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Introduction

This monograph is an anthology of miniature games, a collection of instructive mistakes and the severe retribution they receive. In books of this type one often sees 25-move games, which both formally, and in character, bear no relation to the theme. But in the present book only genuine miniatures are included: no game lasts more than 18 moves.

Any game, whether it be a short or a ‘full-length’ one, concluding deep in the endgame, is not lost without a mistake: perhaps a tactical blunder or an imperceptible error in the evaluation of a position. A loss in the opening, or immediately after it, is usually the result of a serious oversight. But we have endeavoured to select examples, in which the mistakes causing the disaster are not so obvious, and the retribution is both instructive and entertaining.

In such a thoroughly studied stage of the game as the opening, one would expect theoretical knowledge and experience to be a reliable guarantee against danger. But, as the reader will see, opening disasters are suffered not just by ignorant amateurs, but even by well-known grandmasters. How can this be explained?

The principles of playing the opening are fairly simple, and can be found in any primer. But when it comes to applying them, it turns out that all these general recommendations are relative, and that they frequently contradict one another. When, for example, a strong player violates the principle of development in favour of material gain, he does not do this through naivety. He may decide that in the given instance the material lost by the opponent is more important than the time wasted. If this evaluation is correct, he will win. But he may also make a mistake (say, by cutting short his calculation too early and overlooking a veiled manoeuvre by the opponent), and will then come under an irresistible attack.

In this volume the reader will find 107 instructive games won by Black. When White loses in such a short time, this is usually for one of the following reasons: (a) Passive play in the opening, allowing the opponent to take the initiative by sharp (including gambit) means; (b) Significant positional errors when mounting an attack; (c) Direct tactical mistakes, such as overlooking a combinational possibility for the opponent in the calculation of a variation.

In the commentaries, apart from an indication of the mistakes made, the reader will find information on the basic theory of the given variation. The games are arranged in the order normally adopted in opening guides, each opening being preceded by a brief description and historical outline.
This, the most popular of the Open Games, gives White the opportunity, without burning his boats, of solving his main opening problem – that of turning the advantage of the first move into an enduring initiative. In contrast to the classical Open Games, he operates over a broad front, subjecting the opponent’s position to methodical pressure.

Black has a wide choice of both defensive, and counterattacking possibilities – from purely positional to gambit lines. His plan is usually based on the preparation of a central counter and activity on the queenside. But a number of variations have also been developed, in which Black resorts to sharp measures, aiming to seize the initiative and to attack the position of the white king.

Schliemann Defence

<table>
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<th>Game 1</th>
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<td>Mazzoni-Boey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havana Olympiad 1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 e4 e5
2 c3 c6
3 d3 f5

A counterattack which was originally proposed by the Russian master Jaenisch in 1847. Outwardly the position resembles the Vienna Game with colours reversed (1 e4 e5 2 c3 c6 3 f4). The difference, however, is fundamental. Black complicates the play, regardless of the lost tempo and the opponent’s active move b5.

4 c3

The sharp reaction 4 d4 is hardly correct, although it demands accurate defence on Black’s part. There is a problematic variation where White sacrifices a piece: 4...fxe4 (4...exd4 5 e5) 5 cxe4 dxe5 6 dxe5 c6 7 c3 (otherwise after 7...a5+ Black picks up the e5 pawn) 7...cxb5 8 cxb5 d5 9 exd6 f6.

4...fxe4
5 dxe4 d5
6 dxe5

After the quiet 6 c3 Black gains a satisfactory position by 6...g4:

(a) 7 h3 xf3 8 xf3 d6 9 0-0 (9 f5 e6 10 g4 Kf7! is unfavourable for White) 9...0-0-0 (Sigurjónsson-Tatai, Barcelona 1980);
(b) 7 0-0 f6 8 xc6+ bxc6 9 d3 e7 10 e1 0-0-0 11 g5 xf6 12 xg6 xd1 13 xe7 xe7 14 xd1 d6 and again Black equalises (Geller-Mikh.Tseitlin, Moscow 1993).

6...dxe4
7 c6

7 h5+ g6 8 xg6 hxg6 9 xh8 favours Black. After 9...f6! 10 xg8 e6 11 xc6+ bxc6 12 h7 0-0-0 the white queen is in danger.

7...g5
This is considered more risky than 7...\textit{d}5.

\textbf{8 \textit{c}4?}

This is what White plays against 7...\textit{d}5. But here the queen is not attacked, and Black has available an important tempo for development.

The critical variation begins with 8 \textit{w}e2 \textit{d}f6 9 \textit{f}4, and now:

(a) 9...\textit{w}xf4 10 \textit{d}e5+ \textit{c}6 11 \textit{d}4 \textit{h}4+ 12 \textit{g}3 \textit{h}3 13 \textit{c}4 \textit{e}6 14 \textit{g}5 and 0-0-0, when White stands better;

(b) 9...\textit{w}h4+ 10 \textit{g}3 \textit{h}3 11 \textit{d}e5+ \textit{c}6 12 \textit{c}4 \textit{c}5 13 \textit{d}3 \textit{g}4 14 \textit{f}7 \textit{f}2+ 15 \textit{d}1 \textit{e}3 16 \textit{w}f3, and Black’s counterattacking attempts are parried.

\textbf{8 ... \textit{d}f6}

Black continues his development and prevents the unpleasant queen check at \textit{h}5, which would have followed after the immediate capture of the \textit{g}2 pawn, as well as after 8...\textit{d}7 9 \textit{d}3 \textit{x}g2.

Relying on the rapid mobilisation of his forces, the Belgian master aims for a curious gambit variation.

\textbf{9 \textit{d}xa7+ \textit{c}6}

\textbf{10 \textit{d}xc6 \textit{b}xc6}

\textbf{11 \textit{d}xc6+ \textit{f}7}

\textbf{12 \textit{d}xa8 \textit{w}xg2}

\textbf{13 \textit{f}1 \textit{h}3}

Of course, Black has no intention of regaining the exchange — his bishop dominates the weak light squares.

\textbf{14 \textit{w}e2 \textit{c}5}

\textbf{15 \textit{d}5+ \textit{x}d5}

\textbf{16 \textit{c}xd5 \textit{e}8}

\textbf{17 \textit{a}4}

White’s pieces are paralysed, and his queenside blockaded. The only way of offering any resistance was by 17 \textit{w}c4. But then, exploiting the fact that the white queen has to guard the rook, and that moves by the d- and f-pawns are not possible, Black can regroup his forces against \textit{f}2: 17...\textit{g}8 18 \textit{d}6+ \textit{h}8 19 \textit{d}7 (19 \textit{b}4 \textit{d}4) 19...\textit{f}8 20 \textit{d}8=\textit{w} (20 \textit{f}3 \textit{exf}3; 20 \textit{w}e2 \textit{a}4 and 21...\textit{w}f3) 20...\textit{a}xd8, and the attack nevertheless achieves its goal.

The move played allows Black to conclude the game immediately.

\textbf{17 ... \textit{a}g4}

\textbf{White resigns: moving the queen allows 18...\textit{w}f3 with inevitable mate.}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Game 2}
\textbf{Matanovic–Janosevic}
\textbf{Zagreb 1953}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
1 e4 e5
2 \textit{d}f3 \textit{c}6
\end{center}
3 \( \text{b5} \) \( f5 \)
4 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \)
5 \( \text{exf5} \) \( \text{c5} \)
6 0-0 0-0
7 \( \text{e1} \)

More in the spirit of the variation is 7 \( \text{dxe5} \), and if 7...\( \text{dxe5} \) 8 \( d4 \), or 7...\( \text{dxe4} \) 8 \( \text{d3} \).

After the move played the d4 square is controlled by Black, and White is unable to create any threats on the e-file. It should also be borne in mind that, with the f-file half open, the f2 square may become a tactical weakness.

7 ... d6
8 \( \text{a4} \)

White’s desire to exchange the active enemy bishop is understandable. He assumed that the threat of leaving Black with three isolated pawns on the e-file would force him to reject the advance in the centre and to retreat his bishop to b6.

The natural continuation was 8 d3 and then \( \text{dxe3} \).

8 ... e4!
9 \( \text{xc5} \) dxc5
10 \( \text{xc6} \)

The attempt to play actively on the kingside by 10 \( \text{c4+ h8} \) 11 \( \text{g5} \) is dubious. By sacrificing the exchange – 11...\( \text{xf5} \) 12 \( \text{f7+} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 13 \( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{e5} \), Black gains a highly promising position.

The move played has the aim of maintaining the pawn at f5.

10 ... bxc6
11 \( \text{h4} \)

When he allowed ...e5-e4, the future grandmaster was aiming for this position. But had he taken into account the opponent’s reply?

11 ... \( g5! \)

Pawns do not count – what is important is to open the file. Exploiting the unfortunate position of the knight, Black gains time for the attack on f2.

12 \( \text{fxg6} \) \( \text{g4} \)
13 \( \text{gxh7+ g7}! \)

This way, rather than 13...\( \text{xh7} \), when there could have followed 14 \( \text{xe3} \), and if 14...\( \text{dxe3} \) 15 \( \text{h5+} \).

14 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d4} \)
15 \( \text{e2?} \)

Of course, a tougher defence was offered by 15 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{dxe3} \) (if 15...\( \text{xf2} \) 16 \( \text{h8=+} \) \( \text{xe8} \) 17 \( \text{xf2} \) or 16...\( \text{xe8} \) 17 \( \text{h5+} \), while after 15...\( \text{xe2} \) White defends with 16 \( \text{e1} ) 16 \( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 17 \( \text{e2} \).

15 ... \( \text{xf2} \)
16 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{f1+} \)

White had overlooked the double check (this one or 16...\( \text{g2+} \), and
he resigned without waiting for the mate.

**Cozio Defence**

**Game 3**

**Spielmann–Tartakower**

*Munich 1909*

1 e4 e5
2 ♘f3 ♗c6
3 ♘b5 ♗ge7

An ancient continuation. Of the modern grandmasters, Bent Larsen is one who has occasionally employed it.

4 ♗c3

4 c3 or 4 d4 is also played.

4 ... g6

5 d4 exd4

5...♗g7 is strongly answered by 6 ♘g5!, e.g. 6...h6 (6...f6 shuts in the bishop and weakens the a2-g8 diagonal) 7 ♘e3 exd4 8 ♘xd4 0-0 9 ♗d2 and then 0-0-0.

6 ♘xd4

In his game with Tartakower at the tournament in Karlsbad (1911) Johner played 6 ♘d5, and after 6...♘xd5 7 exd5 ♗e7+ 8 ♗f1 ♗e5 9 ♗xd4 f6 10 ♗f4 ♗g7 11 ♗e1 he gained the advantage.

It is considered bad to answer 6 ♘d5 with 6...♗g7 in view of 7 ♘g5, but an interesting game on this theme was played recently in Moscow. Black, as though nothing had happened, played 7...h6, and after 8 ♗f6 ♘xf6 9 ♘xf6+ ♗f8 10 ♘xd4 ♗f5! 11 ♘h7+ (11 exf5 ♗xf6 12 ♘xc6 dxc6 13 fxg6 ♗g7! 14 gxf7 ♗d8 leads to an intricate position) 11...♗xh7 12 exf5 ♗f6 13 ♘xc6 (or 13 fxg6 fxg6 14 ♗f3 ♗e7+, with equal chances) 13...dxc6 14 fxg6 fxg6 15 0-0 ♗d7 the game was completely equal – immediately or after 16 c3 c5 White will have to play ♗f3 (Chernov-Vul, USSR 1992).

6 ... ♗g7

7 ♘e3 0-0

8 h4?

This flank activity is premature. In full accordance with the teachings of Steinitz, Black replies with a counterblow in the centre.

8 0-0 or 8 ♗d2 would have been the natural continuation.

8 ... ♘xf5!

This move demanded precise calculation.

9 exd5 ♘xd5

10 ♘xc6 bxc6

11 ♘xc6 ♗xe3

12 fxe3
On 12 \( \text{Wxd8} \) there would have followed 12...\( \text{Qxc2}+ \) 13 \( \text{Qd2} \) (13 \( \text{Qf1? \ Aa6+} \)) 13...\( \text{Qxd8+} \) 14 \( \text{Qxc2} \) \( \text{Qf5+} \), winning a pawn after 15 \( \text{Qe4} \) (15 \( \text{Qe4? \ Ab8} \) and ...\( \text{Qb6} \)) 15...\( \text{Qxc3} \). However, this would have been the lesser evil for White.

12 ... \( \text{Qb8} \)
13 \( \text{Wxd8} \) \( \text{Qxd8} \)

The two bishops have become enormously strong.

14 0-0 \( \text{Qxb2} \)
15 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qa6} \)
16 \( \text{Qad1} \)

16 ... \( \text{Qd6!} \)

The white pieces have lost their coordination, and Tartakower accurately exploits this. 16...\( \text{Qxf1?} \) would have been a false trail in view of 17 \( \text{Qc7+ Qf8} \) 18 \( \text{Qxg6+ hxg6} \) 19 \( \text{Qxd8+ Qc7} \) 20 \( \text{Qd7+ Qe6} \) 21 \( \text{Qxf1} \) \( \text{Qxc2} \) 22 \( \text{Qxc7} \).

17 \( \text{Qf2} \)

White moves his rook and at the same time defends his c2 pawn, but... ends up in a fatal pin.

17 ... \( \text{Qf8} \)

Forcing the bishop to retreat.

18 \( \text{Qa4} \) \( \text{c6!} \)

White resigns.

The 'trick' 19 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \) 20 \( \text{Qxd6} \) fails to save him after 20...

\( \text{Qb1+} \) 21 \( \text{Qh2} \) \( \text{Qe5+} \), winning.

**Steinitz Defence**

**Game 4**

**Varain–Salminger**

*Munich 1896*

1 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{e5} \)
2 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qc6} \)
3 \( \text{Qb5} \) \( \text{Qf6} \)
4 0-0 \( \text{d6} \)

For 4...\( \text{Qc5} \), see Games 7 and 8.

5 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{exd4} \)
6 \( \text{Qxd4} \)

6 \( \text{Wxd4} \) followed by 6...\( \text{Qd7} \) 7 \( \text{Qxc6} \) \( \text{Qxc6} \) 8 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 9 \( \text{Qg5} \) is also good.

6 ... \( \text{Qd7} \)
7 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qe7} \)

The game has transposed into a line of the Steinitz Defence, in which numerous continuations have been tried: 8 \( \text{b3} \), 8 \( \text{Qg5} \), 8 \( \text{Qf4} \), 8 \( \text{Qe1} \), 8 \( \text{Qde2} \), as well as 8 \( \text{Qxc6} \) followed by 9 \( \text{Wf3} \), 9 \( \text{Wd3} \) or 9 \( \text{Qf4} \), and 8 \( \text{Qxc6} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) 9 \( \text{Qa4} \).

8 \( \text{f4} \)

This move is also perfectly feasible. White plans \( \text{e4-e5} \), in order to gain a spatial advantage in the centre. However, subsequently both players do not act in the best way.

8 ... 0-0
9  
It looks natural to put pressure on the e4 pawn. But this means that the e-file is the place for the rook, not the queen.
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
Failing to anticipate the danger, White opens the long diagonal for the opponent's light-square bishop. He should have completed his development by 14 \( \text{Wf3} \) and \( \text{dxe1} \).
14  
15  
White naively assumes that the queen will be forced to retreat. He should have defended \( g2 \) by 15 \( \text{We2} \), and answered 15...\( \text{h5} \) with 16 \( \text{g1} \), and 15...\( \text{g4} \) with 16 \( \text{g1} \).
But what is bad about the move played?

White is already a piece down, so it is not essential to give this capture a question mark.
16  
17  

\textbf{Classical Defence}

\textbf{Game 5}
\textbf{Licka–Gierek}
\textit{Prague 1958}

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
A sharp counterattack with the aim of not allowing White to create pawn centre. 4...\( \text{d5} \), with the same aim, is examined in Game 6.

The alternative is 5 \( \text{exf5} \), e.g. 5...\( \text{e4} \) 6 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{exf3} \) 7 \( \text{dx}c5 \) \( \text{we7}+ \) 8 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{fxg2} \) 9 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{g6} \) with a sharp position and chances for both sides.

But what is bad about the move played?

Until quite recently it was thought that the variation 6 \( \text{dxe}5 \) \( \text{dxe}5 \) 7 \( \text{wh5}+ \) \( \text{g7} \) 8 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{we7} \) 9 \( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{f6} \) leads to an equal game: 10 \( \text{xf7}+ \) \( \text{f8} \) (not 10...\( \text{xf7} \) 11 \( \text{xe5}+ \)) 11 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 12 0-0 \( b6 \). But after 10 \( \text{xf7}+ \) \( \text{xf7} \) 11 \( \text{xf7}+ \) \( \text{xf7} \) 12 \( \text{f4} \) White stands slightly better.

Black does best to answer 6 \( \text{g5} \) with 6...\( \text{b6} \), and if 7 \( \text{d5} \) e3!

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8 \( \text{Wh} \) 5+ \( g \) 6
9 \( \text{Q} \) xg 6

9 \( \text{We} \) 2 is more promising. Until recently the sharp line 9...\( \text{Wh} \) 4 *(9...\( \text{Q} \) f 6 is well met by 10 \( \text{Q} \) g 5) 10 \( \text{Q} \) d 2 (it is unfavourable to win the e 4 pawn by 10 g 3 \( \text{Wh} \) 3 11 \( \text{W} \) xe 4 in view of 11...\( \text{Q} \) e 6) 10...\( \text{Q} \) f 5 was considered acceptable for Black, since 11 h 3 \( \text{Q} \) xe 5 12 dxe 5 0-0-0 13 g 4 e 3! 14 \( \text{W} \) xe 3 \( \text{Q} \) e 6 15 \( \text{W} \) xa 7 (15 \( \text{Q} \) f 3 \( \text{Q} \) xg 4) 15...\( \text{Q} \) xg 4 gives him active play for the sacrificed material.

But 11 g 4! (instead of 11 h 3) is very strong: if 11...\( \text{Q} \) e 6 12 \( \text{Q} \) xe 4 \( \text{Q} \) xe 5 13 h 3 with the threats of 14 \( \text{Q} \) g 5 and 14 \( \text{Q} \) c 5, while after 11...
\( \text{Q} \) xe 5 12 gxf 5 \( \text{Q} \) f 6 13 fxg 6 hxg 6 14 \( \text{Q} \) xe 4 Black has no compensation for the lost pawn *(Davies-Speelman, Hastings 1987/8)*.

9... \( \text{Q} \) f 6

10 \( \text{W} \) h 4

On the basis of an ancient analysis by Schliemann, given in Bilguer’s *Handbuch*, 10 \( \text{W} \) h 6 \( \text{Q} \) g 8 11 \( \text{Q} \) h 4 \( \text{Q} \) f 8 12 \( \text{W} \) e 3 \( \text{W} \) e 7 leads to a promising position for Black. If instead 11 \( \text{Q} \) e 5, then Black can ignore the threat of \( \text{Q} \) g 5 by replying 11...\( \text{W} \) x 2, and if 12 \( \text{Q} \) g 5 \( \text{Q} \) xe 5 13 dxe 5 \( \text{Q} \) g 4!

10... \( \text{W} \) g 8
11 \( \text{Q} \) e 5 \( \text{Q} \) x 2

Later, in a game Gutierrez-L.Bronstein (Buenos Aires Olympiad 1978), Black counterattacked by 11...\( \text{Q} \) xe 5 12 dxe 5 \( \text{W} \) d 3!, creating the threat of...\( \text{Q} \) g 4.

On 13 h 3 there followed 13...\( \text{Q} \) e 6 14 \( \text{Q} \) d 2 (if 14 exf 6 0-0-0 15 \( \text{W} \) h 5 \( \text{Q} \) g 4) 14...0-0-0 15 \( \text{W} \) h 6 (15...e 3 16 fxe 3 \( \text{Q} \) x 2 was threatened) 15...\( \text{Q} \) d 5!! 16 \( \text{W} \) xe 6+ \( \text{Q} \) b 8 17 \( \text{W} \) f 5 \( \text{Q} \) e 3! 18 fxe 3 (18 \( \text{W} \) xe 4? \( \text{Q} \) c 2+ 19 \( \text{Q} \) d 1 \( \text{W} \) xe 4) 18...\( \text{W} \) xe 3+ 19 \( \text{Q} \) d 1 \( \text{Q} \) x 2, and the attack succeeded.

As shown by Kovacevic, White would not have been saved by either 13 \( \text{Q} \) d 2 \( \text{Q} \) g 4 14 f 3 exf 3 15 gxf 3 \( \text{W} \) e 3+ 16 \( \text{Q} \) d 1 (16 \( \text{Q} \) f 1 \( \text{Q} \) f 5) 16...\( \text{Q} \) x f 3+, or 13 exf 6 \( \text{Q} \) g 4 14 f 3 exf 3 15 gxf 3 \( \text{Q} \) x f 3.

12 \( \text{Q} \) g 5
White was probably happy with his position, anticipating 12...e7
13 cxb6 axb6 14 w5+, but...

12 ... dxe5
13 dxe5 g4!
14 e2 e3
White resigns

Game 6
Petterson–Forslund
Correspondence 1988

1 e4 e5
2 f3 c6
3 b5 c5
4 c3 d5

A new and original continuation in this ancient variation. The resulting positions resemble the Ponziani Opening – 1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c3 d5.

5 a4

5 dxe5 comes into consideration, and if 5...w5 6 d4 (or 6 c6 wxg2 7 f1 xe4+ 8 e2 xe2+ 9 xe2 a6) 6...xg2 7 f3 xf3 8 xf3 dxe4 9 g5 e7 10 c6+ bxc6 11 e4.

5 ... dge7
6 dxe5 0-0

An interesting sacrifice. Black replies to 7 c6 c6 8 c6 with 8...w5, provoking a weakening of the light squares on the kingside, when 9 g3 bxc6 transposes into a position from the game. Instead 9...xf2+ is more than risky: 10 xf2 w6+ 11 g2!

7 c6 c6

8 c6 w5!
The basic tactical idea of this variation. After 8...bxc6 White would have castled and then played d2-d4.

9 g3

Now 9 0-0? would have been answered by 9...h3.

9 ... bxc6
10 w1?

By defending his bishop White creates the threat of 11 d4, but he fails to consider the consequences of a further sacrifice. He should have played 10 xc6, when after 10...xf2 11 xf2 Black still has to demonstrate the correctness of his attack.

10 ... xf2+
11 xf2 g4
12 w1 f5

Of all White’s pieces, only his king is ‘developed’. The unavoidable opening of the f-file concludes the attack.

13 d4
If 13 e5 f4.

13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
White resigns

This continuation is unfavourable for Black, but only if White plays accurately.

After the natural 6...c6 7 dxe5 dxe5 8 dxe5 d5 9 exd6 Black has difficult problems: 9...\( \text{dxe}4 \) (not 9...\( \text{dxe}6 \)? 10 \( \text{We}1+ \), when he loses the right to castle, since 10...\( \text{dxe}6 \) is met by 11 \( \text{dxe}6+ \text{fxe}6 12 \text{Wh}5+ \) and 13 \( \text{dxe}5 \)) 10 \( \text{dxe}5+ \text{dxe}5 12 \text{Wxe}6+ \text{fxe}6 13 \text{dxe}5 \text{Wh}5+ , \text{Ivkov-Keller, Copenhagen 1953} \)) 11 \( \text{h}5+ \), if 11...\( \text{dxe}5 \), 12 \( \text{dxe}5+ \text{fxe}6 13 \text{Wh}5+ , \text{15...dxe}5 \) with advantage to White (Shamkovich-Aronin, Moscow 1962).

Attention has therefore turned to 6...a6:

(a) 7 \( \text{dxe}5 \text{a}7 \) (preserving the dark-square bishop is an improvement over 7...\( \text{dxe}4 \) 8 dxc5 \( \text{dxe}5 \) 9 b4 \( \text{dxe}6 \) 10 \( \text{dxe}5+ \text{b}5 \), which favours White – Euwe) 8 dxe5 \( \text{dxe}4 \) 9 \( \text{dxe}5 \text{Wh}4 \) (the immediate 9...d5 10 exd6 \( \text{dxe}5 \) is also satisfactory) 10 \( \text{dxe}5 \) d5 11 exd6 \( \text{dxe}6 \) 12 \( \text{dxe}5 \) with equal chances (Chandler-Spassky, London 1984);

(b) 7 \( \text{a}4 \text{dxe}4 \) 8 \( \text{dxe}4 \) is a recommendation by Plaskett, but after 8...\( \text{dxe}7 \) 9 \( \text{dxe}4 \) Black’s position would not appear to be worse;

(c) 7 dxe5 axb5 8 exf6 \( \text{dxe}6 \) 9 c3 c6 10 d3 0-0 11 \( \text{dxe}3 \) \( \text{dxe}3 \) 12 \( \text{dxe}3 \) with an equal position (Timman-Belyavsky, Linares 1993).

7 dxe5 \( \text{dxe}5 \)
8  \textit{f}g4

8 \textit{f}d4 followed by \textit{f}2-\textit{f}4 is also promising (8...\textit{f}g5 9 \textit{x}xg5 \textit{x}xg5 10 \textit{f}4, or 8...\textit{c}c5 9 \textit{f}4).

8  \ldots  \textit{f}g5

9  \textit{f}4  \textit{h}5

10  \textit{f}g3

White maintains his sights on the \textit{g}7 pawn.

The seemingly restrained 10 \textit{f}f1 was good. If 10...\textit{c}c5+ 11 d\textit{h}1 \textit{d}e4, then 12 \textit{w}e2!

10  \ldots  \textit{h}4

11 \textit{w}g4  \textit{c}c5+

12 \textit{d}h1  \textit{d}e4

13  \textit{x}xg7  \textit{d}h5

White has carried out his plan, but in moving his rook Black has created a strong threat.

14  \textit{e}e2?

The danger could have been eliminated by the other attack on the rook – 14 \textit{w}g4.

When he defended against the threat by attacking the rook, White overlooked the final move of the combination. There were, however, mitigating circumstances: the game was played without looking at the board.

![Game 8](image)

Tordera–Garcia
Madrid 1988

1  e4  e5

2  \textit{d}f3  \textit{d}c6

3  \textit{d}b5  \textit{d}f6

4  0-0  \textit{d}c5

5  \textit{d}xe5  \textit{d}xe4

6  \textit{f}xf7?!

This temporary sacrifice is tempting but incorrect. It is true that Black is prevented from castling, but on the other hand he gains time.

The consistent continuation is 6 \textit{w}e2 \textit{d}xe5 7 \textit{w}xe4 \textit{w}e7 8 \textit{d}c3 (to 8 \textit{d}d4 Black should reply 8...\textit{d}c6, whereas 8...\textit{d}g6 loses a pawn after Simagin’s suggestion of 9 \textit{d}xd7+! \textit{d}xd7 10 \textit{w}xf5+, or 9...\textit{d}xd7 10 \textit{w}xb7 0-0 11 dxc5 \textit{w}xc5 12 \textit{d}c3). 8...\textit{d}g6 9 \textit{w}xe7+ \textit{d}xe7 (if 9...\textit{d}xe7 10 \textit{d}e4 \textit{b}6 11 b3 a6 12 \textit{d}c4 \textit{d}e5 – or 12...d6 13 \textit{d}b2 with the better chances – 13 \textit{d}b2 d6 14 \textit{d}f1 \textit{f}8 15 \textit{c}d5 with advantage, Marjanovic-Stoica, Kirovakan 1978) 10 \textit{d}d5, when White stands better.

10...c6 is not good in view of 11 \textit{d}c7+ \textit{d}d8 12 \textit{d}xa8 cxb5 13 a4! b4
14 d3 b6 15 a5 (Adorjan), while after 10...d6 11 e1+ d8 12 e3 e8 13 c4 e7 14 d4 f4 15 g3 xex3 16 xex3 d6 17 h4! White’s two bishops and spatial advantage give him the advantage (Y. Grunfeld-Salov, Haifa 1989).

6 ... xf7
7 h5+ g6
8 d5+ g7
9 xex6

To 9 xex4 Black has the good reply 9...d5, and if 10 a4 xf8.

9 ... e8

An important move, gaining time for the completion of his mobilisation.

10 a4 e6
11 d3

White’s queenside is completely undeveloped, whereas Black’s pieces are aiming at the kingside.

It should be mentioned that Black’s vigorous actions in this game (and, however, also in certain others) are an indication primarily of good opening knowledge. The game Kuznetsov-Spassky from a tournament in Kiskovodsk (1960) developed in exactly the same way. Spassky continued the offensive with 11...h4, and White cleverly complicated matters: 12 g3 h3 13 b4! xf2 14 c3+ g8 15 xex5 g4 16 b3+ d5 17 xd5+. Even so, 17...e6! (after 17..cxd5 18 xex5+ e6 the mate threat can be parried by 19 g2) 18 f8+ g7 (not 18...xf8? 19 xex6+ g7 20 e7+, when it is White who wins!) clarified the situation. After 19 b2+ h6 20 xex8 xex8 Black’s attack triumphed.

However, there is no need for Black to balance on the edge of the abyss, since he has available a comparatively simple way to win.

11 ... f6!

This move, attacking the f2 pawn, but in so doing denying White the defence g2-g3, was also not devised in the present game, but was known earlier. In other words, Black won a competition for the player who was better theoretically prepared.

12 f3 xf3
13 gxf3 g5

The attack continues even without the queens.

14 g2 d5
15 g3 d6+
16 f4 h3

This is possible, but the immediate 16...xf4! is simpler.

17 d1
17 ... \textit{\texttt{\textsc{dxf4+}}}

White resigns in view of the unavoidable mate: 18 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xf4 \texttt{\textsc{e4+}}}}} 19 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xg5}}} (19 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{g3}}} 19...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{g4}}} mate, or 18 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{h4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f5}}} and 19...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xf3}}} mate.

\textbf{Berlin Defence}

\textit{Game 9}

\textit{Daskalov–Neikirch}

\textit{Sofia 1964}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
1 & e4 & e5 \\
2 & d3 & \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c6}}} \\
3 & b5 & \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f6}}} \\
4 & d4 & \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe4}}} \\
5 & dxe5 & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

After this Black successfully solves his opening problems.

5 0-0 leads to the main line of the Berlin Defence.

A great deal of analysis has been devoted to the so-called Rio de Janeiro Variation: 5...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{e7}}} 6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{we2}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d6}}} 7 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc6}}} bxc6 8 dxe5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{b7}}} 9 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c3}}}. At the end of the last century its reputation was shaken by Pillsbury’s move 10 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e1}}}, aimed at hindering ...d7-d5, but many years later it transpired that this move is possible. The game Balashov-Smyslov (Leningrad 1977) went 10...d5 11 exd6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd6}}} 12 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{g5}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d7}}} 13 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e4}}} c5 14 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{ad1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c6}}} 15 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{wd2}}} f6 16 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{g4}}}, when Black has compensation for the isolation of his pawns.

Another possibility is 5...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d6}}} 6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc6}}} dxc6 7 dxe5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e4}}} 8 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{we2}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f5}}} 9 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e3}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{g6}}} 10 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c5}}} 11 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e7}}} 12 f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{g5}}} 13 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c3}}} 0-0-0 with equal chances (Petrosian, Suetin).

The ancient move 5...a6 is perhaps the best way to equalise: 6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d3}}} (after 6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc6}}} dxc6 7 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{we2}}} – or 7 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f6}}} – 7...f5 8 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e7}}} 9 dxe5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{wc8}}} 10 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d4}}} 0-0 11 f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c5}}} White has no advantage) 6...d5 7 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe5}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd4}}} 8 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e6}}} 9 c3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c6}}} 10 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc6}}} bxc6 11 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{wa4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{wd7}}} 12 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe4}}} dxe4 13 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c6}}} 14 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d6}}}. This occurred in the ancient game L.Paulsen-Morry (New York 1857). White should have exchanged bishops by 14 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f4}}}, after which the chances would have been equal.

After 5...a6 White probably does best to play 6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{a4}}}, transposing into the Open Variation (3...a6 4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{a4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f6}}} 5 0-0 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe4}}} 6 d4).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
5 & \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e7}}} \\
6 & 0-0 \\
7 & \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d5}}} \\
8 & \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c4}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e6}}} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
9 \( \text{We}2 \) \( \text{a}6 \)
10 \( \text{cxd}5 \) \( \text{\&xd}5 \)
11 \( \text{\&c}4 \) \( \text{\&c}5 \)
12 \( \text{\&c}3 \)

Not 12 \( \text{\&d}1 \) in view of 12...\( \text{\&xc}4 \).

12 ... \( \text{\&xc}4 \)
13 \( \text{\&xc}4 \) \( \text{\&d}3 \)!

This sets White a dilemma: should he simplify the position and allow the enemy knight to occupy a strong position, or, ignoring Black's domination of the central file, try to build up an attack?

14 \( \text{\&g}4 \) \( \text{\&ad}8 \)
15 \( \text{\&h}4 \)

Logical, because the knight is aiming for f5, and White has no objections to the exchange 15...\( \text{\&xh}4 \)
16 \( \text{\&xh}4 \). But the knight move meets with a decisive refutation.

To 15 \( \text{\&h}6 \) Black would have replied 15...\( \text{\&g}6 \).

15 ... \( \text{\&d}4 \)!

Much stronger than the plausible 15...\( \text{\&d}4 \), when White would have played 16 \( \text{f}4 \).

White can no longer accept the offer to exchange queens: after 16 \( \text{\&xd}4 \) \( \text{\&xd}4 \) his knight is en prise and 17...\( \text{\&c}2 \) is threatened.

The variation worked out by Black concludes with a typical combination.

16 \( \text{\&f}4 \) \( \text{\&d}3 \)
17 \( \text{\&f}5 \) \( \text{\&xf}2+ \)
18 \( \text{\&h}1 \)

White no doubt assumed that 18...\( \text{g}6 \) was the opponent's only move...

18 ... \( \text{\&xe}1+! \)

On 19 \( \text{\&xe}1 \) there follows 19...\( \text{\&f}2+ \) and 20...\( \text{\&xg}4 \).

White resigns.

**Exchange Variation**

```plaintext
Game 10
Hübner–Tal
Wijk aan Zee 1982
```

1 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \)
2 \( \text{\&f}3 \) \( \text{\&c}6 \)
3 \( \text{\&b}5 \) \( \text{a}6 \)
4 \( \text{\&xc}6 \) \( \text{dxc}6 \)
5 \( \text{0-0} \)

The basic idea of the Exchange Variation is, in return for conceding the advantage of the two bishops, to obtain a pawn majority on the kingside, which is achieved by exchanging the d-pawn for the black e-pawn. This variation was successfully employed on several occasions by Fischer.
5 ... f6

For 5...g4, see Game 11. Other alternatives are 5...d6, 5...e7, 5...e7, 5...f6 and 5...d6.

6 d4 g4

7 dxe5

This unpretentious simplification demands well-considered action on Black's part. After the disappearance of the queens White's minimal advantage (four pawns against three on the kingside) may become an important positional factor.

7 ... wxd1

8 axd1 fxe5

After 8...xf3 9 gxf3 fxe5 10 e3 Black experiences a certain discomfort, e.g.:

(a) 10...d6 (if immediately 10...e7, then 11 f4 is good) 11 d2 e7 12 c4 0-0-0 13 d3 b5 14 a5, or 13...g6 14 g5 and ad1;
(b) 10...f6 11 d2 0-0-0 12 c4, again with the better prospects for White.

9 d3 d6

10 c4

Black can play 10...b5, depriving the enemy knight of the c4 square and planning ...e7-g6. After 11 b3 e7 12 b2 g6 13 f3 0-0 14 g2 f6 15 h3 d7 16 g1 c5 Black even stands slightly better (Nunn-Portisch, Wijk aan Zee 1985).

Instead 11 b4 comes into consideration. The game Dvoretsky-Southam (Philadelphia 1991) continued 11...f6 (the exchange of the b-pawn for the e-pawn favours White: 11...xb4 12 xe5, or 11...e7 12 c4! xb4 13 xe5 e6 14 a3, Kurajica-Gligoric, Novi Sad 1979) 12 b2 d7 13 c4! xf3 14 xf3 bxc4 15 c3 xb4 (if 15...b6, then 16 c2 is good) 16 xc4 d6 15 xc6. White has the advantage.

11 c4

With the knight at f6, 11 b3 comes into consideration, e.g. 11...0-0-0 12 b2 xf3 13 xf3 xe4 14 xe5 hf8 15 c5 d4 16 d1 e6 17 f1, and White's position is the more promising (Lautier-Dolmatov, Marseille 1988).

11 0-0

After 11...xe4 12 fxe5 e6 (the forcing variation 12...f5 13 f3! f6 14 xd6 cxd6 15 xd6+ e7 16 xf5+ e6 17 xg7+ xe5 18 b3! favours White) 13 f3 xe5 14 xe5 c5 (if 14...f6 or 14...d6, then 15 g5 is good) 15 e3 White still has the better chances.

12 cxe5
An inaccuracy. It is correct to take with the other knight. After 12 \( \text{Nxe5} \) \( \text{Qe2} \) 13 \( \text{He3} \) \( \text{Qxc4} \) 14 \( \text{Qxc4} \) \( \text{Nxe5} \) Black regains his pawn, answering 15 \( \text{Qe2} \) (or 15 \( \text{He1} \)) with 15...\( \text{He8} \). In the game Kasparov-Tal (46th USSR Championship, Tbilisi 1978) White preferred 15 \( \text{Qf3} \), and after 15...\( \text{Qxe4} \) 16 \( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Nxf3} \) 17 \( \text{gxf3} \) \( \text{Qd6} \) the game was completely equal.

12 ... \( \text{Qh5!} \)

Black is excellently developed, and moreover he has retained his two bishops. After material equality has been restored (the e4 pawn cannot be defended) it is White who will have to think in terms of equalising. But it is difficult to imagine that he was to make only one more move...

13 \( \text{Qf4?} \)

After 13...\( \text{Qxe4} \) Hübner was most probably intending to retreat his bishop to g3.

This seemingly banal exchange, forces White... to resign the game! After 14 \( \text{Qxf3} \) or 14 \( \text{gxf3} \) there follows 14...\( \text{Qh5} \), when he loses material.

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**Game 11**

**Böhm–Hernandez**

**Amsterdam 1979**

| 1  | \( e4 \) | \( e5 \) |
| 2  | \( \text{Qf3} \) | \( \text{Qc6} \) |
| 3  | \( \text{Qb5} \) | \( a6 \) |
| 4  | \( \text{Qxe4} \) | \( dxc6 \) |
| 5  | 0-0 | \( \text{g4} \) |
| 6  | \( h3 \) | \( h5 \) |

On account of this move, early castling used to be considered premature. If he accepts the piece sacrifice, White does indeed come under attack. However, he can delay the capture of the bishop and continue his development.

7 \( d3 \) \( \text{Qf6} \)

8 \( \text{Qe3} \)

8 \( \text{hgx4} \) \( \text{hgx4} \) 9 \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{wh6} \) 10 \( \text{Qh3} \) \( \text{Wh4} \) favours Black.

It is logical to support the knight at f3 by 8 \( \text{Qbd2} \). After 8...\( \text{Qe7} \) 9 \( \text{Qe1} \) \( \text{Qg6} \) 10 \( d4 \) \( \text{Qd6} \) the sacrifice can now be accepted: 11 \( \text{hgx4} \) \( \text{hgx4} \) 12 \( \text{Qh2} \), and 12...\( \text{Qxh2} \) answered by 13 \( \text{Qxg4} \). White’s position is favourable after both 13 \( \text{Qh4} \) 14 \( \text{Qxh4} \) \( \text{Qxh4} \) 15 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qh5} \) (15...\( \text{Qh8} \) 16 \( \text{dxe5} \)) 16 \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 17 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 18 \( c3 \), and 13...\( \text{Qh4} \) 14 \( \text{Qf5} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 15 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 16 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qh5} \) 17 \( \text{Qe3} \) 0-0-0 18 \( g3 \) \( \text{Qdh8} \) 19 \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{fxe5} \) 20
\( \text{b2 and h1} \) (Adorjan-Perecz, Hungary 1975).

Instead Black can consider 8...g5!?, as in the game P.Nikolic-Rogers (Bor 1986). After 9 \( \text{c4} \text{xf3} 10 \text{xf3} \text{xf3} 11 \text{gxf3} \text{f6} 12 \text{h4} \text{gxf4} 13 \text{f4} \text{exf4} 14 \text{xg4} 0-0-0 15 \text{g2} \) a draw was prematurely agreed. Both sides have chances.

8 ... \text{e7}

Black could have gained a satisfactory position with 8...\text{xf3} 9 \text{xf3} \text{xf3} 10 \text{gxf3} \text{d6} followed by 11...\text{e7} and ...f7-f6 or 11...f5.

\text{9 bd2} \text{g6}

10 \text{hxg4}?

White reckoned that this was an appropriate moment to capture the bishop: the knight move to g5 prevents the enemy queen from switching to the h-file, and there do not appear to be any other threats...

Meanwhile, 10 \text{g5} \text{hxg5} 11 \text{xg5} \text{xd1} 12 \text{axd1} would have led to simplification and a roughly equal position.

10 ... \text{hxg4}

11 \text{g5} \text{f4}

12 \text{wxe5?}

A move which White had in mind when he accepted the sacrifice, and with which he was hoping to parry all the threats.

After the comparatively best 12 \text{xf4} \text{xf4} 13 \text{g3} \text{wxe5} 14 \text{g2} he would have escaped with the loss of just a pawn.

12...\text{wh6} is met by 13 \text{h3}, after which Black has no attack, and he is a piece down...

12 ... \text{wxe5}!

This tactical idea was overlooked by the Dutch player. The queen cannot be taken on account of 13...\text{e2} mate. 13 \text{f3} loses to 13...\text{wh4}, and 13 \text{f3} to 13...\text{h3}.

White resigns.

\text{Steinitz Defence Deferred}

Game 12
Kubanek–Flohr
Prague 1930
1 e4 e5
2 ∆f3 ∆c6
3 ∆b5 a6
4 ∆a4 d6

This variation is called the Steinitz Defence Deferred. In contrast to the classical Steinitz Defence – 3...d6, in which after 4 d4 ∆d7 5 ∆c3 ∆f6 6 0-0 ∆e7 7 ∆e1 Black is forced to concede the centre, the inclusion of ...a7-a6 and ∆a4 enables him to maintain his pawn at e5.

5 d4

Whereas after 3...d6 the move 4 d4 is the strongest, here it promises White much less on account of an important tactical feature (cf. the note to Black’s 7th move).

More usual is 5 c3 (planning to create a pawn centre with d2-d4), 5 ∆xc6+ bxc6 6 d4 (exchanging the ‘Spanish’ bishop with the aim of seizing space in the centre) or Duras’s move 5 c4 (which has the aim of establishing control of d5, thus assisting White’s activity on the queenside).

5 ... b5
6 ∆b3 ∆xd4

6...∆g4? meets with an instructive refutation: 7 dxe5 ∆xe5 (if 7...dxe5 8 ∆d5! ∆xd5 9 ∆xd5 ∆d7 10 ∆xe5, or 7...∆xf3 8 ∆xf7+ ∆xf7 9 ∆d5+ ∆e7 10 ∆g5+ ∆f6 11 exf6+ gxf6 12 ∆xc6) 8 ∆xe5!

∆xd1 9 ∆xf7+ ∆e7 10 ∆c6+ ∆xf7 11 ∆xd8+ ∆xd8 12 ∆xd1, and White is a pawn up.

7 ∆xd4 exd4

White has several possible continuations: 8 ∆d5, 8 a4 and the gambit 8 c3. Only, not 8 ∆xd4?, since after 8...c5 9 ∆d5 ∆e6 10 ∆c6+ ∆d7 11 ∆d5 c4 he has to part with his bishop. The Hungarian master A. Steiner fell into this rather transparent ‘Noah’s Ark Trap’ in a game with Capablanca (Budapest 1929), while at the 1956 Olympiad in Moscow the Polish master Dworzynski lost in the same way to Keres.

8 ∆d5 ∆b8
9 ∆xd4

9 ∆c6+ also causes Black no difficulties. After 9...∆d7 10 ∆xd7+ ∆xd7 11 ∆xd4 ∆f6 12 ∆c3 ∆e7 13 0-0 0-0 14 ∆g5 (stronger is 14 ∆e3, when Medina-Keres, Wijk aan Zee 1960, continued 14...∆f8 15 f3 ∆c6 16 a3 a5 17 ∆d3 a4 18 ∆fd1 ∆d7 with a roughly equal position) 14...b4 the game Bernstein-Alekhone, Paris 1933 (one of a four-game match, the score of which was +1 -1 =2...) showed that it is not only uninformed amateurs who are capable of blundering: 15 ∆d5? (also not 15 ∆e2? ∆xe4; after 15 ∆d1 ∆f8 the chances remain with Black, but all the play is still to come) 15...∆xd5 16 ∆xd5 ∆b5 White resigns.

9 ... ∆e7

The natural 9...∆f6 obliges Black to consider 10 ∆a7. However, by continuing 10...∆d7 he equalises: 11 ∆xa6 ∆b6 12 ∆a5 c6 and 13...∆xe4.
The immediate 9...\textit{d}d7 is also possible, when White has to defend against the threat of 10...\textit{c}c6 and ...	extit{c}5-\textit{c}4.

