

11...\text{b6}, Ruben – Coleman, Email 2002 and here it deserves attention for White to continue with 12.ab1?! , planning to follow with b2-b4, after for example: 12...0–0 13.bh3 g6 14.e5 \text{d7 15.b6±} Black’s dark squares

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are compromised and he has no counterplay in sight.

12.\texttt{h3g6} 13.\texttt{ad1d7}

In answer to 13...\texttt{e8}, Paehzt - Kursova, Kusadasi 2006, White can follow with the standard plan: 14.e5 \texttt{d7} 15.\texttt{a4} and no matter how Black counters that, White’s prospects are clearly superior: 15... \texttt{b6} 16.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{xb6} 17.b3\texttt{±}; 15... \texttt{c5} 16.\texttt{xc5} \texttt{xc5} 17.\texttt{g4}+; 15... \texttt{c5} 16.c4 \texttt{wa5} 17.b3 d4 18.\texttt{e4}+ 14.\texttt{a4} \texttt{c5}

Black would not fare any better after: 14...\texttt{b6} 15.exd5! cxd5 (but not 15...\texttt{xa4} 16.dxc6 \texttt{xc6} 17.\texttt{xg6} hgx6 18.\texttt{e5}+ and White wins) 16.\texttt{g6}! hxg6 17.\texttt{e5} and here Black can parry the threat of a checkmate in one in different fashions, but he remains in a difficult position anyway: 17...\texttt{f6} 18.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xf6} 19.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{ad8} 20.b3\texttt{±}; 17...\texttt{f6} 18.\texttt{xe6}+ \texttt{f7} 19.\texttt{xb6} fx5 20.\texttt{xa8}+; 17... \texttt{f5} 18.\texttt{h8}+ \texttt{f7} 19.\texttt{g7}+ \texttt{e8} 20.\texttt{xg6}+ \texttt{d7} 21.\texttt{g7}! \texttt{xa4} 22.\texttt{xe6}+ and Black is faced with the unpleasant choice between: 22... \texttt{e8} 23.\texttt{xf8} \texttt{xf8} 24.\texttt{e5}-- and 22... \texttt{c7} 23.\texttt{xe7}+ \texttt{xe7} 24.\texttt{xe7}+ \texttt{c6} 25.\texttt{xf8} \texttt{xf8} 26.\texttt{d4}+

15.\texttt{xc5} \texttt{xc5} 16.\texttt{g3} a5 17.\texttt{c3}+. Black’s kingside is compromised and he can hardly create any counterplay. Instead, White has excellent attacking prospects, Scheffner – Menghi, Email 1998.

c2) 9...\texttt{e7}

That is the main line for Black and it is his most logical move.

10.e5 \texttt{d7} 11.\texttt{g4} g6

11...\texttt{f8} – Black leaves his king in the centre deliberately. 12.b3?! – This move is always useful for White. 12...a5 (It is not better for Black to continue with: 12...h5 13.\texttt{f4} \texttt{b8} 14.\texttt{a4} \texttt{g8} 15.c4\texttt{±} Perenyi – Gyorkos, Szolnok 1987.) 13.\texttt{a4} \texttt{b6} 14.\texttt{e3} \texttt{xa4} 15.\texttt{g3} g6 (Or 15...g5 16.\texttt{h5} \texttt{e8} – it is a disaster for Black to opt for: 16...\texttt{c5} 17.\texttt{f3} \texttt{e8} 18.\texttt{h6}+ \texttt{g8} 19.\texttt{gx5} \texttt{g5} 20.\texttt{g3}+ and White wins. 17.bxa4 \texttt{c7} 18.\texttt{exg5}! \texttt{hxg5} 19.\texttt{g5} \texttt{e7} 20.\texttt{g7} \texttt{f8} 21.\texttt{h7}+ White will regain his exchange at any moment, while Black will have great problems containing his opponent’s h-pawn, Ruppel – Nocci, Email 2002.) 16.\texttt{h6}+ \texttt{e8} 17.\texttt{xa4}
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Wfc7, Hazai - Zapata, Camaguey 1987 and here the transfer of White's bishop to the f6-square seems to be rather unpleasant for Black - 18.

11...\textit{ff}8 - This move is too passive. 12.b3 \textit{bb}8 (It is worse for Black to try: 12...c5 13.\textit{bb}2 \textit{cc}7?, Ottaviani - Sherwood, Internet 2002, because White can organize a dangerous attack with: 14.\textit{xd}5! \textit{exd}5 15.e6 \textit{xf}6 16.\textit{xe}f6 \textit{gf}6 17.\textit{hh}5→ Black's position is very difficult to defend, for example: 17...\textit{ce}7 18.\textit{ef}7+ \textit{ff}8 19.\textit{xe}h7 \textit{ff}4 20.\textit{gg}6 \textit{gg}5 21.\textit{gg}8+-, it is evidently more resilient for him to try: 17...\textit{bb}7! 18.\textit{exf}7+ \textit{dd}8 19.\textit{ee}8+ \textit{cc}7 20.\textit{aa}e1+, although he has no satisfactory defence against c2-c4 even then.) 13.\textit{aa}4 \textit{gg}6, Rogers - Mishra, Calcutta 1988 and here White obtains a clear advantage after: 14.c4 \textit{gg}7 15.\textit{gg}3 \textit{cc}7 16.\textit{bb}2 0–0 17.\textit{ac}1± Black's pieces are passive, his bishops have no good prospects and the vulnerability of his dark squares is quite obvious.

12.b3!? This move has not become so popular yet, despite the fact that White will have to push that pawn anyway. That is partially due to his successes with the move - 12.\textit{aa}4, which used to be considered as the main line. The latest games played in that line however, showed that Black could make a draw, despite having to play only moves:

12.\textit{aa}4 \textit{aa}5 13.\textit{hh}6 \textit{wb}4 14.\textit{xb}4 \textit{xb}4 15.c3 \textit{aa}5! (The exchange of the bishops after: 15.\textit{ff}8 16.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 17.\textit{ee}7 18.\textit{xd}5 \textit{exd}5 19.\textit{ac}1 \textit{aa}7 20.\textit{bb}4+ leads to a very difficult endgame for Black, because of his passive light-squared bishop, his lack of space and White's dominance on the c-file, Carlsen - Vescovi, Wijk aan Zee 2006.) 16.b4 \textit{cc}7 17.\textit{ff}4 a5 18.b5 \textit{bb}6 19.\textit{xb}6 (It is worse for White to play 19.\textit{dd}5, in view of 19...\textit{dd}7! and he is forced to go back with his knight, Hazai - Romanishin, Sochi 1982. White has no advantage either after: 19.\textit{bb}2 \textit{xb}5! 21.\textit{xb}5+ \textit{dd}7 22.\textit{ee}2 \textit{aa}4! 23.\textit{xa}4 \textit{xa}4 24.c4 \textit{xc}4=) 19...\textit{xb}6+ 20.\textit{ff}1 \textit{cx}b5 21.\textit{xb}5+ \textit{dd}7 22.\textit{ab}1 \textit{xb}5+! (It is inferior for Black to continue here with: 22...\textit{bb}8?! 23.c4 \textit{aa}7 24.\textit{ac}6! \textit{cc}6 25.\textit{xd}5 \textit{exd}5 26.\textit{ff}5?! \textit{bb}1 27.\textit{xb}1 \textit{dd}7 - after: 27...\textit{gg}5 28.\textit{dd}3 \textit{ee}7 29.\textit{xf}5 \textit{gg}8 30.\textit{bb}4! \textit{ff}6 31.\textit{ef}6+ \textit{xf}6 32.\textit{g}4+, his defence is problematic, because of the weakness of his h7-pawn and his passive rooks - 28.\textit{cc}1 \textit{gg}5 29.\textit{dd}3 \textit{ee}8 30.\textit{ff}4 \textit{dd}4 31.\textit{xf}5+ \textit{cc}7 32.\textit{ee}6+ \textit{bb}6 33.\textit{bb}1+ \textit{cc}5 34.\textit{exf}7+- and
White soon won the game Bacrot – Rublevsky, Khanty-Mansyisk 2005. It is more tenacious for Black, but hardly satisfactory, to defend with: 30...c7 31.\(\textit{\texttt{e}}\)\textit{xf5+ c7} 32.\(\textit{\texttt{x}}\)\textit{h7 d4} 33.\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{3± and White remains with an extra outside passed pawn.) 23.\(\textit{\texttt{x}}\)\textit{xb5 c7} 24.\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{4 dxc4} 25.\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{5} (In case of 25.\(\textit{\texttt{e}}\)\textit{e4, Black has the powerful argument 25...\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{d7!}, while the move 25...\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{8} is bad, because of: 26.\(\textit{\texttt{xb}}\)\textit{8+ \(\textit{\texttt{x}}\)\textit{xb8} 27.\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{4! \(\textit{\texttt{a}}\)\textit{7}\textit{d6} and Black fails to bring his rook into action.) 25...0–0–0 26.\(\textit{\texttt{xc}}\)\textit{4 d7} 27.\(\textit{\texttt{g}}\)\textit{5} (After: 27.a4 \(\textit{\texttt{hd}}\)\textit{8} 28.\(\textit{\texttt{g}}\)\textit{5}, Black has the resource 28...\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{4!}. It is also premature for White to try: 27.f5?! \(\textit{\texttt{gxf}}\textit{5.}) 27...\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{7} (It is worse for Black to play: 27...h6?! 28.\(\textit{\texttt{f}}\)\textit{6} \(\textit{\texttt{g}}\)\textit{8} 29.\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{1± and he has problems activating his pieces.) 28.\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{1+ (White would not achieve anything with 28.\(\textit{\texttt{f}}\)\textit{6} \(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{8!=}) 28...\(\textit{\texttt{a}}\)\textit{7!! (This move prevents White's main idea – the pawn-break f4-f5, after which Black's e6-pawn would become vulnerable. It is bad for Black to opt for: 28...\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{6?!} 29.f5! \(\textit{\texttt{a}}\)\textit{7?!} 30.\(\textit{\texttt{xc}}\)\textit{6! \(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{4} 31.\(\textit{\texttt{fxe}}\)\textit{6} \(\textit{\texttt{fxe}}\)\textit{6} 32.\(\textit{\texttt{xf}}\)\textit{6!± Ponomariov – Rublevsky, Poikovsky 2006; it is even worse for him to try 29...\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{8?}, since that does not parry White's main threat: 30.\(\textit{\texttt{xe}}\)\textit{3 \(\textit{\texttt{a}}\)\textit{7} 31.\(\textit{\texttt{xb}}\)\textit{6} \(\textit{\texttt{xb}}\)\textit{6} 32.\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{6 \(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{d7} 33.\(\textit{\texttt{fxe}}\)\textit{6} \(\textit{\texttt{fxe}}\)\textit{6} 34.\(\textit{\texttt{xe}}\)\textit{6++; it is possibly the best for Black to follow with: 29...\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{7} 30.\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{4! \(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{8! 31.\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{6 \(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{6} 32.\(\textit{\texttt{e}}\)\textit{3 \(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{7} 33.\(\textit{\texttt{xe}}\)\textit{6}}\textit{fxe} 34.\(\textit{\texttt{e}}\)\textit{2±. His position remains difficult, but it might still not be lost altogether.) 29.f5 (It is not preferable for White to opt for: 29.\(\textit{\texttt{bc}}\)\textit{1 \(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{8!} 30.\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{8 \(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{7} 31.\(\textit{\texttt{xe}}\)\textit{2\textit{h6=; or 29.\(\textit{\texttt{h}}\)\textit{4 \(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{8} 30.\(\textit{\texttt{f}}\)\textit{2+ \(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{6=}) 29...\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{8} 30.\(\textit{\texttt{e}}\)\textit{3+ \(\textit{\texttt{a}}\)\textit{8} 31.\(\textit{\texttt{bc}}\)\textit{1! (White had better comply with the inevitable – 31.\(\textit{\texttt{xb}}\)\textit{8+ \(\textit{\texttt{xb}}\)\textit{8} 32.\(\textit{fxe}}\textit{6} \(\textit{\texttt{fxe}}\)\textit{6} 33.\(\textit{\texttt{e}}\)\textit{4 \(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{5} 34.\(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{4 \(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{7=) 31...\(\textit{\texttt{xe}}\)\textit{5\textit{f} Mekhtarian – Leitao, Brazil 2006.)

12...\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{7}

Black is trying to exploit the insufficient protection of his opponent's e5-pawn, but White defends it easily, maintaining his advantage.

12...a5?! – Black is preparing counterplay connected with the advance a5-a4. 13.\(\textit{\texttt{a}}\)\textit{4 \(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{5} 14.\(\textit{\texttt{h}}\)\textit{6 \(\textit{\texttt{xa}}\)\textit{4} 15.\(\textit{\texttt{xa}}\)\textit{4 \(\textit{\texttt{d}}\)\textit{7} 16.\(\textit{\texttt{f}}\)\textit{4± The difference in the activity of the pieces is evidently in favour of White, while after 16...\(\textit{\texttt{f}}\)\textit{8, Spraggett – An.Sokolov, Saint John 1988, it deserves attention for White to follow with 17.\(\textit{\texttt{c}}\)\textit{4!?}, after which it is bad for Black to opt for 17...a4, due to: 18.\(\textit{\texttt{xf}}\)\textit{8 \(\textit{\texttt{xf}}\)\textit{8} 19.\(\textit{\texttt{b}}\)\textit{4 \(\textit{\texttt{g}}\)\textit{7} 20.\(\textit{\texttt{ac}}\)\textit{1±}
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and White is dominant in the centre and on the dark squares.

12...\textit{\textit{\textit{\texttt{a5}}}}?! – This move is considered to be the best after 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{a4}}}, but here it is clearly unsatisfactory. 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{d2}} \texttt{\texttt{b4}}}?! – Black is trying to exploit the pin; otherwise his previous move would be a loss of time. 14.a3 \textit{\textit{\texttt{xc3}}} 15.b4 \textit{\texttt{xb4}} (It is possibly better for Black to play: 15...\textit{\texttt{xe5}} 16.\textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{d8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{xc3}} \textit{\texttt{xd3}} 18.cxd3 \texttt{f6} – or 18...0–0 19.\textit{\texttt{ac1}} \texttt{d4}?! 20.\textit{\texttt{d2±}} – 19.\textit{\texttt{ac1}} 0–0 20.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{d7}} 21.d4\textit{\texttt{c}} and the presence of opposite-coloured bishops provides White with powerful pressure on the dark squares, which more than compensates his sacrificed pawn.) 16.axb4 \textit{\texttt{c7}}, Thomas – Verfuerden, corr. 1998, Black’s extra pawn cannot balance his weak dark squares, his passive pieces and his unsafe king, stranded in the centre. White’s simplest line, emphasizing the defects of Black’s position, is: 17.\textit{\texttt{h6}} \texttt{c5} (Black loses quickly after the greedy line 17...\textit{\texttt{xe5}} – he destroys the pawn-shelter of his own king. 18.\textit{\texttt{f4}} \texttt{f6} 19.\textit{\texttt{xf6}} \textit{\texttt{xf7}} 20.\textit{\texttt{g7}} \textit{\texttt{g8}} 21.\textit{\texttt{xe6+}} \textit{\texttt{xe6}} 22.\textit{\texttt{xe6++}}) 18.\textit{\texttt{h4}} \textit{\texttt{g8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xc5}} \textit{\texttt{xc5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{d2±}} and Black’s defence is questionable, because of the vulnerability of the dark squares in his camp.

12...\textit{\texttt{b8}}? – This attempt to activate the rook is illogical, since Black loses important tempi, while the rook remains passive anyway. 13.\textit{\texttt{a4}} \textit{\texttt{c5}} (It is not better for Black to try: 13...0–0 14.\textit{\texttt{h6}} \textit{\texttt{e8}} 15.c4 a5, Fier – Lafuente, Santos 2006, but here after: 16.cxd5 cxd5 17.\textit{\texttt{ac1±}} White is dominant all over the board. In answer to 13...\textit{\texttt{c7}}, Jaracz – Collutiis, Porto San Giorgio 2006, White’s most precise line seems to be: 14.\textit{\texttt{f4}} \texttt{h5} – and Black’s greed is swiftly punished after: 14...\texttt{g5}?! 15.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{xe5}}? 16.\textit{\texttt{xe5+}} – White remains with an extra knight – 15.\textit{\texttt{e2}} \texttt{c5} 16.\textit{\texttt{d2±}} and now, Black has problems organizing any counterplay; 13...\texttt{h5} 14.\textit{\texttt{e2}} \textit{\texttt{b6}} 15.\textit{\texttt{xb6}} \textit{\texttt{xb6}} 16.c4 \texttt{d4} 17.\textit{\texttt{c2}} \texttt{c5} 18.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \texttt{b7} 19.\textit{\texttt{ab1}} Black’s king is stranded in the centre and White has a long-lasting initiative. 19...\texttt{a5} 20.\textit{\texttt{c1}} \texttt{h4} 21.\texttt{h3} \texttt{c6} 22.\textit{\texttt{c2}} \textit{\texttt{d7}} 23.\textit{\texttt{e4±}} Grigoriants – Amonatov, Moscow 2006.) 14.\textit{\texttt{h6}} \textit{\texttt{xd3}} (It seems even worse for Black to follow with: 14...\texttt{b4} 15.\textit{\texttt{xb4}} \textit{\texttt{xd3}} 16.\textit{\texttt{c3}} \textit{\texttt{xe1}} 17.\textit{\texttt{xe1±}} Black’s dark squares are so catastrophically weak that he has no chances for a successful defence.) 15.cxd3 \textit{\texttt{b4}} 16.\textit{\texttt{g3±}} – Black’s light-squared bishop is isolated from the actions, therefore he can hardly counter White’s dark-squared offensive. 16...\texttt{g5} 17.\textit{\texttt{g7}} \textit{\texttt{g8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{f6}} \textit{\texttt{xf6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xf6}} \textit{\texttt{xf6}} 20.\textit{\texttt{ac1±}} White regains unavoidably his pawn and the difference in the activity of the pieces provides his with clearly superior prospects. 20...\texttt{f8} (It looks more resilient for Black to try: 20...\texttt{f4} 21.\textit{\texttt{xc6}} \textit{\texttt{gx3}} 22.h\texttt{gx3}) 21.\textit{\texttt{xc6}} \texttt{b7} 22.
4.\text{exd}4 \text{e}5 5.\text{c}3 \text{a}6 6.\text{xc}6 \text{bc} 7.\text{d}3 \text{d}5 8.0-0

\text{c}7 \text{e}f4 23.\text{c}c5 \text{a}8 24.\text{a}a7 \text{c}6 25.\text{h}h3 \text{d}2 26.\text{h}6+ \text{e}8 27.\text{xe}6+ 1-0 \text{Sax} – \text{Jansa, Baile Herculane 1982.}

12...0-0 – This is a logical move, which leads to standard positions. 13.\text{h}h6 \text{e}8 14.\text{a}a4 \text{c}5, \text{Wiersma} – \text{U.Andersson, Feugen 2006, after:} 15.c4!? d4 16.\text{f}f4 \text{b}7 (or 16...\text{c}c7 17.h4 \text{b}7 18.h5+) 17.e4 \text{xe}4 18.\text{xe}4\uparrow \text{White has good attacking prospects on the kingside.}

In answer to 12...\text{c}5, it deserves attention for \text{White} to follow with the energetic move – 13.\text{h}h6! and after the active line for \text{Black}: 13...\text{a}a5 14.\text{a}a4 \text{c}4 15.\text{f}f1 \text{b}7, the position has been tested in the game \text{Carlsen – Mamedyarov, Moscow 2006.} Here, it seems attractive for \text{White} to play 16.\text{h}h3, with the idea to win the \text{h}7-pawn. \text{Black} has numerous possibilities, but \text{White’s prospects look superior in all the lines:} 16...\text{f}8 17.\text{b}2 \text{hx}h6 18.\text{hx}h6 \text{c}3 19.\text{xc}4\uparrow \text{and he has powerful queenside pressure;} 16...\text{g}8?! 17.\text{e}3 \text{h}5 18.\text{d}4 \text{d}2 (After: 18...\text{f}8 19.\text{e}3 \text{g}7 20.\text{c}3\uparrow \text{Black risks coming under attack.}) 19.\text{c}3 \text{e}6 20.\text{b}6\uparrow \text{White has a clearly better piece-coordination;} 16...\text{c}6 17.\text{g}7 \text{g}8 18.\text{xh}7 0-0-0 19.\text{e}2 \text{xa}4 20.\text{bxa}4 \text{c}5 (or 20...\text{g}5 21.\text{g}3\uparrow) 21.\text{b}1 \text{xa}4 22.\text{c}3\uparrow; 16...\text{g}5?! – This is the most aggressive move for \text{Black.} 17.\text{g}7 \text{g}4 18.\text{h}5 \text{g}8 19.\text{hx}h7 0-0-0 20.\text{e}2\uparrow – \text{White maintains excellent chances of consolidating the position, remaining with an extra pawn, for example:} 20...\text{d}2! 21.\text{h}6 \text{g}5 22.\text{ad}1 \text{f}4 23.\text{g}3 \text{e}4 (\text{Black loses after:} 23...\text{xe}5 24.\text{f}3 \text{g}5 25.\text{xf}7 \text{h}6 26.\text{f}4 \text{g}6 27.\text{d}6 \text{h}8 28.\text{d}4\uparrow \text{and he has no compensation for the sacrificed pawns.}) 24.\text{xe}4 \text{dxe}4 25.\text{g}5 \text{g}5 26.\text{d}6 \text{f}5 27.\text{xe}5 (\text{It is not any better for \text{Black} to try:} 26...\text{cx}b3 27.\text{cxb}3 \text{xe}5 28.\text{c}1\uparrow) 27.\text{b}6+ \text{c}7 28.\text{xd}8 \text{xd}8 29.\text{xc}4 \text{xc}4 30.\text{xc}4\uparrow \text{White has problems materializing his extra pawn, but he is still much better.}

13.\text{a}a4

\text{White makes a useful move and he protects tactically his e5-pawn in the process. Now, naturally it is bad for \text{Black} to continue with:} 13...\text{xe}5? 14.\text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 15.\text{b}2\uparrow

13...\text{c}5

\text{Dominguez – Jakovenko, Oropesa del Mar 1999. It is hardly better for \text{Black} to opt for 13...a5, Alvarez – Hebert, Argentina 1998, since after:} 14.\text{b}2 0-0 15.\text{c}4 \text{a}6 16.\text{e}3\uparrow \text{White has good attacking chances.}
14.\( \textbf{\textit{e2}} \)

The placement of the queen on that square is not less active than on g3. The pawn-advance c5-c4 for Black is now impeded. His a6-pawn might be hanging at some moment and he lacks space on the kingside and in the centre.

14...0-0

The other replies for Black are not any better: 14...\( \textbf{\textit{f8}} \)!? – He transfers his bishop to a more active position. 15.c4! \( \textbf{\textit{g7}} \)!? (It is better for Black to follow with: 15...d4 16.\( \textbf{\textit{f4}} \), but White maintains the standard initiative in this variation.) 16.cxd5 exd5 17.e6! (White's lead in development provides him with excellent attacking chances.) 17...\( \textbf{\textit{f6}} \)! (That is the only move for Black. It is bad for him to try: 17...\( \textbf{\textit{xal}} \)? 18.e xd7+ \( \textbf{\textit{xd7}} \) 19.\( \textbf{\textit{e7}} + \textbf{\textit{c6}} \) 20.\( \textbf{\textit{xc5}} + - \), because White wins the enemy queen, preserving his checkmating attack.) 18.\( \textbf{\textit{b2}} \)\? \( \textbf{\textit{xe6}} \) 19.\( \textbf{\textit{ac1}} \)\± Now, Black not only loses his extra pawn, but he must give up some additional material in order to evacuate his king from the centre.

15.\( \textbf{\textit{h6}} \) \( \textbf{\textit{e8}} \) 16.\( \textbf{\textit{c4}} \)

White's prospects are better in that position, because he has a space advantage in the centre. Meanwhile, he has good chances of organizing a kingside attack, while on the queenside he can easily cope with Black's possible counterplay.

**Conclusion**

We have analyzed in this chapter the main line of the variation: 5...a6 6.\( \textbf{\textit{xc6}} \) bxc6 7.\( \textbf{\textit{d3}} \) – 7...d5. After the natural move 8.0-0, Black plays most of all the following lines:

- 8...\( \textbf{\textit{d6}} \) – variation a). This move is usually a loss of time, because Black fails to prevent the pawn-advance e4-e5;

- 8...\( \textbf{\textit{c7}} \) – variation b). Here, just like in variation a), Black is trying to impede White's control over the e5-square, but he does not succeed. The correct plan for White, after he places his pawn on e5, was best demonstrated by Anand in his magnificent game against Svidler at the World Blitz Championship.

- 8...\( \textbf{\textit{f6}} \) – variation c). This move seems to be the most logical. After 9.\( \textbf{\textit{e1}} \), Black's main replies are: 9...\( \textbf{\textit{b7}} \) – variation c1) and 9...\( \textbf{\textit{e7}} \) – variation c2). In variation c1), after the natural moves 10.\( \textbf{\textit{f4}} \) \( \textbf{\textit{e7}} \),

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White has the pleasant choice between 11.\textit{f}3, following Anand’s example and 11.e5 \textit{d}7 12.a4, so in both cases White has a dangerous initiative on the kingside, while Black’s counterplay has been impeded considerably. In variation c2, Black tries to complete his development with natural moves, but after: 10.e5 \textit{d}7 11.g4, he is forced to weaken the dark squares on the kingside with 11...g6 (White’s task is much easier after Black’s other moves.). Here, the move 12.a4, used to be quite unpleasant for Black for a long time, but after the best line for him – 12...\textit{a}5, it looked like the game should end in a draw after the best defence. Therefore it seems that the move 12.b3 is more logical. It is always useful for White in all the variations and then the move 12...\textit{a}5 leads to a difficult position for Black. In case he plays something else, White develops his forces according to the scheme: \textit{a}4, \textit{h}6, he pushes c2-c4 and he has a powerful pressure in the centre and on the kingside, while Black has problems creating any counterplay.
Part 3

Paulsen System

1.e4 c5 2.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}f3} \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}c6} \) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}xd4} \) e6 5.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}c3} \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{w}}c7} \)

This is no doubt a more flexible line for Black than 5...\( a6 \). Now, the popular scheme connected with capturing on c6, followed by \( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}d3} \) (see Chapters 8 and 9) is not so effective anymore, because Black has played a move, which is much more useful from the point of view of mobilization of forces. There are no objective drawbacks to that move-order. It is too difficult for White to exploit the fact that the b5-square is not controlled by Black yet, since it is considered that in the variation: 6.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}db5} \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{w}}b8} \) 7.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}e3} \) a6 8.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}b6} \) axb5 9.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}xb5} \) b4+ 10.c3 \( \text{\textit{\textit{a}}a5} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}c7}+ \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{w}}xc7} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}xc7} \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}xc7} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textit{g}}g4} \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}f8} \) Black obtains a promising position.

Naturally, if we have in mind that on his next move Black will most probably follow with a7-a6, White can still try to transpose to the already mentioned scheme with \( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}d4xc6} \). The point is however, that White has an only move, which is reasonably connected with that idea – 6.f4. In that case, he must at first consider the variation 6...\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}xd4} \) 7.\( \text{\textit{w}}xd4 \) a6, and secondly, even in case of 6...a6 7.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}xc6} \), Black has the possibility to change the course of the game with the line 7...\( \text{\textit{\textit{w}}xc6} \).

In general, it is worth mentioning that the Paulsen system is quite reliable and that is based on the solid pawn-structure d7-e6-f7. It is tremendously difficult for White to organize an attack against it; meanwhile the open a3-f8 diagonal presents Black with additional possibilities. In fact, after the classical move 6.\( \text{\textit{\textit{e}}e2} \), besides the Scheveningen schemes, Black can choose the variation: 6...a6 7.0–0 \( \text{\textit{\textit{w}}f6} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{\textit{d}}e3} \) \( \text{\textit{\textit{b}}4} \) – and presently, there have not been found any clear paths for White to claim an advantage against it.

6.\( \text{\textit{\textit{e}}e3} \)

With that move, White choos-
es another system of development, which is becoming universal in the Sicilian Defence – that is the set-up Šd2, 0–0–0, f3, g4 etc. Here, once again, the move-order chosen by Black, presents him with additional possibilities and if White wishes to maintain the initiative, he must show right from the first moves of the game flexibility and inventiveness.

Chapter 10 is devoted to the move 6...Šf6!? Black is trying to exploit maximally the advantages of his move-order in that scheme of development. He increases his pressure against the centre, trying to save a tempo for the move a7-a6. In case he manages to accomplish comfortably the plan connected with Šb4 and d7-d5, then White should simply forget about his dreams of obtaining an advantage in the opening. The defects of Black’s set-up can be emphasized only with the move 7.f4! and he cannot already enter the standard schemes of the Paulsen system anymore.

In Chapter 11, we have dealt with some seldom-played lines for Black after 6...a6 7.Šd2. Tournament practice has shown that he has no chances of equalizing in that case.

It has become evident that Black should better develop his king’s knight first – 7...Šf6 8.0–0–0 – and in Chapter 12 we have analyzed different variations with the exception of 8...Šb4. White has excellent prospects then too: after 8...b5, he can disrupt the coordination of his opponent’s forces with the move 9.Šf4, while after the move 8...Še7, Black practically loses the advantages that the Paulsen system provides for him. There begins a double-edged play on the different sides of the board and White’s prospects are superior as a rule.

White has more problems to obtain an advantage in the main line. After 8...Šb4 9.f3, Black has at his disposal several equally strong lines and we can mention among them 9...Še7 and 9...Ša5 – we have devoted to them Chapter 13, as well as 9...Še5 10.Šb3 b5 – which is the most important position of the entire variation. That is the critical line and White can develop his initiative in numerous ways, but Black in his turn can organize various counterplay in many lines. In Chapter 14, we suggest a cardinal solution of that problem – after 11.Šd4 White is trying to enter an endgame. He does not plan to obtain a great advantage then, but Black’s counter chances are minimal indeed.
6...\textit{f6}!?

This logical developing move is more rarely played than 6...a6, since Black is usually afraid to enter variations in which White can use the b5-square with his knights. Still, after: 7.\textit{d}db5 \textit{b}b8 8.f4 a6 9.e5 axb5 10.exf6 b4 11.\textit{b}b5 b6\infty, there arises a complex and quite unclear position, in which Black has a compact pawn-mass in the centre and his centralized king is relatively safe.

His most popular move – 6... a6 will be the subject of out next chapters.

The other possibilities for Black are only rarely played:

About 6...d6 7.\textit{d}d2 a6 – see 6...a6; as for 7.\textit{f}f6 – see the Scheveningen variation;

6...\textit{b}b4?! – This bishop-move is clearly premature and it weakens his king and causes disharmony in Black's set-up. 7.\textit{d}db5 \textit{b}b8 8.g4 g6 (Black would not fare any better after: 8...\textit{f}f8 9.a3 \textit{f}f6 10.g3±) 9.a3 \textit{e}e7 10.g3 \textit{x}g3 11.hxg3 \textit{f}f8 12.0–0–0± White has better development and he dominates on two semi-open files, Hector – Sagit, Gothenburg 2006;

6...g6?! – This is a deliberate weakening of the kingside for Black. 7.\textit{d}d2 \textit{f}6, Alvir – G.Kovacs, Oberwart 2005 and here White's most aggressive line seems to be: 8.\textit{f}f4 e5 9.d5± and he easily occupies the weak central squares in Black's camp;

6...b6?! – This move is not so often played in the Sicilian Defence, because it is obviously too passive, Vukcevich – Lombardy, Oberlin 1975 and here after 7.\textit{d}d2, White's edge is evident in case of: 7...a6 8.0–0–0±, as well as following: 7...\textit{f}6 8.d5 b8 9.d1 a6 10.d6+ \textit{x}d6 11.xd6 \textit{x}d6 12.\textit{x}d6 b5 13.f3±;

6...\textit{a}5?! – This experiment-
tal move was tried by one of the classics in the Sicilian Defence in the game Averbakh – Taimanov, Moscow 1961, but it did not attract any followers. White’s most aggressive line seems to be 7. \( \text{d}b5 \text{b}8 \) (Black loses immediately after 7... \( \text{d}8 \) 8.\( \text{f}4+ \), or 7...\( \text{e}5 \) 8.\( \text{d}2+ \) with the unavoidable 9.\( \text{f}4 \) to follow.) 8.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}6 \) (The move 8...a6? – leads to huge material losses for Black after: 9.\( \text{b}6 \) axb5 10.\( \text{x}b5+ \)) 9. 0–0–0 a6 10.\( \text{b}6 \) axb5 11.\( \text{x}b5 \) \( \text{x}e4 \) 12.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) (Black’s position is nearly terrible after: 12...\( \text{c}5 \) 13.\( \text{x}c5 \) \( \text{x}c5 \) 14.\( \text{x}c5 \), because of his king, stranded in the centre, and the catastrophic vulnerability of his dark squares in the centre. It is not better for him to continue with 12...d5 13.\( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 14.\( \text{f}4 \), Black loses his queen without obtaining sufficient material compensation for it.) 13.\( \text{c}7+ \) \( \text{c}7 \) 14.\( \text{x}e4 \) \( \text{x}a2 \) 15.\( \text{b}1+ \) Black loses unavoidably the exchange and White can even postpone capturing it for a while;

6...h6?! – This move loses time and it creates a target for an attack on the kingside. 7.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}6 \), Satyapragyan – Haba, Pardubice 2005 and here after 8.\( \text{db}5 \), Black has serious problems: 8...\( \text{a}5 \) 9.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 10.\( \text{d}6+ \) \( \text{f}8 \) 11.\( \text{c}4 \), he lags in development and his king remains in the centre, or 8...\( \text{b}8 \) 9.0–0–0 \( \text{b}4 \) 10.\( \text{f}3 \) d5 11.\( \text{f}4 \) e5 12.exd5 and now, irrelevant of whether Black leaves his king in the centre, or he evacuates it to the kingside, White obtains excellent attacking prospects;

6...\( \text{xd}4 \)?! – This move helps White to complete his development: 7.\( \text{xd}4 \) a6 (In answer to 7...e5, Datyner – Gassmann, Geneve 1995, White obtains a clear advantage after 8.\( \text{d}5 \) and Black can hardly find a good square for his queen: 8...\( \text{a}5+ \) 9.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{ex}d4 \) 10.\( \text{xa}5 \), or 8...\( \text{b}8 \) 9.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 10.\( \text{c}5 \) 8.0–0–0 \( \text{e}7 \), Corral – Stecher, Mittelfranken 2004 (It is very bad for Black to opt for 8...\( \text{e}7 \), Ward – Revnell, USA 1999, because after: 9.\( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 10.\( \text{g}3 \) White remains with a solid extra pawn.) and here it deserves attention for White to block his opponent’s queenside with: 9.\( \text{xb}6 \)? \( \text{xb}6 \) 10.\( \text{xb}6 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 11.\( \text{g}3 \) d6 – otherwise Black is incapable of developing his queenside, but now after 12.f4, he has no satisfactory defence against the threat 13.\( \text{c}7 \).