10 \textit{g}g5

10 \textit{a}4 is more in the spirit of the position, e.g. 10...\textit{c}5 11 \textit{w}c3 \textit{d}xd5 12 exd5.

10 ... \textit{f}6

11 \textit{x}xf6?

White considered this bishop sacrifice (most probably planned beforehand) to be in his favour. Indeed, for the two minor pieces he gains a rook and two pawns, and in addition he destroys the enemy castled position. But Flohr had calculated further.

11 ... \textit{g}xf6

12 \textit{w}xf6 \textit{d}xd5

13 \textit{w}xh8

The evaluation of this position might have been debatable, had it not been for Flohr’s next move.

13 ... \textit{f}6!

The white queen is trapped, and the other pieces are powerless to help it.

14 0-0 \textit{e}7

15 \textit{f}4 \textit{f}7

16 \textit{e}5 \textit{g}7

White resigns

\textbf{Møller Defence}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Game 13}
\textbf{Katskova--Kakabadze}
\textit{USSR Ladies’ Championship}
\textit{Yerevan 1962}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
1 \textit{e}4 \textit{e}5

2 \textit{d}f3 \textit{c}6

3 \textit{b}5 \textit{a}6

4 \textit{a}4 \textit{c}5

\end{center}

A defence studied by the Danish theoretician Møller, who published an analysis of it in 1903. Without waiting for his bishop to be pushed back by \textit{d}2-\textit{d}4, Black plays it to \textit{a}7, so that it continues to exert pressure on the central squares (the moves ...	extit{f}6 and ...	extit{c}5 are sometimes made in reverse order).

5 0-0 \textit{f}6

6 \textit{c}3

Black does best to answer 6 \textit{d}xe5 with 6...\textit{d}xe5. After 7 \textit{d}4 \textit{d}xe4 8 \textit{e}1 \textit{e}7 9 \textit{d}xe4 \textit{g}6 10 \textit{c}4 0-0 11 \textit{c}3 White has only a slight advantage.

6 ... \textit{a}7

7 \textit{e}1

A quiet continuation, that allows Black to maintain his position in the centre. For a long time it was
thought that after 7...b5 8 b3 d6 9 d4 wce7 he could equalise without difficulty, but the typical ‘Spanish’ plan of playing the queen’s knight to e3 promises White some initiative. For example, 10 bg5 0-0 11 d5 d7 12 b2 b8 13 fl d8 14 e3 c6 15 b3 (Kostro-Pietzsch, Munich Olympiad 1958).

and f2, and White assumed that she was choosing the lesser evil.

In fact it was essential to cover the f2 pawn by 11 xe3. After 11... wxf2+ 12 fl wh1+ (if 12... xe3+ 13 fxe3 wh1+ 14 f2 wh4+ 15 g1 xe4 16 c3 White has a clear advantage) 13 e2 xg2 14 c3 xe3 15 xe3 g5+ Black has a piece for three pawns with the enemy king insecurely placed (16 d3 f6; 16 f4 g3+; 16 e2 c5!).

But now the game is concluded by a blocking sacrifice.

11 ... wxf2+
12 h1

7 ... g4?!
A trappy move.
8 d4 exd4
9 cxd4?
This is what Black’s 7th move is counting on.

White should first drive back the knight by 9 h3 and only after 9... f6 play 10 cxd4. It is true that Black can sacrifice his knight with 9... xf2 10 xf2 dxc3+, but after 11 f1 (or even 11 g3) White has the better chances thanks to his excellent development.

9 ... xd4!
10 xd4 w4
11 f3?
It is impossible to defend both h2
Winning Quickly with Black

knights with h2-h3. After 8...\(\text{Ng4}\) 9 d4 exd4 10 h3 \(\text{Nxf2!}\) 11 \(\text{Nxf2}\) d3+ Black regains the piece and remains a pawn up.

Following Katskova, several players with White have fallen for the smothered mate in this Alekhine variation. We can name the games Augusti-Uzman (Siegen Olympiad 1970), Belkin-Rakha (Pervomaisk 1981) and Hawelko-Sziszko-Bohusz (Velicka 1986).

Knowledge is indeed strength!

Rubinstein Defence 5...d6

| Game 14 |
| Carranza–Alekhine |
| Buenos Aires 1926 |

| 1 e4 | e5 |
| 2 \(\text{Nf3}\) | \(\text{Nc6}\) |
| 3 \(\text{b3}\) | a6 |
| 4 \(\text{a4}\) | \(\text{Nf6}\) |
| 5 0-0 | d6 |

This move characterizes a defence that was employed by Rubinstein. In some lines play transposes into the Steinitz Defence Deferred, while 6 \(\text{Nf3}\) b5 7 \(\text{b3}\) \(\text{e7}\) leads to the basic position of the Closed Variation.

6 d4

The main alternative is 6 \(\text{xc6}\) bxc6 7 d4, but 6 c3 and 6 c4 are also played.

6...\(\text{d7}\)

6...b5 is considered soundest: 7 \(\text{b3}\) (after 7 dxe5 dxe5 8 \(\text{Nxd8}\) \(\text{b3}\) \(\text{d6}\) 10 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{e6}\) Black’s position is not worse) 7...\(\text{xd4}\) 8 \(\text{xd4}\) exd4, and in analogy with a variation of the Steinitz Defence Deferred (Game 12) White cannot play 9 \(\text{Nxd4}\)? in view of 9...c5 and ...c5-c4. 9 a4 is possible, while the pawn sacrifice 9 c3 is unclear.

7 \(\text{e1}\)

7 \(\text{xc6}\) comes into consideration: 7...\(\text{c6}\) (if 7...bxc6 8 \(\text{e1}\) exd4, then 9 e5! is strong, Tal-Pytel, Lublin 1974) 8 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{e7}\) 9 \(\text{c3}\), forcing Black to cede the centre, since 9...0-0 loses material as in the well-known game Tarrasch-Marco (Dresden 1892).

The preliminary exchange on e5 leads to an equal game.

7 8 \(\text{b5}\)
| 8 \(\text{b3}\) | \(\text{xd4}\) |
| 9 \(\text{xd4}\) | exd4 |
| 10 e5 |

Of course, not 10 \(\text{Nxd4}\)? c5. With the move played White hopes to create threats on the e-file.

10 11 \(\text{xe5}\)+

After 11 \(\text{Nxd4}\) \(\text{d6}\) 12 \(\text{f4}\) 0-0 13 \(\text{xe5}\) \(\text{xe5}\) 14 \(\text{xe5}\) \(\text{e6}\) the game is level (Enklaar-Ciocaltea, Wijk aan Zee 1975).

11 12 \(\text{e7}\)

Black’s position looks hazardous, but the undeveloped state of White’s queenside prevents the other pieces from joining the attack.

After the unpretentious 12 \(\text{Nxd4}\)
Black would have castled and seized the initiative.

12 ... c5
13 d2
If 13 axc5 0-0.
13 ... a5
14 a5 was threatened.
14 a4 c4
15 axb5

It may seem that White’s offensive has succeeded. The black queen, when it is attacked, will be unable to abandon its post, since the bishop at e7 will be left undefeated...

Jumping ahead, we should mention that White should have moved his bishop, after which the struggle would have continued.

15 ... cxb3!
16 a5

A spectacular refutation of the combination.

17 d8 d5
18 c7 d8
White resigns
In the event of 9 c3 \( \Box \times b 3 \) 10 \( \Box \times b 3 \) Black does better not to regain the pawn (10...\( \Box \times d 5 \) or 10...\( \Box \times d 5 \)), since after 10 \( \Box e 1 \) this can lead to difficulties, but to continue his development with 10...\( \Box d 6 \). For the sacrificed pawn he obtains an active position, e.g. 11 d4 exd4 12 \( \Box e 1+ \) \( \Box f 8 \) 13 cxd4 \( \Box b 7 \) 14 \( \Box c 3 \) b4, or 11 d3 \( \Box f 5 \) 12 c4 0-0! 13 cxb5 \( \Box b 8 \) 14 a4 axb5 15 a5 h6 (Kupper-Lombardy, 1961).

The attempt by 9 d6 to attack f7, and after 9...\( \Box b 3 \) to interpose 10 dxc7, allows Black a powerful initiative: 10...\( \Box c 7 \) 11 axb3 h6 12 \( \Box f 3 \) e4 (Arulaid-Lahti, Estonia 1940).

Apart from the move in the game, White can also attack the e5 pawn in a rather awkward way — 9 \( \Box e 1 \), as in Bogatyrev-Dzagurov (Moscow 1939). Black disregarded the threat — 9...\( \Box c 5 \)! 10 \( \Box x e 5+ \) \( \Box f 8 \), and after 11 c3 (11 h3 is very strongly answered by 11...\( \Box d 7 \) 12 \( \Box e 3 \) h6 13 \( \Box e 4 \) \( \Box x c 2 \) 14 \( \Box c 3 \) \( \Box x a 1 \) 15 \( \Box x c 5 \) \( \Box x b 3 \), winning the exchange) 11...\( \Box g 4 \) 12 \( \Box x f 7 \) \( \Box h 4 \)! 13 \( \Box x c 7 \) \( \Box e 2+ \) he won.

Black reacts in similar fashion to the threat of taking the pawn with the rook.

9 \( \Box c 3 \) is perhaps comparatively best for White.

9... \( \Box c 5 \)

10 \( \Box x e 5+ \) \( \Box f 8 \)

Black is two pawns down, and in addition his king is unable to castle. But despite the apparently active placing of White’s rook and knight, it is he who has to find a defence, and in particular against the threat of 11...\( \Box g 4 \).

The danger in the position is illustrated by the game Korchnoi-Estrin (Leningrad 1951), in which 11 \( \Box c 3 \) was automatically played. There followed 11...\( \Box g 4 \) 12 \( \Box g e 4 \) \( \Box h 4 \)! 13 \( \Box h 5 \) (13 h3 is met by 13...\( \Box x e 5 \) 14 \( \Box x c 5 \) \( \Box e f 3+ \) 15 gxf3 \( \Box x h 3 \) or 15 \( \Box f 1 \) \( \Box x h 3 \!), mating) 13...\( \Box x h 5 \) 14 h3 \( \Box h 4 \) 15 \( \Box x c 5 \) (if 15 hxg4 \( \Box x g 4 \) 16 \( \Box f 1 \) \( \Box f 3+ \) 17 gxf3 \( \Box x f 3 \), and to avoid mate White has to give up his queen; after 15 \( \Box f 1 \) \( \Box b 6 \) 16 hxg4 \( \Box x g 4 \) there is no defence against the threat of 17...\( \Box f 3+ \)!) 15...\( \Box x f 2+ \) 16 \( \Box h 1 \) \( \Box g 3 \) 17 hxg4 \( \Box x g 4 \) 18 \( \Box f 1 \) \( \Box f 3 \), and Black successfully completed his offensive.

Nevertheless, it should be added that instead of 16...\( \Box g 3 \) he could have concluded the game with a sacrifice of unusual beauty — 16...\( \Box f 3 \) 17 \( \Box e 4 \) \( \Box g 3 \)!!
If White prevents the knight move to g4 with 11 h3, he is placed in a critical position by 11...\(\text{Q}d7!\)
Bonch-Osmolovsky–Dzagurov (Moscow 1939) continued 12 \(\text{Q}xf7\) \(\text{Q}f6\) 13 \(\text{Q}xh8\) \(\text{Q}xe5\) 14 d3 (if White defends f2 by 14 \(\text{Q}f1\), then 14...\(\text{Q}e3+\) 15 \(\text{gx}f3\) \(\text{Q}xf3+\) 16 \(\text{Q}h1\) \(\text{Q}e5\) wins) 14...\(\text{Q}xb3\) 15 axb3 \(\text{Q}xf2+\) 16 \(\text{Q}h2\) \(\text{Q}g4\) 17 \(\text{Q}h1\) \(\text{Q}f3\) mate.

11 \(c3\)

Objectively the strongest. The idea is after 11...\(\text{Q}xb3\) 12 axb3 \(\text{Q}g4\) to give up the exchange – 13 d4 \(\text{Q}xe5\) 14 dxe5, obtaining for it two powerful central pawns and excellent prospects.

But Black continues his gambit play.

11 ... \(\text{Q}g4!\)
12 \(\text{cxd4}\) \(\text{Q}xd4\)

Now 13 \(\text{Q}e2\) \(\text{Q}xg5\) 14 h3 fails to 14...\(\text{Q}xf2\) 15 \(\text{Q}xf2\) \(\text{Q}xh3\).
13 \(\text{Q}e4\) is strongly answered by 13...\(\text{Q}xf2+\) 14 \(\text{Q}f1\) \(\text{Q}xg5\) 15 h3 h5! with a dangerous attack, e.g. 16 h4 g4 h4 17 \(\text{Q}xf2\) g3+ 18 \(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{Q}xf5\) 19 \(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}f2+\) 20 \(\text{Q}d3\) \(\text{Q}f5\), and White loses material, or 16 d3 \(\text{Q}e3!\) 17 \(\text{Q}e2\) \(\text{Q}f6+\) 18 \(\text{Q}e1\) \(\text{Q}h4+\) 19 \(\text{Q}d1\) \(\text{Q}f2+\), winning the exchange.

The only possibility of resisting is 13 \(\text{Q}f3\), and if 13...\(\text{Q}xe5\) 14 h3. Even so, 14...h5! enables Black to maintain the tension. Thus 15 h4 g4 hxe4 16 \(\text{Q}xe5\) fails to 16...\(\text{Q}h4\) 17 \(\text{Q}f1\) \(\text{Q}f6!\), with the threats of 18...\(\text{Q}xe5\) and 18...\(\text{Q}h1+\). After the comparatively best 15 \(d4!\) the following variation is possible: 15...\(\text{Q}d6\) 16 h4 g4 hxe4 17 \(\text{Q}g5\) \(\text{Q}e7\) 18 g3 \(\text{Q}h5\), and in this extremely sharp situation Black retains an attack.

The course of the game shows that, in provoking 7 \(\text{Q}g5\), Black was sufficiently well informed. And White? Why did he choose a variation with a dubious reputation? Had he found an improvement after 13 \(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{Q}xe5\) 14 h3 h5, or had he discovered another, hitherto unknown possibility?..

13 \(\text{Q}e6+\)

Neither the one, nor the other! The first move beyond the bounds of theory proves to be essentially capitulation. It can be assumed that White was making use of old books and did not know the analysis of 11...\(\text{Q}g4!\) 12 \(\text{cxd4}\) \(\text{Q}xd4!\) Or perhaps, setting out on a stormy voyage without a theoretical compass, he repeated other players’ mistakes...

The game concluded: 13...\(\text{Q}xe6\) 14 \(\text{Q}xe6\) \(\text{Q}h4\) 15 h3 \(\text{Q}xf2\) 16 \(\text{Q}f3\)

\( \Delta xh3+ \) 17 \( \Delta f1 \) \( \Delta g5 \) 18 \( \Delta f5 \) g6
White resigns.

We should once more remind the reader of a banal truth: the more complicated the variation and the greater the number of tactical nuances, the more important it is to be familiar with contemporary theoretical knowledge.

Centre Attack 6 d4

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<td>6</td>
<td>d4</td>
<td>exd4</td>
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The soundest move. Also possible is 6...\( \Delta xe4 \), and if 7 \( \Delta e2 \) (or 7 \( \Delta e1 \)) 7...f5, as well as 6...b5 7 \( \Delta b3 \) d6 8 c3 \( \Delta g4 \) or 8...0-0 9 \( \Delta bd2 \) \( \Delta g4 \).

7 e5  \( \Delta e4 \)
8 \( \Delta xd4 \) 0-0
9 c4

The main line of this variation goes 9 \( \Delta f5 \) d5 10 \( \Delta xc6 \) bxc6 11 \( \Delta xe7+ \) \( \Delta xe7 \) 12 \( \Delta e1 \), after which Black has several satisfactory possibilities. For example, he can play 12...\( \Delta e8 \), and if 13 f3 \( \Delta d6 \), planning ...f7-f6 and ...\( \Delta f7 \).

With the move in the game White leaves his e5 pawn en prise. Can it be taken?

9 ... \( \Delta xe5 \)?

The evaluation of White’s last move used to be based on the game Alekhine-Teichmann (Karlsbad 1911), in which after 9...\( \Delta c5 \) 10 \( \Delta c2 \) \( \Delta xe5 \) 11 \( \Delta h5 \) \( \Delta g6 \) 12 f4 d6 13 f5 \( \Delta f6 \)! Black gained the advantage. Instead of 12 f4 an attempt was made to improve White’s play with 12 b4. After 12...\( \Delta e6 \) (12...\( \Delta f6 \) comes into consideration) 13 \( \Delta xe6 \) dxe6 14 \( \Delta d1 \) \( \Delta e8 \) 15 \( \Delta d3 \) f5! 16 \( \Delta h3 \) h6 White’s attack is only good enough to restore material equality:

17 \( \Delta xh6 \) \( \Delta h4 \) 18 \( \Delta xe8 \) \( \Delta xe8 \) 19 \( \Delta d2 \).

Zaitsev takes the e5 pawn without the preparatory move ...\( \Delta c5 \), despite the fact that the black knights on the e-file are not defended against a frontal attack...

10 \( \Delta e1 \)

10 ... \( \Delta xf2 \)!

11 \( \Delta xf2 \) \( \Delta c5 \)!

12...\( \Delta h4+ \) is threatened. If 12 \( \Delta e3 \), then 12...\( \Delta h4+ \) 13 \( \Delta g1 \) \( \Delta g4 \).
If 12 g3  \textit{g6+ 13 f4 (13 g1 xd4+) 13...xd4+}, and again the bishop cannot be taken on account of the loss of the queen.

12 \textit{g3}  \textit{f6}
13 \textit{c2}

The immediate threats have been parried, but the attack continues.

13 ... \textit{g6}
14 \textit{f3}  \textit{d5}
15 \textit{c3}

The only defence was 15 \textit{e3}, giving up the b2 pawn, but closing the important diagonal. After 15...
\textit{xe3} 16 \textit{exe3 wb2} 17 \textit{bd2}
Black has three pawns for the piece in a rather sharp position.

But what is bad about the move played?

15 ... \textit{b6}!!

A brilliant idea! The king, which was feeling quite comfortable at \textit{g3}, is faced with mortal danger — 16... \textit{f2} mate. At the same time 16... \textit{d6+} is threatened.

There is no satisfactory defence, and so \textbf{White resigned}.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Marshall Attack}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Game 17}
A.Yanofsky–Tornerup
\emph{Copenhagen 1947}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
1 e4  e5
2 \textit{f3}  \textit{c6}
3 \textit{b5}  a6
4 \textit{a4}  \textit{f6}
5 0-0  \textit{e7}
6 \textit{e1}  b5
7 \textit{b3}  0-0
8 \textit{c3}  d5
\end{center}

The positional basis for this pawn sacrifice is White’s delay in developing his queenside.

9 \textit{exd5}  \textit{c4}

The main line of the Marshall Attack continues 9...\textit{xd5} 10 \textit{xe5} \textit{xe5} 11 \textit{xe5}, and now either 11...\textit{f6} (as in the stem game Capablanca-Marshall, New York 1918) or 11...c6.

The 9...e4 variation bears little relation to the main line: it has
mainly been developed and employed only in the last few decades. According to modern theory, White can parry the threats and gain an advantage.

10 \( \text{\textit{Qg5?!}} \)

The way to refute the gambit is by 10 dxc6 exf3, and now 11 d4 fxg2
12 \( \text{\textit{Wf3}}, \) e.g. 12...\( \text{\textit{Le6}} \) (12...\( \text{\textit{Qg4}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{Af4}}, \) or 12...\( \text{\textit{Ee8}} \)) 13 \( \text{\textit{Qg5}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{ Af4!}} \)
(dangerous is 13 \( \text{\textit{Xe6}} \) fxe6 14 \( \text{\textit{Xe6}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qd5}} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{Wxg2}} \) \( \text{\textit{Ah4}}, \) or 14 \( \text{\textit{Wh3}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qd5}} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{Wxe6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{Ah8}} \)) 13...\( \text{\textit{Qd5}} \)
14 \( \text{\textit{Qg3}} \) a5 15 \( \text{\textit{Qd2}}, \) with the better position for White.

11 \( \text{\textit{Wxf3}} \) is less strong: 11...\( \text{\textit{Qg4}} \)
12 \( \text{\textit{Wee3?}} \) (the queen is badly placed on the e-file on account of White’s undeveloped queenside; 12 \( \text{\textit{Wg3}} \) is correct, although after 12...\( \text{\textit{Qd6}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{Wh4}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qe8}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qf5}} \) Black holds the initiative, and if 15 d4 there is the interesting forcing variation 15...
\( \text{\textit{Qxh2+}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{Qxh2}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qg4+}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{Qg3}} \)
\( \text{\textit{Wxh4+}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{Qxh4}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qxe1}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{fxg4}} \)
\( \text{\textit{Qxc1}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{gxg5}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qf1}}, \) which would appear to be in his favour) 12...\( \text{\textit{Qe8}} \)
13 d4 (White overlooks a diverting sacrifice) 13...\( \text{\textit{Qd6}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{Wd2}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qf4!}} \) 15
\( \text{\textit{Qxe8+}} \) (15 \( \text{\textit{Qe3}} \) would have held out longer) 15...\( \text{\textit{Qxe8}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{Qd3}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qe1+}}, \) and White resigns, since if 17 \( \text{\textit{Wf1}} \)
\( \text{\textit{Qxh2+}} \) (Tislenko-Pakulis, Liepaja 1981).

10 ... \( \text{\textit{Qd6}} \)

10...\( \text{\textit{Qg4}} \) is thought to be better. After 11 f3 (if 11 \( \text{\textit{Cc2}} \) \( \text{\textit{De5}} \)) 12
\( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qd6}} \) Black has a strong attacking position) 11...
\( \text{\textit{Qxf3}} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{Qxf3}} \) (12 \( \text{\textit{gxg3}} \) is very strongly answered by 12...\( \text{\textit{Qxd5}} \) – in all variations the complications favour Black) 12...\( \text{\textit{Qa5}} \) (12...\( \text{\textit{Qxd5}} \) is good enough to equalise) 13 \( \text{\textit{Cc2}} \)
\( \text{\textit{Qe8}} \) 14 d4 \( \text{\textit{Wxd5}} \) Black’s position is preferable.

11 \( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \)

According to the books, this loses, whereas the acceptance of the sacrifice by 11 dxc6 gives White a winning position after 11...\( \text{\textit{Qxh2+}} \) (otherwise Black is simply a piece down) 12 \( \text{\textit{Qxh2}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qg4+}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{Qg1}} \)
\( \text{\textit{Wxg5}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{Qe3}} \) \( \text{\textit{Wh4}} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{Qg3}} \) (Tal, Krogius). But it is worth continuing this variation: 15...\( \text{\textit{Wxh2+}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{Qf1}} \)
\( \text{\textit{Wh1+}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{Qe2}} \) \( \text{\textit{Wh5}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{Qh3}} \) \( \text{\textit{Wc5}}, \) and when White defends his f2 pawn – 19...\( \text{\textit{Qe5}} \). The outcome is still unclear.

11 ... \( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \)

12 \( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qf5}} \)

13 \( \text{\textit{Qe3}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qe5}} \)

14 \( \text{\textit{h3}} \)

White’s queenside is undeveloped. Both now, and on the next
move d2-d4 suggests itself. Then the following variations are possible: 14 d4 \( \text{Q}g4 \) 15 \( \text{Hh}3 \text{He}8 \), and now:

(a) 16 f3? \( \text{Q}xh2 \) 17 \( \text{Hxh2} \text{Q}xh2+ \) 18 \( \text{Q}xh2 \text{Wh}4+ \) and 19...\( \text{He}1+ \);

(b) 16 \( \text{Q}e3 \text{Q}xe3 \) 17 \( \text{Hxe3} \text{Hxe3} \) 18 fxe3 \( \text{Wh}4 \) 19 h3 \( \text{Wg}3 \) or 19 g3 \( \text{xg}3 \);

(c) 16 \( \text{Q}d2 \text{Q}xf2 \) 17 \( \text{Q}xf2 \text{Q}xh3 \) 18 gxh3 \( \text{Wh}4+ \) 19 \( \text{Q}g2 \text{Be}1 \) 19 \( \text{Wg}4 \text{Wxg}4 \) 20 hxg4 \( \text{Q}f4 \).

14 ... \( \text{Wh}4 \)
15 \( \text{Cc2} \)

15 d4 was the only way to resist, when Black would have continued the attack with the thematic 15...\( \text{Q}g4 \):

(a) 16 h\( x \)g4 \( \text{Wh}2+ \) 17 \( \text{Q}f1 \text{Wh}1+ \) 18 \( \text{Q}e2 \text{Q}xg4+ \) 19 f3 (19 \( \text{Q}f3 \text{Wxg}2 \) 19...\( \text{Wxg}2+ \) 20 \( \text{Q}d3 \text{Q}f5+ \) 21 \( \text{He}4 \text{He}8 \);

(b) 16 \( \text{Hf}3 \text{Cc}4 \) 17 h\( x \)g4 \( \text{Wh}2+ \) 18 \( \text{Q}f1 \text{Q}xf3 \) 19 gxf3 (19 \( \text{Wxf}3 \text{Wh}1+ \) and 20...\( \text{Wx}c1 \) 19...\( \text{Bae}8 \) 20 \( \text{Q}e3 \) \( \text{Af}4 \) 21 \( \text{Wd}2 \text{He}7 \);

(c) 16 \( \text{Q}e2 \text{Bae}8 \) 17 \( \text{Cc}3 \) (17 \( \text{Q}d2 \text{Cc}3 \) 17...\( \text{Q}xe3 \) 18 fxe3 \( \text{Wg}3 \).

Irrespective of the final evaluation of the opponent's attacking possibilities, 15 d4 was essential. With the opponent's queenside bottled up, Black's attacking forces are clearly superior.

15 ... \( \text{Q}g4 \)
16 \( \text{Cc}2 \) \( \text{Cc}2 \) 17 \( \text{Wxc}2 \text{Bae}8 \) 18 d4

18 ... \( \text{Wxf}2+! \)

White resigns (19 \( \text{Hxf}2 \text{He}1+ \) 20 \( \text{Qf}1 \text{Ah}2+ \) and 21...\( \text{Wxf}1 \text{mate} \).

Game 18
Kudinov-Fershter
Leningrad 1963

1 e4 e5
2 \( \text{Qf}3 \text{Qc}6 \)
3 \( \text{Cc}3 \) a6
4 \( \text{Ca}4 \text{Qf}6 \)
5 0-0 \( \text{Bb}7 \)
6 \( \text{Cc}7 \) b5
7 \( \text{Bb}3 \) \( \text{Bb}7 \)

This variation was developed by the Yugoslav player Trajkovic.

8 c3

The alternative is 8 d4 \( \text{Q}x \)d4 (Black can of course play 8...d6 9 c3 0-0, in analogy with the Closed Variation, but with the bishop at b7 White can manage without the move h2-h3):
Now 9  başlayan 8 f8 (9... 8xf7 10 8xe5+ 8g8 11 8xd4 c5 leads to unclear complications) 10 8b3 (10 8xe5 d6 11 8xd4 dxe5 12 8xd8+ 8xd8 13 8b3 8xe4 gives Black an active position) 10...8xb3 11 axb3 d6 gives equal chances.

9 8xd4 exd4 10 e5 is more promising:

(a) 10...8e4 11 8g4 c5 12 8xg7 8f8 13 8xh7 c4 (13... 8g5 is refuted by 14 8xg5 8xg5 15 e6!, Bondarevsky-Trajkovic, Correspondence 1962) 14 8xe4 cxb3 15 axb3! 8xe4 16 8xe4. Black has two pawns for the exchange, and until quite recently it was considered that the chances are equal, but in fact White has an undisputed advantage;

(b) 10...8d5 11 c3! 0-0 12 8f3 c6 13 cxd4 d6 14 8c3 dxe5 15 8xd5 cxd5 16 dxe5 8d7 17 8c2 d4 (Gild.Garcia-Hector, Manila Olympiad 1992) 18 8g3!, and White has attacking chances.

8 ... d5

A modification of the Marshall Attack. Instead of castling Black has played ... 8b7, which has both advantages (the bishop is attacking the kingside) and disadvantages (the fact that he has not castled gives White certain tactical possibilities).

9 exd5 8xd5

10 8xe5 8xe5

11 8xe5 8f4

The attack on g2 is the main difference between this variation and the Marshall Attack.

12 8xf7+

Tempting, but very risky. In winning a second pawn, White falls behind in development and comes under an attack.

The refutation of Trajkovic’s idea should be sought in the continuation 12 d4, in order to answer 12...8xg2 with 13 8e2 (the immediate 13 8g5 gives White only perpetual check after 13...f6 14 8xf6 gxf6 15 8h5+ 8d7, Krogius-Minev, Bulgaria 1958). After 13...h6 14 8h5 g6 (if 14...0-0? 15 8d5 and the black knight is in trouble) 15 8h3 8c8 16 8g3 White stands better.

An attempt to improve Black’s play was made in the game Polovodin-Genin (USSR 1981): 15... 8d6 (intending if 16 8g5 to sacrifice queen for rook and bishop – 16... 8xe5 17 dxe5 8xg5, obtaining two powerful bishops with White’s king insecure and his queenside undeveloped) 16 8d2 8h4 (16...8f4 17 8e3 8d5 18
Ruy Lopez

\[ \text{xd5 xxd5 19 e4 favours White, and now the queen sacrifice} \]

17...\text{xe5} 18 dxe5 xxe4 led to a double-edged position with chances for both sides: 19 d1 d8 20 e3
g5 21 f3 xxd5 22 e2 g8.

A variation given by Nunn also comes into consideration: 12 f5
d6 13 g4 xg2 14 xf7 h4 15
d4 h5 16 g3.

12 ... xxf7

13 f5+ f6

14 xf4

14 ... \text{d3!}

Blocking the queenside. If 15 c3 xhe8 16 h4 (16 c2? xxc2)
16...e2 17 c2 xae8, and 18 e3 fails to 18...x8xe3 19 fxe3 xg2+.

Or 15 h5+ g8! 16 h4 (if 16 a4
g6 17 d1 g7 18 xb5 xhe8! 19
bxa6 xe2!, and the attack triumphs)
16...g6, and if 17 c5 xh8 (18 xf6
xel+ 19 h2 xh1+, 20...f1+ and
21...xg2 mate).

In a later game Stieg-Trajkovic (Correspondence 1968) White def-ended with 15 f1 e4 16 xhe4 (he has to give up the exchange)
16...xhe4 17 d4 xhe8 18 d2 c2
19 f3 h6 20 xel xel 21 xel
xel 22 e3 (22 d2? e2) 22...
xelb2, and Black, although a pawn down, has at least an equal position.
White’s direct play for simplifi-cation led in the end to his defeat:
23 c1 c2 24 d1 xxd1+! 25
xel xel 26 a4 d5 27 axb5 axb5
28 a1 c5 29 xxc5 xec3 30 e1 b4
31 f1 c4 32 e2 b3, and Black capitalised on his passed pawn.

The game we are examining proved much shorter.

15 a4?

There is no time for such leisurely actions.

15 ... xhe8

16 axb5 xe2

White resigns

There is no defence against
17...ae8.
In this section we will consider all the other Open Games (1 e4 e5), apart from the Ruy Lopez.

### Guiooco Piano

#### Game 19
**Estrin–An.Bykhovsky**
*Moscow 1967*

1 e4 e5
2 .df3 c6
3 0-0 c5

By developing his bishop at c4, White attacks f7, the most vulnerable square in the Open Games, and apparently hinders ...d7-d5. But in fact the position of the bishop assists this counter, which in a number of variations breaks up White’s pawn centre.

4 0-0 d6
5 d3 df6
6 c3

The modern way of handling the quiet 5 d3 variation. 6 dc3 would have led to the ‘Guiooco Pianissimo’ in classical form, or the Italian Four Knights Game.

6 ... g4
7 db3

White tries to exploit the absence of the bishop from the queenside. Leisurely development is replaced by sharp tactical play: the f7 and b7 pawns are simultaneously attacked.

Some modern players treat the Guiooco Piano in the spirit of the closed variation of the Ruy Lopez, by continuing bb3, bd2, e1 and f1-g3(e3).

Of course, 7 le3 is also possible.

7 ... xf3
8 xxb7?

White is tempted into this attack on rook and knight.

After 8 xf7+ f8 9 gxf3 Black has an active position for the pawn, but all the play would have been to come. Now, however, White loses several tempi and comes under a crushing attack.

8 ... d7!

It transpires that, due to the threat of ...g4, the rook cannot be taken.

9 gxf3 b8
10 a6 b6
11 a4 h3
12 a2
12 ... h5!
Threatening a mating attack with 13...\(\text{Q}g4\) 14 \(\text{fxg4}\) \(\text{hxg4}\).

13 \(\text{Axd1}\)
White vacates the f1 square for his knight.

13 ... \(\text{Ah6}\)
Had White returned his queen to d1 on move 12 (keeping the h6 square under fire), he would not have managed to bring his knight to the defence, and Black would have won by ...\(\text{Q}g4\).

14 \(\text{Qf1}\) \(\text{Qg6+}\)
15 \(\text{Qg3}\) \(\text{Qxg3+!}\)
16 \(\text{hxg3}\) \(\text{Wxg3+}\)
After 17 \(\text{Kh1}\) \(\text{xf2}\), mate at \(h3\) is unavoidable.

White resigns.

**Two Knights Defence**

---

**Game 20**
**Bibikov–Neishtadt**
**Moscow 1946**

1 \(e4\) \(e5\)
2 \(\text{Af3}\) \(\text{Cc6}\)
3 \(\text{Lc4}\) \(\text{Af6}\)

Black hits at the e4 pawn, and invites his opponent to attack the f7 pawn by \(\text{Q}g5\).

Many lines of the Two Knights Defence are sharply tactical and have been studied deep into the middlegame. To calculate them at the board is not possible, and so both players require a substantial knowledge of theory.

---

4 \(\text{Qg5}\)
White's main alternative is to battle for control of the centre by 4 d4.

4 ... \(d5\)
5 \(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{Qa5}\)

---

If 5...\(\text{Qxd5}\)? White gains a dangerous attack, by sacrificing his knight at f7 in one of two ways:

(a) 6 \(\text{Qxf7}\) \(\text{Qxf7}\) 7 \(\text{Wf3+}\) \(\text{e6}\) 8 \(\text{Cc3}\);

(b) 6 \(d4\) \(\text{exd4}\) 7 0-0! \(\text{Le7}\) (7... \(\text{Le6}\) 8 \(\text{Ld7}\) 9 \(\text{Qxf7}\)! \(\text{Qxf7}\) 10 \(\text{Wf3+}\) \(\text{g8}\) 11 \(\text{Lxe6!}\) 8 \(\text{Qxf7}\)! \(\text{Qxf7}\) 9 \(\text{Wf3+}\) (we are following a game of Morphy, played in a blindfold simultaneous display in 1858 in New Orleans; much later it was established that 9 \(\text{Wh5+}\) is more accurate) 9...\(\text{Le6}\)? (9...\(\text{Le8}\) 10 \(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) is a tougher defence) 10 \(\text{Cc3}\) dxc3 11 \(\text{Le1+}\) \(\text{Qe5}\) 12 \(\text{Af4}\), and the black king came under the fire of all the enemy pieces.

5...\(\text{Qd4}\) is examined in Games 21 and 22, and 5...\(b5\) in Game 23.
6 \( \text{\underline{\text{b}}5+} \)

The alternative is 6 d3. After 6...h6 7 \( \text{\underline{\text{f}}3 \text{ e4} 8 \text{\underline{\text{w}}2 \text{ xc4} 9 \text{ dxc4 \text{c5}} \text{ Black has an active attacking position for the sacrificed pawn.}} \)

6 ... c6

7 \text{ dxc6 bxc6}

8 \text{ e2}

8 \text{\underline{\text{w}}f3} is strongly answered by 8...\text{\underline{\text{b}}8}, since it is unfavourable for White to accept the sacrifice of the second pawn (9 \text{\underline{\text{xc6+ xc6} 10 \text{\underline{\text{w}}xc6+ d7).}}

8 ... h6

An essential move, since otherwise White, by playing d2-d3, will take measures against ...e5-e4.

9 \text{\underline{\text{f}}3 e4}

10 \text{\underline{\text{e}}5 \text{\underline{\text{d}}6}

11 f4

If 11 d4, then 11...exd3 12 \text{\underline{\text{xd3 w}}c7 is promising.}

After 11 \text{\underline{\text{c4}} Black develops his offensive by 11...\text{\underline{\text{xc4} 12 \text{\underline{\text{xc4}} g4} 13 \text{\underline{\text{w}}e2 0-0} 14 \text{h3 \text{\underline{\text{w}}h4} 15 \text{g3} (\text{\underline{\text{xf2}} was threatened} 15...\text{\underline{\text{gx3}} 16 \text{fxg3 \text{\underline{\text{w}}xg3+} 17 \text{\underline{\text{f1 d5!}}}}

11 \text{\underline{\text{g4}} is weak in view of 11...\text{\underline{\text{xc4}}} 12 \text{\underline{\text{xc4}} g5!} 13 \text{h3 h5} 14 \text{d3 \text{\underline{\text{w}}g6.}}

11 ... exf3

12 \text{\underline{\text{xf3}} w\text{c7}

White is a pawn up, but Black has a lead in development and the more active pieces. Now White should have castled.

13 d4

At first sight this assists his development. But only at first sight...

13 ... \text{\underline{\text{g4!}}

Preventing castling and threatening to break up the opponent's kingside.

14 \text{\underline{\text{c3}} \text{\underline{\text{xh2}}}

15 \text{\underline{\text{xc4}}} \text{\underline{\text{w}3+}}

16 \text{\underline{\text{d2}}

16 ... \text{\underline{\text{c4+!}}

17 \text{\underline{\text{xc4}}} \text{\underline{\text{w}3 mate}

---

**Game 21**

Leonhardt-Englund

Stockholm 1908

1 e4 e5

2 \text{\underline{\text{f3}} \text{\underline{\text{c6}}}

3 \text{\underline{\text{c4}} \text{\underline{\text{f6}}}

4 \text{\underline{\text{g5}} d5}

5 \text{exd5 \text{\underline{\text{d4}}}

A clever move, suggested early this century by A.Fritz.

6 c3

The attack on f7 by 6 d6 is not at all promising. Black replies 6...\text{\underline{\text{w}}xd6}, and after 7 \text{\underline{\text{xf7+ \text{e7} 8 \text{\underline{\text{b3}} (8...h6 was threatened, and 8

---
c3 fails to this same move 8...h6, when after 9 cxd4 hgx5 10 b3
eqd4 11 d3 g4 12 f3 e4! White
cannot parry the attack) 8...xf3 9
xex5 h6 10 f3 e4 11 g1 (or 11
hx4) 11...f7 (11...f5 is also
good) 12 c3 wc6 his excellent
development is sufficient compen-
sation for the pawn (Bogoljubow-
Rubinstein, Stockholm 1919).
The naïve 7 xf7? is instructive-
y refuted by 7...c6 8 exh8 xg2
9 fl e4+ 10 e2 f3 mate.

For 6 c3, see the next game.

6 ... b5
6...f5 is weak: White replies 7
d4! exd4 8 0-0.

7 f1
Evidently the strongest. After 7
cxd4 bxc4 8 dxe5 xd5 9 f3 d7
10 0-0 b7 11 c3 wc6 followed
by queenside castling Black gains
an excellent position for the pawn.

7 ... xd5

The knights at g5 and d4 are
attacked, and White must decide
whether to (a) exchange knights by
8 cxd4 xf5, or do this after
preventing the opponent from
casting – 8 xf7 xf7 9 cxd4; (b)
retreat his knight to e4, or (c)
defend his knight with 8 h4.

8 f3 is unfavourable in view of
8...xf3+ 9 xf3 b8 10 g3
b6! (Khodzhaev-Estrin, Riga
1951).

8 cxd4
After 8 xf7 xf7 9 cxd4 exd4
10 xb5 e7+ 11 e2 xe2+ 12
e2 d4 13 e4+ e6 (13...g6
is also possible) 14 xe6+ xe6 in
a comparatively simple position
White is still a pawn up, but he has
difficulty in developing his queen-
side.

Now let us see what happens if
White is tempted by the check 10
f3+. It used to be thought that this
virtually refuted the Fritz Variation,
but a correspondence game
Semenenko-Perfiliev (1947) showed
that Black has an unexpected and
very strong reply – 10...f6!,
leaving his rook undefended. If
White accepts the gift with 11
xa8, he comes under a crushing
attack: 11...c5! 12 xb5 e8+ 13
f1 (or 13 xe8+ xe8+ and,
depending on which way the king
moves, 14...g4+ or 14...a6+)
13...a6!.

Taking the rook is, of course, a
mistake. But even after 11 xb5
e6 12 0-0 b8 Black has an
excellent game (Estrin-Gilman,
Correspondence 1948).
8 \( \text{Q}e4 \) and 8 h4 are considered in Game 23.
\[
8 \ldots \text{\textit{\text{Wxg5}}}
9 \text{\textit{\text{Bxb5+ d8}}}
10 \text{\textit{\text{Wf3 b7}}}
\]
In Fischer's opinion, Black should sacrifice a second pawn by 10...e4 11 \text{\textit{\text{Wxe4 d6}}.}
11 0-0

If 11 \text{\textit{\text{Cc3 exd4}}}, while after 11 dxe5 \text{\textit{\text{Wxe5+ e2 Wxe2+ 13 Bxe2 Ff4+ 14 d1 xg2 15 Bg1 d6}} Black has a clear advantage (Molchadsky-Neishtadt, Moscow 1958).

11 \ldots \text{\textit{\text{Bb8}}}

As on the previous move, 11...e4 12 \text{\textit{\text{Wxe4 d6}}} should be considered.
12 d3

A natural but unfortunate move. 12 \text{\textit{\text{Wh3?}}} loses a piece to 12...\text{\textit{\text{Cc8!}}}, but 12 \text{\textit{\text{Cc3}}} is correct, when after 12...\text{\textit{\text{Exc3}}} 13 dxc3 \text{\textit{\text{Bxf3}}} 14 \text{\textit{\text{Xg5+f6}}} 15 \text{\textit{\text{Gxf3 Bxb5}}} 16 \text{\textit{\text{Cc1 exd4}}} 17 \text{\textit{\text{Dd1 d6}}} 18 \text{\textit{\text{Exd4 Bc8}}} Black's active position compensates for the pawn.

12 \ldots \text{\textit{\text{Wg6}}
13 \text{\textit{\text{Bh3 exd4}}}

Black has restored material equality with an excellent position.
14 \text{\textit{\text{Cc3?}}}

After 14 \text{\textit{\text{Cc4}}} (or 14 \text{\textit{\text{Bd2 f4!}}
15 \text{\textit{\text{Wxg6 hxg6}}} 14...\text{\textit{\text{d6}}} 15 \text{\textit{\text{Wf3}} Bf6 \text{\textit{\text{Cc8}}} (with the threat of playing the rook to e5 or invading the second rank) White comes under an attack.

The move played leads to a rapid showdown.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
14 & \text{\textit{\text{Bxa3}}}
15 & \text{\textit{\text{Bxa3 Bc3}}}
16 & \text{\textit{\text{Wxg6 hgx6}}}
17 & \text{\textit{\text{Cc4}}}
\end{array}
\]

The queens have been exchanged, and the pawns covering the king would appear to be defended...

17 \ldots \text{\textit{\text{Cc2+}}
18 \text{\textit{\text{Bh1 Bc7?}}}

This modest move creates the threat of 19...\text{\textit{\text{Bh2+}}} and 20...\text{\textit{\text{Bh8+}}. The g-pawn is pinned, and therefore 19 h3 does not prevent the mate.

White resigns.

Game 22
Syromyatnikov-Petrov
Yelabuga 1975

1 e4 e5
2 \text{\textit{\text{Bf3 Bc6}}
3 \text{\textit{\text{Cc4 Bf6}}
4 \text{\textit{\text{Bg5 d5}}
5 \text{\textit{\text{Exd5 Bd4}}
6 \text{\textit{\text{Cc3}}}
This is only good enough to give White an equal game.

6 ... h6
7 ∆ge4?

As was shown by the American master Pinkus, after this Black gains the advantage by force. White should have retreated his knight to f3, when after 7...∆g4 8 ∆e2 (8 d3 is strongly answered by 8...∆b4, and if 9 a3 ∆xc3+ 10 bxc3 ∆xf3+ 11 gxf3 ∆h5) 8...∆xf3 9 ∆xf3 ∆b4 10 0-0 0-0 11 ∆e1 ∆e8 12 a3 ∆xc3 13 dxc3 ∆xf3+ 14 ∆xd3 ∆xd5 Black restores material equality with a sound position.

7 ... ∆xe4
8 ∆xe4 ∆h4
9 d3 ∆g4
10 ∆d2 ∆f3!

This entire variation is given in an analysis after the War by Pinkus, with which White was not familiar.

11 0-0?
11 ∆f1 was essential.

11 ... ∆e2+
12 ∆h1

12 ... ∆f4

A perfectly worthy finish, as however, also was the immediate 12...∆h3! (13 ∆g1 ∆xg1 14 gxf3 ∆xf3).

13 ∆g1
If 13 gxf3 ∆h3.

13 ... ∆h3!

White resigns

---

Game 23
Lvov–Radchenko
Krasnodar 1957

1 e4 e5
2 ∆f3 ∆c6
3 ∆c4 ∆f6
4 ∆g5 d5
5 exd5 b5

An analysis of this outlandish move was published by the American master Ulvestad in 1941. The main line transposes into the Fritz Variation, but independent branches are also possible.

6 ∆f1!
Ulvestad's idea is after the direct 6 \( \text{dx}5 \text{c}6 + \text{wx}6 5 \) 7 \( \text{xc}6+ \text{xc}6 8 0-0 \) to launch an attack by 8...\( \text{b}7 9 \) \( \text{wf}3 \) e4 10 \( \text{b}3 \) (10 \( \text{xf}7? \) e3, or 10 \( \text{h}3+ \text{b}8 11 \text{xf}7 \text{xd}5! 12 \text{dx}8 \text{h}5) 10...0-0-0!

The complications after 8 \( \text{w}f3 \) require further testing: 8...e4 9 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 10 \( \text{xf}7+ \text{d}8 11 0-0 \text{e}8 \) (van Scheltinga-Prins, Rotterdam 1946).

After 6 dxc6 bxc4 7 \( \text{we}2 \) (7 \( \text{c}3! ? \)) 7...h6 it is dangerous to play 8 \( \text{we}5+ \), since 8...\( \text{e}7 9 \text{f}3 0-0 \) 10 0-0 \( \text{g}4 \) gives Black good attacking chances.

6 ... \( \text{d}4 \)

Not 6...\( \text{xd}5? \) 7 \( \text{c}3 \).

After 6...\( \text{xd}5 \) 7 \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{b}7 \) (if 7...\( \text{d}7 \) 8 d4 \( \text{ex}4 \) 9 0-0 \( \text{e}7 \) 10 \( \text{xf}7 \) 8 d4 f6 9 0-0! \( \text{fxg}5 \) 10 c4 a6 11 cxd5 \( \text{xd}5 \) 12 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 13 \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{xd}1 \) 14 \( \text{xd}1 \) White exerts strong pressure on the opponent's shattered position.

7 \( \text{c}3 \)

The game has transposed into the Fritz Variation.

7 ... \( \text{xd}5 \)

8 \( \text{e}4 \)

Probably the best reply.

The position after 8 h4 h6 9 \( \text{c}4 \) has a number of special features. Fuglewicz-Neishtadt (Correspondence 1963/4) continued 9...\( \text{e}6 \) 10 \( \text{xb}5+ \) \( \text{d}7 \) 11 \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{df}4 \) (11...f5!??) 12 d4 \( \text{xf}2+ \) 13 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{gf}4+ \) 14 \( \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{ex}f4+ \) 15 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 16 \( \text{bd}2 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 17 h5 \( \text{h}4+ \) 18 \( \text{e}2 \) exd4, with roughly equal chances.

8 ... \( \text{h}4 \)

A risky move.

The quiet (if this word can be applied to such a sharp variation) 8...\( \text{d}6 \) 9 \( \text{xb}5+ \text{d}7 \) leads to a position from the Fuglewicz-Neishtadt game, but without the moves h2-h4 and ...h7-h6. After 10 \( \text{xd}7+ \text{xd}7 \) 11 0-0 \( \text{e}7 \) 12 d4 \( \text{ex}4 \) 13 \( \text{c}3 \) Black still has to demonstrate that the slight extra activity of his pieces is worth the sacrificed pawn. It should be added that with the inclusion of the moves h2-h4 and ...h7-h6 this variation loses in strength in view of the unfavourable position of White's pawn at h4.

9 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \)

Black stakes everything on this move. However, experience has shown that everything else is unfavourable. For example, 9...\( \text{g}4 \) 10 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 11 \( \text{xb}5+ \text{d}8 \) 12 0-0 \( \text{c}5+ \) 13 d4 \( \text{ex}4 \) 14 \( \text{e}4 \) (but not 14 \( \text{fxg}4? \) d3+, when it is Black who wins, Rubinov-Steiner, USA 1946) 14...\( \text{de}3 \) 15 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 16 \( \text{xd}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 17 \( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{dx}3 \) 18 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 19 \( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 20 \( \text{c}5 \) with advantage to White.

Berliner's attempted improvement 11...e4 would appear to be unsuccessful: 11 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 12 \( \text{xb}5+ \text{d}8 \) 13 0-0 \( \text{ex}3 \) 14 \( \text{b}3 \) (Estrin) - White maintains a material advantage.

10 \( \text{c}4 \) 0-0-0

11 \( \text{xb}5? \)

This greed is punished.
The Soviet theoretician Radchenko, who did a great deal of analysis of 9...\texttt{Wh}4, gave a number of variations confirming the dangers of White's position. After 11 dxe5, 11 \texttt{C}c3 or 11 \texttt{C}e2 Black continues his attack with 11...\texttt{C}f4. If 11 \texttt{Wh}5 \texttt{W}xd4 12 \texttt{W}f5+ \texttt{B}b8 13 \texttt{C}c3 \texttt{C}f4 14 d3 \texttt{C}b4 15 \texttt{C}d2 g6 16 \texttt{W}f6 \texttt{C}d5, and Black wins.

White can try to refute the bold knight sacrifice by including his bishop in the defence with 11 d3! In the variation 11...\texttt{C}f4 12 \texttt{C}xf4 exf4 13 \texttt{Wh}5! \texttt{B}b4+ (13...\texttt{W}c7+ 14 \texttt{C}e2 g5 15 \texttt{C}d2 \texttt{W}xd4 16 0-0-0! favours White) 14 \texttt{C}d1 \texttt{W}e7 15 \texttt{C}e2! Black's active position does not compensate for the sacrificed piece.

11 ... \texttt{C}f4
12 0-0

White was planning to answer 12...\texttt{C}xg2 with 13 \texttt{C}a6+ \texttt{C}b8 14 \texttt{W}b3+ \texttt{C}a8 15 f3, and 12...\texttt{C}xg2 with 13 f3, defending and remaining a piece up.

The game, however, did not last long.

12 ... \texttt{Wh}3!

After this reply, which White had not foreseen, he was obliged to resign.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Scotch Game}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textit{Game 24}
\textit{Witling--Sergiev}
\textit{Correspondence 1982}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
1 & e4 \texttt{e}5 \\
2 & \texttt{C}f3 \texttt{C}c6 \\
3 & d4 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

This opening took its name from the first correspondence game in the history of chess between players from Edinburgh and London (1824-6), in which the Scots were successful.

The point of the exchange offered by White at d4 is to gain domination of the centre. To neutralise it Black usually aims to play ...d7(d6)-d5, which promises equal chances.

The move 3 d4 can also be made with gambit aims, if after 3...exd4 White plays 4 \texttt{C}c4 (4...\texttt{B}b4+ 5 c3 dx\texttt{C}c3 6 0-0), the Scotch Gambit, or 4 c3, the Göring Gambit.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
3 & ... \texttt{exd}4 \\
4 & \texttt{C}xd4 \texttt{C}c5 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The main alternatives are 4...\texttt{C}f6 and 4...\texttt{W}h4.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
5 & \texttt{C}b3 \texttt{C}b6 \\
6 & \texttt{C}c3 \texttt{C}f6 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
Black continues his development. Surprisingly, this natural move began to be employed only in the early 1980s. Before this Black mainly played 6...\textit{w}f6 or 6...d6 and ...\textit{g}e7.

7 \textit{g}5

The alternative is 7 e2 and 0-0.

7 ... \textit{h}6
8 \textit{h}4 \textit{d}6
9 \textit{d}5?

This allows a classic Legall sacrifice.

The game Radulov-Smyslov (Hastings 1972/3) went 9 \textit{w}e2 \textit{e}6 (after 9...\textit{d}4 10 \textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 11 \textit{w}d2 White stands better) 10 0-0-0 g5 11 \textit{g}3 \textit{w}e7 12 f3 0-0-0 13 \textit{f}2 d5, and Black equalised.

been 10...g5 11 \textit{g}3 \textit{f}6 12 \textit{xf}6+ \textit{xf}6 13 0-0-0.

Other ways of declining the sacrifice are unsatisfactory:
(\text{a}) 10 \textit{xc}7+ \textit{xc}7 11 \textit{we}2 d5 12 f3 (material equality is restored, but only for a couple of moves) 12...0-0 13 fxe4 \textit{e}8 14 \textit{d}2 \textit{d}4;
\textit{\text{b})} 10 \textit{xb}6 \textit{wh}4 11 g3 \textit{f}6 12 \textit{we}2 axb6;
\textit{\text{c})} 10 \textit{we}2 \textit{wh}4 11 g3 \textit{gg}4 12 f3 \textit{we}6 13 fxe4 0-0 14 0-0-0 f5.

After the capture of the queen, the white king is driven into the centre.

10 ... \textit{xf}2+
11 \textit{we}2 \textit{g}4+
12 \textit{d}3

9 ... \textit{xe}4!

10 \textit{xd}8

Had White known what was awaiting him, he might have put up a resistance with 10 \textit{wh}5, reconciling himself to the loss of a pawn. The continuation could have

12 ... \textit{e}5+!

One can only be amazed that, in a correspondence game, White failed to notice this move!

13 \textit{xe}4 f5+
14 \textit{f}4 \textit{g}6 mate
Game 25
Prügel–Dyckhoff
Correspondence 1899

1 e4 e5
2 d3 d5
3 d4 exd4
4 cxd4 Wh4

An old continuation, that used to be employed by Steinitz.

5 Wh3

Attempts to refute the black queen’s early sortie are associated with the sacrifice of the e4 pawn in various guises: 5 c3 b4 6 db5 Whxe4+ 7 e2, 5 f3 Whxe4+ 6 e2, and 5 b5 Whxe4+ 6 e3, gaining a marked lead in development.

However, Black can decline the gift. In the first case after 5 c3 b4 6 db5 he has 6...a5, e.g. 7 d3 a6 8 a3 b5 (V. Zhuravlev-Bronstein, USSR 1980), and in the second he can answer 5 f3 with 5...Wh5.

And in the third case he can reply to 5 b5 with 5...b4+, and only if 6 1 e3 (6 c3 a5) 6...Whxe4+. According to analysis by Chaplinsky, after 7 e2 xc3+ 8 xc3 Whd4 9 d3 db4 10 b5 xd3+ 11 Whd3 Whxd3 12 cxd3 f3 d8 13 f4 White’s initiative is sufficient only to restore material equality and gain equal chances: 13...d6 14 c1 c7 15 xc7 c8 16 d5 xc1+ 17 xc1 c6. If instead 16 xd6,

then 16 c6! 17 e4 (the knight has nowhere to go) 17...Wh7 18 f4 Wh6.

After the continuation chosen by White, the black queen’s sortie is justified.

5 ... Wh6
6 c3 d3?

Strangely enough, this natural move, defending the e4 pawn, allows Black to launch an attack. White should have first exchanged on c6.

6 ... Whg4
7 g3 Whf6
8 c4 f3 Whc5

8...f3 would have been answered in the same way. 8...c5 would also have won.

9 Whc3

After other queen moves White would have had to reckon with 9...c5.

9 ... Whb4

9...Whb6 would also have won.
Loss of material is unavoidable, and so **White resigned**. He played the opening so weakly, that Black would have won in various ways.

**Four Knights Game**

| Game 26 |
| Abonyi–Hromadka |
| Prague 1908 |

1 e4 e5  
2 d4 d5  
3 c3 c6  
4 c4 b5

The classical continuation.

4 d4 exd4 leads either to the so-called Scotch Four Knights after 5 cxd4, or to the interesting Belgrade Gambit – 5 d5 exd5 6 e2 f5 7 g5.

4 ... d4

‘Rubinstein has, in my opinion, made one of his finest contributions to the theory of the openings in the discovery and analysis of the variations springing from this move’ wrote Alekhine.

The main alternative is 4 ... b4 5 0-0 0-0 6 d3 d6 7 g5, when Black should avoid the symmetry and allow his opponent the advantage of the two bishops – 7 ... xc3 8 bxc3. Metger’s plan of 8 ... e7 followed by ... d8-e6 gives him hopes of equalising.

5 a4

5 ... c6

Subsequently 5 ... c5 has been played more often. Here 6 xex5 leads to a complicated game. If White wishes without fail to keep a material advantage, he risks coming
under a dangerous attack: 6...0-0 7
\( \text{d}1 \) (to 7 \( \text{d}3 \) or 7 \( \text{f}3 \) Black replies
7...\( \text{b}6 \) 8 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 9 \( \text{f}xd5? \)
\( \text{xd}5 \) 10 \( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{h}4! \)
Instead of the greedy 9 \( \text{f}xd5? \)
White should take defensive
measures, with 9 \( \text{d}3 \). After 9...\( \text{c}6 \) 10
\( \text{h}1 \) (10 \( \text{f}3 \), suggested by Keres, looks
risky) 10...\( \text{e}8 \), by returning the
pawn White has an equal game
(Hoek-Spielmann, Helsinki 1935).
And one more point. Instead of 8
\( \text{h}4 \) White can consider Short’s
idea of 8 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 9 \( \text{d}5 \).
6 0-0
Recent games have seen 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{b}5 \)
7 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{xb}3 \) 8 \( \text{xb}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 9 0-0 \( \text{e}7 \)
10 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{g}4 \) with roughly equal
cances (Nunn-Piket, Wijk aan Zee
1991), and the sharper 6 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 7
0 0 \( \text{d}6 \) 8 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 9 \( \text{b}3 \) (Short-
6...\( \text{c}5 \)
The sharp 6...\( \text{b}5 \)!? is interesting: 7
\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 8 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 9 \( \text{d}3 \) (taking
on \( \text{f}7 \) is unfavourable) 9...\( \text{a}4 \) 10 \( \text{e}5 
\( \text{a}8 \) (10...\( \text{g}8 \) 11 \( \text{g}4 \)) 11 \( \text{xf}6 
\( \text{xe}6 \) 12 \( \text{xb}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) — both sides
have chances.
7 \( \text{xe}5 
Here too taking the pawn assists
the mobilisation of the black pieces.
The quiet 7 \( \text{d}3 \) is better.
7...\( \text{d}6 
8 \( \text{d}3 
As we have already seen, this
hinders the development of the
queenside. However, 8 \( \text{f}3 \) allows
the unpleasant pin 8...\( \text{g}4 \) 9 \( \text{d}3 
\( \text{f}1 \) , and if 10 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{xf}3 \) 11 \( \text{gxf}3 
\( \text{h}3 \) 12 \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 13 \( \text{e}2 \) (13
\( \text{f}4 \)?) \( \text{g}4 \)) 13...\( \text{e}5 \) 14 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}5 \).
8...\( \text{g}4 
9 \( \text{e}1 
9...\( \text{f}3+! 
10 \( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{xf}3 \)
The threat is 11...\( \text{e}8 \) (which
follows, for example, on 11 \( \text{xc}5 \)).
White’s pieces are unable to come
to the aid of their king. If 11 \( \text{f}4 
\( \text{g}4 \) 12 \( \text{ce}2 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 13 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{xe}2 \) 14 
\( \text{xe}2 \) \( \text{g}3 \) and 15...\( \text{h}2 \) mate.
11 \( \text{e}5 
If 11...\( \text{c}8 \) White hopes to set up
a defence by 12 exd6+ \( \text{f}8 \) 13 \( \text{e}5 \).
11...\( \text{f}8 
12 \( \text{e}6 
If White takes the knight, 12...
\( \text{d}7 \) wins.
12...\( \text{g}4 
Now 13 \( \text{e}5 \) is answered by the
decisive 13...\( \text{xh}2 \).
13 \( \text{e}7 \) \( \text{xd}6 \)
White resigns
Ponziani Opening

Game 27
Vasilev–Schröder
Correspondence 1982

1 e4 e5
2 d3 c6
3 c3

This move was first analysed by Ponziani in 1769.

White’s direct attempt to occupy the centre involves delaying the development of his Queenside. In contrast to the Giuoco Piano (3 d4 c4 5 d4 c6 6 e4), here the move d2–d4 is made without an attack on the bishop, and Black is not obliged to exchange on d4. As a result, White’s queen’s knight is deprived of the important c3 square.

3 ... d5

For a long time this move was regarded as the strongest, but now this evaluation has been shaken. The soundest is considered to be 3 ... f6.

4 b5

4 exd5 wxd5 5 d4 exd4 6 cxd4 leads to a position from the Göring Gambit Declined.

The other alternative is 4 a4, when Black has a choice between 4 ... f6 (recommended by Steinitz) 5 b5 g6, and two gambit variations:

(a) 4 ... f6 5 exd5 cxd5 6 x c6 bxc6 7 d3 (7 bxc6+ d7 8 a6 dxe4, and if 9 b5 0-0 is extremely dangerous for White) 7 ... 0-0, although after 8 e2! it is not clear whether Black’s initiative compensates for the sacrificed pawn;
(b) 4 d7 5 exd5 d4 6 d1 xf3+ 7 xf3 f6 8 c4 c5 (or 8 ... e4), with some compensation for the pawn.

4 ... dxe4

Here too 4 ... f6 is possible, transposing into the variation recommended by Steinitz.

5 x e5 g5

Black initiates gambit play by allowing the attack on c6. Events also take an interesting course after 5 ... d5.

6 a4 x e5

After 6 ... xg2 7 x c6+ (7 f1 comes into consideration) 7 ... bxc6 8 x c6+ d8 9 f1 the attack 9 h3 (given an exclamation mark in most opening guides) 10 x a8+ e7 11 d1 (Keres suggested 11 c6+, but then comes 11 ... d6 12 x f 8+ e7!! 13 x e7+ cxc6,
when the checks come to an end and Black wins) 11...\texttt{xf}1+ 12 \texttt{c}2 \texttt{f}6 is parried by 13 \texttt{b}3!

12...\texttt{f}5 is better, when 13 \texttt{a}3 leads to an unclear position, difficult to evaluate.

7 \texttt{xc}6+ \texttt{xc}6
8 \texttt{xc}6+ \texttt{d}8
9 \texttt{xa}8 \texttt{c}5

12 \texttt{b}7

If 12 \texttt{xb}5? \texttt{xf}2+.

12... \texttt{d}3

The paralysis of White's queenside renders his position indefensible.

13 \texttt{b}4 \texttt{xf}2+!
14 \texttt{xf}2 \texttt{f}4+
15 \texttt{e}1 \texttt{h}4+
16 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{h}5

White resigns

\textbf{Philidor Defence}

\textbf{Game 28}
\textit{Zvirbulis–Randviir}
\textit{Pärnu 1950}

1 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{e}5
2 \texttt{f}3 \texttt{d}6

Philidor, after whom this opening is named, used to answer 3 \texttt{c}4 or 3 \texttt{d}4 with 3...\texttt{f}5, but later it was shown that after this White can gain a considerable advantage. Only 3...exd4, and the later recommendations of 3...\texttt{d}7 and 3...\texttt{f}6 give Black hopes of an acceptable game.

In its modern interpretation the Philidor Defence is a rather cramped, but sound set-up, in which after completing his development Black plans play on the queenside or in the centre.

3 \texttt{d}4 \texttt{f}6
4 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{bd}7
5 \texttt{c}4 \texttt{e}7

Black provokes the bishop sacrifice 6 \texttt{xf}7+ \texttt{xf}7 7 \texttt{g}5+. It
appears to favour White, since when the king moves there follows 8 Ʌe6 and then Ʌxc7. However, as shown by the game A.Rabinovich–Ilyin-Genevsky (Moscow 1922), after 7...Ʌg8! 8 Ʌe6 Ʌe8 9 Ʌxc7 Ʌg6 10 Ʌxa8 Ʌxg2 11 Ʌf1 exd4! 12 Ʌe2 (if 12 Ʌxd4 Ʌe5 13 f4 Ʌfg4) 12...dxс3! Black has a decisive attack: 13 Ʌc4+ d5 14 Ʌxc8+ Ʌf7.

The exchange on e5 is an interesting attempt to improve White’s play: 6 dxе5 dxе5 and now 7 Ʌxf7+ Ʌxf7 8 Ʌg5+ Ʌg6 (after 8...Ʌg8 Black no longer has the possibility of ...exd4 followed by ...Ʌe5) 9 h4 (after 9 Ʌe6 Ʌg8 10 Ʌxc7 Ʌb8 White has only two pawns for the piece, and his attacking chances are problematic; regarding 9 f4, see below) 9...h5. Now the variation 10 f4 exf4 11 Ʌe2 Ʌd6 12 e5 looks very threatening: if 12...Ʌxe5 13 Ʌd3+ Ʌh6 14 Ʌf7 mate, while 12...Ʌxe5 allows White to win the queen. However, after 13 Ʌxf4+ Ʌh6 14 Ʌf7+ Ʌxf7 15 Ʌe6+ Ʌh7 16 Ʌxd8 Ʌxd8 Black has three minor pieces for it. And what pieces! 17...Ʌg3+ is threatened, and castling also leads to the loss of the queen. It is easy to see that other continuations also allow Black to launch a decisive counteroffensive.

White would appear to have better attacking chances after 9 f4 (9...exf4 10 Ʌe6 Ʌg8 11 Ʌxc7 Ʌb8 12 Ʌxf4).

We should draw attention to another modification of the sacrifice on f7: 7 Ʌg5 0-0 8 Ʌxf7+ Ʌxf7 9 Ʌe6 Ʌe8 10 Ʌxc7 Ʌd8 11 Ʌxa8 b5! 12 Ʌd5! Now 12...Ʌxd5 13 Ʌxd5 Ʌf6 14 Ʌxb5 favours White, but 12...Ʌd6 followed by 13...Ʌb7 allows Black to win the errant knight and to remain with two minor pieces for a rook and two pawns, with a promising position.

Let us return to the game, where White continued his development.

6 0-0 0-0
7 Ʌe2 c6
8 a4

Directed against Black’s activity on the queenside.

8 ... exd4

The restrained 8...Ʌc7 followed by ...b7-b6, ...Ʌb7 and ...Ʌad8 is objectively best.

9 Ʌxd4 Ʌxe4

At one time it was thought that in this way Black could release the tension in the centre and obtain a perfectly acceptable position.
Now it has been shown that 10 \(\text{dxe}4\) \(d5\) 11 \(\text{\#f5}\) \(\text{dxc}4\) 12 \(\text{\#h6!}\) places him in a critical position. 12...gxh6 is answered by 13 \(\text{\#g4+}\) \(\text{\#g}5\) 14 \(\text{\#xh6+}\), while if 12...\(\text{\#f6}\) 13 \(\text{\#e3}\) \(\text{\#xf5}\) 14 \(\text{\#xf5}\) gxh6 15 \(\text{\#xe7+}\) \(\text{\#g}7\) 16 \(\text{\#e5}\) with a winning position (Tseshkovsky-Lutikov, 36th USSR Championship, Alma-Ata 1968/9).

If instead of 11...\(\text{dxc}4\) Black takes the knight – 11...\(\text{dxe}4\) 12 \(\text{\#xe4}\) \(\text{\#f6}\), White develops his initiative with 13 \(\text{\#d1!}\), although he can also consider the sharp 13 \(\text{\#h6+}\) gxh6 14 \(\text{\#d3}\) \(\text{\#e8}\) 15 \(\text{\#xh7+}\) \(\text{\#f8}\) 16 \(\text{\#xh6+}\) \(\text{\#e7}\) 17 \(\text{\#f1+}\) (Pitkas-Randviir, Estonia 1951).

Thus 9...\(\text{dxe}4\) is risky, to say the least. 9...\(\text{\#e8}\) looks natural, and if 10 \(\text{\#a2}\) \(\text{\#f8}\).

\[\text{10 \#xe4}\]

An unsuccessful attempt to refute the temporary piece sacrifice.

\[\text{10 \ldots d5}\]

\[\text{11 \#xd5?}\]

Had White anticipated what was awaiting him, he would undoubtedly have preferred 11 \(\text{\#xd5}\) \(\text{\#f6}\) 12 \(\text{\#xf7}\) \(\text{\#xf7}\) 13 \(\text{\#d3}\). Even so, after 13...\(\text{\#g4!}\) Black’s initiative is more than sufficient compensation for the pawn.

\[\text{11 \ldots cxd5}\]

\[\text{12 \#xd5}\]

If 12 \(\text{\#xd5}\) \(\text{\#f6}\).

Now White is a pawn up, and he assumed that there was nothing threatening him. But in fact, only one more move was made in the game, one with which Black offered the exchange of queens.

\[\text{12 \ldots \#b6!}\]

After the forced 13 \(\text{\#xd8}\) \(\text{\#xd8}\) there are two minor pieces en prise, and one of them is lost.

White resigns.

Petroff Defence

Game 29
Schlenker–Schwarz
Correspondence 1940

1 \text{e4} \text{e5}

2 \text{\#f3} \text{\#f6}

This symmetrical opening was developed in the first half of the 19th century by the Russian masters Jaenisch and Petroff – hence its alternative name of the Russian Defence. Its guiding idea is a counterattack against \text{e4} combined with quick development.

A drawback to the opening is the
fact that White can choose continuations leading to set-ups that are symmetrical, or almost so, in which the importance of the first move plays an important role. However, some lines (especially those developed in recent years) lead to lively piece play with tactical possibilities for both sides.

3 \( \text{Qxe5} \)

Black must also be prepared for 3 d4, White's main alternative.

3 ... d6

3...\( \text{Qc6?} \), an incorrect and risky attempt to seize the initiative, succeeded unexpectedly quickly in a game Lowens-Stafford (Correspondence 1950): 4 \( \text{Qxc6 dxc6 5 e5} \) (the simple 5 d3 is good enough to refute the sacrifice) 5...\( \text{Qe4} \) 6 d3? (a plausible, active and... losing move; 6 \( \text{Qc3} \) was not bad) 6...\( \text{Qc5!} \), and White resigned: if he takes the knight he loses his queen after 7 dxe4 \( \text{Qxf2+} \) 8 \( \text{Qe2 Qg4+} \), while if he defends f2 by 8 \( \text{Qe3} \), then 8...\( \text{Qxe3 9 fxe3 Qh4+} \) wins.

4 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \)

5 d4 d5

6 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qd6} \)

6...\( \text{Qe7} \) is sounder.

7 0-0 \( \text{Qg4} \)

After actively deploying his bishops, Black consolidates his knight at e4 with ...f7-f5 and plans an attack on the kingside. In reply White undermines the d5 pawn, depriving the knight of one of its supports.

8 \( \text{Qe1} \)

8 c4 is preferable.

8 ... f5

9 c4 0-0

10 cxd5?

White should have played 10 h3 or 10 \( \text{Qbd2} \).

The d5 pawn could have been taken in the double-edged variation 8 c4 f5 9 cxd5 0-0 10 \( \text{Qc3} \), when the rook is at f1. To maintain his initiative Black has to sacrifice a second pawn: 10...\( \text{Qd7} \) 11 h3 \( \text{Qh5} \) 12 \( \text{Qxe4 fxe4} \) 13 \( \text{Qxe4 Qf6} \) 14 \( \text{Qf5 Qh8} \), but after 15 g4! (this strong move changed the evaluation of this variation, which had been successfully employed by Marshall) 15...\( \text{Qxd5} \) 16 \( \text{Qe6}! \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 17 \( \text{Qg5!} \) White wins the exchange and eliminates the attack (Alexander-Malisson, Brighton 1938).

The conclusion: the seemingly active bishop development at d6 and the plan associated with it do not give Black equality.

10 ... \( \text{Qxh2+!} \)
This move would also have followed after 10 \( \diamondsuit c3 \).

11 \( \diamondsuit xh2 \)  \( \diamondsuit xf2 \)
12 \( \dagger d2 \)  \( \dagger xd3 \)
13 \( \dagger xd3 \)  \( \dagger xf3 \)
14 \( gxf3? \)

If instead of 10 \( cxd5? \) White had played 10 \( \dagger bd2 \), the combination would not have worked – he would have recaptured on \( f3 \) with the knight.

Now he should have moved his rook, although after 14...\( \dagger xd5 \) the ending with two extra pawns merely demands technical accuracy of Black.

14 ...  \( \dagger h4+ \)

The exchange and a pawn down, there is no point in playing on.

White resigns.

Latvian Counter-Gambit

Game 30
Shlter–Chigorin
St Petersburg 1878

1 \( e4 \)  \( e5 \)
2 \( \dagger f3 \)  \( f5 \)

Original analyses early this century by Karl Behting and other Riga players strengthened Black’s play and drew attention to this ‘King’s Gambit by Black’.

However, the modern evaluation of the opening, based largely on the line 3 \( \dagger xe5 \)  \( \dagger f6 \)  4 \( \dagger c4! \), is unfavourable for Black.

3 \( \dagger xf5 \)

A perfectly feasible continuation (with colours reversed – the King’s Gambit Accepted with an extra tempo), which promises White a slight advantage.

3 ...  \( \dagger c6 \)

The theoretical variation 3...\( e4 \)  4 \( \dagger e5 \)  \( \dagger f6 \)  5 \( \dagger e2 \)  \( d6 \) leads to interesting complications: 6 \( \dagger h5+ \)  \( \dagger e7 \)  7 \( \dagger f7 \)  \( \dagger e8 \)  8 \( \dagger xh8 \)  \( \dagger xh5 \)  9 \( \dagger xh5 \)  \( \dagger xh5 \)  10 \( g4 \)  \( \dagger f6 \)  11 \( \dagger g1 \)

\( \dagger c6 \)  12 \( \dagger g3 \)  \( \dagger d4 \)  13 \( \dagger d1 \)  \( g6 \) (or 13...\( d5 \)  14 \( d3 \) followed by \( \dagger g5 \) and \( \dagger h3 \))  14 \( d3 \)  \( gxf5 \)  15 \( g5 \). White stands better.

Simpler is 4 \( \dagger e2 \) (instead of 4 \( \dagger e5 \))  4...\( \dagger e7 \)  5 \( \dagger d4 \), and if 5...\( \dagger e5 \)  6 \( \dagger b5 \) with the better game.

4 \( \dagger b5 \)

4 \( d4 \)  \( exd4 \)  5 \( \dagger xd4 \) is a good alternative.

4 ...  \( \dagger c5 \)
5 \( \dagger xc6 \)

5 \( 0-0 \) is correct. White’s planned queen manoeuvre encounters a spectacular refutation.

5 ...  \( dxc6 \)
6 \( \dagger xe5 \)  \( \dagger xf5 \)
7 \( \dagger h5+ \)  \( g6 \)
8 \( \dagger xg6 \)

(see diagram next page)

8 ...  \( hxg6! \)

White had only reckoned on 8... \( \dagger xg6 \)  9 \( \dagger xc5 \). The rook sacrifice radically changes the situation.

9 \( \dagger xh8 \)

One gains the impression that White has only been moving his queen.
3 $\text{Wxd4}$

Here the queen comes under attack, but by retreating it to e3 White prepares queenside castling.

Events take a different course when for the sake of rapid development he sacrifices one or even two pawns: 3 $c3$ $\text{dxc3}$ 4 $\text{c4}$ (or 4 $\text{xc3}$) 4...$\text{xb2}$ 5 $\text{xb2}$. This, the Danish Gambit, is best answered by the central counter 5...$d5$ (or 5...$f6$ 6 $\text{c3}$ $d5$) or the restrained 5...$d6$.

3 

4 $\text{e3}$ $g6$

Black usually plays 4...$f6$ 5 $\text{c3}$ $e7$ or 5...$b4$, preparing $d7$-$d5$-$d6$.

5 $\text{d2}$ $g7$

6 $\text{c3}$ $\text{ge7}$

6...$f6$ is more energetic:

(a) 7 $e5$ $\text{g4}$ 8 $\text{e4}$ (stronger than 8 $\text{e2}$?, which allows Black to seize the initiative at the cost of a pawn: 8...$d5$ 9 $\text{exd6+}$ $\text{e6}$ 10 $\text{dxc7}$ $\text{xc7}$, Charousek-Makovetz, Budapest 1893) 8...$\text{gxe5}$ 9 $f4$ $d5$ 10 $\text{xd5}$ (10 $\text{xd5}$? $\text{f5}$) 10...$\text{d7}$ (or 10...$\text{g4}$) 11 $\text{e4+}$ $\text{e7}$, with an equal position;

(b) 7 0-0-0 0-0 8 $\text{d5}$ (8 $f3$ $d5$!, or 8 $\text{d3}$ $\text{e8}$ 9 $\text{g3}$ $d5$) 8...$d6$ 9 $\text{c3}$ $\text{xd5}$ 10 $\text{exd5}$ $\text{e8}$ 11 $\text{g3}$ $\text{e5}$, with chances for both sides.

7 0-0-0 0-0

8 $f4$

A poor move. The thematic counter ...$d7$-$d5$ could have been prevented by 8 $\text{c4}$, and 8...$d6$ answered by 9 $h4$. 

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* In some publications the game is given as being played in Bradford in 1901.
8 ... d5!
The opening of the position allows Black to disclose the drawbacks to the advanced position of the white queen.

9 exd5  
10  
11  

Black has taken the initiative, and his minor pieces are aiming at the position of the enemy king.

12  
13 ?
13 was essential.

A deadly check at d3 was threatened.

15 . . . wa6!
A tactical blow on the theme of diversion (16 xa6 xa2 mate). At the same time the bishop is attacked and 16...xa2 is threatened. This means that the game is decided.

16 g4  

17 e3  
18 xc3
White resigns

King’s Gambit

Game 32
E.Kristiansen–Kolarov
Havana Olympiad 1966

1 e4  
2 f4
One of the most ancient openings, and, until the mid-19th century, perhaps the most popular.

The idea of 2 f4 is to divert the pawn from e5 and then occupy the centre with d2-d4. An important part in White’s plan is to break down the barriers on the f-file and include his rook and bishop in an attack on f7.

2 ... exf4
3  
3 g5
The old classical defence.

4 h4
White deprives the f4 pawn of its support.

If 4 c4 Black is not obliged to go in for the Muzio Gambit (4...g4 5 0-0), but can play 4...g7, avoiding the weakening of his kingside (he is ready to meet 5 h4 with 5...h6!). After 5 d4 d6 White should castle; the slow move 6 c3?! allows Black to change plan with 6...g4! 7 wb3 (compared with the Muzio Gambit, in which the c3 square is intended for the knight, the attack after 7 0-0 gxf3 8 xf3 or 7 xf4 gxf3 8 0-0
loses in strength) 7...gxf3 8 ∆xf7+ ♞f8 (according to later analysis by L. Collijn, 8...♗e7! is stronger) 9 ♞xg8? (White unblocks the f-file, but exchanges an important attacking piece, and also brings the enemy rook into play; he should have castled) 9...hxg8 10 0-0 (reckoning on answering 10...fxg2 with 11 ∆xf4+, but...) 10...♗xd4+! 11 cxd4 ♞xg8 12 ♞h1 ♦xh2+! 13 ♞xh2 ♦h4+ 14 ♞g1 ♦g3+ 15 ♞h1 ♦g2 mate (Mayet-Hirschfeld, Berlin 1861).

4 ... g4
5 ∆e5

This is known in theory as the Kieseritzky Gambit.

The Allgaier Gambit 5 ∆g5 is more risky, since the knight has no retreat square, and (for example, in reply to 5...h6) it has to be sacrificed: 6 ∆xf7 ♦xf7 7 d4 or 7 ∆c4+. White’s attack is quite dangerous, but can be parried by accurate defence.

5 ... ♦f6

The Berlin Defence, which, along with Paulsen’s Defence 5...∆g7, is considered the best reply to the Kieseritzky Gambit.

6 ∆c4

Great complications result from 6 ∆xg4 ∆xe4 7 d3 ∆g3 8 ∆xf4 ∆xh1 (or 8...∆e7+ 9 ♞e2 ∆xh1 10 ∆g5) 9 ♦e2+ ♦e7 (9...∆e7? 10 ∆f6+ ♞f8 11 ♞h6 mate) 10 ∆f6+ ♞d8 11 ∆xc7+ ♞xc7 12 ∆d5+ ♞d8 13 ∆xe7 ♞xe7 14 ♦g4 d6 15 ♦f4 ♦g8. Against the queen Black has three active minor pieces – his chances are better.

Apart from the game continuation, we should also mention a move which has occurred occasionally in modern events (for example, in the game Spassky-Fischer, Mar del Plata 1960): the solid 6 d4 followed by 6...d6 7 ∆d3 ∆xe4 8 ∆xf4.

6 ... d5

The source of this counter, which involves a pawn sacrifice, is a consultation game played in 1845 in Paris by Kieseritzky, on this occasion upholding the black position against ‘his’ move 5 ∆e5.

7 exd5 ∆d6
8 d4

The Rice Gambit 8 0-0 ∆e5 9 ♞e1 is merely of historical significance. A thematic match Chigorin-Lasker (Brighton 1903) and several tournaments with the participation of famous masters, financed by the chess patron Isaac Rice, allowed it
to be concluded that after 9...\textit{We}7 10 c3 \textit{A}h5 11 d4 \textit{A}d7 Black, who is a piece up, should be able to parry the attack.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

8 ... \textit{A}h5
9 \textit{A}xg4?

In this well known theoretical position 9 0-0! ensures White the initiative. After 9...\textit{W}xh4 (9...\textit{A}xe5 is weak in view of 10 \textit{W}e1 0-0 11 \textit{W}xe5) 10 \textit{W}e1 \textit{W}xe1 11 \textit{A}xe1 0-0 12 \textit{A}c3 White’s centralised pieces and better development are sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

9 ... \textit{A}g3!

Forcing the rook to occupy an unfortunate position.

10 \textit{A}h2 \textit{W}e7+
11 \textit{A}f2

11 ... h5!

The h2 square is occupied, and after 12 \textit{A}e5 Black wins by 12... \textit{A}xe5 13 dxe5 \textit{A}c5+.

White resigns.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
1 e4 & e5 \\
2 f4 & exf4 \\
3 \textit{A}c3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In contrast to the Bishop’s Gambit (3 \textit{A}c4 \textit{W}h4+ 4 \textit{A}f1), here in reply to 3...\textit{W}h4+ White has to move his king to e2, blocking in his bishop. Why then does he play 3 \textit{A}c3? As the reader will see, it is not so easy for Black to exploit the exposed position of the king. Especially when it is not possible to consult an openings book...

At the basis of this variation, first employed in a game Mason-Rosenthal (Paris 1878), lies an opening idea of Steinitz in the Vienna Game: 1 e4 e5 2 \textit{A}c3 \textit{A}c6 3 f4 exf4 4 d4. After 4...\textit{W}h4+ 5 \textit{A}e2 White’s strong centre and good development make it difficult for Black to create threats. An analysis of this position suggested to the future World Champion the paradoxical idea that the king can be a strong piece in the middlegame.

In the 1930s Mason’s move was upheld by the young Keres.

3 ... \textit{W}h4+
4 \textit{A}e2

White intends to play 5 \textit{A}f3 (and then d2-d4) or 5 \textit{A}d5. This obliges Black to play energetically.

4 ... d5!

Not only sacrificing a pawn, but also allowing an attack on c7.
After quiet continuations White has good chances of gaining an advantage, e.g. 4...d6 5 Qf3 g4 6 d5 exf3+ 7 gxf3 d8 8 d3 g5 9 Qd2 followed by e1 and h2-h4, and White stands clearly better (Keres-Kunerth, Corr. 1936).

Apart from 4...d5, perhaps the only move worth considering is 4...e7, as employed in the game Westernen-Arkhipov (Hungary 1983). After 5 Qf3 Wh5 6 d4 g5 7 Qf2 d6 poor play by White proved disastrous: 8 Qe2 Qg7 9 Qb5 Qa6 10 c3 g4 11 Qe1 Qh6 12 Qg1 Qg8 13 h3 f3 14 hxg4 f2+, and the game concluded. In reply to the flank activity White should have undermined the f4 pawn by 8 h4, so as after 8...g4 9 Qe1 to play the knight to d3. In this case both sides have chances.

5 Qxd5 Qg4+
6 Qf3 Qd6

The prelude to a wild variation with a rook sacrifice.

Earlier 6...Qd6 had been considered best, and if 7 d4 Qc6 followed by queenside castling. But after 8 c3 (or immediately 8 Qd3) 8...0-0-0 9 Qd3 and then Qc2 (Keres) White can face the future with confidence.

7 Qxc7+ Qd8

As it later transpires, the king must move to this square, rather than d7.

8 Qxa8 Qe5

An interesting, although ultimately incorrect attack begins with 8...Qd4+?! 9 Qd3 Qf6 10 c3 Qa6+ 11 c4! (11 Qxd4? leads to mate after 11...Qd6+ and 12...Qe6+) 11...Qc5 11 b4! (Jago-J.Littlewood, Correspondence 1964/5).

Now Black is threatening 9...Qxf3 10 gxf3 xfx3!! 11 xfx3 Wh5+, winning the queen. This means that White cannot play 9 d4. Note that if on the 7th move Black had played his king to d7, this operation would not have worked: after 12 Qf2 Qxd1 White would have won immediately with 13 Qh3+.

9 Qe1

A recommendation of the Mexican master Carlos Torre. White gives up a piece to exchange the queens. However, as the present game shows, this does not weaken Black’s attack. Therefore 9 h3 comes into consideration, although it is true that Black can then force a draw: 9...Qxf3+ 10 gxf3 Qg3!, and if 11 d4 Qxf3+ 12 Qe1 Qg3+ 13...
c2 f3+ with perpetual check.
If in reply to 9 h3 Black retreats his bishop – 9... h5, White should boldly play 10 d4! (but not 10 g1? g3 11 e1 xf3+ 12 gxf3 xf3 mate!), sacrificing his queen: 10... xf3 11 gxf3 xf3+ 12 xf3 h5+ 13 g2 xd1 14 d3 h5 15 xf4. The resulting extremely sharp position probably favours White (Jago-Thomas, Correspondence 1966).

9 ... xf3
10 xh4

Here too with the black king at d7 White could have calmly taken the knight – 10 gxf3 (10... xf3+ 11 xf3 xe1 12 h3+).

10 ... xh4+
11 e1

Until the present game this position was considered relatively acceptable for White. But it soon turns out that, despite the exchange of queens, the white king is threatened with a dangerous attack.

11 ... f3
12 f2

12 g3 is strongly answered by 12... g2+, and if 13 d1 c5 14 e3 f6. On 12 gxf3 Black has 12... xf3 13 g1 xe4.

12 ... f6
13 g3
If 13 g3 c5+ 14 d4 xd4+ 15 c3 xe4+.

(see diagram next column)

13 ... d6+!
14 f2

If he takes the knight, White is mated (14 xf4 f4!). But now, totally lacking in defenders, the white king comes under the attack of all the enemy pieces.

14 ... xe4+
15 e3 e8
16 b5 f5+

White resigns

Game 34
Tenebaum–Kantorovich
Moscow 1951

1 e4 e5
2 f4 d5
3 exd5 c6

This is the Nimzowitsch Counter-Gambit, first employed in the Spielmann-Nimzowitsch match (Munich 1907). By offering a pawn, Black tries to take the initiative. The idea is not justified, but to confirm this theoretical evaluation White must act very precisely.

4 dxc6
It is at this plausible move that the counter-gambit is aimed. The present game demonstrates how White should not play.

4 \( \square c3 \) (threatening 5 fxe5) is the correct reply, e.g. 4...exf4 5 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle f6 \) 6 d4 \( \triangle d6 \) (the simplification after 6...\( \triangle xd5 \) 7 \( \triangle xd5 \) \( \triangle xd5 \) 8 \( \triangle xf4 \) \( \triangle e4+ \) 9 \( \triangle e2 \) \( \triangle xe2+ \) 10 \( \triangle xe2 \) favours White, with his central pawn majority, Stoltz-Brinckmann, Swinemünde 1932) 7 \( \triangle e2+ \) \( \triangle e7 \) 8 \( \triangle xe7+ \) \( \triangle xe7 \) 9 \( \triangle e5 \) \( \triangle xd5 \) 10 \( \triangle xd5+ \) cxd5 11 \( \triangle xf4 \) f6 12 \( \triangle d3 \) \( \triangle c6 \) 13 0-0-0 \( \triangle xf4+ \) 14 \( \triangle xf4 \) \( \triangle d6 \) (Tenebaum-Estrin, Moscow 1959). After 15 \( \triangle e2 \) \( \triangle f5 \) 16 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle e4 \) 17 c4 (17...\( \triangle xf3 \) 18 c5+) the chances are with White.

4 ... \( \triangle xc6 \)

5 d3

5 \( \triangle b5 \) is well answered by 5...e4.

5 ... \( \triangle c5 \)

Now Black’s compensation for the sacrificed pawn is clearly apparent: kingside castling by White is ruled out, and his king is in danger.

6 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle f6 \)

7 \( \triangle c3 \) 0-0

8 fxe5

Otherwise Black himself will take on f4, opening the e-file.

8 ... \( \triangle xe5 \)

9 \( \triangle g5 \)

On 9 \( \triangle xe5 \) there follows 9...\( \triangle e8 \) 10 \( \triangle f4 \) \( \triangle g4 \), and if 11 \( \triangle e2 \) \( \triangle xe5 \) 12 \( \triangle xe5 \) \( \triangle d4 \) 13 0-0-0 \( \triangle xe5 \). On the queenside too the white king does not find peace: 14 \( \triangle f3 \) (14 \( \triangle d2 ? \) \( \triangle e3 \)) 14...\( \triangle xc3 \) 15 bxc3 \( \triangle g5+ \) 16 \( \triangle b2 \) (16 \( \triangle d2 ? \) \( \triangle e1+ \)) 16... \( \triangle b5+ \) 17 \( \triangle a1 \) \( \triangle g4 \), and Black wins.