7.\( \text{f}4 \)!

According to the opinion of one of the contemporary classics of the Paulsen system – GM
Chapter 10

S. Rublevsky, this move creates maximal problems for Black. White’s attempt to develop his pieces, following the habitual system, without paying attention to the actions of the opponent, would not provide him even with a minimal advantage after for example: 7.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{b4}} 8.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{xd4}} 9.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{xc3}}+ 10.\textit{\texttt{bxc3}} 0–0! (or 10...e5?!).

In the diagrammed position, Black has most often played the obvious move \textit{a}) 7...\textit{\texttt{d6}}, and sometimes the more aggressive try \textit{b}) 7...\textit{\texttt{xb4}}.

He has also tested in practice: 7...a6?! – Black remains behind in development after that move and he ends up with an isolated pawn on d5: 8.e5 \textit{\texttt{d5}} 9.\textit{\texttt{xd5}} exd5, Fransson – Carlsson, Stockholm 1994 and here White must complete his development in order to capitalize on the defects of Black’s position. 10.\textit{\texttt{d3}} d6 (It is worse for Black to play: 10...\textit{\texttt{xd4}} 11.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{c5}} 12.\textit{\texttt{xc5}} \textit{\texttt{xc5}} 13.\textit{\texttt{f3}}± and his queen is out of actions. It is not better for him to try: 10...\textit{\texttt{b6}} 11.\textit{\texttt{f5}} \textit{\texttt{xb2}} 12.0–0 g6 13.\textit{\texttt{d6}}+ \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 14.exd6\textit{\texttt{g6}}, because his dark squares are quite vulnerable. White’s lead in development is a more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.) 11.exd6 \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 12.0–0;

7...\textit{\texttt{xd4}} – That move only enhances White’s development. 8.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{g4}} 9.\textit{\texttt{b5}}! – Now, White preserves the control over the g1-a7 diagonal. 9...\textit{\texttt{b8}} (After: 9...\textit{\texttt{xc2}} 10.\textit{\texttt{d3}} \textit{\texttt{xe3}} 11.\textit{\texttt{xe3}} \textit{\texttt{xb2}} 12.0–0+–, Black has no defence against his opponent’s numerous threats. White’s lead in development is rather obvious in the variation: 9...\textit{\texttt{c6}} 10.\textit{\texttt{g1}} a6 11.\textit{\texttt{c3}} b5 12.\textit{\texttt{e2}}! 13.0–0–0± White is perfectly prepared for his kingside offensive, while Black has developed only a single piece.) 12.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 13.\textit{\texttt{e2}} \textit{\texttt{h6}}, Fier – El Debs, Guarulhos 2006, The main drawback of Black’s position is his passive knight. White can obtain a long-lasting positional pressure with natural moves. 14.0–0–0 b5 (The other possibilities are not any better for Black: 14...\textit{\texttt{c5}} – this move enables White to act effectively on the queenside. 15.\textit{\texttt{a4}} \textit{\texttt{a7}} 16.\textit{\texttt{c3}} f6 17.\textit{\texttt{d4}}±; 14...\textit{\texttt{e7}} 15.g4±; 14...\textit{\texttt{c7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{f3}}! 15.e5 \textit{\texttt{e7}} 16.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{b8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{e3}}±;

7...\textit{\texttt{b6}} – Black is trying to capture a pawn, disregarding his development, Szokol – Kyllo, Email 2001, 8.\textit{\texttt{d2}}! – That is White’s most energetic reaction against Black’s last move. White obtains a clear lead in development. 8...\textit{\texttt{xb2}} 9.\textit{\texttt{b1}} \textit{\texttt{a3}} 10.\textit{\texttt{d5}} \textit{\texttt{a5}} 11.e5 \textit{\texttt{g4}} 12.\textit{\texttt{g1}} \textit{\texttt{e7}} (Black might lose very quickly after: 12...\textit{\texttt{b4}} 13.\textit{\texttt{xb4}} \textit{\texttt{xb4}} 14.\textit{\texttt{d6}}+ \textit{\texttt{e7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{c4}}–+; or: 12...a6? 13.\textit{\texttt{b6}} \textit{\texttt{xb6}} 14.\textit{\texttt{d6}}+ \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 15.\textit{\texttt{xb6}} \textit{\texttt{c5}} 16.\textit{\texttt{xc6}}–+ and White preserves a huge mate-
rial advantage in both variations; 12...f5 13.♗b3 ♕d8 14.♕d6+ ♣xd6 15.♗xd6?) 13.♗b3! 0–0 (After: 13...a6? 14.♘b6+- Black loses his queen.) 14.♖e2 ♛h6 (White regains his pawn too in the line: 14...f5 15.♕xa7 ♘b4 16.♕xc8 ♕xc8 17.a3 ♘xc3 18.♖xc3?) 15.♕xa7 ♘b4 16.♗e5± The material is equal now, while Black's pieces are misplaced.  

a) 7...d6

![Diagram](image)

Black thus prevents mechanically the pawn-advance – e4-e5. Now, there arises the Scheveningen variation by a transposition of moves – 1.e4 c5 2.♘f3 e6 3.d4 cxd4 4.♘xd4 ♖f6 5.♗c3 d6 6.f4 ♕c7 7.♗e3 ♘c6, but Black's queen has been prematurely developed to c7 and accordingly he lacks time to create a sufficient counterplay on the queenside.

8.♕f3

White's queen is placed quite actively on that square.

Black has played most often in that position the moves a1) 8...a6, or a2) 8...♗e7.

8...♗xd4?! – This move even increases White's lead in development. 9.♗xd4 e5 10.fxe5 dxe5 11.♗g3± and Black has problems protecting his e5-pawn, Grabics – Boronyak, Hungary 1995.

8...e5 – This attempt by Black to stabilize the situation in the centre leads to a very bad position for him, Pollinger – Schleupner, Krumbach 1981, 9.♗b5!? – that is the most aggressive answer for White, since he exploits the absence of the pawn on a6 and he attacks the prematurely developed queen on c7. 9...♗a5 (After: 9...♗d8 10.♗d5 ♘xd5 11.exd5± White has three extra tempi in comparison to the well-familiar position from the Chelyabinsk variation – 1.e4 c5 2.♗f3 ♘c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.♘xd4 ♘f6 5.♗c3 e5 6.♗b5 d6 7.♗d5!? ♘xd5 8.exd5 – he has already developed his bishop, queen and he has pushed f2-f4.) 10.♗d2 ♗g4 (It is not better for Black to try: 10...♗b4 11.♕c1 ♕d8 12.a3 ♘c6 13.♕d5±; 12...♗a6 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.♗g5±) 11.♗f2 ♘b4 12.♗c1± Black's pieces are unstable and White obtains a huge lead in development because of that, for example: 12...♗d8 (or 12...a6 13.axb5 14.axb4 ♕xb4 15.♗xb5+ ♘d7 16.♖xd7+ ♘xd7 17.0–0± Black's king is stranded in the centre and the d5-square is weak.) 13.♗g3 ♗e7 14.♖xd6+ ♕xd6 15.fxe5 ♘e6 16.exf6 ♘xf6 17.♗b5+ ♘c6 18.0–0± White has a superior development and an extra pawn.
Chapter 10

8...\(\text{d}7\) 9.0–0–0 h5 – Black prevents the pawn-advance g2-g4 with that move, but he compromises his kingside. (About 9...a6 10.g4 – see 8...a6 9.0–0–0 \(\text{d}7\) 10.g4; as for 9...\(\text{e}7\) 10.g4 – see 8...\(\text{e}7\) 9.0–0–0 \(\text{d}7\) 10.g4; 9...\(\text{xd}4\) – this is an attempt at simplifying the position. 10.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{c}6\) 11.g4 e5 12.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{exf}4\) 13.\(\text{xf}4\) a6 14.g5 \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{c}4\)± White’s prospects are clearly better, because of his dominance over the d5-outpost, his extra space and Black’s weak d6 and f7-pawn. 15.\(\text{b}6\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) 0–0–0 17.\(\text{e}3\) f6 18.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 19.\(\text{h}g1\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{d}5\)± – Lau – Andonov, Saint John 1988.) 10. h3 a6, Repkova – Fomina, Debrecen 1992 and here it deserves attention for White to prepare his kingside actions with 11.\(\text{e}2\)! – Black has problems creating counterplay, for example: 11... 0–0–0 12.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{b}8\) 13.\(\text{b}3\)± and his king is quite unsafe, or: 11... \(\text{e}7\) 12.g4 \(\text{xd}4\) 13.\(\text{xd}4\) e5 14. \(\text{e}3\)± and White has excellent prospects on the centre and on the kingside, or 11...h4 – that is the most principled answer for Black. 12.\(\text{b}1\) (This is a useful prophylactic move.) 12...\(\text{e}7\) (Black’s attempt to create some threats on the queenside seems to be much worse: 12...b5 13.e5! b4 14.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 15.\(\text{cb}5\)±, or 13...\(\text{dxe}5\) 14.\(\text{f}e5\) b4 15.\(\text{cb}5\) axb5 16. \(\text{xf}6\)± and his king is quite endangered.) 13.g4 hxg3 14.\(\text{xf}3\) g6 15.h4 0–0–0 16.\(\text{f}2\)± Black’s position looks solid, but it is too passive.

a1) 8...a6

This move is usually useful for Black. He prevents moves like \(\text{b}5\) and prepares the advance of his b-pawn.

9.0–0–0

After that move, Black most often plays: a1a) 9...\(\text{d}7\)?! and a1b) 9...\(\text{e}7\).

He has tried in practice some other moves, though:

9...b5? – That activity is too premature. 10.e5 \(\text{b}7\) (Black loses even quicker after: 10...\(\text{xd}4\)? 11.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{xb}5\) axb5 14.\(\text{xb}5\) 1–0 Gelzinis – Vítartas, Vilnius 1995.) 11. \(\text{xb}5\)! axb5 12.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{b}8\) (or 12...\(\text{c}8\) 13.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{b}4\) 14.\(\text{xf}7\)± – Esplana – Choque Paredes, Peru 1999) 13.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\), Koscielski – I.Naiditsch, Dortmund 1999 and here White’s most technical decision seems to be: 14.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{b}4\) 15.\(\text{exd}6+\) \(\text{xd}6\) 16.\(\text{xd}6\)± \(\text{xd}6\) 17.\(\text{xb}7\)± – Black will have to defend an endgame, in which White’s queenside passed pawns seem to be decisive;
9...\(\textit{\text{d}a5}\)?! – Black decentralizes his knight and he falls behind in development. 10.\(\textit{\text{g}}3\) b5 11.e5 dxe5 12.fxe5 \(\textit{\text{d}}d7\) 13.\(\textit{\text{f}}4\)† (White’s centralized pieces and his lead in development provide him with a long-lasting initiative.) 13...\(\textit{\text{b}}7\) 14.\(\textit{\text{f}}5\)! g6 15.\(\textit{\text{d}}d6+\) \(\textit{\text{xd}}6\) 16.\(\textit{\text{xd}}6\) \(\textit{\text{c}}5\) 17.\(\textit{\text{h}}6\)± – Black’s position is very difficult, because of his vulnerable dark squares and his unsafe king, Crafty – Patzer, 1998;

9...e5?! – These active actions for Black in the centre look rather strange, because he falls behind in development. 10.\(\textit{\text{f}}5\) exf4 (The other possibilities are not better for him: 10...g6? 11.\(\textit{\text{f}}5\) \(\textit{\text{xf}}5\), Martin del Campo – Dlaykan, Bucaramanga 1992 and here after: 12.\(\textit{\text{xf}}6\) \(\textit{\text{e}}5\) 13.\(\textit{\text{d}}5\)+– White remains with an extra pawn and superior development; 10...d5 11.\(\textit{\text{xd}}5\) \(\textit{\text{xd}}5\) 12.\(\textit{\text{xd}}5\) \(\textit{\text{b}}4\) 13.\(\textit{\text{e}}4\) \(\textit{\text{xf}}5\)? – The least of evils for Black would be to enter an endgame without a pawn: 13...\(\textit{\text{xc}}2+\) 14.\(\textit{\text{xc}}2\) \(\textit{\text{xc}}2\) 15.\(\textit{\text{g}}7+\) \(\textit{\text{h}}6\) 16.\(\textit{\text{xc}}2± – or 14.\(\textit{\text{xf}}5\) \(\textit{\text{c}}8\), Kallgren – Ahlqvist, Stockholm 1994, 15.\(\textit{\text{c}}4\)!+- Black’s knight seems to be lost, White is threatening – 16.a3, as well as 16.d6, while Black’s pawn on e5 is hanging. He has no compensation after: 12...\(\textit{\text{xf}}5\) 13.\(\textit{\text{dxc}}6\) e4 14.\(\textit{\text{xb}}7\) \(\textit{\text{xb}}7\) 15.\(\textit{\text{g}}3\) \(\textit{\text{c}}8\) 16.\(\textit{\text{xe}}2\) \(\textit{\text{c}}6\) 17.\(\textit{\text{c}}3±, while in the variation: 13... \(\textit{\text{exf}}4\) 14.\(\textit{\text{xf}}4\) \(\textit{\text{xc}}6\) 15.\(\textit{\text{xc}}6+\) bxc6 16.\(\textit{\text{c}}4± the material remains equal, but Black is clearly behind in development and his queenside is vulnerable,) 11.\(\textit{\text{xf}}4\) \(\textit{\text{e}}5\), De Mie – Erwich, Dieren 1998, after: 12.\(\textit{\text{e}}3\) \(\textit{\text{xf}}5\) 13.\(\textit{\text{exf}}5\) \(\textit{\text{c}}7\) 14.\(\textit{\text{e}}2\)± White has completed his development and he is well-prepared to start his kingside pawn-offensive;

9...\(\textit{\text{b}}8\)?! – That rook might be useful on some other square as well, Licina – Schwarz, Finkenstein 1998, after: 10.\(\textit{\text{g}}3\) b5 (or 10...\(\textit{\text{xd}}4\) 11.\(\textit{\text{xd}}4\) b5 12.e5) 11.e5 dxe5 12.\(\textit{\text{fxe}}6\) \(\textit{\text{c}}8\) 14.\(\textit{\text{xc}}6\) \(\textit{\text{xc}}6\) 14.\(\textit{\text{d}}3\)± White has a huge lead in development;

9...\(\textit{\text{d}}7\) – Black retreats his knight in anticipation of White’s pawn-offensive on the kingside. 10.\(\textit{\text{g}}4\) b5 (It is less logical for Black to play: 10...\(\textit{\text{c}}5\), Vadla – Feletar, Zagreb 1999, 11.\(\textit{\text{xc}}6\) \(\textit{\text{xc}}6\) 12.\(\textit{\text{f}}5\) b5 13.a3 \(\textit{\text{b}}8\) 14.\(\textit{\text{fxe}}6\) \(\textit{\text{xe}}6\) – but not: 14...\(\textit{\text{fxe}}6\) 15.\(\textit{\text{g}}2\) b4 16.\(\textit{\text{xb}}4\) \(\textit{\text{xb}}4\) 17.\(\textit{\text{h}}f1\) \(\textit{\text{c}}7\) 18.\(\textit{\text{g}}5\)±, because after opening of the f-file, Black’s king remains stranded in the centre for a long time – 15.\(\textit{\text{d}}5\) \(\textit{\text{e}}7\) 16.\(\textit{\text{h}}4\)† and White’s initiative seems to be much more serious than Black’s possible counterplay. It is much worse for Black to play: 11...\(\textit{\text{bxc}}6\)?? 12.\(\textit{\text{xc}}5\) dxc5 13.e5± and his bishops are cramped inside his narrow cage of pawns.) 11.\(\textit{\text{g}}5\) \(\textit{\text{dxc}}4\), Polzin – Barbero, Germany 1997 and here it deserves attention for White to refrain from advancing his b-pawn with: 12.\(\textit{\text{dxc}}4\) \(\textit{\text{b}}8\) (about 12...\(\textit{\text{e}}7\) 13.\(\textit{\text{h}}4\)† – see 9...\(\textit{\text{e}}7\) 10.\(\textit{\text{g}}4\) \(\textit{\text{xd}}4\) 11.\(\textit{\text{xd}}4\) b5 12.\(\textit{\text{g}}5\) \(\textit{\text{d}}7\) 13.\(\textit{\text{h}}4\)†) 13.
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a3 \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 14.\( \text{h4} \)  – and White has the standard offensive plan on the kingside;

9...h5  – This move creates problems for Black to castle short later, because it compromises his kingside. 10.\( \text{\texttt{e2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{b1}} \)!
\( \text{\texttt{xd4}} \) (After: 11...b5 12.e5!? dxe5 13.fxe5 \( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{hf1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{gxe5}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{g3}} \), the main drawback of Black’s position is the absence of a reliable shelter for his king.)
12.\( \text{\texttt{xd4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{c6}} \), Delgado Kuffo – Sotomayor, Quito 1997 and here White can follow with the quite unpleasant for Black line: 13.\( \text{\texttt{we3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) (Black’s attempt to seize the initiative fails: 13...b5?! 14.\( \text{\texttt{xf6}} \) gxf6 15.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) \text{\texttt{d8}} 16.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \), because he will have to trade the only defender of his vulnerable light squares.) 14.f5 e5 15.\( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) \text{\texttt{d7}} 16.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \) \text{\texttt{c8}} 17.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) White will gradually prepare his kingside offensive, while Black will have no counterplay whatsoever;

9...\( \text{\texttt{xd4}} \)  – That exchange in the centre is in favour of White. After 10.\( \text{\texttt{xd4}},\)

10...e5? 11.fxe5 dxe5 12.\( \text{\texttt{g3}} \)±
Now, he has tried to solve the problem with the protection of his central pawn in different fashions: 12...\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) \text{\texttt{d6}} 14.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \) f6, Feher – Borsok, Hungary 1987 and here White’s simplest win seems to be: 15.\( \text{\texttt{a5}} \) \text{\texttt{f7}} 16.\( \text{\texttt{c7}} \) \text{\texttt{c6}} 17.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \)\( \text{\texttt{g6}} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} ! \text{\texttt{h6}} 19.\( \text{\texttt{xa8}} \)– and he has an extra rook as well as a powerful attack; 12...d6 13.\( \text{\texttt{wxg7}} \) \text{\texttt{exd4}} 14.\( \text{\texttt{wh8}} \)\( \text{\texttt{xe7}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{xd4}} \)\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{c5}} \)\( \text{\texttt{e3}} \)– White has a colossal lead in development and his position is winning. In the game Siemers – Martens, Germany 1992, Black survived only for five more moves: 14...\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) \text{\texttt{b8}} 16.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \) \text{\texttt{a4}} 17.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \) \text{\texttt{b5}} 18.\( \text{\texttt{c7}} \)\( \text{\texttt{d8}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{xf7}} \) 1–0;

10...\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \)?! Helstroffer – Nezar, Nancy 2006, that move worsens the placement of the queen and after: 11.f5 \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) (or 11...e5 12.\( \text{\texttt{xe3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \)±) 12.g4 \text{\texttt{h6}} 13.\( \text{\texttt{h4}} \)± White’s kingside offensive seems to be very unpleasant for Black;

10...\( \text{\texttt{d7}} \)?!  – This bishop is rather passive here. 11.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) \text{\texttt{c8}}, van Mechelen – Plomp, Antwerp 1997, It is favourable for White to open the centre, because of his lead in development. 12.e5 dxe5 (It is equally dangerous for Black to opt for: 12...\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{g3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 14.f5±) 13.\( \text{\texttt{xe5}} \) \text{\texttt{c6}} (The other possibilities are not any better for Black. After: 13...\( \text{\texttt{a5}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{xb7}} \)± White remains with an
extra pawn, while in the line: 13...\texttt{\textbackslash e}6 14.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7, or 13...\texttt{\textbackslash b}6 14.\texttt{\textbackslash h}e1 \texttt{\textbackslash e}7 15.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 Black can hardly defend his kingside.) 14.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3 \texttt{\textbackslash a}5 15.\texttt{\textbackslash h}e1\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 Black has great problems due to his king, stranded in the centre, for example: 15...b5 (or 15...\texttt{\textbackslash d}7 16.f5!->) 16.f5 b4 17.fx6 bxc3 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}xf6+-;

In answer to 10...\texttt{\textbackslash e}7, Kosciel-
ski – A.Martin, Ruhrgebiet 1999, it seems very good for White to continue with 11.e5 dxe5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e5 \texttt{\textbackslash a}5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash d}3\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash d}8 Black can hardly develop his queenside and his king has no reliable shelter;

10...b5 – This is probably the best for Black. 11.a3 \texttt{\textbackslash b}7 12.\texttt{\textbackslash d}3 \texttt{\textbackslash e}c8 13.\texttt{\textbackslash h}e1 \texttt{\textbackslash a}5 (White’s initiative is very dangerous too af-
ter: 13...\texttt{\textbackslash c}7 14.g4\texttt{\textbackslash d}7) 14.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7 15.\texttt{\textbackslash d}5 \texttt{\textbackslash d}8 16.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}8 Black’s king remains stranded in the centre and it hampers the coordination of his pieces, Tal – Gufeld, Tbilisi 1969.

\textbf{a1a) 9...\textbackslash d}7?!

That is not the most active square for that bishop and it is much rather a loss of a tempo. In comparison to the variation a2), the bishop goes to g4 in two moves. Still, that move is popular enough.

10.g4 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d4

10...0–0? – This move is not logical and Black can hardly organize any counterplay on the queenside. After: 11.g5 \texttt{\textbackslash g}8 12.\texttt{\textbackslash b}3 \texttt{\textbackslash g}e7 13.\texttt{\textbackslash f}2 \texttt{\textbackslash e}8 14.\texttt{\textbackslash b}6 \texttt{\textbackslash b}8 15.h4\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash g}8 he is practically completely stalemated, Sisniega – Chavez, Buenos Aires 1978.

10...e5?! – Now, that move looks even more strange than on the previous move. 11.\texttt{\textbackslash f}5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}6 (or 11...g6 12.g5! \texttt{\textbackslash x}f5 13.gxf6 \texttt{\textbackslash d}8 14.\texttt{\textbackslash d}5\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 and Black has no satis-
factory defence against the threat 15.\texttt{\textbackslash b}6, Celli – Hang, corr. 1983) 12.\texttt{\textbackslash b}1 b5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash d}5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 14.exd5 \texttt{\textbackslash b}4 (After 14...e4 15.\texttt{\textbackslash g}2 \texttt{\textbackslash e}7 16.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e7 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e7 17.g5 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d}4\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash e}7 Black’s e4-pawn is weak and his kingside is not developed.) 15.c3 e4 16.\texttt{\textbackslash g}2 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 (It is not bet-
ter for Black to try: 16...g6 17.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d}5? – 17.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d5+- Bedny – G.Pavlov, St. Petersburg 2004; 10...\texttt{\textbackslash e}8?! – After that move Black will have to retreat his knight to its initial square – g8. 11.g5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d4 12.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d4 \texttt{\textbackslash g}8 13.\texttt{\textbackslash c}4 \texttt{\textbackslash c}6, Talving – Kuvaldin, corr. 1986 and here White’s most ag-
grressive line seems to be: 14.f5 b5 15.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d4 exf5 16.\texttt{\textbackslash x}f5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}7 17.\texttt{\textbackslash f}2?; 10...h6?! – Black creates a target for White with that move and his castling short becomes
too risky now. 11.h4 \( \text{exd4} \) (It is not better for Black to opt for: 11...0–0–0 12.b3 \( b8 \), Colas – Fontana, San Jose 1992, since after 13.h3± White’s kingside pawns are ready to advance; or 11.h5 12.g5 \( g4 \), M.Pavlov – Sax, Nice 1974, White should better keep his bishop: 13.g1 0–0–0 14.h3 \( b8 \) 15.xc6+ and now no matter how Black plays, he remains a pawn down, with unsafe king and passive pieces: 15...xc6 16.xg4 hxg4 17.xg4 b5 18.a3±; 15...xc6 16.xg4 hxg4 17.xg4 d5 18.xf3±; 15...xc6 16.xg4 hxg4 17.xg4 b5 18.xf3 b4 19.e2±) 12.xd4 e5 – This move is quite principled in many lines, in which Black exchanges on d4, but it has not been tested in that position. (12.c6 13.g5 d7 14.g6 f5, Mendoza – Ruiz, Cali 2001 and here it deserves attention for White to try: 15.h3!? , with the idea to sacrifice the exchange in answer to 15...e7 – 16.exf5?? xh1 17.xh1 exf5 18.c4 \( b8 \) 19.d5± White has a huge lead in development and he controls the light squares, so he has a clear advantage.). After: 13.c4 xg4 14.g3,

Black has three logical retreats, but no matter how he continues, there arise some positions from the main line with the inclusion of the moves h4–h6, and that is either immaterial, or it is in favour of White – he has covered the g5-square, while Black has weakened the g6-square, for example:

14...\( b8 \) 15.d5 b5 (or 15...xd5 16.exd5 b5 17.c6 d7 18.b6 \( c7 \) 19.fxe5 dxe5 20.d3± Black’s kingside is static and he has no counterplay in sight.) 16.c6 b7 17.c7 \( b8 \) 18.xf6+ gxf6 19.xf7 \( xf7 \) 20.xg4± White is totally dominant on the light squares as a compensation for the exchange-sacrifice.

It is no less dangerous for Black to try: 14...\( e7 \) 15.fxe5 wxe5 (After: 15...dxe5 16.c5 \( e8 \) 17.xe5 \( e6 \) 18.d5 \( d6 \) 19.h3± – White’s activity is just threatening.) 16.f4 \( e6 \) 17.g1! h5 18.c7 b5 19.g2± Black has failed to bring his king to safety and White is threatening 20.e5, as well as 20.d5, opening files in the centre;

Or 14...\( d7 \) 15.d5 \( xd5 \) 16.exd5 b5 17.c6 e4 18.d4± and the activity of White’s pieces more than compensates his sacrificed pawn, for example: 18.e6 19.xa6! \( xd5 \) (In case of: 19.xa6 20.dxe6 fxe6 21.b3± White regains the exchange and he maintains dangerous threats against Black’s king, stranded in the centre.) 20.b6 \( c4 \)
21.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) (or 21...f5 22.b3 \( \text{d}5 \) 23.\( \text{g}6+ \) f7 24.\( \text{xf}5 \)± and White is clearly better thanks to his active pieces) 22.e1 \( \text{d}5 \) (After: 22...d5 23.b3 \( \text{xa}2 \) 24.bxc4 bxc4 25.\( \text{g}4 \) -- White has three pawns for the piece and a winning position.) 23.d3 \( \text{c}4 \) 24.\( \text{xe}4 \)± e7 25.xc4 bxc4 26.e3± White has restored the material balance and he is well-prepared for new gains.

11.\( \text{Exd}4 \)

11...e5

That is the most logical line for Black.

His other possibilities enable White to obtain an advantage in the centre:

11...b5?! 12.g5 e5?, Silva Pereira – Quaresma, corr. 1977 (Black’s position is not too promising after: 12...\( \text{g}8 \) 13.f5±, but still that would have been his best.) and here White wins with: 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.d3! b4 (or 14...\( \text{g}4 \) 15.h3+-) 15.gxf6 bxc3 16.\( \text{x}c3 \) d6 17.fxg7+- Black has no chance of saving the game with a pawn down and a badly protected king.

11...d5?! – That move creates another weak pawn for Black. 12.exd5 \( \text{Exd}5 \) 13.\( \text{xd}5 \) exd5, Chudinovskikh – Pokrovsky, corr. 1980 and here after: 14.\( \text{g}2 \) c8 (or 14...c6 15.\( \text{f}2 \)±) 15.c3 \( \text{c}6 \) 16.\( \text{f}2 \) e7 17.hd1± Black loses unavoidably his d5-pawn and White can capture it at any opportune moment.

11...c6?! – That move does not create any problems for White. 12.g5 d7 13.h3 g6 (In answer to 13...e7, Wittmann – Mascarinas, Thessaloniki 1984, it seems very good for White to follow with 14.f5 \( \text{e}5 \) 15.\( \text{e}2 \) d7 16.\( \text{f}1 \)±, or 14...c5 15.\( \text{d}2 \) exf5 16.\( \text{xf}5 \)± and in both cases White remains with an overwhelming advantage in the centre and a superior development.) 14.hd1 b5 15.\( \text{g}3 \)± (White is clearly better with his lead in development, while Black’s king is endangered in the centre.) 15...g7 16.\( \text{xd}6 \) b4 17.f5! bxc3 (Black’s king will come under a dangerous attack on the queenside as well: 17...0-0-0 18.\( \text{fxe}6 \) \( \text{fxe}6 \) 19.\( \text{d}5 \)→ and here he loses quickly after: 19...exd5 20.\( \text{f}4 \) d7 21.exd5 \( \text{b}5 \) 22.e3 \( \text{de}8 \) 23.\( \text{c}5 \)± d8 24.\( \text{xd}7 \) \( \text{xd}7 \) 25.\( \text{b}6 \)–, his chances for a successful defence are just minimal too in case of: 19...\( \text{xd}5 \) 20.\( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 21.dxe6! \( \text{exe}3 \) 22.exd7+ \( \text{b}8 \) 23.hxg3+– and Black must give up his queen, in the best case for a rook.) 18.\( \text{xe}6 \)± d8 19.\( \text{xc}6 \) 1–0 Timman – Larsen, London 1980.

12.e4 \( \text{xe}4 \) 13.\( \text{g}3 \)
Following: 13...a5, Zsiltzova-Lisenko – Hind, Istanbul 2000, it deserves attention for White to opt for: 14.a4! d8 (about 14...exf4 15.xf4 d8 16.e5 – see 13...exf4; after 14...c7 15.fxe5 dxe5 16.b5+ d7 17.d4 White regains his pawn, maintaining powerful threats against Black's king, stranded in the centre.) 15.fxe5 dxe5 16.xe5+ e6 17.b5+ axb5 (It is not better for Black to try: 17...d7 18.a4 d8 16.e5 dxe5 17.xe5 e4 18.g2! and White has a huge compensation for the pawn, due to his overwhelming lead in development, for example after the greedy line: 17...f5 18.b6 c8 19.c3 ecx6 20.dxc6±. Black's extra pawn

13...d7

Black with his king in the centre. 14.xf4 a5 (After: 14...d7 15.d5 xd5 16.exd5 f5 17.c3 Black does not have a single active piece on the board, his king is stranded in the centre and it is rather unclear whether he will manage to complete his development, Zahariev – Baretic, Novi Sad 1992.) 15.e4 d8 16.e5 dxe5 17.xe5 e6, Messing – S.Cvetkovic, Novi Travnik 1969 and here the most unpleasant line for Black seems to be: 18.c4!? d8 (or 18...b5? 19.xb5 axb5 20.xf6 gxf6 21.xb5+–) 19.d1 b6 20.xf6 gxf6 21.e4! f5 (or 21...xc4 22.xc4 h6+ 23.b1 xc4 24.d6+-) 22.f4 xe4 23.xe4+ e7 24.e1± – Black's problems are even greater, because of the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board.

14.fxe5

It also deserves attention for White to try: 14.d5!? xd5 (It is not better for Black to opt for: 14...exf4 15.xf4 xd5 16.exd5 f6 – but not 16...e7 17.h3 g5 18.hxg4 fxg4 19.c3+– 17.d3! f7 18.g1, the coordination of Black's pieces has been disrupted and it is quite evident that White will have a very powerful attack rather soon.) 15.exd5 b5 16.c6 e4 17.g2? and White has a huge compensation for the pawn, due to his overwhelming lead in development, for example after the greedy line: 17...f5 18.b6 c8 19.c3 ecx6 20.dxc6±. Black's extra pawn
would not balance White's dangerous passed c6-pawn, while in the variation: 17...\textit{f5} 18.\textit{b6} \textit{xc8} 19.\textit{xc8}+ \textit{xc8} 20.\textit{e1} White regains his pawn and he maintains great piece-activity.