9 ... \( \triangle e8 \)

10 \( \triangle e4 \)

After 10 \( \triangle xe5 \) \( \triangle xe5+ \) 11 \( \triangle e4 \) the ‘Legall mechanism’ goes into action: 11...\( \triangle xe4! \) 12 \( \triangle xd8 \) \( \triangle f2+ \) 13 \( \triangle e2 \) \( \triangle g4 \) mate.

And in Lazard-Tartakower (Paris 1929) after 10 \( \triangle e2 \) Black won easily by 10... \( \triangle xf3+ \) 11 gxf3 \( \triangle d4 \) 13 c3 \( \triangle f2+ \) 14 \( \triangle d2 \) \( \triangle xf3 \).

Up to now Black has demonstrated his knowledge of theory, whereas White has been unsuccessfully improvising. According to the books, Black is supposed to employ a complicated version of the Legall combination: 10...\( \triangle xe4 \) 11 \( \triangle xd8 \) \( \triangle c3!! \) 12 \( \triangle xe5 \) (12 bxc3 \( \triangle xf3 \) mate!) 12...\( \triangle xe5+ \) 13 \( \triangle e2 \) (or 13 \( \triangle d2 \) \( \triangle xd1 \) 14 \( \triangle xd1 \) \( \triangle g4 \) 15 \( \triangle c7 \) \( \triangle e7 \) 13...\( \triangle xd1 \) 14 \( \triangle xd1 \) (14 \( \triangle xd1 \) \( \triangle g4 \)) 14...\( \triangle xe2 \) 15 \( \triangle xe2 \) \( \triangle g4+ \) and 16...\( \triangle xd8 \). Black has two active bishops for a rook and a pawn.
But the position is so strong that there is also a simpler way to win.

10 ... \( \text{\textit{g4}} \)
11 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) \( \text{\textit{x f3}} \+)
12 \( \text{\textit{gxf3}} \) \( \text{\textit{x e4}} \)
13 \( \text{\textit{dxe4}} \)

If 13 \( \text{\textit{x d8}} \), then 13...\( \text{\textit{f2+}} \) and 14...\( \text{\textit{h3}} \) mate, or 13 \( \text{\textit{fxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{x e2}} \), winning.

13 ... \( \text{\textit{w x g5}} \)
14 \( \text{\textit{f x g4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \)
White resigns

**Vienna Game**

**Game 35**
**Lazard–Krepo**
**Strasburg 1925**

1 \( \text{\textit{e4}} \) \( \text{\textit{e5}} \)
2 \( \text{\textit{c c3}} \)

The idea of this opening, studied in the mid-19th century by Hamppe and other Viennese masters, is to prepare f2-f4, after first defending the e4 pawn and putting pressure on d5.

2 ... \( \text{\textit{f f6}} \)
3 \( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d5}} \)
4 \( \text{\textit{f x e5}} \) \( \text{\textit{x e4}} \)

The basic position of the main variation of the Vienna Game.

5 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \)

The alternatives are 5 \( \text{\textit{w f3}} \), to which 5...\( \text{\textit{c c6}} \) is considered the strongest reply, and 5 \( \text{\textit{d3}} \). In the latter case Black should not be tempted by 5...\( \text{\textit{h4+}} \), since after 6 \( \text{\textit{g3}} \) \( \text{\textit{x g3}} \) 7 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{h5}} \) 8 \( \text{\textit{x d5}} \) the play favours White. The complications arising after 5...\( \text{\textit{b b4}} \) 6 \( \text{\textit{dxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{w h4+}} \) 7 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) are not altogether clear. The soundest is 5...\( \text{\textit{c c3}} \) 6 \( \text{\textit{b c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{d d4}} \), when after 7 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{c c6}} \) 8 \( \text{\textit{c x d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{b b4+}} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{d d2}} \) \( \text{\textit{x d2+}} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{w x d2}} \) \( \text{\textit{x d4}} \) the chances are equal.

5 ... \( \text{\textit{c c6}} \)
6 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \)

White assumed that ...\( \text{\textit{c c5}} \) was not a threat, since he would drive back the bishop with gain of tempo. The only way to hope for an opening advantage is with 6 \( \text{\textit{b b5}} \).

6 ... \( \text{\textit{c c5}} \)
7 \( \text{\textit{d4}} \)

7 ... \( \text{\textit{c x d4!}} \)
8 \( \text{\textit{x d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{h h4+}} \)
9 \( \text{\textit{g3}} \) \( \text{\textit{x g3}} \)
10 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f2+}} \! \)

Driving the king into the middle of the board.

11 \( \text{\textit{w f2}} \) \( \text{\textit{e4+}} \)
12 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f2+}} \)
13 \( \text{\textit{d3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f5}} \)
14 \( \text{\textit{g1}} \) \( \text{\textit{g5+}} \)
White resigns
3 Sicilian Defence

The Sicilian Defence is the most popular modern opening, and leads to a tense, uncompromising battle. Although known from much earlier times, the opening began developing rapidly only in the 1930s, and in the second half of the present century 1...c5 has become the most common reply to 1 e4.

In the majority of variations White continues 2 d3 followed by 3 d4. After 3...cxd4 he obtains the half-open d-file, and Black the half-open c-file. Exploiting his spatial advantage resulting from the pawn at e4, White prepares an offensive on the kingside, while Black takes defensive measures and operates on the queenside.

**Dragon Variation**

| Game 36 |
| Gimpelman–Gorodetsky |
| Leningrad 1962 |

1 e4 c5
2 d3 d6
3 d4 cxd4
4 dxc4 d6
5 c3 g6
6 e3 e6

But not 6...d4? 7 b5+.
7 f3 0-0
8 c4 c6
9 d2

The basic position of the Dragon Variation. Having reinforced his e4 pawn, White carries out a plan suggested in the pre-war years by Rauzer. He castles queenside, in order to mount a kingside pawn storm.

If, instead of developing his bishop at c4, White plays 8 d2 c6 9 0-0, Black can offer the pawn sacrifice 9...d5 (suggested before the war by Konstantinopolsky), the aim of which is to open lines and gain an attack on the queenside, in which an important role is assigned to the bishop at g7.

The main line goes 10 dxc6 bxc6 11 exd5 d5 12 d5 cxd5 13 d5 c7 14 c5 (14 a8 f5 14...b7 15 a3 f5 16 a6! c7 17 c5 b6! According to analysis by Averbakh, 18 b6 axb6 19
c4 fc8 20 b3 xa2! 21 d8+!
(21 xxa2? xc2+) 21...xd8 22 xa2 leads to an equal position (a later game Ravinsky-Beylin, 1955, took this course and ended in a draw).

Nowadays White prefers to decline the sacrifice with 10 exd5 xd5 11 xc6 bxc6, and instead of 12 xd5 to play 12 d4. Another possibility is 10 e1.

9 d7

Various plans have been tried against the Rauzer Attack. The currently preferred set-up is d7, c8 and e5. The advance of the h-pawn can be halted by h7-h5. For example, 10 0-0-0 c8 11 b3 e5 12 h4 h5 13 g5 c5 with a sharp game and chances for both sides.

With the move in the game Black plans to establish a knight at c4 by playing b6 and a5 (or e5).

10 0-0-0

10 h4 is rather more energetic, for example, 10..a5 11 b3 e5 (or 11..b6 12 d3) 12 e2 d7 13 h5.

10 b6
11 b3 a5
12 h6?

An instance where a thematic move proves to be a decisive mistake.

White should have played 12 wd3 and h2-h4.

12 bc4
13 g5

13 e5!

This seemingly modest offer to exchange queens decides the outcome of the game!

14 de2

If 14 xd8 Black first takes the bishop with check and emerges a piece up. But now the queen is lost.

14 f6
15 g3 h4

White resigns

It should be mentioned that (with the only difference that 12..ac4 was played instead of 12..bc4) a correspondence game Fuchs-Honfi ended in exactly the same way.

| Game 37 |
|——— |——— |
| Lekander–Sibe |
| Sweden 1965 |

| 1 e4 | c5 |
| 2 d3 | c6 |
| 3 d4 | cxd4 |
| 4 xd4 | g6 |
| 5 c3 | g7 |
Black delays ...d7-d6, in order to have the possibility of playing ...d7-d5 without loss of time. With the following manoeuvre White prevents this.

7 ∆b3

For 7 ∆e2, see the next game.

If 7 ∆xc6 bxc6 8 e5 Black can consider a pawn sacrifice – 8...∆d5 9 ∆xd5 cxd5 10 wxd5 b8.

As the further course of the game shows, White was intending to castle long. Meanwhile, in the Rauzer Attack the knight is actively placed in the centre.

White could have countered ...d7-d5 with 7 ∆c4, but then by 7...w a5 Black prevents queenside castling: 8 w d2 ∆xe4 9 ∆xc6 wxc3!, or 8 f3 w b4 9 ∆b3 ∆xe4 10 ∆xc6 ∆xc3+ 11 bxc3 wxc3+ 12 ∆e2 dx6 13 w g1 (13 d4 e5!) 13...f6 14 d4 w b4 15 w e3 0-0, retaining a material advantage.

7...d6 7...a5 comes into consideration.

8 f3

An unfortunate mixing of different set-ups. With his knight at b3, it is better to develop according to the pattern 8 ∆e2, f2-f4 and 0-0. After 8...∆e6 9 f4 0-0 he has the clever, but possibly not fully correct idea of rejecting castling in favour of the bayonet attack 10 g4, well known, in particular, from the game Alekhine-Botvinnik (Nottingham 1936).

It should be mentioned that with a different move order the knight retreat to b3 is often linked with the development of the bishop at g5 (the variation 2...d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ∆xd4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 g6 6 ∆e2 ∆g7 7 0-0 0-0 8 ∆b3 ∆c6 9 ∆g5 and then f2-f4).

8...w d2 9 ∆e8 10 0-0-0 Too risky. 10 ∆d5 should have been considered.

10...w d7 11 h4 Here too it was worth considering 11 ∆d5.

11...∆xb3 12 axb3?

The general principle states that it is better to capture towards the centre. However, rules (especially chess rules) have exceptions. In this case 12 cxb3 followed by ∆b1 would have aided White’s defence.

12 w a5 13 b1 w b4 Threatening 14...∆xe4 15 fxe4 ∆xc3 16 bxc3 w a2+, mating.
14 \( \text{d4} \)

14 \( \ldots \) \( e5 \)

15 \( \text{\textit{\text{e3}}} \) \( \text{d5} \)

After 16 exd5 \( \text{\textit{\text{f}}xd5 \} \) there is no
defence, and this means that White
might already have resigned.

16 \( \text{\textit{\text{e2}}} \) \( \text{d4} \)

17 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xc3}}}! \)

Either capture of the rook is an-
swered by 18...\( \text{w}a2^+ \) and 19...\( \text{h6}^+ \).

White resigns.

---

**Game 38**

Wolf–Eisinger

*Karlsruhe 1958*

1 \( e4 \) \( c5 \)

2 \( \text{\textit{\text{f3}}} \) \( g6 \)

3 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xd4} \)

4 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \)

After the early ...g7-g6 White can
also play 4 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \).

4 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{\text{g7}}} \)

5 \( \text{\textit{\text{c3}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{c6}}} \)

---

6 \( \text{\textit{\text{e3}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{f6}}} \)

7 \( \text{\textit{\text{e2}}} \) \( 0-0 \)

As in the previous game, Black
delays ...d7-d6, hoping to play
...d7-d5 in one go. However, for the
moment 7...d5 is premature in view
of 8 \( \text{\textit{\text{b5}}} \) (8...\( \text{\textit{\text{d7}}} \) 9 \text{\textit{\text{exd5}}} \text{\textit{\text{b4}}} 10
\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c8} \) 11 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{a5} \) 12 \( \text{d2} \).

8 \( \text{\textit{\text{d2}}} \)

8 \( \text{\textit{\text{b3}}} \) radically prevents ...d7-d5.
However after 8 0-0 White need not
fear this move. After 8...d5 9 \text{\textit{\text{exd5}}}
\( \text{\textit{\text{b4}}} \) (if 9...\( \text{\textit{\text{dxd5}}} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd5}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \) 11
\( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{c6}}} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{\text{h7}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xd1}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{cxd1}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{h7}}} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{\text{b3}}} \) Black
experiences some difficulties)
10 \( \text{\textit{\text{d6}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{c6}}} \) 11 \( \text{\textit{\text{cb5}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{d7}}} \) (or 11...\( \text{\textit{\text{b8}}} \)
12 \( \text{\textit{\text{c4}}} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{\text{c4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{a6}}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{\text{c6}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{a6}}} \) 14
\( \text{\textit{\text{ad1}}} \) he has the initiative (Bartis-
Yudovich, Correspondence 1971).

After the move played the
...d7-d5 counter gains in strength.

8 \( \ldots \) \( \text{d5} \)

9 \( \text{\textit{\text{exd5}}} \)

After 9 \( \text{\textit{\text{exc6}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{bxc6}}} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{\text{e5}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{g4}}} \) 11
\( \text{\textit{\text{xf4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{gxf4}}} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{\text{f4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{f6}}} \) Black has
excellent counterplay.

9 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xd5}}} \)

10 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd5}}} \)

10 \( \text{\textit{\text{exc6}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{bxc6}}} \) 11 \( \text{\textit{\text{d1}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{e6}}} ! \) 12
\( \text{\textit{\text{d4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{a5}}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{\text{a4}}} \)
\( \text{\textit{\text{b6}}} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{\text{a3}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{b8}}} ! \) is also
positionally favourable to Black
(Barczy–Adorjan, Budapest 1978).

10 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \)

11 \( \text{\textit{\text{c4}}} \)

After 11 \( \text{\textit{\text{xd4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{xd5}}} \) White is
obliged to sacrifice a pawn: 12
\( \text{\textit{\text{xf4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\text{g2}}} \) 13 0-0-0 (the bold 13
\( \text{\textit{\text{d4}}} \) fails to 13...\( \text{\textit{\text{e5}}} ! \) 13...\( \text{\textit{\text{xf4}}} \) 14
We2. But 14...c6! 15 d3 e6 16 h4 h5 17 hg1 g4 suppresses White's initiative and he does not gain any compensation (Crepeaux-Clatman, Varna 1972).

11 f5
12 0-0-0 xc3

13 f6+?

The queen is won at too high a cost. 13 xe3 e6 would have been the normal development of events.

13 xf6
14 xd8 xc4

Black has three minor pieces. But the main thing is that after the queen moves White loses his b2 pawn, and his king comes under attack.

15 d5 e6
16 f3 xb2+
17 b1 ac8

White resigns. He has no way of preventing the black rook from moving onto the sixth rank (if 18 d3 e5).

Richter-Rauzer Variation

Game 39
V. Shcherbakov–Taimanov
Leningrad 1954

1 e4 c5
2 d4 d6
3 d4 cxd4
4 xd4 xf6
5 c3 d6
6 g5 e6
7 d3

It was Rauzer who developed the idea of 7 d2 followed by queenside castling, putting pressure on the d6 pawn and simultaneously preparing an attack on the kingside.

The move 7 d3 is a patent of Keres. The queen is switched to g3 (or in some variations to h3) to participate in the attack.

7 ... a6

An alternative is 7...e7 8 0-0-0 0-0 9 b3, when Black has a choice between 9...a5, 9...b6 and 9...d5.

8 0-0-0

The plan with kingside castling is also possible: 8 d1 d7 9 d2 e7 10 0-0 0-0 11 g3 (Keres-Stahlberg, Budapest 1950).

8 ... d7
9 f4 h6
10 h4
10 xc6 bxc6 11 h3 comes into consideration.

10 ... g5!

In this way Black secures the e5 square for his knight.
11 fxg5
A game Klavins-Koblencs (Latvia 1952) went 11 $\mathcal{D}xc6 \mathcal{D}xc6 12 fxg5 $\mathcal{D}g4 13 $\mathbb{W}d2 \mathcal{A}e7 14 \mathcal{A}e2 \mathcal{D}e5$. Black regains the g5 pawn, and the chances are equal.

11 $\ldots$ $\mathcal{D}g4$
12 $\mathbb{W}g3$ hxg5

13 $\mathcal{D}f3$?
13 $\mathbb{W}xg4 \mathcal{A}xh4 14 \mathbb{W}g3 \mathcal{D}xd4 15 \mathcal{D}xd4 \mathbb{W}a5$ would have retained material equality, although Black’s position is the more promising. But what is bad about the move played?

13 $\ldots$ gxh4
14 $\mathbb{W}xg4$ e5

It turns out that the queen has no good square. 15 $\mathbb{W}g5$ is answered by 15...$\mathcal{D}h6$. White resigns.

This plan of Sozin is one of the methods of playing against the Scheveningen set-up, and also the Najdorf Variation.

6 $\ldots$ e6
7 0-0 $\mathcal{A}e7$
8 $\mathcal{A}b3$ 0-0
9 f4

A standard move, which should be played after the preparatory $\mathcal{D}e3$.

9 $\ldots$ $\mathbb{W}c7$

White’s inaccuracy could have been exposed by 9...d5! In the game Estrin-Taimanov (Leningrad 1954) after 10 e5 $\mathcal{D}xd4$ 11 $\mathbb{W}xd4 \mathcal{D}g4$ the unfortunate position of the bishop at b3 gave Black the advantage: 12 f5 $\mathbb{W}b6$ 13 $\mathbb{W}xb6$ axb6.

10 f5?

After this Black finally finds the correct reply.

10 $\ldots$ d5!
11 $\mathcal{D}xc6$ bxc6
12 fxe6

12 e5 $\mathbb{W}xe5$ 13 $\mathcal{D}f4$ is unsuccessful. Black does not reply 13...$\mathbb{W}xf5$? 14 $\mathcal{D}d6$, but 13...$\mathcal{A}c5+$ 14 $\mathcal{A}h1$ $\mathbb{W}d4$.

12 $\ldots$ fxe6
13 exd5 exd5

As in the Estrin-Taimanov game, note the bishop at b3, which is shut out of play. However, White has his own opinion about this...
16 ... \textit{Qg4!}
Threatening not only mate at h2, but also a diagonal check from c5 or b6.

17 \textit{Qxf8+}
If 17 g3 Black wins by 17...\textit{Wb6+ 18 Qh1 (18 Qg2 Qf2+) 18...Qb7+ 19 Qxb7 Wxb7+ 20 Qg1 Qc5+ .}
17 ... \textit{Qxf8}
White resigns

\textbf{Sveshnikov Variation}

\textbf{Game 41}
\textbf{Kalabukhov–K.Grigorian}
\textit{Kiev 1972}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
1 & e4 & c5 \\
2 & d4 & exd4 \\
3 & \textit{Qf3} & \textit{Qc6} \\
4 & \textit{Qxd4} & \textit{Qf6} \\
5 & \textit{Qc3} & e5 \\
\end{tabular}

An old variation, which has been modernised by grandmaster Yevgeny Sveshnikov. Black voluntarily weakens his d5 square and is even
prepared to allow the deformation of his kingside pawns. In return he obtains a position rich in tactical chances. The play is normally of a concrete, calculating nature. Despite Black’s serious positional concessions, there is no direct refutation of the Sveshnikov Variation.

6 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \)

The main continuation. 6 \( \mathcal{f}f5 \) d5 7 exd5 \( \mathcal{x}xf5 \) 8 dxc6 is hardly dangerous for Black. Apart from 8...bxc6 9 \( \mathcal{w}f3 \) \( \mathcal{w}d7 \), which leads to positions with chances for both sides, he can simplify with 8...\( \mathcal{w}xd1+ \) 9 \( \mathcal{x}xd1 \) bxc6, and after 10 \( \mathcal{c}c3 \) \( \mathcal{e}e6 \) 11 \( \mathcal{a}a6 \) \( \mathcal{b}b8 \) 12 0-0 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) he even has rather the more active position.

After 6 \( \mathcal{f}f3 \) Black gains a comfortable game by 6...\( \mathcal{b}b4 \). If 7 \( \mathcal{c}c4 \) he can confidently accept the pawn sacrifice: 7...\( \mathcal{x}xe4 \) 8 0-0 (8 \( \mathcal{x}xf7+ \) \( \mathcal{x}xf7 \) 9 \( \mathcal{w}d5+ \) \( \mathcal{f}f8 \) 10 \( \mathcal{w}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{d}5 \)) 8...\( \mathcal{x}xc3 \) 9 bxc3, and now play 9...\( \mathcal{e}e7 \) (but not 9...\( \mathcal{a}c3 \)??) 10 \( \mathcal{w}d5 \) 0-0 11 \( \mathcal{g}g5 \) \( \mathcal{x}xa1 \) – if 11...\( \mathcal{w}f6 \) 12 \( \mathcal{w}d3 \), or 11...\( \mathcal{a}a5 \) 12 \( \mathcal{w}e4 \) 12 \( \mathcal{x}xf7 \) \( \mathcal{x}xf7 \) 13 \( \mathcal{w}xf7+ \) \( \mathcal{h}h8 \) 14 \( \mathcal{a}g5 \)) 10 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) (10 \( \mathcal{g}g5 \) \( \mathcal{x}g5 \) 11 \( \mathcal{w}h5 \) does not work in view of 11...d5! 12 \( \mathcal{x}xg5 \) \( \mathcal{w}a5 \) 13 \( \mathcal{a}b3 \) 0-0) 10...0-0 11 \( \mathcal{d}xe5 \) \( \mathcal{d}xe5 \) 12 \( \mathcal{w}xe5 \) d6 – Black’s position is preferable.

6...d6

If 6...h6, preventing \( \mathcal{g}g5 \), then 7 \( \mathcal{d}d6+ \) is strong.

7 \( \mathcal{g}g5 \)

White begins a battle for the d5 square, voluntarily weakened by Black. Black’s counter-actions involving ...a7-a6 and ...b7-b5 can be radically suppressed by Schlechter’s move 7 a4, but experience has shown that after 7...a6 8 \( \mathcal{a}a3 \) \( \mathcal{e}e6 \) and then ...\( \mathcal{e}c8 \) Black achieves a good game.

7 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) is occasionally employed (7...\( \mathcal{d}xd5 \) 8 exd5 \( \mathcal{e}e7 \) or 8...\( \mathcal{b}b8 \)).

7 ...a6

8 \( \mathcal{d}xf6 \)

In Sveshnikov’s opinion, 8 \( \mathcal{a}a3 \) is more promising, not hurrying to exchange the bishop. In recent years the variation 8...b5 9 \( \mathcal{x}xf6 \) (or 9 \( \mathcal{e}e7 \) 10 ...\( \mathcal{e}e7 \)) 9...\( \mathcal{g}xg6 \) 10 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) f5 11 \( \mathcal{a}a3 \) has been popular.

8 ...gxf6

9 \( \mathcal{a}a3 \) f5

A move which was played in Vienna as long ago as 1898 in the game Tarrasch-Janowski. Black undermines the centre and gets rid of his doubled pawns.

10 \( \mathcal{w}h5 \)

This aggressive sortie was also chosen by Tarrasch. After 10...b5 he sacrificed a knight – 11 \( \mathcal{a}axb5 \) axb5 12 \( \mathcal{a}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{b}b7 \) 13 \( \mathcal{c}c4 \) \( \mathcal{w}f6 \) (Black gives up a rook for the strong knight, but exchanges queens and eliminates the attack) 14 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) \( \mathcal{w}g6 \) 15 \( \mathcal{c}c7+ \) \( \mathcal{d}d8 \) 16 \( \mathcal{x}xg6 \) fxg6 17 \( \mathcal{a}xa8 \) \( \mathcal{a}xa8 \) 18 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) \( \mathcal{c}c7 \), which led to a complicated game with diverse material. After 19 c3 the chances would have been equal.

10...d5!?
\( \text{\textit{Winning Quickly with Black}} \)

\( \text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{Q}}x\text{\textit{d5}} \text{\textit{Q}}x\text{\textit{a3}} 12 \text{\textit{bxa3}} \text{\textit{W}}a5+ 13 \text{\textit{c3}} \text{\textit{Le6}} \text{\textit{and then ...0-0-0, or 11 exd5}} \text{\textit{Qxa3}} 12 \text{\textit{bxa3}} \text{\textit{W}}a5 13 \text{\textit{d2}} \text{\textit{Qe7}}.} \)

\( 11 \text{\textit{0-0-0}} \)

White himself prefers to mount an attack.

\( 11 \ldots \text{\textit{Qxa3}} \)

\( 12 \text{\textit{bxa3}} \)

The piece sacrifice 12 \( \text{\textit{Qxd5}}, \) devised by Lerner, is interesting.

\( 12 \ldots \text{\textit{Qd4}} \)

After 12...\( \text{\textit{fxe4}} \text{\textit{13 Qxd5 Qe6}} \text{\textit{14 Qc4}} \) Black would have experienced some difficulties.

In the game Fischer-Seidler (simultaneous display, Buenos Aires 1971) White played 13 \( \text{\textit{Qxd5}}, \) and after 13...\( \text{\textit{We7}} \text{\textit{14 Qxe4 Qxa3+}} \text{\textit{15 Qd1 Qe6}} \text{\textit{16 Qd6+ Qe7}} \text{\textit{17 Wg5+ Qf8}} \text{\textit{18 Wh6+ Qe7}} \text{\textit{19 Wg5+}} \) the complications concluded in perpetual check.

\( 13 \text{\textit{Qxd5 Qe6}} \)

\( 14 \text{\textit{Wh6?}} \)

14 \( \text{\textit{Qc4}} \) is correct, in order then to sacrifice the exchange. For example, 14...\( \text{\textit{Qc8}} \text{\textit{15 Qxd4 exd4}} \text{\textit{16 exf5 Qxd5}} \text{\textit{(16...Qxc4 17 fxe6; 16...0-0 17 f6 Qh8 18 Qd3) 17 Qe1+ Qd7}} \text{\textit{(17...Qf8? 18 Wh6+ and f5-f6)}} \text{\textit{18 Qxd5}, with an attack.}} \)

\( 14 \ldots \text{\textit{Qc8}} \)

On 14...\( \text{\textit{Qxd5}} \) White was intending 15 \( \text{\textit{Wg7}}. \)

\( 15 \text{\textit{Wg7?}} \)

Energetic, but... losing.

\( 15 \ldots \text{\textit{Qxc2+}} \)

\( 16 \text{\textit{Qb1}} \)

White was happy with his position: the rook at h8 is attacked, and after 16...\( \text{\textit{Qf8}} \) there follows 17 \( \text{\textit{Qxd4 exd4}} \text{\textit{18 Qxc2}}. \)

White’s king appears to be defended against checks. But there was one check, a very important one, that he had failed to take account of.

\[ \text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{W}}b6+!} \]

\( 17 \text{\textit{Qxb6 Qxa2+}} \)

\( 18 \text{\textit{Qa1 Qb3 mate}} \)

\[ \text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{Four Knights Variation}}} \]

\[ \text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{Game 42}}} \]

\[ \text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{Reggio-Tarrasch}}} \]

\[ \text{Monte Carlo 1902} \]

\[ 1 \text{\textit{e4}} \text{\textit{c5}} \]

\[ 2 \text{\textit{Qf3}} \text{\textit{e6}} \]

\[ 3 \text{\textit{d4}} \text{\textit{cxd4}} \]

\[ 4 \text{\textit{Qxd4}} \text{\textit{Qf6}} \]

\[ 5 \text{\textit{Qc3}} \text{\textit{Qc6}} \]

The point of this set-up for Black is to develop his bishop at b4 and to play without loss of time. After
quiet replies (6 \textit{e}2, 6 \textit{e}e3 or 6 g3) he solves his opening problems.

6 \textbf{\textit{d}db5}

White aims to exploit the weakness at d6. 6 \textit{xc6} bxc6 7 e5 \textit{d}d5 8 \textit{e}e4 \textit{c}c7 9 f4 \textit{b}b6 (or 9...\textit{wa}5+ 10 c3 \textit{e}e7) is also occasionally encountered.

6 ... \textbf{\textit{b}4}

6.d6 7 \textit{f}4 e5 8 \textit{g}5 a6 leads to the Sveshnikov Variation.

7 \textit{f}4

This provokes great complications. The restrained 7 a3 is more often played (Game 43). For 7 \textit{d}d6+ see Game 44.

7 ... \textbf{\textit{x}e4}

8 \textbf{\textit{c}7+} \textbf{\textit{f}8}

15 \textbf{\textit{x}a8} fxe5 16 \textbf{\textit{c}7} \textit{f}8 favours Black) 12...f5 13 \textbf{\textit{c}4}, and now after 13...\textit{f}7 14 \textit{xd}5 \textit{f}8 (or 14...\textit{g}7) 15 \textbf{\textit{b}4} \textbf{\textit{g}6} 16 \textbf{\textit{h}e}1 a5 the position remains unclear.

9 \textbf{\textit{x}a8}?

Tarrasch's opponent overlooks a double attack. Could he have imagined that, 90 years later, this position, in which he so light-heartedly captured the rook, would be under close scrutiny by the theoreticians?

Of course, White should play 9 \textbf{\textit{f}3}, when after 9...d5 we will first analyse 10 0-0-0:

(a) 10...\textbf{\textit{x}c}3 11 bxc3 \textbf{\textit{a}3}+ 12 \textbf{\textit{b}1} e5 13 \textbf{\textit{x}a}8 exf4 14 \textbf{\textit{x}d}5 \textbf{\textit{e}7} 15 \textbf{\textit{b}3} \textbf{\textit{d}6} 16 \textbf{\textit{c}4} g6 17 \textbf{\textit{x}f}7 \textbf{\textit{g}7} 18 \textbf{\textit{h}e}1 (Kapengut-Begun, USSR 1985), and according to analysis by Kapengut, after 18...\textbf{\textit{e}5} 19 g3 \textbf{\textit{f}3} 20 \textbf{\textit{b}5} \textbf{\textit{xf}7} 21 \textbf{\textit{xd}6} \textbf{\textit{xd}6} 22 \textbf{\textit{x}e}5 the chances are equal;

(b) 10...\textbf{\textit{x}c}3 11 bxc3 g5 12 \textbf{\textit{x}e}4 (after 12 \textbf{\textit{g}3} \textbf{\textit{x}g}3 13 \textbf{\textit{x}g}3 \textbf{\textit{b}8} Black is a pawn up, although White's position remains active; 12 \textbf{\textit{x}a}8 is bad on account of 12...\textbf{\textit{a}5}) 12...\textbf{\textit{xc}7} 13 \textbf{\textit{xc}7} dxe4, and in this problematic position the recent game Rasik-Rogozenko (Sas van Gent 1992) continued 14 h4 (an attempt to improve on 14 \textbf{\textit{b}5} \textbf{\textit{g}7}) 14...g4 15 \textbf{\textit{b}5} (in order to answer 15...\textbf{\textit{g}7} with 16 h5) 15...\textbf{\textit{f}6} 16 \textbf{\textit{h}e}1 e5 17 \textbf{\textit{x}e}4 \textbf{\textit{e}6} 18 \textbf{\textit{xc}6} bxc6 19 \textbf{\textit{d}6} \textbf{\textit{f}7} 20 \textbf{\textit{b}4}, and White gained the more promising ending.

Where should the king move: to f8 or e7? We will give the main lines of the analysis.

8...\textbf{\textit{e}7} 9 \textbf{\textit{f}3} d5 10 0-0-0 (not 10 \textbf{\textit{x}a}8 \textbf{\textit{a}5} 11 \textbf{\textit{d}2} \textbf{\textit{xd}2} 12 \textbf{\textit{x}d}2 d4) 10...\textbf{\textit{x}c}3 11 bxc3 g5 12 \textbf{\textit{g}3} (the tactical operation 12 \textbf{\textit{x}e}4 dxe4 13 \textbf{\textit{x}g}5+ f6 14 \textbf{\textit{x}d}8 \textbf{\textit{x}d}8
Instead of 10 0-0-0 (until recently considered obligatory), White can also try taking the ill-starred rook: 10 Qxa8 e5 (the reader is also invited to consider 10...Nxa5) 11 0-0-0! (11 Ng3? Qd4) 11...Qxc3 (if 11...Qxc3 12 bxc3 Nc3+ 13 Ne1 exf4 14 Qxd5, with advantage to White) 12 bxc3 exf4 (Volokitin-Malyshev, USSR 1987). After 13 Qc4 Qe6 14 Qxf4 Qxa8 the position is unclear.

It remains to add that the moves 8 Qc7+ and 9 Qf3 are often made in reverse order.

The reader should be warned that the evaluations of variations are least stable, when positional considerations are pushed into the background by an abundance of combinational possibilities.

Let us return to this na"ive game, which served as the starting point for the above analysis.

9 ... Qf6
10 Qf3 Qxc3
11 Qd2

11 ... Qd4!
12 Qd3
If 12 Qxf6 Qxc2 mate.
12 ... Qe5+
13 Nxe3 Qa4+
14 c3 Qxb2

White resigns. After 15 Qd2 (or 15 Qxd4 Qxc3+) 15...Qxc3 16 Qxc3 Qf3+ he loses his queen.

Game 43
B.Richter–Tarrasch
Halle 1883

1 e4 c5
2 Qf3 e6
3 Qc3 Qc6
4 d4 Qxd4
5 Qxd4 Qf6
6 Qdb5 Qb4
7 a3

Compared with 7 Qf4 this is a much quieter variation, in which after the following exchange White will have the advantage of the two bishops.

7 ... Qxc3+
8 Qxc3 d5
9 exd5 exd5

Tarrasch had a liking for positions with an isolated central pawn (remember the Tarrasch Defence to the Queen’s Gambit). Compensation for the weakness (which may tell only after simplifying exchanges) is provided by freer piece play.

After 9...Qxd5 10 Qd2 White’s chances are preferable.
10 \( \text{g}5 \)

A direct attempt to put pressure on the isolated pawn.

Chances of gaining some advantage are promised by 10 \( \text{d}3 \):

(a) 10...d4 11 \( \text{e}2, f5 \) 12 0-0 (12 \( \text{x}f5, a5+ \) and 13...\( \text{x}f5 \)) 12...
\( \text{x}d3 \) 13 \( \text{x}d3 \) 0-0 14 \( \text{g}5 \) h6 15
\( \text{h}4, e8 \) 16 \( \text{ad}1, c8 \) 17 \( \text{f}1, e6 \)
18 \( \text{f}1! \) with the more promising position (Karpov-Kuzmin, Leningrad 1977);

(b) 10...0-0 11 0-0 d4 12 \( \text{e}4 \) (12
\( \text{e}2, d5 \) 13 \( \text{g}3 \) also comes into consideration) 12...
\( \text{f}5 \) 13 \( \text{g}5 \)
\( \text{xe}4 \) 14 \( \text{xe}4 \) h6 15 \( \text{h}4! \) g5 16
\( \text{xe}6, bxc6 \) 17 \( \text{g}3, d5 \) 18 f4! \( \text{e}4 \)
19 \( \text{x}g5, hxg5 \) 20 \( \text{d}3 \) f5 21 \( \text{ad}1 \)
and White stands better (Kir.

10...0-0!

11 \( \text{xf}6 \)

Winning the pawn leaves White catastrophically behind in development. The restrained 11 \( \text{e}2 \) (11
\( \text{d}3, e8+ \)) 11...\( \text{e}6 \) 12 0-0 would

have led to a roughly equal game, e.g. 12...h6 13 \( \text{h}4 \) d4 14 \( \text{e}4 \) g5
15 \( \text{x}f6+ \) \( \text{x}f6 \) 16 \( \text{g}3, \text{ad}8 \).

11...\( \text{xf}6 \)

12 \( \text{x}d5? \)

\( \text{e}2 \) was more circumspect.

12...\( \text{e}8+ \)

13 \( \text{e}2 \)

14 f3 \( \text{ad}8 \)

Black is virtually two rooks up.

Such positions are impossible to defend.

15 \( \text{c}5 \)

16 0-0-0

Or 16 \( \text{fxg}4, xc2 \) mate!

16...\( \text{f}5 \)

17 \( \text{d}2 \)

If 17 \( \text{d}3, xd3 \) 18 \( \text{xd}3, b3+ \).
1 e4 c5
2 d4 d5
3 c3 dxe4
4 f3 cxd4
5 fxe4 f6
6 g4 e6
7 c3 d3+ 

As in the previous game, White gains the advantage of the two bishops, but by exchanging his active knight for a passive bishop he falls behind in development.

7 ... c7
8 dxe8+ 

To 8 f4 Black replies 8...e5, and after 9 f5+ f8 10 d2 d5 11 exd5 xxd5 he has a fully equal game.

8 ... x8
9 d2?

This leads to exchanges and... to White getting further behind in development.

9 c3 was correct. After 9 d5 10 exd5 xd5 11 0-0 xd5 12 xh5 xh5 13 d2 the chances are equal (Keres-Trufunovic, Moscow 1947).

9 ... c3
10 xc3 xe4
11 xg7 xg8
12 d4 

12 h6, as well as 12 c3, would have been answered by 12 wb6.

12 a5+
13 c3 bxc3
14 xd4 xc3!

White resigns.

It should be mentioned that a similar game was won back in 1953 in Budapest by Eigler against Szabadi.

Taimanov Variation

Game 45
Mardle–Gaprindashvili
Hastings 1964/5

1 e4 c5
2 f3 c6
3 d4 cxd4
4 xxd4 e6
5 e3 

16 g5!

Defending the queen and threatening the deadly 17 d5.

With this, and especially his next move, White avoids theoretical continuations (5 c4, 5 b5, 5 c3). By giving up the battle for the central squares, he does not create
any problems for his opponent. He could have tried to exploit the delay in the development of the knight at f6 by playing 5 c4, when 5...\textit{\&}f6 6 \textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}b4 is examined in Game 46.

Topical variations arise after 5 \textit{\&}b5 d6 6 c4 \textit{\&}f6, or 6 \textit{\&}f4 e5 7 \textit{\&}e3.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{5} ... \textit{\&}f6
  \item \textbf{6} \textit{\&}d2
\end{itemize}

A passive move. In the game Keres-B.Vladimirov (29th USSR Ch., Baku 1961) 6 \textit{\&}d3 was played. After 6...d5 7 \textit{\&}xc6 bxc6 8 e5 \textit{\&}d7 9 f4 \textit{\&}a6 (10 \textit{\&}xa6 \textit{\&}a5+) the chances were equal.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{6} ... e5
  \item \textbf{7} \textit{\&}xc6
\end{itemize}

After other moves by the knight (including to f5) Black was planning 7...d5.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{7} ... dxc6
  \item \textbf{8} f3 \textit{\&}e7
  \item \textbf{9} \textit{\&}c4 0-0
  \item \textbf{10} 0-0 \textit{\&}h5
\end{itemize}

Black is the first to begin playing actively. The aim is to force a weakening of the dark squares by exchanging bishops.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{11} \textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}g5
  \item \textbf{12} \textit{\&}c5
\end{itemize}

White could not exchange queens on account of the interposition of 12...\textit{\&}xe3+, but 12 \textit{\&}c1 came into consideration.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{12} ... \textit{\&}f6!
  \item \textbf{13} \textit{\&}xf8
\end{itemize}

The \textit{\&}lady World Champion's opponent decided that he could pick up the exchange unpunished.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{13} ... \textit{\&}e3+
  \item \textbf{14} \textit{\&}h1?
\end{itemize}

14 \textit{\&}f2 was essential.

14 ... \textit{\&}g3+!

This White had not taken into account. He was obliged to resign, since 15 h\textit{x}g3 is answered by 15...\textit{\&}h6 mate.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{1} c4 e6
  \item \textbf{2} \textit{\&}c3 c5
  \item \textbf{3} e4 \textit{\&}c6
  \item \textbf{4} \textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}f6
  \item \textbf{5} d4 cxd4
  \item \textbf{6} \textit{\&}xd4 \textit{\&}b4
\end{itemize}

From an English Opening the game has transposed into a Sicilian Defence with the move c2-c4. This energetic bishop move stifles White's initiative.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{7} f3
\end{itemize}
After this Black advantageously opens the centre. 7 \( \mathcal{B}x\mathcal{C}6 \) \( bx\mathcal{C}6 \) or 7...\( dx\mathcal{C}6 \) 8 \( W\mathcal{X}d8+ \) \( \mathcal{B}x\mathcal{D}8 \) 9 \( \mathcal{D}d2 \) e5 would have led to an equal position.

7 ... d5
8 cxd5 exd5
9 \( \mathcal{B}b5 \)

White should have played 9 \( \mathcal{G}g5 \), and if 9...\( W\mathcal{A}5 \) 10 \( \mathcal{X}xf6 \), not fearing 10...\( \mathcal{B}xc3+ \) 11 \( bxc3 \) \( W\mathcal{X}c3+ \), since 12 \( \mathcal{F}f2 \) \( gxf6 \) is in his favour. Instead Black should play 11...\( gxf6 \) with equal chances (Teller-Tartakower, Hastings 1926/7).

9 ... 0-0!

Black ignores the threats against \( c6 \). The white king, that has stayed too long in the centre, comes under attack.

10 \( \mathcal{D}xe6 \) \( bx\mathcal{C}6 \)
11 \( \mathcal{D}xe6 \)

11 ... \( \mathcal{D}xe4! \)
12 fx\( e4 \)

If 12 \( \mathcal{X}xa8 \), then 12...\( W\mathcal{H}4+ \) 13 g3 \( \mathcal{X}xg3 \).

12 ... \( W\mathcal{H}4+ \)

13 \( \mathcal{D}d2 \) \( \mathcal{G}g4 \)
14 \( W\mathcal{A}4 \) \( W\mathcal{F}2+ \)
15 \( \mathcal{D}d3 \) \( dx\mathcal{E}4+ \)
16 \( \mathcal{C}c4 \) \( \mathcal{A}ab8! \)

White resigns

Paulsen Variation

Game 47
Gutop–Roshal
Moscow 1963

1 e4 c5
2 \( \mathcal{D}f3 \) \( \mathcal{C}c6 \)
3 d4 cxd4
4 \( \mathcal{X}xd4 \) \( W\mathcal{C}7 \)

After this play can transpose into the Paulsen Variation, as in the present game, but original lines are also possible, if White plays 5 \( \mathcal{B}b5 \) \( W\mathcal{B}8 \) 6 c4, or immediately 5 c4, ignoring Black’s threat to win a pawn, and now:

(a) 5...\( W\mathcal{E}5 \) 6 \( \mathcal{F}f3 \) \( W\mathcal{X}e4+ \) 7 \( \mathcal{E}e2 \) d6 8 \( \mathcal{C}c3 \) \( W\mathcal{F}5 \) 9 0-0 \( \mathcal{F}f6 \) 10 \( \mathcal{D}d5 \), and Black is markedly behind in development (Matanovic-Benko, Portorož 1958);

(b) 5...\( \mathcal{F}f6 \) 6 \( \mathcal{C}c3 \) \( \mathcal{X}e4 \) 7 \( \mathcal{X}e4 \) \( W\mathcal{E}5 \) leads to a difficult position for Black. Although with this temporary piece sacrifice he again wins a pawn, 8 \( \mathcal{B}b5 \) \( W\mathcal{X}e4+ \) 9 \( \mathcal{E}e2 \) \( W\mathcal{E}5 \) 10 f4 \( W\mathcal{B}8 \) 11 0-0 gives White a definite initiative. However, after 11...f5 there are players who are willing to uphold Black’s position.

5 \( \mathcal{C}c3 \) e6
6 g3
For 6 \( \mathcal{D} \)b3 (as well as 6 \( \mathcal{A} \)e3), see Game 48.

6 ... a6

The set-up chosen by Black was employed by Louis Paulsen in the second half of the last century and has been named the Paulsen Variation. Its characteristics are the development of the queen at c7, the position of which is secured by ...a7-a6, and a delay in both the development of the king's knight and the advance of the d-pawn. The moves ...\( \mathcal{W} \)c7 and ...a7-a6 are more often made in reverse order.

7 \( \mathcal{A} \)g2 b5

This involves a definite risk, since Black delays the development of his kingside. 7...\( \mathcal{F} \)f6 is sounder, e.g. 8 0-0 \( \mathcal{D} \)xd4 9 \( \mathcal{W} \)xd4 \( \mathcal{A} \)c5 10 \( \mathcal{F} \)f4 d6 11 \( \mathcal{W} \)d2 h6 12 \( \mathcal{A} \)ad1 e5 13 \( \mathcal{A} \)e3 \( \mathcal{E} \)e7 with chances for both sides (Gdanski-Dorfman, Polanica Zdroj 1992).

8 0-0 \( \mathcal{A} \)b7

9 \( \mathcal{A} \)e3

A natural move, but not the strongest. 9 \( \mathcal{E} \)e1, with the threat of \( \mathcal{D} \)d5, is the most unpleasant for Black, for example:

(a) 9...\( \mathcal{C} \)c8 10 \( \mathcal{D} \)d5! \( \mathcal{W} \)b8 (10...
\( \text{exd5} 11 \text{exd5} \mathcal{D}e5 12 \text{d6} \mathcal{A}xd6 13 \mathcal{F}f5 favours White) 11 a4 \( \mathcal{D} \)xd4 12 \( \mathcal{W} \)xd4 with advantage to White (Ciric-Janosevic, Titovo Uzice 1966);

(b) 9...\( \mathcal{F} \)f6 10 \( \mathcal{A} \)xc6 \( \mathcal{W} \)xc6 11 a4
\( \text{b4} 12 \mathcal{D}d5 \mathcal{A}c5 13 \mathcal{E}e3 \mathcal{E}c8 14 \mathcal{D}d4! with the better prospects.

9 ... \( \mathcal{F} \)f6

10 \( \mathcal{A} \)xc6

10 a3 came into consideration.

10 ... \( \mathcal{W} \)xc6

11 a3

White considered that the opposition of the bishop at g2 and queen at c6 was to his advantage.

11 ... h5

12 \( \mathcal{W} \)e2 h4

13 \( \mathcal{A} \)g5?

He should have played 13 \( \mathcal{A} \)ad1.

13 ... hxg3

14 hxg3 \( \mathcal{A} \)c5

15 a4 b4

16 \( \mathcal{A} \)d5

This advance, typical of the Sicilian Defence and of the given variation, was what White had in mind when he played 13 \( \mathcal{A} \)g5. The knight cannot be taken with the pawn, of course, on account of the loss of the queen.

16 ... \( \mathcal{D} \)xd5

17 exd5 \( \mathcal{W} \)d6

18 \( \mathcal{A} \)f4?

18 \( \mathcal{E} \)e3 was essential, covering the a7-g1 diagonal and preventing 18...\( \mathcal{W} \)xg3.
18 ... \( \textit{W} \textit{xd5!} \)
A queen sacrifice that was unexpected for White, and that forced his resignation.
After 19 \( \textit{\textbf{A}} \textit{xd5} \textit{\textbf{A}} \textit{xd5} \) there is no defence against the mate at h1.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Game 48} \\
\text{Huguet–Matulovic} \\
\text{Reggio Emilia 1967}
\end{array}
\]

\begin{align*}
1 & \text{e4} & \text{c5} \\
2 & \text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}f3} & \text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}c6} \\
3 & \text{d4} & \text{cx\textit{\textbf{d}}}4 \\
4 & \text{\textit{\textbf{A}}xd4} & \text{\textit{\textbf{W}}c7} \\
5 & \text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}c3} & \text{e6} \\
6 & \text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}b3}
\end{align*}

White prevents the development of the bishop at c5.
A popular continuation here is 6 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}e3 \) a6 7 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}d3 \) (also 7 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}e2 \) ) 7...\( \textit{\textbf{Q}}f6 \) 8 0-0. The game Kasparov-Portisch (Debrecen 1992) continued 8...\( \textit{\textbf{A}}d6 \) 9 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}xc6 \) bx\textit{\textbf{c}}6 (9...dxc6 10 f4 e5 11 f5 favours White – the absence of the d-pawn deprives Black of counterplay) 10 f4 e5 11 f5 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}e7 \) 12 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}a4 \) d5 13 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}b6 \textit{\textbf{W}}b8 \) 14 \( \textit{\textbf{W}}e2 \). White's position is preferable.

\begin{align*}
6 & \ldots & \text{a6} \\
7 & \text{\textit{\textbf{A}}d3} & \text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}f6} \\
8 & \text{\textit{\textbf{A}}e3} & \text{b5} \\
9 & \text{f4} & \text{d6} \\
10 & \text{\textit{\textbf{W}}f3} & \text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}e7} \\
11 & 0-0-0
\end{align*}

The pawn storm planned by White is risky – Black is ready for counter-action on the queenside.

\begin{align*}
11 & \ldots & \text{\textit{\textbf{A}}b4} \\
12 & \text{g4} & \text{\textit{\textbf{A}}b7}
\end{align*}

13 \( \textit{\textbf{Q}}b1 \)
A prophylactic manoeuvre, which is rather common in similar situations. But in the given case this slowness is unjustified. White should have played 13 g5 without delay.

13 ... d5!
14 g5?
But now this is a decisive mistake. In his calculations White has overlooked a tactical rejoinder.
As will be seen from what follows, on 14 e5 Black was intending 14...\( \textit{\textbf{A}}e4 \).

14 ... dxe4
15 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}xe4 \) \( \textit{\textbf{A}}xe4 \)
16 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}xe4 \)

16 ... \( \textit{\textbf{W}}xc2+! \)
White was expecting the exchange of bishops, but this unanticipated move forced his resignation. After 17 \( \textit{\textbf{A}}xc2 \textit{\textbf{A}}xf3 \) there is no point in playing on a pawn and the exchange down.
It should be added that the blow at c2 would not have worked, if
instead of 14 g5 White had defended his queen with 14 \textit{\textdegree}hf1.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Game 49} & \\
\textbf{Zuidema–Ivkov} & \\
\textbf{Belgrade 1964} & \\
\hline
1 & e4 \\
2 & \textit{\textdegree}f3 \\
3 & d4 \\
4 & \textit{\textdegree}xd4 \\
5 & \textit{\textdegree}d3 \\
6 & a6 \\
7 & \textit{\textdegree}b3 \\
8 & \textit{\textdegree}a7 \\
9 & 0-0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Depending on the circumstances, White retains the option of playing c2-c4.

5 \ldots \textit{\textdegree}c5

Polugayevsky’s move, which was popular in the 1970s. The alternatives are 5...\textit{\textdegree}c6, 5...\textit{\textdegree}f6, 5...\textit{\textdegree}e7, 5...\textit{\textdegree}c7 and 5...g6.

6 \textit{\textdegree}b3 \textit{\textdegree}a7

White can try to exploit the removal of the dark-square bishop to the queenside in order to develop an initiative on the kingside: 7 \textit{\textdegree}g4 \textit{\textdegree}f6 8 \textit{\textdegree}g3 (but not 8 \textit{\textdegree}xg7? \textit{\textdegree}g8 9 \textit{\textdegree}h6 in view of 9...\textit{\textdegree}xf2+) 8...d6 9 0-0 \textit{\textdegree}c6 10 \textit{\textdegree}c3 (here too it is dangerous to take the g7 pawn – after 10 \textit{\textdegree}xg7 \textit{\textdegree}g8 11 \textit{\textdegree}h6 \textit{\textdegree}e5 Black seizes the initiative) 10...\textit{\textdegree}e5 (if 10...0-0 11 \textit{\textdegree}g5!) 11 \textit{\textdegree}h1 h5 12 \textit{\textdegree}e2!, now threatening to take on g7, or 10...h5 11 \textit{\textdegree}e2 with the same threat.

7 \ldots \textit{\textdegree}c6

8 \textit{\textdegree}h1

The logical plan is to exchange the a7 bishop with 8 \textit{\textdegree}e2 followed by \textit{\textdegree}e3, c2-c4 and \textit{\textdegree}c3.

8 \ldots \textit{\textdegree}f6

9 f4 h5!

Exploiting the fact that most of the white pieces are on the queenside, and his bishop at a7 is raking an important diagonal, Black makes an aggressive attempt to launch an attack.

10 a4?

This carelessness is punished. White should have taken measures against the unequivocal threat of 10...\textit{\textdegree}g4 and ...\textit{\textdegree}h4 by playing, for example, 10 \textit{\textdegree}e1.

The Dutch master was evidently assuming that he would be able to defend both possible invasion points – h2 and f2.

10 \ldots \textit{\textdegree}g4

11 \textit{\textdegree}f3 \textit{\textdegree}h4

12 h3

White is agreeable to a draw (12... \textit{\textdegree}f2+ 13 \textit{\textdegree}h2 \textit{\textdegree}g4+). How can Black strengthen his position?

12 \ldots g5!!

An excellent resource!
If White takes the pawn, the knight at c6 joins the attack with decisive effect: 13 fxg5 f2+ 14 h2 e5 and 15...eg4+.

13 d2

Another instant, and the bishop will be at e1, but it is Black's turn to move.

13 ... f2+
14 h2 g4!
15 g3 xg3+

After 16 xg3 h4+ 17 h2 g3+ the 'gathering of the harvest' begins. White resigns.

Closed Variation

Game 50
Csom–Flesch
Szombathey 1966

1 e4 c5
2 c3 e6
3 g3 c6
4 g2 b8

The rook supports the advance of the b-pawn.

5 f3

In the Closed Variation White usually develops his king's knight at f3 after first playing f2-f4, or else brings it out to e2. The move in the game indicates that White has decided to try to exploit the opponent's delay in developing his kingside, and that he is going to switch to an open set-up with d2-d4.

5 ... b5
6 0-0 b4

7 e2 f6
8 d4

In sacrificing his e4 pawn, White is counting on attacking the unsupported enemy knight. However, the planned variation meets with an elegant refutation.

8 ... xe4
9 e5 xe5
10 dxe5 f5

Black cannot play either 10...d5? 11 f3 g5 12 h4, or 10... g5? 11 h4.

11 h4

Threatening 12 f3. Black's reply parries this threat.

11 ... a6
12 f4

For the sake of a check at h5 White gives up the exchange. What happens if Black takes it?

12 ... xfl
13 h5+ g6
14 xg6

White assumed that he was winning: on 14...hxg6 there follows
15 ♗xg6+ ♙e7 16 ♘xe4. But in his calculations he had overlooked:

46, after 4 d4 cxd4 5 ♙xd4 ♙f6 6 ♙c3 Black gains counterplay by 6...♖b4.

4 ... ♙f6
5 e5?

The e5 pawn will be attacked three times by Black, whereas White will have only two defences.

5 ... ♘g4
6 ♘e2 ♙c7
7 ♙b5 ♙b8
8 d4 cxd4
9 ♙f4 ♙b4+
10 ♙d1?

Overlooking an elementary tactical blow. After 10 ♙d2 ♙gxe5, White would have remained ‘only’ a pawn down.

Game 51
Kretschmer–Edith Keller
Dresden 1950

1 e4 c5
2 ♙f3 ♙c6
3 c4

This move is aimed at hindering Black’s counterplay in the centre.

3 ... e6

The symmetrical 3...e5 is also acceptable, when the weaknesses at d5 and d4 are mutual.

4 ♙c3

As we already know from Game 10 ... d3!

Whether White takes this pawn or moves his queen to e4, the f2 pawn is left undefended and the queen is lost to a fork.

White resigns.
French Defence

This opening takes its name from a correspondence game between London and Paris (1834/6), in which the French players, on the advice of La Bourdonnais, chose 1...e6 and went on to win. With his modest first move Black cedes a spatial advantage in the centre. After 2 d4 d5 White has to choose whether to advance his pawn to e5, exchange on d5, or defend his pawn (with 3 \( \Box \text{c}3 \) or 3 \( \Delta \text{d}2 \)).

When White plays e4-e5 (either immediately or after 3 \( \Box \text{c}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) or 3 \( \Box \text{c}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \)) his pawn outpost allows him to direct his pieces at the kingside. The basic strategical drawback of the French Defence is the fact that the c8 bishop is blocked in by the pawn at e6, and Black is therefore unable to include it in the defence of the kingside.

Black’s standard plan is to attack the centre with ...c7-c5 (sometimes combined with ...f7-f6), and to gain counterplay on the queenside using the c-file. This is combined with defensive measures on the kingside, in particular the undermining (and exchange) of the e5 outpost.

Exchange Variation

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & \text{e}4 & \text{e}6 \\
2 & \text{d}4 & \text{d}5 \\
3 & \text{ex}d5 & \\
    & \text{This simplifying exchange leads to a symmetrical pawn position. White’s slight activity, resulting from the advantage of the first move, is normally extinguished by exchanges of the heavy pieces on the open e-file. If Black, as in the present game, is not satisfied with a draw, he is obliged to complicate the play, which involves a certain degree of risk.} \\
3 & \ldots & \text{ex}d5 \\
4 & \text{d}3 & \text{c}5 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Played in analogy with the Tarrasch Variation 3 \( \Box \text{d}2 \) \text{c}5 4 exd5 exd5, in which the isolation of the d-pawn does not worry Black. This makes it all the more surprising that most books do not mention 4...\text{c}5. The usual continuations are 4...\text{d}6 and 4...\text{c}6.

\[
\begin{align*}
5 & \text{f}3 & \text{c}6 \\
6 & \text{e}2+ & \\
\end{align*}
\]

The point of this check is to exchange queens, or, if Black avoids this, for the time being to win the c-pawn. However, the queen is insecurely placed on the open file and 6 dxc5 \( \text{x}c5 \) 7 0-0 is more natural.

\[
\begin{align*}
6 & \ldots & \text{e}7 \\
7 & \text{d}xc5 & \text{f}6 \\
8 & \text{h}3 & \\
\end{align*}
\]

After this the initiative is already with Black.
French Defence

8 ... 0-0
9 0-0 甥xc5
10 c3

White again delays his development. He should have considered 10 甥g5.

10 ... 甥e8
11 甥e2 甥d6
12 甥bd2?

A move which is correct from the positional point of view (the knight is aiming for d4), but tactically faulty. White should have moved his king to h1.

13 甥f5

Defending against 13...甥xh3.

13 ... 甥xe2!

The f2 pawn begins to 'creak'.

14 甥d4 甥xd4

Now 15 cxd4 (if 15 fxg3 甥xc2+ and 16...甥xa1) is met by 15...甥xd4 16 甥xc8 (otherwise Black captures on f2 'for free') 16...甥xf2 17 甥xf2 甥xf2+ 18 甥h2 甥e5+ 19 甥h1 甥e1+ and 20...甥xf1 mate.

Not wishing to participate in the reproduction of this variation, White resigned.

Advance Variation

Game 53
Estrin–Neishtadt
Moscow 1938

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 e5

In this and other variations, by means of this advance White obtains a pawn outpost beyond the demarcation line, and hence a spatial advantage, which assists the preparation of activity on the kingside. Black’s strategy consists in methodical pressure on d4 and the use of the c-file.

3 ... c5

Another possible plan involves the exchange of the light-square bishops after 3...b6 and ...甥a6. With this pawn structure the f1 bishop is assigned an important role in the
attack on the kingside, whereas the c8 bishop is restricted by its own pawns.

4  c3

By supporting his pawn, White tries to maintain his central position. The alternative is to control e5 with pieces, by playing 4  d3 or 4 dxc5.

4  ...  c6

5  f4

White securely defends his e5 outpost, but he loses time and allows the opponent to develop strong pressure on the queenside.

5  ...  w6

6  f3  h6

7  d3  d7

Of course, Black does not fall into the transparent trap 7...cxd4 8 cxd4  xd4? 9  xd4  xd4? 10  b5+, but after the move played White has to defend his d4 pawn.

8  c2  c8

9  b3?

One can understand White’s desire to free his bishop from having to defend the b2 pawn. But in so doing he weakens the c3 square. The knight manoeuvre that follows in the game would have been prevented by 9 a3.

9  ...  cxd4

10  cxd4

If 10  xd4  xd4 11 cxd4  c7!, and White loses material.

10  ...  b4

11  a3

(see diagram next column)

11  ...  c7!

This wins a piece, since not only 12...  xc2+ is threatened. If the attacked bishop moves, there follows a check at c3.

White resigns.

McCutcheon Variation

| Game 54 |
|---|---|
| Glauser–Keller |
| Lugano 1966 |

1  e4  e6

2  d4  d5

3  c3  f6

4  g5  b4

This aggressive (compared with 4...e7) development of the bishop is associated with the name of the American player McCutcheon.

Black is not concerned about his knight being attacked. The tactical basis of his counterattack is the old variation 5 e5 h6 6 exf6 (6  h4 g5 7  g3  e4 and ...c7-c5) 6...hxg5 7
fxg7 hxg8 8 h4 (8 Wh5 Wf6) 8... gxh4 (not 8...xg7 9 h5!) 9 Wh5 (or 9 Wg4) 9...Wf6 and then ...Wxg7, with equal chances.

5 e5 h6
6 d2 xc3
7 bxc3

After 7 xc3 de4 Black has an equal game.

7 ...
8 Wg4

The basic position of the McCutcheon Variation. Black has a choice between 8...Wf8 (when he can no longer castle, but he avoids weakening the dark squares) and 8...g6.

8 ...

8...g6 9 d3 (9 c1 is an interesting pawn sacrifice for the sake of retaining the dark-square bishop: 9...xc1 10 d3, or 9...c5 10 d3 cxd4 11 de2!) 9...xd2 10 xd2 c5 11 f3 d6 leads to a complicated, asymmetrical position, the evaluation of which is still unclear.

9 h4

The alternatives are 9 d3 d2 10 xd2 and 9 c1 c5 10 d3 xc3 11 dx5 a5 12 d2 a4 13 h3.

9 ...

Euwe recommended 9...f5 10 exf6 Wxf6 11 f3 c6, but after 12 Wf4 White stands better.

10 h3 cxd4

According to analysis by Maroczy, after 10...a5 11 d3 d2 12 ag3! White gets his attack in first: 12...g6 13 xd2 exd4 14 Wxd4 c6 15 Wf4 d4 16 f3 Wxc3+ 17 de2, and if 17...xa1 (17...de7 is more tenacious, but even then Black is in serious difficulties after 18 Wxd4, Sachsenmaier-Keres, Correspondence 1934) 18 Wf6 ag8 19 h5, and wins.

After 10...c6 11 f3 d2 12 xd2 it is unfavourable to block the queenside by 12...c4: after 13 e2 de7 14 Wf4 d7 15 h5 White has a strong attack (Yates-Znosko-Borovsky, Cheltenham 1928).

11 cxd4 Wb6
12 f3 a6
13 d3 xe5

A tempting tactical blow.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{White rejected 14 } \text{x} \text{xe5 on account of the double attack 14... } \\
\text{Wxd4, after which both his knight } \\
\text{and his rook (with check) are } \\
\text{attacked. ‘But why not take the } \\
\text{knight with the pawn? Apart from } \\
\text{the check at } f2 \text{ Black appears to } \\
\text{have nothing...’}
\end{array}
\]

14 dxe5 Wxf2+
15 $\texttt{\textdollar}d1$

What White had overlooked was:

15 ... $\texttt{\textdollar}xd2+$!
16 $\texttt{\textdollar}xd2$ $\texttt{\textdollar}f2+$

After this he was obliged to resign the game.

Meanwhile, in the position from the first diagram there was a pretty, forced win by 14 $\texttt{\textdollar}xe5$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xd4$ 15 $\text{\textdollar}f4!$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xa1+$ 16 $\texttt{\textdollar}e2$ $f6$ 17 $\texttt{\textdollar}g6+$ $\texttt{\textdollar}g8$ 18 $\texttt{\textdollar}c7!$ $\texttt{\textdollar}h7$ 19 $\texttt{\textdollar}xe4$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xe4$ 20 $\texttt{\textdollar}g3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}g8$ 21 $\texttt{\textdollar}xh6$ $f5$ (the result is the same after 21 ... $b6$ 22 $\texttt{\textdollar}f8+$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xh6$ 23 $\texttt{\textdollar}g6+$ $\texttt{\textdollar}h5$ 24 $g4+$ and 25 $\texttt{\textdollar}h2$ mate) 22 $\texttt{\textdollar}f8+$ $\text{\textdollar}h8$ 23 $\texttt{\textdollar}f7$ $\texttt{\textdollar}b2$ 24 $\texttt{\textdollar}h5$ $g6$ 25 $\text{\textdollar}c1+$ $\text{\textdollar}gxh5$ 26 $\texttt{\textdollar}xb2+$. $\texttt{\textdollar}d4$ $d5$
3 $\text{\textdollar}c3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}b4$
4 $\texttt{\textdollar}d3$

For 4 $\text{\textdollar}ge2$, see the next game.

4 ... $\texttt{\textdollar}xe4$
5 $\texttt{\textdollar}xe4$ $\texttt{\textdollar}c5$

5...$\texttt{\textdollar}f6$ is probably the simplest, and if 6 $\texttt{\textdollar}d3$ (or 6 $\texttt{\textdollar}f3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}bd7$, preparing ...e6-e5, while 6 $\texttt{\textdollar}g5$ $h6$ leads to a harmless line of the McCutcheon Variation) 6...$c5$. White's attempt to gain an advantage by 7 a3 (after 7 $\texttt{\textdollar}xc5$ the game is level) 7...$\texttt{\textdollar}xc3+ 8$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xc3$ 0-0 9 $\texttt{\textdollar}f3$ led to an advantage for Black after 9...$\texttt{\textdollar}c7$ 10 0-0 $\texttt{\textdollar}c4!$ 11 $\texttt{\textdollar}e2$ $\texttt{\textdollar}d5$ 12 $\texttt{\textdollar}d2$ $\texttt{\textdollar}d7$ 13 $\texttt{\textdollar}e1$ $\text{\textdollar}eb6$ in the modern game Barlov-Sahovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1984 (however, the source game was Lilienthal-Boleslavsky, Absolute USSR Championship 1941, where a similar position was reached via a different move order).

6 $\text{\textdollar}ge2$

After 6 a3 $\texttt{\textdollar}xc3+ 7$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xc3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}f6$ 8 $\texttt{\textdollar}d3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}bd7$ 9 $\texttt{\textdollar}f3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}c7$ 10 0-0 $\texttt{\textdollar}c4!$ 11 $\texttt{\textdollar}e2$ $\texttt{\textdollar}d5$ a familiar situation arose in the afore-mentioned game, where Lilienthal sacrificed a pawn with the aim of activating his dark-square bishop: 12 a4 $\texttt{\textdollar}xc3$ 13 $\texttt{\textdollar}d2$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xe2+ 14$ $\texttt{\textdollar}xe2$ 0-0 15 $\texttt{\textdollar}a3$ $\texttt{\textdollar}d8$. After 16 $\texttt{\textdollar}d5$ Boleslavsky sensibly declined the gift by playing 16... $\texttt{\textdollar}f6!$ (16... $\texttt{\textdollar}xe4$ would have been met by 17 $\texttt{\textdollar}e7$ $\texttt{\textdollar}b6$ 18 $\texttt{\textdollar}d6$, when there is no defence against 19 a5 or 19 $\texttt{\textdollar}fb1$), and 17 $\texttt{\textdollar}d6$ $\texttt{\textdollar}a5$ 18 $\texttt{\textdollar}xc4$ $\texttt{\textdollar}d7$ 19 $\texttt{\textdollar}h4$ $\texttt{\textdollar}c6$ gave Black a promising game.

Winawer Variation

Game 55
Winawer–de Vère
Baden Baden 1870

1 $\texttt{\textdollar}e4$ $\texttt{\textdollar}e6$
6 ... cxd4

Nowadays Black plays 6...\(\text{c6} \) here, and if 7 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{c6}\).

7 \(\text{exd4}\) \(\text{xc3+}\)

A dubious exchange. A modern player would most probably prefer 7...\(\text{f6}\) 8 \(\text{f3}\) e5, with roughly equal chances.

8 bxc3 \(\text{a5}\)
9 \(\text{f3}\)

Black’s last two moves could have been exploited by the energetic 9 0-0! The absence of Black’s dark-square bishop would have made his defence very difficult, and 9...\(\text{xc3}\)? would have been refuted by 10 \(\text{b5}\) \(\text{xa1}\) 11 \(\text{c7+}\).

In defending his c3 pawn, White also attacks b7, but de Vére shows that this is not a threat.

White’s is unable to castle and now comes under attack.

14 \(\text{b1}\)

After 14 \(\text{e3}\), Black, as in the game, would have brought his knight and rook into the battle: 14...\(\text{c4+}\), 15...\(\text{c6}\) and 16...\(\text{b8}\).

14 ... \(\text{c4+}\)
15 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{c6}\)
16 \(\text{b7}\) \(\text{d4!}\)

The king cannot be saved. If 17 \(\text{d2}\) the simplest is 17...\(\text{d5}\).

White resigns.

---

Game 56
Pailer–Sahovic
Yugoslavia 1974

1 \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{e6}\)
2 \(\text{d4}\) \(\text{d5}\)
3 \(\text{c3}\) \(\text{b4}\)
4 \(\text{ge2}\) \(\text{dxe4}\)
5 \(\text{a3}\) \(\text{e7}\)

Black avoids conceding the advantage of the two bishops and aims to exploit the rather unfavourable position of the knight at \(\text{e2}\).

6 \(\text{exe4}\) \(\text{c6}\)

6...\(\text{f6}\) is also acceptable.

7 \(\text{c3}\)

A harmless continuation. In one of his match games with Euwe (1935) Alekhine employed the aggressive 7 g4. The experiment succeeded: after 7...\(\text{b6}\) 8 \(\text{g2}\) \(\text{b7}\) 9 \(\text{c3}\) \(\text{f6}\) 10 \(\text{g3}\) 0-0?! (10...\(\text{d7}\) and 0-0-0 came into consideration)

11 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{xe4}\) 12 \(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{h8}\) 13 \(\text{h5}\)

The black king is safe, whereas
Black’s kingside came under attack. Instead of slow development he should have preferred 7...\(Qf6\), and if 8 \(Qxf6+ Qxf6\) 9 \(Qe3\) h5 10 g\(xh5\) \(Wd5\), seizing the initiative.

Also possible is 7...e5 8 d5 \(Qd4\) 9 \(Q2c3\) f5 10 gxf5 \(Qxf5\) (Keres) or 7...h5 8 g5 e5 (Botvinnik).

In the game Lilienthal-Botvinnik (Moscow 1936) 7 \(Qe3\) was played. After 7...\(Qf6\) 8 \(Qxf6+ Qxf6\) 9 \(Wd2\) e5 a roughly equal position was reached. In the event of 8 \(Q2c3\) the easiest way to equalise is by 8...\(Qxe4\) 9 \(Qxe4\) e5; and if 10 d5 \(Qd4\)! (11 \(Qxd4\) \(Wxd5\)).

Black also gains a satisfactory position after 7 \(Qf4\) \(Qf6\) 8 \(Wd3\) 0-0 9 0-0-0 b6 10 \(Q2c3\) \(Qd5\) 11 \(Qxd5\) exd5 12 \(Qc3\) \(Qf6\) 13 \(Wf3\) \(Le6\) (Stoica-Uhlmann, Bucharest 1978).

\[8 \(Q2g3\) \(Qxe4\)\]
\[9 \(Qxe4\) \(Wd5\)\]
\[10 \(Wf3\)\]

On 10 \(Qd3\) there would have followed 10...e5. White prevents this (10...e5? 11 \(Qf6\)+), but the position of the queen at f3 has its drawbacks.

\[10... b6\]
\[11 \(Qf4\) \(b7\)\]
\[12 \(Qd2\)\]

On 12 \(Qxc7\) Sahovic was intending to continue 12...\(Qxd4\) 13 cxd4 \(Wxe4\)+, but after 14 \(Wxe4\) \(Qxe4\) 15 \(Qb5+ Wf8\) 16 f3 \(Qd5\) (or 16...\(Qb7\)) 17 \(Qc1\) White’s control of the c-file and his active bishops compensate for the weakness of his isolated pawn. It is stronger to first play 12...\(Qc8\), and only after the retreat of the bishop (to f4 or g3) – 13...\(Qxd4\) 14 cxd4 \(Wxe4\)+.

12 \(Qd3\) is well met by 12...0-0-0 (but not 12...e5? 13 \(Qf6\)+).

\[12... \(Wd7\)\]
\[13 \(Qb5\) \(a6\)\]
\[14 \(Qd3?\)\]

14 \(Qa4\) is correct, and if 14...b5 15 \(Qc2\). Then 15...\(Qxd4?\) 16 \(Wxb2\) \(Qxc2+\) fails to 17 \(Qd1\) \(Qd8\) 18 \(Qxc2\) \(Wd3+\) 19 \(Qc1\) \(We2\) 20 \(Wf3\), when White is a piece up, and otherwise he plays 16 \(Wg3\) on the next move, activating his position.

\[14... \(Qe5\)\]
\[15 \(Wg3\)\]

Or 15 \(Wxb7\) \(Qxd3+\) 16 \(Qf1\) 0-0-0, and if 17 \(Wxc7\) \(Qb5\)! with a clear advantage.

\[15... \(Qh4!\)\]
The theme of diversion. The capture of the bishop is answered by 16...\texttt{Qxd3}+ 17 \texttt{Qf1 Qxf4} 18 \texttt{Qxf4 Qb5+} and 19...\texttt{Qxb2}, while after 16 \texttt{Qh3 Qxg2+} 17 \texttt{Qxg2 Qxd3+} 18 \texttt{Qfl} 0-0 19 \texttt{Qg1 f5} 20 \texttt{Qh6 Qf6} 21 \texttt{Qb1 e5}! Black is a pawn up with a good position.

16 \texttt{Ee3}?

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{image}
\end{center}

16 ... \texttt{Qxf2+!}
The queen is lost, whichever way the bishop is captured.

White resigns.

Tarrasch Variation

\textbf{Game 57}

\textit{Janka–Schuster}

\textit{Berlin 1960}

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 Qd2

This move initiates a large section of the French Defence, comprising several variations with different strategical features. 3 \texttt{Qd2} was employed at the end of the last century by Tarrasch, and bears his name.

By 3 \texttt{Qd2} White avoids the Winawer Variation (3 \texttt{Qc3 Qb4}) and after 3...\texttt{Qf6} 4 e5 \texttt{Qfd7} the knight is more favourably placed at d2 than at c3, since he can support his d4 pawn with c2-c3.

3 ... \texttt{Qf6}
4 e5 \texttt{Qfd7}
5 Qd3 c5
6 c3 Qc6
7 Qe2

White keeps f3 for his queen's knight. The deployment of the knights at e2 and f3 assists the reinforcement of the centre. In addition, if Black undermines the e5 outpost with ...f7-f6, he will have to reckon with \texttt{Qf4}.

7 ... \texttt{cxd4}

7...\texttt{f6} would appear to be premature. In the game Keres-Czerniak (Helsinki Olympiad 1952) after 8 \texttt{Qf4 Qe7} 9 exf6 Qxf6 10 Qf3 cxd4 11 0-0! Qde5 (if 11...Qc5 12 Qe1!; 11...dxc3 is very strongly answered by 12 Qxe6! Qxb2 13 Qxh2 Qxb2 14 Qe1; if 11...Qd6, then again 12 Qxe6!) 12 Qxe5 Qxe5 13 Qb5+ Qd7 14 Qxd7+ Qxd7 15 Qe1 White gained a strong attacking position. In the event of the more tenacious 13...Qc6, both 14 Qh5 Qf7 15 Qf4 and 14 Qe1 Qe7 15 cxd4 0-0 16 Qe3 give White the better chances.

8 cxd4 \texttt{f6}
9 Qf4
Tempting, since, as was also the case after 7...f6 8 f4, Black is threatened with a check at h5. But in comparison with the previous variation there is an important detail – the d4 pawn is not defended.

It was simpler to exchange on f6.

9 ... xd4

Black is prepared to give up the right to castle and even to sacrifice the exchange.

10 h5+ e7
11 exf6+

If first 11 g6+ hxg6 and only then 12 exf6+, Black can play not only 12...fxg6 (12...gx6 13 xh8 e5 14 xg6 favours White), but also 12...xf6!?, when 13 xh8 (13 xg6+? e7 leaves Black a piece up) 13...f7 14 h3 e5 15 b3 leads to an unclear position.

11 ... xf6
12 h4?

A loss of time. White should have won the exchange immediately: 12 g6+ hxg6 13 xh8 f7 14 0-0 e5.

Compared with the game, where Black succeeds in advancing his pawn to e4, White’s defences hold (for example, 15 b3 f5 16 g5 b6 17 ac1).

12 ... f7!
13 g6 hxg6
14 xh8 e5

Black dominates the centre, and the white queen is shut out of play.

15 0-0

This grants Black an additional tactical possibility in his pursuit of the queen (it is denied the squares f4 and g3).

15 ... e4
16 b1 f5
17 h4 e7

Threatening to move the knight to h5. On account of the check at e2 (the consequence of castling) the queen cannot go to either f4 or g3.

18 g5 g4
White resigns

---

Game 58
Pohl–Teschner
Celle 1948

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 d2 c6
4 c3 e5

White has not played e4-e5 and Black, exploiting the rather passive position of the knight at d2, initiates a pawn battle in the centre. Even so, the advantage of the first move promises White a definite initiative.
French Defence

5 exd5

If 5 dxe5 Qxe5 6 Qg3 Qxf3+ 7 Wxf3 Qf6 8 Qd3 White's position is slightly the move active. He also has the advantage after 5...dxe4 6 Qa4 e3 (or 6...Wd5 7 f4 exf3 8 Qgxf3) 7 fxe3 Qd7 8 Qg3 We7 9 Qb5 a6 10-0 g6 11 e6 fxe6 12 Qd4 (Veingold-Vaganian (Tallinn 1979)).

5 ... Wxd5

6 dxe5

Here and later, Teschner's opponent thinks only about simplifying the position and reaching the safety of a draw. How such play can end is shown by the present game.

He should have played 6 Qg3, and if 6...exd4 (as well as 6...e4 or 6...Qg4) 7 Qc4, with the initiative.

6 ... Qxe5

7 Qg3 Qe6

8 Qxe5 Wxe5+

9 We2 Wxe2+

10 Qxe2 Qf6

11 Qb3 0-0-0

12 Qe3 Qd5

13 Qc5

The continuation of the same naive strategy. Instead of 'chasing' Black's undeveloped bishop, it would have been simpler to retreat to d2 or a move earlier play 12 Qd2, and if 12...Qe4, only then 13 Qe3.

On exchanging bishops White has wasted three tempi, which Black has used in the interests of development.

How should White defend his g-pawn? If 15 Qf3 Qd3+, while on 15 Qf1 there follows 15...Qfe8. 15 Qf1 Qxe2 16 Qxe2 Qfe8 also holds little cheer for White.

15 g3 Qxe2

16 Qxe2 Qfe8

Threatening a crushing discovered check. If 17 Qf1, then 17...Qh3+ and 18...Qe2. White's reply is pure desperation.

17 Qhe1 Qxb3+

White resigns
5 Caro-Kann Defence

This defence, a favourite among players of positional style, is named after Horatio Caro and Marcus Kann, who analysed it in the 1880s.

In contrast to the French Defence, where Black’s queen’s bishop plays a passive role, here the bishop can often be comfortably developed at f5 or g4. On the other hand, Black has to spend an extra tempo if he wants to attack the centre with ...c5.

In the classical variations of the Caro-Kann Defence (2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxe4 4 c4 e5 or 4...d7) White gains a slight spatial advantage, and his actions are normally directed against the black king. However, Black’s solid position enables him to neutralise the opponent’s initiative by simplification, and to achieve an equal game.

Game 59
Mnatsakanian–Simagin
Kiev 1965

1 e4 c6
2 c3 d5
3 d4 dxe4
4 c4 cxd5
5 cxd5

Black does best to decline the pawn sacrifice 5 c4 with 5...dxe4 6 cxe4 d5 and ...cxd5.

5...exf6

What does Black gain in return for conceding his opponent a queenside pawn majority? Firstly, he can freely complete his development. And secondly, the doubled pawns control the immediate approaches to his king. However, after simplification, in the endgame, if the pawn formation does not undergo any changes, White stands better since he can hope to create a passed pawn, whereas Black’s extra pawn on the kingside is devalued.

The capture with the g-pawn is considered in the following game.

6 e4

The most active position for the bishop.

The direct attempt to exploit White’s queenside pawn majority – 6 f3 d6 7 e2 0-0 8 0-0 c7 (or 8...e8 9 e1 c5 10 e3 d7 11 h3 e4, Karpov-Hort, Tilburg 1979) 9 c4 is countered by active play in the centre: 9...e8 10 e3 c5, with equal chances.

The fianchetto of the king’s bishop by 6 g3 is well answered by 6...a5. After 7 f3 b6 8 g2 a6 Black has a comfortable game.

6...e7

Black can also play 6...d6, 6...d7 or 6...e7+.

7 h5

The alternative is 7 e2 0-0 8 0-0 d7 9 b3 (in Stein-Bronstein, Amsterdam 1964, Black answered 9 e1 with 9...c5 10 c3 cxd4 11 cxd4...
Caro-Kann Defence

\( \mathcal{b}4, \) when he blockaded the d-pawn and gained equal chances.

9...\( \mathcal{e}8 \) 10 \( \mathcal{f}4 \) \( \mathcal{f}8 \) 11 \( \mathcal{e}1 \) \( \mathcal{d}6 \) 12 \( \mathcal{x}e8 \) \( \mathcal{w}xe8 \) 13 \( \mathcal{e}3, \) as in the correspondence game Lyublinsky-Konstantinopolsky, 1965. After 13...

\( \mathcal{e}6! \) 14 \( \mathcal{x}xe6 \) \( \mathcal{e}xe6 \) 15 c4 \( \mathcal{w}d7 \)

White's slight initiative is gradually extinguished.

7 ... 0-0

8 \( \mathcal{e}2 \) g6

Black can delay this and play 8...c5, e.g. 9 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{w}a5+ \) 10 c3 \( \mathcal{c}6 \) 11 \( \mathcal{d}3 \) (if 11 dxc5 \( \mathcal{e}5 \)), and now 11...g6 12 \( \mathcal{h}4 \) f5 13 \( \mathcal{g}3 \) cxd4 14 \( \mathcal{x}d4 \) \( \mathcal{f}6 \) with an equal game (Bronstein-Boleslavsky, 20th USSR Ch, Moscow 1952).

9 \( \mathcal{w}h6 \)

If 9 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) Black should reply 9...\( \mathcal{e}6 \) or 9...\( \mathcal{b}6. \)

9 ... \( \mathcal{f}5! \)

Gaining time by attacking the c2 pawn, Black seizes the initiative.

10 \( \mathcal{b}3 \) c5

11 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{c}6 \)

12 0-0-0?

On the queenside the king comes under attack.

12 ... c4!

Opening the c-file for the rook.

13 \( \mathcal{xc}4 \) \( \mathcal{b}4 \)

14 \( \mathcal{b}3 \) \( \mathcal{c}8 \)

14...a5 was also strong.

15 \( \mathcal{c}3 \) \( \mathcal{a}5 \)

16 \( \mathcal{b}1 \)

16 \( \mathcal{d}2 \) was essential.

16 ... \( \mathcal{x}c3! \)

17 bxc3 \( \mathcal{xc}2+ \)

White resigns

The bishop cannot be taken on account of mate in two moves, while 18 \( \mathcal{c}1 \) is met by the decisive 18...\( \mathcal{xb}3 \) 19 axb3 \( \mathcal{w}a2! \)

Game 60

Romanovský–Zubarev

Leningrad 1930

1 e4 c6

2 d4 d5

3 \( \mathcal{c}3 \) dxe4

4 \( \mathcal{xe}4 \) \( \mathcal{f}6 \)

5 \( \mathcal{xf}6+ \) \( \mathcal{gx}f6 \)

This is sharper and more risky than 5...exf6.

6 \( \mathcal{f}3 \) \( \mathcal{g}4 \)

Another possibility is 6...\( \mathcal{f}5, \) and if 7 \( \mathcal{d}3 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \) (or 7...\( \mathcal{g}8 \)), for example, 8 \( \mathcal{f}4 \) (if 8 \( \mathcal{xf}5, \) then of course 8...\( \mathcal{a}5+, \) or 8 0-0 \( \mathcal{g}4, \) even if this involves a loss of time) 8...e6 9 \( \mathcal{d}2 \) \( \mathcal{d}3 \) 10 \( \mathcal{xd}3 \) \( \mathcal{a}5+ \) 11 \( \mathcal{d}2 \) \( \mathcal{c}7 \) 12 0-0-0 0-0-0, with equal chances.

7 \( \mathcal{e}3 \) e6
8 \textcolor{red}{\text{c}4} \textcolor{blue}{\text{d}6} \\
9 \textcolor{red}{\text{w}e2} \textcolor{blue}{\text{a}5+} \\
10 \text{c}3 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}7} \\
11 0-0-0 0-0-0

Here Romanovsky decided to transfer his knight to b3. With this aim he first drove away the bishop:
12 \text{h}3 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}5} \\
13 \text{g}4 \textcolor{red}{\text{g}6} \\
Now he played:
14 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}2} \\
and... \textbf{resigned} the game!

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

The highly experienced master, twice USSR Champion, had overlooked 14...\textcolor{red}{\text{w}xc3+ 15 bxc3 \textcolor{red}{\text{a}3} mate.

Black's combination only became possible after the blunder 14 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}2}. When Romanovsky, who immediately noticed his error, turned over his king as a sign of resignation, his opponent Zubarev (who not long before this had won the Moscow Championship) asked him: 'What's the matter?'

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
1 & e4 & c6 \\
2 & d4 & d5 \\
3 & \textcolor{red}{\text{e}c3} & \text{dxe}4 \\
4 & \textcolor{red}{\text{xe}4} & \textcolor{red}{\text{f}6} \\
5 & \textcolor{red}{\text{g}3} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Game 61 \\
Schuster--Carls \\
\textit{Bremen 1914}

The knight retreat to g3 is more often employed in the variation 4...\textcolor{red}{\text{d}7 5 \textcolor{red}{\text{f}3} \textcolor{red}{\text{gf}6}, when the exchange on f6 no longer spoils Black's kingside pawn formation.}

5 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\text{h}5}

The most energetic.

5...c5, leading to quieter play, is also considered a sound reply:
(a) 6 \textcolor{red}{\text{f}3} \textcolor{red}{\text{c}6} 7 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}3} \text{cxd}4 8 \textcolor{red}{\text{xd}4} \textcolor{red}{\text{a}5+ 9 c}3 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}7} with equal chances;

(b) 6 \text{dxc}5 \textcolor{red}{\text{xd}1+ 7 \text{xd}1 e}6, and White cannot hold on to the pawn: 8 b4 a5 9 c3 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}5} 10 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}2} axb4 11 cxb4 \textcolor{red}{\text{c}6} (Ivanovic-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1980).

Against Karpov and Sax at the tournament in Tilburg (1979) Larsen played 5...g6. After 6 \textcolor{red}{\text{f}3} \textcolor{red}{\text{g}7} 7 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}2} 0-0 8 0-0 \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6} 9 b3 (this was how both games developed) White's position was preferable.

To the simplifying 5...e5 White replies 6 \textcolor{red}{\text{f}3} \text{exd}4 7 \textcolor{red}{\text{xd}4}:

(a) 7...\textcolor{red}{\text{c}5} is unfavourable in view of 8 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}2+ \text{e}7 (or 8...\text{e}7 9 \textcolor{red}{\text{xe}7+ \text{xe}7 10 \text{df}5) 9 \text{e}3 c}5 10 \text{df}5 0-0 11 \textcolor{red}{\text{c}4} (Alekhine-Tartakower, Kecskemét 1927);
(b) 7...\( \text{\textit{e}}7 \) 8 \( \text{\textit{d}}f5 \) \( \text{\textit{w}}d1+ \) 9 \( \text{\textit{w}}d1 \) \( \text{\textit{f}}8 \) 11 \( \text{\textit{c}}4 \), and Black is behind in development.

6 \( \text{\textit{g}}5 \)

With his previous move Black unequivocally declared that he was intending to cramp the opponent’s kingside. 6 h4 would have prevented this. On the basis of the game Spielmann-Alekhine (Karlsbad 1911) until quite recently it was thought that White gains the advantage: 6...\( \text{\textit{g}}4 \) 7 \( \text{\textit{e}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{xe}}2 \) 8 \( \text{\textit{d}1xe2} \) \( \text{\textit{bd}7} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{w}d}3 \).

However, Black can improve with 6...\( \text{\textit{w}}c7 \)! After 7 \( \text{\textit{c}4} \) (7 \( \text{\textit{e}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}4 \)) 7...\( \text{\textit{g}}4 \) 8 \( \text{\textit{d}1e2} \) \( \text{\textit{e}}6 \) 9 \( \text{\textit{f}3} \) \( \text{\textit{d}6} \)! 10 \( \text{\textit{f}1} \) (if 10 \( \text{\textit{f2} \), then Black continues his mobilisation with 10...
\( \text{\textit{bd}7} \), since the acceptance of the sacrifice – 11 \( \text{\textit{fxg}}4 \) \( \text{\textit{xg}4+} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{f}3} \) 0-0-0 with the threat of 13...\( \text{\textit{xg}}3 \) 14 \( \text{\textit{xg}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{de}}5+ \) gives him a strong attack) 10...\( \text{\textit{f}5} \) 11 \( \text{\textit{g}5} \) \( \text{\textit{bd}7} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{w}d}2 \) \( \text{\textit{d}5} \) White conceded the initiative in the game Kupreichik-Skembris (Zenica 1989).

6 ... h4

7 \( \text{\textit{xf}6} \)

This turns out unexpectedly badly for White. He should have retreated his knight to e2.

7 ... hxg3!

8 \( \text{\textit{e}5} \)

White had this move in mind when he played 7 \( \text{\textit{xf}6} \). After 8...
\( \text{\textit{xf2}+} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{xf2} \) it is not so easy for Black to exploit the position of the king at f2, and the h2 square seems to be securely defended...
The combination that occurred in the game - 10...\textsf{Wxe5}+ 11 dxe5 gxf2 - is no longer favourable: after 12 \textsf{Qf3} h1=\textsf{W} 13 0-0-0 White gains a strong attack.