14...dxe5

15.\textit{xe5}+ \textit{e6}, De Vault – Khlystov, Email 2000, 16.\textit{f4} \textit{d8} (After: 16...\textit{xe5} 17.\textit{xe5} \textit{d8} 18.\textit{g2} \textit{e6} 19.\textit{c7} \textit{d7} 20.\textit{d1}!+, Black has problems defending against his opponent's active pieces, despite the numerous exchanges.) 17.\textit{c7} \textit{xe5} 18.\textit{xe5} \textit{d7} 19.\textit{c8}+ \textit{d8} 20.\textit{xd8}+ \textit{xd8} 21.\textit{g1} \textit{e6} 22.\textit{d4} – Black still has difficulties completing his development.

10...\textit{xd4}

In case Black wishes to simplify the position a bit with this exchange, then he must trade on d4 right now; otherwise, later White will manage to capture on d4 with his bishop.

10...\textit{h5}? 11.g5 \textit{g4} 12.\textit{g1} e5, O.Popovych – Shaine, Philadelphia 1988 and here White's fastest road to victory is the line: 13.\textit{d5} \textit{b8} (After: 13...\textit{d8} 14.\textit{xc6 bx}c6 15.\textit{b6}– Black loses a rook.) 14.\textit{xc6 bx}c6 15.\textit{xe7 xe}7 16.f5– and Black's active knight is unavoidably lost.

10...\textit{e5}?! – This move compromises the light squares in the centre. 11.\textit{f5} \textit{g8}? (Black's defence is difficult even after the best for him: 11...\textit{xf5} 12.\textit{exf5} \textit{xf4} 13.\textit{xf4} \textit{h6} 14.e4\pm) 12.g5 \textit{d7} 13.\textit{d5}– Spatz – Walther, Bad Neustadt 1992.

10...\textit{a5}?! – After that move, the knight is away from the fight for the centre. 11.g5 \textit{d7}, Schepers – Freeman, Oakham 1997 and now, the most unpleasant for Black seems to be: 12.\textit{h3} \textit{f8} (Black's attempt to occupy the c4-square with his knight leads to an immediate disaster for him: 12...\textit{b6} 13.g6 \textit{f6} 14.\textit{db5} axb5 15.\textit{xb5} \textit{c6} 16.\textit{xd6}+ \textit{f8} 17.\textit{b5} \textit{c7} 18.e5\pm) 13.f5 \textit{c4} 14.\textit{xc4 xc4} 15.\textit{h1}– Black remains catastrophically behind in development.

10...\textit{g6}?! – Black fails to parry
White's pawn-offensive in that fashion. 11.g5 \&d7 (It is not better for Black to try: 11...\&h5, Feletar – Polajzer, Bosnjaci 2005, after: 12.f5 \&e5 13.\&h3 \&c4 14.\&e2± Black's knight is terribly misplaced at the edge of the board.) 12.h4 b5 13.h5 \&f8 14.hxg6 hxg6 15.\&h7± White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative, Kupreichik – Richtmann, Germany 2001.

10...\&b8?! – That looks like a loss of time. 11.g5 \&d7 12.\&h3 b5 13.g6 \&xd4 14.gxf7+ \&xf7 15.\&xd4 \&b7, Al Sayed – Tristan, Dos Hermanas 2004. Black's king is rather unsafe and White can best emphasize that with the line: 16.\&g1! \&f6 17.\&xb5! \&xd4 (White's attack is checkmating after: 17...axb5 18.\&xb5 \&c6 19.\&xf6 \&xf6 20.\&xd6+ \&f8 21.\&xf7+++) 18.\&xd7 \&xd7 19.\&xd4+-

10...\&d7 11.g5 b5 (about 11...0–0 12.\&g1 – see: 10...0–0 11.g5 \&d7 12.\&g1; as for 11...\&b8 12.\&h3 – see 10...\&b8 11.g5 \&d7 12.\&h3; after: 11...\&c5 12.f5 \&d7, Rantanen – Green, Haifa 1976, White can play the rather unpleasant variation for Black: 13.\&xc6 \&xc6 14.fxе6. Here, he has serious problems after: 14...\&xe6 15.\&d5 \&xd5 16.exd5 \&c5 – and it is even worse for him to opt for 16...\&xg5 17.\&g2± and White regains his pawn, since Black has no defence against 18.h4; or 17.h4±, as well as after: 14...fxе6 15.\&h3 \&d7 16.\&hf1 0–0–0 17.\&f7± and Black remains at least a pawn down, or 15...g6 16.\&xc5 dxc5 17.\&xe6 \&xg5+ 18.\&b1 \&f8 19.\&h3± and Black's king remains stranded in the centre for a long time.) 12.h4 \&c5 (or 12...\&b7 13.a3 \&b6?! 14.\&f2 \&c4? – Black had better admit his mistake: 14...\&d7 15.f5± – 15.\&xb5! axb5 16.\&xb5 \&b8?! 17.\&xc4 \&a5 18.\&d3+– Black has no compensation for the two pawns whatsoever, Ciuksyte – Morrison, Birmingham 2006; 12.b4 13.\&ce2 \&b7 14.\&g3 \&c8 15.\&h2 \&c5 16.\&b1 \&a5 17.h5+ Black's defence is very difficult. His king hampers the coordination of his pieces in the centre and he risks coming under a dangerous attack on the kingside, Zeller – Brenner, Deizisau 1999; it is even worse for Black to play 13...\&a5, Kulaots – Kanep, Tallinn 2007, because after: 14.h5 \&c4 15.\&f2 \&db6 16.g6 \&f6 17.\&h3+ White's kingside initiative is very powerful.) 13.h5 \&b7 (White's initiative develops very fast after: 13...b4 14.\&ce2 \&xd4 15.\&xd4 \&b7 16.\&g3 0–0 17.g6+, or 15...e5 16.\&e3 \&b7 17.\&g3 \&c8 18.\&h2†) 14.g6 f5 (Black's counterplay will be too late after 14...b4, due to: 15.\&xf7+ \&xf7 16.\&xe6! \&xe6 17.\&d5 \&a5 18.\&c4→; 17...\&d8 18.\&h6→ and White's attack is very powerful in both cases.) 15.h6 hxg6 16.hxg7 \&g8 17.\&g3± – Black can hardly maintain the material balance, Conquest – Soderberg, Tanta 1997.

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4. \( \text{dxd4 e6} \) 5. \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{w7} \) 6. \( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{df6} \) 7. \( \text{f4} \)

10...h6 – That is an attempt to parry White's pawn-onslaught on the kingside. 11.h4 \( \text{dxd4} \) (After: 11...e5?! 12.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 13.\( \text{exf5} \) 0–0–0 14.g5± White occupies the d5-outpost and that, together with his bishop pair, provides him with a great advantage, Harkins – Churchill, Cardinal 1978; 11...h5!? 12.g5 \( \text{g4} \) 13.\( \text{g1} \) b5, Fabian – Bojda, Slovakia 2001 and here it deserves attention for White to contain Black's queenside counterplay with: 14.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 15.a3† 12.\( \text{xd4} \) e5 13.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{hxg4} \). Black has accomplished his standard exchange operation in the centre, but here White can enter a very favourable endgame with: 14.\( \text{wxg4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 15.\( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 16.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) (After: 16...b5 17.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xf1+} \) 18.\( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 19.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{h4} \) 20.\( \text{xf7±} \), Black can hardly save the game against White's powerful rooks, supported by his centralized knight.) 17.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{f6} \), Illescas Cordoba – Campos, Barcelona 1982 (Naturally, Black loses after: 17...\( \text{xf1} \) 18.\( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{hxh4} \) 19.\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{g5} \) 20.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{d8} \) 21.\( \text{d5} \)±) and here White has a powerful line at his disposal – 18.\( \text{d5} ! \) \( \text{dxd5} \) 19.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{e7} \) (or 19...0–0 20.c4±) 20.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{d8} \) (It is not better for Black to opt for: 20...g6 21.h5 \( \text{g5} \) 22.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{d8} \) 23.c4±) 21.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{xd5} \) (After 21...\( \text{d6} \) 22.c4 \( \text{g5} \) 23.b4± White's pawns are much more dangerous than their counterparts.) 22.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{d6} \) 23.\( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{e6} \) 24.\( \text{c6} \)± and Black's rook on h8 has failed to enter the actions.

10...0–0 – That move is too optimistic, since White's kingside set-up looks very powerful. 11.g5 \( \text{d7} \) (Or 11...\( \text{d4} \) 12.\( \text{d4} \) e5?? – that is a grave blunder, Black had better try: 12...\( \text{d7} \) 13.\( \text{g1} \) – see 11...\( \text{d7} \) 12.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{d4} \) 13.\( \text{d4} \) 13.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 14.\( \text{d5} \)± Farinha – Bastos, Lisbon 1998; 11...\( \text{e8} \)?! – Black's knight is too passive here, Blazkova – Stauch, Bayern 2003, 12.h4 b5 13.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 14.\( \text{d3} \) b4 15.\( \text{e2} \)±) 12.\( \text{g1} \) – this is a useful move, since White plans a massive kingside offensive with pieces and pawns.

\( \text{E} \)

Black has tested in practice here:

12...\( \text{d8} \) – That move supports neither Black's counterplay, nor his kingside defence, Dambacher – De Jonge, Hengelo 1995 and here it deserves attention for White to continue with: 13.\( \text{wh3} \)\( ? \) \( \text{c5} \) 14.\( \text{f5} \) b5 (or 14...\( \text{e5} \) 15.\( \text{f3} \)±) 15.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 16.f6 \( \text{f8} \) 17.e5→, followed later by a transfer of the rook to the h4-square;

12...b5 – Black is trying to obtain some counterplay. 13.f5
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\text{$\Delta$de5 14.$\mathbf{\mathbb{W}}$f2 $\mathbb{B}$e8 (After: 14...
$\Delta$xd4 15.$\mathbf{\mathbb{W}}$xd4 $\mathbb{B}$e8 16.f6 $\mathbb{A}$f8 17.h4
$\mathbb{A}$b7 18.h5 $\mathbb{A}$ac8 19.$\mathbb{B}$b1+ Black fails to obtain any counterplay on
the queenside, while White will push g5-g6 on the kingside at any
moment, Scholl – van der Vliet, Velp 1974.) 15.f6 $\mathbb{A}$f8, Maliangkay
– Tirabassi, corr. 1995 and here,
before White begins his kingside onslaught, he should better
take care about the defence of his
queenside: 16.$\Delta$xc6 $\mathbb{A}$xc6 (Af­
ter: 16... $\mathbb{A}$xc6 17.a3 $\mathbb{A}$b7 18.h4+ White's hands are completely free
for active actions.) 17.$\mathbb{B}$b6
$\mathbb{B}$b7 (It is not better for Black to try:
17...$\mathbb{B}$b8 18.g6 hxg6 19.$\mathbb{A}$xg6+ and
White maintains excellent attacking chances.) 18.fxg7 $\mathbb{A}$xg7
19.$\mathbb{A}$xd6+ – White preserves his extra pawn and much more active
pieces;

12...$\mathbb{B}$e8 13.$\mathbb{W}$h5 $\Delta$xd4 (After:
13...$\mathbb{A}$f8? 14.$\mathbb{B}$g3 g6 15.$\mathbb{W}$h4 $\mathbb{A}$g7
16.f5→ White's attack is decisive,
Belotti – T.Horvath, Mendrisio
1997.) 14.$\Delta$xd4 b5 (Black would
not save the game after: 14...g6
15.$\mathbb{W}$h4 b5 16.$\mathbb{W}$g3 h5 17.$\mathbb{A}$e2 b4
18.$\mathbb{A}$xh5+ and White checkmates unavoidable.) 15.$\mathbb{A}$d3!+-
Now, no matter how Black de­
defends, his position is lost: 15...g6?
16.$\mathbb{W}$xh7+–; 15...b4 16.$\mathbb{W}$h3 $\mathbb{A}$f8
17.g6! fxg6 18.$\mathbb{A}$xg6 e5 19.$\mathbb{A}$d5
$\mathbb{A}$d8, Haritver – Popov, Romana
1976 and now, White’s sim­
plest winning line seems to be:
20.fxe5 hxg6 21.$\mathbb{A}$c4+–; 15...$\mathbb{A}$f8
16.f5 exf5 17.$\mathbb{A}$d5 $\mathbb{B}$a5 (or 17...$\mathbb{B}$b7
18.$\mathbb{A}$h3+–) 18.$\mathbb{A}$b6 $\mathbb{W}$e1+ 19.$\mathbb{A}$d1
$\mathbb{W}$xe4 20.$\mathbb{A}$g2 $\mathbb{A}$a4 21.$\mathbb{A}$f6+ $\mathbb{A}$xf6
22.gxf6+ –; 15...$\mathbb{A}$b7 16.$\mathbb{A}$h3 $\mathbb{A}$f8
17.g6! fxg6 18.$\mathbb{A}$xg6 e5 19.$\mathbb{A}$xg7+$\mathbb{A}$xg7 20.fxe5 d5 21.e6+$\mathbb{A}$f6 22.
$\mathbb{W}$g5+ 1–0 T.Horvath – van der
Stricht, Gent 1997;

12...$\mathbb{A}$xd4 13.$\mathbb{A}$xd4 b5 (In an­
swer to 13...$\mathbb{B}$e8, Wessels – Bol­
werk, Germany 2004, the fol­
lowing line seems to be most
unpleasant for Black: 14.f5 $\mathbb{A}$e5
15.$\mathbb{A}$xe5 dxe5 16.f6 $\mathbb{A}$b4 17.$\mathbb{A}$g3±)
14.f5 b4 (After: 14...$\mathbb{A}$e5 15.$\mathbb{A}$xe5!
dxe5 16.f6 $\mathbb{A}$c5 17.fxg7± Black’s
kingside is terribly compromised.
17...$\mathbb{A}$d8 18.$\mathbb{A}$g3 $\mathbb{A}$xd1+ 19.$\mathbb{A}$xd1
$\mathbb{B}$b7 20.$\mathbb{A}$d3 $\mathbb{A}$xg7 21.$\mathbb{W}$h5+–,
Black managed to prolong the fight for more than twenty moves,
but he had no chances of saving
the game, U.Andersson – Es­
pig, Raach 1969.) 15.$\mathbb{A}$xg7! $\mathbb{B}$xc3,
Petrzelka – Mihailov, USSR 1975
(Black’s position remains quite
difficult after his other possi­
bilities too: 15...$\mathbb{A}$xg7 16.f6+$\mathbb{A}$g8
17.fxe7 $\mathbb{B}$e8 18.$\mathbb{W}$e2± and White’s
knight goes to the f6-square via
h5. It is evidently better for Black
to opt for: 15...$\mathbb{A}$e5 16.$\mathbb{A}$xe5 dxe5
17.$\mathbb{B}$b1±, because his bishop pair
provides him with some counter
chances.) and here White’s
most energetic line seems to be:
16.$\mathbb{A}$xc3! $\mathbb{A}$e5 (The other moves
lose even quicker for Black: 16:
d5 17.$\mathbb{A}$h5+–; 16...$\mathbb{B}$b6 17.$\mathbb{A}$g3+–)
17.$\mathbb{A}$f4 $\mathbb{B}$b7 (It is worse for Black
to play: 17...$\mathbb{A}$d8 – since his rook
comes under attack here. 18.g6

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hgx6 19.fxg6 f6 20.\texttt{h}h4 \texttt{f}f8 21.\texttt{a}a5+--; Black's position is defenseless too after: 17...\texttt{f}f8 18.g6 hxg6 19.fxg6 f6 20.g7++–) 18.f6 \texttt{g}g6 19.\texttt{g}g4 \texttt{d}d8 20.\texttt{h}h5 \texttt{h}h8 21.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{x}xe4 (or 21...\texttt{f}f4 22.\texttt{h}h6 \texttt{g}g8 23.g6!+) 22.\texttt{d}d3 d5 23.\texttt{h}h3 \texttt{f}f4 24.\texttt{h}h6 \texttt{x}xd3+ (White checkmates as well after: 24...\texttt{g}g8 25.\texttt{x}xg7+ \texttt{x}xg7 26.\texttt{x}xh7#) 25.cxd3 \texttt{g}g8 26.dxe4 \texttt{f}f4+ 27.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{x}xe4 28.\texttt{d}d4 and Black loses after: 28...\texttt{g}g6 29.\texttt{d}dh4+-

11.\texttt{x}xd4

11...\texttt{e}5!?

Black wins a pawn with that standard resource.

About 11...\texttt{d}d7 12.g5 b5 13.h4 – see 11...b5 12.g5 \texttt{d}d7 13.h4.

11...d5?! – This move enables White to sacrifice the exchange quite effectively. 12.exd5 \texttt{x}xd5 13.\texttt{x}xd5?! exd5 14.\texttt{x}xd5 \texttt{d}d6 15.f5 0–0 16.g5 \texttt{x}d8 17.g2\# Black can hardly develop his queenside without material losses, I.Platonov – B.Kogan, Kiev 1963.

11...0–0 12.g5 \texttt{d}d7 13.h4±. Now, despite the fact that White's rook has occupied the d4-square, instead of his bishop, Black's defense against his opponent's powerful kingside initiative is very difficult, for example: 13...\texttt{f}f8?! 14.h5 b5 15.a3 \texttt{b}b8 16.\texttt{h}h1 \texttt{f}f8 17.g6→ and White had a very strong attack in the game Balashov – Hoffman, Albena 1989, or 13...b5 14.\texttt{h}h3 \texttt{b}b8 15.h5 b4 16.\texttt{e}e2 \texttt{c}c5 17.\texttt{b}b1 \texttt{b}b7 18.f5± and White's kingside threats are much more dangerous than Black's counterplay on the queenside, Zontakh – Vitiugov, St. Petersburg 2003.

11...b5 12.g5 \texttt{d}d7 13.h4±

Black has tested different possibilities in practice, but White's prospects are clearly better in all the variations:

13...\texttt{c}c5 – This move seems to be senseless, because Black can hardly create any threats against the e4-pawn. 14.h5 \texttt{b}b7, Sigurjonsson – Bachmann, Germany 1980 and here after: 15.f5 0–0 16.\texttt{b}b1± White is quite prepared for active actions on the queenside too after 17.a4;

13...\texttt{b}b8 – Black is trying to organize some counterplay as quickly as possible. 14.a3 \texttt{b}b7 15.\texttt{h}h3 \texttt{c}c6, Steinberg – Chovnik,
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Kharkiv 1975 and White is ready to begin his kingside offensive. 16.f5!? – Black has no satisfactory defence anymore, for example: 16...e5 17...g3 d7 18...f4 a5 19.g6± and White is already attacking his opponent’s king, or 16...exf5 17...xf5 e5 18...g3±. It is not better for Black to try: 16...e5 17...d3 b4 18.axb4 xb4 19...hd1± and he has no adequate defence against – 20.f6.

13...b7 14.h5 e5 (After: 14...b6 15...f2 c4 16...xc4 bxc4 17.f5± Black’s defence is very difficult too, Radulov – Tayeb, Dubai 1986.) 15.fxe5 xe5 16...g3± Black has only one good piece – his knight on e5, while the rest of his pieces are very passive, Czebe – Vandrey, Budapest 1993.

12.fxe5
Black’s bishop is on e7 now and not on f8, so the move 12...c4 is not so good for White anymore due to: 12...xg4 13...g3 d8! 14. fxe5 dxe5 15...xe5 d6!±

12...xg4
12...dxe5? – That is naturally a blunder. 13...c4 xg4? 14...xf6 xc4 15...xg7 1–0 Garbarino – Madina, Buenos Aires 1984.

13...g3! dxe5 14...d5 a5
After: 14...xd5 15...xd5 e6 16...xg7 f8 17...xe5±, White remains with an extra pawn, but he has problems pressing that advantage home.

15...d3 h5!
15...xa2?! – This move is too risky. 16...xf6+ xf6 17...xg4 a1+ 18...d2 0–0 19...g1± Black’s attempt to organize an attack has failed and White’s bishop is obviously more powerful than several pawns.

15...xd5?! – That move only helps White to complete his development: 16...xd5 b5 17...c4! h5 18...xe5 0–0 19...xh5! xh5 20...d4 f6 21...xf6 g6 22...g5 h7 23...d3→ White’s bishop are evidently more active than Black’s rooks.

16.b4!
That is the only resource for White to fight for the advantage.

16...xa2
After: 16...xb4 17...b6 d2+ 18...b2 c5+ 19...b3 c6 20. c7+ d7 21.a8 b8 22...xe5 e6 23.h3± White has excellent chances to materialize
his extra exchange.

17.\textit{c7}+ 1f8 18.\textit{xe5} 1d7!

This is the only move for Black. It is too bad for him to opt for: 18...\textit{c8} 19.\textit{xe7}+ 1g8 (White checkmates in an amusing fashion after: 19...\textit{xe7} 20.\textit{c5#}) 20.\textit{d4} \textit{e8} 21.\textit{b2} \textit{xc7} 22.\textit{c3} \textit{b5} 23.\textit{xc8}+ 1xc8 24.\textit{g5}+–; or 18...\textit{e8} 19.\textit{xe8} \textit{xe8} 20.\textit{c5}±

19.\textit{xd7} \textit{a3}+

The other possibilities for Black are again worse for him: 19...\textit{xd7} 20.\textit{c5}! \textit{xc5} 21.\textit{xc5}+ 1g8 22.\textit{xa8} \textit{a1}+ 23.\textit{d2}±, or 19...\textit{f6} 20.\textit{c5}+ 1g8 21.\textit{d2} \textit{xd7} 22.\textit{xa8}– and Black has hardly any compensation for the piece in both variations.

Black is trying to evacuate his king promptly from the centre.

9.0–0–0 0–0

About 9...\textit{a6} 10.\textit{g4} – see 8...\textit{a6} 9.0–0–0 \textit{e7} 10.\textit{g4}.

9...\textit{xd4}?! – This exchange leads to a bad position for Black, while his king is in the centre.

10.\textit{xd4} e5 (In answer to 10...0–0, White has a very unpleasant resource for Black at his disposal: 11.\textit{e5}! \textit{dxe5} 12.\textit{xe5} \textit{a5} 13.\textit{e2} \textit{d8} – Black cannot repel White’s active bishop from its position: 13...\textit{d7} 14.\textit{xd7} \textit{xd7} 15.\textit{xb7}± and White remains with two light pieces for a rook. 14.\textit{xd8}+ \textit{xd8} 15.\textit{d1} \textit{a5} 16.\textit{b1}± All White’s pieces are active, meanwhile Black can hardly develop his queenside.) 11.\textit{f5} \textit{dxe5} (It is a disaster for Black to play: 11...
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\[ \text{g4? } 12.\text{b5+ } d8 13.\text{exd6+--}, \text{or } 12...f8 13.\text{exf6+--) } 12.\text{g3 } 0-0 \\
13.\text{xe5+} - \text{White has a great advantage, because of his extra pawn and very active pieces, Herrera - Sanjuan Garcia, Malaga 2000.} \\
9...\text{d7} 10.g4 h6 (The move - 10...\text{xd4} - only increases White's dominance in the centre. 11.\text{xd4} e5 12.fxe5 dxe5 13.\text{g3 } d6 14. \\
\text{b5 } \text{xb5 15.\text{xb5+ } e7 16.e3+} - \text{and he has two powerful bishops, extra space and a clear-cut attacking plan on the kingside. Black's counterplay is nowhere in sight, Feher - Fokin, Kobanya 1991.)} \\
11.h4 h5 (In answer to 11...\text{xd4} 12.\text{xd4} e5 13.fxe5 dxe5 14.\text{g3 } d6, S.Klimov - I.Dorofeev, Kolontaev 1997, it deserves attention for White to play analogously to the variation above and to obtain a bishop pair with: 15.\text{b5 } \text{xb5 16.\text{xb5+ } e7 17. } e3+) \\
12.g5 \text{g4, Kupreichik - Dydyshko, Minsk 1976 and here White should preserve his dark-squared bishop, creating serious problems for Black - 13.\text{g1 a6 14.}\text{h3+} \\
\text{10.}\text{g1!}?

Unfortunately, White cannot begin an effective kingside attack without that move. It might look like a loss of time, but after: 10.g4?! \text{xd4 11.}\text{xd4} e5 12.\text{c4 } \text{g4 13.}\text{g3 exf4! 14.}\text{xf4 } \text{b6±, White's compensation for the pawn might be good enough only to equalize, van der Wiel - V.Liberzon, Baden 1980.} \\
Mikhail Tal won a magnificent game by choosing: 10.\text{bd5}?! and after: 10...\text{b8} 11.g4 a6 12.\text{d4 } \text{xd4 13.}\text{xd4 b5 14.g5 } \text{d7 15.d3 b4}, he followed with the standard, but still very beautiful piece-sacrifice - 16.\text{d5}?! Tal - Larsen, Bled 1965. We cannot assert however, that sacrifice was 100% correct.

\[ \text{10...}\text{xd4} \\
\text{That is the most principled decision for Black. He has saved a tempo for the move a7-a6 and he has managed to castle - therefore his actions in the centre seem to be quite justified. His situation would remain much worse after his other possibilities:} \\
10...\text{d8?}! - \text{This move is too passive. 11.g4 } \text{d7 12.g5 } e8, \text{Paljusaj - Sertic, Hvar 1998, 13.f5 } e5 14.\text{h3±;} \\
10...\text{e8?}! 11.g4 \text{xd4, De Roda Husman - Veld, Haarlem 2005, 12.}\text{xd4 } e5 13.\text{f2 exf4 14.g5±; 10...a6 - This move most often leads to the positions, which we analyze in variation a1b).} \\
11.g4 \text{xd4 (About 11...}\text{d7 12.g5 - see 8...a6 9.0-0 } \text{e7 10.g4 0-0 11.g5 } \text{d7 12.}\text{g1; as for 11...} \\
\text{216}
4. \( \text{exd4} \) e6 5. \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 6. \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d6} \) 7. \( \text{f4} \)

\( \text{exd4} \) 12. \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 13. \( \text{h5} \) – see 8...
\( \text{a6} \) 9.0–0–0 \( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{g4} \) 0–0 11.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 12.\( \text{eg1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 13.\( \text{h5} \).) 12.\( \text{exd4} \) b5 (12...d5?! – That move only creates a weak pawn for Black in the centre. 13.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{cx}d5 \) 14.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{d3±} \) Now, White can attack his opponent’s vulnerable d5-pawn, as well as his kingside, Belova – Epstein, Yerevan 1980) 
13.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 14.\( \text{f5} \)!! \( \text{e}5 \) 15.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{e}8 \) 16.\( \text{f6} \) – see 8...\( \text{a6} \) 9.0–0–0 \( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{g4} \) 0–0 11.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{b5} \) 13.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{de5} \) 14.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{cx}d4 \) 15.\( \text{exd4} \) \( \text{e}8 \) 16.\( \text{f6} \);

10...\( \text{e}5 \)?! – That move weakens the important d5-outpost. 11.\( \text{db5} \) \( \text{b8} \) (White had a very powerful attack after: 11...\( \text{a5} \) 12.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{e}8 \) 13.\( \text{f5} \)– Podlesnik – Simic, Slovenia 1991.) 12.\( \text{g4} \) 13.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{d7} \) (It is no less perilous for Black to try: 13...\( \text{g4} \) 14.\( \text{exg4} \). Here, after: 14...\( \text{xf4} \) 15.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xb5} \) 16.\( \text{h5±} \) White has dangerous threats on the kingside. It is not better for Black to try: 14...\( \text{xb5} \) 15.\( \text{h4} \)–; while in the variation: 14...\( \text{xf4} \) 15.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{de5} \) 16.\( \text{c4±} \) all White’s pieces are in action.) 
15.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{exf4} \) 16.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 17.\( \text{f6++} \) \( \text{h8} \) 18.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 19.\( \text{h5±} \) White’s powerful threats on the kingside more than compensate the unfavourable placement of his knight on a3.

11.\( \text{Exd4} \)

11...\( \text{e5} \)

About 11...\( \text{a6} \) 12.\( \text{g4} \) – see 10...\( \text{a6} \).

In answer to 11...d5, Spraggett – Coudari, Montreal 1980, White can capture the pawn – 12.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{cx}d5 \) 13.\( \text{cx}d5 \) \( \text{e6} \) 15.\( \text{b5} \) b6 16.\( \text{d3±} \). It is worse for Black to play: 12...\( \text{exd5} \) 13.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 14.g5?! – because White obtains a great lead in development and excellent attacking chances for the exchange. 14...\( \text{exd4} \) 15.\( \text{exd4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{d6} \) (Black must control the e5-square, because after: 16...\( \text{a5} \) 17.\( \text{e4}+– \) he loses, for example: 17...\( \text{c5} \) 18.\( \text{d7}+ \) \( \text{h8} \) 19.\( \text{d7}+ \) \( \text{h8} \) 20.g6 \( \text{fxg6} \) 21.\( \text{gxh6}+– \) and Black’s entire queenside fails to enter the actions.

12.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xf4} \)

12...b5?! – Black can hardly obtain any compensation for the pawn after that move. 13.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 14.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{b8} \) 15.\( \text{e1±} \) Pietrusiak – Ksieski, Ciechocinek 1976.
12...\texttt{Qg4}?! – Black loses too much time in order to trade pieces. 13.\texttt{Qd5 Qd8}, Mrdja – Hlavac, Pula 1992 and here after: 14. \texttt{Qxe7+ Qxe7} 15.f5 \texttt{Qxe3} 16. \texttt{Qxe3±} Black is practically helpless against White’s massive kingside offensive.

13. \texttt{Qxf4 Qe6} 14.g4 \texttt{Qa5} 15. \texttt{g5 Qd7} 16.a3 \texttt{Qac8} 17.\texttt{Qd5±}

White is better, thanks to his dominance in the centre and his potential two-bishop advantage, Maliangkay – Bang, corr. 1999.

b) \texttt{7...Qb4}

That is an attempt by Black to create some weaknesses on White’s queenside.

\texttt{8.Qdb5 Qa5}  
After: 8...\texttt{Qb8} 9.a3 \texttt{Qxc3+} 10. \texttt{Qxc3} 0–0 11.e5± Black loses material, V.Krasnov – Malyshev, Zelenograd 1997.

9.\texttt{e5 Qe4}  
9...\texttt{Qd5} – That move is not so purposeful, because it enables White to preserve the elasticity of his pawn-structure. 10.\texttt{Qd2 Qxc3}, E.Romanov – Vitiugov, Sochi 2006 and here White can avoid doubling his pawns with the help of the natural reaction: 11.\texttt{Qxc3}. After: 11...d5 12.a3 \texttt{Qxc3} 13.\texttt{Qxc3 Qa4} 14.\texttt{Qg4±} he has the two-bishop advantage and a powerful kingside pressure. In the variation: 11...0–0 12.\texttt{Qd3} d5 13.a3†, there arises a “French-type” pawn-structure, in which White has good attacking prospects and eventually a better endgame. He maintains strong pressure on the kingside after: 11...\texttt{Qb6} 12.\texttt{Qg4} 0–0 13.\texttt{Qd3} d6 14.\texttt{Qh3} h6 15.a3†

9...\texttt{a6} – This move leads to a better endgame for White almost by force. 10.\texttt{Qd6+ Qxd6} 11.\texttt{Qxd6 Qe4} 12.\texttt{Qd3 Qxc3} 13.\texttt{Qxc3 Qxc3+} 14.bxc3 f6 15.exf6 gxf6 16.c4±. White’s bishop pair more than compensates the defects of his pawn-structure. 16...d5 17.0–0–0 d4! – This is a wonderful idea! Black annihilates one of his opponent’s bishops at the price of a pawn. 18.\texttt{Qxd4} 18...\texttt{Qxd4} 19.\texttt{Qxd4 Qd7} 20.\texttt{Qe2 Qc8} 21.\texttt{Qf3 Qc7} 22. \texttt{Qd2±}. White will have problems materializing his extra pawn; nevertheless he is clearly better,
4. \( \text{d}x\text{d}4 \text{e}6 \) 5. \( \text{c}3 \text{c}7 \) 6. \( \text{a}3 \text{a}e3 \) 7. \( \text{f}6 \text{f}4 \\

Karjakin – Volokitin, Merida 2005. It also deserves attention for White to play the less greedy line: 18. \( \text{d}2 \text{e}5 \) 19. \( \text{d}3 \text{g}8 \) 20. \( \text{g}3 \)±\ with the idea to preserve his important bishop.

10. \( \text{d}3 \text{xc}3 \\

10... \text{f}5 – Now, Black reaches a position without any good prospects, because he will never manage to organize any effective counterplay. 11. \( \text{ex}f6 \text{xf}6 \) 12. \( \text{e}2 \text{e}5 \) 13. \( \text{d}2 \text{e}7 \), Man- nion – Conquest, Hastings 1992, 15. \( \text{d}d4 \)±

11. \( \text{bxc}3 \text{e}7 12. \text{g}3!? \\

This is a very interesting idea of GM E.Inarkiev. White develops his bishop to g2, with the idea to exert powerful pressure on the queenside.

\[ 
\]

12...0–0

12... \text{a}6?! – This move leads to a difficult position for Black. 13. \( \text{d}6+ \text{x}d6 \) 14. \( \text{ex}d6 \text{b}5 \) 15. \( \text{g}2 \text{b}7 \) 16.0–0 \( \text{a}4 \) (It is a disaster for Black to play: 16...0–0?! 17. \( \text{a}4 \)±, as well as: 16... \( \text{d}8 \)?! 17. \( \text{xb}7 \text{xb}7 \) 18. \( \text{a}4 \)±, since he will have great problems on the queenside.) 17. \( \text{b}6 \) – White is threatening to continue with the moves \( \text{fb}1, \text{a}3, \text{xc}6 \) and \( \text{b}4 \), trapping his opponent’s queen. 17...0–0 (It is very bad for Black to play: 17... \( \text{d}8 \)?! 18. \( \text{xb}7 \text{xb}7 \) 19. \( \text{f}3 \)–, it seems quite logical for him to try 17... \( \text{c}8 \) ?, but after: 18. \( \text{fb}1 \text{d}8 \) 19. \( \text{a}3 \text{c}4 \) 20. \( \text{c}7 \)± Black is almost beyond salvation, because in the endgame after: 20... \( \text{c}5+ \) 21. \( \text{d}4 \text{xd}4 \) 22. \( \text{cx}d4 \text{e}7 \), he will not manage to place his knight on the d5-square, in view of 23. \( \text{c}4 \). Now, Black loses immediately after: 23... \( \text{bxc}4 \) 24. \( \text{dx}e7 \)–, while after: 23... \( \text{f}5 \) 24. \( \text{ex}b5 \text{ax}b5 \) 25. \( \text{xb}5 \text{xd}4 \) 26. \( \text{a}4 \)±, he will hardly manage to survive for long.) 18. \( \text{fb}1 \) \( \text{ac}8 \) 19. \( \text{a}3 \)± \( \text{e}5 \), Inarkiev – Khalifman, Khanty-Mansiysk 2005 and here White obtains a huge advantage with the fantastic move – 20. \( \text{d}5 \)!! It would be very difficult to find it over the board, if at all... 20... \( \text{ex}f4 \) 21. \( \text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 \) 22. \( \text{b}4 \text{xb}6 \) (You can see the main idea of White’s move twenty in the variation: 22... \( \text{xd}6 \) 23. \( \text{xd}6 \text{xc}2 \) 24. \( \text{f}2 \text{xc}3 \) 25. \( \text{e}1 \text{f}3 \) and after 26. \( \text{xf}8 \)–, it becomes clear that the e-file is opened for White’s pieces.) 23. \( \text{xa}4 \text{bxa}4 \) 24. \( \text{gxf}4 \)± and the superiority of the queen over Black’s rook and bishop is quite obvious, although White’s victory is too far from being clear. (We have used the comments of N.Vitjugov.)

13. \( \text{g}2 \text{f}6 \) 14. \( \text{ex}f6 \text{xf}6 \) 15. 0–0 \( \text{d}5 \)
16.\texttt{ab1!}

This move seems to be much more energetic than 16.\texttt{fe1}, which was tried in the game Inarkiev – Vitiugov, Moscow 2006.

16...\texttt{a6 17.\texttt{d6 \texttt{xc3 18.\texttt{h3 d8 19.\texttt{xc3 xc3 20.\texttt{fd1 f6}}}}}

After: 20...\texttt{b5 21.\texttt{d3 f6 22.\texttt{xc8 xc8 23.\texttt{xd5 xc2 24.\texttt{d6 a5 25.bd1 e7 26.d7\texttt{xc8 White's active pieces compensate amply the sacrificed pawn, for example}}}}}

21.\texttt{c4 d4 22.\texttt{f2 h8, Gallagher - Pelletier, Lenzerheide 2006, Black's extra pawn is practically immaterial, since he has no moves at all. White should not be in a hurry to regain the pawn and after: 23.c5! \texttt{d7 24.b6\texttt{± Black might soon lose all his weak pawns – b7, d4 and e6.}}}

\textbf{Conclusion}

We have started analyzing in this chapter the Paulsen system, which begins with the move 5...\texttt{c7. White answers that with 6.e3, with the idea to prepare castling long as quickly as possible. He intends to deploy his pieces according to the scheme of the “English Attack” in the Sicilian Defence – e3, d2, 0–0–0, f3. Black plays 6...\texttt{f6 and he thus prevents that set-up, but he exposes himself to other dangerous lines. White's aggressive move – 7.f4 puts Black's choice of development to a serious test.}}

In variation a), we have analyzed Black's answer 7...\texttt{d6, which prevents mechanically the pawn-advance e4-e5, but in that case, there arises an unfavourable for Black line of the Scheveningen variation. In variation a1), Black tries to organize some counterplay on the queenside by playing 8...a6. Still, in a position with opposite sides castling, White dominates in the centre and his initiative develops faster.
than that of his opponent. The least of evils for Black seems to be the exchange in the centre – $\text{Nxd}4$, at an opportune moment, followed by $e6-e5$. In that case, Black must find a series of precise moves in order to enter an endgame, in which, despite the simplifications, his defence is not easy at all. In variation a2), Black saves a tempo for the move $a7-a6$, trying to complete the development of his kingside as quickly as possible. White needs then to waste a tempo for the preparation of his pawn-offensive on the kingside with the move 10.$\text{N}g1$, since in answer to 10.$g2-g4$, the above-mentioned exchange operation in the centre provides Black with a good game. After 10.$g1$, Black cannot obtain counter chances on the queenside without the move $a7-a6$ and that leads to unfavourable positions for him from variation a1). After 10 ...$\text{N}x\text{d}4$, followed by 11...$e5$, White maintains a slight, but stable advantage in the middle game.

In variation b), we deal with the contemporary aggressive line for Black – 7...$\text{N}b4$. He is ready to present his opponent with the two-bishop advantage, but he might create weak pawns for him on the queenside. In that variation, the idea of GM E.Inarkiev for White to develop his bishop on $g2$ is quite unpleasant for Black. White's pressure on the long diagonal is very effective, moreover that the defect of the doubled pawns on his queenside is more than compensated by the tremendous effect of the pressure on the semi-open $b$-file.
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1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)f3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)xd4 e6 5.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 6.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 a6

That is the most often played move for Black. He covers the b5-square from the possible attacks of White's knights and he prepares his standard counterplay on the queenside.

7.\textit{W}d2 b5!?  
This move is logical, but it is less popular than 7...\textit{e}f6, which we will analyze in the following chapters. Black is trying to create some counterplay on the queenside and he plans to develop his kingside only later.

About 7...\textit{e}e7 8.0–0–0 \textit{d}f6 9.f3 – see 7...\textit{f}f6 8.0–0–0 \textit{e}e7 9.f3, Chapter 12.

7...\textit{g}ge7?? – That is a typical blunder. Black has protected the b5-square with his previous move indeed, but White's attack there still works after: 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)b5! axb5 9.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)xb5 \textit{e}e5 (Black loses even quicker after: 9...\textit{a}a5 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6+ \(\textit{d}\)d8 11.\textit{x}xa5+ \textit{d}xa5 12.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)b6# Tarantin – Subkov, Sverdlovsk 1972.) 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6+ \textit{d}xd6 11.\textit{d}xd6 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5 12.\textit{g}g3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)db4 13.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3+– White has an overwhelming material advantage.

7...h6?!, Vitis – Carvallo, Santiago 1994, – This is a loss of time and it also creates a target for White's future actions on the kingside: 8.0–0–0 \textit{d}f6 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b1+

7...\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b4 8.a3 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7 (The other possibilities are not better for Black: 8...\textit{a}a5 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b3 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b6, Makuch – Halasz, Slovakia 1997, 10.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)xb6 \textit{d}xb6 11.\textit{g}g5± and he must either weaken his kingside, or he would lose his castling rights. After: 8...\textit{a}a5 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)xc3, T.Ruck – Gyorkos, Hungary 2006, the quiet line: 10.\textit{x}xa5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)xd2+ 11.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)xd2± provides White with a slight, but stable advantage thanks to his two bishops.) 9.f4 – It is too risky for White to castle long, while his opponent's pawn is on d7, since then Black will advance his b-pawn, exploiting the drawbacks of the move – 8.a3. White there-
4. \( \text{d}xd4 \) e6 5. \( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{c}c7 \) 6. \( \text{e}3 \) a6 7. \( \text{d}d2 \)

fore tries to make use of the move – a3. 9...d6 10.0-0-0 0f6 11.e2 8b8 12.g4 b5 13.g5 \( \text{d}d7 \), S.Farago – Yeke, Budapest 2003 and here after: 14.\( \text{x} \)xc6 \( \text{xc} \)6 15.\( \text{d} \)d4 0-0 16.f5† White is clearly ahead of his opponent in creating threats.

7...\( \text{e} \)e5 – Black plays that move with the idea to obtain the two-bishop advantage, but White has an overwhelming lead in development. 8.0-0-0 0f6 (About 8...b5 9.f4 – see 7...b5 8.0-0-0 \( \text{e} \)e5 9.f4; as for 8...\( \text{b} \)b4 9.\( \text{b} \)b3 0f6 10.f3 – see 7...0f6 8.0-0-0 \( \text{b} \)b4 9.f3 \( \text{e} \)e5 10.\( \text{b} \)b3.) 9.f4! – That is the most energetic line for White.

7...b5 10.\( \text{x} \)xc4 \( \text{xc} \)4 11.e5 \( \text{d} \)d5 12.\( \text{d} \)xd5 \( \text{x} \)xd5 13.b1 and White obtains an obvious lead in development. His task now is to create swiftly threats along the d and f-files. 13...b5 14.\( \text{w} \)f2 \( \text{b} \)b7 15.\( \text{w} \)f3 \( \text{w} \)c6 16.\( \text{d} \)d3† White’s initiative develops with natural moves and Black’s defence becomes more and more difficult. 16...b4 17.\( \text{h} \)hd1 \( \text{c} \)c8 18.f5† White starts his decisive attack, meanwhile Black’s only active piece is his queen. 18...\( \text{e} \)e7 19.\( \text{f} \)f6 \( \text{g} \)xf6 20.\text{exf6} \( \text{xf} \)6 21.\( \text{g} \)g5 \( \text{x} \)xg5 22.\( \text{x} \)xg5+– Black was helpless against White’s attack on the dark squares and the game was soon over, Topalov – Ljubojevic, Monaco 2003.

Or 7...\( \text{x} \)xd4 8.\( \text{x} \)xd4 \( \text{e} \)e7 (about 8...b5 9.0-0-0 – see 7...b5 8.0-0-0 0xd4 9.\( \text{x} \)xd4 9.0-0-0 \( \text{c} \)c6 (about 9...b5 10.\( \text{b} \)b1 – see 7...b5 8.0-0-0 0xd4 9.\( \text{x} \)xd4 0e7 10.\( \text{b} \)b1) 10.\( \text{e} \)e3 0e7, Z.Andriasian – Andreikin, Budva 2003 (about 10...b5 11.\( \text{b} \)b1 – see 7...b5 8.0-0-0 0xd4 9.\( \text{x} \)xd4 \( \text{e} \)e7 10.\( \text{b} \)b1 \( \text{c} \)c6 11.\( \text{e} \)e3) and here White obtains a powerful initiative by advancing his rook-pawn. 11.h4 b5 12.h5†

7...d6 8.0-0-0 \( \text{d} \)d7 (about 8...\( \text{w} \)f6 9.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation; after: 8...b5 9.\( \text{xc} \)c6 \( \text{xc} \)6, Stockfleth – Saltaev, Hamburg 1991, it deserves attention for White to follow with: 10.e5 d5 11.\( \text{e} \)e2† and he has a powerful initiative in that “French”- type pawn-structure, thanks to his lead in development.) 9.f3 \( \text{e} \)e7, Sonter – Davidovic, Australia 1999. Now, it is reasonable for White to impede the development of Black’s kingside with the move – 10.g4†

8.0-0-0 White is not afraid of his opponent’s threats on the queenside.

Black usually answers that with: a) 8...\( \text{x} \)xd4, or b) 8...b4.

About 8...\( \text{f} \)f6 9.\( \text{f} \)f4 – see 7...\( \text{f} \)f6 8.0-0-0 b5 9.\( \text{f} \)f4; as for 8...d6 9.\( \text{xc} \)c6 – see 7...d6 8.0-0-0 b5 9.\( \text{xc} \)c6.
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He has tried in practice some other moves too:

8...b7? – That possibility enables White to either repel Black's queen from its ideal position, or to obtain useful outposts in the centre. 9.f4 c8 (It is a disaster for Black to play: 9...e5? 10.dxe5 axb5 11.fxe5+- and White regains his knight, due to the vulnerability of Black’s d7-pawn. After: 9...d6 10.xc6 xc6 11.xd6 d8 12.e5 xe6 13.exd6 f6 14.d4 0-0 15.e2 d7 16.f3 White remains with a solid extra pawn. 9...e5 10.xc6 xc6, Shomoev – J.Geller, Krasnodar 2002 – It is not better for Black to try: 10... dxc6? 11.xc5+-, while after: 10... exf4 11.d4!? b4 12.f5 f6 13.d4± White is dominant in the centre. 11.d5! b8 12.g3=) 10.f3 f6 11.b3 h6 12.h4 b4 13.a3 a7, Leko – Jlubojevic, Monaco 2003 and here it looks logical for White to continue his kingside actions with 14.g4, without being afraid of Black’s queenside counterplay: 14...b4 15.axb4 axb4 16.d6 a5 (16...xd6 17.xd6 b8 18.c5=) 17.xb4 axb4 18.b5± Black’s counterplay failed and he ended up with weak dark squares in the centre.

8...b4 – Black can hardly make use of the pin in this line. 9.xc6 xc6 10.d4 f6 11.e5 b7? (Or 11...fxe5 12.xe5 f6 13.g5 0-0 14.d3 xc3! 15.xc3 d6 16.f4± White has a stable advantage, because of his two powerful bishops and the possibility to create some pressure against Black’s hanging pawns in the centre.) 12.e2 0-0 13.f3 c7 14.e3 xf3 15.xf3 c6 16.xc6+ dx6 17.e4± – Black has numerous weaknesses on the queenside, he lags in development and he cannot complete it without creating weaknesses on the kingside as well, Fogarasi – Kovacs, Hungary 2002;

8...e5 – This move is a bit premature, because now Black has problems getting rid of the pin. 9.f4 b4 (About 9...f6 – see 7...f6 8.0-0 b5 9.f4 e5; 9...d6?! – this logical move allows White to sacrifice a piece quite dangerously for Black. 10.xb5+ axb5 11.xb5 – and here Black is in trouble, no matter where he retreats his queen: 11...c5? 12.b4 b6 13.c4, now Black loses after: 13...b7 14.c7+ e7 15.xe5 dxe5 16.f5+ f6 17.f4 h6 18.h4++, as well as following: 13...b8 14.xe5 d7 15.xe6--; it is not any better for Black to try: 11...b7 12.xe5 dxe5 13.f5 b6 14.bd6+ xd6 15.xd6+ f8 16.c4 b5 – or 16...xa2 17.b1++ – 17.d8+ e8 18.b6 xa2 19.b1++ and White regains his piece, remaining with an extra pawn and superior development; 11...b8 – That is the most resilient defence for Black. 12.c3! – After the seemingly attractive line for White: 12.xe5 d7! 13.xe6 xe6 14.d6+
4. \( \text{dxd4} \) \( e6 \) 5. \( \text{cxc3} \) \( \text{wc7} \) 6. \( \text{exe5} \) \( a6 \) 7. \( \text{wd2} \)

\( \text{xd6} \) 15. \( \text{xd6} \)\+ his advantage is only minimal – 12...\( e7 \) 13. \( \text{c7}+\) \( \text{xf8} \) 14. \( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{xa8} \) 15. \( \text{exe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 16. \( \text{c6} \)\+ Now, White not only has a great lead in development, but he has a material advantage too.)

10. \( \text{ce2} \) \( \text{f6} \) 11. \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 12. \( \text{gxf3} \) \( \text{a5} \) 13. \( \text{b1} \) \( d5 \), Saldano Dayer – Rodriguez Guerrero, Mancha Real 2001 and here it deserves attention for White to play the aggressive line: 14. \( \text{d4} \)!? \( \text{b7} \) (Black loses after the greedy attempt: 14...\( \text{dxe4} \)? 15. \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{xb5} \) 16. \( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 17. \( \text{dxd7}+\) \( \text{e7} \) 18. \( \text{d6}+\) \( \text{d8} \) 19. \( \text{a6} \)\+–) 15. \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{a4} \) (It is not better for Black to try: 15...\( \text{b6} \) 16. \( \text{c5} \)\+ \( \text{g5} !? \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 17. \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 18. \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e7} \) (After 18...\( \text{exf3} \) 19. \( \text{he1} \)– White has a powerful attack against Black’s king, stranded in the centre, for example: 19...\( \text{e7} \) 20. \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 21. \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{f7} \) 22. \( \text{xe7}+\) \( \text{xe7} \) 23. \( \text{d6}+\) \( \text{f7} \) 24. \( \text{c7}+\) \( \text{f8} \) 25. \( \text{xb7} \)\+ The coordination of Black’s pieces has been disrupted and his king has no safe shelter; after: 18...\( \text{c8} \) 19. \( \text{a5} \) \( \text{c6} \) 20. \( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{a8} \) 21. \( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 22. \( \text{e2}+\) Black’s badly protected king will come under attack.) 19. \( \text{h6} \) \( \text{c6} \) (or 19...\( \text{e3} \) 20. \( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 21. \( \text{e2}+\)\) 20. \( \text{a5} \) \( \text{c7} \) 21. \( \text{g7} \) \( \text{f8} \) 22. \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xc4} \) (After 22...\( \text{xb7} \) 23. \( \text{hx7} \)\+ Black’s king remains in the centre and it stands in the way of his piece-coordination.) 23. \( \text{a5} \) \( \text{b5} \) 24. \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{exf3} \) 25. \( \text{hx7} \)\+)

White has an excellent compensation for the pawn thanks to his outside passed h-pawn and his better coordination of pieces;

8...\( \text{e7} \), Mongontuul – Lanchava, Bled 2002, this move enables White to obtain a huge lead in development: 9. \( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{dxc6} \) (After 9...\( \text{xc6} \) 10. \( \text{e5} \)\+ Black has problems developing his kingside.) 10. \( \text{e5} \)\+ White has a powerful initiative due to his superior development. For example: 10...\( \text{f6} \) 11. \( \text{e2} \) \( b4 ? ! \) 12. \( \text{a4}+\)\+ 11...\( \text{exe5} \) 12. \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 13. \( \text{e4} \)\+ 10...\( \text{exe5} \) 11. \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g5} \) 12. \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 13. \( \text{g4}+\) and the lack of coordination of Black’s pieces is quite evident in all the variations.

a) 8...\( \text{dxd4} !? \)

This line is too slow, but it requires energetic play from White.

9. \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{e7} \)

In answer to 9...\( \text{b8} \), Kazhgaleyev – Kobalia, Internet 2004, it deserves attention for White to occupy the centre: 10. \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 11. \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{f5} \) 12. \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 13. \( \text{xd4}+\) and his centralized pieces and obvious lead in development provide him with superior prospects, for example: 13...\( \text{b6} \) (but not 13...
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9...\(\texttt{b7}\) 10.\(f3\) \(\texttt{gb6}\), Valerga – Duarte, Villa Martelli 2004 (After: 10...\(\texttt{c8}\) 11.\(g4\) \(d6\) 12.\(\texttt{b1}\) \(\texttt{f6}\) 13.a3 \(\texttt{d7}\), Topalov – Lautier, Amsterdam 1995, White maintains a powerful initiative with the move 14.\(\texttt{gf2}\); in answer to 10...\(\texttt{e7}\), White can exchange favourably the dark-squared bishops: 11.\(\texttt{e5}\) \(\texttt{c6}\) 12.\(\texttt{d6}\) \(\texttt{g6}\) 13.\(\texttt{xf8}\) \(\texttt{xf8}\) 14.\(\texttt{d4}\); it is hardly any better for Black to try: 12...\(\texttt{c8}\) 13.\(\texttt{xf8}\) \(\texttt{xf8}\) 14.e5 \(\texttt{f6}\) 15.\(\texttt{exf6}\) \(\texttt{xf6}\) and his h7-pawn is weak, just like his centre; meanwhile Black lags in development too, Zulaika Centeno – Manso Marquez, San Sebastian 2006.) and now White can obtain an advantage in space and a powerful initiative with: 11.e5 \(\texttt{d5}\) 12.\(\texttt{e4}\) \(\texttt{e7}\) (After: 12...\(\texttt{d4}\) 13.\(\texttt{d6}\)+ \(\texttt{xd6}\) 14.\(\texttt{exd6}\) \(\texttt{xd6}\) 15.a3 \(\texttt{c6}\) 16.\(\texttt{xf7}\) \(\texttt{xf2}\)+ 17.\(\texttt{xd2}\) \(\texttt{g8}\) 18.\(\texttt{f6}\)+ White's bishop-pair provides him with excellent chances, despite Black's mobile pawn-centre, for example: 18...\(\texttt{g6}\) 19.\(\texttt{c3}\) \(d5\) 20.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(f5\) 21.\(\texttt{e2}\)+, or 20...\(\texttt{h6}\) 21.\(\texttt{g7}\)+ 13.\(\texttt{b1}\)+ and now after the most natural move 13...0–0, Black has great difficulties: 14.\(\texttt{xf6}\)+ \(\texttt{xf6}\) (After: 14...\(\texttt{gx}f6\) 15.\(\texttt{exf6}\) \(\texttt{xf6}\) 16.\(\texttt{xf6}\) \(\texttt{xf4}\) 17.\(\texttt{xf4}\) \(\texttt{xf4}\) 18.\(\texttt{f4}\)+) White only needs to play accurately. Black's position is very difficult too if he does not capture the knight – 14...\(\texttt{h8}\) 15.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(h6\) 16.c3± and he has no active play; meanwhile White is well-prepared to begin his kingside pawn-offensive.) 15.\(\texttt{xf6}\) \(\texttt{xf6}\) (Black loses immediately after: 15...\(\texttt{gx}f6\) 16.\(\texttt{wh6}\) \(\texttt{e5}\) 17.\(\texttt{d3}\)+–) 16.\(\texttt{xf6}\) \(\texttt{gx}f6\) 17.\(\texttt{h6}\) \(f5\) (or 17...\(\texttt{ac8}\) 18.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(f5\) 19.g4±) 18.g4! \(f6\) (After 18...\(\texttt{xf6}\) 19.\(\texttt{gx}f5\)+– White checkmates.) 19.\(\texttt{gx}f5\)+ White's king is much safer in that position and that provides him with better chances.

10.\(\texttt{b1}\)

That is the most popular move, but it is also interesting for White to try the original line: 10.h4!? \(\texttt{c6}\) 11.\(\texttt{e3}\) \(\texttt{b8}\) (or 11...\(\texttt{b4}\) 12.\(\texttt{a4}\)±) 12.h5 \(\texttt{b4}\) 13.\(\texttt{a4}\) \(\texttt{a5}\) 14.b3± – and it is unclear how Black can organize anything active, while White's kingside offensive is just starting, Shomoev – Pelletier, Warsaw 2005.

10...\(\texttt{c6}\) 11.\(\texttt{e3}\)

11...\(\texttt{e5}\)

Black plays too many moves with one and a same piece, there-
4. $\text{d}4 \text{e}6 5. $\text{d}c3 \text{c}7 6. $\text{e}3 \text{a}6 7. $\text{d}2$

before he comes under attack, but even after: $11.\text{b}8 12.\text{f}4 \text{b}4$, Korneev – Barlov, Spain 1998 (In answer to 12...d6, Vuckovic – Pe­ runovic, Kopaonik 2005, White obtains a strong initiative after: $13.\text{d}3 \text{e}7 14.\text{e}2 0–0 15.\text{h}4\uparrow$, here it deserves attention for White to follow with: $13.\text{h}4! 0–0 14.\text{f}5!\uparrow$, or $13.\text{a}5 14.\text{h}5 \text{xc}3 15.\text{xc}3 \text{xc}3 16.\text{xc}3 \text{b}7 17.\text{h}6\uparrow$ and he has powerful pressure in that endgame, because of his ex­ cellent bishop pair.

12.\text{f}4 \text{c}4 13.\text{xc}4 \text{xc}4 14. \text{d}4 \text{f}6 15.\text{g}4!

White can transfer his lead in development into something real only with energetic play; otherwise his opponent’s couple of bishops might create some problems for him.

15...\text{e}7 16.\text{g}5 0–0 17.b3!

White repels Black’s queen to a less favourable placement.

17.\text{c}6 18.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 19. \text{h}1 \text{b}4

Now, White is just forced to play super aggressively. Black’s defence is without any good prospects after: 19...\text{xd}4 20.\text{xd}4 \text{xf}7 21.\text{d}3\uparrow

20.\text{d}5!!→

White usually sacrifices that piece in the Sicilian Defence in order to keep his opponent’s king in the centre.

20...\text{exd}5 21.\text{e}5 \text{e}7

The other possible retreat is not better for Black: 21...\text{d}8 22.e6 \text{f}6 (Black would not save his king either after: 22...g6 23.f5 \text{xf}5 24.\text{h}6 \text{f}6 25.gf1+) 23. \text{f}5 \text{h}6 24.\text{g}7+! What follows is practically forced: 24...\text{xe}7 25.\text{g}1+ \text{f}8 26.\text{g}6 \text{xf}5 27.\text{g}7+ \text{e}8 28.\text{g}6+ \text{e}7 29.\text{xf}5 \text{xe}6 30.\text{c}5+ \text{d}6 31.\text{h}7+

22.e6

The a1-h8 diagonal has been opened and Black’s queenside pieces are incapable of helping in the defence of the king.

22...\text{f}6

This seems to be the most re­ silient line for Black.

He loses quickly after the desperate variation: 22...g5!? 23. \text{xe}5 \text{xe}6 24.g6+-; it is equally bad for him to try: 22...\text{f}6 23.e7! \text{e}8 24.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 25.\text{xd}5+ \text{h}8 26.\text{xa}8+-

Still, in the line: 22...g6 23.f5! \text{xf}5 24.\text{h}6 \text{f}6! 25.gf1 dxe6!, that is the only move for Black. (He loses quickly after the other possibilities: 25...\text{xe}6 26.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 27.\text{de}1 \text{g}7 28.\text{h}4+, or 25...\text{f}8 26.e7 \text{xe}7 27.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 28.\text{e}1+) 26.\text{xf}6 \text{f}8! 27.\text{f}4±

Black has two pawns for the ex­ change and despite his vulnerable dark squares and his lag in devel-
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opment; he can still offer some resistance.

23.f5 dxe6

It is hardly better for Black to continue with: 23...h6 24.\textit{exg7}+ $\textit{hxg7}$ 25.$\textit{g1}$+ $\textit{f8}$ 26.$\textit{g2}$ $\textit{e8}$ 27.$\textit{xf6}$ $\textit{xf6}$ 28.$\textit{g8}$+ $\textit{e7}$ 29. $\textit{f7}$+ $\textit{d6}$, because after that forced line, White only needs to make two precise moves in order to win that position: 30.e7! $\textit{c3}$ (or 30... $\textit{c7}$) 31.e8\textit{g}!! –

24. $\textit{exg7}$+!

This is a standard sacrifice, but still it is very beautiful and it destroys the pawn-shelter of Black's king.

24...$\textit{hxg7}$ 25.$\textit{d5}$+ $\textit{f7}$ 26. $\textit{g1}$ $\textit{f8}$

White wins too after: 26... $\textit{e8}$ 27.$\textit{xf6}$ $\textit{xf6}$ 28.$\textit{xf6}$ $\textit{d7}$ 29.$\textit{g7}$+ $\textit{d6}$ 30.$\textit{e7}$+ $\textit{e5}$ 31. $\textit{xe6}$ $\textit{g5}$+! $\textit{e4}$ 33.a4!! – That is a wonderful move and its main purpose is prophylactic against the perpetual check. In case Black captures the pawn, his queen is defenseless – 33... $\textit{bxa}$ 34. $\textit{hxh7}$+ $\textit{e3}$ (or 34... $\textit{d4}$ 35.$\textit{g7}$+–) 35.$\textit{h3}$+–

29.\textit{f6e}6+– Black is incapable of protecting his king without huge material losses. 29... $\textit{e7}$ (The game ends spectacularly after: 29... $\textit{exe6}$ 30.$\textit{xf8}$+ $\textit{xf8}$ 31.$\textit{xe6}$+ $\textit{d8}$ 32.$\textit{xb}$6#; 31... $\textit{e7}$ 32.$\textit{xc6}$+–) 30.$\textit{h6}$ $\textit{b8}$ (or 30... $\textit{exe6}$ 31.$\textit{xf8}$+) 31.$\textit{f6}$ $\textit{xe6}$ 32.$\textit{xf8}$+ $\textit{d7}$ 33.$\textit{g7}$+ $\textit{c6}$ 34.$\textit{e5}$ $\textit{b7}$ 35.$\textit{h8}$ 1–0 Short – Pogorelov, Catalan Bay 2004.

b) 8...$b$4

Black repels White's knight at the edge of the board, but it is quite well-placed there as well.

9.$\textit{e4}$ $\textit{f6}$


27.$\textit{xf6}$+ $\textit{e8}$ 28.$\textit{g8}$ $\textit{d6}$
good compensation for it in the endgame.

10. \textit{f3} \textit{e5}

10...\textit{b8?} – Black loses the exchange and he falls behind in development. 11.\textit{f4} \textit{e5} 12.\textit{xe5} \textit{xe5} 13.\textit{c6}+– M. Petrov – Semkov, Bulgaria 1995.

In answer to 10...\textit{b7}, Kubacsny – Los, Hungary 1995, White should better bring his knight closer to the centre with: 11.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 12.\textit{b6} \textit{d8} 13.\textit{c4}± and now he is threatening to capture Black's dark-squared bishop with \textit{d6}+, while in case of: 13...\textit{d5} 14.\textit{a5} \textit{c7} 15.\textit{xb7} \textit{xb7} 16.\textit{d3}± White remains with a couple of bishops and better development.

Following 10...\textit{e7}, Wagner – Blaich, Germany 1993, it is again advisable for White to bring his knight to b6 – 11.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} (It is worse for Black to play: 11...\textit{dxc6} 12.\textit{b6} \textit{b8} 13.\textit{c4}±, because his weak queenside pawns will hardly help him to obtain any active counterplay.) 12.\textit{b6} \textit{b8} 13.\textit{d4} 0–0 (White should not be afraid of 13...\textit{e5} 14.\textit{c4} 14.e5 \textit{d8} 15.\textit{exf6} \textit{xb6} 16.\textit{d2}± and White has a powerful initiative, while Black cannot organize any counterplay, for example: 16...\textit{e5}?! (After: 16...\textit{xe3} 17.\textit{xe3} \textit{gx6} 18.\textit{d4}→ Black's king is defenseless, while in the variation: 16...\textit{d5} 17.\textit{fg7} \textit{xd2}+ 18.\textit{xd2} \textit{g7} 19.\textit{xb4}± White remains with a solid extra pawn.) 17.\textit{fg7} \textit{e8} 18.\textit{d3}±

11.\textit{b3} \textit{b8} 12.\textit{f2}

12...\textit{e7}

In answer to 12...\textit{d5}, Erdogdu – Mastrovasilis, Thessaloníki 2001, it is sensible for White to worsen the placement of Black's rook – 13.\textit{a7} \textit{a8} 14.\textit{d4}. Now, Black has problems defending against White's threats, since he lags in development and his king is stranded in the centre. The central files might be opened at any moment, for example: 14...\textit{ed7} 15.\textit{b6} \textit{xb6} 16.\textit{xb6} \textit{c6} 17.\textit{a5} \textit{a4} 18.\textit{c4}!± – Black can evacuate his king only at the price of a pawn: 14...\textit{c4} 15.\textit{b1} \textit{e7} 16.\textit{exd5} \textit{exd5} (It is not better for Black to try: 16...\textit{xd5} 17.\textit{xg7} \textit{bg8} 18.\textit{d4}±) 17.\textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 18.\textit{xd5}± and White remains with a solid extra pawn; 14...\textit{d6} – This move seems to be the most logical for Black. 15.\textit{b6} \textit{b8} 16.\textit{exd5} \textit{xd5} (After: 16...\textit{exd5} 17.\textit{xc8} \textit{xc8} 18.\textit{xa6} \textit{b8} 19.f4± Black has no compensation for the pawn, since his king remains endangered in the centre.) 17.\textit{xc8} \textit{xc8} (It is even worse for Black to play: 17...\textit{xc8} 18.\textit{e2}±) 18.\textit{xa6} \textit{b8}
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19.\text{\texttt{\textbf{x}e5 \texttt{\textbf{x}e5}} 20.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}5}} and now the queens are exchanged and White preserves good chances to materialize his extra pawn in the endgame.

12...d6 – Now, Black’s rook is forced to occupy a less active square. 13.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\textbf{a}7}} \texttt{a8}} 14.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}4}} \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}d7}} 15.\texttt{\texttt{b6}} \texttt{b8} (After: 15...\texttt{x}b6 16.\texttt{x}b6 \texttt{e}6 17.\texttt{\texttt{a}5} \texttt{a4} 18.\texttt{\texttt{b}1}± Black’s queen is terribly misplaced and he is behind in development.) 16.\texttt{\texttt{c}8} \texttt{c8}, Ibarra Jerez – Antoli Royo, Lorca 2003 and here after: 17.\texttt{\texttt{b}1} \texttt{c}6 18.\texttt{\texttt{c}3} a5 19.\texttt{\texttt{d}2} a4 20.\texttt{\texttt{c}4}± Black loses his d6-pawn.