But instead of 10...\textsf{Wxe5}, Black wins with another diverting blow by the fearless pawn - 10...gx(f2+!}

\textbf{Game 62}
\textbf{Alburt-Ruderfer}
\textit{Dnepropetrovsk 1970}

1 c4 c6
2 e4 d5
3 exd5 cxd5
4 d4

This variation (more usually reached via 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 exd5 cxd5 4 c4) is named after Panov, who published an analysis of it in 1930.

Inviting his opponent to leave him with an isolated pawn, White plays actively for superiority in the centre. If Black delays taking on c4, he has to reckon with c4-c5, after which White has a queenside pawn majority.

4 ... \textsf{Qf6}
5 \textsf{Qc3}

Here 5 c5 is premature in view of 5...e5 6 dxe5 \textsf{Qxe4}.

5 ... \textsf{Qc6}
6 \textsf{Qg5} \textsf{Qa5}

A double-edged sortie, known since the game Keres-Czerniak (Buenos Aires Olympiad 1939).

If 6...e6 there can now follow 7 c5 \textsf{Qe7} 8 \textsf{b5} 0-0 9 \textsf{Qf3}.

7 \textsf{Qf3}

First of all we must answer the question: what happens if White takes the pawn with 7 \textsf{Qxf6} exf6 8 cxd5. After 8...\textsf{Qb4} winning the knight leads to a draw: 9 dxc6 \textsf{Qxc6}+ 10 bxc3 \textsf{Qxc3}+ 11 \textsf{Qe2} 0-0 12 f3 \textsf{Qe8}+ 13 \textsf{Qf2} \textsf{Qe3}+ 14 \textsf{Qg3} \textsf{Qg5}+ with perpetual check. This was how the game Zilberstein-Podgaets (Beltsy 1977) concluded.

White also has the quiet move 9 \textsf{d2}, when 9...\textsf{Qxc3} 10 bxc3 \textsf{Qxd5} 11 \textsf{Qf3} 0-0 12 \textsf{Qe2} \textsf{a5} 13 0-0 \textsf{Qd7} leads to approximate equality, but 9...\textsf{Qe7} is also possible: 10 \textsf{Qb5}+ \textsf{Qxb5} 11 \textsf{Qxb5} \textsf{Qxd2}+ and 12...\textsf{Qxd5} with equality, or even 10...\textsf{Qf8}! (Sanz-Bellon, Las Palmas 1979).

7 \textsf{d2} was played in the source game Keres-Czerniak, when Black tried to clarify the situation with 7...dxc4 8 \textsf{Qxc4} e5, but 9 d5 \textsf{Qd4} 10 f4! led to an advantage for White. Black has other possibilities on his 7th move:
(a) 7...e5 8 \( \text{xf6} \) (8 dxe5 \( \text{de} \) 9 \( \text{xe} \) 4 \( \text{b} \) 4 10 \( \text{c} \) 3 d4! favours Black) 8...gx \( \text{xf6} \) 9 \( \text{xd} \) 5 \( \text{xd} \) 2+ 10 \( \text{xd} \) 2 \( \text{h} \) 6+ 11 \( \text{c} \) 3 exd4+ 12 \( \text{b} \) 3 0-0 13 \( \text{d} \) 3 b5! with an attack;

(b) 7...\( \text{e} \) 6 8 \( \text{f} \) 3 dxc4 9 \( \text{xf6} \) exf6 10 d5 0-0-0 11 \( \text{xc} \) 4 \( \text{b} \) 4 12 \( \text{d} \) 1 \( \text{c} \) 5! 13 \( \text{b} \) 3 \( \text{e} \) 7 14 0-0 \( \text{xc} \) 3 15 bxc3 \( \text{xd} \) 5 16 \( \text{d} \) 4 \( \text{he} \) 8 with chances for both sides (Skrobek-Lechtynskiy, Pamperovo 1981), or 8 c5 \( \text{e} \) 4 9 \( \text{exe} \) 4 dxe4 10 \( \text{wx} \) a5 \( \text{xa} \) 5 11 \( \text{d} \) 2 \( \text{c} \) 6 12 \( \text{c} \) 3 0-0-0 13 \( \text{e} \) 2 \( \text{c} \) 4 with an equal game (Ribli-Torre, Alicante 1983);

(c) 7...\( \text{f} \) 5 8 \( \text{xf6} \) exf6 9 cxd5 \( \text{b} \) 4 10 \( \text{b} \) 5+ \( \text{d} \) 8 11 \( \text{f} \) 1 \( \text{xd} \) 5 12 \( \text{gc} \) 2 \( \text{b} \) 4 with equal chances.

We should also mention the modern idea 7 \( \text{d} \) 2. In the game Kindermann-Goldenberg (Trouville 1982) after 7...\( \text{wd} \) 8 \( \text{xf} \) 3 e6 White gained a rather favourable position with a pawn majority on the queenside: 9 c5 \( \text{e} \) 7 10 \( \text{b} \) 5 0-0 11 0-0.

7 ... \( \text{g} \) 4

If 7...\( \text{e} \) 4 White gains the better chances by 8 cxd5 \( \text{xc} \) 3 9 bxc3 \( \text{wd} \) 5 (9...\( \text{wc} \) 3+? 10 \( \text{d} \) 2 and 11 dxc6) 10 \( \text{wb} \) 3.

8 \( \text{xf6} \)

After 8 \( \text{xe} \) 2 dxc4 9 d5 0-0-0 10 \( \text{xc} \) 4 e6 11 \( \text{xf6} \) gxf6 12 0-0 \( \text{g} \) 8 Black has a highly promising position (Uusi-Bagirov, Tallinn 1981). Black also achieved a good game in Neuer-Tal (Viljandi 1972), which went 9 \( \text{xf6} \) exf6 10 d5 (10 \( \text{xc} \) 4 0-0-0!) 10...\( \text{xf} \) 3 11 gxf3 (11 \( \text{xf} \) 3 \( \text{e} \) 5) 11...0-0-0.

Evidently White should follow Ravinsky's recommendation of 8 cxd5 \( \text{xd} \) 5 9 \( \text{d} \) 2, after which Black does not have 9...\( \text{xd} \) 4 in view of 10 \( \text{xd} \) 4 \( \text{xd} \) 1 11 \( \text{b} \) 5+ \( \text{d} \) 8 12 \( \text{xd} \) 5.

8 ... \( \text{xf6} \)

9 cxd5 \( \text{b} \) 4!

In contrast to the drawing variation analysed above (7 \( \text{xf6} \) exf6 8 cxd5 \( \text{b} \) 4 9 dxc6 \( \text{xc} \) 3+) this move now gains in strength, since 10 dxc6? \( \text{xc} \) 3+ 11 bxc6 \( \text{wc} \) 3+ 12 \( \text{e} \) 2 0-0! gives Black a very strong attack, while if 10 \( \text{wd} \) 2 \( \text{xf} \) 3 (11 dxc6 \( \text{xc} \) 6; 11 gxf3 \( \text{xc} \) 3 12 bxc3 \( \text{wd} \) 5).

10 \( \text{wb} \) 3 \( \text{xf} \) 3

11 dxc6 \( \text{xc} \) 6

12 \( \text{c} \) 4?

White overlooks the opponent's tactical rejoinder. He should have played 12 a3.

\[
\begin{align*}
12 & \ldots \text{xa} 4! \\
13 & \text{xf7+ } \text{f} 8 \\
14 & \text{wc} 4
\end{align*}
\]
The queen is saved, but the attack continues.

14 ... 
15 \[b5!\]
16 a4
A move of desperation. If 16
0-0-0 \[xc3+ 17 bxc3 \[a4.
16 ... 
17 f4 \[xa4
18 \[xa4 \[xa4
White resigns (19 \[xa4 \[xc3+ 20 bxc3 \[xa4).

Game 63
Andreev–Veits
Moscow 1963

1 e4 c6
2 \[c3 d5
3 \[f3 dxe4
4 \[xe4 \[f6
A clear-cut plan against this variation was demonstrated by Petrosian in his game with Lutikov (27th USSR Ch, Leningrad 1960). He played 4...\[d7 5 d4 \[d6! (this knight, so that the d4 pawn should be attacked). After 6 c3 \[xe4 7 \[xe4 \[f6 8 \[c2 Black prevented the development of the knight at f3 with 8...\[g4!, and gained complete equality.

5 \[c4
Of course, 5 \[xf6+ \[xf6 6 \[c4 is also logical.

5 ... \[bd7
6 d4 e6
6...\[b6 is unjustified, since after
7 \[d3 it is dangerous to accept the

pawn sacrifice: 7...\[xd4 8 \[e2
\[d8 9 \[xf6+ \[xf6 10 \[f4 \[e7
(10...\[d6? 11 \[g3!) 11 0-0-0.

7 \[e2
7 \[g5 \[e7 8 0-0-0 is more energetic. Despite the simplification –
8...\[xe4 9 \[xe7 \[xe7 10 \[xe4
\[f6 11 \[h4 0-0 12 \[f3 – White’s chances are better.

7 ... 
8 \[xe4 \[f6
9 \[f3 \[c7
10 \[b3 b6
11 \[f4 \[d6
White assumed that the queen was bound to move, since now he wins a pawn...

12 \[g3 \[xf4
13 \[xg7?

13 ... \[e7!
The refutation of White’s faulty tactical operation.

14 \[xb8 \[b7
The queen is trapped. 15 \[g7 is answered by 15...\[g8.

White resigns.
Game 64
Krause–Könecke
Rotenburg 1952

1 e4 c6
2 f4

White is aiming to leave (or divert his opponent from) the well-trodden paths.

2 ... d5
3 e5

A structure typical of the 3 e5 variation in the French Defence has been reached. Moreover, instead of ...c7-c5 Black has played ...c7-c6, which means that to attack the centre he will have to waste a tempo. But much more important is the fact that his queen’s bishop (his main cause of concern in the French Defence) is not shut in.

3 ... d5
4 d4 e6
5 d3 c5
6 c3 d6
7 d3 b6

As in similar variations of the French Defence, it is important to maintain control over f5.

8 0-0 b6

The position of the bishop at f5 deprives White of any hopes of active play on the kingside. But at the same time Black is threatening to intensify the pressure on d4.

9 xf5 xf5
10 dxc5 xc5+
11 h1 h5

White decided that the opponent was merely securing the position of his knight, and turned his attention to the queenside.

12 b4 e7
13 a4 h4!
14 a5?

Had White seen the threat, it can be assumed that he would also have discovered the only good defence – 14 g1!

14 ... g3+!

White resigns
6 Other Semi-Open Games

Pirc-Ufimtsev Defence

This opening is named after the Yugoslav grandmaster Vasja Pirc and the Soviet player Anatoly Ufimtsev, who developed it in the 1930s. Although it belongs to the semi-open games, many of its set-ups have similarities with the King’s Indian Defence.

The actions of White, who enjoys a spatial advantage, are usually directed against the king. Black’s strategy involves attacking the centre (normally by ...c7-c5 or ...e7-e5, but in some lines by ...d6-d5) and active play on the queenside.

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Game 65
Suetin–Zhidkov
Kaliningrad 1972
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1 e4  g6
2 d4  g7
3 c3  d6
4 f4

The preparatory 6...g4 followed by 7 h3 xf3 8 xf3 c6 has also been tried, but after 9 e3 e5 10 dxe5 dxe5 11 f5! White has the better chances.

Other moves also favour White:
(a) 6...c6 7 0-0 b5 8 e5;
(b) 6...c5 7 dxc5 dxc5 (with the bishop at d3 Black does not have ...wa5) 8 e2 c6 9 e5;
(c) 6...bd7 7 e5 e8 8 e4 c5 9 c3 wb6 10 ed2!, and White’s solidly placed pawns give him the better chances (Gligoric-Rocha, Hastings 1964/5).
7 e5 dxe5
8 fxe5
8 dxe5 Qd5 9 Qd2 is also possible.
8 ... Qd5
After 8...Qg4 9 Qe4 and h2-h3
the knight has to retreat to h6.
9 Qxd5 Qxd5
10 c3 Qe6

Black experiences difficulties
after both 10...f6 11 We2 Qh8 12
Qc4 Qd8 13 exf6 exf6 14 0-0, and
10...Qg4 11 h3 Qxf3 12 Qxf3 Qxf3
13 gx f3 (Gheorghiu-Gipslis, Bucha-
rest 1966).

11 We2
11 c4 Qd7 12 d5 does not suc-
ceed in view of 12...Qb4, and if 13
Qb1 Qf5.

11 ... Ad8
12 Qg5?
This allows Black to destroy the
centre with a knight sacrifice, after
which the white king, unable to
castle, comes under attack.

12 Qe4 would have retained the
initiative (12...Qd7 13 0-0 or 12...
Qc4 13 Qxc4 Qxc4 14 b3).

12 ... Qxd4!
13 Qxd4 Qxd4
14 Qxe6

Reducing the attacking forces in
this case does not weaken the attack.

14 ... fxe6
15 Qc4 Qxe5

Threatening not only 16...W.h4+, but
also 16...Qxh2, and 16 Qe3
W.h4+ 17 Qf2 does not help in view
of 17...Qxf2 18 Qxf2 (18 Qxe6+
Qf7+) 18...Qxc4.

16 g3 Qf2!

White’s position is hopeless.
After 17 Qxe6+ Qh8 18 We3 Black
concludes his attack with 18...Qxh2!
19 Qxh2 Qd1+ 20 Qf2 Qf8+ 21
Qf4 (21 Qg2 Qf1 mate) 21...Qd4+.

If immediately 17 We3, then 17...
Qxc4 18 Qxe5 (18 Qxf2 Qe4+; 18
Qxf2 Qd4+) 18...Qf5 19 We2 (19
We3 Qd5) 19...Qb4+ 20 Qd2 Qxd2
21 Qxd2 Qe4+.

All this does not mean, of course,
that White had to get mated imme-
diately. But the grandmaster, upset
by the unfortunate turn of events,
took the rook:

17 Qxf2?

And this allowed the author to
include the game in this book of
miniatures.

17 ... Qd1 mate

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Game 66
Kanal–Parma
Reggio Emilia 1966

1 e4 d6
2 d4 Qf6
3  \( \text{c3} \quad \text{g6} \)
4  \( \text{g5} \)

After \( \text{d2} \) White will castle queenside and aim to exchange the fianchettoed bishop, which is important for Black’s defence and counterplay. If Black drives away the bishop with \( ...\text{h7-h6} \), then \text{f2-f4} and \( \text{e4-e5} \) or a kingside pawn storm with \( \text{g2-g4} \) becomes a possibility.

The move 4 \( \text{g5} \) can also be associated with \( \text{f2-f4} \) (without the preparatory \( \text{d2} \)).

4  \( \ldots \quad \text{c6} \)
5  \( \text{e2} \)

An idea of Suetin. The queen supports the \( \text{e4-e5} \) advance.

After 5 \( \text{f4} \) White must be prepared to sacrifice a pawn: 5...\( \text{wb6} \) 6 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 7 \( \text{ge2} \) \( \text{b4} \) 8 \( \text{xf6} \) exf6 9 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 10 \( \text{f5} \) (Ribeiro-Fuderer, Munich 1954), for which he gains compensation.

5 \( \text{d2} \) was answered in the game Soltis-Torre (Cleveland 1975) by 5...\( \text{b5} \) 6 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{h6} \) 7 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 8 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 9 \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 10 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 11 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 12 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{c5} \), with chances for both sides.

5  \( \ldots \quad \text{h6} \)
6  \( \text{h4} \)

If 6 \( \text{xf6} \) exf6 7 0-0-0 \( \text{g7} \) 8 \( \text{f4} \) 0-0-0 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{b5} \) Black has good counterplay (Minic-Parma, Zagreb 1965).

6  \( \ldots \quad \text{a5} \)
7  \( 0-0-0 \quad \text{g7} \)
8  \( \text{e5} \)

We have here an instance where the consistent implementation of a plan leads to difficulties. 8 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{h5} \) 9 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xh4} \) 10 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{g5} \) would have led to a roughly equal position.

8  \( \ldots \quad \text{dx} \)
9  \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{h5} \!

This move, by which Black prevents the opponent from supporting his \( \text{e5} \) pawn with \( \text{f2-f4} \), looks suspicious. But the Yugoslav grandmaster has accurately worked everything out.

10  \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{e6} \)
11  \( \text{h3} \)

White assumed that, in view of the threat of 12 \( \text{g4} \), Black would have to exchange on \( \text{h3} \).

11  \( \ldots \quad \text{d} \)
12  \( \text{g4} \)

The knight is lost, but when White wins it Black will destroy the position of his king!

12  \( \ldots \quad \text{x} \)
13  \( \text{gxh5} \) \( \text{xc3} \)
14  \( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{a} \)
15  \( \text{d} \)

Or 15 \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{xa2} \) + and 16...
(4c4)+, winning the queen.
15 ... 0-0-0
There is nowhere for the white king to hide. If 16 We3 De5+ 17 We2 xc4+.
16 We3 Wxc3+
White resigns

Alekhine Defence

The basic idea of this opening, introduced into tournament practice by Alekhine in his game with A. Steiner (Budapest 1921), appears to contradict the basic principles of development. By attacking the knight White gains space, and if he wishes he can obtain two, three, or even four connected pawns in the centre. But, paradoxically, the pawn centre is not only a strength, but also a target for attack, and Black gains counterplay by undermining the d4 and e5 pawns.

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Game 67
Tukmakov–Stein
Kiev 1962

1 e4 Df6
2 e5 Dd5
3 d4 d6
4 Dc4
White sets his sights on the f7 square. The main alternatives are 4 Df3 and 4 c4 Db6 5 f4 (the Four Pawns Attack).

4 ... Db6
4...c6 is also an acceptable reply, e.g. 5 We2 dxe5 6 dxe5 Df5 7 Df3 e6 8 0-0 Dg4! 9 Dbd2 Dd7 with equal chances (Mestel-Popov, Malta Olympiad 1980).

On the contrary, 4...e6, shutting in the queen’s bishop, gives White the freer game: 5 Db3 De7 6 0-0 0-0 7 De1. The game Kanal-Grünfeld (Karlsbad 1929) continued 7...Dc6
8 Dc3 Dxc3 9 bxc3 d5 10 Da5 De5 11 Dd2 c5 12 dxc5 Dxc5 13 Wh5 with excellent prospects for White.

5 Db3 Dc6
This leads to great complications, in which Black risks coming under a dangerous attack.

5...dxe5 is a sound continuation:

(a) 6 Wf3 (this or 6 Wh5 is the point of the variation) 6...e6 7 dxe5 a5! 8 c3 (after 8 a4 Black has the favourable manoeuvre ...Dbd7-c5) 8...a4 9 Dc2 Dd7 10 Wh3 (the b7 pawn cannot be taken, of course) 10...Db5 11 Dg5 Wh5 12 Dd2 Dc6, and Black’s position is clearly better (Gufeld-Vasyukov, Kislovodsk 1968);

(b) 6 Wh5. This is more advisable, although even here 6...e6 7 dxe5 c5! 8 c3 Dc6 9 Df3 g6 10 Wg4 Wc7 promises Black equal chances. There can follow 11 We4 Dg7 12 Df4 Dd7 13 Db2 Da5 14 Dc2 Dc6 15 We2 Dd7 (Fedorov-Gipslis, Tbilisi 1973).

6 e6
A typical pawn sacrifice in this opening, preventing the normal development of Black’s kingside.

6 ... fxe6
Not 6...Dxe6? 7 d5.
7 \( \texttt{\textit{f3}} \) \textit{g6}

7...d5 is weak on purely positional grounds: 8 \( \texttt{\textit{f4}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{d7}} \) 9 c3 \( \texttt{\textit{f6}} \) 10 h4 puts Black in a difficult position.

After the exchange of the b3 bishop by 7...\( \texttt{\textit{a5}} \) 8 \( \texttt{\textit{g5}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{xb3}} \) 9 axb3 White also gains a promising position.

7...e5 8 dxe5 d5! should be considered, and after 9 \( \texttt{\textit{c3}} \) the pawn sacrifice 9...\( \texttt{\textit{g4}} \) 10 \( \texttt{\textit{xd5}} \) e6 11 \( \texttt{\textit{xb6}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{xd1+}} \) 12 \( \texttt{\textit{xd1}} \) axb6 (Parma-Kovacevic, Yugoslavia 1978).

8 \( \texttt{\textit{h4}} \)

This looks promising, but the immediate 8 \( \texttt{\textit{g5}} \) is more dangerous for Black:

(a) 8...d5 9 \( \texttt{\textit{f3}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{d7}} \) 10 \( \texttt{\textit{f7+}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{d8}} \) 11 \( \texttt{\textit{xh7}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{e8}} \) 12 \( \texttt{\textit{g5}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{xd4}} \) 13 c3 \( \texttt{\textit{xb3}} \) 14 axb3 with advantage to White;

(b) 8...\( \texttt{\textit{g7}} \) (Black returns the pawn) 9 \( \texttt{\textit{x6}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{f8}} \) 10 d5 \( \texttt{\textit{d4}} \) (Sax-Hazai, Budapest 1974), and now 11 h4! (suggested by Szabo).

8...\( \texttt{\textit{g7}} \)

9 \( \texttt{\textit{h5}} \) \textit{e5}

10 \( \texttt{\textit{g5}} \)?

White should have played 10 hgx6 hxg6 11 \( \texttt{\textit{xh8+}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{xh8}} \) 12 \( \texttt{\textit{h4}} \). Now Black not only parries the offensive, but launches a counterattack.

10...\( \texttt{\textit{d5}} \)

11 \( \texttt{\textit{f3}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{f5}} \)

12 hxg6 \( \texttt{\textit{xd4}} \!\!\

Black’s powerful position in the centre enables him to maintain his material advantage without difficulty.

13 \( \texttt{\textit{g3}} \) hxg6

14 \( \texttt{\textit{xh8+}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{xh8}} \)

15 \( \texttt{\textit{h4}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{f6}} \)

16 \( \texttt{\textit{h7}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{d7}} \)

Of White’s attack not a trace remains. After 17 c3 \( \texttt{\textit{xb3}} \) 18 axb3 \( \texttt{\textit{h8}} \) Black is two pawns up with a good position. There is no point in playing on.

White resigns.

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**Game 68**  
A.Rabinovich–Levenfish  
*Moscow 1927*

1 \( e4 \) \( \texttt{\textit{f6}} \)

2 \( e5 \) \( \texttt{\textit{d5}} \)

3 \( \texttt{\textit{f3}} \) \textit{d6}

4 \( \texttt{\textit{e2}} \)

Such a move (instead of 4 d4 or 4 c4 \( \texttt{\textit{b6}} \) 5 d4) can be explained only by a desire to divert the opponent from the theoretical paths.

4...\( \texttt{\textit{f4}} \)
5  ¿f1?
White did not want to allow the exchange of knight for bishop. Of course, he should have castled.
5  \ldots  dxe5
6  ¿xe5?
And now 6 d4 was essential.

6  \ldots  ¿d5!
The g2 pawn cannot be saved.
7  ¿f3
This move should also be accompanied by a question mark. After all, White could have played 7 d4, getting away with the loss of just a pawn.

7  \ldots  ¿e4+
8  ¿e2  ¿xg2+
9  ¿f1  ¿h3
10  d3  ¿h4+
11  ¿e1
Or 11  ¿g1  ¿g4 mate.
11  \ldots  ¿xf3 mate
It is hard to believe that such a game could be lost by an experienced master, who a year earlier had won the Moscow Championship.

| Game 69 |
| Gibbs–Schmid |
| Lugano Olympiad 1968 |
| 1  e4  ¿f6 |
| 2  ¿c3  d5 |
| 3  exd5  ¿xd5 |
| 4  ¿ge2 |
A passive move.
| 4  \ldots  ¿c6 |
| 5  g3? |
And this significantly weakens the f3 square.
White should have played 5 ¿xd5  ¿xd5 6 ¿c3, but, of course, this would not have caused Black any problems.

| 5  \ldots  ¿g4 |
| 6  ¿g2  ¿d4! |
With his last two moves White has allowed his knight at e2 to be pinned and attacked. 7...¿xc3 is threatened.
The only possible defence is 7 h3, although after 7...¿f3 Black’s advantage is obvious.
The Hong Kong player, appearing on board two in the match against West Germany, did not think for long before taking the knight.

7  ¿xd5? 
He thereby came the co-author of the shortest game at the Olympiad.

7  \ldots  ¿xd5!
On 8 ¿xd5 there follows 8...¿f3+ 9 ¿f1 ¿h3 mate, and 8 0-0 also does not save White – then comes 8...¿f3+ 9 ¿h1 (9 ¿g2 ¿h4+) 9...¿g5+ 10 ¿xd5 ¿f3+ 11 ¿g1 ¿h3 mate.
8 f3

Instead of this it would have been appropriate to resign, which White did after two more moves.
8 ...  \( \text{xf3} \)
9 \( \text{xf1} \)  \( \text{g2} \)

White resigns

**Centre Counter Game**

The idea of this opening is to create piece counterplay. Significant drawbacks to it are the tempo lost if the queen is developed early, and the absence of strong points in the centre.

### Game 70

**Ilyin-Genevsky–Strazdins**

_Liepaja 1921_

1 \( e4 \)  \( d5 \)
2 \( \text{exd5} \)  \( \text{xd5} \)
For 3...\( \text{xd5} \), see Game 72.
3 \( \text{c3} \)  \( \text{a5} \)
4 \( d4 \)  \( e5 \)

5 \( \text{h5} \)

An old and eccentric move, with which White, by pinning the e5 pawn, tries to exploit the opposition of the queens. However, Black is able to solve all his opening problems. For 5 \( \text{e2} \), see the next game.
5 ...  \( \text{c6}! \)
6 \( \text{b5} \)  \( \text{d7} \)
7 \( \text{xc6} \)

If 7 dxe5, then 7...\( \text{b4} \).
6 ...  \( \text{xc6} \)
8 \( d5 \)  \( \text{xd5} \)

The game Ollson-Collijn (Stockholm 1920) went 8...\( \text{b4} \) 9 dxe6 \( \text{xc3}+ \) 10 \( \text{f1} \)  \( \text{d4} \) 11 \( \text{e2} \)  \( \text{f6} \), with advantage to Black. Here 9 \( \text{d2} \) is better, although after 9... \( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xe5}+ \) \( \text{e7} \) Black's position is still favourable.
9 \( \text{xe5}+ \)  \( \text{e7} \)
10 \( \text{b4} \)

A seemingly energetic move, which meets with an energetic rejoinder. 10 \( \text{ge2} \) would have led to an equal game.
10 ...  \( \text{xb4} \)
11 \( \text{xb1} \)  \( \text{c4}! \)
12 \( \text{xd5} \)  \( \text{xd5} \)
13 \( \text{xc7} \)

*(see diagram next page)*

White should have exchanged queens and, after picking up the b7 pawn, restored material equality.
13 ...  \( \text{c6}! \)

Threatening 14...\( \text{d6} \), and if 15 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{b8} \).
14 \( \text{g3} \)
If 14 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{b8} \).
14 ... \( \text{Bd}4 + \)
15 c3 0-0-0!

White resigns.

Game 71
Lysenko–Voronova
Frunze 1978

1 e4 d5
2 exd5 \( \text{Bxd}5 \)
3 \( \text{Cxd}3 \) \( \text{Bd}a5 \)
4 d4 e5
5 \( \text{Be}2 \)

A dubious attempt to exploit the vertical pin.

In one of the match games Morphy–Anderssen (Paris 1858) White simply continued 5 dxe5, and after 5...\( \text{Bxe}5 + \) 6 \( \text{Be}2 \) \( \text{Bb}4 \) 7 \( \text{Cf}3 \)
(7 \( \text{Cd}2 \) is also good) 7...\( \text{Cxc}3 + \) 8 bxc3 \( \text{Bxc}3 + ?! \) (8...\( \text{Bd}6 \) is more cautious) 9 \( \text{Cd}2 \) \( \text{Cc}5 \) 10 \( \text{Cb}1 \) he gained a clear advantage. Instead of 5...\( \text{Bxe}5 + \) Black should play 5...\( \text{Bb}4 \), when after 6 \( \text{Cd}2 \) \( \text{Cc}6 \) 7 a3 (if 7 f4 White has to reckon with 7...f6)

7...\( \text{Bxe}5 + \) (7...\( \text{Cd}4 \) 8 \( \text{Ce}2 \)) 8 \( \text{Be}2 \)

White still retains some initiative.

Objectively best is 5 \( \text{Cf}3 \), emphasising Black's lack of development.

5 ... \( \text{Cc}6 \)
6 d5

To 6 dxe5 Black does not reply 6...\( \text{Bxe}5 \) in view of 7 \( \text{Cb}5 \), but either 6...\( \text{Bb}4 \) 7 \( \text{Cd}2 \) \( \text{Bf}5 \), or 6...a6 7 f4 (7 \( \text{Bf}4 \) \( \text{Bb}4 \); 7 \( \text{Bf}3 \) \( \text{Bg}4 \)) 7...\( \text{Bf}5 \) followed by ...0-0-0, rapidly mobilising his forces.

6 ... \( \text{Bb}4 ! \)
7 \( \text{Bc}4 ? \)

The queen defends both the knight and the d5 pawn, but the c2 square becomes vulnerable.

After 7 \( \text{Cd}2 \) \( \text{Bxc}3 \) 8 \( \text{Bxc}3 \) \( \text{Bxd}5 \) 9 f4 \( \text{Bf}5 \)! Black gains the advantage, according to Collijn, but this, of course, was the lesser evil.

7 ... \( \text{Cd}4 \)
8 ... \( \text{Bd}3 \)

8 ... \( \text{Bb}5 ! \)

The queen has no retreat square.

White resigns.
Game 72
Trippe–Skončenčna
Correspondence 1988

1 e4 d5
2 exd5 ²f6
3 d4 ²xd5
4 c4 ²b4

A move that counts on White being tempted into winning the knight. Black usually retreats to f6 or b6.

5 ²a4+

A good continuation. But not because after 5...²8c6 the immobile knight can be attacked by 6 d5.

Another favourite plan for White is to drive back the knight: 5 a3 ²4c6 6 d5 ²e5, followed by 7 ²f3 ²xf3+ 8 ²xf3 e6 9 ²c3.

5 ...

6 a3

But why not immediately 6 d5? Because then Black has the excellent tactical response 6...b5!

(a) 7 cxb5 ²d4! 8 ²a3 e5 9 dxe6 (the game Middleton-Lotfee, Moscow Olympiad 1956, went 9 ²d2 ²xd5 10 ²e2 ²b6 11 ²d1 ²g4 12 ²c3 ²c5 13 ²xd4 exd4 14 ²b3 d3, and Black won) 9...²xe6. Instead of the knight, White has won a pawn. But at what a price! After 10 ²e3 (10 ²d2 is answered by 10...²d5! 11 ²xb4 ²xb4+ 12 ²xb4 ²e4+, winning, Schleicher-Kübart, Leipzig 1961, or 11 f3 ²e5+ 12 ²f2 ²c5 with the same result) 10...²h4! 11 ²xd4 ²xd4 12 b6+ c6 13 ²d1 ²xb2 14 ²c1 ²e5+ White resigns (Delgado-Traveset, Spain 1975/6);

(b) 7 ²xb5 ²c2+ 8 ²d2 (if 8 ²d1 ²d7! 9 ²a6 ²d6b4 10 ²b7? ²c6, and Black traps the queen, Brachon-Gedult, France 1973, or 9 dxc6 ²g4+ 10 ²xc2 ²d1+ 11 ²c3 ²xc1+, Goldbov-Kanadin, Minsk 1970) 8...²d7 9 dxc6 ²f5+ 10 ²d5 ²b4! 11 ²xd8+ ²xd8+ 12 ²c3 ²c2 13 ²f4 e5! 14 ²xe5 ²b4+ 15 ²b3 ²b8 16 ²xc7 0-0! 17 ²xb8 ²xb8 18 a3, and Black sent 18...²xa3+ (the game was played by correspondence), announcing mate in seven (Rhode-Zitzewitz, 1910).

Since neither 7 cxb5 nor 7 ²xb5 is satisfactory, all that remains for White is to return his queen to its initial square. After 7 ²d1 ²d4 8 ²a3 e5 Black has an active position.

6 ...

7 d5?

White so wants to win a piece! Meanwhile, the positional 7 ²e3 ²d7 8 ²c2 would have promised him an excellent game.
7 ... ¤c5
8 ♕b5?

(see diagram)

8 ... e6
9 dxc6

White has achieved his aim – he is a knight up.

9 ... b6!

But after this move he was obliged to resign the game.

10...a6 11 ♕b4 ♢d3+ is threatened, and 10 ♤e2 does not save the queen in view of 10...a5 and ...♗a6.
Queen’s Gambit

The Queen’s Gambit is characterised by the moves 1 d4 d5 and now 2 c4, with which White begins a battle for control of the centre, aiming to divert the enemy pawn from d5. His central superiority will then enable him to deploy his forces advantageously for active play.

In contrast to the King’s Gambit, where Black is offered a genuine sacrifice of the f4 pawn, the sacrifice of the c4 pawn is only temporary, since direct play to hold on to the material advantage can have dire consequences. It should also be mentioned that, in contrast to the King’s Gambit, in the Queen’s Gambit White does not weaken the position of his king.

Black’s main options considered here are accepting the gambit with 2...dxc4, declining it with 2...e6 or 2...c6 (the Slav Defence), or trying to seize the initiative by the counter-sacrifice 2...e5 (the Albin Counter-Gambit).

For a long time it was thought that the immediate occupation of the centre did not cause Black any problems, and that he could equalise without difficulty with 3...e5 or 3...c5. But now the evaluation of the move 3 e4 has changed. It is employed frequently, and in general successfully, comprising one of the main branches of the accepted gambit.

3 ... e5

The modern continuation is 3...d6 – Black invites the opponent to advance his central pawn, e.g. 4 e5 d5 5 xd4 c6 or 5...d6.

There is also a similar manoeuvre, only with the queen’s knight – 3...c6 – see the following game.

4 d3

4 dx5 wxd1+ 5 xd1 is unpromising. Black replies 5...c6 and if 6 f4 e6 or 6...xg4+ and then ...e5.

4 xc4?!, with which White sacrifices one or two pawns in the interests of development, is risky, although its refutation demands a precise defence: 4...xd4 5 wb3 xe4+ 6 c3 g6 (6...xg2? loses to 7 xf7+ d8 8 d5 and then 9 xg8) 7 f3 d7 (here too the g2 pawn is taboo: 7...xg2? 8 xf7+ d8 9 g1 w3 10 xg8 or 9...xf3? 10 g5+) 8 bc3 c6 9 0-0 e7 10 and gf6. The white pieces are ideally developed, but
Black’s position has no weaknesses, and he is two pawns up.

4 ... exd4
4...b4+ should be considered, e.g. 5 d2xd2+ 6 wxd2 exd4 7 wxd4 f6 8 wxd8+ c8d8 9 c3 e6 10 d4 bd7 11 xex6+ fxe6 12 xc4 e5 13 f3 c6 with an equal game (Miles-Rachels, USA 1989).

5 d4
This concedes the initiative.
5 xc4 is the only way to fight for an opening initiative. After 5...c6 (5...c5 loses by force to 6 e5! c6 7 xe6 fxe6 8 xh5+ g6 9 xg6 f6 10 h3 g8 11 xxe6+, when White is a pawn up) 6 0-0 for the pawn White has a promising position:
(a) 6...g4? 7 wb3;
(b) 6...g6 7 e5 followed by wb3;
(c) 6...c5 7 g5 h6 8 xf7 xf7 9 xf7+ xf7 10 xh5+ g6 11 xc5;
(d) 6...e6 7 xe6 fxe6 8 wb3 d7 9 xb7 b8 10 a6 f6 11 bd2 e7 12 a3 followed by b2-b4, b2b2 and ac1.
5 ... c5
6 e3 f6
7 wa4+

To 7 f3 Black would have replied 7...c6.

7 ... bd7
8 c3?
8 f3 is correct, preventing the knight move to g4.
8 ... 0-0
9 xc4

Now on 9 f3 Black can defend his c4 pawn with 9...bd6.
9 ... g4!
10 e2 xe3
11 xe3 f6

The pin on the knight at d4 is highly unpleasant.
12 d1 g4
13 d2 f6
14 f3

On 14 d5 there would have followed 14...we5.
14 ... d8
15 d5
15 ... hx3!
A temporary exchange sacrifice, which leads to a decisive material advantage.

16 exd5 We5+
17 Re2
If 17 We2 b4+, or 17 Re2 f2 mate.

17 ... Re3
18 f2 Rf5!
White resigns

It can be assumed that already here White considered 7 Wa4+, and weighed up the variation 7...c6 8 b4 cxb3 9 axb3. And he decided that first he could strengthen his position by the inclusion of f3 and ...d6.

7 ... d6
8 Wa4+

Game 74
Illescas–Sadler
Linares 1995

1 d4 d5
2 c4 dxc4
3 e4 Ac6
4 Re3

Also possible is 4 d5 Re5 5 f4 (or 5 f4 Ag6 6 Ag3) 5...d3+ 6 Ax3 cxd3 7 Ac3.

4 ... Af6
5 Ac3 e5

5...Ag4 has also been played, followed by 6 Ax3 Ax3 7 fxe3 e5.

6 d5 Aa5
An original idea. The position of the knight at a5 looks suspicious, but how can it be exploited?

6...Ae7 suggests itself, and if 7 Ax3 Ag6, but the pawn sacrifice 6...Ad4?! 7 Ax4 exd4 8 Wa4 Ab4 9 Ax4 0-0 is hardly correct. White defends by 10 Ag2 and f2-f3.

7 Af3

8 ... Aa7!
This why did not expect – the opponent leaves his knight en prise. ‘Why not take it?’

9 Wxa5 a6!
White also did not anticipate this modest pawn move. 10...b6 is threatened. What to do?

10 Ab1
‘Retreat the queen to d2’.

10 ... Axe4
11 Ad1
‘Well, at least to e1’.

11 ... c3

The game can be saved by 12 b4, but after 12...b6 13 Wa3 a5 good advice for White is at a premium. And he decided not to continue the game.
Game 75
Frese–Schröder
Marburg 1951

1 d4 d5
2 c4 dxc4
3 e3

As is the case with 3 e3 or 3 e4, White does not prevent ...e7-e5.

3 ... e5
4 d5

Black has no problems at all after 4 dxe5 wxe5 5 dxc1 (or 5 dxc1 e6 6 f4 f6!) 5...e6 6 e4 dxe5 7 dxe5 d6.

4 ... d6

Also possible is 4...c6 followed by 5 e4 f6 6 g5 b4 with equal chances.

5 e4 f5
6 xxc4 f6
7 d3 fxe4
8 dxe4 0-0

Disregarding the d5 pawn, Black continues his development.

9 g5?

This pin is illustrary. Black now acquaints his opponent with a slightly complicated form of Legall’s combination.

9 ... dxe4!
10 xxb4+ e2

Mate can be avoided by 11 wd2, after which Black remains with a decisive material advantage. But now the white king perishes in the middle of the board.

11 ... xxf2+
12 e3 e8+
13 xe4 f5+
14 xe5 d7 mate

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Queen’s Gambit Declined

Game 76
J. Enevoldsen–Ortega
Helsinki Olympiad 1932

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e6
3 d3 f6

Black aims for the rapid development of his kingside. Another plan is the immediate central counter 3...c5 (the Tarrasch Defence), as in the next game.

4 g5 c6
4...e7 is the most solid continuation.

5 e3 bd7

The move 5 e3 has cut off the bishop from the queenside, and after 6 d3 Black plans to attack the
Had White anticipated the opponent’s reply, he would have found the only good response 9 $d2!  

9 ... $xa3!  

It transpires that White cannot get away with the loss of only a pawn. The Danish master sorrowfully made one more move before conceding the game.

10 $d3 $b4

White resigns

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Game 77

Astfalk–Mellerowicz

Oranienbaum 1989

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e6
3 $c3 c5

This move characterises the Tarrasch Defence. The German grandmaster considered it to be the only correct one. In the main lines after 4 cxd5 exd5 Black allows his d5 pawn to be isolated, but an important diagonal is opened for his queen’s bishop. However, in the present game the move 3...c5 is the prelude to a risky gambit.

4 cxd5 cxd4

A clever pawn sacrifice, suggested by the Austrian master Schara and introduced into tournament practice by the German master Hennig. In return Black gains a lead in development and even seizes the initiative. Nevertheless, theory considers that with accurate defence
the material advantage proves more important. That is with accurate defence, but with inaccurate...

5 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\text{\textw{xb}d4}}} \)

First 5 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textw{a4+}}} \) can also be played, and if 5...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd7}}} \) 6 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textw{xd4}}} \). After 6...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textexd5}}} \) 7 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textw{xd5}}} \text{\textbf{\textc6}} \) 8 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf3}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf6}}} \) 9 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd1}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc5}}} \) 10 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte3}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte7}}} \) Black castles long, planning a kingside pawn storm. Even so, experience has shown that 11 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte2}}} \) 0-0-0-0 12 0-0 g5 allows White, by returning the pawn, to count on an advantage: 13 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb4}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textxb4}}} \) 14 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb2}}} \).

The recent game Karpov-Hector (Haninge 1990) went 8 e3 (instead of 8 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf3}}} \)) 8...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf6}}} \) 9 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb3}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc5}}} \) 10 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf3}}} \) 0-0 11 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte2}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte6}}} \) 12 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texta4}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc7}}} \) 13 0-0 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texta8}}} \) 14 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd2}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textg4}}} \) 15 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textfd1}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd6}}} \) 16 g3 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte7}}} \) 17 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte1}}} \), and White has successfully retained his extra pawn.

5...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb5}}}?! \) is an interesting modern innovation. 6 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textwxd4}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc6}}} \) 7 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd2}}} \) \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textexd5}}} \) 8 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textwxd5}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd7}}} \) leads to a theoretical position, with the difference that the b7 pawn is at b5. In the event of 9 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textxb5}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf6}}} \) 10 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd6+}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textxd6}}} \) 11 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textwxd6}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textw6}}} \) Black has the initiative, but after other continuations typical of this variation Black’s plan of castling queenside is very risky.

5 ... \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc6}}} \)
6 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd1}}} \) \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textexd5}}} \)
7 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textwxd5}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte6}}} \)
8 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb5}}}?! \)

White continues to lose time. While his queen is wandering around the board, Black brings fresh forces into play.

8 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textwxd8+}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textxd8}}} \) 9 e3 is correct, not fearing 8...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb4}}} \), since 9 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb5+}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte7}}} \) 10 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf1!}}} \) securely parries the threats, after which Black would appear to have insufficient compensation for the pawn. This last move casts doubts on the correctness of the Schara-Hennig Gambit. There can follow 10...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf6}}} \) 11 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf3}}} \), and after 11...\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc2}}} \) (11...a6 is comparatively best) 12 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb1}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf5}}} \) 13 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textd2}}} \) White is not afraid of any discovery by the knight. He is a pawn up with a good position (Smyslov-Estrin, Leningrad 1951).

8 ... \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texta6}}} \)
9 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textxb7}}}? \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb4}}} \)
10 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texte4}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{\textf6}}} \)
11 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textb1}}} \)

Out of eleven moves White has made seven with his queen!

11 ... \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textc8}}} \)
12 \( \text{\textbf{\textit{\texta3}}} \)

It was naïve to assume that the knight would retreat.
b2-b4 and  \( \text{b2} \) is also employed. White can try to gain a tempo by first playing 6 a3, and only after the development of Black's king's bishop - dxc5, b2-b4 and  \( \text{b2} \). However, Black is not obliged to move his bishop, but can change the central structure by 6...cxd4, or continue the symmetry with 6...a6.

6 ... a6
7 0-0

This allows Black to obtain a classical position from the Queen's Gambit Accepted in a favourable version.

7 ... dxc4
8  \( \text{xc4} \) b5
9  \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{b7} \)
10  \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c7} \)

Game 78
Sellsted-Padevsky
Budapest 1959

1 d4  \( \text{f6} \)
2 c4  e6
3  \( \text{f3} \) c5
4  \( \text{e3} \) d5
5  \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c6} \)

The symmetrical variation of the Tarrasch Defence. Its apparent simplicity harbours numerous pitfalls for both sides.

6  \( \text{d3} \)
6 dxc5 \( \text{xc5} \) 7 a3 followed by

Compared with the well known variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3  \( \text{f3} \)  \( \text{f6} \) 4  \( \text{f3} \) e6 5  \( \text{xc4} \) c5 6 0-0 a6 7  \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c6} \) 8  \( \text{c3} \) b5 9  \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{b7} \)

Black has gained a tempo; his queen is already developed at c7.

11 d5 exd5
12 e4
In the gambit accepted after 10 \( \text{d}d1 \text{wc}7 \quad 11 \text{d}5 \text{exd}5 \quad 12 \text{e}4 \) White’s rook is already at d1, and the break in the centre enables him to launch an offensive. In the present game the rook is still at f1, and the sacrifice of the central pawn is unjustified. He should have played 12 \( \text{dx}d5 \).

12 \( \ldots \) \( \text{dxe}4 \)
13 \( \text{exe}4 \) 0-0-0!

With the rook at d1 this move would have been impossible.

14 \( \text{xf}6? \)

By opening the g-file for the opponent, White comes under attack.

14 \( \ldots \) \( \text{gxf}6 \)
15 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{g}8 \)
16 \( \text{g}3 \)

In defending against the threats of 16...\( \text{ex}g2+ \) 17 \( \text{ex}g2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) and also 16...\( \text{e}5 \), White catastrophically weakens the long diagonal.