13.\texttt{\texttt{a}7} \texttt{b7}

13...\texttt{e}8 – Here, Black’s rook is placed much worse, because he loses the control over the b6-square. 14.\texttt{\texttt{d}4} 0–0 15.f4 \texttt{c}6 16.\texttt{b6} \texttt{b8} 17.e5 \texttt{d}5 18.\texttt{c}5 a5 (It looks more reliable for Black to opt for: 18...\texttt{\texttt{c}5} 19.\texttt{\texttt{b}xc}5 f6 20.exf6 \texttt{xf6} 21.g3±) 19.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{x}c5 20.\texttt{\texttt{b}xc}5 \texttt{c}e7 21.\texttt{\texttt{e}4} Black has difficulties parrying White’s active pieces. 21...\texttt{a}6 22.\texttt{\texttt{d}5} \texttt{\texttt{d}5} 23.d6 f6 24.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}d}5}± That is an excellent resource for the development of White’s initiative. His light pieces are very active, contrary to Black’s passive rooks. 24...\texttt{\texttt{e}d}5 25.\texttt{\texttt{c}5} fxe5 26.\texttt{\texttt{b}6}!+ \texttt{\texttt{a}7} 27.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}5}exf}4 28.\texttt{\texttt{e}1}± White’s centralized knights are dominating over all Black’s pieces. 28...f3 29.gxf3 \texttt{a}8 30.\texttt{\texttt{d}4} \texttt{a}7, Shirov – Kogan, Birmingham 2005 and here the quickest road to victory for White is: 31.\texttt{\texttt{b}6} \texttt{ad}8 32.\texttt{\texttt{e}7} \texttt{f}6 33.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}5}}+ \texttt{e}6 34.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}6}+ dxe}6 35.\texttt{\texttt{a}7}+–

14.\texttt{\texttt{d}4} 0–0

It is just a transposition of moves after: 14...d6 15.\texttt{\texttt{b}6} \texttt{b8} 16.\texttt{\texttt{c}8} \texttt{c8} 17.\texttt{\texttt{b}1} 0–0 18.f4 – see 14...0–0.

15.\texttt{\texttt{b}1} d6 16.\texttt{\texttt{b}6} \texttt{b8} 17.\texttt{\texttt{c}8} \texttt{c8}

Short – Kogan, Santo Domingo 2002. It is obvious that White must begin his kingside offensive in the diagrammed position. It seems very promising for him to try: 18.f4 \texttt{\texttt{d}7} (Black loses a pawn after his other possibilities without any sufficient compensation: 18...\texttt{\texttt{f}g}4 19.\texttt{\texttt{f}3} e5 20.h3±; 18...\texttt{\texttt{g}6} 19.\texttt{\texttt{xf}6} \texttt{xf6} 20.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}6}±}; 18...\texttt{\texttt{c}6} 19.\texttt{\texttt{xf}6} \texttt{xf6} 20.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}6}±}) 19.e5 \texttt{\texttt{e}4} (That is an attempt by Black to fortify his position in the centre. His other possible plan is connected with the line: 19...dxe5 20.fxe5 \texttt{d}4 21.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}3}} \texttt{\texttt{d}d}5 – but after 21...\texttt{\texttt{c}5} 22.\texttt{\texttt{a}5}± the vulnerability of the c6-square is very troublesome for Black – 22.\texttt{\texttt{d}3}! \texttt{x}d3 23.cxd3 \texttt{g}5 24.\texttt{\texttt{g}4} h6 25.h4±, and Black’s knight will be

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isolated from the play for long, or 20...\texttt{d}d5 21.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{a}a8 22.\texttt{d}d2 a5 23.\texttt{e}e4\pm 20.\texttt{w}e3! White takes the c5-square under control. (It is less precise for him to play: 20.\texttt{w}f3 d5 21.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{d}dc5 22.g4 a5! 23.f5 a4 24.\texttt{c}xc5 \texttt{xc}5 25.\texttt{x}xe4 dxe4 26.\texttt{w}xe4 \texttt{b}3, because Black obtains excellent counterplay.) 20...d5 21.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{dc}5 (In case Black tries the risky move – 21...a5, White can simply capture that pawn: 22.\texttt{x}xe4 dxe4 23.\texttt{c}xa5 \texttt{a}6 24.\texttt{b}b3 \texttt{a}8 25.\texttt{c}c1\pm) 22.g4 \texttt{e}e8. That prophylactic is just forced for Black. (Otherwise, he would hardly manage to protect his g7-square in many variations, for example: 22...a5 23.\texttt{c}xc5 \texttt{xc}5 24.f5 \texttt{xd}3 25.f6++; it is also bad for Black to play: 23...\texttt{c}xc5 24.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{xd}4 25.\texttt{x}h7+ \texttt{x}h7 26.\texttt{x}xd4\pm. White obtains a stable advantage after the other lines for Black: 22...\texttt{xb}3 23.\texttt{xb}3 a5 24.\texttt{xe}4 dxe4 25.\texttt{xe}4\pm, or 22...\texttt{c}c7 23.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{xc}5 24.f5\pm) 23.\texttt{h}h3 (White eyes the h7-square with that move and now Black’s possibilities are considerably restricted, since his knight on e4 is static.) 23...\texttt{c}c7 (In the variation: 23...\texttt{c}6 24.\texttt{c}xc5 \texttt{xc}5 25.\texttt{xe}4 dxe4 26.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{x}d4 27.\texttt{x}d4 \texttt{ed}8 28.\texttt{hd}1 \texttt{xd}4 29.\texttt{x}d4 \texttt{b}b5 30.b3\pm Black is incapable of protecting his pawn, since it is isolated from the rest of his forces.) 24.\texttt{c}c5 \texttt{xc}5 25.\texttt{xe}4 dxe4 26.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{xd}4 27.\texttt{x}d4 \texttt{ed}8 28.\texttt{hd}1\pm. White dominates in the centre and he has good chances to realize his material advantage.

Conclusion

With the exception of the move – 7...\texttt{f}6, which is analyzed in the next chapters, we have dealt in this chapter with all sensible seventh moves for Black. The most logical seems to be – 7...\texttt{b}5. He prepares his queenside counterplay, delaying his piece-development. After the natural move 8.0–0–0, Black has two main lines: a) 8...\texttt{xd}4, or b) 8...\texttt{b}4. In variation a), Black falls behind considerably in his development and that enables White to organize a powerful attack. It is practically impossible to memorize all concrete moves in the main line of the variation, but that is hardly necessary. After 20.\texttt{d}d5!! White’s attack develops in a quite natural fashion. In variation b), White has a powerful initiative, thanks to his advantage in the centre. It is worth noticing the maneuver \texttt{e}3-a7-d4, with the help of which White forces his opponent’s rook to either occupy the not so favourable b7-square, or to go back to a8.
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1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}c6\) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\(\text{\&}xd4\) e6 5.\(\text{\&}c3\) \(\text{\&}c7\) 6.\(\text{\&}e3\) a6 7.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}f6\)

This is Black’s most natural and strongest move – his knight joins in the fight for the centre.

8.0–0–0

In this position Black’s preferred choice usually is 8...\(\text{\&}b4\) (see the following chapters) as well as a) 8...\(\text{\&}b5\) and b) 8...\(\text{\&}e7\).

About 8...d6 9.f3 – see the Scheveningen variation.

The other possibilities for Black are rarely played; nevertheless, White’s task is not easy after them at all:

8...\(\text{\&}e5\) 9.f4! – This is his most energetic move. 9...\(\text{\&}c4\) 10.\(\text{\&}xc4\) \(\text{\&}xc4\) 11.e5 \(\text{\&}d5\) 12.\(\text{\&}xd5\) \(\text{\&}xd5\) 13.\(\text{\&}b1\) (White has a great lead in development and his aim is to create threats rapidly along the d and f-files.) 13...b5 14.\(\text{\&}f2\) \(\text{\&}b7\) 15.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}c6\) 16.\(\text{\&}d3\)↑ White’s initiative develops with natural moves and Black’s defence is difficult. 16...b4 17.\(\text{\&}hd1\) \(\text{\&}c8\) 18.f5→ White’s attack is becoming decisive, since Black has only his queen in action. 18...\(\text{\&}ce7\) 19.f6 gxf6 20.exf6 \(\text{\&}xf6\) 21.\(\text{\&}g5\) \(\text{\&}xg5\) 22.\(\text{\&}xg5\)+ White’s dark squares were practically defenseless and the game was quickly over, Topalov – Ljubojevic, Monaco 2003;

8...\(\text{\&}g4?!\) – Black plays tactically, ignoring his lag in development. 9.\(\text{\&}f4\) e5 (The drawbacks of that move are obvious – Black weakens squares along the d-file, but his alternatives are not any better: 9...\(\text{\&}ge5\) 10.\(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}xd4\) 11. \(\text{\&}xd4\) f6 12.f4 \(\text{\&}c5\) 13.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}f7\) 14.e5 f5 15.\(\text{\&}f2\) \(\text{\&}xf2\) 16.\(\text{\&}xf2\) b5. That practically forced play has led to a position in which Black’s king is stranded in the centre and his knight on f7 is too passive. Still, he intends to complete soon his development, so White must play energetically: 17.g4!? – He sacrifices a pawn and he wins tempi in order to create tactical threats. 17...fxg4 18.h3 \(\text{\&}b7\) 19.\(\text{\&}g2\) g3. Black has here a more princi-
pled variation, but it has not been tested in practice yet – 19...gxh3 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}exh3 b4 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}e8 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}hd3 and the pressure along the d-file and the superior piece-coordination more than compensate White’s pawn-sacrifice. Black cannot simplify the position with: 22...\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe4 23.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c4 24.\textit{\textvisiblespace}g2 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xa2 25.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xd7, since he has failed to castle, his kingside pawns are weak, while all White’s pieces are in action and Black’s knight and rook on h8 will remain isolated for long. 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xg3 b4 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e2 g5 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xb7 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xb7 23.\textit{\textvisiblespace}d4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}e4 24.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xe5 25.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xe5 26.\textit{\textvisiblespace}he1+ White regains his pawn and he maintains dangerous threats, thanks to his great piece activity, despite the considerable simplifications, Grischuk – Needleman, Khanty-Mansyisk 2005.) 10.\textit{\textvisiblespace}d5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d8 (It is worse for Black to play: 10...\textit{\textvisiblespace}b8?! 11.h3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xf2 12.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf2 exf4 13.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f5, because he has only a single developed piece in action, while White has occupied all the key-squares in his opponent’s camp.) 11.h3! \textit{\textvisiblespace}xf2 (In answer to 11...\textit{\textvisiblespace}f6, Meera – Kavitha, Calicut 2003, White obtains a stable advantage with the line: 12.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf6+ gxf6 – It is not better for Black to defend with 12...\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf6 13.\textit{\textvisiblespace}g5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d6 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xd2+ 15.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xd2± – 13.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc6 bxc6 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}h6± and Black’s king is so unsafe that he can hardly prove the power of his central pawns.) 12.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf2! exf4 13.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf4 d6 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}c4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xd4? (It is better for Black to opt for: 14...\textit{\textvisiblespace}e5 15.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}e7 16.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe7 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xe7 17.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xf5 18.exf5±, but White preserves a stable edge even then, thanks to his pressure against the d6-pawn and his more active heavy pieces.) 15.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xd4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}e6 16.e5! \textit{\textvisiblespace}c8, Arizmendi – Collutiis, Saint Vincent 2003 (Black loses after: 16...dxe5 17.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d6 18.\textit{\textvisiblespace}c7+, while following 16...b5 17.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}b8 18.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e1– he can hardly survive with his king stranded in the centre against White’s powerful centralized forces, for example: 18...dxe5 19.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d6 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f6+ \textit{\textvisiblespace}xf6 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xe6+ \textit{\textvisiblespace}fxe6 22.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xf6+–) and here the most precise line for White seems to be: 17.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e3 \textit{\textvisiblespace}xc4 18.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc4 d5 19.\textit{\textvisiblespace}f1 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c7 20.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xd5 b5 21.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e3± and he remains with an extra pawn and an overwhelming lead in development; 8...\textit{\textvisiblespace}xd4 – This is an attempt by Black to exploit the insufficient protection of White’s f2-pawn. 9.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xd4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}g4 (White’s chances are better too after 9...d6 10.f3, for example: 10...e5?! 11.\textit{\textvisiblespace}a4+ \textit{\textvisiblespace}d7 12.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c6 13.\textit{\textvisiblespace}g5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d7 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc6 bxc6 15.\textit{\textvisiblespace}d3± Black’s pawns on the queenside and in the centre are weak, his development is inferior and his chances of creating any meaningful counterplay are just nil, Valerga – L.Bronstein, Buenos Aires 2005; 10...b5 11.g4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}b7 12.g5 \textit{\textvisiblespace}d7 13.h4 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c8, Rojas – Needleman, Las Condes 2005 and here after: 14.\textit{\textvisiblespace}b1 \textit{\textvisiblespace}e5 15.\textit{\textvisiblespace}e2 \textit{\textvisiblespace}c4 16.\textit{\textvisiblespace}xc4, White main-
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tains a powerful initiative on the kingside after: 16...bxc4 17.h5↑, as well as in the variation: 16...cxc4 17.a7 c7 18.a3 e7 19.h5↑; 10...e7 11.g4 0–0 12.g5 d7 13.f4 e8 14.h4 f8 15.h5↑ White’s kingside initiative looks threatening, since he dominates in the centre, A.Zubarev – A.AlSmirnov, Voronezh 2005.) 10.b6 c6 (The endgame is very difficult for Black after: 10...xb6 11.xb6 a4 12.f3 f6, Fier – Needleman, Sao Paulo 2004 and now White maintains a stable advantage if he exploits Black’s weak squares on the queenside with: 13.a4 d5 14.d4 a5 15.exd5 exd5 16.c5±, 15...exd5 16.c4 f6 17.b6±; or 14...dxe4 15.b6 b8 16.e5± and Black loses the exchange without any sufficient compensation.) 11.

d4 e5 12.e3 xe3 (It is more reliable for Black to opt for: 12...d6 13.d5 xe3 14.xe3+ 13.xe3 a5 14.g5 0–0 15.xe5 d6 (After 15...xf2 16.d6 c5 17.d5 b5 18.d3± White’s centralized pieces look quite impressive.) 16.g3 e6 17.f4 aac8 18.f5 White begins his decisive onslaught. 18...

b6 (Black loses after: 18...xa2 19.d3 d5 20.f6 xf6 21.xa2+ and he loses a piece, as well as following: 18...d7 19.f6 g6 20.g5 h8 21.d3++ and White will soon checkmate.) 19.fxe6 e3+ 20.b1 xc3 21.xd6 xc2 (After 21...c6 22.exf7+ h8 23.xc6 bxc6 24.c4++ White remains with three extra pawns.) 22.xc2

b5

This is a standard move for Black and he can hardly create any counterplay on the queenside without it.

9.f4!

White disrupts the harmony in his opponent’s camp with that move.

Here, Black most often plays a1) 9...e5, but still the majority of the strong players prefer a2) 9...b6. Black’s other possibilities enable White to obtain a clear advantage without too much of an effort:

9.e5 – Black loses material practically by force after that move. 10.xc6 xf4 (It is a disaster for Black to play here: 10...dxc6 11.xe5+) 11.e5 dxc6 (After 11...g4 12.d4± Black is in a big trouble, because after the natural line: 12.b7 13.xb5! axb5 14.xcxb5! White needs his knight on d4 more, because it can go to
the e6-square at some moment. 14...\textit{a}5 15.\textit{xf}4 \textit{f}5 16.\textit{he}1! \textit{g}6 17.\textit{d}6+ \textit{xd}6 18.\textit{xd}6+ \textit{d}8 19. \textit{b}3+ -- Black’s terrible piece-coordination makes his chances of saving the game just minimal; or 15...\textit{h}6 16.e6! \textit{dx}6 17.\textit{c}7+ \textit{e}7 18.\textit{dx}6!+ -- and Black’s king remains completely bare.) 12.\textit{xf}6 \textit{e}6 13.e4 \textit{d}5, Luther – Stanke, Koenigshofen 2007 and here the most resolute line for White seems to be 14.c4! \textit{bxc}4 (After 14...\textit{xe}4 15.\textit{d}4 \textit{gx}f6 16.\textit{xe}4+ \textit{e}7 17.\textit{bl}± Black’s problems are even greater, due to the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board.) 15.\textit{xc}4 0–0–0 (The centre has been opened and Black must evacuate his king urgently from there. It is terrible for him to try 15...\textit{xe}4 16.\textit{he}1+–, as well as 15...\textit{xc}4 16.\textit{c}3+–) 16.\textit{xa}6+ \textit{b}8 17.\textit{he}1±;

9...\textit{b}7 – This move enables White to establish firm control over the centre. 10.e5 \textit{b}4 (After 10...\textit{h}5 11.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 12.\textit{e}3± Black’s knight on h5 is an additional liability in his position, Melia – Paridar, Instanbul 2005.) 11.\textit{fx}6 \textit{xc}3 12.\textit{xc}3 \textit{b}4 13.\textit{c}4 \textit{gf}6 14.\textit{f}5± and Black can hardly defend against White’s numerous threats, Sutovsky – Arakhamia-Grant, Caleta 2005.

\textbf{a1) 9...\textit{e}5}

That is Black’s most principled reaction – he does not wish to give up his position in the centre.

\textbf{10.\textit{f}3}

White opens files, since it is too bad for Black to play 10...d6? due to 11.\textit{xe}5 \textit{dxe}5 12.\textit{xe}5+–

\textbf{10...\textit{f}4}

10...\textit{xf}3 – Black not only opens the g-file for his opponent with that exchange, but he also fortifies his centre. He will hardly manage to exploit the weakness of the doubled pawns in the nearest future. 11.\textit{xf}3 \textit{c}6 (It is not better for Black to try here: 11...\textit{a}5 12.\textit{d}6 \textit{b}4 13.\textit{b}1 \textit{b}6 14.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 15.\textit{g}1\textit{t} Walsh – Beaumont, Email 2002.) 12.\textit{e}2 \textit{b}7 13.\textit{d}4 \textit{b}6 14.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}8 15.\textit{g}1\textit{b}4 16.\textit{e}5\textit{t}. The main drawback of Black’s position is his undeveloped kingside. 16...d5 17.\textit{d}3 a5 18.\textit{d}4! \textit{c}7 19.\textit{b}5+ \textit{c}6 20.\textit{xc}6+ \textit{xc}6 21.\textit{xf}6 \textit{gf}6 22.\textit{ex}d5±. The centre is opened now and that is not good for Black at all, because he has not found a better square for his king than e8. His weak pawns are not fewer than those of his opponent and their protection is even more complicated. 22.\textit{c}7 23.\textit{b}1 \textit{a}4 24.\textit{dx}6! \textit{fx}6 25.\textit{d}4 \textit{b}3 26.\textit{xb}3 \textit{xb}3 27.\textit{xb}3+– \textit{f}7

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28...c1 b7 29...xc8 bxc8 30...c1 b7 31...d8 1–0 Acher – Milesi, Aix les Bains 2003.

11...g3 f6

It is a disaster for Black to play 11...b4? 12...g5+, or 11...b4? 12...d5 exd5 13...xe5 dxe5 14...xd5±.

In answer to 11...d6, Luther – Banikas, Fuerth 2002, White’s most energetic line seems to be: 12.h3!?. Dhxf3 (It is worse for Black to opt for: 12...b4 13...d5! exd5 14.hxg4 dxe4 15...xe5 dxe5 16...xe5± and he can hardly neutralize White’s threats along the d-file, because of his great lag in development.) 13.gxf3 e5 14.f4 c4 (After 14...c6 15.a3 Dh7 16.f5 White can see the advantage of having doubled pawns for White – he attacks the e6-square and Black cannot occupy the e5-square with his knight, because it can be repelled from there.) 15...xc4 bxc4 (or 15...bxc4 16.f5±) 16.f5 b4 17...a4 cxa2 18...xb4+ – and Black’s only active piece is his queen and that provides White with clearly better chances, for example: 18...a5 19...d4 d7 20...b6 b8 21...d2±, or 18...d5 19...d4! b7 (After 19...d7 20...b6 a1+ 21...d2 a5+ 22...e2 d8 23.exd5± White’s king finds a quite reliable shelter.) 20...b6 a1+ (or 20...d8 21.c4±) 21...d2 a5+ 22.c3! d8 23.b4! a2+ 24...e3 c2 25...c7± – and despite the fact that both kings remain in the centre, White’s prospects are clearly better, because of his more active pieces, moreover that he can win the exchange at any moment.

12.h3

In the game Topalov – Mvos-sesian, Sarajevo 2001, there followed: 12...xe5 dxe5 13.f4 c4 14...xc4 bxc4 15.f5 and here White would have obtained a minimal advantage after the move 15...e5?±, while after 15...b4!? the position would have remained rather complicated following: 16.fxe6 bxc3 17.exd7+ c7

12...b4

After 12...xf3 13.gxf3 e5 14.f4 c4 15...e1± White can develop a powerful initiative, for example: 15...b4 16...d5 exd5 17...xb4 dxe4 18.d4 d5 19...xc4 bxc4 20...xd5± and Black cannot stop the advance f4-f5 and that means that White’s bishop would remain much more active than its counterpart. It is not better for Black to try: 12...h6 13...xe5 fxe5 14.f4 f7 15.fxe5 dxe5 (After 15...b4 16...a4 e7 17...d4 0–0 18...c4± White has a solid extra pawn and more active pieces.) 16...e2 e7 17...h1± Black’s king has failed to find a safe haven on the queenside and he has no counterplay. His powerful knight on e5 does not compensate the drawbacks of his position.

13...d5!

This standard Sicilian piece-sacrifice is just temporary in that position.
13...exd5 14.hxg4 dxe4 15.\textit{\&}xe5! fx\textit{e}5 16.\textit{\&}g5 \&e7

It is no less dangerous for Black to opt for: 16...\textit{\&}b7 17.\textit{\&}c4 \&e7 18.\textit{\&}f7+ \&f8 19.\textit{\&}b3+, because his king would not be safe at all.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\textbf{Diagram 1: }
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17.\textit{\&}xh7\textrightarrow. White's attack is very powerful and that can be illustrated by the following variations: 17...\textit{\&}g5 (or 17...\textit{\&}g6 18.\textit{\&}f6+! \textit{\&}xf6 19.\textit{\&}xh8+ \&xh8 20.\textit{\&}h6 \&f6 21.\textit{\&}xg6+ \&e7 22.g5 \&c6 23.\textit{\&}c4!+-) 18.\textit{\&}h6 \textit{\&}d6 19.\textit{\&}f6+ \&xf6 20.\textit{\&}xf6 \&e7 21.\textit{\&}xg5+-

White has won a pawn and his threats against the enemy king are still present. For example after: 21.\textit{\&}e6 22.\textit{\&}g6+ \&d7 23.\textit{\&}c4!
Black loses his d6-pawn.

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\textbf{Diagram 2: }
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\textbf{a2) 9...\textit{\&}b6}

Black is trying to go into an endgame, he is ready to leave his king in the centre for that, and he presents his opponent with a powerful initiative, for example: 10.e5\textit{\&}xd4! (It is much weaker for Black to play: 10...\textit{\&}xd4? 11.exf6 \&c6 12.\textit{\&}e4 d5 13.\textit{\&}d6+ \&d7 14.\textit{\&}xf7 \&g8 15.\textit{\&}g5+-, since he ends up in a completely hopeless situation. Judit Polgar defended that position for more than 25 moves, but she did not survive at the end, Kasimdzhanov – J.Polgar, Moscow 2002.) 11.\textit{\&}xd4 \textit{\&}xd4 12.exf6 \&c6! (Black has only played in practice: 12...\textit{\&}f5? 13.\textit{\&}d3 g6 14.\textit{\&}e4 \&a7 – but not 14...d5 15.\textit{\&}xd5 exd5 16.\textit{\&}xd5 \&a7 17.\textit{\&}c6+- and Black loses plenty of material – 15.\textit{\&}b8± White won the exchange and he materialized it gradually in the game, Solovjova – Vasilevich, Sochi 2006.) 13.\textit{\&}e1 \&d8 14.f\textit{g}7 \&xg7 15.\textit{\&}e4 d5!\textrightarrow and Black has excellent chances of neutralizing White's initiative and proving the advantages of the pawn-centre.

\textbf{10.\textit{\&}b3}

It is easier for White to create threats with queens present on the board.

\textbf{10...\textit{\&}g4}

10...\textit{\&}e7 – This move is too passive. 11.f3 0–0 12.g4 d6 13.g5 \textit{\&}e8 14.h4 \textit{\&}c7 15.h5 a5, H.Nagy – Jakab, Hungary 2004 and here after 16.g6\textrightarrow Black has great problems to parry the attack against his king.
After 10...\(b4\) 11.f3 0–0 12.g4 \(\text{d}8\) 13.g5 \(\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{d}1\)+ White's kingside initiative is running smoothly, while Black's counterplay is too slow. Meanwhile, White is controlling the centre, Yemelin – Jakovenko, Krasnodar 2002.

11.h3! \(\text{g}5\) 12.\(\text{b}1\) d6 13.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 14.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 15.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}7\)

It is hardly any better for Black to try: 15...\(\text{a}5\) 16.f4 \(\text{e}4\) 17.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 18.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}3\) 19.\(\text{xe}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 20.g4 \(\text{b}4\) 21.\(\text{ce}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 22.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 23.h4± and White dominates in the centre, his king is reliably protected and Black’s bishops cannot be activated easily, Cheparinov – Nikolov, Pleven 2005.

16.f4 \(\text{c}4\) 17.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 18.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{g}4\)+ Anand – Oral, Deutschland 2005. White’s king is safe; he has plenty of space and he has excellent chances of developing a powerful initiative on the kingside. Black’s position looks solid, but White’s prospects are still superior.

b) 8...\(\text{e}7\)

That is a calm line after which Black’s bishop will protect his kingside.

9.f3

Now, Black has played most often in practice b1) 9...\(\text{b}5\) or b2) 9...0–0.

He has tried some other moves too, but they usually transpose to other variations:

About 9...d6 10.\(\text{g}4\) – see the Scheveningen variation.

9...h6 10.\(\text{g}4\) e5? (It is better for Black to play 10...d6 – see the Scheveningen variation) 11.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{g}8\) 12.h4+- Plaskan – Sever, Rogaska Slatina 2002; After 9...h5 10.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}6\), A.Sokolov – Maes, Mulhouse 2005, 11.\(\text{f}2\) there arises a position from the Scheveningen variation, but with the strange move – h5. Now, Black cannot castle short and it is not good for him to leave his king in the centre either. In case he castles long, he would have no counterplay at all there.

9...\(\text{e}5\) 10.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{d}6\), Csukas – Kozli
tin, Hungary 2001 (About 10...\(\text{b}5\) 11.g5 – see 9...\(\text{b}5\) 10.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 11.g5.) 11.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 12.f4 \(\text{c}4\) 13.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 14.\(\text{hf}1\)†
**b1) 9...b5**

Black is trying to organize some counterplay on the queenside without determining the future of his king.

10.g4

10...\(\text{\textit{d}e5}\)

This move enables White to advance his pawns, but Black’s alternatives are not better either:

About 10...d6 – see the Scheveningen variation; as for 10...0-0 11.g5 – see 9...0-0 10.g4 b5 11.g5;

10...b4 – That move only creates additional weaknesses on the queenside, instead of organizing counterplay. 11.a4 0-0, Wagner – Blaich, Germany 1993 and here after: 12.g5 \(\text{\textit{d}e8}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{x}c6}\) dxc6 14.b6 \(\text{\textit{e}5}\) 15.h4± Black’s pieces are passive and he has no active play;

Black fails to organize anything active in the centre after: 10...\(\text{\textit{x}d4}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{x}d4}\) e5 (He would not fare any better following: 11.d6 12.g5 \(\text{\textit{d}d7}\)? 13.\(\text{\textit{x}g7}\) \(\text{\textit{g}g8}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{h}6}\)+ – King_Lee – Fernwick, Internet 1999; after 12...\(\text{\textit{h}5}\) 13.a3 0-0 14.f4+ Black’s knight is misplaced on h5 and White’s kingside initiative is powerful. That would be Black’s best, though...) 12.e3 \(\text{\textit{b}b7}\) 13.g5 \(\text{\textit{h}5}\), V.Kalinina – Stepovaia-Dianchenko, Krasnodar 2003 and here White can play a useful prophylactic move – 14.\(\text{\textit{b}1}\), after which Black has problems creating counterplay, for example: 14...\(\text{\textit{f}4}\) (It is not better for him to try 14...\(\text{\textit{c}8}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{h}3}\)+, or 14...\(\text{\textit{d}8}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) \(\text{\textit{b}8}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{a}7}\) \(\text{\textit{a}8}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b}6}\)+ and White’s pieces are evidently quite active.) 15.\(\text{\textit{xf}4}\) \(\text{\textit{exf}4}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d}d4}\) 0-0 17.\(\text{\textit{x}d7}\) \(\text{\textit{ac}8}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{x}c7}\) \(\text{\textit{xc}7}\) 19.h4± White has an extra pawn and although his win will not be so simple, but still he is clearly better.

10...\(\text{\textit{b}7}\) 11.g5 \(\text{\textit{h}5}\), Yakimenko – Chukhir, Russia 2002, now it is favourable for White to trade the knights. 12.\(\text{\textit{x}c6}\) dxc6 (or 12...\(\text{\textit{x}c6}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{h}3}\)+) 13.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) c5 (It is worse for Black to opt for: 13...b4 14.\(\text{\textit{a}4}\) \(\text{\textit{a}5}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{c}5}\) and here no matter how Black continues – he will be in trouble: 15...\(\text{\textit{c}8}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{c}4}\) \(\text{\textit{f}4}\) 17.h4+; 15...\(\text{\textit{xa}2}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xb}7}\) e5 17.\(\text{\textit{e}2}\)! \(\text{\textit{a}1}\)+ 18.\(\text{\textit{d}2}\) \(\text{\textit{xb}2}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{c}4}\)+, or 15...\(\text{\textit{xc}5}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xc}5}\) \(\text{\textit{xa}2}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{d}4}\)+) 14.\(\text{\textit{e}2}\) 0-0 15.\(\text{\textit{h}3}\)+ Black’s knight on h5 is terribly misplaced and that forces him to create additional weaknesses on the kingside after: 15...g6 16.\(\text{\textit{g}4}\) \(\text{\textit{g}7}\) 17.h4 – White has good attacking chances.

10...h6 11.h4 \(\text{\textit{b}7}\) (About 11...d6 – see the Scheveningen variation; the move 11...b4 – creates weaknesses on the queenside.
12.\(a4\) d5 13.\(\text{x}c6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 14.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 15.exd5 exd5, Miller – Quan Zhe, Toronto 2004 and here after 16.\(\text{x}c8\) \(\text{x}c8\) 17.\(\text{d}3\) White has the two-bishop advantage and a powerful initiative on the kingside. He can also exploit Black's pawn-weaknesses on the queenside.) 12.\(g1\) \(\text{c}8\), Cid - Menezes, Fortaleza 1994. Here, White maintains a great advantage by simply advancing his kingside pawns: 13.g5 hxg5 14.hxg5 \(\text{h}5\) 15.\(\text{x}c6\) \(\text{x}c6\) 16.g6 f6 17.\(\text{e}2\) Black fails to create any threats on the queenside and his king has no safe shelter;

11.g5 \(\text{h}5\) 12.\(f4\)

12...\(\text{g}4\)

It is not better for Black to play: 12...\(\text{c}4\) 13.\(\text{x}c4\) bxc4 (or 13...\(\text{xc}4\) 14.\(\text{b}1\) 0–0 15.\(f2\) and White has good attacking chances) 14.\(\text{f5}\)! \(\text{b}4\) 15.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{x}d6\) 16.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 17.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{b}7\) 18.\(\text{hd}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{d}4\) and White wins a pawn, while Black's knight on h5 has no good prospects, Micic – Mastrovasilis, Novi Sad 2002. It would not be better for Black to accept the sacrifice: 14...

exf5 15.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}6\) (He must keep the d6-square under control, because after: 15...\(\text{b}7\) 16.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 17.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{c}5\) Black has no defence.) 16.exf5 d6 (or 16...\(\text{b}7\) 17.\(\text{e}2\) g6 18.\(\text{he}1\) 17.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xf}5\) 18.\(\text{he}1\) and White's heavy pieces are so active along the open files in the centre that he can easily regain his material, preserving his powerful threats.

13.\(e5\) \(\text{b}7\)

Or 13...\(\text{b}4\) 14.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{b}7\) 15.\(\text{d}3\)

14.\(g1\) \(\text{xe}3\)

After 14...\(\text{b}4\) 15.\(\text{x}g4\) bxc3 16.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 17.bxc3 \(\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{d}2\) White has an extra pawn, despite its being doubled and he controls the centre with good prospects to create some pressure on the b-file.

15.\(\text{exe}3\) \(\text{h}6\)

It is not better for Black to opt for 15...g6 16.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{xg}2\) 17.\(\text{xe}2\)\(\text{xe}2\), because his knight on h5 will not enter the actions anytime soon.

16.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{f}6\)

After 16...0–0 17.\(\text{e}2\) fxg6 18.\(\text{xh}5\) gxh5 19.\(\text{g}6\) Black's king might come under a dangerous attack.
17. \( \textit{\&e2} \text{ fxe5} \) 18. \( \textit{\&xe5} \textit{\&g5} \)
(After 18...b4 19. \( \textit{\&a4} \textit{\&g5} \) 20. \( \textit{\&xg5} \textit{hxg5} \) 21. \( \textit{\&xg5} \textit{\&d8} \) 22. \( \textit{\&d2} \pm \) Black's pieces are passive and his king is rather unsafe. White's compensation for the exchange is more than sufficient.) 19. \( \textit{\&xg5} \textit{hxg5} \) 20. \( \textit{\&xg5} \textit{\&d8} \) 21. \( \textit{\&d2} \textit{\&e7} \) 22. \( \textit{\&b3} \textit{\&c6} \) (Black's king will not run away from the attack on the queenside – 22...0-0 23.a4 b4 24.\( \textit{\&a2} \pm \) ) 23.\( \textit{\&f1} \) 0-0-0 24. a4 White has a pawn for the exchange and powerful threats on the queenside.

b2) 9...0-0

This is a logical move. Black completes his development before beginning his queenside counterplay.