16 \( \ldots \) \( \text{f}5 \)
17 \( \text{g}5? \)

A mistake in a very difficult situation.

17 \( \ldots \) \( \text{x}g5! \)

After 18 \( \text{ex}g5 \) there follows 18...\( \text{d}4 \) 19 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{f}3+ \) 20 \( \text{g}2 \), and now not 20...\( \text{ex}g5+ \) 21 \( \text{f}3 \) (which, however, is also good enough), but 20...\( \text{c}6 \)!, and if 21 \( \text{xd}8 \) \( \text{e}1+! \) 22 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{g}2+ \) 23 \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{xh}2+ \) 24 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{h}6+ \) 25 \( \text{x}f5 \) \( \text{g}6+ \), mating. White resigns.

Slav Defence

Game 79
Cserna–Szöllösi
Hungary 1983

1 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \)
2 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \)

Black supports his d5 pawn without, as in the Queen’s Gambit Declined (2...e6), blocking in his queen’s bishop. In some variations the move ...c6 is exploited for counterplay on the queenside with ...dxc4 and ...b7-b5. White also has to reckon with the possibility of the gambit pawn being held, which leads to interesting tactical play.

The drawback to the Slav Defence is that the advance ...c6-c5, which is important in a number of lines, is made with loss of time. White’s strategy, as in the declined gambit, consists in energetic action in the centre.

3 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \)
4 \( \text{c}2 \)

This prevents the development of the bishop at f5. Black can choose a
closed line with 4...e6, or else prepare the fianchetta of his king's bishop with 4...g6, insisting on his right to play ...\( \text{\textit{f5}} \).

4 ... \( \text{\textit{a6}} \)

A move that occurs in a number of lines of the Slav Defence when White has played a2-a4. The basis for it in the given position is the possibility of advancing ...\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) with gain of tempo.

5 \( \text{\textit{f4}} \)

White is not afraid of the standard attack on c2 (...\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) and ...\( \text{\textit{f5}} \)), but this should have concerned him. It was simpler to prevent the attack on his queen with 5 a3.

5 ... \( \text{\textit{b4}} \)

6 \( \text{\textit{b3}} \)

6 ... e5!

Defending the knight, and at the same time gaining an important tempo for the attack.

7 \( \text{\textit{dxe5}} \) \( \text{\textit{f5}} \)

8 \( \text{\textit{a3}} \)

8 exf5 loses to 8...\( \text{\textit{c2}} + \) 9 \( \text{\textit{d1}} \) dxc4+.

8 ... \( \text{\textit{e4}} \)

9 \( \text{\textit{cxd5}} \)

If 9 e3, then 9...\( \text{\textit{a5}} \). The same move would have followed on 9 \( \text{\textit{d4}}, \) e.g. 9...\( \text{\textit{a5}} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{xf5}} \) \( \text{\textit{c2}} + \), when an amusing finish would be 11 \( \text{\textit{d1}} \) \( \text{\textit{xal}} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{xb7}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf2}} + \) 13 \( \text{\textit{c1}} \) \( \text{\textit{e1}} \) mate.

However, 9 \( \text{\textit{d2}} \) was essential.

9 ... \( \text{\textit{c5}} \)

10 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \)

10 e3 cuts off the bishop from the defence of d2, after which 10...\( \text{\textit{a5}} \) is very strong.

10 ... \( \text{\textit{a5}} \)

11 \( \text{\textit{d2}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe3}} \)

12 \( \text{\textit{xe3}} \)

If 12 fxe3 \( \text{\textit{xd2}} \).

12 ... \( \text{\textit{xd5}} \)

13 \( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{b4}} \)

14 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) cannot be played on account of 14...\( \text{\textit{c2}} + \). Meanwhile Black is threatening 14...\( \text{\textit{xa3}} \) 15 bxa3 \( \text{\textit{c2}} + \) and 16...\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \), as well as 14...\( \text{\textit{d8}} \). If 14 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \), then again 14...\( \text{\textit{d8}} \) (15 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c2}} \) mate).

White resigns.
Game 80
Djindjihashvili–Seredenko
Aktyubinsk 1970

1 d4 d5
2 c4 c6
3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f6
4 e3 g6

This variation with the kingside fianchetto was first employed in the Lasker-Schlechter match (1910). In contrast to the Grünfeld Defence (1 d4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 2 c4 g6 3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c3 d5), in the Schlechter Variation Black controls d5 and the position is of a more enduringly strategical nature. But at the same time the opportunities for counterplay are restricted.

5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g7
6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d3

The alternative is 6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)e2, preventing the pin ...\( \mathcal{Q} \)g4 and not blocking the d-file.

6 ... 0-0
7 0-0 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g4

The idea of this manoeuvre is to exchange on f3 and fight for control of e5. After 7...\( \mathcal{Q} \)f5 8 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf5 gxf5 Black securely controls e4, but his kingside is weakened.

8 cxd5

The alternative is 8 h3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3 9 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3 e6 10 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d1 \( \mathcal{Q} \)bd7.

8 ... cxd5
9 \( \mathcal{Q} \)b3

White assumes that the slight deformation of his kingside pawns will be nothing to worry about, and that pressure on the queenside is more important.

9 ... \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3
10 gxf3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d7
11 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d2 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c6
12 \( \mathcal{Q} \)e2

12 \( \mathcal{Q} \)e2 was essential, strengthening the kingside defences. On 12...e5 there could have followed 13 dxe5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xe5 14 f4, when after 14...\( \mathcal{Q} \)h3 15 fxe5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g4 16 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xg4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xg4+ Black only has perpetual check.

After the move played, the opening of lines by Black gains significantly in strength.

12 ... e5
13 dxe5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xe5

How can the f3 pawn be defended? On 14 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g2 there follows 14...\( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3 (15 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g4 mate).

14 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d4

14 ... \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3+
15 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g4+
16 \( \mathcal{Q} \)h1 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf3+
17 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g1 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g4
18 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)h3

White resigns
The justification for the gambit is the powerful position of the bishop at b4. White is offering a second pawn (8...\textit{\texttt{w}}xg2), but it is extremely dangerous to take it.

8 \ldots \textit{\texttt{d}a6}

Other possibilities are:
(a) 8...\textit{\texttt{c}5}, with the idea of vacating the c6 square for the queen, and in certain lines of gaining a tempo for the defence by attacking the bishop at c5;
(b) the modern idea of 8...\textit{\texttt{e}7}, intending to answer 9 \textit{\texttt{f}3} with 9...\textit{\texttt{d}5}.

9 \textit{\texttt{c}3}

9 \textit{\texttt{d}6} is an interesting alternative – from this square the bishop can operate both against the kingside, and against the queenside. Black has two acceptable replies:
(a) 9...b6, as occurred in Ragozin-Shaposhnikov, Correspondence 1952. After 10 \textit{\texttt{f}3} \textit{\texttt{b}7} 11 \textit{\texttt{e}5} (or 11 0-0 \textit{\texttt{d}8}! 12 \textit{\texttt{e}5} \textit{\texttt{e}7} 13 \textit{\texttt{e}1} \textit{\texttt{w}h}4 14 g3 \textit{\texttt{w}f}6 15 \textit{\texttt{g}4}, I.Sokolov-Vera, Portoroz/Ljubljana 1987, when 15...\textit{\texttt{g}6}! 17 \textit{\texttt{e}5} \textit{\texttt{f}6} gives equal chances) 11...f6 12 0-0! \textit{\texttt{x}e}5 13 \textit{\texttt{h}5}+ g6 14 \textit{\texttt{e}1} \textit{\texttt{w}h}4 15 \textit{\texttt{g}4} \textit{\texttt{d}8} 16 \textit{\texttt{x}e}5, according to analysis by Ragozin, Black should play 16...\textit{\texttt{c}5}!, when the sharp variation 17 b4 (17 \textit{\texttt{x}e}6 \textit{\texttt{e}7}) 17...\textit{\texttt{h}6} 18 bxc5 \textit{\texttt{w}x}4 19 \textit{\texttt{x}g}4 \textit{\texttt{x}g}4 20 \textit{\texttt{x}e}6+ \textit{\texttt{d}7} 21 \textit{\texttt{e}7}+ \textit{\texttt{c}8} 22 \textit{\texttt{a}e}1 bxc5 23 \textit{\texttt{c}7}+ \textit{\texttt{b}8} 24 \textit{\texttt{b}1} \textit{\texttt{x}d}6 25 \textit{\texttt{x}b}7+ ends in perpetual check;
(b) 9...\textit{\texttt{e}5} 10 \textit{\texttt{f}3} \textit{\texttt{g}4} 11 \textit{\texttt{x}e}5 \textit{\texttt{x}e}2 12 \textit{\texttt{w}e}2 \textit{\texttt{x}e}2+ 13 \textit{\texttt{e}2}
\( \text{f6! with equal ending (Vaisert-Novikov, Bolgodonsk 1983).} \)

9 ... \( \text{\textit{d}e7} \)

9...f6 is strongly answered by 10 \( \text{w}d6. \)

10 \( \text{\textit{x}g7} \)

The restrained 10 \( \text{\textit{f}3} \) should also be considered. After 10...0-0 11 0-0 \( \text{\textit{g}6} \) 12 \( \text{\textit{e}1} \) \( \text{\textit{f}4} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{b}4} \) \( \text{\textit{c}7} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{d}3} \) \( f6 \) 15 \( \text{\textit{c}2} \) \( \text{\textit{f}6} \) 16 \( \text{h}4 \) White gained a strong attacking position in Rudnev-A.Mikenas (Corr. 1982).

10 ... \( \text{\textit{g}8} \)

The tempting 10...\( \text{w}xg2 \) allows White to create mating threats with 11 \( \text{\textit{f}6}! \), e.g. 11...\( \text{w}xh1 \) 12 \( \text{w}d6 \) 0-0 (after 12...\( \text{w}xg1+ \) 13 \( \text{\textit{d}2} \), mate is threatened at e7, and the queen is attacked) 13 \( \text{\textit{g}3+} \) \( \text{\textit{g}6} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{f}3} \), winning the queen.

11 \( \text{\textit{c}3} \)

To 11 \( \text{\textit{f}6} \) Black has the reply 11...\( \text{w}f4. \)

(The game Lautier-M.Gurevich (Biel Interzonal 1993) showed that in this case Black has difficulties after 12 \( \text{\textit{c}3!} \) (12 \( \text{\textit{x}e7} \) \( \text{\textit{x}e7} \) 13 \( g3 \) is also possible) 12...\( \text{\textit{x}g2} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{f}3} \) \( f6 \) 14 \( \text{\textit{d}2!} \) \( \text{\textit{x}d2+} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{x}d2}, \) when despite the exchange of queens it is hard for him to repel the invasion of the white pieces – Editor’s note.)

11 ... \( \text{\textit{d}5!} \)

As before, Black has to reject 11...\( \text{\textit{x}g2} \) on account of 12 \( \text{\textit{d}2}, \) and if 12...\( \text{\textit{x}h1} \) 13 0-0-0 with a very strong attack (Bronstein-Kotov, Budapest Candidates 1950).

The clever move 11...\( \text{\textit{d}5}, \) suggested by Yudovich, has the aim of blocking the d-file and thereby gaining time for the capture on g2.

The game that we are examining was played in the Leningrad Correspondence Championship thirty years after Yudovich and Romanovsky had published their analysis of this move. Up to now and in the subsequent play, both players follow the recommendations of opening guides.

12 \( \text{\textit{c}x}d5 \) \( \text{\textit{w}x}g2 \)

13 \( \text{\textit{d}x}e6 \)

If 13 \( \text{\textit{f}3} \) \( \text{\textit{x}h}1. \)

13 ... \( \text{\textit{x}e6} \)

Taking the rook is ruled out: 14 \( \text{ex}f7+ \) \( \text{\textit{x}f7} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{c}4+} \) \( \text{\textit{e}6} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{h}5+} \), and White wins.

14 \( \text{\textit{f}6} \)

Here, according to theory, Black had a choice between the forcing variation 14...\( \text{\textit{x}h1} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{d}6} \) \( \text{\textit{x}g1+} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{d}5+} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{x}d5} \) \( \text{\textit{xd}5} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{x}g1} \) \( \text{\textit{d}7} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{x}a}6 \) \( \text{\textit{b}xa6} \) with a drawn ending, and Romanovsky’s move 14...\( \text{\textit{x}g6}. \)

14 ... \( \text{\textit{g}6} \)

According to Romanovsky and Yudovich, after 15 \( \text{\textit{h}4} \) \( \text{\textit{x}h1} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{d}6} \) \( \text{\textit{x}g1+} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{g}5+} \) (the only defence, but sufficient) 18 \( \text{\textit{x}g5} \) \( \text{\textit{x}g5} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{e}1} \) \( \text{\textit{d}8} \) Black’s chances are slightly preferable – in the given instance his rook and minor piece are more active than the queen.

It is possible that, when studying this variation White evaluated the position differently, or perhaps he found some improvement during the
game. An answer to this question was not given, since in the game the following occurred:

15 ♝h4 ♞xh1
16 ♞d6

Black parries the mating threat, keeping a decisive material advantage.

White’s next move was made in desperation.

17 ♞d4 ♞xg1+

But after this he resigned a game that had effectively lasted just one move!

An instructive example of the refutation of an analysis that for many years migrated from one opening book to another.

Albin Counter-Gambit

Game 82
Gil–Leontxo García
Benidorm 1983

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e5

A clever pawn sacrifice, suggested by the Rumanian master Albin in the early 1890s. Its idea is to cramp the opponent, restrict his development, and seize the initiative. However, experience has shown that with accurate play White should gain the advantage.

3 dxe5 d4
4 ♞f3

Attacking the pawn by 4 e3? meets with the tactical refutation 4...♗b4+ 5 ♞d2 dxe3!, and if 6 ♞xb4? exf2+ 7 ♞e2 fxg1=♕+! (this way, since promoting to a queen would merely restore material
equality) 8 e1 (8 xg1 g4+) 8... Wh4+ 9 d2 (9 g3 We4+) 9...c6
10 c3 g4, and the game is decided.

It does not help White to include a check – 6 Wa4+ c6 7 xb4,
since then comes 7...exf2+ 8 xf2 Wh4+ 9 e3 (or 9 g3 Wd4+ 10 g2
xd2+ 11 d2 xa1 12 gf3 Wb2
13 a3 g4 White resigns – this was a game Petrov-Panteleev, played in
1973 in Bulgaria) 9...d4+ 10 f3
g4+ 11 g3 h6 12 h3 f5+ 13
h2 Wf4+ and mate next move
(Linse-Kjelberg, Malmö 1917).

If White has already gone wrong
with 4 e3?, the lesser evil for him
after 4...b4+ 5 d2 dxe3 is to play 6 fxe3. Then 6...Wh4+ 7 g3
We4 8 f3 xd2+ 9 xd2 xe5
10 0-0-0 f6 merely gives Black a
positional advantage.

4...c6

4...c5 is well answered by 5 e3,
since there is no check at b4.

5 g3

Probably the most effective
method of play against the Albin
Counter-Gambit.

5 a3 is also employed, in order,
after preventing the check at b4,
nevertheless to play e2-e3.

5...g4

If Black tries to restore material
equality by attacking the e5 pawn,
his d4 pawn may be in danger. In
order to gain counter-chances, Black
must develop his queenside, and g4
proves to be the most convenient
square for the bishop.

The plan of opening the h-file
logically stems from the set-up with
casting on opposite sides.

Note that 8...h3? is refuted by 9
e6!

9 bd2?

A routine move, instead of which
White should have played 9 d1!
with the threat of 10 xd4. His
initiative in the centre and on the
queenside leaves Black no time for
activity on the kingside. There can
follow 9...b6 10 f4 h4 11 c3,
and if 11 xf3 12 xf3 g5, then
13 b5! (13 xg5 xe5 leads to an
unclear position) 13...b8 14
xd7+ xd7 15 e6 xe6 16 e5
g7 17 xg7 xg7 18 xd4, when
White is a pawn up with a clear
advantage (Silakov-Khaunin, USSR
1964).

9...h4

10 xh4
Otherwise ...hxg3 and ...h3 is unpleasant. However, the exchange of the e-pawn for the h-pawn favours Black, who obtains a powerful passed pawn.

In the event of 10 e6 Black would have captured the pawn with his queen.

\[
\begin{align*}
10 & \ldots \quad \text{hxg3} \\
11 & \text{h1} \quad \text{d3} \\
12 & \text{h3f3} \quad \text{f5} \\
13 & \text{wb5}
\end{align*}
\]

White still has his sights trained on the queenside. ‘If the opponent drives away my queen with ...a7-a6, it may be possible to open lines by advancing my b-pawn’ – this was his approximate reasoning. But this only applies if things remain quiet on the kingside.

\[
\begin{align*}
13 & \ldots \quad \text{a6}
\end{align*}
\]

14 wa4  xe5

15 xxe5

\[
\begin{align*}
15 & \ldots \quad \text{xf2+}! \\
\end{align*}
\]

A mating net (16 xf2 c5 mate) with the participation of the d3 pawn.

White resigns.
Indian Defences

This chapter covers games that begin 1 d4 $\triangle f6$ 2 c4 — the various Indian defences, as well as the Catalan Opening and the Budapest Defence.

Nimzo-Indian Defence

This opening was analysed and brought into practice in the 1920s by Aron Nimzowitsch. By developing his bishop at b4, Black exerts piece pressure on the central squares e4 and d5.

White has numerous plans, largely aimed at preparing an attack on the kingside. Black’s actions are usually concentrated on the queenside; in many lines he exchanges on c3, giving White doubled c-pawns, and then puts the c4 pawn under siege.

4 ... b6
By the fianchetto of his bishop Black exerts pressure on e4. Another plan envisages the development of the bishop at a6 and an attack on the c4 pawn.

5 $\triangle$ge2
This is how Rubinstein used to continue, followed by driving away the bishop with a2-a3. A drawback is the slight delay in the development of White’s kingside.

5 $\triangle$d3 $\triangle$b7 6 $\triangle$f3 is also played, followed by 6...d5, 6...c5 or 6...$\triangle$e4.

5 ... $\triangle$e4
This pursues two aims: firstly, it contains the positional threat of doubling White’s pawns and beginning a siege of c4, and secondly, it makes way for the f-pawn and takes control of e4.

6 $\triangle$c2 $\triangle$b7
7 $\triangle$g3
7 a3 is logical, when 7...$\triangle$xc3+ 8 $\triangle$xc3 f5 is strongly met by 9 d5!
After 9...$\triangle$xc3 10 $\triangle$xc3 0-0 11 dxe6 (11 b4 can also be considered, and if 11...exd5 12 $\triangle$b2) 11...dxe6 12 b3 $\triangle$e7 (or 12...$\triangle$e6 13 $\triangle$xf6 gxf6 with a favourable ending for White) 13 $\triangle$b2 followed by 0-0-0 White has the better chances, thanks to his two bishops and pressure on the long diagonal.

7 ... $\triangle$wh4!
Black maintains control of e4.

8 $\triangle$d3 f5
9 0-0  $\text{a}xc3$
10 $\text{b}xc3$ 0-0
11 $\text{a}e2$

This retreat (with loss of time) could have been followed up by driving away the knight with f2-f3.

11 . . . $\text{a}f6$

The storm clouds are gathering over White's position.

12 $\text{a}xe4$?

This could have been played without first moving away the knight - at any event, the kingside would have been covered.

12 . . . $\text{a}xe4$
13 $\text{w}d1$

13 . . . $\text{a}f3$!

A blockading sacrifice.

After 13...$\text{h}6$ White could still have prolonged the resistance by giving up a pawn: 14 f3 (14 h3 $\text{a}xg2$) 14...$\text{w}xh2+$ 15 $\text{g}f2$. But now if 14 $\text{g}xf3$ Black concludes the attack by 14...$\text{h}6$ (15 $\text{e}e1$ $\text{w}xh2+$ 16 $\text{f}1$ $\text{w}h3+$ and 17...$\text{w}h1$ mate).

White resigns.

It should be mentioned that the player who so submissively lost this short game was to gain the grandmaster title the following year.

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Game 84
Romanov–Goncharenko
Correspondence 1984

1 $\text{d}4$ $\text{f}6$
2 $\text{c}4$ $\text{e}6$
3 $\text{c}c3$ $\text{b}4$
4 $\text{w}c2$

The Classical Variation, in which White forestalls the doubling of his pawns after the possible exchange on c3. The position of the queen at c2 is also of significance in the battle for the e4 square.

4 . . . $\text{d}5$
5 $\text{c}xd5$ $\text{w}xd5$

Black tries to create pressure on the d4 pawn. 5...$\text{exd}5$ is sounder.

6 $\text{e}3$

6 $\text{d}f3$ is preferable, planning later to play e2-e4, e.g. 6...c5 7 $\text{d}d2$! $\text{xc}3$ 8 $\text{xc}3$ $\text{c}xd4$ (or 8...$\text{c}c6$ 9 $\text{d}d1$) 9 $\text{d}d1$ $\text{c}c6$ (9...$\text{w}xa2$ is dangerous in view of 10 $\text{xd}4$ $\text{c}c6$
11 $\text{a}a4$ $\text{w}d5$ 12 e4 with a clear initiative) 10 $\text{xd}4$ 0-0 11 $\text{f}3$ and then e2-e4. White stands better.

6 . . . $\text{c}5$
7 $\text{a}3$

Compared with the variation in the previous note, here 7 $\text{d}d2$ is not so favourable: after 7...$\text{xc}3$ 8 $\text{xc}3$ $\text{c}6$ or 8...$\text{c}xd4$ 9 $\text{xd}4$ $\text{c}6$
10 $\text{xf}6$ $\text{gxf}6$ 11 $\text{e}e2$ $\text{d}7$ 12 $\text{g}3$
\( \text{\#e5} 13 \text{\#c3 f5 (Kasparov-Anand, Match 1995) Black holds his ground in the centre.} \)

\[ \text{7 ... \#xc3+} \]
\[ 7...\text{cxd4 8 axb4 dxc3 9 bxc3 favours White.} \]

\[ 8 \text{ bxc3} \]
\[ \text{After 8 \#xc3 \#bd7 9 \#f3 cxd4 10 \#xd4 \#c5 White has no advantage (Flohr-Botvinnik, Hastings 1934/5).} \]

\[ 8 \ldots \text{0-0} \]
\[ \text{The variation with 6 e3 was tested extensively in the late 1920s and especially in the 1930s. Experience has shown that the following are also good enough to equalise:} \]
\[ \text{(a) 8...\#c6, e.g. 9 \#f3 0-0 10 c4 \#d6 11 \#b2 cxd4 12 exd4 b6 13 \#d3 \#b7 14 0-0 \#ac8 (Alekhine-Euwe, World Championship 1937);} \]
\[ \text{(b) 8...\#bd7, e.g. 9 \#f3 b6 10 c4 \#d6 11 \#b2 \#b7 (Levenfish-Botvinnik, match, Moscow 1937).} \]

\[ 9 \#f3 cxd4 \]

\[ 10 \text{cxd4 \#d7} \]
\[ \text{Another game from the same Alekhine-Euwe match went 10...b6 11 \#c4 \#c6 12 \#d3 \#xc2 13 \#xc2 \#a6, leading to an equal ending.} \]

\[ \text{The move made in the present game is also not new. Alekhine played this in a match game with Euwe in Amsterdam in 1927.} \]

\[ 11 \#c4 \#h5 \]

\[ 12 \#e5?! \]
\[ \text{12 0-0 was simpler, completing his development (as in the aforementioned game).} \]

\[ 12 \ldots \text{\#c6} \]

\[ 13 \text{\#xc6 \#xc6} \]

\[ 14 \text{0-0 \#ac8} \]
\[ \text{In the resulting position White's two bishops are of no significance. What is more, he experiences some discomfort on account of the poor position of his bishop at c1. Now he has to take measures against the threats on the c-file. The queen has to move, but where to? 15 \#e2 should have been considered.} \]

\[ 15 \#b2 \text{ b6} \]

\[ 16 \#d2 \]
\[ \text{When he played this, White saw the tactical stroke on d4 (16...\#xd4 17 \#xd4 \#fd8 18 \#c3 \#e4), but found what he thought to be a strong counter.} \]

\[ 16 \ldots \text{\#xd4} \]

\[ 17 \#a6 \]
\[ \text{White was pinning great hopes on this rejoinder.} \]

\[ \text{The bishop has moved away from the attack, and both the knight and rook are threatened. At this White} \]
prematurely terminated his analysis, but Black had calculated further.

17 ... \( \text{g}4 \)
18 h3 \( \text{e}5!! \)

Such a move at the end of a variation can easily be overlooked, even in a correspondence game! Faced with the dilemma of whether to be mated or part with his queen (19 h\text{x}g4 \( \text{e}2+ 20 \text{xe}2 \text{x}b2 \), White resigned.

**Queen’s Indian Defence**

This opening was also suggested and brought into practice by Nimzowitsch. The move 3 \( \text{f}3 \) does not control e4, and by the fianchetto of his bishop Black prevents the occupation of the centre.

In the majority of variations the play is of a manoeuvring nature, with Black having a solid, but comparatively inactive position.

This restricts the bishop at a6. The alternatives are 5 \( \text{bd}2 \), 5 \( \text{c}2 \) and 5 \( \text{a}4 \).

5 ... \( \text{d}5 \)

In modern tournaments Black more often plays 5...\( \text{b}4+ 6 \text{d}2 \) (6 \( \text{bd}2 \) should also be considered) 6...\( \text{e}7 \), with the idea of exploiting the slight weakening of the d4 pawn. After 7 \( \text{g}2 \) c6 8 0-0 d5 White eliminates this positional defect by 9 \( \text{c}3 \), and 9...0-0 10 \( \text{bd}2 \) \( \text{bd}7 \) 11 \( \text{e}1 \) c5 12 e4 leads to a position that resembles the Catalan Opening, where both sides have chances.

6 \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{b}4+ \)

For 6...dxc4, see the next game.

7 \( \text{fd}2 \)

The reason behind this rather strange way of defending against the check is White’s unwillingness to weaken his c3 square. However, the move is incorrect: he not only moves an already developed piece, but also takes away his control of d4. 7 \( \text{d}2 \) was correct.

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1 d4 \( \text{f}6 \)
2 c4 \( \text{e}6 \)
3 \( \text{f}3 \) b6
4 g3 \( \text{a}6 \)

Exploiting the fact that White’s king’s bishop will be developed at g2, Black attacks the c4 pawn.

5 h3
Opening up the position is the correct reaction to the opponent’s delayed development.

Now the bishop at b4 switches to a strong position. But after 8 a3 əxd2+ (8...a5? loses a piece to 9 b4! cxb4 10 axb4 əxb4 11 a4+) 9 əxd2 Black could try to win a pawn with 9...cxd4 10 əf3 əc6, since 11 əxd4 əxd4 12 a4 can be met by 12...dxc4! 13 əc6+ a8.

8 ... əxc5
9 əb2 0-0
10 əc3 əc8

The pressure on c4 (the result of White’s inaccurate opening play) is very real: 12...dxc4 13 əxc4 (13 bxc4 əa5) 13...əxc4 14 bxc4 əa5 winning a pawn is threatened. In eliminating this threat, White opens the diagonal for the bishop at a6.

12 cxd5

He should first have driven back the bishop with 12 əa4, and only then played 13 cxd5.

12 ... exd5
13 əa4

What difference does it make in what order the moves cxd5 and əa4 are made? The difference is that now the role of the bishop pair increases significantly – White is no longer able to drive away the bishop from c5.

It should be mentioned that 13 əf3 is strongly answered by 13... əe8 with the threat of ...d5-d4.

The knight has to return, otherwise it is not apparent how the threats against e2 and c2 can be parried. If 14 əxd4 əxd4 15 əb1, then 15...əe7 or 15...b5 16 əb2 əa5 – in both cases with an obvious advantage to Black. And 14 əe1 loses the exchange to 14...əc2! (the knight cannot be taken on account of the loss of the queen after 15...əxf2+).

14 ... əe7
15 əe1

This weakening of the f2 square allows Black to carry out a spectacular combination.

The only way to resist was by defending the e2 pawn with 15 əf3, although after 15...əxf3+ 16 əxf3 əe8 Black would have retained an enormous positional advantage.

15 ... əc2!

The themes of this combination with the sacrifice of four pieces are
the vacating of a diagonal (for the bishop at c5) and the ‘drawing out’ of the king. After 16 \textit{\textipa{wx}c2} Smyslov had calculated the variation 16... \textit{\textipa{xf}f2+ 17 \textit{\textipa{xf}f2} (if 17 \textit{\textipa{h}h1} \textit{\textipa{xe}l} 18 \textit{\textipa{xe}l} d4) 17...\textit{\textipa{g}g4+ 18 \textit{\textipa{f}f3} (18 \textit{\textipa{g}g1} \textit{\textipa{e}e3+ leads to a smothered mate) 18...\textit{\textipa{f}f6+! 19 \textit{\textipa{x}g}x4 \textit{\textipa{c}c4+! (vacating the c8 square) 20 bxc4 \textit{\textipa{c}c8+ 21 \textit{\textipa{h}h5} \textit{\textipa{w}h6 mate.}})\textit{\textipa{f}f1} is interesting:

(a) 8...c6 9 \textit{\textipa{xc}c6} \textit{\textipa{xc}c6} 10 \textit{\textipa{xc}c6+ \textit{\textipa{e}e7} 11 \textit{\textipa{xa}a8} \textit{\textipa{xa}a8} 12 f3 \textit{\textipa{d}d8} 13 bxc4 \textit{\textipa{xc}c4} 14 \textit{\textipa{f}f2} e5 15 \textit{\textipa{a}a3}! \textit{\textipa{xa}a3} 16 \textit{\textipa{xa}a3} \textit{\textipa{xd}d4} 17 \textit{\textipa{c}c2}, and Black’s compensation for the pawn is probably insufficient (Mager-erramov-Horvath, Trnava 1981);

(b) 8...\textit{\textipa{d}d6} 9 \textit{\textipa{xc}c4} \textit{\textipa{d}d5} 10 \textit{\textipa{f}f3} \textit{\textipa{c}c6} 11 \textit{\textipa{g}g2} 0-0 12 \textit{\textipa{b}b2} b5 (Pytel-Kengis, Yurmala 1983), and White could have gained the better chances by 13 \textit{\textipa{xd}d6} \textit{\textipa{xd}d6} 14 e4 \textit{\textipa{de}e7} 15 \textit{\textipa{c}c3};

(c) 8...\textit{\textipa{fd}d7} 19 \textit{\textipa{xc}c4} (9 \textit{\textipa{xa}a8} \textit{\textipa{xe}e5} or 9 \textit{\textipa{xf}f7} \textit{\textipa{xf}f7} 10 \textit{\textipa{xa}a8} c6 leads to unclear complications) 9...c6 (Langeweg-van der Wiel, Montpellier 1985), and 10 \textit{\textipa{a}a3} \textit{\textipa{xa}a3} 11 \textit{\textipa{db}bxa3} 0-0 12 \textit{\textipa{w}d2} would have given White a promising position.

8 ... \textit{\textipa{cxb}b3}

The position arising after the piece sacrifice 8...\textit{\textipa{w}xa4} 9 \textit{\textipa{xb}b4} \textit{\textipa{xa}a1} 10 \textit{\textipa{c}c3} \textit{\textipa{xa}a2} 11 \textit{\textipa{xa}a8} \textit{\textipa{cxb}b3} 12 \textit{\textipa{d}d2} is unclear.

9 \textit{\textipa{c}c6}?

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{1} & \textbf{d}4 \textit{\textipa{f}f6} \\
\textbf{2} & \textbf{c}4 \textit{\textipa{e}6} \\
\textbf{3} & \textit{\textipa{f}f3} \textit{\textipa{b}6} \\
\textbf{4} & \textit{\textipa{g}g3} \textit{\textipa{a}a6} \\
\textbf{5} & \textit{\textipa{b}3} \textit{\textipa{d}5} \\
\textbf{6} & \textit{\textipa{g}g2} \textit{\textipa{dxc}c4} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

A strange looking move: Black has developed his bishop at a6, and now he opens the long diagonal. The capture on c4 is an attempt, typical of modern opening ideas, to seize the initiative by gambit means.

7 \textit{\textipa{e}e5} \textit{\textipa{b}4+}

8 \textit{\textipa{d}d2}
Instead of this White should have chosen the quiet 9 axb3 (e.g. 9...\textit{\&}xd2+ 10 \textit{\&}xd2 \textit{\&}d5 11 0-0 0-0 12 \textit{\&}c1 with the initiative), or the sharper 9 \textit{\&}c3.

9 ... b2!

10 \textit{\&}xb4

If 10 \textit{\&}xb4 bxa1=\textit{\&} 11 \textit{\&}xd8 \textit{\&}xd8 12 \textit{\&}xa8 \textit{\&}xa2 with the threat of 13...\textit{\&}xe2 and a clear advantage to Black.

10 ... bxa1=\textit{\&} 11 \textit{\&}c3

White picks up the new queen, but in the end he nevertheless loses material.

11 ... \textit{\&}xc3+

12 \textit{\&}xc3 c6

It transpires that after 13 \textit{\&}xa6 \textit{\&}xc6 14 \textit{\&}xc6+ \textit{\&}f8 15 \textit{\&}xa8 \textit{\&}xa8 Black is a knight up, while if 13 \textit{\&}xc6, then simply 13...\textit{\&}c7 14 \textit{\&}a4 0-0, again with a decisive material advantage.

White resigns.

**Catalan Opening**

This opening is something of a hybrid, combining a Queen’s Gambit set-up with the fianchettto of the king’s bishop. Its basic idea is to put pressure on queenside and the central squares, an active role being played by the bishop at g2.

Black has various possibilities for counterplay in the centre and the queenside; only he should bear in mind that excessive striving for simplification in the opening can have unfavourable positional consequences.

One particular feature of the Catalan Opening is that transpositions are possible to and from several other openings, such as the Queen’s Gambit, Slav Defence, Queen’s Indian Defence, English Opening and Réti Opening.

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**Game 87**

**Veitsch–Penrose**

**Buxton 1950**

1 d4 \textit{\&}f6
2 c4 e6
3 \textit{\&}f3 d5
4 g3 dxc4

The so-called Open Variation, or Catalan Gambit Accepted.

In the Closed Variation Black delays the capture on c4 or else avoids it altogether. After strengthening his centre, he bases his play on preparing the counter ...c7(c6)-c5, along the lines of ...\textit{\&}e7, ...0-0, ...\textit{\&}bd7, ...c7-c6, ...b7-b6, ...\textit{\&}b7 and ...c6-c5 (with or without the preparatory ...dxc4).

5 \textit{\&}bd2

The theoretical continuations are 5 \textit{\&}a4+ and 5 \textit{\&}g2.

5 ... c5!

6 dxc5

White did not want to play 6 e3 on purely positional grounds. Against 6 \textit{\&}a4+ and also 6 \textit{\&}c4 Black has the good reply 6...\textit{\&}c6.
6 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}xc5}}}

7 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{g}2}?}}

White has no suspicion of any danger. However, even after the comparatively best 7 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}a4+}}}, \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}d7}}}, 8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}xc4}}}, \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{b}b6}}}, 9 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{e}e3}}}, \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{c}c6}}}, he would still have been in difficulties.

7 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}c2}}} is more flexible, leaving White a choice of several plans after 7...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}6}}}. Apart from 8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}xc4}}}, he can play 8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}4}}}, 8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{e}e4}}}, and also 8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}bd2}}}.

7 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}6}}}

The prelude to the development of the queenside.

8 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}xc4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{b}5}}}

9 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}c2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{b}b7}}}

10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}d1}}}

Theory considers 10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{f}f4}}}, 10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{g}g5}}}, 10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}d2}}}, 10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}a4}}}, 10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{c}c3}}}, and 10 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}bd2}}}. With the move played White voluntarily deprives his queen of a possible retreat to d1, and on the queenside its position may become dangerous.

10 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{e}e4}}}

11 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}b3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{c}c6}}}

12 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}bd2}?}}

In the given position this natural move (as well as 12 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{c}c3}}}) is an irreparable mistake. 12 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{f}f4}}} would have vacated a retreat square for the queen at c1, although even then 12...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}a5}}} would have given Black an excellent game.

12 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{a}a5}}}

13 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}e3}}}

Things are not changed by 13 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{w}c3}}}, \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{b}4}}}.

13 \ldots \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{c}c2}}}

14 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{f}f1}}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{d}d5}}}

15 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\text{\textcircled{e}e5}}}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Game 88 & Biro–B. Lengyel & Hungary 1982 \\
\hline
1 d4 & d5 & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
15 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f5}}}! \)

Threatening 16...\( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d6}}} \), 16...\( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f6}}} \) or 16...\( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f6}}} \). The trapped queen is lost.

White resigns.

Budapest Defence

Game 89

Helmer-Krejci

Vienna 1917

1 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d4}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f6}}} \)

2 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c4}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e5}}} \)

With this pawn sacrifice Black aims to obtain an open game and to seize the initiative. The idea can prove justified if White tries to hold on to his material advantage. But, by returning the pawn at a convenient moment, he achieves significant positional gains, as a result of which theory considers the defence to be not altogether correct.

3 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{dxe}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{g4}}} \)

4 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f4}}} ?! \)

5 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xh2}}} ?! \)

This knight sacrifice prevents White from castling, but there is no certainty that it is correct.

The theoretical continuation refuting 4 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f4}}} ? \) is 5...\( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d6}}} \), and if 6 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{exd}}} \) 0-0. After 7 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{dxc7}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{wxc7}}} \) 8 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{b4}}} \) 9 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{wb3}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c6}}} \) 10 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e3}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e8}}} \) Black has a winning attack, while if White tempers his 'greed' with 7 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e4}}} \), then 7...\( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{cxd6}}} \) 8 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c6}}} \) gives Black
excellent compensation for the pawn.

6 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_x}h2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_h}4+
7 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}5

The queen’s bishop joins the attack. The threat is 8...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_g}3 9 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}}}_h}1 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_e}3+ 10 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}_f}5+.

8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_b}3?

8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_e}1? would have been met by 8...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_e}3+ 9 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}1 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_x}e1+ and 10...
\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_x}c1, but 8 e4! would have significantly complicated Black’s task (if, for example, 8...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}}}_x}h3+ 9 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_x}h3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_x}f4+ 10 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}1 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_e}4+ 11 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_e}2).

8 ... \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_x}h3
9 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_x}h3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_f}4+
10 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}2?

The only way of continuing to offer any resistance was by 10 e3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_x}f1 11 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}}}_h}1.

10 ... \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_x}f1!
11 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_c}8+ \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_e}7
12 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_x}h8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_e}2+
13 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}2

Not only this move loses, but also 13 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_d}2 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}6! 14 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_a}8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}4+, as well as 13 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}4+ 14 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}_b}3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}1 mate.

13 ... \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}6!
14 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_x}a8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}_b}4+
15 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}_b}3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_c}c4+
16 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_a}4 b5+
17 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}_a}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}_b}6 mate

---

**Game 90**

**Lagha–Contedini**

*Leipzig Olympiad 1960*

1 d4 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_f}6
2 c4 e5
3 dxe5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_e}4

Fajarowicz’s move, which enjoys a dubious reputation. It is considered that White should be able to parry the opponent’s attacking attempts and secure positional gains or else hold on to his material advantage. However, things are not so simple.

4 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}}}_c}2

In the game Alekhine-Tartakower (London 1932) White did not try to retain his extra pawn but continued 4 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}2. After 4...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}5 5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_f}3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}6 6 g3 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_e}7 7 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_g}2 g6 8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}_b}1! (the knight is aiming for d5) 8...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_x}e5 9 0-0 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_x}f3+ 10 exf3! \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_g}7 11 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_e}1 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}_e}6 12 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}3 0-0 (12...\texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}_c}6 13 \texttt{\textbf{\textbf{f}}}_f4) 13 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}5 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}_d}8 14 f4 Alekhine gained a clear positional advantage. However, 6...d6 is more energetic, e.g. 7 exd6 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}}}_x}d6 8 \texttt{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}_g}2 \texttt{\textbf{\textbf{f}}}_f5 9 0-0 0-0 0-0 with compensation for the pawn.

Instead of 6 g3 there is the sound continuation 6 a3, e.g. 6...a5 (here
6...d6 is strongly met by 7 b4 Qe6 8 Qb2) 7 Qb3 Qe6 (7...g6 8 Qf4, or
7...Qe7 8 Qxc5 Qxc5 9 Qg5 Qe7
10 Qf4) 8 Qd2 a4 9 Qc1 d6 10 Qc3, and White has the advantage
(Hübner-Pedersen, Athens 1969).

4 ... Qb4+

The problematic 4...d5 5 exd6 Qf5 leads to an unclear position.

5 Qd2

Until recently it was thought that White should play 5 Qc3 here,
when the variation 5...d5 6 exd6 Qf5 7 Qd2! Qxd6 8 Wb3 Qc6 9 e3
Wxe7 10 Qf3 0-0-0 11 Qe2 favours him. But the move played is also
acceptable.

5 ... d5

6 exd5?

The modern game Stohl-Trapl
(Namestovo 1987) is of interest.
White played 6 Qf3! Qc6 (if 6...
Qf5 7 Wb3! Qc6 8 cxd5 Qc5 9
Qc4 b5 10 Wf4) 7 e3 Qg4 (7...Qf5
8 Qd3) 8 cxd5 Qxf3, and now 9
gxf3 Qxd2 10 Qxd2! Qxd5 11
Qxb4 Qxb4 12 Wa4+ Qc6 13 Qg2
would have secured him an advan-
tage (Trapl).

6 ... Qf5

7 Wb4+

Up to here the correspondence
game Mues-Reinhardt (1935) took
exactly the same course. After 7
dxc7 Wxc7 8 Wa4+ Qc6 9 Qgf3 0-
0-0 10 a3 Black crushed his oppo-
ten: 10...Qxd2+ 11 Qxd2 Qxd2 12
Qxd2 Qxd2! 13 Qxd2 We5! If now
14 Wb5, then 14...Qd8+ 15 Qc1
Qd4! 16 Wxe5 Qb3 mate.

7 ... Qc6

8 a3

As in the game given in the pre-
vious note, this move, a thematic
one in the Budapest Defence, comes
too late.

8 Qgf3 was essential.

8 ... Qc5

9 dxc7

9 Wd1 would have been answered
by 9...Qd4.

9 ... We7!

10 a Wd1 Qd3 mate

King’s Indian Defence

Although played on isolated
occasions in the last century, this
opening only began to be developed
intensively in the late 1930s. After
the war and in the 1950s it became
the most popular defence to 1 d4,
thanks to the efforts of Boleslavsky
and Konstantinopolsky, and later
Bronstein, Geller, Tal and Fischer.
Today it still features in the repertoires of many leading players and is employed in the most important events.

With the early fianchetto of his king’s bishop, Black allows the opponent to set up a pawn centre, which he then intends to attack, usually with...e7-e5 or ...c7-c5. Numerous plans are available to both sides, but one significant feature of the opening is that there are few variations leading to simplifying exchanges, and this attracts players who have a leaning towards tactical complications and an uncompromising struggle.

Game 91
Smyslov–Gligoric
Candidates Tournament
Yugoslavia 1959

1 d4 ♘f6
2 c4 g6
3 ♘c3 ♘g7
4 ♘g5

Smyslov’s patent. White intends to support his d4 pawn with e2-e3, and first he brings out his bishop to an active position.

4 ... c5

This move is more often made after 4...0-0 5 ♘f3 d6 6 e3, but it is also perfectly possible in the given position.

5 dxc5

The present game showed that this exchange does not set Black any opening problems, and later Smyslov took to playing 5 e3.

5 ... ♗a6
6 g3
6 e4 came into consideration, and if 6...♕xc5 7 f3.

6 ... ♘xc5
7 ♗g2 d6
8 ♗e1 0-0
9 b4?

White decides to drive back the knight, but after its retreat he has to reckon with the ...a7-a5 counter. He can maintain the pawn at b4, of course, but with the rook at c1 Black advantageously opens the a-file.

9 ... ♗e6
10 ♗d2 a5!
11 a3 axb4
12 axb4 ♗d4

Now 13 ♘f3 is met by the unpleasant 13...♕xf3+ 14 ♘xf3 ♗h3, preventing castling.

13 ♗h3

Another poor move. Here the knight is out of play. It was essential to drive away the active enemy knight with 13 e3, and if 13...♕c6 to play 14 ♗d5, intending ♗c3.

13 ... ♗e6
14 ♗d5

The third mistake made by the Ex-World Champion during the space of seven opening moves. Chess truly is a difficult game!

This last error leads to defeat.

14 ... ♗xd5
15 cxd5 ♗d7!

Threatening 16...♗a4, and 16 0-0 loses the exchange to 16...♗a4 17
$\text{Kc1}$ $\text{a2}$

17 $\text{Wh1}$

And now on 17 0-0 Black wins by 17...$\text{xa4}$ 18 $\text{We1}$ $\text{xe2+}$ 19 $\text{xe2}$ $\text{xc3}$.

17 ... $\text{Wa8}$

18 $\text{xc1}$

Perhaps White was still hoping to resist after 18...$\text{xa1}$ 19 $\text{xa1}$ $\text{xc2+}$ 20 $\text{xc2}$ $\text{xa1+}$ 21 $\text{c1}$, with a rook and minor piece for the queen. But Black has a stronger continuation.

18 ... $\text{f5!}$

19 $\text{e4}$ is met by 19...$\text{xa3}$ 20 $\text{xa3}$ $\text{f3+}$. **White resigns.**

This would appear to be the only opening catastrophe in the Ex-World Champion's lengthy career.

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**Game 92**

**Zita–Junge**

**Prague 1942**

1 $\text{c4}$ $\text{f6}$

2 $\text{f3}$ $\text{g6}$

3 $\text{g3}$ $\text{g7}$

4 $\text{g2}$ 0-0

5 0-0 $\text{d6}$

6 $\text{d4}$ $\text{c6}$

Black provokes the advance of the white d-pawn, after which the scope of his bishop at $\text{g7}$ is extended. The knight will go to $\text{a5}$, which has both its positive, and negative sides. A variation that became popular in the 1960s was 7 $\text{d5}$ $\text{xa5}$ 8 $\text{xd2}$ $\text{c5}$.

7 $\text{xc3}$

White declines the offer and continues his development.

7 ... $\text{e5}$

Another plan is to put pressure on $\text{d4}$ with 7...$\text{ag4}$. If, for example, 8 $\text{h3}$, then 8...$\text{xf3}$ 9 $\text{xf3}$ $\text{d7}$ followed by 10 $\text{e3}$ $\text{e5}$ 11 $\text{d5}$ $\text{e7}$ and ...$\text{f7-f5}$.

8 $\text{dxe5}$

As in the variation from the previous note, on 8 $\text{d5}$ the knight retreats to $\text{e7}$, after which Black prepares ...$\text{f7-f5}$.

8 ... $\text{dxe5}$

Later experience showed that 8...$\text{xe5}$ 9 $\text{xe5}$ $\text{dxe5}$ is also acceptable:

(a) 10 $\text{xd8}$ $\text{xd8}$ 11 $\text{g5}$ $\text{d4}$! with equal chances (Larsen-Uhlmann, Wageningen 1957);

(b) 10 $\text{g5}$ $\text{xd1}$ 11 $\text{xd1}$ $\text{c6}$ 12 $\text{d2}$ $\text{e6}$ 13 $\text{b3}$ $\text{e8}$ 14 $\text{a4}$ $\text{g4}$! 15 $\text{c5}$ $\text{h6}$ 16 $\text{xe6}$ $\text{xe6}$ (Darga-Fischer, Bled 1961).
9 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{W}}}}xd8}

After 9 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}g5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{E}}}}}}e6 10 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{D}}}}}d5 (or 10 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{D}}}}d2 h6 11 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xf6 12 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{D}}}}d5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{G}}}}g7 13 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}e4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{D}}}}d4 14 e3 c6!, Keene-Mestrovic, Hastings 1970/1) Black defends successfully with 10...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}}xd5 11 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xf6 12 cxd5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{E}}}}e7 13 e4 c6 (Thorbergsson-Stein, Reykjavik 1972).

The exchange of queens also does not promise White any advantage.

9 \ldots \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{K}}}}xd8
10 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}g5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{G}}}}e6
11 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xf6

Otherwise, with his control of d5, Black even stands a little better.

11 \ldots \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}}xf6
12 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{D}}}}e4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{G}}}}e7
13 h3 f6
14 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}fd1 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xd1+
15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xd1 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}d8
16 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xd8+ \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xe1

This positionally justified manoeuvre of the knight to d3 suffers from a tactical defect. Looking at this simplified position, it is hard to believe that only one move by the opponent separates White from capitulation.

17 \ldots f5!

It does not matter where White moves. After both 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{E}}}}c3 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{B}}}}b4, and 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}d2 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{B}}}}b4 19 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{E}}}}~f3 e4 one of the knights is lost.

\textbf{White resigns.}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ |c|c|c|c|c|c| }
\hline
1. & d4 & e6 & d4 & c5 & e5 \\
\hline
2. & c4 & g6 & c3 & f3 & c4 \\
\hline
3. & e4 & d6 & f3 & f6 & e5 \\
\hline
4. & d5 & e5 & e4 & g5 & f3 \\
\hline
5. & e5 & f3 & d5 & g5 & g4 \\
\hline
6. & f4 & e4 & d6 & e4 & f4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{Game 93}

\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{P}}}}}orath--\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{G}}}}ligoric}

\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{N}}}}}}etanya 1965

The Classical Variation. White harmoniously deploys his forces, and for the time being avoids determining the position in the centre.

6 \ldots e5

A curious metamorphosis can occur in the event of 6...c5. If both players wish it – after 7 0-0 cxd4 8 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xd4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}c6 – play transposes into the Maroczy Variation of the Sicilian Defence.

7 0-0

Capturing twice on e5 – 7 dxe5 dxe5 8 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{W}}}}xd8 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xd8 9 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xe5? is unfavourable on account of 9...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xe4, when after 10 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xe4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}xe5 11 0-0 (11 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}g5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}d4) 11...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{A}}}}c6 Black’s pieces are more actively placed.
White can of course close the centre with 7 d5, which determines the subsequent plans for the two sides. Black will prepare active play on the kingside by moving his knight and advancing ...f7-f5, or, in the event of the bishop’s development at g5, by ...h7-h6, ...g6-g5 and ...g6-g5-f4. White’s plan is to exploit his spatial advantage on the queenside with b2-b4 and c4-c5, combined with defensive measures on the kingside.

Nowadays 7 e3 is often played, and if 7 ...g4 8 g5 f6 9 g6, or 7...h6 8 0-0 g4 9 c1.

7 ... exd4

This exchange prepares pressure on e4 and a possible counter in the centre by ...d6-d5.

The other interpretation of the Classical Variation envisages 7 ... c6, provoking 8 d5 e7, followed by the preparation of ...f7-f5 and ...f5-f4. With the centre closed, Black uses his spatial advantage on

the kingside for a pawn storm (...g7-g5-g4).

White’s plan remains the same: to prepare c4-c5, with the prospect of invading on the queenside with his heavy pieces.

8 cxd4 e8

9 f3

Defending the e4 pawn with 9 f3 leaves the bishop passively placed, while 9 wc2 fails to 9...a4 e4 10 a4 e4 e4 xd4, and if 11 g5 f6 12 ad1 fxg5 13 xd4 e5, with advantage to Black.

9 ... e6

10 f4?

The bishop is immediately forced to retreat from this seemingly active position. 10 c2 was a good continuation.

10 ... b5

11 e3 f5

12 d2

To 12 f4 Black would have replied 12...g6, with a triple attack on the e4 pawn. But now, by advancing his pawn to f4 and thereby seizing space on the kingside, Black launches an offensive.

12 ... f1

13 f2 e5

The d6 pawn is securely defended, and White’s kingside is blockaded.

14 ad1 w6

15 b3

With his last two moves White has prepared d4, in order to exchange the bishop at e5 which is hindering his counterplay.
White thought that after 18... $\text{Wh}2+ 19 \text{f}1 \text{Wh}1+ (\text{if } 19... \text{h}3 20 \text{d}3) 20 \text{g}1 \text{he would parry the threats. But Black was of the opposite opinion, and this is why.}$

18 ... $\text{f}4!$

Here, after some thought, White resigned.

The bishop cannot be taken on account of mate. Meanwhile, the threat of winning his queen (19... $\text{Wh}2+ 20 \text{f}1 \text{Wh}1+$) forces White to move it – 19 $\text{d}3$. Then comes 19...$\text{Wh}2+ 20 \text{f}1$ (perhaps the Israeli master had terminated the calculation of his sixteenth move in this position?), and the concluding tactical nuance 20...$\text{h}3! (20 \text{gxh}3 \text{g}2+)$ ends the game.

Game 94
Csom–Korchnoi
Gyula 1965

1 $d4 \text{f}6$
2 $c4 \text{g}6$
3 $d5$

This is possible, of course, but why hurry? The only reason can be to prevent the opponent from playing the Grünfeld Defence.

3 ... $\text{g}7$
4 $\text{c}3 0-0$
5 $e4 \text{d}6$
6 $\text{c}2 \text{c}6$
7 $\text{e}3 \text{a}6$

In this version of the King’s Indian Defence Black prepares the flank diversion ...b7-b5.
8 a4
This forestalls Black’s intentions.
8 ... a5
This move is made by Black in two steps. How is this to be explained?

We have here an example of the transformation of an opening plan. In playing ...c7-c6 and ...a7-a6, Black was aiming for ...b7-b5, but when White went a2-a4 this gave him the opportunity by ...a6-a5 to expose the weakness of the b4 square. And Black’s subsequent play is based on the exploitation of this weakness. This is assisted by White’s reckless preparations for a kingside attack.

9 g4 a6
10 f4
This looks active, but in fact it only weakens his position. However, Black would also have seized the initiative after 10 h4 d7 11 f3 dc5 12 d4 wb6.
10 ... d7
The king’s knight heads for c5, while at a convenient moment the queen’s knight will go to b4.

11 h4
Another ‘active’ move.

11 ... dc5
12 f3
After this the d3 square is left inadequately defended, and it is there that disaster strikes.

12 ... wb6!
How can the b2 pawn be defended?

13 we2

13 ... wxb2!
Very strong, but not as simple as it might seem.
14 wxb2 d3+
15 d2 xb2
16 e2

After c2 (or b1) the knight will have nowhere to go...

16 ... xg4!
This diverting blow frees the knight and increases Black’s material advantage (after 17 xg4 xc4+ 18 d3 xe3 he is already three pawns up; if 17 f1 the simplest is 17...cxd5 18 cxd5 ac8).

White resigns.

Grünefeld Defence

Named after the Austrian grandmaster Ernst Grünfeld, who first played 3...d5 in a game in 1922, this opening has the basic conception of allowing (or more precisely, provoking) the seizure of the centre
by White, in order to subject it to piece (...g7, ...c6) and pawn (...c7-c5) pressure.

13...d5 b4
14 b3 d7 Black has an excellent game.

13... e5
14 b3
If 14 b3, then 14...b4+.

14... d7!
The position in the centre has been stabilised, and Black prepares a counteroffensive on the queenside. On 15 xb7 he was intending 15... db8 16 a6 b4.

15 f3?
A move based on general considerations. The Philippino master overlooks a tactical threat. The combination could have been averted (although this would in no way have improved White’s position) by 15 f1.

15... b5!
16 d3 b4+!
A nice illustration of the themes of diversion and decoy.

White resigns, since he loses a bishop.
**Game 96**

Sokor–Volck

*Prague 1937*

1  d4  ♘f6
2  c4  g6
3  ♘c3  d5
4  ♗b3

This move was introduced by Botvinnik in a game with Levenfish (8th USSR Championship, Leningrad 1933). Nowadays, with the same idea in mind (pressure on d5 with the aim of seizing the centre) the move is played after 4 ♗f3 ♗g7.

4  ...  dxc4

The strongest. Defending the centre with 4...c6 allows White the better chances after 5 cxd5 cxd5 (or 5...♘xd5 6 e4) 6 ♗f3 ♗g7 7 ♗g5.

5  ♕xc4  ♘e6
6  ♘b5+

To 6 ♗d3 Black has the good reply 6...c5 7 dxc5 ♘c6. White is behind in development, and he cannot hold on to the pawn. Both after the exchange of queens, and in the event of 8 e4 ♗g7 9 ♗f3 0-0, Black has an excellent game.

6  ...  ♘c6

Boleslavsky's recommendation of 6...♘d7 is probably better:

(a) 7 ♕xb7 ♘c6 8 ♘b3 ♕xd4, when after 9 ♗f3 ♕b6 the chances are equal;

(b) 7 ♕c4, when Black can offer to repeat moves with 7...♗e6, or if he wishes continue the battle with 7...♗g7 and ...0-0;

(c) 7 ♗b3 ♘c6 8 ♗f3 ♗g7 9 e4 0-0 10 h3 (taking the b7 pawn is dangerous on account of 10...♗b8, ...♗b4 and ...c7-c5) 10...♗b8 11 ♘e3 b5 with good prospects for Black (Forintos–Adorjan, Wijk aan Zee 1971).

7  ♗f3

Not 7 ♕xb7 in view of 7...♘xd4.

7  ...  ♘d5?

8  ♕xb7?

Here too this capture is wrong.

The correct reply is 8 e4, and if 8...♗b4 9 ♕a4 (9 ♕xb7? ♘b8) 9...♗d7 10 ♕d1 e5 11 a3!, with good prospects for White (after 11...exd4 12 ♘b1! ♘a6 13 b4 ♘xb4 14 axb4 ♘xb4+ 15 ♘d2 ♕e7 16 ♘d3 the minor piece is worth more than the three pawns, Petrosian–Benko, Los Angeles 1963).

8  ...  ♕db4!

By defending the knight at c6, Black cuts off the retreat of the enemy queen. 9...♗b8 is threatened.

9  ♘f4
If 9 \( \texttt{wb5} \texttt{\land{d}7} \), while after 9 \( \texttt{\land{b}5} \texttt{\land{b}8} \! \) 10 \( \texttt{\land{xc7}+ \texttt{\land{d}7}} \) 11 \( \texttt{\land{xe6+ \texttt{\land{xe6}}}} \) the queen is lost.

9 \( \ldots \texttt{\land{h}6!} \)

9...\texttt{\land{c}2+} 10 \texttt{\land{d}2 \texttt{\land{xa1}}} 11 \texttt{\land{xc6+}} is unsatisfactory for Black, since his knight cannot escape.

But what can White play now? 10 \( \texttt{\land{xc7}} \texttt{\land{d}7} \), when the queen is trapped, while if 10 \( \texttt{\land{xc7 \texttt{\land{xc7}}} c2+} \).

10 \( \texttt{\land{xc7} \texttt{\land{xd4!}}} \)

This queen sacrifice decides the outcome.

11 \( \texttt{\land{xd8}} \)

After 11 \( \texttt{\land{xd4}} \) Black wins by 11...\texttt{\land{xd4}} 12 \texttt{\land{xa8+ \texttt{\land{d}7}}}.

11 \( \ldots \texttt{\land{dc2+}} \)

12 \texttt{\land{d1 \texttt{\land{xd8+}}} \texttt{\land{xd5}}} \texttt{\land{xf3+}}

15 \texttt{\land{xd8+ \texttt{\land{xd8}}} \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}f3 \texttt{c7}}}!

A ‘quiet’ move, after which White resigned. If 17 \texttt{\land{b1 \texttt{\texttt{e}}d8+ \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}e2 \texttt{\texttt{d}2}}} 18 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}e2 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}d8+ 19 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}e2 \texttt{\texttt{d}2}}} mate.

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**Game 97**

**V.Gurevich–Voloshin**

**Zvenigorod 1976**

1 \texttt{d4 \texttt{\texttt{e}}f6}

2 \texttt{c4 \texttt{\texttt{g}6}}

3 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}3 \texttt{\texttt{d}5}}} 4 \texttt{\texttt{f3 \texttt{\texttt{g}7}}} 5 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{g}5}}

A variation in which White does not aim to seize the centre, but continues his mobilisation.

5 \( \ldots \texttt{dxc4} \)

5...\texttt{\texttt{e}4 \texttt{6 \texttt{cxd5}}} (after 6 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}3 \texttt{\texttt{xg}5} 7 \texttt{\texttt{xg}5 \texttt{\texttt{d}x}d4}}} Black has a good game) 6...\texttt{\texttt{xg}5} 7 \texttt{\texttt{xg}5 \texttt{\texttt{e}6}} (the pawn sacrifice 7...\texttt{c6} 8 \texttt{\texttt{d}xc6 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}c6}}} 9 \texttt{\texttt{d}5 \texttt{\texttt{e}5}} is unclear) has been studied more:

(a) \texttt{8 \texttt{\texttt{f}3 \texttt{exd5}}} and then \( \ldots \texttt{0-0} \) with equal chances;

(b) \texttt{8 \texttt{\texttt{d}2 \texttt{\texttt{e}x}d5} 9 \texttt{\texttt{d}3+}, and although Black has to play 9...\texttt{\texttt{d}f8}, losing the right to castle, after 10 \texttt{\texttt{w}f4 \texttt{\texttt{c}f}6 11 \texttt{\texttt{h}4 \texttt{c}6} 12 \texttt{\texttt{b}0-0-0} \texttt{h}6 13 \texttt{\texttt{d}f3 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}6} the game is level (Spassky–Stein, 31st USSR Ch, Leningrad 1963);

(c) \texttt{8 \texttt{\texttt{d}a}4+}, when Black has the promising pawn sacrifice 8...\texttt{c6} 9 \texttt{\texttt{d}xc6 \texttt{\texttt{xc}6}} 10 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}3 \texttt{\texttt{d}7}}}.

6 \texttt{\texttt{e}3}

Or 6 \texttt{\texttt{e}4 \texttt{c}5}, when White has a choice between:

(a) \texttt{7 \texttt{d}5}, leading to great complications – 7...\texttt{b5} 8 \texttt{e}5 (if 8 \texttt{\texttt{x}f6 \texttt{\texttt{x}b5}, then 9...\texttt{\texttt{f}5}!) 8...\texttt{b4} 9 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}f}6 \texttt{\texttt{x}f}6} 10 \texttt{\texttt{w}e}2+ \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}8}} (but not 10...\texttt{\texttt{c}7} 11 \texttt{\texttt{e}4 \texttt{\texttt{f}x}g5} 12 \texttt{\texttt{d}6}! \texttt{\texttt{w}e}6 13 \texttt{\texttt{f}xg5 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}5} 14 \texttt{\texttt{f}4}) 11 \texttt{\texttt{e}3 \texttt{\texttt{b}x}c3} 12 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}c}5+ \texttt{\texttt{g}8} 13 \texttt{\texttt{b}x}c3 \texttt{\texttt{b}7} or 13...\texttt{\texttt{d}7};

(b) 7 \texttt{\texttt{x}c}4, with quieter play – 7...\texttt{\texttt{x}d}4 8 \texttt{\texttt{w}x}d4 \texttt{\texttt{x}d}4 9 \texttt{\texttt{x}d}4 \texttt{\texttt{c}6} (the exchanging operation 9...\texttt{\texttt{e}x}e4 10 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}e}4 \texttt{\texttt{x}d}4} favours White after 11 \texttt{\texttt{0-0-0}} 10 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}c}6 \texttt{\texttt{b}x}c6} 11 \texttt{\texttt{0-0}} with the better chances (Dorfman–Smyslov, Lwow 1978).

6 \( \ldots \texttt{\texttt{e}e}6 \)

7 \texttt{\texttt{e}5 \texttt{\texttt{d}5}}

After 7...\texttt{c}5 the game is level.
The move played is also acceptable: Black will answer 8 \( \mathbb{N}xc4 \) with 8...c5.

White chose this move after some deliberation. Weighing up the position after the exchanges on c3 and c4, he noticed a double attack by his opponent, but found what he thought to be an excellent reply...

\[
\begin{array}{c}
8 \quad \mathbb{N}xc4 \\
9 \quad bxc3 \quad \mathbb{N}xc4 \\
10 \quad \mathbb{N}xc4 \quad \mathbb{W}d5 \\
11 \quad \mathbb{W}f3
\end{array}
\]

White cut short his calculations after the variation 11...\( \mathbb{W}xc4 \) (11...\( \mathbb{W}xg5? \) 12 \( \mathbb{W}xb7 \) and 13 \( \mathbb{W}xa8 \)) 12 \( \mathbb{W}xb7 \), when Black cannot play 12...\( \mathbb{W}c6 \) (and otherwise the rook is lost) on account of 13 \( \mathbb{W}c8 \) mate. ‘This means’, he decided, ‘that both the bishop and the knight are indirectly defended’...

But Black had calculated further!

\[
\begin{array}{c}
11 \quad \ldots \quad \mathbb{W}xc4 \\
12 \quad \mathbb{W}xb7 \quad 0-0!
\end{array}
\]

White had not taken into account this move, which decides the game. Now, when the knight has been given up, there is no choice – he has to take the rook.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
13 \quad \mathbb{W}xa8 \quad \mathbb{N}c6! \\
(13...\( \mathbb{W}xc3+ \) 14 \( \mathbb{W}e2 \) \( \mathbb{N}c6 \) 15 \( \mathbb{W}b7 \) \( \mathbb{B}b8 \) 16 \( \mathbb{W}a6 \) \( \mathbb{B}b2+ \) 17 \( \mathbb{B}f1 \) (17 \( \mathbb{B}f3 \) \( \mathbb{N}xd4+ \)) 17...\( \mathbb{W}c2 \) White’s position is hopeless.
\end{array}
\]

But the move played is more accurate – it concludes the game immediately. After 14 \( \mathbb{W}b7 \) \( \mathbb{B}b8 \) 15 \( \mathbb{W}xc7 \) \( \mathbb{B}b2 \) mate is inevitable – 16 \( \mathbb{W}c8+ \) \( \mathbb{B}f8 \) 17 \( \mathbb{G}g4 \) \( \mathbb{W}xc3+ \) 18 \( \mathbb{B}f1 \) \( \mathbb{W}d3+ \). White resigns.
9 Other Closed Games

Queen’s Pawn Game

This is the general name given to a number of openings in which, after the initial moves 1 d4 d5 or 1...\( \mathcal{Q}f6 \), White refrains from 2 c4.

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**Game 98**
**Sangla–Karpov**
**Riga 1968**

1 d4 \( \mathcal{Q}f6 \)
2 \( \mathcal{Q}f3 \) e6
3 \( \mathcal{Q}g5 \)

The Torre Attack, named after the Mexican Carlos Torre, who employed this method of development in the 1920s.

3 ... c5
4 e3

4 e3 is more promising, with the idea after 4...\( \mathcal{W}b6 \) of sacrificing a pawn with 5 \( \mathcal{Q}bd2 \).

4 e4 is parried by 4...\( \mathcal{W}a5+ \) 5 \( \mathcal{Q}d2 \) \( \mathcal{W}b6 \).

4 ... cxd4

This variation is known from the game Marshall-Capablanca (New York 1927), in which after 4...\( \mathcal{W}b6 \) 5 \( \mathcal{W}c2 \) cxd4 6 \( \mathcal{Q}xd4 \) \( \mathcal{Q}c6 \) 7 e3 d5 8 \( \mathcal{Q}d2 \) \( \mathcal{Q}d7 \) Black achieved a comfortable game.

5 cxd4 \( \mathcal{W}b6 \)
6 \( \mathcal{W}b3 \) \( \mathcal{Q}e4 \)
7 \( \mathcal{Q}f4 \)

---

The exchange of queens by either side (at b3 or b6) would have opened the a-file for the opponent, giving good compensation for the isolating of the pawns.

7 ... \( \mathcal{Q}c6 \)
8 e3 \( \mathcal{Q}b4+ \)
9 \( \mathcal{Q}bd2 \)

The obvious move (since pieces have to be brought into play), but losing. White should have defended against the check with his other knight.

9 ... g5!

Forced, since after 10 \( \mathcal{Q}g3 \) (or 10 \( \mathcal{Q}e5 \) f6 11 \( \mathcal{Q}g3 \)) Black wins a knight by ...g5-g4.

10 ... \( \mathcal{Q}xd2+ \)

White resigns, although after 11 \( \mathcal{Q}xd2 \) it would have been worth seeing the opponent’s move (especially since at that time Karpov...
was only a young master). The point is that only 11...\textit{wa}5! wins a piece, whereas the automatic 11...\textit{dxg}5 is answered by 12 \textit{h}4!, when the knight has no retreat square.

\noindent \textbf{Game 99}  
\textbf{Chepukaitis–Yakovlev}  
\textit{Leningrad 1981}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & \textit{d}4 & \textit{d}f6 \\
2 & \textit{g}5 & d5 \\
& \textit{e}4 & \textit{h}4 \\
& d5 & f3 \\
3 & f3 & g5 \\
4 & \textit{g}xh4 & \textit{f}xe4 \\
& \textit{d}d2 & \textit{d}d2 \\
5 & \textit{x}d2 & \textit{e}xh4 \\
6 & \textit{xh} \textit{d}5 & \textit{w}xh4 \\
7 & \textit{c}3 & a5 \\
8 & f3 & c6 \\
9 & e3 & f3 \\
8 & \textit{h}3 & d3 \\
9 & g3 & c6 \\
10 & \textit{d}5 & c6 \\
11 & e4? & h5 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
& \textit{d}5 & \textit{b}5, and after 11...\textit{wb}5 12 \textit{dx}b5 \\
& & \textit{db}4 both sides had chances. \\
11 & \textit{e}4 & \textit{g}4 \\
12 & \textit{f}2? & \textit{b}4! \\
13 & \textit{g}2 & c6!
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

This move, leaving the queen \textit{en prise}, was not expected at all by White, who had reckoned only on 13...\textit{wb}5 14 \textit{dx}b5+ c6 15 \textit{a}4, defending the \textit{c}2 pawn. But now he was obliged to \textit{resign} the game: on 14 \textit{xa}5 there follows 14...\textit{xc}2+ 15 \textit{f}2 \textit{e}3 mate!, and otherwise the queen is lost.

\textbf{Dutch Defence}

In this opening Black’s set-up is aimed at an attack on the kingside. Against this an effective method of play for White is the development of his bishop at \textit{g}2, when he combines defensive measures on the
kingside with activity on the queenside, and in some lines plans e2-e4.

Game 100
Grünfeld–K.Torre
Baden Baden 1925

1 d4 e6
Black does not play 1...f5 immediately, since he wants to avoid the Staunton Gambit after 2 e4.
2 ∇f3
"You can play the Dutch Defence," White as it were says with this move. Had he wished he could have gone 2 e4, forcing his opponent to play the French.

2 ... f5
3 g3 ∇f6
4 g2 d5
5 0-0 ∇d6
6 c4 c6
7 w-c2 0-0
8 b3

8 ∇f4 also comes into consideration, in order to exchange bishops and emphasise the weakness of the e5 square (the result of Black's 'stonewall' set-up). This is what Tarrasch played against Torre in the same tournament.

8 ... ∇e4
The modern line is 8...a6 followed by ...d7 and ...e8-h5.
9 b2 ∇d7
10 e5 w-f6
11 f3 ∇xe5?
The question mark is attached to a move, after which Black... instantly crushed his opponent. As becomes clear from the comments below, he should have played his knight to g5, after which 12 ∇d3, preparing e2-e4, would nevertheless have left White with a slight initiative.

12 dxe5?
A mistake in reply. The Austrian grandmaster overlooks a tactical nuance. He assumed that he was winning a piece: 12...xex5 13 xex5 wxe5 14 fxe4, since if Black takes the rook he loses his queen (14...wxa1 15 c3). And after 12...c5+ 13 h1 both queen and knight remain en prise...

12 ... ∇c5+
13 h1

In this position Grünfeld cut short his calculations, imagining that Black was bound to lose material. This would have been so, had it not been for:

13 ... ∇xg3+!
After 14 hgxg3 Black mates by 14...w-h6+. White resigns.
And now let us return to the position in which White incorrectly played 12 dxe5.

Disregarding the attacked knights, let us play 12 c5! White is a piece down, but three of the opponent’s pieces are attacked.

After 12...c7 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 xxe5 wxe5 15 fxe4 White wins a knight as in the note to his 12th move, since on 15...wa1 there follows 16 cc3.

12...wh6 13 cc1! dg5 14 cxd6 dg6 15 h4 xhx4 16 gxh4 wh4 17 xg5 w5xg5 18 f4! also favours White – here too he is a knight up.

12...f7 13 fxe4 ce7 is the only way to maintain material equality, but then 14 exd5 cxd5 15 e4! leads to a clear advantage for White.

Game 101
Litvinov–Veresov
Minsk 1958

1 e4  f5
2 d4  g6
3 c3  e6
4 f3  b4

After this the play takes on features typical of certain variations of the Nimzo-Indian and Queen’s Indian Defences.

5 c2  0-0
6 e3  b6
7 c2  b7
8 0-0 xc3
9 wxc3 e4
10 w2  f6

White has played the opening passively and now faces serious problems. 11...h6 and...g7-g5 is threatened.

Firstly, instead of 6 e3 it was worth fianchettoing the king’s bishop, which would have opposed the bishop at b7 (e.g. 6 g3 b6 7 g2 b7 8 0-0).

Secondly, instead of 7 cc2 and 8 0-0 it was much safer to play 7 dd3, and if 7...b7 8 dd2, planning to castle on the queenside.

11 dd2  h6
12 g3

White assumed that now the enemy queen would not be able to go to h4.

On 12 f4 there would have followed 12...xd2 13 wxd2 (or 13 xd2) 13 wh4 14 h3 xg2. It was essential to play 12 f3.

12... w4!

On 13 gxh4 there follows
13...g6+ 14 h1 xf2 mate!
13 f3 d4!!
The queen cannot be taken with the knight on account of 14...\( \text{g} \text{h}3 \) mate.

Therefore 14 g\( \text{g} \text{h}4 \) \( \text{g} \text{xf}3 \) is forced:

(a) 15 \( \text{g} \text{h}1 \) \( \text{x} \text{xd}4 \) and 16...\( \text{g} \text{xc}2 \);

(b) 15 \( \text{g} \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{g} \text{g}6+ \) 16 \( \text{g} \text{g}2 \) \( \text{x} \text{g}2+ \) 17 \( \text{g} \text{h}1 \) \( \text{x} \text{f}2+ \) 18 d5 \( \text{g} \text{xc}2 \), and wins;

(c) 15 \( \text{g} \text{g}2 \) \( \text{g} \text{e}1+ \) 16 \( \text{g} \text{g}3 \) (after 16 \( \text{g} \text{h}3 \) \( \text{g} \text{g}2+ \) 17 \( \text{g} \text{g}3 \) \( \text{g} \text{g}6+ \) 18 \( \text{g} \text{f}4 \) \( \text{x} \text{xc}2 \) White is a rook down), and White gets mated – 16...\( \text{g} \text{g}6+ \) 17 \( \text{f}4 \) (17 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{g} \text{g}2 \) mate) 17...\( \text{g} \text{g}2+ \) 18 \( \text{e}5 \) d6 mate.

These variations remained ‘off-stage’ – White resigned.

The attack carried out by Black is a typical one, as can be seen from the following two games.

**Ekstein-Laes**

*Tallinn 1956*

1 d4 f5 2 c4 \( \text{g} \text{f}6 \) 3 \( \text{c} \text{c}3 \) e6 4 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 5 \( \text{w} \text{c}2 \) c5 6 e3 b6 7 \( \text{d} \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b} \text{b}7 \) 8 \( \text{e}2 \) 0-0 9 a3

An unnecessary move, since all the same Black’s plan includes exchanging on c3 in order to control e4.

9...\( \text{g} \text{xc}3 \) 10 \( \text{x} \text{xc}3 \) \( \text{e} \text{e}4 \) 11 0-0 \( \text{f} \text{f}6 \) 12 \( \text{d} \text{d}2 \)

On 12 \( \text{ad}1 \), with the aim of neutralising the dangerous bishop after 12...\( \text{h} \text{h}6 \) 13 d5, there could have followed 13...g5. A spectacular variation would be 14 dxe6 g4 15 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{h} \text{h}4 \) 16 h3 gxh3 17 exd7 \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{f}2+ \) 18 \( \text{w} \text{xf}2 \) h2+, and mate next move.

12...\( \text{g} \text{h}6 \)

13 g3

13 \( \text{f} \text{f}3 \) would not have defended the king in view of 13...\( \text{w} \text{h}4 \) 14 h3 \( \text{g} \text{g}5! \) 15 \( \text{xb}7 \) \( \text{x} \text{h}3+ \) 16 gxh3 \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{h}3 \), mating, while if 13 h3, then 13...\( \text{x} \text{d}2 \) 14 \( \text{w} \text{x} \text{d}2 \) (or 14 \( \text{x} \text{d}2 \) 14...\( \text{x} \text{g}2 \) 15 \( \text{x} \text{g}2 \) \( \text{g} \text{g}5+ \) 16 \( \text{h} \text{h}2 \) \( \text{w} \text{h}4 \) 17 \( \text{g} \text{g}4 \) \( \text{f} \text{x} \text{g}4 \).

13...\( \text{x} \text{d}2 \) 14 \( \text{x} \text{d}2 \) \( \text{w} \text{h}4! \)

A familiar picture. White resigns.
And here is a ‘senior twin’, the game Wagner-Scheps (Magdeburg 1954): 1 d4 e6 2 c4 f5 3 Qf3 Qb4+ 4 c3 Qf6 5 e3 0-0 6 Qd3 b6 7 0-0 Qxc3 8 bxc3 Qb7 9 Qe2 Qe4 10 Qc2 Qf6 11 Qd2 Qh6 12 g3 Qxd2 13 Qxd2 Qh4 14 Qh5 Qxh2+ 15 Qxh2 Qxh5+ 16 Qg1 Qh1 mate.

**English Opening**

This opening is distinguished by the diversity and flexibility of its strategic plans, and for the numerous possible transpositions into other openings. Played by Staunton in his match with Saint-Amant in 1843, it is nowadays to be found in the repertoires (with White or with Black) of nearly all players, from participants in club tournaments to World Champions.

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1 e4 Qf6
2 Qc3 e6
3 e4 c5
4 f4

This is considered harmless. A problematic variation begins 4 e5 Qg8 5 d4 (also interesting is the pawn sacrifice 5 Qf3 Qc6 6 d4 cxd4 7 Qxd4 Qxe5, and now 8 Qdb5, 8 Qf4 or 8 Qa4) 5...cxd4 6 Qxd4 Qc6 7 Qe4 d6 or 7...f5.

Which knight is more of a danger to White?

9 a3?

This only defends against the threat of ...Qf5. It is not known how Botvinnik was intending to reply to 9 h3.

9 ... c4
10 \textit{a4}+ \textit{d7}
11 \textit{d1} \textit{b6}!

Now 12 \textit{e2} is met not by 12...
\textit{c2}+ and 13...\textit{xa1} (which, however, is not bad), but 12...\textit{d3}+ 13
\textit{d1} \textit{b3} mate, while if 12 d4 \textit{xd}3 13 \textit{d2} \textit{c2}+.

\textbf{White resigns.}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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\textbf{Game 103} & \\
Bobotsov–Larsen & \\
Büsum 1969 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

1 \textit{c4} \textit{f6}
2 \textit{c3} \textit{e6}
3 \textit{f3} \textit{b4}
4 \textit{g3}

4 d4 would have led to a position from the Nimzo-Indian Defence.
4 ... 0-0
5 \textit{g2} \textit{d5}
6 0-0

And here 6 a3 would have led after 6...\textit{e7} 7 d4 to a position from the Catalan Opening, with the extra
move for White a2-a3, which is of no significance.

6 ... dxc4
7 \textit{a4}

This is how White acts in the Catalan Opening, but there it leads to him restoring material equality.

7 ... \textit{a6}

Other moves also came into consideration: 7...\textit{c6} (if, for example, 8 \textit{e5}, then 8...\textit{xe5} 9 \textit{x}4 \textit{d6!}) and 7...a5.

8 a3 \textit{d7}
9 \textit{b5}

The pin on the a4-e8 diagonal is more than dangerous, but after 9
\textit{xc2} \textit{d6} the pawn cannot be regained.

9 ... \textit{e8}
10 \textit{fd4}

White had the possibility of restoring material equality by 10
\textit{xc7} \textit{xa4} 11 \textit{xe8}, but after 11...
\textit{e7} 12 \textit{xf6}+ \textit{xf6} Black would have gained an overwhelming positional advantage.

White also has an unsatisfactory position in the variation 10 axb4
\textit{xb5} 11 \textit{a5} \textit{d5}.

10 ... \textit{e5}!

This diverts White's pieces to the queenside, after which his kingside is left undefended.

11 \textit{xb7}

There is nothing else.

11 ... exd4
12 \textit{xa6}

Perhaps White was hoping that the attacked bishop would retreat?..
Now on 13 \( \text{Ke1} \) Black would have continued his attack with 13...\( \text{Wc6} \) 14 \( f3 \) \( \text{Ac5} \) 15 \( \text{Wxc4} \) d3+ 16 \( \text{Oh1} \) \( \text{Ae8} \) with irresistible threats.

White could have avoided the destructive attack by giving up the exchange with 13 \( \text{Ac3} \), which would still have demanded some technical effort on the part of Black.

13 \( \text{axb4?} \)

Evidently White was counting on 13...\( \text{Wxe2} \) 14 \( \text{Wd1} \).

13... \( \text{We4!} \)

14 \( \text{Ab7} \)

Desperation, since on 14 \( f3 \) there follows 14...\( \text{Wxe2} \) 15 \( \text{Af2} \) \( \text{We1+} \).

14... \( \text{Wxb7} \)

15 \( f3 \) \( \text{Ad7} \)

From poetry to prose: the knight is lost, and so White resigned.

### Réti Opening

Introduced by Richard Réti in 1923, this opening has the aim of putting pressure on the centre without first occupying it with pawns. A characteristic feature of White’s set-up is the fianchettto of one and sometimes both his bishops. Many players are attracted by its strategical flexibility, transpositions being possible into other openings such as the Catalan, Queen’s Gambit and Queen’s Indian Defence.

1 \( \text{Df3} \) \( \text{d5} \)

2 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{d4} \)

Accepting the offer to seize space in the centre. An alternative is 2...\( \text{dxc4} \), when, in analogy with variations from the Queen’s Gambit Accepted, the time spent by White on regaining his pawn is used by Black for development.

3 \( \text{e3} \)

White undermines the outpost. In modern tournaments 3 \( \text{g3} \) or 3 \( \text{b4} \) is more often played.

3... \( \text{Ac6} \)

4 \( \text{exd4} \) \( \text{Axd4} \)

5 \( \text{Ad4} \) \( \text{Wxd4} \)

6 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e5} \)

7 \( \text{Ac3} \) \( \text{Ag4} \)

An instructive mistake was made by Black in the game Judovic-Bokić (Yugoslavia 1960). With the aim of fixing the backward \( \text{d3} \) pawn, he played 7...\( \text{c5} \)?, but the weakness of the \( \text{d5} \) square allowed White to exploit the position of the queen in the centre: 8 \( \text{Dd5} \) \( \text{Ad6} \) 9 \( \text{Ac2} \) \( \text{Ae7} \) 10 \( \text{Ac3} \! \) The threat is 11 \( \text{Ab5} \), and on 10...\( \text{a6} \) there follows 11 \( \text{Ae4} \) with the threat of 12 \( \text{Ae3} \).

8 \( \text{Wb3} \) \( \text{Wb6} \)

9 \( \text{Dd5} \)

With the idea after 9...\( \text{Wxb3} \) 10 \( \text{axb3} \) of creating unpleasant pressure on the queenside.

9... \( \text{C6} \)

10 \( \text{d4} \)

A little trap: 10...\( \text{exd4} \) is met by 11 \( \text{g3} \! \) with a double attack. However, the opening of the central files proves to be in Black’s favour.
10 \ldots 0-0-0!
11 dxe5 $\Box e7$

The knight cannot be maintained at d5, but as soon as it leaves its post Black’s lead in development will tell.

12 $\Box e3$

12 \ldots $\Box f5$!

13 $\Box xf5$?

This loses immediately. The threat of 13...$\Box d4$ was very strong, and White thought it best to eliminate the dangerous knight.

It should be mentioned that the acceptance of the bishop sacrifice would also not have saved White: 13 $\Box xg4$ $\Box d4$ 14 $\Box d1$ $\Box b4+$ 15 $\Box d2$ $\Box e4+$ (already it is possible to win the queen – 15...$\Box xd2+$ 16 $\Box xd2$ $\Box f3+$ 17 $\Box xf3$ $\Box xd2$ 18 $\Box xd2$ $\Box xf3$ or 18...$\Box d8+$) 16 $\Box e3$ $\Box c6$.

Now, however, mate in two moves follows.

13 \ldots $\Box b4+$

White resigns
prepared b2-b4 with 9 a3 followed by ♗bd2 and ♗b1, or with 9 ♗a3 and ♗c2.

He could also have considered the immediate 9 b4 (9...♕xb4 10 ♗a4+ ♗c6 11 ♕e5).

9 ... 0-0
10 b4 ♗d7!

After the advance of the b-pawn or its exchange the knight will comfortably settle at c5.

11 ♗bd2 a5
12 ♗a3?

12 bxa5 would have been advantageously answered by 12...♕c5, and 12 b5 by 12...♕b4 and then ...♕c5.

The move in the game illustrates yet again the theme of the queen perishing in the enemy camp.

![Chess Diagram]

12 ... axb4!
13 ♗xa8 ♗b6

White resigns

This incident took place in the meeting between the leaders of the Italian and USA teams.

---

**Bird Opening**

**Game 106**

**Bird–Steinlitz**

*Match, London 1866*

1 f4

Named after Henry Bird, one of the strongest English players in the second half of the 19th century, this opening often leads (after 1...d5) to positions from the Dutch Defence with colours reversed and an extra tempo for White. Although strategically correct, it nevertheless gives White less chance of taking the initiative than the traditional closed games.

1 ... e5
2 fxe5

If White wishes he can transpose into the King’s Gambit with 2 e4.

2 ... d6
3 exd6 ♗xd6
4 ♕f3

The basic position of the From Gambit. White’s kingside, where the f2 pawn is missing, comes under an attack in which an active role is played by the bishop at d6.

4 ... ♗c6

Other problematic continuations are 4...g5 (Lasker) and 4...♕f6 (Schlechter). However, these recommendations belong to later times.

5 d4 ♗f6
6 ♗g5 ♗g4
7 e3 ♗d7
8 ♗b5
8  \text{\textcopyright} c3 is better.
8 \ldots 0-0-0
For the sacrificed pawn Black has achieved a strong position: he is splendidly developed, and the e3 pawn, situated on an open file, is weak.

9  \text{\textcopyright} xf6
White is tempted by the possibility of attacking the pinned knight (if immediately 9 d5, then 9...\text{\textcopyright} xd5 10 \text{\textcopyright} xd8 \text{\textcopyright} xe3 and 11...\text{\textcopyright} xd8 with an overwhelming position.
Here too he should have played 9  \text{\textcopyright} c3.

9 \ldots  gxf6
10 d5?
He should have castled.

11 \ldots  \text{\textcopyright} xe3+
12  \text{\textcopyright} e2
12 \text{\textcopyright} f1 would have been answered by 12...\text{\textcopyright} xf3 13 gxf3 (13 \text{\textcopyright} xf3 \text{\textcopyright} c1+) 13...\text{\textcopyright} c5.
12 \ldots  \text{\textcopyright} c1+
13  \text{\textcopyright} d1  \text{\textcopyright} de8+
14 \text{\textcopyright} xe8  \text{\textcopyright} xe8+
15  \text{\textcopyright} f2  \text{\textcopyright} e3+
16  \text{\textcopyright} f1  \text{\textcopyright} xf3
17 gxf3
Or 17 \text{\textcopyright} xf3 \text{\textcopyright} e1 mate.
17 \ldots  \text{\textcopyright} c5
18  \text{\textcopyright} g2  \text{\textcopyright} g8+
White resigns

\textbf{Sokolsky Opening}

\textbf{Game 107}
\textbf{Chubukin–Saplinov}
\textit{Correspondence 1965/6}

1 b4
The modern understanding of this unusual opening is associated with Alexei Sokolsky, who played it in dozens of games against top-class opponents in tournaments before and after the war. The basic idea is to seize space on the queenside, while simultaneously exerting pressure on the central squares.

1 \ldots  \text{\textcopyright} f6
2 \text{\textcopyright} b2  g6
Black builds up his position along the lines of the King’s Indian Defence.
3 c4  \text{\textcopyright} g7
4 e4
With his pawns already advanced to b4 and c4, White would do better to restrict himself to the modest 4 \( \triangle f3 \) and e2-d3, or 4 d3 followed by g2-g3.

4 \ldots d6
5 \( \triangle f3 \) e5
6 d4

Four in a row! It was not yet too late for 6 d3.

6 \ldots exd4
7 \( \mathcal{W}xd4 \) \( \triangle c6 \)
8 \( \mathcal{W}c3 \) 0-0
9 b5 \( \triangle e5 \)
10 \( \mathcal{W}c2 \)

The long diagonal, on which White had deployed his queen, has begun to work for the opponent. Therefore he should have blocked it with 10 \( \triangle x e5 \) dxe5 11 f3.

10 \ldots \( \mathcal{H}e8 \)
11 \( \triangle x e5 \) \( \triangle x e4! \)

White has not managed to castle, and the opening of the c-file proves decisive after both 12 \( \mathcal{W}xe4 \) (if 12 \( \triangle d3 \) \( \triangle g3+ \)) 12...\( \mathcal{H}xe5 \), and the move in the game.

12 \( \triangle xf7 \)

12 \ldots \( \mathcal{W}h4! \)
13 \( \triangle xd6 \) \( \mathcal{W}xf2+ \)
14 \( \triangle xe8 \) \( \triangle d3+! \)
15 \( \mathcal{H}d2 \) \( \mathcal{W}e1+ \)

White resigns, without waiting for 16 \( \mathcal{H}d3 \) f5 mate.
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It is much harder to win quickly with the black rather than the white pieces since White has the advantage of the first move. Russian master Iakov Neishtadt shows you how to score quick victories with Black in this instructive and entertaining book, which will set every attacking player on the path to opening success. A companion volume, Winning Quickly with White, also translated by Ken Neat, is available from Cadogan.