10. \( \textit{\&g4} \textit{b5} \)

Black's other moves do not prevent White's kingside offensive and they do not help the organization of his counterplay.

About 10...d6 – see the Scheveningen variation; as for 10...\( \textit{\&e8} \) 11.h4 b5 12.g5 – see 10...b5 11.g5 \( \textit{\&e8} \) 12.h4.

10...\( \textit{\&b4} \)?! – and Black loses a tempo in comparison to the variation with 8...\( \textit{\&b4} \) 11.a3 \( \textit{\&a5} \) 12.\( \textit{\&b3} \textit{\&xc3} \) (Or 12...\( \textit{\&b6} \), Djuric – Cavar, Banja Luka 2004, that move impedes the advance of the b-pawn and after 13.\( \textit{\&xb6} \textit{\&xb6} \) 14.g5 \( \textit{\&e8} \) 15.h4\( \textit{\&} \), or 14...\( \textit{\&h5} \) 15.f4\( \textit{\&} \) White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative.) 13.\( \textit{\&xc3} \) d6 14.\( \textit{\&b1} \textit{\&d7} \) 15.g5 \( \textit{\&e8} \) 16.h4 \( \textit{\&c8} \) 17.f4\( \textit{\&} \) and White has a stable advantage thanks to his extra space and superior piece coordination, Pruess – Ferrari Nunes, Internet 2004.

10...d5?! – White is very well prepared to counter that breakthrough. 11.g5 \( \textit{\&h5} \) (Black has no compensation for the pawn after: 11...\( \textit{\&e8} \) 12.exd5 \( \textit{\&xd4} \) 13.\( \textit{\&xd4} \) e5 14.\( \textit{\&h4} \) Blechschmidt – Weiss, Saarland 1992.) 12.exd5 \( \textit{\&e5} \) 13.\( \textit{\&e2} \textit{\&g6} \) 14.dxe6 fxe6 (or 14...\( \textit{\&xe6} \) 15.\( \textit{\&xe6} \) fxe6 16.\( \textit{\&c4} \)\( \textit{\&} \) White has an extra pawn and he exerts pressure against the weak e6-pawn.

10...\( \textit{\&d8} \) 11.g5 \( \textit{\&e8} \) 12.h4 b5 and here after 13.h5 b4 (It is a disaster for Black to play: 13...\( \textit{\&f8} \) 14.g6 fxg6 15.\( \textit{\&g5} \textit{\&e7} \) 16.\( \textit{\&xe7} \) \( \textit{\&xe7} \) 17.\( \textit{\&xe6} \) – and he soon resigned, Kranjec – Kukovec, Maribor 1997.) 14.\( \textit{\&ce2} \) d5 15.\( \textit{\&c6} \) \( \textit{\&xc6} \) 16.e5\( \textit{\&} \) White is evidently ahead of his opponent in the creation of dangerous threats against the king.

10...\( \textit{\&a5} \) 11.g5 \( \textit{\&h5} \), Kragh – Tolstrup, Copenhagen 1998,
Black’s knights are misplaced at the edge of the board and that enables White to create powerful threats in the centre and on the kingside. 12.\( \text{d}f5! \) \( \text{b}4 \) (Capturing of the knight leads to an even more difficult position for Black after: 12...exf5 13.\( \text{d}5 \text{d}8 14.\text{g}1 \) (White can also play the simple line: 14.\text{e}6 \text{c}6 15.\text{f}6\rightarrow regaining his piece and maintaining dangerous threats on the kingside.)

d6 – It is worse for Black to defend with 14...\text{f}xe4 15.\text{b}6 \text{e}8 16.\text{c}c7+\rightarrow, or 14...\text{d}6 15.\text{b}6+- and White remains with an overwhelming material advantage – 15.\text{b}6 \text{e}8 16.\text{x}a5 \text{d}8 17.\text{x}d8 \text{x}d8 18.\text{x}d8 \text{xd}8 19.e5+ Black’s pieces are passive and he would hardly be able to maintain the material balance because of that.) 13.\text{g}3 \text{xc}3 14.\text{bxc}3 \text{g}6 (After 14...\text{f}xg3 15.\text{h}xg3 \text{x}g3 16.\text{f}4 \text{xf}3 17.\text{h}2\rightarrow White’s attack is decisive.) 15.\text{x}h5 \text{gxh}5 16.\text{d}6 \text{xd}6 (Black loses after 16...\text{xc}3 17.\text{d}4 \text{xf}3 18.\text{e}5+-) 17.\text{xd}6+ – White has a stable advantage thanks to his total control over the dark squares.

10...\text{e}5 – That move allows White to continue with his kingside offensive gaining tempi in the process. 11.g5 \text{h}5 12.f4 \text{c}4 13.\text{xc}4 \text{xc}4, Bakhmatov – Bischoff, Goch 1999 and here it seems quite logical for White to proceed with his kingside attack. After 14.f5 \text{b}4 15.\text{de}2\uparrow Black has two logical moves:

15...d5 16.f6 dx e4 (or 16...\text{g}6 17.\text{a}3 \text{d}6 18.\text{exd}5± and Black has no compensation for the pawn) 17.\text{a}3 \text{xc}3 (It is not any better for Black to try: 17...\text{a}5 18.\text{d}6 \text{c}7 19.\text{e}7 \text{c}6 20.\text{d}4 \text{d}7 21.\text{f}5+, or 18...\text{c}6 19.\text{xc}6 \text{bxc}6 20.\text{c}5± and in both cases White maintains powerful pressure thanks to his active pieces.) 18.\text{xc}3 \text{b}5 19.\text{f}2 \text{g}6 (It is also bad for Black to opt for: 19...\text{e}5 20.\text{fxg}7 \text{xc}7 21.\text{d}5±) 20.\text{d}4 \text{c}6 21.\text{d}1± Black has no chances of equalizing with his passive knight on h5;

or 15...\text{xf}5 16.\text{d}5 \text{xd}5 17.\text{xd}5 (It is worse for Black to play: 16...\text{c}6 17.\text{xf}5 \text{g}6 18.\text{f}1! \text{f}6 19.\text{d}4 \text{c}5 – he loses after 19...\text{c}7 20.\text{d}5+\rightarrow 20.\text{f}5 \text{c}6 21.\text{d}5 \text{xf}5 22.\text{xf}6\rightarrow and White’s attack should be victorious.) 17...\text{a}5 (17...\text{f}4 – Black gets rid of his misplaced knight in that fashion, but he fails to complete his development: 18.\text{xf}4 \text{xf}4 19.\text{xf}4 and now Black has no comfortable way to remove his bishop from its being attacked: 19...\text{a}5 20.\text{c}7 \text{c}7 21.\text{xc}7± and White’s knight is evidently

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stronger than Black’s bishop; 19...e5 20.b4 \(\text{a}7\) 21.d6\(\text{+}\) and Black loses the exchange; 19...a5 20.c7 \(\text{a}7\) 21.e3\(\text{+}\) Black loses a pawn.) \(18.\text{b}6\) \(\text{xb}6\) 19.cxb6 \(\text{b}8\) 20.exf5\(\text{+}\)

11.g5 \(\text{e}8\)

Black would hardly fare any better after 11...h5 12.c2 g6 (His counterplay in the centre would be too slow after 12...d8, Tiemann – L. Radulov, corr. 1987, 13.h3! d4 14.d4 d5 15.e5\(\text{+}\) and White has powerful threats on the kingside, while Black can hardly organize anything real on the queenside.) 13.g3 d4 14.d4 f4 15.h4 e5 16.e3 d8 17.e2 h5 18.c3 b7 19.f2\(\text{+}\) Black has failed to create any counterplay, L.Dominguez – Zapata, Havana 2003.

12.h4

12...b7


After 12...b4 13.xc6 xxc6 14.e2 c5 15.h5 xxe3 16.xe3\(\text{+}\) White has good attacking chances and in answer to the central pawn-break – 16...d5?! Sarasola – Camacho, Spain 1988, it looks very good for him to follow with: 17.exd5 exd5 18.h6 g6 19.d4\(\text{+}\) and Black’s dark squares on the kingside are vulnerable as well as his d5-pawn and he will need to defend for long due to his passive pieces.

In answer to 12...d4, Korchnoi – Alvarez Diaz, Sauzal 2004, it looks more active for White to continue with 13.xd4 (It is worse for White to play as in the game – 13.d4?! , because Black could have countered that with the line: 13...b4 14.a4 b8\(\text{+}\) with a good counterplay, since White could not redeploy his bishop to b3, where it would have cemented the position, exerting pressure on the kingside of the opponent.) 13...a5 (It is not advisable for Black to defend with: 13...b4 14.a4 b8 15.c4 c6 16.b3\(\text{+}\) and he has no attacking chances; after 13...d6 14.b1\(\text{+}\) Black’s knight on e8 is quite passive.) 14.b1 b4 15.e2 b7 16.c1 d5 17.e5 c8 18.h5\(\text{+}\) and White has good attacking chances.

13.xc6 dxc6

After 13...xc6 14.h5 b4 15.e2 d5 16.e5 b5 17.d4 xf1 18.xf1\(\text{+}\), it is quite obvious that White is much ahead of his opponent in creating threats.

14.xc2 c5

The move 14...b4 – creates weaknesses on the queenside. 15.a4 a5 16.c5 c8 (after 16...xa2 17.xb7 c8 18.c5
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\[ a1+ 19.\text{d}2 \text{d}8+ 20.\text{d}3 \text{xb}2 21.\text{e}2\pm \text{Black's compensation for the piece is evidently insufficient} \]

\[ 17.\text{c}4 \text{d}6 18.\text{b}3\pm; \text{after} \]

\[ 14...\text{d}8 15.\text{e}2 \text{xd}1+ 16.\text{xd}1 \text{c}5 17.\text{e}5\pm \text{Black's kingside pieces can hardly enter the actions anytime soon.} \]

\[ 15.\text{h}5 \text{c}4 16.\text{g}6 \uparrow \]

(diagram)

White's kingside initiative is likely to turn into a dangerous attack.

Conclusion

We have started analyzing in this chapter the main line for Black - 7...\text{f}6. After the natural move 8.0-0-0, Black replies usually - 8...\text{b}4. That move is dealt with in the next chapters.

The seldom-played moves enable White to obtain an obvious advantage in the centre and to develop a powerful initiative most often on the kingside.

In variation a), Black plays the standard move 8...\text{b}5 and he starts his queenside counterplay. White's powerful argument - 9.\text{f}4 poses serious problems to Black then. If he plays 9...\text{e}5 - variation a1), he tries to hold his position in the centre, but White can organize a powerful kingside initiative with precise moves. After 9...\text{b}6 - variation a2), it is not advisable for White to go into an endgame with 10.\text{e}5 \text{xd}4!, since Black would obtain then good counter chances because of his powerful pawn-centre. It is much easier for White to develop his initiative after playing - 10.\text{b}3. Later, he brings his king to safety on b1 and he attacks on the kingside.

In variation b), we have analyzed the strongest line for Black - 8...\text{e}7. Its main drawback is that it is somewhat passive. White's kingside pawn-assault is obviously faster than Black's counterplay then.
That is Black's most active line. He is trying to prove that White's queen is not well placed on d2; meanwhile his bishop supports the pawn-advance d7-d5, moreover that White's next move seems to be forced.

9.f3

This move is obligatory, but that does not mean that it is bad, since it is a part of White's plan anyway.

Black has played most often here a) 9...b5, b) 9...d5, c) 9...e7, d) 9...a5 and 9...e5 (see the following chapter).

The other possibilities for Black are only seldom played, since they seem to be less purposeful:

9...h5?! – This move impedes the pawn-advance g2-g4 indeed, but on the other side it makes castling short for Black practically impossible, Garcia Carbo – Cubero Ferreiro, Ferrol 2002, 10.dxe5 dxe5 11...d4 d6 12.g5;

9...a5?! – Now, Black cannot even compromise White's pawn-structure on the queenside. 10.b3 xc3 11.xa5 xd2+ 12.xd2 xa5 13.xa5 b5 14.d6± Luther – Wanderer, Graz 2004;

9...a7?! – That is a strange move, since the knight on a7 has no good prospects whatsoever. 10.g4 d6 11.a3 xc3 12.xc3 xc3 13.bxc3 e7 14.b3 c6 15.c4± Gajsin – Gankin, Osasco 2004;

9...xd4 – Black creates some weaknesses for his opponent on the queenside indeed, but he cannot exploit them effectively, because White's dark-squared bishop becomes very powerful. 10.xd4 xc3 11.bxc3 0–0 (or 11...d5 12.exd5 exd5 13.g5±) 12.c5± d8 (after 12...xc5 13.xc5 White dominates completely on the dark squares) 13.c4 d5, Schneider – Needleman, Osasco 2004. Here, the most energetic line for White seems to be: 14.g5! xe4 (It is even worse for
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Black to play: 14...h6 15.cxd5 hxg5 16.dxe6+- and his queen has no good square to retreat to, or 15...exd5 16...xd5+- and Black loses material in both cases.) 15...d8 xc5 16.e7± and White wins the exchange;

9...0-0 – This move seems somewhat premature, because White’s kingside initiative can quickly turn into a dangerous attack. 10.g4 b5 (After 10...xd4 11...xd4 a5 12.a3 xc3 13.xc3 xc3 14.bxc3 d5 15.g5 h5 16.exd5 exd5 17.exd5± White has an extra pawn and a couple of bishops and that more than compensates the minute defects of his pawn-structure, Drexel – Straub, Bayern 2004; 10...d5 – White is perfectly prepared to counter that move. 11.g5 h5 12.exd5 exd5, Reist – Vega, Lansing 1993 and here after 13.a3 xc3 14.xc3± Black has a weak isolated pawn on d5 and a misplaced knight on h5. The other retreat of the knight is not better at all – 11...d7 12.exd5 exd5 13.a3 xc3 14.xc3 b6, Kalivoda – Marsalek, Pribram 2000 and here after 15.b3±, it is difficult to find any sensible plan for Black; 10...d8 – This move does not stop White’s kingside offensive. 11.g5 e8, Novak – Cherin, Nova Gorica 2006 and here it is sensible for White to get rid of the pin with 12.a3, because after: 12...e7 13.h4 d5 14.exd5 exd5 15.h5±, as well as following: 12...a5 13.b3 b6 14.h4±, or 12...c5 13.xc6 xc6 14.h4±, White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative; 10...d6 11.a3 c5, Moyses – De Andrade, Brazil 2001 and now after 12.g5 h5 13.b3 xe3 14.xe3 White has a powerful kingside initiative, because the exchange of the dark-squared bishops has weakened Black’s d6-pawn considerably.) 11.g5 h5 12.b1 e5, Rogers – Bjelobrk, Brisbane 2005 and here the logical consequence of White’s previous move would have been the tactical strike: 13.xxb5! (It is worse for Black to play 13... axb5 14.xb4± and White remains with an extra pawn, or 13...xd2 14.xc7 xe3 15.xa8 f4 16.b6± and Black has no compensation for the exchange.) 14.c3 b8 (After 14...xc3 15.xc3 xc3 16.bxc3± White remains with an extra pawn and the two-bishop advantage.) 15.b3 c7 16.a3! xc3 (Black loses after 16...xf3 17.f2 xc3 18.xf3+–) 17.xc3 xc3 18.bxc3 d5 19.e2± White has an extra pawn, despite its being weak, as well as a couple of powerful bishops.

a) 9...b5?!

Black’s attempt to organize some counterplay on the queenside is countered by White with direct actions in the centre.

10.f4 e5

The other possibilities are not better for Black: 10...
11. \( \text{dxc6} \) \( \text{dxc6} \) 12. \( \text{e5} \) – see 10...
\( \text{e5} \) 11. \( \text{dxc6} \) \( \text{e5} \) 12. \( \text{dxe5} \); 10...
\( \text{e5} \) 11. \( \text{dxc6} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 12. \( \text{dxc3} \) \( \text{exf4} \)
13. \( \text{e5+} \) \( \text{exe5} \) 14. \( \text{dxe5} \); 10...
\( \text{dxc3} \) 11. \( \text{dxc7} \) \( \text{xd2} \); 12. \( \text{xd2} \)

White creates great problems for his opponent with that beautiful move.

11. \( \text{dxc6} \)

White’s queen becomes very active on the kingside and he has a powerful pressure. 12... \( \text{d7} \) 13. \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{c8} \) 14. \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{g5} \) 15. \( \text{d6} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 16. \( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 17. \( \text{d4} \) It is too difficult for Black to exploit his opponent’s weaknesses on the kingside, while White has an extra pawn and a bishop pair, Cheparinov – Kazantzidis, Internet 2003.

12. \( \text{bxc3} \)

That is the most energetic line for White after which he obtains the two-bishop advantage. In case of: 12. \( \text{dxc3} \) \( \text{d3} \) 13. \( \text{cxd3} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 14. \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{c7} \) 15. \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 16. \( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 17. \( \text{d4} \) It is too difficult for Black to exploit his opponent’s weaknesses on the kingside, while White has an extra pawn and a bishop pair, Cheparinov – Kazantzidis, Internet 2003.

12. \( \text{dxc6} \)

It is too bad for Black to play 12... \( \text{dxc6} ?? \) 13. \( \text{dxe5} \) and he has nothing to protect his dark squares with.

White’s chances are clearly better in a tactical fight: 12... \( \text{d7} \) 13. \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{c7} \) 14. \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 15. \( \text{d6} \) (Black loses outright after: 14... \( \text{xc6} \) 15. \( \text{d8} \) –) 15. \( \text{d6} \) 16. \( \text{xc3} \) 16. \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{d5} \) 17. \( \text{xd5} \) – That is the most energetic line for White. 17... \( \text{exd5} \) 18. \( \text{xb5} \) 0–0 (White checkmates after: 18... \( \text{axb5} \) 19. \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{f8} \) 20. \( \text{b4} \) –) 19. \( \text{e7} \) and White’s two light pieces are considerably stronger than Black’s rook.

13. \( \text{dxe5} \) 0–0

This move seems to be quite natural, while actually it loses, despite the fact that it is too hard to
believe that! White’s advantage is obvious after the other possibilities for Black: 13...b7 14...g5±; 13...h6 (defending against 14...g5) 14...d4±

14...xf6!
That is the most concrete action by White, but he is slightly better too after 14...d6, or 14...d6.

14...gxf6 15.e5→
Black’s defence is quite difficult against the attack, since his pawn-shelter has been compromised and he has no pieces to defend his kingside. The following variations illustrate that his position is beyond salvation:

15...g7 (After 15...f5 16...g5+...h8 17...f6+...g8 18...e1+—, or 15...f5 16...g5+...g8 17...f6+...g8 18...d3+— White should checkmate, while after: 15...d5 16...xd5...xd5 17...xf6+ Black will gradually lose that endgame without a pawn and with too passive pieces.) 16...f4!...xc3
(About 16...f5 17...g5+ — see 15...f5 16...g5+; as for 15...f5 16...f5+ — see 15...f5 16...g5+) 17...xf6+...f8 18...d3 d5!
(Black will not manage to protect his h7-square either after: 18...b7? 19...g5+...h8 20...h5+—) 19...xh7+!...xh7 20...d3...a1+ (20...c4 21...f4+—) 21...d2...xh1 22...h4+...g6 23...g3+...h5 (23...f5 24...e3+—) 24...d4+

b) 9...d5?!

That is a thematic move, but Black is not well prepared for it yet.

10...d6 11...d3...e7, Arakhamia – Skripchenko, Warsaw 2001 (It is inferior for Black to opt for: 11...0-0 12...xd5...xd5 13...xd5...xd5 14...xd5...d8 15...d3 g6 16...g5± — White has a solid extra pawn and a stable advantage. 16...e5 17...b1 b5 18...e4...b8 19...d4...e8 20...h1+ Now, White starts a direct attack: 20...f8 21...xg6+— h6 22...xf7+...xf7 23...f4+ 1–0 Ramesh – Himanshu, Visakhapatnam 2006) and here White’s most energetic line seems to be: 12...f4 e5 13...xd5...f5 (In case Black does not sacrifice a pawn, then after 13...exf4 14...d4± White dominates in the centre, for example: 14...f5 15...e1+...f8
16.\textit{xf6} gxf6 17.g3→ and White has excellent attacking prospects, since Black’s king is not well protected.) 14.fx{e}5 \textit{x}e{5} 15.\textit{g}5 0–0 (It is worse for Black to try: 15...h6 16.\textit{e}1! hxg5 17.d6±, or 16...0–0 17.d6 \textit{xd}6 18.\textit{xf}6±) 16.e1 h6 17.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 18.\textit{fx}4 \textit{e}7 19.d6 \textit{d}8 20.\textit{e}2± White has a dangerous passed pawn in the centre for the sacrificed exchange, as well a couple of powerful bishops and noticeable initiative in the centre and good chances on the kingside.

10...\textit{a}5 11.\textit{b}3 \textit{dxe}4 (It is bad for Black to opt for 11...0–0? 12.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5, Gallego – Kallio, Linares 2002, because after 13.\textit{g}5! Black loses after: 13...\textit{d}8 14.e5 \textit{xe}5 15.\textit{f}4 \textit{f}5 16.g4 \textit{g}6 17.\textit{d}3–+, as well as following: 13...\textit{c}414.\textit{xc}4 dxc415.\textit{xf}6 gxf6 16.\textit{wh}6 \textit{e}7 17.\textit{d}5! f5 18.\textit{xf}5–, as well as following: 13...\textit{d}xe4 14.\textit{xf}6 gxf6 15.\textit{wh}6 f5 16.g4→ White’s attack is tremendously dangerous; 11...\textit{xc}3 – That is possibly Black’s most reliable move. 12.\textit{xc}3 0–0 13.\textit{g}5 \textit{dxe}4 14.\textit{xf}6 \textit{f}4+, Bonn – Mahiouz, Aix les Bains 2006 and here after: 15.\textit{d}2 gxf6 16.fxe4 \textit{e}5 17.\textit{e}2± Black’s king shelter has been weakened indeed, but he has some compensation for that thanks to his powerful knight on e5.) 12.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5 (It is worse for Black to try: 12...\textit{xa}5 13.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}7, Sengupta – Nikolopoulos, Denizli 2003, because after 14.\textit{f}2! Black’s queen has no good square: 14...\textit{c}6 15.\textit{d}6–+, or 14...\textit{e}7 15.\textit{d}6 \textit{d}8 16.\textit{g}3–+) 13.fx{e}4 0–0 14.\textit{g}5 \textit{d}8 15.\textit{d}3 b5? (It would be better for Black to try: 15...\textit{e}5 16.\textit{hf}1 b5 17.\textit{b}1 \textit{b}7 18.\textit{f}3±, although even then White’s threats on the kingside seem to be quite dangerous.) 16.e5–+ (The game is quickly over now.) 16...b4 17.\textit{xf}6 gxf6 18.\textit{wh}6 f5 19.\textit{e}4 fxe4 20.\textit{xe}4 1–0 Rizouk – Garrido Dominguez, Seville 2003.

10...\textit{e}7!? 11.ex{d}5 \textit{xd}5 (It is advantageous for Black to trade his weak knight on f6. It is worse for him to play 11...\textit{xd}5? 12.g4 and here after: 12...h6 13.h4 \textit{e}6 14.\textit{d}3+ Sanchez – Laplanche, France 2004, as well as in the variation: 12...\textit{e}6 13.g5 \textit{d}7 14.\textit{xe}6 fxe6 15.\textit{h}3 \textit{d}8 16.f4± Ramaswamy – Vasquez Ramirez, Bled 2002, White controls the centre and he has a powerful kingside initiative.) 12.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5, Speckner – Suran, Germany 2001, 13.h4 0–0 14.h5 \textit{e}8 15.g4 White has the initiative and he is ready to enter an endgame, which will be very favourable for him due to the vulnerability of Black’s d5-pawn.

11.\textit{xc}3 \textit{dxe}4

After 11...0–0 12.e5 \textit{d}7 13.f4 \textit{e}8 14.\textit{d}3± Black has no counterplay whatsoever, Naumann – Kronencke, Kiel 2005.

12.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6

It is not any better for Black to continue with: 12...\textit{xc}6 13.\textit{c}5
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exf3 14.gxf3 \(\texttt{#b7} 15.\texttt{g1} = \) because White has a powerful initiative on the dark squares for the pawn, while after: 15...\(\texttt{d5} 16.\texttt{gxg7} 0-0-0 17.\texttt{g3} \pm\) the material is equal, but White’s two-bishop advantage provides him with clearly better chances.

13.\(\texttt{e5} 0-0 14.\texttt{g5} \texttt{d7}


Now, White can enter an endgame, which is clearly superior for him thanks to his bishop pair, his pawn-majority on the queenside and the domination on the only open file. 15.\(\texttt{xe4} \texttt{xe4} 16.\texttt{fxe4} b5\) (It is not advisable for Black to follow the recommendation of GM Atalik: 16...\(f6 17.\texttt{e3} \texttt{e8} 18.\texttt{e2} \texttt{f8} 19.\texttt{h5} \texttt{g6} 20.\texttt{d6} \texttt{e6} 21.\texttt{hd1} \pm\) 17.\(\texttt{e2} f6 18.\texttt{e3} \texttt{e5} 19.\texttt{d4} \texttt{b7} 20.\texttt{hd1} \pm\)

c) 9...\(\texttt{e7}\)

(diagram)

White had problems to counter that move for a long time. Black is preparing \(d7-d5\) and White cannot prevent that.

10.\(\texttt{de2}!\)

White avoids doubling of his pawns and he frees the \(d4\)-square for his queen. Here, Black’s most often played move is c1) 10...\(d5\), but it seems more reliable for him to continue with c2) 10...\(b5\).

c1) 10...\(d5\)

That is Black’s thematic pawn-advance.

11.\(\texttt{g5} \texttt{dxe4}\)

It is hardly any better for him to try: 11...\(\texttt{d7} 12.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{gxf6} 13.\texttt{d4} \texttt{d6} 14.\texttt{d5} \texttt{e5} 15.\texttt{d2} \texttt{g6} 16.g3 \texttt{f5} 17.f4 \texttt{f6} 18.\texttt{g2} \texttt{d8}, \texttt{Okkes - Peng Zhaoqin, Hoogeveen 2006}, because after 19.\(\texttt{he1} 0-0 20.\texttt{d4} \pm\) his compensation for the pawn is evidently insufficient.

12.\(\texttt{xf6} \texttt{gxf6} 13.\texttt{d4} \texttt{exf3}\)

13...\(\texttt{xc3}?! \) – This move only facilitates White’s piece-development. 14.\(\texttt{xc3} \texttt{e5} \) (It is not advisable for Black to opt for: 14...\(\texttt{f4} 15.\texttt{b1} \texttt{c6} 16.\texttt{c4} \) – This is the most active square for White’s queen. 16...0-0 17.\(\texttt{xe4} \texttt{g7} 18.\texttt{c3} \texttt{e7}, \texttt{Motylev - Tunik, Russia 2002}, after 18...\(\texttt{e5} 19.\texttt{e3} \pm\) Black has a problem to find a useful move. Here, it de-
served attention for White to play the energetic line: 19.\textit{c5}!? \textit{g6} 20.\textit{h4}→ with a dangerous attack. It is worse for Black to defend with 19...\textit{d5}? 20.\textit{c4}! \textit{e3} 21.\textit{xf6}! \textit{xf6} 22.\textit{xf8} \textit{xd1} 23.\textit{xd1} \textit{xc4} 24.\textit{h6}+ \textit{e7} 25.\textit{g5}+ \textit{f6} 26.\textit{g7}+ \textit{e8} 27.\textit{xf6}+ and White wins.) 15.\textit{xe4} 0–0 (In answer to: 15...\textit{f5} 16.\textit{h4} \textit{e6}, Gaponenko – Kamber, Biel 2006, it deserves attention for White to follow with: 17.\textit{g3}!? \textit{e8} 18.\textit{d3}±, or 17...0–0 18.\textit{d3} \textit{f6} 19.\textit{hg1}± and White not only has a superior pawn-structure, but his pieces are more active too and his king is safer.) 16.\textit{h4} \textit{f5} (After 16...\textit{b6} 17.\textit{e4} \textit{g7} 18.\textit{d6}± Black loses his f6-pawn.) 17.\textit{xf6} \textit{ad8} 18.\textit{e2} \textit{g6} 19.\textit{h4}+– Goloshchapov – Renette, Leuven 2003.

\textbf{14.\textit{xb4} \textit{fxe2} 15.\textit{xe2} \textit{f5}}

\textbf{16.\textit{d6}}

Unfortunately Black saves the game with only moves after: 16.\textit{b5}+?! \textit{xb5} 17.\textit{xb5} \textit{a5} 18.\textit{c5} \textit{f6}!

It deserves attention however, to try the idea of GM Alexander Motylev, which has not been duly appreciated yet – 16.\textit{he1}. After 16...\textit{d7} 17.\textit{h5} \textit{g8}, Motylev – Ribli, Saint Vincent 2005, Black will have problems finding a reply and that can be emphasized by White with the precise move – 18.g3! The following variations confirm that Black’s defence is very difficult:

18...\textit{c6}? 19.\textit{xe6}±;

In answer to 18...\textit{h6}?! or 18...\textit{b5}!? White realizes his main threat – 19.\textit{xe7}! \textit{xe7} 20.\textit{d5}+ \textit{d6} 21.\textit{xc7}+ \textit{xc7} 22.\textit{xf7} \textit{g7} 23.\textit{xe6}± and he remains with an extra pawn. It might not be so easy to press his advantage home, but he still has his chances;

18...\textit{e5} 19.\textit{d5}!? \textit{e4} (It is not less dangerous for Black to play: 19...\textit{a5} 20.\textit{h4} \textit{e4} 21.\textit{f6}→) 20.\textit{xe4} \textit{fxe4} 21.\textit{xe4} 0–0 0–0 22.\textit{xe7} \textit{ge8} 23.\textit{c5}± and again there arises an endgame with an extra pawn for White;

18...\textit{c6} – This is obviously the best move for Black. 19.\textit{h4} \textit{d8} 20.\textit{xe6}+!? \textit{xe6} 21.\textit{xd8}+ \textit{xd8} 22.\textit{f3}± White’s queen is more mobile than Black’s rook, for example: 22...\textit{d7} 23.\textit{f4} \textit{c8} 24.\textit{a4} \textit{d4} 25.\textit{b6}+ \textit{d8} 26.\textit{e3}+ and in a position with approximate material equality, White’s pieces create numerous threats with combined efforts, while Black’s rook on g8 is presently out of play.

\textbf{16...\textit{d7}}

After 16...0–0 17.\textit{hd1}± White has an excellent compensation for
the pawn, because he dominates on the only open file and Black's king is rather unsafe.

17.\texttt{hxd1 c6}

18.\texttt{xf3}!?

This move is logical, but it has not been tested in practice yet. Black's bishop is more active than its counterpart and it is good for White to trade it. After 18.\texttt{d4}, in the game Volokitin - Ribli, Neum 2005, Black managed to equalize with 18...0-0 19.g4 \texttt{fe8}!

18...0-0

18.\texttt{xf3} - The main drawback of that move is that the g-file is opened and Black's king is doomed to remain in the centre for a long time: 19.\texttt{gxf3 c6} 20.\texttt{f4 e7} 21.\texttt{g3}! e5 (The alternatives are not better for Black: 21...\texttt{d8} 22.\texttt{x8+ d8} 23.\texttt{a4}! h6 24.\texttt{b1} - Naturally, White should preserve queens on the board. 24...\texttt{g5} 25.\texttt{e5! g8} - it is a disaster for Black to play: 25...0-0 26.\texttt{c5} - 26.a3 \texttt{c6} 27.\texttt{c7} White's compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient, since Black's king is stranded in the centre and his queenside has no defenders left; 21.\texttt{f8} 22.\texttt{d7 e8} 23.\texttt{xb7} Material is equal indeed, but White has more pieces into action.) 22.\texttt{g7 f8} (It is just terrible for Black to continue with: 22...\texttt{f8} 23.\texttt{e6+ e7} 24.\texttt{exe7+} and he will need to give up plenty of material to avoid being checkmated.) 23.\texttt{f6 d4} 24.\texttt{d5} White's pieces are tremendously active and that would enable him to obtain great material advantage soon, for example: 24...\texttt{d7} (After 24...\texttt{c5} 25.\texttt{e6+ fxe6} 26.\texttt{c7+-} Black loses his queen.) 25.\texttt{xa6! xa6} 26.\texttt{xe5+ d8} (In case of 26...\texttt{e6} 27.\texttt{f6+-} Black loses again his queen, while in the variation: 26...\texttt{e6} 27.\texttt{c7+ e7} 28.\texttt{xe6 fxe6} 29.\texttt{xd4+-} White remains with an extra pawn and with a powerful attack.) 27.\texttt{b6 e8} (It is hardly any better for Black to try: 27...\texttt{xb6} 28.\texttt{xd4 e8} 29.\texttt{xd7+ xd7} 30.\texttt{xf5+ e7} 31.\texttt{hxh7+}; or 27...\texttt{e2+} 28.\texttt{xe2} \texttt{xb6} 29.\texttt{xd7+ xd7} 30.\texttt{d3+ e7} 31.\texttt{xf5+-} and in both lines White's queen and pawns are considerably stronger than Black's two rooks.) 28.\texttt{xd7 e2+} 29.\texttt{d2 xe5} 30.\texttt{xe5+-} 18...\texttt{g6} - That move would not equalize for Black either. 19.\texttt{xc6+ bxc6} 20.\texttt{a4!} - That is a powerful maneuver for White. His knight is headed for the f6-square and it can hardly be stopped. 20...0-0 21.\texttt{c5 f8} (or 21...\texttt{fd8} 22.\texttt{d7 c5} 23.\texttt{c3} 22.\texttt{c3} \texttt{f8} 23.\texttt{g4}± Black's extra pawn is practically
immaterial, since his pieces are very passive and his king is rather unsafe.

19.\(\texttt{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\texttt{xc6}\) 20.\(\texttt{wh4}\) \(\texttt{w7}\)

That seems to be forced. It is just terrible for Black to play 20...\(\texttt{ad8}\)? 21.\(\texttt{g3}\) \(\texttt{h8}\) 22.\(\texttt{xd8}\)\(-\)\(+\), White regains his pawn too after: 20...\(\texttt{ac8}\) 21.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(\texttt{e5}\) 22.\(\texttt{h3}\) \(\texttt{f6}\)

23.\(\texttt{xex6}\)\(+\)

In the variation: 20...\(\texttt{d7}\) 21.\(\texttt{g3}\)\(+\)! \(\texttt{g6}\) (After 21...\(\texttt{f8}\) 22.\(\texttt{e5}\) \(\texttt{g8}\) 23.\(\texttt{xex6}\)\(+\), Black’s kingside pawns are weak and his pieces are passive.) 22.\(\texttt{d5}\) \(\texttt{a5}\) 23.\(\texttt{b6}\) \(\texttt{ae8}\) (In case of: 23...\(\texttt{xa2}\) 24.\(\texttt{xa8}\) \(\texttt{xa8}\) 25.\(\texttt{d8}\)\(+\) \(\texttt{xd8}\), White regains his pawn too after: 20...\(\texttt{ac8}\) 21.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(\texttt{e5}\) 22.\(\texttt{h3}\) \(\texttt{f6}\), Black is better despite the approximate material equality, because his rook is much stronger than Black’s knight, while the actions are taking part on both sides of the board.) 24.\(\texttt{b1}\) \(\texttt{e7}\) (Black’s position looks worrisome after: 24...\(\texttt{f6}\) 25.\(\texttt{d7}\) \(\texttt{f7}\) 26.\(\texttt{b3}\)\(+\) and he has great problems to parry his opponent’s numerous threats, for example: 26...\(\texttt{e5}\) 27.\(\texttt{xb7}\) \(\texttt{xd7}\) 28.\(\texttt{xd7}\) \(\texttt{xd7}\) 29.\(\texttt{xd7}\) \(\texttt{b5}\) \(\texttt{c4}\)\(+\) 25.\(\texttt{d7}\) \(\texttt{c8}\) 26.\(\texttt{g5}\) \(\texttt{g7}\) 27.\(\texttt{f6}\)\(+\) \(\texttt{g8}\) 28.\(\texttt{c4}\)\(+\) White’s piece-activity compensates amply his sacrificed pawn.

(diagram)

21.\(\texttt{xe7}\) \(\texttt{xe7}\) 22.\(\texttt{d7}\) \(\texttt{g6}\) 23.\(\texttt{xb7}\). White can rely on his pawn-onslaught to be more effective than Black’s counterplay, because his pieces are much more active, for example: 23...\(\texttt{fd8}\) 24.\(\texttt{xd8}\) \(\texttt{xd8}\) 25.\(\texttt{b6}\) \(\texttt{h4}\) 26.\(\texttt{g3}\) \(\texttt{f3}\) 27.\(\texttt{xa6}\) \(\texttt{h2}\) 28.\(\texttt{b4}\) \(\texttt{f1}\) 29.\(\texttt{e2}\) \(\texttt{e3}\) 30.\(\texttt{b5}\)\(+\) and White advances his pawns much faster.

\textbf{c2} 10...\(\texttt{b5}\)

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{diagram}
\caption{Diagram of \textbf{c2} 10...\(\texttt{b5}\)}
\end{figure}

11.\(\texttt{f4}\) \(\texttt{e5}\) 12.\(\texttt{g5}\) \(\texttt{b7}\)

12...\(\texttt{fg8}\)!? – It looks like Black is arranging his pieces for the next game..., but things are not so simple yet. 13.\(\texttt{b1}\) \(\texttt{a5}\), Yagupov – Wen, Moscow 2006 and here after: 14.\(\texttt{d5}\) \(\texttt{xd5}\) 15.\(\texttt{xd5}\) \(\texttt{b7}\) 16.\(\texttt{b3}\) \(\texttt{c8}\) 17.\(\texttt{g3}\) \(\texttt{h6}\) 18.\(\texttt{h4}\)! \(\texttt{g6}\) (It is even worse for Black to play 18...\(\texttt{g5}\) 19.\(\texttt{f5}\) \(\texttt{d5}\) 20.\(\texttt{g3}\)\(+\)) 19.\(\texttt{d3}\)\(+\) it becomes too difficult for Black to advance \textit{d}7-\textit{d}5; meanwhile he has no other sensible plan and it is too risky to grab the piece-sacrifice: 19...\(\texttt{g5}\)
Chapter 13

20. \texttt{f5 gxh4 21. \texttt{xb5!±}

12... \texttt{c6?!} – This move has not been played yet, but it deserves attention at least because it has been recommended by strong computer programs. Its main purpose is to avoid compromising the kingside. (It is worse for Black to try 12... \texttt{b6}, which also has not been tried in practice, because after: 13. \texttt{b1 0-0 14.a3 \texttt{c5 15.b4! \texttt{f2} 16. \texttt{d6!}, there arises a very unpleasant endgame for him, for example: 16... \texttt{xd6 17. \texttt{xd6 d8 18.g3! \texttt{b7 19.g3!± and Black has serious problems with the protection of his d7-pawn.})} 13. \texttt{b1 0-0 (After 13...h6 14. \texttt{xf6 \texttt{xf6 15.a3 \texttt{a5 16.d5 \texttt{xd5 17. \texttt{xa5 \texttt{e3 18. \texttt{d3 \texttt{c4 19. \texttt{b4!± Black can hardly create any real threats on the queenside, so that White can prepare methodically his pressure against Black's weaknesses on the d-file.)} 14.a3 \texttt{c5 (The endgame after: 14... \texttt{a5 15. \texttt{d6 \texttt{xd6 16. \texttt{xd6! seems to be better for White, since Black's d7-pawn is weak and he has no counterplay at all.)} 15. \texttt{c1!} h6 (Black can present his opponent with the two-bishop advantage and he can destroy his queenside, but that would not equalize for him either: 15... \texttt{d4!? 16. \texttt{b3 \texttt{xc3 17. \texttt{xc3 \texttt{xc3 18.bxc3 d5!? 19. \texttt{xf6 gxf6 20.exd5 \texttt{d8 21.c4!; or 15...b4 16.axb4 \texttt{xb4 17. \texttt{d3! \texttt{xc3 18. \texttt{xc3 \texttt{xc3 19.bxc3 d6 20. \texttt{b2! \texttt{d8 21. \texttt{c4 \texttt{e6 22. \texttt{c1!± 16. \texttt{xf6 \texttt{xf6 (It is too dubious for Black}

to try the aggressive move – 16... \texttt{xf6?! 17. \texttt{h6 f5 18. \texttt{h3!}, since he weakens his kingside, avoiding the move 12... \texttt{c6, and he remains without a pawn and he is likely to come under a dangerous attack.)} 17. \texttt{d5 \texttt{d6 (17... \texttt{xd5 – This pawn-sacrifice is too risky.} 18. \texttt{xd5 \texttt{c6 19. \texttt{xe5 d6 and here after 20. \texttt{c3!±, as well as following 20. \texttt{d5!±, it would be too difficult for Black to prove that his bishop pair compensates his pawn-sacrifice.)} 18. \texttt{b3 \texttt{a7 19.g3!± White's bishop is deployed to the h3-square and it will exert powerful pressure against the d7-pawn from there. Black's pieces are so awkwardly placed that he would hardly manage to defend against White's threats along the d-file.}

13. \texttt{b1 \texttt{a5}

Or 13... \texttt{c8 14.g3 h6 15. \texttt{xf6 gxf6 16. \texttt{h3!±} Lupulescu – Cosma, Bucharest 2005.}

14. \texttt{xf6 gxf6 15. \texttt{h6}

15... \texttt{b6!}

Black's difficulties are quite obvious after: 15... \texttt{g6 16.g3!, or 15... \texttt{c8 16. \texttt{xf6 \texttt{g8 17.g3! b4 18. \texttt{h3 \texttt{c6 19. \texttt{d5 \texttt{xd5 20.exd5}}

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**5..dc3 wc7 6.de3 a6 7.wd2 df6 8.0-0-0 db4 9.d3**

\[\text{xc2+ 21.\text{a1 xe2 22.\text{he1+}}}

- these lines have been analyzed by Anand.

It is even worse for Black to play: 15...b4? 16.wxf6 \text{g8 17.dd5 dx}d5 18.exd5 \text{c8}, Vehi Bach - Camacho Calle, Albacete 2005 and here White’s most energetic line seems to be: 19.wf5 \text{g6 20.f4+–}

16.g3 we6

After 16...b4!?, White may continue without exchanging the knight on d5 - 17.\text{a4 c6} 18.b3 \text{0-0-0} 19.wh5±, maintaining a considerable advantage, or 18...d5 19.\text{h3±}. The move 16...f5 would not work for Black due to: 17.wg7 \text{g8 18.wxe5 we6 19.wf4! Shipov.}

17.\text{h3 f5} 18.\text{h4±}

Black’s king seems to be vulnerable, so White should better preserve the queens on the board.

18...f6 19.exf5 \text{f7 20.de4 xe4 21.fxe4 dc6 22.dd6+–}


d) 9...\text{a5}

That is one of the newest lines and it became fashionable thanks to the efforts of Vishvanathan Anand. Still, Black’s knight is worse placed here than on the e5-square and that presents White with additional resources. He can attack Black’s queen along the diagonal with the move \text{e3-f4}, and he can play e4-e5 at some moment too. Black’s knight on a5 would not be able to join in the defence of Black’s kingside either.

10.\text{b1}

The move 10.\text{b3} has been tested at the highest level. It looks quite sensible, but Black’s game is more or less easy after that. There might arise the following interesting variation: 10...d5 11.tf4 (It is still not too late for White to play 11.\text{b1}; now, in case of: 11...hc3 12.bxc3 , the game transposes to the main line, while the forced variation after: 11...\text{xb3} 12.cxb3!? dxe4 is also in favour of White: 13.\text{b5 we7 14.cc7+ xc7 15.xb4 dd5 16.xe4 xe3}

17.\text{xe3 0-0 18.dd3± Luther – Maze, Reykjavik 2004.}) 11...\text{xa5}+ 12.cxb3 (After 12.axb3, it is good for Black to play 12...\text{a5.}) 12...e5!? (Black is trying to seize
the initiative. In case of 12...\textit{\texttt{a}}5, White obtains easily a stable positional advantage – 13.e5 \textit{\texttt{d}}7 14.a3 \textit{\texttt{e}}7 15.\textit{\texttt{b}}1 b5 16.b4± Topalov – Anand, Monaco 2004.) 13.\textit{\texttt{g}}3 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 14.\textit{\texttt{g}}5 \textit{\texttt{x}}3 15.\textit{\texttt{b}}1 (The other possibility for White is – 15.bxc3 \textit{\texttt{xc}}3+ 16.\textit{\texttt{b}}1 \textit{\texttt{c}}8 17.\textit{\texttt{d}}3 dxe4 18.fxe4 0–0 19.\textit{\texttt{e}}5 h6, or 18.\textit{\texttt{e}}5 h6 19.\textit{\texttt{g}}3 \textit{\texttt{h}}5 20.\textit{\texttt{x}}3 \textit{\texttt{x}}3 21.hxg3 exd3 22.\textit{\texttt{g}}7 \textit{\texttt{g}}8 23.\textit{\texttt{e}}5 \textit{\texttt{c}}2 24.\textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{g}}2 25.\textit{\texttt{x}}3 \textit{\texttt{f}}5 26.\textit{\texttt{e}}1+ \textit{\texttt{f}}8 27.\textit{\texttt{x}}h6+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7 and White’s rook on d3 is incapable of inflicting the decisive strike, because it is pinned.) 15...0–0–0 16.\textit{\texttt{c}}1!? (The other line for White here is – 16.bxc3 dxe4 17.\textit{\texttt{d}}8+ \textit{\texttt{d}}8 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}3 \textit{\texttt{d}}5, or 17.\textit{\texttt{e}}2 \textit{\texttt{d}}5 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}3 \textit{\texttt{a}}5 19.\textit{\texttt{c}}1 f6 20.\textit{\texttt{d}}4 \textit{\texttt{f}}5 21.fxe4 \textit{\texttt{e}}4+ 22.\textit{\texttt{h}}2 \textit{\texttt{h}}8 – and Black’s position is quite acceptable in both cases.) 16...b6 17.\textit{\texttt{x}}g7 (Black should not be afraid of 17.\textit{\texttt{e}}3 d4 18.\textit{\texttt{d}}3 \textit{\texttt{b}}8 19.bxc3 \textit{\texttt{c}}8=. 17...\textit{\texttt{h}}5 18.\textit{\texttt{h}}8 \textit{\texttt{x}}h8 19.\textit{\texttt{x}}c3 \textit{\texttt{c}}3 20.bxc3 \textit{\texttt{x}}g3 21.hxg3 dxe4 22.fxe4 \textit{\texttt{g}}8 23.\textit{\texttt{x}}h6 \textit{\texttt{g}}3 24.\textit{\texttt{c}}2 \textit{\texttt{g}}4 25.\textit{\texttt{d}}3 \textit{\texttt{g}}3+ 26.\textit{\texttt{d}}2 \textit{\texttt{g}}4 27.\textit{\texttt{h}}2 \textit{\texttt{e}}4 28.\textit{\texttt{e}}2. White is trying to exploit the somewhat precarious placement of Black’s rook. 28...\textit{\texttt{f}}4! 29.\textit{\texttt{e}}3 \textit{\texttt{f}}6 30.\textit{\texttt{f}}3 (or 30.\textit{\texttt{e}}4 \textit{\texttt{f}}2) 30...\textit{\texttt{g}}6! 31.\textit{\texttt{e}}4 \textit{\texttt{g}}5 – Black has succeeded just in time. Naturally, that analysis should not be considered as the supreme truth in that line...

\textit{\texttt{10...\textit{\texttt{x}}c3}}

After the modest retreat of White’s king, Black’s counter-strike in the centre does not seem to be so attractive; White will counter 10...d5 with 11.\textit{\texttt{c}}b5!

In case of 10...\textit{\texttt{c}}4 11.\textit{\texttt{x}}c4 \textit{\texttt{x}}c4 12.\textit{\texttt{d}}e2, Black’s bishop fails to go back to its usual place (12...\textit{\texttt{e}}7 13.e5±) and as a result of that the vulnerability of Black’s kingside becomes worrisome. 12...b5 (Or 12...d5 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}4 \textit{\texttt{e}}7 14.\textit{\texttt{x}}f6 \textit{\texttt{xf}}6 15.exd5 0–0 16.d6 \textit{\texttt{d}}7 17.\textit{\texttt{e}}4± Embuena Molina – Sanchez Ruiz, Mondariz 1997.) 13.a3 \textit{\texttt{a}}5, Bujisho – Miladinovic, Nice 2004, 14.\textit{\texttt{d}}4 (Now, Black must consider not only the possibility e4-e5, but also the queen-moves to f4 and g5.) 14...h6 15.h4 (White is threatening to continue with his pawn-offensive and he acquires the important h2-b8 diagonal for his pieces.) 15...b8 16.b3! \textit{\texttt{c}}6 17.\textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{c}}7 18.\textit{\texttt{e}}5±

\textit{\texttt{11.bxc3}}

\textit{\texttt{11...b5}}

In case of 11...\textit{\texttt{c}}4 12.\textit{\texttt{x}}c4 \textit{\texttt{x}}c4, White begins immediately his kingside onslaught, exploiting the fact that Black’s queen has abandoned the h2-b8 diagonal:
13. \&f4 d5 14. \&e5 0–0 (White was threatening 15. \&g5.) 15. \&xf6 gxf6 16.e5 \&c7 17. \&he1 \&e7 18. \&f4 fxe5 19. \&xe5 \&d8 20.f4 f6 21. \&e3 \&f7 (Black would not have changed much with: 21...\&e8 22.\&xe6 \&xe6 23.f5 \&ad8 24.\&xe6+ \&xe6 25.\&xe6=) 22.\&xe6 \&xe6 23. \&xe6= Khairullin – Tregubov, Kazan 2005.

White’s task is much more complicated after: 11...d5 12.\&b3 and here the fight might develop in the following fashion:

12...0–0 13.\&g5 dxe4 14.\&xf6 gxf6 15.fxe4 \&g7 (otherwise White would play \&h6, followed by \&d3 etc.) 16.\&d3 with the idea to double the rooks along the f-file with an initiative for White;

12...\&c4 13.\&xc4 dxc4 14.\&c5 \&d7 (White can counter 14...0–0 with the powerful argument – 15.\&a4!) 15.\&d4!? (or 15.\&d6 0–0–0 16.\&xc7+ \&xc7 17.\&d4 \&b5 18.a4 \&xd4 19.\&d4 \&c6 20.\&e5 \&d7= Volokitin – Haba, Erfurt 2005) 15...e5 (or 15...\&ec8 16.\&xd7 \&xd7 17.\&b6 \&e7 18.\&b4=) 16.\&xc4 b6 (or 16...0–0 17.\&d3 \&c6 18.\&d6=) 17.\&xd7!= \&xd7 18.\&d5 \&c8 (or 18...\&d8 19.\&b7=) 19.\&xd7 \&xd7 20.\&xe5+ \&f8 21.\&xb6 f6 22.\&d4=;

12...h6 13.\&f2! (White has excellent chances to fight for the initiative; in case of 13.\&f4 e5! his attacking resources are quickly exhausted: 14.\&xe5 \&xe5 15.\&xa5 \&e6 16.\&d4 \&c7 17.e5 \&d7 18.\&b3 \&xe5= Leko – Anand, Wijk aan Zee 2004.) 13...\&c6 (The alternatives are not any better for Black either: 13...\&c4 14.\&xc4 \&xc4 15.\&g3=. 13...\&xb3 14.axb3 0–0 15.\&b6 \&xc3 16.\&d4 \&c7 17.\&xf6 gxf6 18.exd5 exd5 19.\&xd5=, or 16...\&a5 17.\&xf6 gxf6 18.\&g3+ \&h8 19.\&h4 \&g7 20.\&g4+ \&h8 21.exd5 exd5 22.\&h5 \&g7 23.f4\#) 14.\&c5. Now, Black would hardly manage to castle – for example after 14...\&e7, White would follow with: 15.c4! 0–0 16.cxd5 exd5 17.e5=, while after Black’s other possibilities, White’s initiative remains very powerful thanks to the vulnerable placement of his opponent’s king: 14...b5 15.\&e3 \&e5 16.\&a3 \&b7 17.\&b6 \&b8 18.\&d4=; 14...\&e5 15.c4 dxe4 16.\&d6 \&f5 17.\&d2 e5 18.\&b6 exf3 19.gxf3=; 14...\&d7 15.c4 dxe4 16.\&d6 \&d8 17.\&g3=;

12.\&f4! \&b6

In case of 12...e5, Zawadzka – Berczes, Aghia Pelagia 2004, White has 13.\&f5! exf4 (After 13...0–0, White wins with: 14.\&h6 \&e8 15.\&xg7=+, as well as with: 14.\&xe5 \&xe5 15.\&g5 \&g4 16.\&h6+! \&h8 17.\&xf7=+) 14.e5!, and Black has serious problems: 14...\&e4 15.\&xe4 \&xe5 16.g3 f3 17.\&g5 \&c6 18.\&d6+ \&f8 19.\&e3=, or 14...\&h5 15.\&d6+ \&e7 16.g4 \&b7 17.gxh5 \&xf3 18.\&g2 \&c4 19.\&xf4 \&xe2 20.\&xf7+ \&d8 21.\&xg7=;

13.\&b3 \&c4 14.\&d4 d5

It is possible that Black should have tried to repel White’s bishop
away from the important diagonal with the line: 14...\textit{\textwilde}xd4 15.cxd4 \textit{\texth}5 16.\textit{\textc}1 d6, but even then his defence would have been difficult: 17.\textit{\textxc}4 bxc4 18.\textit{\texta}5 \textit{\textb}8+ 19.\textit{\texta}1 d5 20.\textit{\textd}2 \textit{\textd}7 21.\textit{\textb}1 \textit{\textb}5 22.a4 \textit{\textxb}1 23.\textit{\textxb}1± - White only must not forget about his knight and he should redeploy it to d6 or c5, via the b7-square at an opportune moment.

15.\textit{\textxc}4 \textit{\textw}xd4 16.cxd4 dxc4

It is preferable for Black, from the practical point of view, to follow the recommendation of S.Shipov – 16.bxc4 17.\textit{\textc}5 dxe4 18.fxe4 \textit{\textd}7, although even then the arising position, with opposite-coloured bishops, is very difficult for Black: 19.\textit{\textd}6 \textit{\textxc}5 20.bxc5± - White’s powerful outpost on d6 provides him with the control over the b-file and in general it disorganizes Black’s defence altogether.

17.\textit{\texta}5

The arising endgame is without any good prospects for Black. White has a powerful centre, his pieces dominate over the entire board and his king is much closer to the centre and to the queenside, where the actions will develop.

17...\textit{\textd}7

The further course of the game will indicate – that move is hardly necessary. Black had better play immediately 17...\textit{\textd}7, but that would not have changed the evaluation of the position. White would have proceeded with the same plan as in the game – 18.\textit{\textb}2±.

18.\textit{\textc}7! 0–0 19.d5 exd5 20.exd5 \textit{\textf}6 21.\textit{\texthe}1 \textit{\textd}7 22.\textit{\texte}5 \textit{\textfe}8 23.\textit{\textb}2. White emphasizes his overwhelming advantage. Black has no useful moves left and he is forced just to sit and wait. 23...\textit{\textac}8 24.\textit{\textxf}6 \textit{\textxf}6 25.\textit{\textc}3 \textit{\textf}8 26.\textit{\textd}4± Leko – Anand, Moscow 2004.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In this chapter, we analyze the move 8...\textit{\textb}4, which is no doubt the most aggressive for Black. After the forced reply 9.f2–f3, \textit{\textblack} has numerous possibilities at his disposal. The main lines arise after 9...\textit{\texte}5. They will be dealt with in the next chapters.

Some rarely played moves, including a natural reply like 9...0–0, lead Black to rather difficult positions. Meanwhile, White is not supposed to do anything extraordinary. Either he obtains a stable ad-
vantage in the endgame, or he develops a powerful initiative on the kingside.

The standard pawn-advance for the Sicilian Defence – a) 9...b5 turns out to be premature in that situation. White places his knight under three attacks with his move 11 and he disrupts the pawn-shelter of his king deliberately on his next move. He gains some time however in order to organize some concrete threats. White thus obtains a considerable advantage with an energetic play in the centre and on the kingside.

Black is not well-prepared for the immediate counter strike in the centre – b) 9...d5. After the natural move 10.a3, he is faced with the unpleasant choice between perishing quickly in the complications and defending a difficult endgame without any counterplay.

White had great problems for a long time trying to cope with the move c) 9...c67, connected with the preparation of the thematic pawn-advance d7-d5. White’s most powerful argument here is the move – 10...d2! In variation c1), we have analyzed Black’s most natural move 10...d5, with which he practically wins a pawn by force. He falls behind in development though and his pawn-structure on the kingside is destroyed, so that he has problems finding a reliable shelter of his king. In variation c2), Black is trying to organize some counterplay on the queenside with the move 10...b5. White has a powerful maneuver with his bishop then and he forces his opponent to advance his e-pawn, as a result of which Black’s d7-pawn becomes very weak for a long time.

In variation d), we analyze the line 9...a5, which was introduced into the tournament practice by Anand. It did not become so popular though, since Black was practically forced to give up his bishop for White’s knight on c3. Black’s dark squares are weak then and he must trade queens in order not to come under attack on the dark squares. In the endgame then, Black is doomed to a long and laborious defence without chances of obtaining any counterplay.
Chapter 14

1.e4 c5 2.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f}3 \text{~c}6 3.d4 \text{cxd4} 4.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd4} \text{e}6\) 5.\( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}3 \text{~c}7 6.\text{\textit{e}} \text{e}3 \text{a}6 7.\text{\textit{d}} \text{d}2 \text{~f}6 8.0-0-0 \text{\textit{b}} \text{b}4 9.f3 \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}5

10.\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b}3\)

Black is quite ready to lose a tempo in many variations of the Sicilian Defence in order to repel his opponent’s knight from the active d4-square. Here, surprisingly White retreats his knight deliberately. The reason is that Black’s positional threat – \( \text{\textit{hc}}3 \) has become real and White must consider that possibility seriously.

10...\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b}5\)

We must analyze some other lines for Black too:

If he captures – 10...\( \text{\textit{xc}}3 \), then White obtains a clear advantage after 11.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{xc}3 \) (It is also possible for White to continue with: 11.bxc3 \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}4 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}4 \text{\textit{xc}}3 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}5 \) b6 14.\( \text{\textit{xb}} \text{b}6 \) 0-0 15.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}4\) Equiza – San Emeterio, Mondariz 2002, or 11...d5 12.\( \text{\textit{f}} \text{f}4 \) 0-0 13.\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g}3!\) 11...\( \text{\textit{xc}}3 \) 12.bxc3 b5 (It is weaker for Black to play: 12...d5 13.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}4 \text{ed}7 \), Wiegelmann – Suetin, Berlin 1993, 14.exd5\( \pm \) 13.\( \text{\textit{f}} \text{f}4 \) \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}4 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}4 \text{bxc}4 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{a}} \text{a}5 \) d5, Acher – Chernuschevich, Aix les Bains 2003, 16.\( \text{\textit{he}}1 \) 0-0 17.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}6 \) \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}8 \) 18.exd5 exd5 19.\( \text{\textit{xe}}8+ \) \( \text{\textit{xe}}8 \) 20.\( \text{\textit{xd}} \text{d}5 \) \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}6 \) 21.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}4\)\( \pm \);

Just like before, it is too optimistic for Black to play 10...\( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}4 \) – because he falls behind considerably in development: 11.\( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}4 \) \( \text{\textit{xc}}4 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}4 \) 0-0 (In case of 12...\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}7 \), Pavel – Papp, Budapest 2004, White maintains a stable advantage with: 13.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}5 \) 0-0 14.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}6\) 13.a3 \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}7 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}5 \) \( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}5 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{a}} \text{a}5 \) \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}3 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}4 \text{xd}2+ \) 17.\( \text{\textit{xd}} \text{d}2 \) b5 18.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}6\)\( \pm \) Luther – Hulak, Kuşadası 2006; In case of 10...d6, White can enter the following forced variation: 11.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}4 \) \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c}6 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{xf}} \text{f}6 \text{gxf}6 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{a}} \text{a}3 \) \( \text{\textit{xc}} \text{c}3 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{wc}} \text{c}3 \) \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e}7 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g}4 \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{h}} \text{h}4\) – and his superior pawn-structure and the possibility for him to attack his opponent’s king, stranded in the centre, qualify the position as better for White, B.García – Borges Mateos, Cuba 2003;
It is too slow for Black to play 10...\textit{e}7, since it enables White to develop a powerful initiative after: 11.f4 \textit{c}c4 12.\textit{x}xc4 \textit{xc}xc4 13.e5 \textit{e}e4 (It is equally bad for Black to try: 13...\textit{g}g4 14.\textit{d}d4 f5 15.h3 \textit{h}h6 16.\textit{f}f2 b5 17.\textit{c}c5 \textit{xc}5 18.\textit{xc}5 b4 19.b3 \textit{xc}3 20.\textit{xb}b1-+ Sax - Z.Medvegy, Hungary 2003.) 14.\textit{xc}xe4 \textit{xe}xe4 15.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5 16.\textit{xc}5 \textit{c}c6 17.\textit{e}e3 0-0 18.\textit{f}f6 \textit{e}c7 (In case of: 18...\textit{x}xg2 19.\textit{g}g1 \textit{hxh}2 20.\textit{e}e4, Black’s resistance crumbles rather quickly, for example: 20...b5 21.\textit{f}f2 \textit{h}h6 22.\textit{fd}g2++) 19.\textit{hd}1± Korneev - Bellon Lopez, Seville 2005;

White counts 10...0-0-0 with 11.\textit{xb}b1 and here there might follow:

About 11...d5 12.\textit{d}d4 – see 10...d5; or 11...b5?! 12.\textit{xb}b5±; or 11...\textit{xc}3 12.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xc}3 13.bxc3 d5 14.\textit{d}d4±; or 11...\textit{xc}4 12.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 13.\textit{d}d4 \textit{e}e7 14.e5 \textit{e}e8 15.\textit{e}e4± Skibbe – Igonin, Willingen 2005; or 11...\textit{e}e7 12.f4 \textit{e}e4 13.\textit{e}e4 \textit{e}e4 14.f5 \textit{e}e5 15.\textit{f}f1± Skibbe – Igonin, Willingen 2005; in case of: 12...\textit{xc}4 13.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4, White begins an offensive in the centre – 14.e5 \textit{g}g4 15.\textit{d}d4 f6 16.h3 \textit{x}xe5 17.\textit{hxg}4 \textit{exd}4 18.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xb}b4 19.\textit{e}e3 \textit{xc}3 20.\textit{bxc}3± 13.e5! \textit{xe}3 14.\textit{xe}3 \textit{g}g4 15.\textit{e}e2! \textit{h}h6 16.\textit{g}e4 b5 17.g4 \textit{b}b7 18.\textit{g}g2±;

10...d5 11.\textit{d}d4 0-0 12.\textit{xb}b1 dxe4. That is the principled line for Black. (His position remains rather dubious after: 12...\textit{c}c4 13.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 14.\textit{xf}6 \textit{gxf}6 15.\textit{d}d4±, while the continuous tension in the centre presents White with many more additional possibilities, for example after 12...\textit{d}d8, he can play not only the straightforward line 13.\textit{g}g5 \textit{g}g6 14.e5, but also the insidious move 13.\textit{e}e1 and Black cannot follow with 13...dxe4, due to: 14.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xd}1+ 15.\textit{xd}1++ Sax – Z.Medvegy, Hungary 2003.) 14.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 15.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5 16.\textit{xc}5 \textit{c}c6 17.\textit{e}e3 0-0 18.\textit{f}f6 \textit{e}c7 (In case of: 18...\textit{x}xg2 19.\textit{g}g1 \textit{hxh}2 20.\textit{e}e4, Black’s resistance crumbles rather quickly, for example: 20...b5 21.\textit{f}f2 \textit{h}h6 22.\textit{fd}g2++) 19.\textit{hd}1± Korneev - Bellon Lopez, Seville 2005;

White counters 10...0-0 with 11.\textit{xb}b1 and here there might follow:

About 11...d5 12.\textit{d}d4 – see 10...d5; or 11...b5?! 12.\textit{xb}b5±; or 11...\textit{xc}3 12.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xc}3 13.bxc3 d5 14.\textit{d}d4±; or 11...\textit{xc}4 12.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 13.\textit{d}d4 \textit{e}e7 14.e5 \textit{e}e8 15.\textit{e}e4± Skibbe – Igonin, Willingen 2005; or 11...\textit{e}e7 12.f4 \textit{e}e4 13.\textit{e}e4 \textit{e}e4 14.f5 \textit{e}e5 15.\textit{f}f1± Skibbe – Igonin, Willingen 2005; in case of: 12...\textit{xc}4 13.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4, White begins an offensive in the centre – 14.e5 \textit{g}g4 15.\textit{d}d4 f6 16.h3 \textit{x}xe5 17.\textit{hxg}4 \textit{exd}4 18.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xb}b4 19.\textit{e}e3 \textit{xc}3 20.\textit{bxc}3± 13.e5! \textit{xe}3 14.\textit{xe}3 \textit{g}g4 15.\textit{e}e2! \textit{h}h6 16.\textit{g}e4 b5 17.g4 \textit{b}b7 18.\textit{g}g2±;

10...d5 11.\textit{d}d4 0-0 12.\textit{xb}b1 dxe4. That is the principled line for Black. (His position remains rather dubious after: 12...\textit{c}c4 13.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 14.\textit{xf}6 \textit{gxf}6 15.\textit{d}d4±, while the continuous tension in the centre presents White with many more additional possibilities, for example after 12...\textit{d}d8, he can play not only the straightforward line 13.\textit{g}g5 \textit{g}g6 14.e5, but also the insidious move 13.\textit{e}e1 and Black cannot follow with 13...dxe4, due to: 14.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xd}1+ 15.\textit{xd}1++ Sax – Z.Medvegy, Hungary 2003.) 14.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 15.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5 16.\textit{xc}5 \textit{c}c6 17.\textit{e}e3 0-0 18.\textit{f}f6 \textit{e}c7 (In case of: 18...\textit{x}xg2 19.\textit{g}g1 \textit{hxh}2 20.\textit{e}e4, Black’s resistance crumbles rather quickly, for example: 20...b5 21.\textit{f}f2 \textit{h}h6 22.\textit{fd}g2++) 19.\textit{hd}1± Korneev - Bellon Lopez, Seville 2005;
mate material equality.) 22...\( \textfloat{xc} \)4 23.\( \textfloat{x} \)e5 \( \textfloat{xa} \)4 24.\( \textfloat{h} \)4!? White is no doubt dominant, but still he must play very precisely. (In case of: 24.\( \textfloat{b} \)5 \( \textfloat{e} \)6 25.\( \textfloat{c} \)3 \( \textfloat{c} \)6, Acs – Fries Nielsen, Germany 2005, it is far from easy for White to exploit the vulnerability of the a1-\( \textfloat{h} \)8 diagonal – Black would counter 26.\( \textfloat{e} \)4 with 26...\( f \)6. The point is that the potential energy of the bishop is so great that White must act energetically – otherwise Black might avoid trouble.) 24...\( \textfloat{e} \)8 25.\( \textfloat{f} \)4 \( \textfloat{c} \)6 26.\( \textfloat{h} \)5 \( \textfloat{a} \)4 (or 26...\( \textfloat{a} \)6 27.hxg6 hxg6 28.b3\( \textfloat{e} \)7 27.hxg6 fxg6 28.\( \textfloat{h} \)2 \( \textfloat{e} \)7 29.\( \textfloat{g} \)5 \( \textfloat{c} \)7 30.\( \textfloat{b} \)5 \( \textfloat{d} \)8 31.\( \textfloat{x} \)g6+ hxg6 32.\( \textfloat{h} \)8+ \( \textfloat{g} \)7 33.\( \textfloat{x} \)d8\)

\[ \text{\textfloat{d}4!?} \]

This is a new idea – White must strive to trade queens, since then he would exploit the weaknesses on Black’s queenside much easier. Meanwhile, he is not afraid of the exchange on c3 and he forces his opponent to clarify his intentions concerning the bishop on b4.

In the variation: 11.\( \textfloat{f} \)2 \( \textfloat{xc} \)3 12.bxc3 d6 13.\( \textfloat{b} \)6 \( \textfloat{b} \)8 14.\( \textfloat{a} \)5!, White plans to trade queens on b6 except that after a complicated maneuver. His aim is quite clear after the move in the text. White has tried four other moves in that position, but Black has managed to solve his opening problems after a precise play:

1) 11.\( \textfloat{d} \)4 \( \textfloat{f} \)7 12.\( \textfloat{f} \)2 d6 13.\( \textfloat{g} \)4 0–0 14.\( \textfloat{f} \)1 (Or 14.\( \textfloat{g} \)5 \( \textfloat{f} \)d7 15.f4, Sakaev – Xu Jun, Moscow 2004 15...b4?!, this was recommended by Delchev and Semkov 16.\( \textfloat{e} \)2 \( \textfloat{b} \)7!; 16.\( \textfloat{a} \)4 \( \textfloat{c} \)4 17.\( \textfloat{e} \)2 \( \textfloat{a} \)5 18.\( \textfloat{g} \)1 e5\textfloat{2}) 14...\( \textfloat{f} \)d7 15.\( \textfloat{g} \)1 (It is not good for White to opt for 15.f4?! b4! – that is an important intermediate move. 16.\( \textfloat{a} \)4 \( \textfloat{x} \)g4 17.\( \textfloat{g} \)3 e5\textfloat{1}! Jazbinsek – Ivanisevic, Ljubljana 2005.) 15...\( \textfloat{b} \)7 (It also deserves attention for Black to try the immediate 15...b4 16.\( \textfloat{a} \)4 \( \textfloat{b} \)7!? Delchev, Semkov.) 16.\( \textfloat{g} \)5 \( \textfloat{f} \)c8 17.a3 \( \textfloat{c} \)4 18.\( \textfloat{x} \)c4 \( \textfloat{x} \)c4\textfloat{1}∞ and there arose a position with mutual counter chances in the game, Lahno – Goloshchapov, Kharkiv 2004;

The active queen-sortie does not yield anything substantial for White after: 12.\( \textfloat{g} \)5 \( \textfloat{g} \)6 13.\( \textfloat{g} \)3 – he is trying to trade queens, but Black should better avoid that: 13...e5! 14.\( \textfloat{e} \)3 d6 15.\( \textfloat{f} \)2 (White has also tried here: 15.h4 b4 16.\( \textfloat{d} \)5 \( \textfloat{d} \)5 17.exd5 \( \textfloat{f} \)5 18.\( \textfloat{d} \)2 h5\textfloat{1}, but Black had a promising position in the game Kolesnik – Teterev, Minsk 2004) 15...\( \textfloat{b} \)8 16.\( \textfloat{b} \)1 0–0 17.g4 b4 18.\( \textfloat{e} \)2 a5 19.g5 (It is even worse for White to play: 19.h4? a4 20.\( \textfloat{bc} \)1 \( \textfloat{x} \)g4! 262

19...a4 20.\[c]bc1 \[h]h5 21.\[g]g3 \[g]f4 22.\[x]h5 \[x]h5\[†] and Black has already advanced his pawns and his position was better in the game Smirnov – J. Geller, Togliatti 2003.

2) 11.\[b]b1 – The drawback of this usually quite useful move for White in the Sicilian Defence is that Black can create an immediate counterplay on the b-file with: 11...\[c]c4! 12.\[x]c4 bxc4

13.\[c]c1 (White has also tried to place his knight in the centre 13.\[d]d4!? \[b]b8 14.\[a]al 0–0 15.g4 d6 16.h4 – 16.a3 \[a]5= Sax – Goloshchapov, Rethymnon 2003 – 16...e5 17.\[f]f5 \[x]f5 18.gxf5 d5, Korneev – Vehi, Seville 2007, but here after the best for White: 19.exd5 \[b]b7 20.\[g]g5 \[a]5 21.\[b]b1 \[x]c3 22.\[x]c3 \[x]d5 23.\[x]e5 f6 24.\[w]e6 \[h]h8 25.\[d]d2 \[f]e8 \[b] Black has more than sufficient compensation.) 13...\[b]b8! Black is al-ready eyeing his opponent's king! 14.\[e]e2 (After 14.\[f]f4 e5 15.\[g]g5 \[w]b6 16.\[c]al 0–0 17.\[x]f6 \[a]3 18.b3 \[f]f6 19.\[d]d5 \[w]d8!, the position remains approximately equal, but White played imprecisely later and he could have become even worse. 20.\[g]g3 – The situation is rather unclear after: 20.\[c]c3 cxb3 21.axb3 d6 22.\[w]c7 \[x]c7 23.\[x]c7 f5 24.\[d]c3 \[w]f7\[∞] – 20...a5 21.\[f]f5 \[e]e8 22.g4 \[b]7 23.g5 \[x]d5 24.\[w]d5 cxb3 25.axb3, Zufic – Delchev, Zadar 2004, 25...a4\[†]? 14...0–0 15.\[c]a1 (or 15.\[f]f4 e5 16.\[g]g5 \[e]e8! 17.\[a]al d6 18.a3, Borisek – Delchev, Nova Gorica 2005, 18...\[a]5! and Black is not worse at all) 15...d5! 16.\[g]g5 (It becomes clear now that it is bad for White to play: 16.\[f]f4? e5 17.\[g]g5, Goloshchapov – Tregubov, Istanbul 2003, 17...\[x]c3! 18.\[d]d5 d4 19.\[x]f6 \[w]b6\[†]? 16...dxe4 17.\[x]f6 \[g]xf6 18.\[w]h6 \[w]e5 19.f4 \[f]5, Korneev – Delchev, Navalmoral 2004 and here it was obvious that White's best decision was to force a draw after: 20.\[d]d4? \[x]c3 21.\[x]f5 \[x]b2 22.\[b]b1 \[a]3=;)

3) 11.\[f]f2 – This line is relatively not so well-analyzed.
11...0-0! (Here, it is not so good for Black to play: 11...c4?! 12...c5! 0-0! 13...b1 xc3 13.bxc3 d5 15...c4! ? bxc4 16...d2 b7 17...a1± Volokitin – Vachier Lagrave, Cap d’Agde 2006. White’s idea can be best seen in the line: 11...xc3 12.bxc3 d6 13...b6 b8 14...a5?! , creating the threat to exchange queens on b6 after which White’s endgame is clearly better. 14...c4 15.xb4 a5 16.xd6 cxd6 17.e5 d5 18.exd6 0-0 19...c5 b8= 15.xc4 bxc4 16. d4 b7∞; 15...g3! h5 16...g5 cxa5 17...xa5 c7 18...b3 g6 19...d2 0-0 20.g4 g7 21.xd6 xc3 22.d3 e1 – 22...xf6 23.h4! – 23...b2± Tseshkovsky – Markus, Zlatibor 2006) 12...c5 13.xc5 14...xc5 d5 15.exd5 b4 16...a4 xd5= and White has hardly any advantage in that endgame, Tseshkovsky – Bryzgalin, Belorechensk 2005;

4) 11...e1 – That move creates a tactical threat and it frees the d2-square for the bishop.

11...e7 (After 11...b7? Black falls for a simple trap: 12...xb5 axb5 13...xb4± Abreu – Hernandez, Morelia 2006.) 12.f4 g6 13.e5 g4 14.d2 b7 15.d3 (After 15.h3 h6 16.e4 c8 17.d3 f5 18.d6 xd6 19.exd6 xd6, White’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient. In addition, he simply blundered a piece: 20. xf2?? xd3++ Vasilkova – Ovod, Moscow 2007.) c8 16.e4 (It is not enough for White to claim an advantage after: 16.e2 f5?! 17.exf6?! – 17.h3 h6 18.a3 0-0 19.hf1 d6 20.d4 d7 21.exd6 xd6 22.xe6 xex6 23.xe6 fe8 24.d4 xg2 25.xf5 xf5 26.xf5 cd8 27.cf2 h4± Delchev, Semkov – Delchev, Santa Cruz de La Palma 2005, Black has the surprising resource: 17...xf6 18. hf1 0-0 19.g3 b4 20.e4 xe4 21.xe4 a5± and Black was even slightly better in the game Svidler – Vitiugov, Moscow 2006.) 16...0-0 17...b1 (In case of 17.h3, Kolev – Delchev, Santa Cruz de La Palma 2005, Black has the surprising resource: 17...c4xe5! Delchev, Semkov, 18.fxe5 cxe5 and his compensation is just excellent, which can be best illustrated with the following lines: 19...b1 f5 20.c3 xd3 21.cxd3 xd6= with a good compensation for the piece; or 19...g3 xd3 20.xd3 f5 21.g3 f4 22.f1 b4! 23...b1 xg2 24.g1 xh3++; 23.g1 ef5 24.c3 d5 25.e2 a5+) 17...f5 18.exf6 xf6 19.xf1 a5 20.a5 wc6 21.xxe6 xef6 22.g3, Zufic – Lazarev, Trieste 2005, Black could have equalized by force if he so wished with the line: 22...e5! 23.xg6 hxg6 24.fxe5.
White would not achieve much with 14.\textit{\textsc{e}}e4 0-0 15.\textit{\textsc{c}}c5 \textit{\textsc{b}}b7 16.d6 (White did not obtain any edge after 16.h3 \textit{\textsc{h}}6 17.\textit{\textsc{x}}xe7 \textit{\textsc{x}}xe7 18.\textit{\textsc{x}}d3 \textit{\textsc{d}}5 19.\textit{\textsc{a}}a5 \textit{\textsc{x}}xa5 20.\textit{\textsc{x}}xa5 \textit{\textsc{e}}a7 21.\textit{\textsc{x}}xb7 \textit{\textsc{x}}xb7 22.\textit{\textsc{c}}c6 \textit{\textsc{d}}7 23.g3 f6= Belov – J. Geller, Moscow 2007.) 16...\textit{\textsc{d}}d5 17.\textit{\textsc{x}}d5! White has some compensation indeed, but not more. 17...\textit{\textsc{e}}xd5 18.\textit{\textsc{e}}d1 (Or 18.\textit{\textsc{d}}d2 \textit{\textsc{c}}c6=; 18.g3 \textit{\textsc{f}}6 and here it is bad for White to opt for: 19.\textit{\textsc{d}}d1 fxe5 20.\textit{\textsc{x}}d5 \textit{\textsc{h}}8 21.f5, Balogh – Delchev, Tusnad 2005, 21...\textit{\textsc{x}}d6 22.\textit{\textsc{e}}xd6 \textit{\textsc{e}}e3!+, while after 19.\textit{\textsc{g}}2, the forced play leads to an equal position after: 19...fxe5 20.\textit{\textsc{x}}d5 \textit{\textsc{d}}h8 21.\textit{\textsc{x}}a8 \textit{\textsc{x}}xd6 22.\textit{\textsc{x}}xd6 \textit{\textsc{x}}xd6 23.\textit{\textsc{f}}f3 \textit{\textsc{f}}f6=) 18...\textit{\textsc{f}}6 19.g3 \textit{\textsc{e}}c6 (It is insufficient for Black to equalize with: 19...\textit{\textsc{e}}e4 20.\textit{\textsc{x}}d5 \textit{\textsc{xc}}5 21.\textit{\textsc{xc}}5 \textit{\textsc{ac}}8 22.b4! – 22.\textit{\textsc{xc}}8?! \textit{\textsc{xc}}8 23.b4 \textit{\textsc{f}}8 24.\textit{\textsc{d}}d3 \textit{\textsc{xc}}5 25.\textit{\textsc{xc}}5 \textit{\textsc{b}}7 26.\textit{\textsc{g}}1 \textit{\textsc{d}}5= – 22.\textit{\textsc{xc}}d6 23.\textit{\textsc{xd}}6 \textit{\textsc{wc}}6 24.\textit{\textsc{g}}2 \textit{\textsc{wd}}5 25.\textit{\textsc{xd}}5 \textit{\textsc{fe}}8 26.\textit{\textsc{xd}}a6±; 23...\textit{\textsc{wd}}8 24.\textit{\textsc{h}}3! \textit{\textsc{wf}}6 25.\textit{\textsc{xd}}7 \textit{\textsc{ed}}8 26.\textit{\textsc{e}}e1 \textit{\textsc{wc}}3 27.\textit{\textsc{e}}e4\textsuperscript{+} 20.\textit{\textsc{ex}}f6 \textit{\textsc{xd}}6 21.\textit{\textsc{fx}}g7 \textit{\textsc{fe}}8 22.\textit{\textsc{f}}2 \textit{\textsc{ac}}8 23.\textit{\textsc{d}}d3 \textit{\textsc{ac}}7 24.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4 \textit{\textsc{wf}}6 25.\textit{\textsc{df}}5 \textit{\textsc{ab}}6 26.\textit{\textsc{xb}}6 \textit{\textsc{xb}}6\textsuperscript{=}, with a very complicated fight, with mutual chances, Borisek – Ivanisevic, Nova Gorica 2007.

After 11.\textit{\textsc{xd}}4, Black has three logical responses: a) 11...\textit{\textsc{c}}3, b) 11...\textit{\textsc{e}}7 and c) 11...\textit{\textsc{c}}6.

\textbf{a) 11...\textit{\textsc{c}}3}

We can be easily convinced that the exchange on c3 is not a threat if we analyze this possibility in details. That position is usually reached if White plays 11.\textit{\textsc{e}}e1 (instead of 11.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4) 11...\textit{\textsc{xc}}3 12.\textit{\textsc{xc}}3.

\textit{\textbf{12.\textit{\textsc{xc}}3 \textit{\textsc{xc}}3 13.\textit{\textsc{bxc}}3 \textit{\textsc{c}}6}}

We must have a look at the other variations for Black too:

13...\textit{\textsc{d}}5 – That is an attempt by him to solve his opening problems outright. 14.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4! \textit{\textsc{ed}}7 15.\textit{\textsc{xd}}5 \textit{\textsc{xd}}5. This is forced. (After 15...\textit{\textsc{xd}}5 16.\textit{\textsc{e}}e1 \textit{\textsc{d}}8 17.\textit{\textsc{g}}4± Black is in a big trouble.) 16.\textit{\textsc{xe}}7 \textit{\textsc{g}}8 17.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4 \textit{\textsc{b}}7 18.\textit{\textsc{c}}4! \textit{\textsc{bc}}4 19.\textit{\textsc{a}}5 0-0 0-0 20.\textit{\textsc{xc}}4± and Black was simply a pawn down in the game Iordachescu – Macieja, Bermuda 2004;

13...\textit{\textsc{c}}4 – That move has not been tested in practice yet, but it would not equalize either. 14.\textit{\textsc{xc}}4 \textit{\textsc{bc}}4 15.\textit{\textsc{a}}5 d5 16.\textit{\textsc{xd}}5 \textit{\textsc{xd}}5 (or 16...\textit{\textsc{xd}}5 17.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4 \textit{\textsc{f}}6 18.\textit{\textsc{xc}}4\textsuperscript{=}) 17.\textit{\textsc{he}}1 \textit{\textsc{e}}6 (It would be a mistake for Black to try: 17...0-0? 18.\textit{\textsc{c}}5 \textit{\textsc{d}}8 19.\textit{\textsc{c}}6 \textit{\textsc{d}}7 20.\textit{\textsc{e}}7 \textit{\textsc{h}}8 21.\textit{\textsc{xd}}5\textsuperscript{=} 18.\textit{\textsc{d}}4\textsuperscript{=};

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13...b7, Deepan – Smeets, Kochin 2004, 14.e4! g6 (It is worse for Black to opt for 14... c4? 15.xc4 bxc4 16.a5±) 15. d6 0–0 0 16.c4± – White exchanges his doubled pawn and he preserves the two-bishop advantage with a clear edge.

14.c4 bxc4

After 14...b4 15.c5! a5 16.d6 h5 17.h4 g8 18.c5, Black cannot complete his development: 18...ge7 19.d2 f6 20.f4 e5 21.g3 d4 22.h3± and White obtained an overwhelming advantage in the game Stoinev – Todorov, Sofia 2006.

15.xc4 d5

Black will have to play that move at some moment anyway.

After 15...a5 16.b5 a6, Iuldachev – Satyapragyan, Pune 2004, 17.a4!?, Black has a problem finding a useful move, for example: 17...0–0?! 18.c5±

16.exd5 e5 17.a5 xc4 18.xc4 exd5

It is even worse for Black to try 18...xd5? 19.d6 h8 (After 19.e7 20.c5 f6 21.d4! g5 22.h4± White’s initiative is very powerful, possibly even decisive.) 20.c5 g8 21.c4 f4 22.d2± and White’s knight on d6 is a monster. Black’s defence is quite problematic, despite the material equality.

19.d6!

White insists on attacking. He can also continue with the simpler line: 19.b6 b8 20.xd5± with excellent winning chances.

19...e7 20.c5 e6 21.f4! d7 22.f5 c6 23.a3 d7 24.he1 hf8, Vuckovic – Lapcevic, Bar 2005 and here White could have settled the issue with the move – 25.xd3!+ – and Black would be helpless.

b) 11...e7

This position has been reached after another move-order in the game we will analyze now: 1.e4 c5 2.f3 c6 3.d4 cxd4 4.xd4 wb6 5.b3 f6 6.c3 e6 7.e3 c7 8.f3 a6 9.ud2 b5 10.0–0–0 e5 11.ud4 e7.

12.e2 0–0 13.g4

It deserved attention for White to trade queens with the line:
13.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{xb}6\) 14.\(\text{xb}6\) \(d6\) 15.\(a3\) \(\text{xd}7\) 16.\(\text{a}5\)± with a slightly better endgame for him.

13...\(d6\) 14.\(h4\)

White would not achieve much with 14.\(a3\) \(\text{b}7\) 15.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{xb}6\) 16.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{ac}8\) 17.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{a}8\) =

14...\(\text{b}7\) 15.\(h5\) \(\text{c}6\)

After 15...\(\text{c}4\) 16.\(g5\) \(\text{e}5\) 17.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{b}1\) White is slightly better.

16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}4\), Trkulja – Kurajića, Bihac 1999 and here, instead of the move in the game – (17.\(\text{b}1\)), it looks much better for White to continue with: 17.\(\text{a}4\)! \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(h6\) \(g6\) 19.\(\text{b}1\) \(a5\) 20.\(\text{d}4\)±

c) 11...\(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{b}6\)

12...\(\text{e}5\)?
That is an exquisite move. Black provokes the advance of White’s f3-pawn, with the idea to weaken the e4-pawn. The drawback of that move is that Black’s queen is a bit awkwardly placed.

I will mention here that the other moves lead to an edge for White.

12...\(\text{xb}6\) 13.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{xc}3\) (In case of 13...0–0, White has the resource: 14.\(a4\)! \(\text{xc}3\) 15.\(\text{axb}5\) \(\text{axb}5\) 16.\(\text{bxc}3\) \(\text{a}6\) 17.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{e}8\) 19.\(\text{b}4\)±; 15...\(\text{xb}2\) 16.\(\text{xb}2\) \(\text{axb}5\) 17.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{a}6\) 19.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{dxc}6\) 20.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\) 21.\(\text{a}1\)± and he is clearly better. Black’s knight, as well as his king, is incapable of taking part in the fight on the queenside.) 14.\(\text{bxc}3\) and White has the advantage in that position. His bishop-pair and Black’s vulnerable dark squares compensate amply White’s partially compromised pawn-structure. 14...\(\text{d}5\) 15.\(\text{e}2\) 0–0 16.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}8\) (It is hardly to be recommended to Black to continue with: 16...\(\text{e}5\)?! 17.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{c}4\) 18.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{bxc}4\) 19.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 20.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{gxf}6\) 21.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{g}7\) 22.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{b}7\) 23.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{fb}8\) 24.\(\text{hd}1\) \(\text{a}5\) 25.\(\text{d}7\) \(\text{g}8\) (but not 25...\(\text{d}8\)?! 26.\(\text{bd}4\) \(\text{ac}8\)? 27.\(\text{eg}4\) \(\text{h}8\) 28.\(\text{xf}6\)++) 26.\(\text{d}1\)±) 17.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{a}7\) 18.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}5\) (or 18...\(\text{dxe}4\) 19.\(\text{fxe}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 20.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{c}7\) 21.\(\text{hd}1\) and White occupies reliably the d-file 21...\(\text{b}8\) 22.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{fd}7\) 23.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{d}8\) \(\text{ce}7\) 25.\(\text{d}6\)±) 19.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 20.\(\text{he}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 21.\(\text{exd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) (or 21...\(\text{exd}5\) 22.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{bxa}4\) 23.\(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 24.\(\text{f}1\)± and White’s couple of
bishops is totally dominant in that position) 22.\textit{\textipa{x}}xb5 axb5 23.\textit{\textipa{x}}xd5 \textit{\textipa{d}}f4 24.\textit{\textipa{g}}5! f6 25.\textit{\textipa{g}}4 \textit{\textipa{d}}5 26.\textit{\textipa{c}}4± and White remains with an extra pawn in that endgame;

12...\textit{\textipa{d}}d6!? 13.\textit{\textipa{w}}xc7 \textit{\textipa{w}}xc7 14.\textit{\textipa{g}}4!

– White not only occupies space on the kingside, but he is ready to repel Black’s knight from the f6-square at any moment. 14...0–0 (Black’s plan with the immediate pawn-advance d7-d5 is not good at all: 14...h6 15.\textit{\textipa{w}}e2 b4 16.\textit{\textipa{a}}4 d5 17.\textit{\textipa{a}}c5 – White’s knight has occupied a perfect outpost. 17...dxe4 18.\textit{\textipa{x}}xe4 \textit{\textipa{e}}5 19.\textit{\textipa{h}}3 0–0 20.\textit{\textipa{b}}b1) 15.\textit{\textipa{e}}2 d6 (After the natural move 15...\textit{\textipa{e}}5, White exchanges the dark-squared bishops and he occupies the d6-square: 16.\textit{\textipa{c}}5 \textit{\textipa{d}}8 17.\textit{\textipa{d}}d6 \textit{\textipa{x}}xd6 18.\textit{\textipa{a}} xd6 \textit{\textipa{e}}8 19.\textit{\textipa{d}}d2 d6 20.\textit{\textipa{f}}4 b4 21.\textit{\textipa{a}}a4 a5 22.\textit{\textipa{b}}b5 \textit{\textipa{d}}7 23.\textit{\textipa{h}}d1 \textit{\textipa{e}}5 (or 23...\textit{\textipa{a}}ab8 24.c4 bxc3 25.\textit{\textipa{a}} xc3 \textit{\textipa{b}}4 26.a4±; 23...\textit{\textipa{c}}7 24.\textit{\textipa{x}} xd6 \textit{\textipa{x}}xb5 25.\textit{\textipa{x}} xd7±) 24.\textit{\textipa{x}} xd7 \textit{\textipa{x}} xd7 25.\textit{\textipa{g}}5 \textit{\textipa{a}}7 26.\textit{\textipa{d}}d4 \textit{\textipa{b}}7 27.\textit{\textipa{f}}5 \textit{\textipa{f}}8 28.\textit{\textipa{c}}4± White’s pieces are very active.) 16.a3 \textit{\textipa{b}}7 17.\textit{\textipa{g}}5 \textit{\textipa{d}}7 18.\textit{\textipa{f}}4 \textit{\textipa{b}}6 19.\textit{\textipa{h}}f1± White is slightly better, thanks to his space advantage.

13.\textit{\textipa{a}}d2!?

White prevents Black’s plans and he forces his opponent to clarify his intentions concerning the future of his king. Black can leave it in the centre in case of an immediate transfer into an endgame.

13...0–0

Black’s other possibility here is 13...\textit{\textipa{b}}b8 14.\textit{\textipa{e}}3 – White has exchanged the places of his queen and bishop in an original fashion. Now, his knight on c3 is reliably protected and White’s queen can be quickly redeployed to the kingside. There might follow: 14...\textit{\textipa{c}}7 (or 14...0–0 15.\textit{\textipa{f}}4 \textit{\textipa{c}}7 16.\textit{\textipa{d}}3±) 15.\textit{\textipa{f}}4 (White can also try: 15.\textit{\textipa{d}}5 \textit{\textipa{x}}d2 16.\textit{\textipa{x}} xd2 exd5 17.exd5 \textit{\textipa{e}}5 18.\textit{\textipa{e}}2 \textit{\textipa{x}} e3 19.\textit{\textipa{x}} e3 \textit{\textipa{d}}8 20.\textit{\textipa{e}} c6 dxc6 21.\textit{\textipa{d}}3± 15...d6 16.\textit{\textipa{d}}3± and his attacking chances on the kingside are much greater with a bishop on d3 than his opponent’s counterplay on the queenside. Meanwhile, Black has a problem what to do with his bishop on b4.

14.\textit{\textipa{f}}4 \textit{\textipa{b}}8

It is not good for Black to play 14...\textit{\textipa{h}}5 15.\textit{\textipa{d}}3 \textit{\textipa{b}}8 16.\textit{\textipa{f}}2 d5 17.exd5 \textit{\textipa{x}} xd5 (or 17...\textit{\textipa{a}} xc3 18.\textit{\textipa{x}} xd5 exd5 19.\textit{\textipa{h}}3±) 15.\textit{\textipa{b}} b8

White is not forced to trade queens now, but still it does not seem too good for him to opt for: 15.\textit{\textipa{e}}3 e5!? (It is also interesting for Black to sacrifice a pawn with 15...a5!? 16.\textit{\textipa{a}}xb5 d5 – and he has a serious compensation.)
16.f5 \(\mathcal{b}b7\) 17.g4 (After 17.a3 \(\mathcal{xc}3\) 18.\(\mathcal{xc}3\) \(\mathcal{ed}8\) 19.\(\mathcal{we}1\) d5 20.exd5 \(\mathcal{xd}5\) 21.\(\mathcal{ad}2\) \(\mathcal{wd}6=\) Black’s pieces have occupied the central squares and White is not better at all.) 17... \(\mathcal{xc}3\) 18.\(\mathcal{xc}3\) \(\mathcal{xe}4\) 19.\(\mathcal{wx}e4\) \(\mathcal{dd}4\)
20.\(\mathcal{xd}4\) \(\mathcal{xe}4\) 21.\(\mathcal{xe}4\) f6 22.\(\mathcal{ag}2\) d5 23.\(\mathcal{ee}2\) e4 24.\(\mathcal{db}1\) – There arose a position with a non-balanced material ratio and only tournament practice can deliver its correct final evaluation.

15... \(\mathcal{ex}b8\) 16.\(\mathcal{e}5\) \(\mathcal{gg}4\) 17.\(\mathcal{de}4\)

White has another interesting possibility at his disposal – 17.\(\mathcal{eg}1!\)? f6 (Black should not be too greedy: 17... \(\mathcal{hx}h2?\) 18.\(\mathcal{ee}2\) f5 19.\(\mathcal{ex}f6\) \(\mathcal{xf}6\) 20.\(\mathcal{eh}1\) \(\mathcal{he}6\) 21.f5 \(\mathcal{xc}3\) 22.\(\mathcal{bx}c3\) \(\mathcal{eh}4\) 23.\(\mathcal{fx}e6\) \(\mathcal{dx}e6\)
24.\(\mathcal{le}1\) \(\mathcal{le}4\) 25.\(\mathcal{dd}3=\) – and at the end he loses material. Black is again worse after: 17... \(\mathcal{df}2\) 18.\(\mathcal{ee}1\) f5 19.\(\mathcal{ax}c3\) 20.\(\mathcal{ax}c3\) \(\mathcal{de}4\) 21.\(\mathcal{dd}2=\) 18.\(\mathcal{ee}2\) \(\mathcal{df}2\) 19.\(\mathcal{dd}1\) \(\mathcal{xc}3\) 20.\(\mathcal{ax}c3\) \(\mathcal{de}4\) 21.\(\mathcal{dd}4\) (or 21.\(\mathcal{ff}3\) \(\mathcal{xc}3\) 22.\(\mathcal{bx}c3\) \(\mathcal{bb}6=\) ) 21... \(\mathcal{bx}d4\) 22.\(\mathcal{dx}d4\) \(\mathcal{bb}7\) 23.\(\mathcal{ff}3\) 

17...f5!

The other lines are not any better for Black:

17...f6 18.\(\mathcal{le}2\) f5 19.\(\mathcal{ce}3\) \(\mathcal{ee}7\) 20.\(\mathcal{lx}g4\) \(\mathcal{gx}g4\) 21.\(\mathcal{le}3\) 

17... \(\mathcal{ax}d2\) 18.\(\mathcal{lx}d2\) \(\mathcal{cb}4\) 19.\(\mathcal{le}2\) \(\mathcal{ee}3\) 20.\(\mathcal{ff}3\) \(\mathcal{xa}2\) 21.\(\mathcal{bb}1\) \(\mathcal{cb}4\) 22.\(\mathcal{dd}6\) \(\mathcal{bb}6\) 23.\(\mathcal{ee}1\) \(\mathcal{cc}4\) 24.\(\mathcal{xc}4\) \(\mathcal{bx}c4\) 25.\(\mathcal{ca}5\) c3 26.\(\mathcal{dd}6=\) – Black’s bishop on c8 is a sorry sight now. 26... \(\mathcal{bb}5\) 27.\(\mathcal{bb}3\) \(\mathcal{cb}2\) 28.\(\mathcal{xb}2\) f6 (or 28... \(\mathcal{bb}7\) 29.\(\mathcal{ee}2=\) ) 29.c3 \(\mathcal{cc}6\) 30.c4 \(\mathcal{bb}7\) 31.\(\mathcal{xc}6\) \(\mathcal{dx}c6\) 32.\(\mathcal{xc}6=\)

18.\(\mathcal{xf}6\) \(\mathcal{ax}d2\)

Or 18...d5 19.\(\mathcal{le}2\) \(\mathcal{ax}d2\) 20.\(\mathcal{ax}d2\) dxe4 21.\(\mathcal{lx}g4\) \(\mathcal{xf}6\) 22.\(\mathcal{ee}1\) \(\mathcal{xf}4\) 23.\(\mathcal{dd}1\) \(\mathcal{bb}7\) 24.\(\mathcal{cc}5=\)

19.\(\mathcal{ax}d2\) \(\mathcal{xf}6\) 20.\(\mathcal{xf}6\) \(\mathcal{xf}6\) 21.g3 \(\mathcal{ee}5\) 22.\(\mathcal{xe}5\) \(\mathcal{xe}5\) 23.\(\mathcal{ag}2\) \(\mathcal{bb}7\) 24.\(\mathcal{xb}7\) \(\mathcal{xb}7\) 25.\(\mathcal{hd}1=\)

White maintains the advantage thanks to his superior pawn-structure.

Conclusion

The variation, which we have analyzed in this chapter, is probably one of the key-lines for the evaluation of the entire idea of the aggressive development – \(\mathcal{ee}3\), \(\mathcal{dd}2\), 0–0–0 in the Taimanov system of the Sicilian Defence. After 10...b5, White has a great choice of possibilities. Black’s counterplay seems to be sufficient in the main lines, according to the contemporary theory. Therefore, I suggest a new move and an original idea, connected with it.
Chapter 14

By playing 11.\( \mathcal{d}4 \), White is trying to exchange queens and that seems to be rather unpleasant for Black, since he can hardly avoid it. The trade of Black's dark-squared bishop on c3 turns out to be quite favourable for White. The defect of his pawn-structure is compensated by his complete dominance over the dark squares, moreover that White usually advances easily c3-c4 in most of the cases and his advantage becomes overwhelming. If Black refrains from exchanging on c3 then White succeeds in trading queens. The arising positions then are clearly advantageous for White.
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